UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1013

September Term, 2013

_________________________

MICHAEL CAMERON KARMANN

v.

SUZANNE MARIE KARMANN

_________________________

Krauser, C.J.,

Nazarian,

Leahy,

JJ.

_________________________

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

_________________________

Filed: November 3, 2014

Michael Cameron Karmann (“Husband”) and Suzanne Marie Karmann (“Wife”)

appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, from a Judgment of Absolute Divorce issued July 8,

2013 (“the Judgment”) by the Circuit Court for Harford County. Each appeals from the

court’s award of alimony to Wife, and Husband appeals as well from a monetary award

and award of counsel fees the court granted to Wife. Both sides agree that the awards

should be vacated, but for different reasons. We agree as well and remand for further

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are largely undisputed.1 Husband and Wife were married March 20, 1982,

in a religious ceremony in Baltimore City, and both are devout Christians. They had three

children, all now past the age of majority. Over the course of the marriage, Husband

assumed the role of primary breadwinner and Wife was primary caretaker, though each

party contributed in both respects. The circuit court described the parties’ lifestyle to “have

been solidly middle class.” This is a reasonable characterization, but the record

demonstrates a lifestyle that climbed steadily. At the time of divorce, Husband’s most

recent end-of-year paystub from Honeywell showed a pre-tax income of $114,434.30.

Wife is an Accounts Representative at Mechanical Contractors, a salaried position that paid

1 Wife’s Brief “concurs with the Statement of Facts” presented in Husband’s Brief before

adding a handful of clarifications.

2

$42,266.00.2 Wife also earned income through her own cleaning business; she grossed

$9,195.00 in receipts in 2012, but had earned more in earlier years.

Husband and Wife hit more than one rough patch in their marriage, primarily

because of disputes arising from Husband’s relationships with female classmates and co-

workers. The circuit court stopped short of classifying these relationships as “adultery.”

But in one instance, Husband did find someone who, in the court’s words, “supplanted

[Wife] as his confidant,” and in so doing “supplant[ed] whatever emotional intimacy” he

may have had with her. In another instance, Husband became close with a woman, Ms.

Dimemmo, who was allegedly having financial troubles. Husband forged Wife’s signature

on a form so he could withdraw funds from one of their retirement accounts and loan the

money to Ms. Dimemmo without Wife’s knowledge. The money was repaid, but Wife’s

trust was shaken, ultimately irreparably.

Husband and Wife separated briefly after some of Husband’s indiscretions; after

Husband returned to the marital home, the reunion was short-lived. Husband and Wife

permanently separated on March 30, 2012, after which cohabitation and sexual relations

ceased for good. The circuit court issued a decision divorcing the two on April 25, 2013.

2 Wife claims, however, that this figure will fall to roughly $38,000 once she is no longer

covered under Husband’s health insurance policy.

3

As part of its ruling, the circuit court granted Wife alimony that it characterized as

“rehabilitative alimony” defined not by a term of years, but that continues until Husband

retires:

I did take a look in terms of—in terms of the ability to provide

some sort of alimony. I do believe that [Wife] has really

looked forward into the future, which is what the Court of

Appeals requires the Court and the statute requires the Court to

do, look prospectively, not retrospectively, in making the

alimony determination. I cannot say that indefinite alimony is

appropriate in this matter, but I also cannot say that a period of

three years of rehabilitative alimony is appropriate either.

In this case, looking at the factors of [Wife’s] ability to at least

be able to earn the income that she currently has, which will

decrease as she even gets maybe even one or two years older

because of her inability to continue to clean houses, and

[Husband’s] ability to go further in his career in this case and

his ability to enjoy some of the things that they thought they

would be enjoying as a couple, in this case, it is about allowing

[Wife] the opportunity to be more self-supporting.

So I can’t say that this is an indefinite alimony case, but it’s

also not a three-year rehabilitative alimony case looking at all

of these factors and using the Court’s discretion.

What I am going to do is award [Wife] alimony in the amount

of $1,500 a month effective May 1, 2013, until [Husband]

retires. I do think that given her ability, her earning potential,

which will slowly decrease as she gets older, and the fact that

what she has is a job and not a career, and the fact that

[Husband] is in a career that will allow his income to increase;

also given his ability to earn bonuses in this case, he has the

ability to meet his own needs while meeting [Wife’s] needs

until he retires, and then when the parties—and also the fact

that [Wife] will now have a car payment and also has to buy a

home. She is sitting on a great sum of money in this case, but

she’s going to have to buy a home rather than just using it to

4

cover deficits every month, that that will allow her to also

become more wholly self-supporting in this case.

So based on all of the factors, including the award, the

monetary award that I have made, I do find that 1,500 a month

effective May 1, 2013, until [Husband] retires is rehabilitative

alimony that will allow [Wife] to be able to wholly support

herself.

The court also granted Wife a monetary award that included an even split of the

parties’ four retirement accounts.3 From the bench, the court valued the four retirement

accounts at the values listed in the Amended Joint Statement of Marital Property and Non-

Marital Property (the “Joint Statement”)4 submitted by the parties. Finally, the court

granted Wife one-half of the marital portion of Husband’s pension, one vehicle, and

attorney’s fees of $4,785.00.

After the ruling, the court asked on the record for a “volunteer” to draft the Order.

Wife’s counsel volunteered, and Husband’s counsel did not object. In the following weeks,

3 Husband had already bought Wife’s share of the marital home; the “great sum of money”

referenced in the block quote is the proceeds from the buyout, funds that the parties and

the court expected Wife would use to buy a new home after the dust settled.

4 A Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and Non-Marital Property and an

Amended Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and Non-Marital Property were

submitted to the circuit court listing identical property and values, including the values for

all four retirement accounts. The record suggests that an administrative mix-up is the only

reason two statements were submitted instead of one. One of the statements contains the

signature of Wife’s counsel, and the other contains the signature of Husband’s counsel, but

the documents are otherwise identical. Counsel made clear on the record that the

Statements were meant to show agreement between the parties as to the property values,

and the Statements were collectively accepted into evidence as Joint Exhibit 1.

5

however, each counsel sent correspondence to the court with a proposed judgment. Despite

the court’s ruling, counsel could not agree about the value of the monetary award.

Husband’s counsel argued that the circuit court had valued the assets in the retirement

accounts at the amounts indicated on the Joint Statement, and that that was the end of the

inquiry. Wife’s counsel argued that Maryland law required the accounts to be valued at

their market value on the date of ruling.

The court responded in writing, explaining that—contrary to its ruling—it would

sign Wife’s proposed judgment, which valued the assets at their market value on the date

of ruling without listing the value in dollar terms. The court said this approach would allow

the “Plan Administrators” to determine the value of the assets as of the date of divorce: “I

do not believe that it is necessary to include the sum certain in the judgment itself unless

the [Qualified Domestic Relations Order, (“QDRO”)] is to be signed by this court

contemporaneously.” Wife’s proposed judgment did not, however, explain that the “Plan

Administrators” would value the accounts. Rather, the proposed judgment—later the

Judgment—ordered only that “the Parties shall each receive by way of a [QDRO] one-half

of the marital portion of the total retirement assets...” The Judgment otherwise resolved

the issues of alimony, property, and attorney’s fees consistent with the court’s ruling of

April 25, 2013.

Although she won the battle of the proposed judgments, Wife filed a Motion to

Reconsider on July 22, 2013, arguing that she was entitled to indefinite alimony rather than

the rehabilitative-alimony-until-retirement the court awarded. Husband first filed a timely

6

Notice of Appeal from the Judgment on July 31, 2013, then filed his Answer to Motion to

Reconsider on August 2, 2013, which the circuit court appears to have treated also as a

cross-motion to reconsider. Husband asked that Wife’s Motion be denied and argued that

the alimony payments should be limited to a period of no more than three years. Both

Wife’s Motion and Husband’s Answer were denied on August 7, 2013. Wife filed her own

Notice of Appeal from the Judgment on August 21, 2013.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the parties essentially re-hash their correspondence and respective

motions to reconsider. We are presented with three questions:

1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by awarding

rehabilitative alimony to Wife?

2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by failing to list an

explicit figure for the monetary award in the Judgment?

3. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by awarding Wife

attorneys’ fees?5

5 Husband’s Brief phrases the questions presented as follows:

I. Did the lower court err when it granted Appellee alimony until Appellant

retired after finding Appellee was economically self-sufficient and

indefinite alimony was not supported by the evidence?

II. Did the lower court abused [sic] its discretion in not ordering, in the

Judgment of Divorce, that Appellee was to receive $96,545.02 to equalize

the non-pension marital assets in the Amended Joint Statement of Marital

Property?

III. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in the award of legal fees to

Appellee?

7

Both parties agree that the alimony award should be vacated, but for different

reasons. On the one hand, Husband contends that the court could not award rehabilitative

alimony because Wife was self-sufficient at the time of divorce, nor indefinite alimony

because the disparity in the parties’ standards of living was not unconscionable. He also

argues that the court erred by failing to state the value of the monetary award granted in

the Judgment and failed to consider the respective financial positions of the parties when

it granted Wife attorney’s fees. On the other hand, Wife argues that the court in fact

granted her indefinite alimony and erred only by having the award terminate at all. She

also argues that the monetary award and award of attorney’s fees were proper exercises of

the court’s discretion.

We agree with the parties that the alimony award must be vacated, and we reach

that conclusion because the circuit court’s findings do not track its decision. Although the

alimony award did have a nominal endpoint, we agree with Wife that an alimony award

tied to Husband’s retirement is indefinite in nature, notwithstanding the court’s apparent

intention not to award classic indefinite alimony. But we also agree with Husband that in

justifying that award, the court considered and applied the factors underlying rehabilitative

alimony. This disconnect requires us to vacate the award and remand for further

proceedings, which in turn requires us vacate the monetary award and attorney’s fees. We

Wife combined her Reply and Cross Appeal into one document and submitted the same

“Questions Presented” as Husband, word-for-word.

8

decline, however, both sides’ invitations to order one form of alimony or the other—we

leave it to the circuit court to decide and to make the findings that support its decision.

In a divorce proceeding, alimony, monetary awards, and awards of attorney’s fees

are all areas where circuit courts are afforded broad discretion. Wallace v. Wallace, 290

Md. 265, 282 (1981) (“[T]he chancellor, faced in each case with a unique factual predicate,

is vested with wide discretion in his decision whether to award alimony and if so, in what

amount.”); Hart v. Hart, 169 Md. App. 151, 160-61 (2006) (“[W]hen deciding whether to

make [a monetary] award, the court has broad discretion to reach an equitable result.”)

(citation omitted); Richards v. Richards, 166 Md. App. 263, 285 (2005) (“An award of

attorneys’ fees rests in the court's sound discretion.”). We review all three for abuse of

discretion. Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 196 (2004) (“An alimony award will not

be disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge's discretion was arbitrarily used

or the judgment below was clearly wrong... We review the amount of the alimony itself

under an abuse of discretion standard.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis

in original); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492, 521 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate

decision regarding whether to grant a monetary award, and the amount of such an award,

is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”) (citations omitted); Richards, 166 Md. App.

at 285. A judge abuses his or her discretion by failing to exercise it, Barufaldi v. Ocean

City Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 196 Md. App. 1, 36 (2010), failing to consider the proper

legal standard when reaching a decision, Wilson-X v. Dept. of Human Resources, 403 Md.

9

667, 675-76 (2008), or by acting “in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Garg v. Garg, 393

Md. 225, 238 (2006) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96 (2003)).

A. The Circuit Court’s Findings Do Not Track The Ultimate

Alimony Award.

The alimony award in this case—$1,500 from Husband to Wife per month effective

May 1, 2013, until Husband retires—suffers from a fatal identity crisis. Although his

position softened somewhat at oral argument in this Court, Husband contended in his brief

that Wife is not entitled to alimony at all. He cites most heavily from Karmand v. Karmand,

145 Md. App. 317 (2002), particularly dicta regarding rehabilitative alimony, for the

proposition that rehabilitative alimony is only appropriate where the party seeking it is not

self-supporting, and he argues that Wife was self-supporting. He also cites Karmand and

Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317 (2007), to argue that neither “a mere

difference in earnings” nor wrongdoing on the part of the payor spouse can justify

indefinite alimony. Wife argues that the court should have awarded indefinite alimony

rather than rehabilitative alimony. She cites Ware v. Ware, 131 Md. App. 207 (2000), for

the proposition that “the greater the disparity [between the parties’ post-divorce incomes],

the more likely that it will be found to be unconscionable.”

At the threshold, a court has “discretion to award no alimony, rehabilitative alimony,

or, upon a proper finding of unconscionable disparity, indefinite alimony.” Whittington,

172 Md. App. at 339-40. Rehabilitative alimony “is intended to ease the transition from

dependence to self-support.” Turner v. Turner, 147 Md. App. 350, 387 (2002). It “requires

10

periodic payments that terminate upon either the expiration of the definite duration, death

of either spouse, or the marriage of the recipient spouse and remains subject to modification

until terminated.” McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 351 (1984). Indefinite alimony is

just what the name suggests—alimony “for an indefinite period.” Md. Code (1984, 2012

Repl. Vol.), §11-106(c) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). It is appropriate in “cases where

it is either impractical for the dependent spouse to become self-supporting, or in cases

where the dependent spouse will become self-supporting but still a gross inequity will

exist.” Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md. App. 132, 141 (1999). Importantly, indefinite

alimony is not literally ‘indefinite’; unless the parties agree otherwise, the obligation

terminates on the death of either party, remarriage of the recipient, or if “the court finds

that termination is necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result.” FL §11-108; see also

Bradley v. Bradley, 214 Md. App. 229, 235 (2013), reconsideration denied October 31,

2013. Rehabilitative alimony is favored over indefinite alimony. Blaine v. Blaine, 336

Md. 49, 68 (1994); see also Solomon, 383 Md. at 194 (“It is well settled in Maryland that

the ‘statutory scheme generally favors fixed-term or so-called rehabilitative alimony,’

rather than indefinite alimony”) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 (1992)). This

preference comes from “the conviction that the purpose of alimony is not to provide a

lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from the joint

married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.”

Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 336 (quoting Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App. 591, 605

(2005)).

11

The same twelve factors drive the analysis for both types of alimony. 6

FL §11-106(b). But before awarding indefinite alimony, a court must find either that

6 Before awarding alimony, a court must weigh:

(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or

partly self-supporting;

(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain

sufficient education or training to enable that party to find

suitable employment;

(3) the standard of living that the parties established during

their marriage;

(4) the duration of the marriage;

(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party

to the well-being of the family;

(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of

the parties;

(7) the age of each party;

(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;

(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to

meet that party's needs while meeting the needs of the party

seeking alimony;

(10) any agreement between the parties;

(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party,

including:

(i) all income and assets, including property that does

not produce income;

(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this

article;

(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations

of each party; and

12

(1) Due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking

alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial

progress toward becoming self-supporting; or

(2) Even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much

progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably

be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties

will be unconscionably disparate.

FL §11-106(c). Whether an unconscionable disparity exists “is a finding of fact, reviewed

under a clearly erroneous standard.” Solomon, 383 Md. at 196. A finding of a trial court

is not clearly erroneous if there is “competent or material evidence in the record to support

the court’s conclusion.” Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996).

In this case, and as Husband and Wife suggest in their respective briefs, the circuit

court effectively awarded indefinite alimony even though it labeled the award as

rehabilitative alimony. We say “effectively” because the fact that the alimony payments

“continue until the retirement of [Husband]” seems at first blush to establish an endpoint.

But that “limit” is still indefinite because nobody knows when Husband will retire: he

could work for years to come, but nothing stops him from retiring tomorrow if he chooses.

(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement

benefits; and

(12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident

of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-

General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become

eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise

occur.

FL §11-106(b).

13

Put another way, the duration of alimony is capped only by the extent of Husband’s

ambition7 and the limits of medical science, not by Wife’s economic self-sufficiency.

In supporting its alimony award, however, the circuit court did not make either of

the prerequisite findings. The court hinted at the differences in the parties’ relative post-

divorce economic condition—the court found, for example, that Wife’s earning potential

will “decrease as she gets older,” and that Wife has a “job and not a career,” that Wife will

now have a car payment, and will also have to buy a home, that Wife has used house

proceeds to cover monthly “deficits,” and that Wife “enjoys a negative balance [on her

financial statement]... to the tune of a little over $1,700 [per month].” The court contrasted

Wife’s expenses and opportunities with those of Husband, who the court found “is in a

career that will allow his income to increase,” and has the “ability to earn bonuses,” and

found that Husband “makes significantly more [than Wife], and he enjoys a positive

balance on his financial statement.” The court found as well Husband’s actions—and

Husband’s only—“contributed to the estrangement of the parties” a factor bearing on

whether or not to award indefinite alimony award under FL §11-106(b). As we have held

before, a finding of unconscionable disparity is “fact intensive, case by case” and “founded

on notions of equity.” Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 339 (quoting Karmand, 145 Md. App.

at 338). These findings could be read as laying a foundation in equity for a finding of

7 On another reading, the circuit court effectively delegated its discretion to Husband to

determine the duration of the alimony award. See Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 340 (“It

is legal error for a court, in making a discretionary decision, to fail to exercise discretion.”).

14

unconscionable disparity. But although nobody disputes that there is a disparity, the court

never analyzed or found one way or the other that the disparity was unconscionable.

At the same time, the court’s words left some confusion about what it was awarding.

Based on its earlier finding of so many newfound expenses, the court could have awarded

rehabilitative alimony. Instead, the court concluded its alimony findings by saying that “I

can’t say that this is an indefinite alimony case, but it’s also not a three-year rehabilitative

alimony case looking at all of these factors...,” (emphasis added). The court then described

the $1,500-per-month-until-retirement award as “rehabilitative alimony” one transcript

page later. The Judgment also lists the alimony award as “rehabilitative alimony,” and

orders that “[Wife]’s request for indefinite alimony is denied.” But again, the terms of the

award are indefinite rather than rehabilitative, so the findings and the award fail to match.

And as such, the alimony award represents an abuse of discretion and must be vacated.

Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 339-40 (vacating an award of alimony under abuse of

discretion standard where trial court based decision on factors other than disparity or ability

to become self-supporting).

From there, the parties ask us to frame the court’s task on remand more rigidly.

Based on his position in oral argument, Husband would have us hold, as a matter of law,

that rehabilitative alimony is the only form of alimony available in this case, and to direct

the court on remand that it could not have awarded indefinite alimony in this case. We

decline to pre-judge the question. An award of indefinite alimony could be well supported

by the record, particularly in light of the court’s findings about Wife’s lower post-divorce

15

income, ongoing and newfound expenses, and net negative monthly cash flow. If the court

opts to consider indefinite alimony, though, it must consider the disparity of the post-

divorce standards of living between the two parties and can award indefinite alimony if,

after considering the FL §11-106(b) factors, it finds a disparity that is “gross, so as to offend

the conscience of the court if not ameliorated.” Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 340-41.

Similarly, we suspect that the record could, with the right findings, support an award of

rehabilitative alimony. If the court were to go that route, the award must have a fixed

duration, one not tied to a discretionary or contingent event such as retirement.

B. The Form Of The Monetary Award Was Not Improper Or

Appealable, But Must Be Vacated.

Husband directs our attention to Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358 (2003),8

and argues that once an alimony award is vacated, a monetary award and award of counsel

fees must also be vacated and reconsidered at the trial court. Id. at 425-26. That is true,

and because we have vacated the award of alimony above, we vacate the monetary award

as well so that the court can consider the entire financial package anew and in context in

light of its new alimony decision. In Malin, however, we went on to consider the

appropriateness of the original awards “for the guidance of the court and the parties on

remand,” id. at 426, and we will do the same here.

8 Although Husband only cites this case for the proposition that the award of attorney’s

fees must be vacated, the very sentence to which he points us stands for this proposition as

to marital awards as well.

16

Division of marital property requires a three-step process: (1) determine which

property is marital property, (2) value that property, and (3) determine whether to grant a

monetary award to adjust the equities. Hart, 169 Md. App. at 158. Marital property is

valued “as of the date on which divorce is actually entered,” Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App.

329, 348 (1995), and the value is determined “based upon the evidence produced at trial.”

Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md. App. 662, 676 (1984). In Dobbyn, we acknowledged that

“financial products are inherently endowed with a high propensity towards fluctuation.”

Id. We held in that case that for marital property in the form of securities, “if the chancellor

needs additional time to determine value as of the date of the decree due to fluctuations in

the market, he may reserve in the decree an additional ninety days.” Id. at 677 (citations

omitted). We grounded that holding in §3-6A-05(a) of the Marital Property Act, which has

since been repealed, but FL §8-203(a)(2) grants courts the identical power to reserve up to

ninety days from the decree to make a determination of marital property.9 When the court

reserves on issues of alimony or marital property, a final judgment has not been entered on

these issues until the court resolves them. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 44 (1989)

(holding that because QDROs “were thought by the court to be necessary in order to

resolve” outstanding alimony and property issues, “a claim in the action remained

9 FL §8-204, which covers valuation of marital property, does not affirmatively grant the

same power to reserve time for valuation, but it would work an absurd result to hold that

courts may reserve up to ninety days to determine whether property is marital or non-

marital, but cannot similarly reserve to value that same property.

17

unresolved.”). Until the necessary QDROs were rendered with regards to the plaintiff’s

alimony and property claims, “all prior rulings [with regards to these claims] remained

interlocutory and subject to revision...” Id.10

Here, the circuit court rightly recognized that the parties’ retirement accounts—

consisting at least in part of investments in securities—were marital property in their

entirety and would need to be valued before they could be divided. The court also

reasonably determined that additional time would be needed to value the accounts properly,

and that the resulting monetary award would take place in a subsequent QDRO. The only

wrinkle is that the court appears to have come to these conclusions sometime after valuing

the retirement accounts from the bench:

I have valued all of the property interests in this case based on

what the parties have submitted, and there appears to be not a

whole lot of work that the Court needed to do to determine that.

The Court accepts the values that were placed in this case

regarding that and would award [Wife] her marital share,

dividing it in half in this case.

The only values the parties submitted for the retirement accounts were listed on the

Joint Statement. Thus, at the end of the court’s ruling from the bench, the only reasonable

conclusion would be that the court had valued all of the retirement accounts at the values

assigned in the Joint Statement.

10 As the family law statute and our holdings make plain, however, a court does not render

the rest of a judgment interlocutory by reserving on one issue. FL §8-213(b); Parker v.

Robbins, 68 Md. App. 597 (1986).

18

The court’s correspondence with counsel following its ruling, however, suggests

that the court decided not to include those values in the Judgment:

I do not believe that it is necessary to include the sum certain

in the judgment itself unless the QDRO is to be signed by this

court contemporaneously with the judgment. Although the

division of these assets is as of the date of the divorce, usually

that is the day the decision is rendered (April 25, 2013) rather

than the date the judgment is actually signed. I would expect

the Plan Administrators [of the retirement accounts] to be in

the best position to determine what the exact amounts are as of

the date the decision was rendered, particularly if the amounts

you recited at trial are not correct. Accordingly I will sign the

proposed judgment submitted by [Wife, which is silent as to

the values].

The Judgment addresses the monetary award in a brief paragraph that makes no

reference to the explicit value of the award or any retirement account:

[T]he parties shall each receive by way of a [QDRO], one-half

of the marital portion of the total retirement assets (not

including [Husband’s] Honeywell pension), such that an

amount necessary to equalize the retirements shall be

transferred unto [Wife]’s retirement account.

Husband takes issue with this. Citing no authority, Husband asks us to reverse the

monetary award and remand with instructions to amend the Judgment to reflect an explicit

valuation of the monetary award, $96,545.62. Although his contentions are hard to follow,

Husband appears to argue that (1) because at trial, the court found and both parties agreed

to the valuations in the Joint Statement, basic fairness requires adherence to these findings;

and (2) without an explicit valuation of the monetary award in the Judgment, the parties

will have to prepare a QDRO for each of the four retirement accounts.

19

As to his first point, circuit courts are explicitly empowered to alter judgments after

they are entered.

For a period of 30 days after the entry of a judgment, or

thereafter pursuant to motion filed within that period, the court

has revisory power and control over the judgment.

Md. Code (1977, 2013 Repl. Vol.), §6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article

(“CJ”).11 But here, there was not yet any judgment to revise. Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699

(1994). In Davis, the Court of Appeals held that entry of judgment requires two acts to

occur: “the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by

the clerk.” Id. at 710. The trial court’s oral ruling had rendered a judgment of divorce only

after determining that “there was no contemplation that a further order was to be issued,”

id. at 712 (citation omitted), and that the docket was silent as to any further orders regarding

a decree of divorce. Id. at 713.

In this case, the circuit court explicitly asked for “a volunteer to prepare the Order

for the court,” and the end of the docket entry on April 25, 2013 reads “Plaintiff counsel to

submit Order for signature.” So no judgment was entered in this case until the Judgment

on July 8, 2013, and the circuit court was well within its authority to decide what value, if

any, would go into the Judgment.

11 Although the court’s ruling from the bench is more properly categorized as a “decision”

under Maryland Rule 2-522 rather than a “judgment” under CJ §6-408, it would work an

absurd result to hold that a court can sua sponte vacate a faulty judgment after its entry,

but is bound to render a similarly faulty decision into a judgment.

20

Further, appeal is not even ripe on the issue of valuation. Under Rohrbeck, a final

judgment has not been entered in this case to date with regard to the monetary award.

Because the valuation will now be accomplished in a QDRO, the claim remains

“unresolved,” and the ruling remains “interlocutory.” Thus, any contention with regard to

what the explicit amount of the monetary award should be is not ripe.

Finally, even if the matter were ripe, we still do not follow Husband’s argument that

the circuit court’s ruling would require multiple QDROs. The court seeks to balance

equities through a monetary award. There is no reason to assume that multiple QDROs

would be required to effect the distribution of a single monetary award. Rather, the court’s

ruling, judgment, and correspondence read in concert suggest that one QDRO will effect

that distribution. In so doing, that single QDRO would accomplish the valuation and

transfer of assets that Husband is asking for, albeit likely resulting in a different value than

he is asking for. But Husband has failed to explain why the law entitles him to the result

he requests.

We vacate the monetary award because Malin commands it, and the circuit court is

free on remand to resolve the amount and mechanics of any monetary award as it deems

appropriate. Should the court elect to grant a monetary award on remand, the resulting

judgment should reflect the date of valuation of the retirement accounts to clear up any

confusion as to this issue.

21

C. The Award of Attorneys’ Fees Was Not Improper, But Must Be

Vacated.

For the same reason as the monetary award, Malin requires us to vacate the

attorney’s fee award as well: the factors underlying awards of alimony, attorney’s fees, and

monetary awards are “so interrelated that, when a circuit court considers a claim for any

one of them, it must weigh the award of any other.” 153 Md. App. at 425-26 (quoting

Turner, 147 Md. App. at 400). We also find no abuse of discretion in the award we are

vacating, and we explain why.

Husband contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in three ways. First,

he claims that the court failed to consider Wife’s $120,000 savings from his buying out her

interest in the marital home. Second, he argues that the court failed to consider the debt he

incurred in buying out Wife’s interest in the house. Third, he complains that the court

based the award in part on the difference in monthly income between him and Wife, which

the court allegedly evened out through alimony.12

The governing statute required the court to consider two factors before awarding

attorneys’ fees:

(1) the financial resources and financial needs of both parties;

and

(2) whether there was substantial justification for prosecuting

or defending the proceeding.

12 Husband does not ground his request in any citation to law (other than Malin).

22

FL §7-107(c). This directive by no means requires a court to make affirmative findings as

to both, though. See Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 467-68 (1994) (affirming an award

of counsel fees without review of the justification for prosecuting or defending the

proceeding).

With regard to Husband’s first argument, the court recognized that “[Wife] is sitting

on a great sum of money in this case,” but also that Wife would bear new expenses as a

result of the divorce and would need that money for housing. The court’s analysis

demonstrates that it considered Wife’s financial needs and resources, and specifically in

the manner that Husband alleges it did not.

As to Husband’s corresponding debt, the circuit court referenced Husband’s

financial statement in its ruling as well. Defendant’s Exhibit 9 lists “mortgage” as one of

his expenses, at $1,020.00 monthly. The statement included a page for “secondary

residence,” which Husband left blank, and nowhere else lists either a liability in the form

of a debt or a recurring monthly obligation towards housing. In his direct examination,

Husband affirmed that Exhibit 9 “accurately reflect[s his] monthly living expenses,” and

he did not testify to any debt as a result of purchasing Wife’s equity in the marital home.

So again, the circuit court considered the financial picture that Husband painted in

connection with the fee award.

23

Finally, to the extent the circuit court revises the alimony award, it should consider

that award again (as it did before) when considering whether or not to grant attorney’s fees

again, and if so, how much.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR HARFORD COUNTY VACATED AND

REMANDED FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT

WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE

DIVIDED EVENLY BETWEEN THE

PARTIES.