UNIVERSITY OF DENVER WATER LAW REVIEWcase discussed in Part III. (The views presented in this...

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UNIVERSITYOFDENVER

WATERLAWREVIEWVOLUME13 ISSUE1 FALL2009

PROTECTINGFRESHWATERRESOURCESINTHEERAOFGLOBALWATERMARKETS:LESSONSLEARNED

FROMBOTTLEDWATER

NOAHD.HALL*

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 2 I. THEBOTTLEDWATERMARKETANDCONTROVERSY .................... 7

A. ABriefHistoryofBottledWater ..........................................................7 B. TheBusinessofBottledWater..............................................................8 C. OppositiontoBottledWater ............................................................... 10

II. THEGROUNDRULES:INTERNATIONALANDFEDERALLAW......18 A. InternationalTradeLawandBottledWater................................ 18 B. FederalRegulationofBottledWaterasaFoodProduct......... 20

III. ONTHEGROUND:STATELAW ..............................................................22 A. BottledWaterintheCourts:TheGood,theNotSoBad,andtheUgly................................................................................................ 22

1. TheGood:Michigancraftsabalancedapproachtocompetinggroundwaterandsurfacewaterrights ............. 23

2. TheNotSoBad:CaliforniaandNewHampshirerelyonstateenvironmentalandadministrativelawstoresolvebottledwaterdisputes .................................................... 28

* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School; Executive Director,GreatLakesEnvironmentalLawCenter; J.D.,UniversityofMichiganLawSchool,1998;B.S., University of Michigan School of Natural Resources & Environment, 1995. Thisarticle beganwhenhewas invited to testify before theU.S.HouseofRepresentative’sOversight and Government Reform Committee, Domestic Policy Subcommittee on“Federal and State Laws Regarding Bottled Water.” Professor Hall also representedseveralenvironmentalandconservationorganizationsasamiciintheMichiganCitizensforWater Conservation v. NestléWaters North America Inc. case discussed in Part III.(Theviewspresentedinthisarticlearehisownandnotnecessarilythoseofhisformerclients). Dean Baxtresser (J.D., University of Michigan Law School, expected 2010)contributedsignificantlytothisarticle,andadditionalresearchassistancewasprovidedbyOday Salim andRobertRiley (both J.D.,Wayne StateUniversity LawSchool, 2008)andCarlinDanz(J.D.,UniversityofMichiganLawSchool,expected2010).

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3. TheUgly:Texasrefusestogivelegalprotectionforgroundwaterrights........................................................................... 33

B. BottledWaterinLegislaturesandPolitics:TheGood,theNotSoBad,andtheReallyUgly......................................................... 34

1. TheGood:MichiganandtheotherGreatLakesstatesprotectnaturalresourcesfrombottledwater

withdrawals ......................................................................................... 35 2. TheNotSoBad:ModestregulatoryreformsinNew

England .................................................................................................. 38 3. TheReallyUgly:Michigan’sBottledWaterMoratorium

ExecutiveOrder.................................................................................. 43 IV. NEWSTRATEGIES:WATERISNOTFORSALE(UNLESSTHE

STATEGETSPAID).....................................................................................45 A. TheFalseHopeofthePublicTrustDoctrine ............................... 45 B. IfWaterisGoingtoBeSold,theStateShouldShareinthe

Profits............................................................................................................ 50 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................52

INTRODUCTION

Globalwatermarketsarenowa reality. Whetherwater shouldbebought and sold, imported and exported, is a difficult and importantquestion that raises issues ranging fromhuman rights obligations andenvironmental ethics to economic liberalism and the role ofcorporations. It is also, for purposes of this article, totally moot. Atsomepointintimeintherecentpast,mostlikelyduringmylifetimebutbefore the turnof the twenty‐first century,waterwent global. Wedonot yet know how great or terrible the implications of global watermarketswillbe for freshwaterresourcesandthepeople,communities,and environment they sustain. That is still in our hands anddependslargely on how domestic laws manage and protect our freshwaterresourcesintheeraofglobalwatermarkets.

The pressures on freshwater resources presented by global watermarketsarebynomeansdistantortheoretical. Disputeshavealreadyarisenandarequicklygrowing innumber,andbecause thesedisputesinvolvecompetingrightstotheuseofwater,lawyersandlawmakersareat the frontlines. Water law is contentiousandoften implicates largerissues of social and economic change, such as industrialization,1urbanization,2 and racial injustice.3 Thus, a dispute between propertyownersonasmallstreamandabottledwatercompanyseekingtopumpgroundwater connected to that stream is just as much about

1. See, e.g., THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THEWATERSOFNEWENGLAND(CambridgeUniv.Press1991)(providingahistoricalanalysisoftheroleofchangingwatermanagementlawsinearlyNewEnglandindustrialization). 2. See,e.g.,CYNTHIABARNETT,MIRAGE:FLORIDAANDTHEVANISHINGWATEROFTHEEASTERNU.S.106‐11 (TheUniv.ofMich.Press2007) (detailing legal fightsoverwater rights intheTampaBaywaterwarsinthecontextofurbanizationinFlorida). 3. See,e.g.,HOLLYDOREMUSANDA.DANTARLOCK,WATERWARINTHEKLAMATHBASIN59‐61 (IslandPress2008) (discussing the recognitionof reservedwater rights forNativeAmericantribesinthecontextofhistoricalstrugglesforNativeAmericanjustice).

Issue1 LESSONSLEARNEDFROMBOTTLEDWATER 3

commoditization and export of water as it is about stream flows andtrouthabitat.4

This article examines the challenges that global water marketspresent to the protection of freshwater resources under domestic lawby looking at recent disputes over bottled water. Bottled waterprovidesanidealcasestudyforseveralreasons.ForAmericans,bottledwater is the most tangible and visible representation of waterglobalization. Yourlocalgrocerystoremayhaveforsalebottledwaterfrom every continent except Antarctica: Africa (for example, KaroobrandwaterfromSouthAfrica5),Asia(HimalayanNaturalSpringbrandwaterfromNepal6),theSouthPacific(AntipodesbrandwaterfromNewZealand7), Europe (San Pellegrino brand water from Italy8), NorthAmerica (Ice Age brand water from Canada9), and South America(Peteroa9500brandwaterfromChile10).

Thus,whilescholarsandcommentatorsdebateatwhatpointwaterbecomes a “good” subject to international trade laws, bottled waterclearlycrossestheline.11Itisgenerallyagreedthatwaterinitsnaturalstate isnotconsideredagood,butat somepoint in itsextraction,use,and incorporation into a product, it becomes a good for purposes oftrade law. 12 It is beyond the scope of this article to determinewhenexactlywaterbecomesa good forpurposesof international trade law,andsuchadiscussionisnotnecessaryherebecausebottledwaterliesatthefarendofthespectrum. Waterinitsnaturalstatemaybeapublicresource,butwaterpacked forsale inabottleandsittingon thestoreshelf is obviously a good (taking such bottle out of your local grocery

4. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am. Inc., 709N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), portions rev’d on other grounds, 737 N.W.2d 447(Mich. 2007) (resolving dispute over competing water rights between Dead Streamriparians and bottledwater company seeking to pump groundwater connected to theDeadStream);DAVEDEMPSEY,GREATLAKESFORSALE29‐36(TheUniv.ofMich.Press2008)WaterConservationv.NestléWatersN.Am. Inc., as abattle against corporate controlandexportoflocalwaterresources). 5. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: South Africa, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/South_Africa/Index.asp(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 6. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: Nepal, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/Nepal/Index.asp(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 7. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: New Zealand, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/New_Zealand/Index.asp(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 8. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: Italy, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/Italy/Index.asp(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 9. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: Canada, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/Canada/Index.asp (last visited Dec. 1,2009). 10. Fine Waters: Bottled Water of the World: Chile, available athttp://www.finewaters.com/Bottled_Water/Chile/Index.asp(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 11. See Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free TradeAgreementEra:AsStrongAsEver,53WAYNEL.REV.649,650–52(2007). 12. SeeMarcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Management in theShadowofNAFTA,81U.DET.MERCYL.REV.525,534(2004).


storewithoutpayingforitisaclearillustrationofthispoint).Despite the many choices of imported waters, most of the shelf

space for bottled water is occupied by domestic brands.13 There isproduction of bottled water throughout the United States, and someproduction sites havebecome the setting for highprofile legal battles.FromCaliforniatoMaine,thepumpingandbottlingofwaterhasledtolitigationandnewlegislation. Theselegaldisputesprovideusefulcasestudies of how domestic water laws respond to the new pressures ofwaterbottling.Whenviewedsystematically,thecasestudiesofbottledwaterdisputesprovidevaluable insightsontheevolutionofwater lawintheeraofglobalwatermarkets.

Oppositiontobottledwaterpumpingisalmostalwaysbasedontwogeneralsetsofconcerns.Thefirstconcernrelatestotheimpactofwaterextraction to fill thebillionsofbottlesAmericanspurchaseeveryyear.Opponentsareconcernedthatthehighcapacitywaterpumping,usuallyfrom groundwater that is critically important to relatively smallconnected springs, will reduce stream flows or otherwise harm thenatural ecosystem and riparian interests. While water bottling hasalmostnoimpactonthetotalnationalfreshwatersupply,14themajorityofbottledwatercomesfromgroundwaterwhichhasadirecthydrologicconnectiontospringsandothervulnerablesurfacewaters. Thus,evenrelatively small water withdrawals for bottled water can producesignificant impacts at the local scale on other water users and theenvironment.

This is essentially a traditional resource impact concern in whichoneuserofthewaterresourceisallegedlyharmingotherusersandthenaturalfunctioningoftheresourceitself.AsdiscussedinPartIII,waterlawisevolvingtoaddresstheseconcerns.Stateshaveinplaceandwillcontinue to develop standards to determine how much water use isacceptablegiven impactsonotherusersand theenvironment. Withafew notable exceptions,15 the law tends to allow some water use andresulting impacts, declining to give absolute rights to use unlimitedquantities of water, or total bans on all water use and harm to theenvironment.16 This is equally true for both litigation under thetraditional common law system of water rights,17 and legislation that

13. See Beverages Marketing Corporation 2006 Statistics, available athttp://www.bottledwater.org/public/2006%20Market%20Report%20Findings%20as%20reported%20in%20April%202007.pdf(lastvisitedDec.1,2009)[hereinafter2006Statistics].Ofthe8.253billiongallonsofbottledwaterconsumedbyAmericansin2006,only164.4milliongallons(justunder2%)wereimported.Id. 14. See KEITH ESHLEMAN, BOTTLEDWATER PRODUCTION IN THEUNITED STATES: HOWMUCHGROUNDWATER ISACTUALLYBEINGUSED?4 (DrinkingWaterResearchFoundation) (2007).Groundwaterwithdrawals for bottledwater production representwell less than one‐tenth of one percent (less than 0.02%) of the total groundwater withdrawals in theUnitedStates(notincludingthewaterrequiredtomaketheplasticbottles).Id. 15. SeeinfraPartIII.A.3andnote283. 16. See,e.g.,Mich.CitizensforWaterConservationv.NestléWatersN.Am.Inc.,709N.W.2d174,206(Mich.Ct.App.2005). 17. SeeinfraPartIII.A.1andnote159.


brings modern proactive regulation to water use permitting.18 As aresult,bothwaterbottlersandthepartiesconcernedabouttheimpactsofthewaterwithdrawalcanoftenfindsomesatisfactioninthelaw.

Thesecondconcernthatunderliesbottledwaterdisputesisfarlesssuited to legal relief. Someopponentsobject to theverynatureof theuse – that is, taking water from the ground or a river to sell it in abottle.19Thisconcernismoresocialthanenvironmental;itisbasedonaview that water is a public good and human right that should not becommoditized and sold for profit.20 For opponents holding this view,reducing the quantity of the water withdrawal to some level thatminimizes impacts on otherwater users and the environment fails tosolve the fundamental problem of water commoditization. Theseopponentsobjecttotheextractionandsaleofwaterforprofitunderanycircumstances.

Not surprisingly, the legal system provides little guidance andsatisfactiontopartiesultimatelyconcernedwiththeideologicalissueofsellingwaterforprofit.Opponentsthatraisethisconcernoftenpointtothe public trust doctrine to support their claim that water cannot besold for profit.21 However, no court has ever applied the public trustdoctrine to bar the sale ofwater for profit. The public trust doctrine,discussed further in Part IV, historically protected public interests innavigationofsurfacewaters.22 Whilesomecourtschosetoexpandthepublictrustdoctrinetorequireconsiderationofthepublic’sinterestinenvironmental protection,23 no court has yet held that taking water(even navigable surfacewater traditionally subject to the public trustdoctrine24) and selling it in bottles violates the doctrine itself.Opponents concernedwith commoditizationhavenot foundanyotherlegalbasis toprevent thebottlingandsaleofwateron thosegrounds.Thus,forthesocialconcernregardingthepumpingofwaterforsaleandprofit, the law has provided no satisfaction.25 This is not intended toimply that the law must change to address this concern; rather,opponentsmayneedtochangetheirexpectationsofwhatwaterlawcanand cannot do to address ideological issues regarding freshwater

18. SeeinfraPartIII.B.1–2andnote292. 19. SeeDEMPSEY,supranote4,at47–48. 20. Seeid.at48. 21. Seeid.at26. 22. SeeinfraPartIV.Aandnote395. 23. SeeNat’lAudubonSoc’yv.Sup.Ct.,658P.2d709,712(Cal.1983). 24. Most bottledwaterwithdrawals involve groundwater,which inmany states isnot covered by the public trust doctrine. Felicity Barringer, Bottling Plant PushesGroundwater to Center Stage in Vermont, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/us/21water.html(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 25. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am. Inc., 709N.W.2d174,205(Mich.Ct.App.2005)(“Theprovisionof[bottled]watertothegeneralpublic isalsoaneconomicallyandsociallybeneficialuseof thewater.”); seealso In reTown of Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582, 596 (N.H. 2006) (holding that pumping groundwatertomeet“astrongexistingpublicdemandforbottleddrinkingwaterintheUnitedStates”waspermissible).


resourcesintheeraofglobalizedtrade.26In Part I, this article first provides some historical background on

bottledwater.Bottledwaterhasbeenaroundalongtime,bothgloballyand intheUnitedStates,andabrief lookat thehistoryof the industrygives context to its recent growth and globalization. The article thenprovides an overview of the current bottled water industry. Waterbottling is big business and getting bigger, growing by about 10%annuallyoverthepastfiveyears.27Therecentgrowthhasgivenrisetosignificant opposition and controversies. In addition to the concernsrelating to the impact of the water withdrawals and thecommoditization of water explained briefly above, the growth of thebottled water industry has caused concerns regarding the quality ofbottledwater, thewaste and pollution associatedwithmanufacturing,shipping, and disposing of plastic water bottles, and the lack ofinvestmentinpublicwatersupplies.

PartIIofthisarticleexaminesthetreatmentofbottledwaterunderinternational trade law and federal regulatory law. Bottled waterdisputes and controversies, and the resulting judicial decisions andlegislative solutions, are generally the domain of state law. However,international trade lawand federal foodanddrug regulatory lawhavecreated the ground rules for the bottled water industry.28 To bestunderstand thechallenges thatbottledwaterpresentsunderstate lawand consequential legal solutions, it is important to first examine theactionsinternationaltradelawandfederalregulatorylawhavetakentoshapethebottledwatermarket.

Part III first looks at how courts have developed, reformed, andapplied various common law systems of water rights in disputesinvolvingbottledwater.WithapologiestoClintEastwood,29thisarticlecategorizes the results as the good, the not‐so‐bad, and the ugly.Similarly,PartIIIalsoexaminesthestatestatutesandotherregulatoryefforts intendedtoaddressthepressureofwaterbottlingandsale. Aswith the common law court decisions, these public laws are alsoevaluated and categorized as the good, the not‐so‐bad, and the(sometimesreally)ugly.

Finally, in Part IV the article looks at lessons learned frombottledwaterdisputesandthelegalsystem’sresponse.ThecasestudiesinPartIII offer hard‐learned lessons in how (and how not) to protectfreshwaterresourcesintheeraofglobalizationandwatermarkets.Part

26. Somecommentatorshaveexpressedoptimismthatthelawmayeventuallycometoreflectculturalnormsconcernedwithbottledwaterandwaterprivatization. “[A]tpresent it seems unlikely that courts would find extracting water for the purpose ofbottlingasperseunreasonable....However,iftheanti‐bottledwaterculturecontinuestogain force, it isbothpossibleandplausible that at somepoint in the futurebottledwaterwillno longerbeconsideredareasonableuseofascarceresource.”ChristineA.Klein and Ling‐YeeHuang,CulturalNorms as a Source of Law: The Example of BottledWater,30CARDOZOL.Rev.507,539–40(2008). 27. 2006Statistics,supranote13. 28. See PETER H. GLEICK, THE WORLD’S WATER, THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATERRESOURCES:2004–200526–27(IslandPress2004). 29. THEGOOD,THEBADANDTHEUGLY(MGM1966)(starringClintEastwood).


IV also includes a brief discussion of the public trust doctrine and itssuitability formeeting the challenge of bottledwater disputes. Whilebottledwateropponentsofferthepublictrustdoctrineasasolutiontotheperceivedthreatofcommoditization,itisnotthesilverbullethopedforbyopponentsorfearedbythebottledwaterindustry.

Bottled water offers a compelling contemporary issue throughwhichtoexaminethediversityandevolutionofstatewaterlaw.Bottledwater is a readily available and widely purchased product. Thepassionateoppositionitproducesforadiverserangeofenvironmentaland social reasonsmatches its popularity with consumers.30 Further,bottled water is the most mature example of a growing global watermarket. By looking at the recent disputes and resulting legal reformsinvolving bottled water, we can better anticipate future controversiesanddesignmodernwaterlawstomeetthechallengeofglobalization.

I. THEBOTTLEDWATERMARKETANDCONTROVERSY

Peoplehavebeenbottlingwatersincetheyhadbottles.Butthisoldindustry has had a uniquely twenty‐first century rebirth, as thecombinationofcheappackaging,consumerdemandforconvenientandhealthybeverages,andglobalizedtransportationanddistributionhavecreated amarket for awide range of bottledwater products. Bottledwater sales in the United States have already surpassed ten billiondollars annually, and the industry continues togrow.31 The industry’sgrowth and consumers’ demand have given rise to significantopposition, both locally where water is bottled, and globally as anenvironmentalandsocialjusticeissue.Thispartlooksatthehistoryofbottledwater, the current state of thebottledwaterbusiness, and theoppositiontothemodernbottledwaterindustry.

A. ABRIEFHISTORYOFBOTTLEDWATER

While it seems simple enough to credit (or blame) bottledwater’srecent popularity on “clever marketing,” the industry also has afoundationinahistoryof“deeplyingrained,culturalreverenceforpurewater.”32 Bottledwater has been around a long time, and not just assmallmom‐and‐popoperations.BottledwaterinAmericapredatesthecountry’s independence, with records of water bottled and sold fromJackson’sSpainBostonin1767.33Thebottledwaterindustrytookoffinthe beginning of the nineteenth centurywhen new glass technologiesmade the costof abottle affordable andpractical formassproductionandconsumption.34 By1856,SaratogaSprings,alone,producedover7

30. SeeKleinandHuang,supranote26,at507. 31. 2006Statistics,supranote13. 32. FRANCISH.CHAPPELLE,WELLSPRINGS:ANATURALHISTORYOFBOTTLEDSPRINGWATERS17(RutgersUniversityPress2005) (“[I]t is thehistoryofhumansociety, and thenaturalhistoryofparticularwaters,thatexplainstheallureofbottledwater.”). 33. Id.at73. 34. Id.


millionbottlesofwaterannually,oneofthemostpopularearlybottledwatersources,andsellingforupto$1.75perpint.35

Much like today, the popularity of bottled water is largely due tohealth concerns.36 Consumers in the mid‐1800s believed that bottledspringwaterhadhealthbenefitsthatborderedonthemedicinal.37 Butalso, like today, the historical popularity of bottledwaterwas furtherdue to an associated image and status.38 Then, as now, “[p]eople liketheir water to be clean and stylish, preferably both.”39 Historically,consumers even perceived bottled water from springs as havingmythicalandspiritualsignificance.40Inapreviewofthemoderndebateover ownership of precious water resources, the owner of the landsurrounding Healing Springs in South Carolina was so convinced thatthewaterwasagiftfromGodthathegaveitbacktotheAlmightyinhiswill,sothattherecordeddeedstilllists“GodAlmighty”astheowneroftheproperty.41

Bottled water went out of style and need in the early twentiethcentury when the advent of chlorination in municipal drinking watersuppliesmadepublicwaterconsistentlyhealthyandsafetodrink.42Buttheallureofhealthandimagefueledabottledwatercomebackin1977,whenPerrier launcheda$5millionmarketing campaign in theUnitedStates for its imported water.43 Perrier’s marketing and timing wereperfect as it took advantage of “concerns about pollution and poor‐qualitytapwater,anditcaughttheyuppiesjustastheywerebeginningto flex theirconsumermuscles.”44 Inshort,Perrier “wasall the thingsthe yuppies wanted in a lifestyle‐defining product.”45 After Perrier’ssuccess,anewmarketarosethatleddirectlytothecurrentgrowthandbottledwaterindustryweseetoday.

B. THEBUSINESSOFBOTTLEDWATER

Bottledwaterisbigbusiness.AccordingtotheBeverageMarketingCorporation, bottled water became the second largest commercialbeveragecategorybyvolumeintheUnitedStatesin2003,secondonlyto carbonated soft drinks.46 Americans buy more bottled water thanbeer,milk,orjuice.47In2006,Americansconsumed8.25billiongallons

35. Id.at59. 36. SeeKleinandHuang,supranote26,at514. 37. SeeCHAPELLE,supranote32,at73. 38. Id.at14,73;seealsoKleinandHuang,supranote26,at517–18. 39. CHAPELLE,supranote32,at18. 40. Seeid.at21,23–25. 41. Id.at21. 42. See id. at 3, 15–16. Chlorinating drinking water is credited with savingmorehumanlivesthananyotherhealthtechnology.Id.at182. 43. Id.at16. 44. Id.at16–17. 45. Id.at17. 46. 2006Statistics,supranote13. 47. Janet Larson, Bottled Water Boycotts: BacktotheTap Movement GainsMomentum, EARTH POLICY INSTITUTE (2007), available at http://www.earth‐policy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2007/update68(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).


ofbottledwater,nearly10%morethanthepreviousyear.48 Thistotalconsumptionequatestoanaverageof27.6gallonsofbottledwaterperperson per year.49 In 2007, experts expected the total consumption ofbottledwater to increase another 10% and exceed 9 billion gallons.50Thisistypicalfortheindustry.Between2001and2006,bottledwaterconsumption has almost doubled, averaging nearly 10% annualgrowth.51

The tremendous growth in consumption correlates with similargrowth in bottled water producer revenues. In 2005, bottled watersalesintheUnitedStatessurpassedtenbilliondollars.52Withrevenuesincreasing by nearly 10% annually over the past two years, expertsexpected the 2007 sales of bottled water to approach twelve billiondollars.53 Just one example of the size and value of the bottledwaterindustryisthatWholeFoods,thenation’s leadingorganicupscalefoodretailer,sellsmorebottledwaterthananyotheritem.54

The vast majority (over 95% between 2005 and 2007) of bottledwater consumed in the United States is domestically produced non‐sparklingwater.55 The largestproducerofbottledwater in theUnitedStates is Nestlé Waters North America, with a 2008 market share of35%ofthebottledwatersales.56NestléWatersNorthAmericafocuseson“springwater”(definedanddiscussedinPartII, infra),andmarketsits bottled water under different brand names by region. Its leadingbrands are “Poland Spring” (Northeast), “Arrowhead” (West), “DeerPark” (Mid‐Atlantic), “IceMountain” (Midwest), “Ozarka” (Texas), and“Zephyrhills” (Florida), as well as the national brand, “Nestlé PureLife.”57 The other leading bottledwater companies are the Coca‐ColaCompany,whichsellsthebrandname“Dasani”anddistributes“Evian,”

48. 2006Statistics,supranote13. 49. Id. 50. Id. 51. Id. 52. Id. 53. Id.TheBeverageMarketingCorporationprojected2007salesofbottledwatertobe$11.905billion.Id. 54. CharlesFishman,Message inaBottle, FASTCOMPANY.COM,Dec.2007,availableathttp://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/117/features‐message‐in‐a‐bottle.html (lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 55. See2006Statistics,supranote13.In2005,Americansconsumed7,171.4millionsof gallons of domestic, non‐sparkling water and 7,539.1 millions of gallons of totalbottled water (including imported products and sparkling water). In 2006, thequantitieswere7,899.9millionsofgallonsand8,253.6millionsofgallons,respectively.In2007,theprojectedquantitieswere8,7000.0millionsofgallonsand9,075.0millionsofgallons,respectively.Id. 56. Nestlé Waters North America: Performance, available at http://www.nestle‐watersna.com/Menu/AboutUs/Performance.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). In 2007,NestléWatersNorthAmericahadbottledwatersalesof$4.26billionintheU.S.Id. 57. Nestlé Waters North America: U.S. Brand Portfolio, available athttp://www.nestle‐watersna.com/Menu/AboutUs/Heritage/U.S.+Brand+Portfolio.htm(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).


andPepsiCo,Inc.,whichsellsthebrandname“Aquafina.”58 BothCoca‐Cola’s Dasani and Pepsi’s Aquafina are purifiedmunicipal water frommanysourcesaroundthecountry.59

C. OPPOSITIONTOBOTTLEDWATER

Asthebottledwaterindustryhasgrown,sohasthesizeandpassionof itsopposition. Adiverse rangeof concernsmotivatesopponentsofbottled water: from the wasted plastic in the packaging to thecomparativequalityofbottledversus tapwater. Mostof the litigationand legislation resulting from bottled water disputes involves theimpactsofwaterbottlers’groundwaterandspringwaterextractiononother water users and dependent natural resources. To understandthese impacts, it is importantto firstexplaintheapplicablesourceandscaleofbottledwaterwithdrawals.

Manufacturers obtainwater from one of twomajor sources. Lessthanhalf (44% in200660)ofbottledwater in theUnitedStates comesfrom municipal water supply (examples include Coca‐Cola’s DasanibrandandPepsi’sAquafinabrand).61 Bottlingmunicipalwateralmostnever raises environmental concerns regarding thewaterwithdrawal,sincethewaterbottlingisoftenusingsurplusmunicipalwithdrawalanddistributioncapacity.WhilesomecriticschargethatCokeandPepsiaresimplyselling“tapwater,”suchcriticismignoresthefactthatCokeandPepsi use extensive filtering, treatment, and mineral processes toconverttapwaterintoaproductthatconsumersmayprefer.62Further,using municipal supply insulates these water bottlers from mostcontroversiesandresultinglegalactionsconcerningtheenvironmentalimpactofgroundwaterandspringwaterextractionforwaterbottling.63Thus, bottled water from municipal supply rarely gives rise to legaldisputes.

In contrast, legal controversies often surround the majority ofbottledwater thatmanufacturers sellunder the “springwater” label.64Thiswatercomesfromgroundwaterconnectedtosprings(theleading

58. CNNhealth.com, Aquafina Labels to Spell out Source – TapWater, available athttp://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/07/27/pepsico.aquafina.reut/(lastvisitedDec.1,2009);CompanyNews;CoketoHandleSalesofEvianWaterinNorthAmerica,N.Y.TIMES,Apr.26,2002,atC4. 59. CNNhealth.com,supranote58. 60. ELIZABETHROYTE,BOTTLEMANIA:HOWWATERWENTONSALEANDWHYWEBOUGHTIT38(BloomsburyUSA2008). 61. Id. 62. Id.at38,157–58. 63. Municipal water regulations force municipal water producers to meetenvironmentalstandardsthataremorestringentthanthosethatmustbemetbyspringorgroundwaterbottlers.Forexample,municipalwatermustmeettherequirementsoftheSafeDrinkingWaterAct,42U.S.C.§300f(1974)(amendedbyPub.L.No.104‐182,110Stat.1613(1996)),whereasgroundandspringwaterbottlersneednot,21U.S.C.§349(1996). 64. TheFDA'slabelingrequirementsfor"springwater"canbefoundunder21C.F.R.§165.110(a)(2)(vi).


examplesare theNestlé regionalbrandsnotedabove).65 Asdiscussedbelow,thefederalFoodandDrugAdministrationallowswaterbottlersto collect “springwater” from drilled boreholes that tap groundwaterconnected to thespringwater.66 Although thismayseemdeceptive totheconsumer,sincethespringwateroriginatesfromtheground(whatmostpeoplewouldthenconsider“groundwater”),therearegoodhealthandsafetyreasonstoallowthepractice.Openspringssubjectthewaterto environmental contamination (both natural and human), whilegroundwaterisbetter(butnotperfectly)protectedfromenvironmentalcontamination.67 For this reason, some state health departmentsactually requirewater bottlers to use boreholes to collectwater fromunderground rather than taking spring water once it reaches thesurface.68

On a macro‐national scale, water bottling from springs andconnected groundwater is an insignificant amount of overall waterextraction. Groundwater withdrawals for bottled water productionrepresentfarlessthanone‐tenthofonepercent(lessthan0.1%)ofthetotal groundwater withdrawals in the United States.69 As detailedabove, total annual bottled water production approached ten billiongallonsin2007(notallofwhichcamefromgroundwater).70TheUnitedStates Geological Survey estimates that total annual groundwaterwithdrawalsintheUnitedStatesin2000were30.8trilliongallons.71Ofthistotal,agriculturaluseofgroundwaterforirrigationcomprisesover67%(20,769billiongallons)ofthetotalgroundwaterwithdrawals.72Ofcourse,waterbottling results inaveryhighconsumptionof thewaterwithdrawn, with essentially no water returning to the ground.However, agricultural irrigation also consumes high amounts, withestimatesranging from70%to90%,73so theresulting impacton totalgroundwatersuppliesisstilltremendouslydisproportionate.

Whilewaterbottlinghasessentiallynoimpactonthetotalnationalsupply of groundwater, it can have significant impacts on localgroundwatersupplies.Groundwaterextractionmayaffectthequantity

65. Beverages, Bottled Water, 21 C.F.R. § 165.110(a)(2)(vi) (2003); see NestléWatersNorthAmerica,supranote57. 66. 21C.F.R.§165.110(a)(2)(vi)(2003). 67. SeeCHAPELLE,supranote32,at125. 68. Id. 69. ESHELMAN,supranote14,at4. 70. 2006Statistics,supranote13. 71. UNITEDSTATESGEOLOGICALSURVEY,ESTIMATEDUSEOFWATER IN THEUNITEDSTATES IN2000 Table 4 (2000), available athttp://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/htdocs/table04.html (last visited Dec. 1,2009)[hereinafterUSGS]. 72. Id. 73. See GREAT LAKES COMMISSION, TOWARD A WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DECISIONSUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES‐ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 60 (2003), available athttp://www.glc.org/wateruse/wrmdss/finalreport/pdf/WR‐Ch.3‐2003.pdf (last visitedDec.1,2009).


and quality of the groundwater aquifer.74 Significant groundwaterpumping can cause a temporary or permanent lowering of the watertable,increasedconcentrationofcontaminants,andinsomeregionssaltwaterintrusionintotheaquifer.75Thisaffectsothergroundwateruserswhosewellsgodryorstopproducingpotablewater.76

Moreover, there is often a hydrologic connection betweengroundwaterandfreshsurfacewaterssuchasrivers,streams,andlakes(and groundwater that is bottled and sold as “spring water” is bydefinition hydrologically connected to natural springs, as discussed inPart II.B, infra).77 Pumping groundwater can take water from thesesurfacewater systems.A recent report commissionedby theMichiganLegislatureinthewakeoftheNestlébottledwaterlitigation78succinctlydescribedthebasichydrologysysteminthatstate:

Over time, thedominantsourceofwater toawell,particularlyawellcompleted in an unconfined aquifer, changes to streams. Thiswatermay either be decreased groundwater discharge to the stream orincreased recharge to the groundwater system from the stream. Ineither case, streamflow reduction occurs and is often referred to asstreamflow capture. In the long term, the cumulative streamflowcapturefromagroundwatersystemcanapproachthetotalamountofwaterbeingpumpedfromthatsystem.79

Thus, groundwater pumping can directly impact surface waterusers, both consumptivewater users and people who use the surfacewaterforrecreationandaesthetics.Further,whenthereisahydrologicconnection between groundwater and surface water, a wide range ofnatural resources, including fisheries, wetlands, and aquaticinvertebrates,oftenrelyonthegroundwaterinputtothesurfacewaterfortheirexistenceandhealth.80TheMichiganlegislaturecommissioneda report that determined that “about 80 percent of the annualstreamflow in [Michigan’s] LowerPeninsula results fromgroundwaterdischarge.”81Further,“[m]anylakesandwetlandsdonothavestreamsflowing into them, and groundwater, therefore, is the only inflow

74. Oswald Zachariah & Kimberly Rollins, Optimal Economic Management ofGroundwater Quantity and Quality: An Integrated Approach 3 (1999) (unpublishedmanuscript, available athttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21501/1/sp99za01.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,2009)). 75. JackTuholske,TrustingthePublicTrust:ApplicationofthePublicTrustDoctrinetoGroundwaterResources,9VT.J.ENVTL.L.189,201–02(2007). 76. SeegenerallyROBERTGLENNON,WATERFOLLIES:GROUNDWATERPUMPINGANDTHEFATEOFAMERICA'SFRESHWATERS32(IslandPress2002). 77. SeeinfraPartII.B.SeealsoTuholske,supranote75at202. 78. SeediscussionofNestlélitigationinfraPartIII.A.1. 79. GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT TO THE MICHIGANLEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC ACT 148 OF 2003 24 (2006), available athttp://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq‐gwcac‐legislature.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,2009)[hereinafterMichiganReport]. 80. SeeTuholske,supranote75at202. 81. MichiganReport,supranote79,at15–16.


besides precipitation on the surface of the lake or wetland.”82 Thereport concluded that “[m]ost aquatic ecosystems in Michigan aredependent upon the discharge of groundwater into surface water.”83While the report was specific toMichigan, the hydrological principlesand potential impacts regarding groundwater pumping (for bottledwateroranyotheruse)arewidelyapplicable.84

Theimpactofbottledwater’sgroundwaterpumpingonotherwaterusers and dependent natural resources is the primary focus of legaldisputesoverbottledwaterandthevariouslegislativereformsintendedtorespondtothegrowingindustry. However, theseconcernsmaynotbe the primarymotivation of bottledwater opponents, but rather thelegalhookforlitigationandregulatoryreforms.Thus,itisimportanttorecognizeanddiscussotherlegitimateenvironmentalandpublichealthconcerns raised by opponentswith the bottledwater industry. Whilethese concerns are almost never the focus of legal disputes or newlegislation,theydemonstratethediverseanddeepoppositiontobottledwater nationwide, and help explain the motivation for legal actionagainstwaterbottlers.

The most tangible environmental impacts from the bottled waterindustry relate to the plastic bottles themselves. The pollution andwaste resulting from the manufacturing, shipping, and disposal ofplasticwaterbottleshasreceivedtremendouspublicattentionandevensomesymbolicpolicyactionsatthemunicipallevel.

The environmental impact of consumerspurchasingplasticbottlesissignificantregardlessofthepresenceofthewater.Thepollutionandwaste resulting from the manufacturing, shipping, and disposal ofplastic water bottles strikes many people as simply wasteful. Mostwater bottles derive from the crude‐oil‐based plastic, polyethyleneterephthalate (“PET”).85 The Earth Policy Institute estimates that themanufacture of water bottles for United States consumption requiresmorethan17millionbarrelsofoilannually.86

Manufacturingisonlythefirststepinanenergyintensiveprocessofdistributing water in plastic water bottles. The Earth Policy Institutenoted that “[i]n contrast to tapwater,which is distributed throughanenergy‐efficient infrastructure, transporting bottled water longdistances involves burningmassive quantities of fossil fuels.”87 Then,

82. Id.at16. 83. Id.at17. 84. For furtherdiscussionon the impactsofbottledwaterwithdrawalsonsprings,groundwater, and connected water resources in Florida, see generally Kelly Samek,Unknown Quantity: The BottledWater Industry and Florida’s Springs, 19 J. LAND USE &ENVTL. L. 569 (2004); Tara Boldt‐Van Rooy, “Bottling Up” Our Natural Resources: TheFightOverBottledWaterExtraction in theUnitedStates, 18 J. LANDUSE&ENVTL.L.267(2003). 85. EmilyArnold& JanetLarsen,BottledWater:PouringResourcesDowntheDrain,EARTH POLICY INSTITUTE, (2006), available at http://www.earth‐policy.org/Updates/2006/Update51.htm(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 86. Id. 87. Id.


after drinking the bottledwater, the drinker generally throws out thebottle. While PET plastic can be recycled (and the bottled waterindustrystronglyencouragesrecycling88),86%ofplasticwaterbottlesusedintheUnitedStatesbecomegarbageorlitter.89

Asaresultoftheplasticbottlesandlongdistancetransport,bottledwaterusesupto2,000timesasmuchenergytoproduceanddistributeastapwater,accordingtoDr.PeterGleickofthePacificInstitute.90Theannual consumption of bottled water in the United States in 2007required the equivalent of between 32 and 54million barrels of oil.91Mostof thisenergygoes intoproducing theplasticbottlesand thentoshipping thewater fromsource to consumer (sometimes thousandsofmilesaway).92

Theenvironmentalconcernsregardingthemanufacturing,shipping,and disposal of plastic water bottles motivated the United StatesConference of Mayors to recently pass a resolution to study theenvironmental impact of bottled water.93 The Conference of Mayorsresolutionnoted:

[B]ottledwatermust travelmanymiles from the source, resulting intheburningofmassiveamountsoffossilfuels,releasingCO2andotherpollution into the atmosphere... plasticwater bottles are one of thefastest growing sources of municipal waste; and ... in the U.S. theplasticbottlesproducedforwaterrequire1.5millionbarrelsofoilperyear,enoughtogenerateelectricityfor250,000homesorfuel100,000carsforayear.94

While the bottled water industry does not seem to dispute thestatistics regarding the pollution and waste impacts relating to themanufacturing,shipping,anddisposalofplasticwaterbottles,itmaynotbefairtocomparetheseimpactstotapwater.Inarecentarticleonthesubject, theCEOofWholeFoodsMarket argued thatwaterbottlesaresimply substituting for other plastic beverage bottles in themarketplace:“It’sunfairtosaybottledwater iscausingextraplastic in

88. SeeInternationalBottledWaterAssociationRecyclingResourceGuide,availableathttp://www.bottledwater.org/public/05_IBWA_Recycle_Guide_1.pdf(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 89. Arnold&Larson,supranote85.Notallplasticwaterbottlesbecome“landfilled”–somebecomecellularphones. Motorolareleasedamobilephone–theMOTOW233Renew –with a plastic housingmade entirely from recycledwater bottles. See PressReleases,MotorolaRevealsWorld’sFirstMobilePhoneMadeFromRecycledWaterBottlesand New 3G Touch Tablet with Customizable Home Screen,http://mediacenter.motorola.com/Content/detail.aspx?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=10464(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 90. Peter H. Gleick and Heather S. Cooley, Energy Implications of BottledWater, 4ENVTL.RESEARCHLETTERS6(2009),availableathttp://stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/014009(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 91. Id. 92. Id. 93. USCM 2007 Adopted Resolutions, Importance of MunicipalWater, available athttp://usmayors.org/resolutions/75th_conference/environment_02.asp (last visitedDec.1,2009). 94. Id.


landfills, and it’susingenergy transporting it... There’s a substitutioneffect—it’ssubstitutingforjuicesandCokeandPepsi.”95

The substitution argument notwithstanding, the waste associatedwithbottledwaterseemstohavecaughtthepublic’sattention.ArecentNew York Times article quoted a San Francisco citizen as saying that“fellowBayArea residents act as if ‘you just killed their puppy’ if youdarethrowabottleinthegarbage.”96 Yetdespitetheattention,peoplestill buy bottled water. While many consumers probably do notconsider the environmental impacts of energy and waste, a SeattlecitizenadmittedinthesameNewYorkTimesarticlethatshestillbuysbottledwaterasa“guiltypleasure.”97

Several public interest organizations have also raised concernsabout the health and safety of bottled water, both in comparison tomunicipaltapwaterandincontrasttotheindustry’smarketingimageofpurewaterproducts.98 While thepublicoftenperceivesbottledwateras being of higher quality than tap water, at least one prominentenvironmental organization has directly attacked this perception. In1999, theNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil (“NRDC”) issuedareportentitled “Bottled Water: Pure Drink or Pure Hype?”99 In the report,NRDCwarnedthepublicthat“[n]ooneshouldassumethatjustbecausehe or she purchaseswater in a bottle that it is necessarily any betterregulated, purer, or safer than most tap water.”100 NRDC performed“‘snapshot’testingofmorethan1,000bottlesof103brandsofwaterbythreeindependentlabs[and]foundthatmostbottledwatertestedwasofgoodquality,butsomebrands’qualitywasspotty.”101

Not surprisingly, the bottled water industry disputes NRDC’sfindings and conclusions. An analysis of the NRDC report by theDrinkingWaterResearchFoundationconcludes:

Throughout all of their analysis, NRDC found not one instance ofcontamination that would raise a legitimate health concern. Indeed,thesurveycouldfindonlyfourresultswherefederalhealthstandardswereexceeded.Closerinspectionrevealsthatthetworesultschargedby the NRDC Report to exceed total coliform standards, were in factquite likely false positives because they could not be replicated insubsequent tests as required by federal standards. The other twoexceedances were for a fluoride standard so narrow, and with suchlimited application, as to be irrelevant to public health. In fact, thelevels found in the bottled water are below the EPA health‐based

95. SeeFishman,supranote54(quotingJohnMackey,CEOofWholeFoodsMarket). 96. AlexWilliams,Water,WaterEverywhere,butGuiltbytheBottleful,N.Y.TIMES,Aug.12,2007. 97. Id. 98. SeeNATURALRESOURCESDEFENSECOUNCIL,BOTTLEWATER:PUREDRINKORPUREHYPE?(1999), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/bw/bwinx.asp (last visitedDec.1,2009). 99. Id.100. Id., at Executive Summary, available athttp://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/bw/exesum.asp.101. Id.


fluoridestandardforpublicwatersystems.102

It is noteworthy that NRDC subsequently determined that manymunicipal water supplies also have exceedances of drinking waterstandards.103 For purposes of this analysis, it is fair to conclude thatconcernsremainregardingdrinkingwaterqualitystandards(frombothbottles and tap),104 and environmental groups such as NRDC shouldadvocate stronger standards and more enforcement to protect publichealthfromalldrinkingwatersources.105

Alloftheseenvironmentalandpublichealthconcerns–theimpactofwaterwithdrawalsonotherusersandtheecosystem,thewasteandpollution of plastic bottles, and the inconsistent quality and safety ofbottledwater–arefairlyconventionalenvironmentalandpublichealthregulatoryproblems. Theseconcernsaresimilartothoseofanyotherextractive and consumer product industry, and our public regulatorysystem iswell equipped to address these issues. That does notmeanthat all parties would be satisfied by the regulatory decisions andenforcement,butthereisalegalsystemandadministrativeandpoliticalprocess tobalance the competing concernsof the industry andpublic.Significant portions of this article will discuss in detail how stategovernments and courts have sought to better regulate waterwithdrawals and resolvebottledwaterdisputes, primarily focusingontheimpactsofthewateruseratherthanthatoftheplasticbottlesorthehealthandsafetyoftheproduct.However,adiscussionoftheconcernsregarding bottled water would be misleadingly incomplete withoutacknowledging what is often the primary and fundamental basis foropposition: the perceived privatization and commoditization of waterthroughthebottlingandsaleofwater.

Water privatization and commoditization is a complex andcontentious issue that often motivates bottled water opposition evenwhen the legal issues litigated relate to other concerns. The SierraClub’sWaterCommodificationandCorporatePrivatizationofMunicipalWater/Sewer Services Policy articulates the fundamental concern,statingthat“[w]aterisapublicresource,notacommodity,”andabasicrightforallpeople.106Thebottlingandsaleofwaterisaclearexample

102. DRINKING WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, ANALYSIS OF THE FEBRUARY, 1999 NATURALRESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL REPORT ON BOTTLED WATER (1999), available athttp://www.thefactsaboutwater.org/research‐studies‐publications/water‐quality(followlinktopublication)(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).103. See generally ERIK OLSON, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, WHAT’S ON TAP?GRADING DRINKING WATER IN U.S. CITIES 99, 114, 198 (2003), available athttp://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/uscities/pdf/whatsontap.pdf (lastvisitedDec.1,2009).104. SeeROYTE,supranote60,at143‐44(noting thatexceedancesofdrinkingwaterstandards frommunicipalsuppliesarebetterdisclosedtothepublic thanexceedancesfrombottledwatersupplies).105. SeeNATURALRESOURCESDEFENSECOUNCIL,supranote98,atCh.1. 106. SIERRA CLUB CONSERVATION POLICIES, WATER COMMODIFICATION AND CORPORATEPRIVATIZATION OF MUNICIPAL WATER/SEWER SERVICES (2003), available athttp://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/commodification.asp (last visited Dec.1,2009).


of water privatization and commodification, with other examplesincludingprivatecontrolofwaterdistributionsystemsandschemesforthebulkexportandtradeofwaterataglobalscale.107Itmaynotbefairto characterize these concerns as “environmental,” since on a morefundamental level they emanate from issues of social justice, humanrights, and public governance. Nonetheless, the concerns are often attheheartofenvironmentalopposition.108

According to author and environmental activist Dave Dempsey,allowing bottled water is a “big step” towards the “transformation ofwater from the public commons to private ownership.”109 The result,according to Dempsey, is that allowing bottled water “essentiallyconced[es] that water is a commodity.”110 In Dempsey’s view, thegrowthinbottledwater’spopularityisadirectresultofthe“notionthatsomethingpublicisinherentlybadandsomethingprivateisinherentlygood. For this, in theUnitedStates,wehave30yearsof conservativeattacks on government’s competence and legitimacy and a cult ofprivatization to thank.”111 Dempsey concludes that allowing bottledwaterwilldirectlyresult inthe“commercialization”of theGreatLakesandotherpublicwater.112

Dempsey’sslipperyslopeargumentsreflect the fearsandconcernssharedbymany,andhisargumentsresonatewithpolicy‐makers.113Theargument often motivates legal opposition to bottled waterwithdrawals, even though the resulting cases are decided on more

107. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Water Privatization Overview, available athttp://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/general/(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 108. Apparently not all “environmentalists” share the concerns of the Sierra Club,Natural Resources Defense Council, and other prominent organizations. Perhaps thetwo most prominent leaders of the modern environmental movement, former Vice‐President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore and author, activist, and attorneyRobert Kennedy Jr. are public consumers and supporters of bottled water. Gorerequested bottled spring water (“a regional brand, ‘not Evian’”) throughout his “AnInconvenient Truth” tour. ROYTE, supra note 60, at 150. Kennedy founded “KeeperSprings,” a small Vermont‐based bottledwater company, which, in Robin Hood style,sendsallafter‐taxprofitstothenonprofitadvocacygroupWaterkeeperAlliance. Id.at162. 109. DEMPSEY,supranote4,at48.110. Id.at46.111. Id.at53–54.112. Id.at99. 113. While author Dempsey is the leading expert for articulating these concerns indetail,therapartistMosDefmakesthesamepointmoresuccinctlyandentertaininglyin“NewWorldWater”:

[T]ilyourcrewusetheH2inwiseamountssinceit’stheNewWorldWater;andeverydropcountsYoucanlaughandtakeitasajokeifyouwannaButitdon’trainforfourweekssomesummersAndit’sabouttogetrealwildinthehalfYoubebuyingEvianjusttotakeafuckinbath.

MOSDEF,NewWorldWater,onBLACKONBOTHSIDES(PriorityRecords1999),availableathttp://www.lyricsdepot.com/mos‐def/new‐world‐water.html (last visited Dec. 1,2009).


traditional water law and environmental law doctrines.114 This leadsbottled water opponents to pursue some counterproductive andultimatelyineffectivepolicygoals,suchasexpansionofthepublictrustdoctrine (discussed in Part IV infra).115 Further, even when bottledwater opponents prevail in litigation or in a legislative forum byenactingnewregulations,theresultinglegalreformsdonotaddresstheopponents’fundamentalconcerns.116Asdiscussedinmoredetailinthefollowing sections, the real challengewith bottledwater opposition isusing the opponents’ underlying concerns as motivation to createmeaningful and effective freshwater laws and policies that go beyondfearfulprotectionismandreactionism,andtowardsproactiveprotectionthat incorporates current values and science. Case studies of sucheffortsatthestatelevelarethefocusofPartIIIofthisarticle,butfirstitisimportanttoprovideabriefoverviewofthegroundrulesforbottledwaterfrominternationalandfederallaw.

II. THEGROUNDRULES:INTERNATIONALANDFEDERALLAW

Bottledwaterwithdrawalsaregenerallysubject tostatewateruselaws,anddisputesoverbottledwaterareordinarilyresolvedpursuantto state law. However, international trade law and federal food lawhaveframedthegroundrulesfortheglobalbottledwaterindustry.TheNorth American Free Trade Agreement117 (“NAFTA”) and the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade118 (“GATT”) generally prohibitrestrictionsonexportsofproductsorgoods(includingbottledwater)toothercountries, subject to limitedexceptions. At the federal level, theFood and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates bottled water fordrinking water quality and labeling accuracy,119 with the unintendedeffectofcreatingincreasedmarketpressurefor“springwater”pumpedfrom some of the most vulnerable water resources. Taken together,internationaltradelawandfederalfoodlawcreateamarketinbottledwaterwithapremiumon“springwater”thatbothlimitsandchallengestraditionalstatewaterlaw.

A. INTERNATIONALTRADELAWANDBOTTLEDWATER

Internationaltradelawfacilitatestheglobalmarketinbottledwaterwhile restricting the ability of states to limit the sale and export ofbottledwaterproducts. UnderNAFTAandGATT,statesmaynotenact“prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or

114. DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at 30‐33 (referring to Mich. Citizens for WaterConservationv.NestléWatersN.Am.Inc.,709N.W.2d174(Mich.Ct.App.2005), infraPartIII.A.1).115. Seee.g.,Tuholske,supranote75,at235‐36.116. SeegenerallyDEMPSEY,supranote4,at45‐46. 117. NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement, Can.‐Mex.‐U.S.,Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.289(1993)[hereinafterNAFTA]. 118. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194[hereinafterGATT]. 119. Boldt‐VanRooy,supranote84,at275‐76.


othermeasures...ontheexportationorsaleforexportofanyproductdestined for the territory of any other [state].”120 The thresholdquestion is to what extent water is a “good” or “product” subject toNAFTA and GATT. NAFTA defines “goods” as “domestic products astheseareunderstoodintheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTradeorsuch goods as the Parties may agree.”121 GATT does not define a“product,”leavingthequestionofthewhetherthetermappliestowatersubject to interpretationanddebate.122 This isan importantquestion,butforpurposesofthisarticle,itwillnotbeaddressedinfurtherdetail.

TheextenttowhichGATTandNAFTArestricttheexportandsaleofbulk water is still hotly debated,123 but it is widely agreed that theyapply tobottledwater as a good.124 There is a cleardistinctionunderinternationaltradelawbetweenwaterinitsnaturalstate(whichisnotagood)andbottledwaterasaproduct(whichisagood),withbulkwateroccupying a place somewhere in between.125 In 1993, the federalgovernments of Canada, the United States and Mexico clarified thisdistinction in a joint statement that responded to concerns over theapplicabilityofNAFTAtowater:

Unlesswater, in any form, has entered into commerce andbecomeagood or product, it is not covered by the provisions of any tradeagreement,includingtheNAFTA...Waterinitsnaturalstateinlakes,rivers, reservoirs, aquifers,waterbasins and the like is not a good orproduct,isnottraded,andthereforeisnotandneverhasbeensubjecttothetermsofanytradeagreement.126

AlthoughthisstatementdoesnotbindNAFTApartiesortheWorldTradeOrganization, itprovidesacleardistinctionbetweenwaterinitsnaturalstate,whichstatescanprotectwithoutrunningafoulofNAFTA(and likelyGATT),andbottledwater,whichasaproduct incommercecannotbebannedorrestrictedunlessallowedunderaNAFTAorGATTexemption.

The International Convention on the Harmonized CommodityDescription and Coding System (“HS Code”) adopted by GATT parties,whichuses an international coding system to describe goods for tariffpurposes,providesadditional evidence thatbottledwater is agood.127

120. GATT,supranote118,art.XI;seeNAFTA,supranote117,art.309. 121. NAFTA,supranote117,art.201. 122. DAVID JOHANSEN,WATER EXPORTS AND THE NAFTA (1999), available at http://dsp‐psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection‐R/LoPBdP/EB/prb995‐e.htm(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 123. MarciaValiante,supranote12,at534(“Inthecontinuumbetweenresourceandcommodity,wateratsomepointbecomessubjecttotradeobligations,butthereisstillambiguityas towhen thisoccurs.”);seealsoA.DanTarlock,TheStrangeCareerof theDormantCommerceClauseandInternationalTradeLawintheGreatLakesAntidiversionRegime,2006MICH.ST.L.REV.1375,1393–94(2006).124. SeeSlater,supranote11,at651–52.125. Id.at659. 126. JOHANSEN,supranote122. 127. ANWARULHODA, TARIFFNEGOTIATIONS ANDRENEGOTIATIONSUNDER THEGATT AND THE


The HS Code includes product descriptions for water, defined as“waters, including natural or artificial waters and aeratedwaters, notcontainingaddedsugarorothersweeteningmatternor flavouring; iceandsnow.”128

Considering bottled water as good for purposes of internationaltradelawdoesnotendthedebateoverregulatingbottledwater,but itdoes frame and limit the approaches states can take in restrictingbottledwaterexports.BothNAFTAandGATTallowstatestoimplementmeasures“relatingtotheconservationofexhaustiblenaturalresourcesifsuchmeasuresaremadeeffectiveinconjunctionwithrestrictionsondomestic production or consumption.” 129 Suchmeasuresmay not be“applied in amannerwhichwould constitute ameans of arbitrary orunjustifiable discrimination” nor be “a disguised restriction oninternational trade.”130 Thus, statesmay regulate and restrict bottledwater to theextentnecessary to conserve theirwater resources. Thislimitation is not an obstacle to sound state water policy and bottledwater regulation. Rather, the limitations that international trade lawimposes simply force states to focus on protecting water resourceswhen regulating bottled water. Thinly disguised protectionism andoutrightdiscriminationagainsttheuseofwaterforbottledwaterwouldviolate NAFTA and GATT.131 More fundamentally, such an approachwould not serve a state’s interest in managing and protecting waterresources. Thetaskforstates istousetheconcernoverbottledwaterexports to enact non‐discriminatorywater use regulations focused ontheprotectionofnaturalresources.

B. FEDERALREGULATIONOFBOTTLEDWATERASAFOODPRODUCT

Generally, the federal government does not regulate waterwithdrawal orwater use from surfacewaters or groundwater for anypurpose, including bottlingwater. Water law is primarily state‐basedlaw,asdiscussedinthenextpart.However,becausetheFDAconsidersbottled water a food product under the Federal Food, Drug andCosmeticAct,theFDAregulatesthedrinkingwaterqualityandlabelingaccuracy of bottled water.132 The United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act,regulates the quality of other drinking water supplies, including

WTO:PROCEDURESANDPRACTICES270(CambridgeUniversityPress2001)(explainingthattheHarmonizedCommodityDescriptionandCodingSystem(HS)oftariffnomenclatureisdevelopedandmaintainedbytheWorldCustomsOrganizationCustomsCo‐operationCouncil). 128. JOHANSEN,supranote122. 129. GATT, supra note 118, art. XX(g); NAFTA, supra note 117, art. 2101(incorporatingGATTArticleXX(g)andstatingthatitappliestomeasuresrelatingtotheconservationoflivingandnon‐livingexhaustiblenaturalresources). 130. GATT,supranote118,art.XX;NAFTA,supranote117,art.2101. 131. GATT,supranote118,art.XX;NAFTA,supranote117,art.2101. 132. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Regulates the Safety of Bottled Water BeveragesIncluding Flavored Water and Nutrient Water Beverages, available athttp://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm046894.htm (last visitedDec.1,2009);seealso21U.S.C.§321(f)(2006).


municipaltapwater.133 WhilebottledwaterisnotsubjecttotheEPA’sregulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the FDA must ensurethatbottledwaterquality standardsare “at least as stringent as thoseissuedby theEPA formunicipal tapwater.”134 Further,whenever theEPA revises its drinking water standards, the FDAmust set a similarlevel for bottledwater or reportwhy it is not doing so in the FederalRegister.135

In addition to its water quality protection regulations, the FDAregulates“identity”labelingofbottledwater.136Theidentityregulationsdescribe the different types of bottledwater by source and treatmentprocess. Inadditiontosimply labelingaproductas“bottledwater”or“drinking water,” producers obtaining water from certain sources ormeeting specified treatment standards canusenumerousother labels,including “artesian well water,” “ground water,” “mineral water,”“purifiedwater,” “distilledwater,” “sparklingbottledwater,” “sterilizedwater,”and“wellwater.”137 Further,bottledwatermustbearthelabel“fromacommunitywatersystem”or“fromamunicipalsource”unlessthebottledwaterhasmetcertaintreatmentstandards.138

The labeling requirements for “spring water,” the identityconsumers seem to prefer, are particularly important because of theireffect on the impact of waterwithdrawals and the severity of bottledwaterdisputes.TheFDAregulationsprovide:

The name of water derived from an underground formation fromwhichwaterflowsnaturallytothesurfaceoftheearthmaybe“springwater.”Springwatershallbecollectedonlyatthespringorthroughabore hole tapping the underground formation feeding the spring.Thereshallbeanaturalforcecausingthewatertoflowtothesurfacethroughanaturalorifice.Thelocationofthespringshallbeidentified.Springwatercollectedwiththeuseofanexternal forceshallbe fromthe same underground stratum as the spring, as shown by ameasurable hydraulic connection using a hydrogeologically validmethodbetween theboreholeand thenaturalspring,andshallhaveall the physical properties, before treatment, and be of the samecomposition and quality, as the water that flows naturally to thesurface of the earth. If spring water is collected with the use of anexternalforce,watermustcontinuetoflownaturallytothesurfaceoftheearththroughthespring’snaturalorifice.Plantsshalldemonstrate,on request, to appropriate regulatory officials, using ahydrogeologically valid method, that an appropriate hydraulicconnectionexistsbetweenthenaturalorificeofthespringandtheborehole.139

133. 42U.S.C.§300fetseq.(1974),amendedbyPub.L.No.104‐182,110Stat.1613(1996). 134. Boldt‐VanRooy,supranote84,at275. 135. 21U.S.C.§349(b)(3)(A)(2006). 136. BottledWater,21C.F.R.§165.110(a)(2009).137. Id.§165.110(a)(2).138. Id.§165.110(a)(3)(ii).139. Id.§165.110(a)(2)(vi).


Thus,inordertoproducebottledwaterwiththeconsumer‐desiredlabel of “spring water,” the FDA requires bottled water producers todrawwatereitherdirectlyfromaspringorfromgroundwaterthathasadirect hydrological connection to a surface spring.140 This regulationhas had the unintended consequence of placing tremendous demandand pressure on springs, which are typically some of themost fragileandvulnerablewaterresources.Asexaminedindetailinthenextpart,the new and increased pressure bottled water production creates forvulnerablespringsisoftenthefocalpointoflitigateddisputesandnew,statelevelregulatoryandenvironmentalprotectionefforts.

III. ONTHEGROUND:STATELAW

Waterlawisstatelaw.Thediverseapproachestotheallocationandprotectionoffreshwaterresourcesamongthestatesprovidenumerousexamples of how state law should (and should not) respond to thethreat of water marketing in the era of globalization. Because mostcontroversial bottled water operations involve the withdrawal ofgroundwater, state groundwater law becomes the focus of manydisputes and reform efforts. Sometimes the reform occursincrementally and responsively through litigation involving commonlawwaterrights.Withthegrowthinpubliclawforwatermanagement,moststatesnowalsohavestatutesthataddresswaterwithdrawalsandwaterrights,oftenwithdetailedregulationsimplementedandenforcedbystateadministrativeagencies. ThisPart firstexaminescasestudiesof litigated disputes, and then explores case studies of legislative andpoliticalresponsestobottledwatercontroversies.

A. BOTTLEDWATERINTHECOURTS:THEGOOD,THENOTSOBAD,ANDTHEUGLY

The diversity of state laws applicable to water resourcemanagementhasgivenrisetoabroadrangeofissuesandoutcomesinbottled water litigation. Many disputes focus on common lawgroundwater doctrines. State groundwater law can be characterizedinto five general approaches to groundwater allocation and disputeresolution:141 (1) the rule of capture, also referred to as “absolutedominion” over waters;142 (2) the “American” reasonable use

140. Id. 141. Please note that state statutes have modified and, in some cases, significantlyalteredthecommonlawrulesaddressedherein.SeeRenoSmeltingv.Stevenson,21P.317,320(Nev.1889). 142. Connecticut–Roathv.Driscoll,20Conn.533,538(1850);Delaware–MacArtorv.GraylynCrestIIISwimClub,Inc.,187A.2d417,419(Del.Ch.1963);Indiana–Wigginsv.BrazilCoal&ClayCorp.,452N.E.2d958,964(Ind.1983);Iowa–Houganv.Milwaukee&St.PaulRy.Co.,35Iowa558,558(1872);Kansas–Stateexrel.Petersonv.Kan.StateBd.ofAgric.,149P.2d604,606(Kan.1944);Kentucky–Noursev.Andrews,255S.W.84,86(Ky.1923);Lousiana–Adamsv.Grigsby,152So.2d619,623(La.App.1963);Maine–Maddocks v.Giles, 728A.2d150, 153 (Me. 1999);Massachusetts –Gamerv.Milton,195N.E.2d65,67(1964);Mississippi–ClarkeCountyv.Miss.LumberCo.,31So.905,906 (Miss. 1902);Montana – Ryan v. Quinlan, 124 P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912); Texas –Siprianov.GreatSpringWatersofAm.,Inc.,1S.W.3d75,75(Tex.1999);Utah–Crescent


doctrine;143 (3) the correlative rights doctrine;144 (4) the doctrine ofprior appropriation;145 and (5) the Restatement (Second) of Tortsdoctrine.146 Asdiscussedbelow in thecasestudies fromMichiganandTexas, thesedoctrinesvary considerably inhowwell theyaddress thenewdemandsandpressuresongroundwaterresourcesthatresultfromwaterbottling. Further, common lawwaterrightsarenot theonly,orevenprimary,legalissueinsomebottledwatercases.Opponentsoftenlooktoenforcestateenvironmentalandadministrativelawtodelayorpreventbottledwateroperations. Recent case studies fromCaliforniaandNewHampshire illustrate that this approach sometimes results inmore comprehensive decision‐making, but fails to address the realconcernsinthedispute.147

1. TheGood:Michigancraftsabalancedapproachtocompetinggroundwaterandsurfacewaterrights

Whilemost states have long established some version of commonlaw correlative rights for competing groundwater uses, bottled waterdisputes often involve groundwater withdrawals that impact surface

MiningCo.v.SilverKingMiningCo.,54P.244,245–46(Utah1898);Vermont‐Chatfieldv.Wilson,28Vt.49,50(1885);Virginia–C&WCoalCorp.v.Slayer,104S.E.2d50,54(1958). 143. Alabama –Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So.2d732, 737 (Ala. 1995);Arizona –Bristor v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173, 178–79 (Ariz. 1953); Arkansas – Lingo v.Jacksonville, 522 S.W.2d 403, 404–05 (Ark. 1975); Georgia – Stoner v. Patten, 63 S.E.897,898(Ga.1909);Illinois–Bridgmanv.SanitaryDist.ofDecatur,517N.E.2d309,312(4thDist.1987);Maryland–Finleyv.TeeterStoneInc.,248A.2d106,113(Md.1968);Missouri – Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Mo. App. 1971); Nebraska –Pratherv.Eisenmann,261N.W.2d766,769 (Neb.1978);NewHampshire –Bassett v.SalisburyMfg.Co.,43N.H.569,569 (1862);NewYork–Smithv.CityofBrooklyn,18A.D.340,349–50(N.Y.1897);NorthCarolina–Bayerv.NelloL.TeerCo.,124S.E.2d552,558(N.C.1963);NorthCarolina–Rousev.Kinston,123S.E.482,490(N.C.1924);NorthDakota–Volkmannv.Crosby,120N.W.2d18,23–24(N.D.1963);Oklahoma‐Canadav.Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1963). Oregon – Bull v. Siegrist, 126 P.2d 832, 834(Ore.1942);Pennsylvania–Rothrauffv.SinkingSpringWaterCo.,14A.2d87,90(Pa.1940);Tennessee–Nashville,C.&S.L.Ry.v.Rickert,89S.W.2d889,896(Tenn.Ct.App.1936);WestVirginia–Pencev.Carney,52S.E.702,706(W.Va.1905). 144. California – Katz v.Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 121 (1903); Florida – Cason v.FloridaPowerCo.,76So.535,535(Fla.1917);Hawaii–CityMillCo.v.HonoluluSewer& Water Comm'n, 30 Haw. 912, 914 (1929); Minnesota – Erickson v. CrookstonWaterworks,Power&LightCo.,111N.W.391,394(Minn.1907);NewJersey–Meekerv. E. Orange, 74 A. 379, 385 (N.J. 1909);Washington – Patrick v. Smith, 134 P. 1076,1079(Wash.1913). 145. Colorado – Bruening v. Dorr, 47 P. 290, 298 (Colo. 1896); Idaho – Bower v.Moorman,147P.496,487(Idaho1915);Nevada–InreManseSpring&ItsTributaries,108 P.2d 311, 314 (Nev. 1940); NewMexico – Yeo v. Tweedy, 286 P. 970, 977 (N.M.1929); South Dakota – Deadwood C. R. Co. v. Barker, 86 N.W. 619, 621 (S.D. 1901);Wyoming–Biningv.Miller,102P.2d54,59(Wyo.1940).146. SeeMaerzv.U.S.SteelCorp.,323N.W.2d524,530(Mich.Ct.App.1982);Clinev.Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ohio 1984); State v. Michels PipelineConstr.,Inc.,217N.W.2d339,350(Wis.1974).147. SeeLongv.GreatSpringWatersofAm.,Inc.,No.E030817,2002WL31813096,at*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2002); In re Town of Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582, 588 (N.H.2006).


waters. This gives state courts the opportunity to modernize theapplication of their groundwater laws to incorporate the hydrologicreality that groundwater and surfacewater are often connected. Theleading example of a state court incorporating modern hydrologicalevidence with the common law doctrines to resolve a bottled waterdispute comes from Michigan.148 In Michigan Citizens for WaterConservation v. Nestlé Waters North America, Inc. (“Nestlé”), theMichiganCourtofAppealsappliedthestate’sgroundwatercommonlawdoctrine to address harm to connected surfacewaters, and reached adecisionthatprovidedforcompromisebetweenthedisputingparties.149

The dispute in the case originated from Nestlé Waters NorthAmerica’s (“Nestlé”) planned groundwater withdrawals in MecostaCounty,Michigan.Nestlé,thedefendant,soughttopumpapproximately400 gallons per minute (“gpm”), 576,000 gallons per day, ofgroundwater from four wells located on a site called SanctuarySprings.150 Nestlé selected the Sanctuary Springs locationbecause thegroundwater would meet the Food and Drug Administration’srequirements to bemarketed as “springwater” pursuant to Food andDrugs, 21 C.F.R. § 165.110(a)(2)(vi) (2006) (discussed previously).151Nestlé also obtained a water quality permit from the MichiganDepartmentofEnvironmentalQuality.152

Locatedtothenorthof theareas indispute, thegroundwater fromSanctuarySpringscontributestothewaterfoundintheDeadStream,aswellasthewatersofman‐madeOspreyLake,whichthedammedwatersoftheDeadStreamcreated.153TheDeadStreamflowssoutheasttofeedinto Lake Mecosta, as well as other nearby water bodies.154 NestléplannedtosendthegroundwaterfromSanctuarySpringsviapipelinetoits“IceMountain”bottledwaterproductionfacilitylocatedtwelvemilesaway.155 However, even before construction was complete on thebottling facility, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation (“MCWC”)filedsuittoenjoinNestléfromextractingthegroundwater.156

ThenonprofitcorporationMCWCformedtorepresenttheinterestsof theriparianpropertyowners located inthevicinityof theproposedwells.157 In challenging Nestlé’s groundwater pumping, MCWC raisedthree principal legal issues. First, plaintiffs alleged that Nestlé’sgroundwaterpumpingwoulddiminishhydrologicallyconnectedsurfacewaters(includingtheDeadStream),therebyviolatingplaintiffs’riparian

148. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am. Inc., 709N.W.2d174,207(Mich.Ct.App.2005).149. Id. at 201‐02, 208‐09;portions rev’d on other grounds, 737N.W.2d 447 at 463(Mich.2007).150. Nestlé,709N.W.2dat184.151. Id.at184n.4;seealsosupraPartII.B.152. Nestlé,709N.W.2dat184.153. Id.154. Id.155. Id.at185&n.7.156. Id.at185.157. Id.at184.


rights in therecreationaluseandenjoymentof suchsurfacewaters.158Second, plaintiffs claimed that Nestlé’s groundwater use was per seunreasonablebecauseitwasoff‐tractandwouldcauseharm.159Finally,plaintiffs argued that Nestlé’s bottling and selling of groundwateroutsideofthesourcewatershedviolatedthepublictrust.160

The trial court granted summary disposition to Nestlé for theplaintiffs’ claim regarding their riparian rights, forwhich theplaintiffstooknoappeal.161Thetrialcourtalsograntedsummarydispositionforthe claim regarding thepublic trustdoctrine, ruling thatMichigan lawdoes extend public trust protections for navigable waters togroundwater,buttheDeadStreamwasnotnavigable,andonthisissue,the plaintiffs did not appeal.162 At the trial itself, however, plaintiffswerelargelysuccessful.Afteralengthybenchtrial,thetrialcourtfoundthatbecauseNestléwaspumpingthegroundwaterforbottlingoff‐tractand eventual sale and distribution outside of the source watershed,Nestlé’swaterusewasunreasonable.163ThecourtenjoinedNestléfromoperatingitsbottlingfacility.164Nestléappealed.

TheMichiganCourtofAppealsfirstupheldthetrialcourt’sfindingsof fact, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in makingconclusionsfavorabletoplaintiffs.165ThetrialcourtfoundthatNestlé’sgroundwater pumping would diminish the base flow of thehydrologicallyconnectedDeadStreamby345gpm,166meaningmostofthe 400 gpm of groundwater taken from Sanctuary Springs wouldotherwisecontributetothewatersoftheDeadStream. Thetrialcourtfound that the loss of water, around 24% of the total volume of thestream,167 would result in the stream narrowing by more than fourfeet,168andthewaterleveldroppingbyatleasttwoinches.169Thetrialcourt also found that the water level in nearby wetlands would dropnearlyafoot.170

The Court of Appeals then focused on the common law rules forsurfacewaterandgroundwateruseinMichigan.Inaddressingriparianrights, thecourtnoted thatMichigan followsreasonableuse rules thatbalance “competing water uses to determine whether one riparianproprietor’s water use, which interferes with another’s use, is

158. Id.at205.159. Id.at185‐86.160. Id.at185.161. Id.at185‐86&n.14.162. Id.163. Id.at186.164. Id.165. Id.at193.166. Id.at189‐190.167. Id.at206.168. Id.at191.169. Id.at189.170. Id.at188–89.


unreasonableunderthecircumstances.”171 Tobalancecompetinguses,Michigan courts weigh factors on both sides of a dispute whileacknowledging that “no list of factors is exhaustive,”172 and thatreasonable use must be determined on a “case‐by‐case basis.”173 IndiscussingMichigan’s rejection of the natural flow doctrine, the courtpointed out that neither a diminution in water quantity, nor analteration in flow,norboth, combinedwith injury, “will givea rightofaction, if in view of all the circumstances,... that which has beendone...isnotunreasonable.”174

TherulesinMichiganforgroundwateruseare,however,lessclear.Michigan had already rejected an absolute rule of capture (discussedbelow) for groundwater use, but had never before considered theproblem of groundwater use measurably affecting hydrologicallyconnected surface water.175 Upon surveying the development ofgroundwater law in Michigan, the Nestlé court concluded: “Michigancourtshaveconsistentlyavoidedstrictrulesthatpermitonewaterusertoutilizewaterattheexpenseofanadjacentuser.”176TheCourtwrotethatapreviousMichigancasehadadoptedreasonableusebalancingforgroundwater,177 and consequently elected to apply this approach todisputes between riparian and groundwater users due to the“interconnectednatureofwatersources.”178

The trial court applied a “hybrid rule” to adjudicate the dispute,whichrequiredthatgroundwaterwithdrawals,whenusedoff‐tract,notdiminish the natural flow of the surfacewater.179 This rule, however,essentially made groundwater rights inferior to surface water rights,andsignaledareturntoanabandonedripariandoctrine–naturalflow.Rejecting this rule because itwas inconsistentwith the balancing testforgroundwater‐surfacewaterdisputes,theMichiganCourtofAppealsarticulated three principles that “that govern the process of balancingcompetingwateruses.”180Thecourtstated:

First,thelawseekstoensurea“fairparticipation”intheuseofwaterfor thegreatestnumberofusers.... Hence, thecourtshouldattemptto strike a proper balance between protecting the rights of thecomplaining party and preserving as many beneficial uses of thecommonresourceas is feasibleunderthecircumstances. Second,thelaw will only protect a use that is itself reasonable.... A plaintiffwhose water use has little value or is excessive or harmful will beentitled tonoprotection. Third, the lawwillnotredresseveryharm,

171. Id.at196.172. Id.at194–95.173. Id.at196.174. Id..175. Id.at201–02.176. Id.at201.177. Id. at 200–01 (discussing Maerz v. U.S. Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524, 528–29(Mich.Ct.App.1982)).178. Id.at201–02.179. Id.at202.180. Id.


nomatterhowsmall,butwillonlyredressunreasonableharms.181

On topof these threeunderlyingprinciples, thecourtannouncedanon‐inclusive list of factors for consideration in adjudicating a waterrightsdispute:

These factors include(1) thepurposeof theuse, (2) thesuitabilityoftheusetothelocation,(3)theextentandamountoftheharm,(4)thebenefitsoftheuse,(5)thenecessityoftheamountandmannerofthewater use, and (6) any other factor that may bear on thereasonablenessoftheuse.182

The court recognized the similarity that these factors bear to theRestatement(Second)ofTorts§850(a)andsupplementeditsanalysisasto the applicability of the factors, with multiple references to therestatementcomments.183Thecourtalsoexplainedthatnaturalusesofwater(domesticusetosupportahousehold)willprevailoverartificialuses (all other uses of water, including commercial, recreational, andaesthetic), and that on‐tract uses benefiting the land have preferenceoveroff‐tractusesofsurfacewaterandgroundwater.184

Inapplyingthesefactorstothebottledwaterdispute,thecourtfirstnoted that both competing uses (Nestlé’s water bottling and theplaintiffs’recreationalandaestheticenjoymentoftheDeadStream)areartificialbutalsoreasonableandbeneficial,andthatneitherusewassopreferableornecessarysuchthatitwouldprevailonthatbasisalone.185Instead,thecourtlookedtotheamountofpumping,thesuitabilityofthewaterbodyforNestlé’suse,andtheextentoftheharm.186Inthiscase,Nestlé did not need to pump 400 gpm from this location to meet itscommercial needs, and further, that rate of pumping would causeunreasonable harm to the Dead Stream.187 Therefore, the court ruledthatNestlé’spumpingof400gpmatthislocationwasunreasonable,andenjoinedfuturepumpingatthatrate.188 However,thecourtnotedthatNestlé“shouldbepermittedtohavea‘fairparticipation’inthecommonwater resources of the area,”189 and so remanded the case to the trialcourt to determinewhat rate of pumpingwould be reasonable underthecircumstancesofthiscase.190

The Michigan Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’ssummary disposition in favor of Nestlé regarding the plaintiffs’ public

181. Id.182. Id.at203.183. Id.at203‐06,203nn.45–46.184. Id.at204.185. Id.at205–06.186. Id.at206–07.187. Id.188. Id.at207.189. Id.190. Id.at209.


trustclaim. UnderMichiganlaw,thepublictrustdoctrineonlyappliestonavigablewaters.191FindingthattheDeadStreamwasnotnavigable,thecourtheldthatthepublictrustdoctrinedidnotapplytothiscase.192Additionally, the court declined “plaintiffs’ invitation to expand thepublic trust doctrine” to groundwater and non‐navigable waters inMichigan.193 Plaintiffsarguedthatcase law, theMichiganConstitution,andseveralstatutessupportedtheirposition.194Thecourtdetermined,however, that the cited case law reaffirmed the navigability test forpublic trust applicability and merely dealt with fishing regulations,while the Constitution and statutes only recognized the importance ofwater as a natural resource.195 Mentioning that Michigan had “longrecognizedthatprivatepersonsobtainpropertyrights inwateronthebasis of their ownership of land,” the Michigan Supreme Courtconcluded that the trial court had properly dismissed the public trustclaim.196 Thus, Nestlé’s groundwater pumping did not give rise to apublictrustviolation.

The Nestlé case received tremendous public attention, includingcoverage innationalmediaoutlets such asUSAToday.197 Muchof thepublic attention focused on bottled water, and the controversiessurroundingdiversion and sale ofwater inMichigan.198 However, thecourt’s opinion did not focus on the bottling and sale of water, butinstead on the competing legal rights of surface and groundwaterusers.199TheMichigancourt,asistypical,didnottreatthewaterbottlerdifferentlythanothercommercialwaterusers. Nevertheless,thecourtcraftedalegallyandscientificallysoundapproachtoresolvingdisputesbetweencompetinggroundwaterandsurfacewaterusers.

2. TheNotSoBad:CaliforniaandNewHampshirerelyonstateenvironmentalandadministrativelawstoresolvebottledwater

disputes

Stateenvironmentalandadministrativelawsoftenplayaprominentrole in water withdrawal disputes. Recent cases from California andNewHampshireillustratebottledwaterisnoexception.Inearly2007,aCalifornia appeals court considered a local government’s compliancewith the state’s California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)200 in acontentiousbottledwaterdispute(againinvolvingNestléWatersNorth

191. Id.at218.192. Id.at218–19,222.193. Id.at218.194. Id.at221.195. Id.196. Id.at221‐22. 197. DebbieHowlett,WaterBattleDredgesUpAcrimony,USATODAY,June23,2003,at3A.198. Id. 199. Mich.Citizens forWaterConservationv.NestléWatersN.Am. Inc.,709N.W.2d174,222(Mich.Ct.App.2005). 200. CAL.PUB.RES.CODE,§21050(West2009).


America).201 In Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud CommunityServices District (“McCloud”), the court addressed bottled wateropponents’ challenge to an agreement between McCloud CommunityServicesDistrict (“District”) andNestlé for the sale of springwater.202Plaintiffs, Concerned McCloud Citizens, challenged the District’sapprovaloftheagreementwithNestlé.203

McCloud is a town located in Siskiyou County, California, nearMt.Shasta.204 Duetogrowingeconomicconcerns,theDistrictsoughtextraincome by selling rights to its spring waters to water bottlers.205 In2003, after a public meeting to consider a proposal with Nestlé, theDistrict entered into a tentative agreement for the sale of up to 1,600acre feet of water per year for fifty years with a guaranteed right ofrenewal for an additional fifty years.206 The agreement required afavorablefeasibilityevaluationbyNestlé,anagreementbetweenNestléand the District regarding several actions, and compliance withelementsofCEQA.207Importantly,theagreementwascontingentonthecompletionof “proceedingsunderCEQA,” andneitherpartywas to bebound “unless and until District’s compliance with CEQA [was]completed”withnopossibilityofachallenge“pursuanttoCEQA.”208

CEQA requires that a public agency determine whether a project“mayhaveasignificantenvironmentalimpact...beforeitapprovesthatproject.”209 If the agency determines that a significant environmentalimpactmay occur, the agencymust prepare an Environmental ImpactReport (“EIR”).210 Plaintiffs argued that the District should havecompliedwithCEQApriortosigningtheagreement,andthetrialcourtagreed.211 According to the trialcourt, “theapprovalof theagreementamounted to the creation of an entitlement for Nestlé and committedthe District to a definite course of action.”212 Because the agreementaffected the vitality of an environmentally sensitive resource, the trialcourt held that the District abused its discretion by failing to proceedwithCEQAcompliancepriortoapprovaloftheagreement.213 Thetrialcourtgrantedtheopponents’requested“writofmandaterequiringtheagreement to be vacated, set aside, and voided,” finding that theDistrict’s approval of the agreement was a prejudicial abuse of

201. SeeConcernedMcCloudCitizensv.McCloudCmty.Servs.Dist.,54Cal.Rptr.3d1,2‐3(Ct.App.2007).202. Id.at2.203. Id.204. Id.at3.205. Id.206. Id.at3‐4.207. Id.at4‐5.208. Id.at5.209. Id.at7(internalcitationsomitted).210. Id.211. Id.at2,5.212. Id.at5.213. Id.


discretion.214However,theDistrictandNestléprevailedonappeal. TheCourtof

Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the District’sactions did not constitute the “approval” of a “project” required forCEQAcompliance.215Thus,theDistricthadnodutyofcompliancewithCEQA.216 The court’s decision turned on the fact that the agreementbetweenNestléandtheDistrictwasconditionalonaseriesof“ifs,”thebiggest among them being the securing of all discretionary permits,“expressly defined as including CEQA documentation, review andapprovals, along with the final adjudication of any legal challengesbased on CEQA.”217 The court emphasized the abstract nature of theNestlé agreement, noting its lackof specificity regarding locations anddesigns.218 According to the court, compliance with CEQA would beuseless at this stage given the ambiguity in the agreement: “At thecurrent planning stage of this proposedproject, preparationof anEIRwouldbepremature. Anyanalysisofpotentialenvironmental impactswouldbewhollyspeculativeandessentiallymeaningless.”219

Thus,thecourtofappealsconcludedthatthatthetrialcourterredinits ruling against the District, reversed the trial court’s judgment, andheld that “subsequent compliance with the CEQA review procedures[was] permissible.”220 However, as of July 29, 2008,Nestlé has yet tocommencewater pumping and bottling operations inMcCloud, as theagreementnonethelesswassubjecttoenvironmentalreview.221Despitethe litigation outcome, Nestlé re‐opened the EIR under pressure fromtheCaliforniaAttorneyGeneralandbottledwateropponents.222Nestléalsoagreedto limit theamountofwater itwillwithdrawfromspringsandgroundwater.223 TheEIRisongoingandtheapprovalprocessmaytake several more years.224 Thus, the conflict, though mitigated anddelayed,isnotresolved.

214. Id.at2‐3.215. Id.at8.216. Id.217. Id.at8‐9.Othercontingenciesintheagreementreferencedbythecourtare:(1)ifNestlédeterminesduringthecontingencyperiodthatwaterbottlingfromthespringsispossible; (2) ifNestléobtainsallapplicablegovernmentapprovalsandpermits for thesite and facility; (3) if the District approves a design for water testing, monitoring,collectionanddistribution;and(4)ifthepartiestotheagreementareabletodevelopawatersupplycontingencyplantoaddresspotentialemergencies.Id.218. Id.219. Id.at12.220. Id.221. SeeSamanthaYoung,Calif.AGCracksDownonNestléBottlingPlant,SANFRANCISCOCHRON.,July29,2008,availableathttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/07/29/financial/f135206D79.DTL (last visited Dec. 1,2009).222. Id.223. See SamanthaYoung,BottlingPlantsFaceOppositionasFearsGrowOverWaterSupplies, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 9, 2008, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/04/09/national/a111630D72.DTL (last visited Dec. 1,2009).224. Id.


NewHampshirecourtshavealsodealtwithstateenvironmentalandadministrativelawinthecontextofbottledwaterdisputes.In2004,theNewHampshireDepartmentofEnvironmentalServices(“DES”)issuedalarge groundwaterwithdrawal permit to awater bottler,USA Springs,Inc.225USASpringsplannedtowithdrawupto439,200gallonsofwaterperdayfromaspringandthreewellsforitsbottledwateroperation.226The petitioners – Town of Nottingham, Town of Barrington, and SaveOurGroundwater(a landownersgroup)–appealedtheissuanceofthestatepermit.227

The petitioners raised several claims against the DES, includingviolationsofNewHampshire’sGroundwaterProtectionAct,228failuretoconsider the public trust, failure to comply with the state’s wetlandsprotection statute,229 and unconstitutional takings claims.230 TheNewHampshireGroundwaterProtectionActrequirestheDESto“adoptrulesinrelationto,amongotherthings, ‘[a]llnewgroundwaterwithdrawalsof 57,600 gallons or more in any 24‐hour period.’”231 However, thepetitioners argued that language in a separate chapter of the NewHampshire Code232 directed the DES to consider the public trust inassessing an application to withdraw groundwater.233 The relevantstatute included the finding that surface water and groundwaterconstitute “invaluable public resource[s],” referenced the state as the“trustee of this resource for the public benefit,” and directedgovernment agencies having authority over this resource to “complywiththispolicy.”234

Thecourt,however,agreedwiththerespondent in findingthattheAct’s public trust language did not bar the issuance of the permit inquestion.235 The court held that chapter 481 of the New HampshireRevisedStatutesdidnotapplytoDESbecausechapter485haditsownstatementofpurpose,andchapter481providedno“specificadditionaltest thatDESmustapply” indeterminingwhether to issueapermit.236The court alsodeclined to adopt any contention that the common lawpublic trust doctrine applied to DES.237 The court refused to “engraftcommon law tort principles onto the statutory and regulatory schemegoverninggroundwaterwithdrawals,”therebyconcludingthatthestate

225. InreTownofNottingham,904A.2d582,588(N.H.2006).226. Id.at587.227. Id. 228. N.H.REV.STAT.§485‐C. 229. N.H. REV. STAT. § 482‐A (protecting state wetlands from despoliation andunregulatedalteration.)230. Nottingham,904A.2dat588.231. Id.(quotingN.H.REV.STAT.§485‐C:4,XII).232. SeegenerallyN.H.REV. STAT. §481:1 (declaringpolicy toprotect, conserve, andmanagethewaterofNewHampshire).233. Nottingham,904A.2dat589.234. Id.(quotingN.H.REV.STAT.§481:1).235. Id.236. Id.at589‐90.237. Id.at590.


legislature had included all factors for consideration by DES in thestatute.238

The petitioners also argued that DES erred in not applying thewetlandsprotectionstatute,whichstatesthat“nopersonshallexcavate,remove, fill,dredge,orconstructanystructuresinoronanybank,flat,marsh, or swamp in andadjacent to anywatersof the statewithout apermit from the department.”239 Though the court found that thestatute was ambiguous, it held that no interpretation supported thepetitioner’s argument, as the statute failed to regulate the removal of“water” in the wetlands.240 The existence of regulations under theGroundwater Protection Act that take into account the effect ofgroundwater withdrawals on surface waters served to bolster thecourt’s decision.241 Accordingly, the court concluded that that USASprings’ proposed groundwater withdrawal was not subject to thepermittingrequirementsofthestate’swetlandprotectionstatute.242

ThepetitionersalsoarguedthatUSASprings’proposedwithdrawalswould amount to a taking under the state and federal Constitutions,contendingthat theminingofwaterwoulddecreasethewater level inhomeowners’ wells and contaminate and damage homeowners’pumpingequipment.243 Keytotheirargumentwasthecontentionthat“landownershaveapropertyrightinsubterraneanwaterflows.”244Thecourt,however,heldthatbecauseNewHampshireapplieda“doctrineofreasonable use” to groundwater,245 “[t]he right to use water does notcarrywithitownershipofthewaterlyingundertheland,”andthatsucha right is “not considered ‘private property’ requiring condemnationproceedingsunless thepropertyhasbeenrendereduseless forcertainpurposes.”246 Thus, the takings argument of the petitioners did notpersuadethecourt,andthecourtfoundthattherehadbeennoshowingofaprotectedpropertyinterestunderNewHampshirelaw.247

Therefore, theNewHampshire litigationproduced the same resultas the California litigation – judicial approval of a government’sapplicationofstateenvironmentalandadministrativelawstoabottledwater dispute. From the perspective of the bottledwater companies,the litigation creates increased transaction costs and may discourageinvestmentinthestate,butdoesnotultimatelyprohibitthewithdrawalofwaterandsaleofthebottledwaterproduct.Fromtheperspectiveofbottled water opponents, the litigation delays the bottled wateroperation and may open the door to various compromises andconcessions, but fails to stop bottledwater companies from using the

238. Id.239. Id.at590‐91(quotingN.H.REV.STAT.§482‐A:3).240. Id.at591.241. Id.242. Id.243. Id.at591‐92.244. Id.at592.245. Id.246. Id.247. Id.at593.


communities’waterresources. Theseoutcomeshavevalue,butunlikethe Michigan Nestlé litigation, fail to resolve the primary issues ofcontrolandallocationofwaterresourceswithinacommunityofwaterusers.

3. TheUgly:Texasrefusestogivelegalprotectionforgroundwaterrights

While most states have adopted their common law doctrines tobetter incorporate the modern science of hydrology and to providemore equitable correlative rights for groundwater use, a notableexceptionisTexas.248InSiprianov.GreatSpringWatersofAmerica,Inc.(“Sipriano”), the Texas Supreme Court bucked the trend displayed bymost other states and held fast to the rule of capture,249 which isbasicallynolegalruleforgroundwaterextractionatall.

Thedisputebeganwhenthedefendant(anotherNestlécompany250)soughtanewsourceforitsOzarka“springwater”brand.Ozarkainitiallybegan pumping a relatively modest 90,000 gallons of water per dayfrom landnear Sipriano’s land.251 Not longafter thepumping started,BartSiprianoexperiencedadecreaseinhiswellwatersupplyandsuedthe water bottler to enjoin continued pumping.252 The plaintiffs’ suitwas an attempt to reform the common law in Texas from a rule ofcapture to the more modern correlative rights approach, the “rule ofreasonableuse.”253

In short, the plaintiffs failed.254 The Texas Supreme Court upheldthe state’s common law rule of capture, which had been in place foralmost a century.255 As the court explained, the “rule of captureessentiallyallows...alandownertopumpasmuchgroundwaterasthelandowner chooses, without liability to neighbors who claim that thepumpinghasdepletedtheirwells.”256Inaseparateconcurrence,TexasSupreme Court Justice Hecht noted that Texas remained an unusualwesternstateforfollowingtheoutdatedruleofcapture,257butchoseto

248. SeeSiprianov.GreatSpringWatersofAm.,Inc.,1S.W.3d75,81‐82(Tex.1999)(Hecht,J.,concurring).249. Id.at75,81‐82. 250. Nestlé Waters North America: Our Brands, available at http://www.nestle‐watersna.com/Menu/OurBrands.htm(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).251. Sipriano,1S.W.3dat75‐76.252. Id.at76.253. Id.at75.254. Id.255. Id.256. Id.257. Id.at81‐82(Hecht,J.,concurring).Texasmayhavebeenalonestarstickingwiththeruleofcaptureinthewest,butithadacontemporarycompanionontheeastcoastinMaine. Aroundthesametimeof theSiprianodecision,Maine’sSupremeCourt facedasimilarlegalchallenge,andruledthesamewayasTexas.InMaddocksv.Giles,728A.2d150,151‐53(Me.1999), theMaineSupremeCourtopted toretain theruleof capture,ratherthanadopttheRestatementdoctrine,asfavoredbytheplaintiff.Accordingtothecourt,theplaintiffscontendedthattheruleofcapturewas“baseduponfaultyscience,”


leavetothestatelegislaturethetaskofmodernizingTexasgroundwaterlaw.258

This result is ugly, and not just for homeowners leftwith no legalremedytoprotecttheirgroundwaterusefromwaterbottlersandotherlargecommercialwaterusers.Texasandotherstatesthatadheretotheruleofcaptureleaveanygroundwateruserwithout legalrecourseandinstead let the biggest, deepest groundwater pumpers take as muchwaterastheycan.WhiletheimmediateresultoftheSiprianolitigationappearstobeawinforNestlé,itactuallyleavesNestléasvulnerableasBart Siprianowhen a new groundwater user (such as another bottledwater company) comes to town. Bottled water companies andmanyother commercial water users need some legal protection for theirgroundwaterusetoencourageinvestmentinanarea. Thelackoflegalprotectionandrulesmayalsoresult inanuncheckedrunonaregion’sgroundwaterresource,sincenopartywouldhaveanylegaloreconomicincentive to restrict itswateruse. In the end, thiswill leave the statewithdepletedgroundwaterresources,thebottledwatercompaniesandother water users will have failed investments, and the lack of legalprotectionwillseverelyimpacttheenvironmentontheway.Thecourtsseem to recognize this, yet they have put their faith in the politicalprocess and state legislatures to solve the problem.259 As the nextsection details with several case studies, that faith is sometimesjustified,butpoliticsandbottledwaterdonotalwaysmixwell.

B. BOTTLEDWATERINLEGISLATURESANDPOLITICS:THEGOOD,THENOTSOBAD,ANDTHEREALLYUGLY

Nearly every state has statutory authority regarding groundwaterwithdrawals and management, ranging from basic reporting andregistrationrequirementstoextensivesitespecificpermittedreviewsofgroundwaterwithdrawals.260Mostofthesestatutespredatetherecent

and the court acknowledged that several other courts had used this argument whenabandoningthedoctrine.Id.at153.Despitethisrecognition,theMaineSupremeCourtdeclined to abandon the rule of capture, emphasizing stare decisis and the reliance ofMaine groundwater users on the present property laws. Id. at 153‐54. And like theTexasSupremeCourt,theMaineSupremeCourtreasonedthatwaterpolicyreformsarebestlefttothestatelegislature.Id.at154.258. Sipriano,1S.W.3dat81‐83(Hecht,J.,concurring).259. See,e.g.,Maddocks,728A.2dat154;Sipriano,1S.W.3dat80. 260. Alabama Water Resources Act, ALA. CODE § 9‐10B‐1 (2009); Water Use Act,ALASKASTAT.§46.15.010(2009);ARIZ.REV.STAT.. §45 (2009);ArkansasGroundWaterManagement and Protection Act, ARK. CODE. § 15‐22‐901 (2009); CAL. WATER CODE §10702(West2009);ColoradoGroundWaterManagementAct,COLO.REV.STAT.§37‐90‐101 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a‐351 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 373.016 (2009); GroundWaterUseActof1972,GA.CODEANN.§12‐5‐90(2008);StateWaterCodeof1987,HAW.REV. STAT. § 174C‐1 (2009); GroundWater Act of 1951, IDAHO CODE § 42‐101 (2009);IllinoisWaterUseActof1983,525 ILL.COMP.STAT.45/1 (2009); IND.CODE§14‐25‐1‐1(2009); 1945Water Appropriation Act, KAN. STAT. § 82a‐702 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. §151.110 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. § 38:3091 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38 § 404 (2009);Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32701(2009);MINN.STAT.§103G.291(2008);MISS.CODE§51‐3‐1(2009);MissouriWaterWellDrillers Act MO. REV. STAT. §§ 256.600‐640 (2009); MONT. CODE §§ 85‐2‐501 (2009);GroundwaterManagementandProtectionAct,NEB.REV.STAT.§46‐701(2009);NEV.REV.


controversiessurroundingbottledwater.Butasbottledwaterdisputeshavecometothepublic’s(andpoliticians’)attentionoverthepast fewyears, several states – includingMichigan,Maine, andVermont – haverespondedwithnewregulatorymeasures.261Thishasbeenagenerallypositivetrend,astheresultingregulationsprovideincreasedprotectionfor water resources while balancing water rights with hydrology andaquatic ecology concerns. However, politicians are also prone tooverreact to the threat of bottledwaterwithdraconianmeasures thatunsettlewaterrightsandhavenobasisinscience.

1. TheGood:MichiganandtheotherGreatLakesstatesprotectnaturalresourcesfrombottledwaterwithdrawals

EvenbeforetheMichigancourtofappealshandeddownitsdecisionintheNestlécasediscussedabove,theMichiganlegislaturemadesomemodest reforms in groundwater law. In 2003, Michigan enacted agroundwater dispute resolution program.262 The program provides asimple process for small quantitywell owners to “submit a complaintallegingapotentialgroundwaterdispute if the smallquantitywellhasfailedtofurnishthewell’snormalsupplyofwater...andtheownerhascredible reason to believe thewell’s problems have been caused by ahigh capacity well.”263 Small quantity wells are wells with less than100,000 gallons per day of pumping capacity; high capacity wells arewellswithcapacitygreaterthan100,000gallonsperday.264Essentially,thestatuteprovidesafarcheaperandsimplermechanismthanprivatelitigationtoprotectthegroundwateruserightsofindividualsandsmallbusinessesharmedbylargergroundwaterextractions.

After the Nestlé decision, the Michigan legislature made far moresignificantreforms.Statutesenactedin2006requiredanypersonwhodevelopsneworincreasedwaterwithdrawalcapacityofover2milliongallons per day (“gpd”) from an inland water source (includinggroundwater)toobtainawaterwithdrawalpermit.265Forwithdrawalsfrominlandwatersandgroundwater,thesolestandardforissuanceofa

STAT.§534.010(2009);GroundwaterProtectionAct,N.H.REV.STAT§485C(2009);N.M.STAT.§72‐12‐1(2009);N.Y.ENVTL.CONSERVATIONLAW§55(Consol.2009);N.C.GEN.STAT.§143‐215(2009);N.D.CENT.CODE§61‐04‐01(2009);OHIOREV.CODE§1521.01(2009);OklahomaGroundwaterLaw,OKLA.STAT.tit.82§1020.1(2009);OR.REV.STAT.§537.505(2007);R.I.GEN.LAWS§46‐13‐1(2009);GroundwaterUseandReportingAct,S.C.CODE§49‐5‐10 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46‐6‐1 (2009); Tennessee Water ResourcesInformationAct,TENN.CODE§69‐7‐301(2009);TEX.WATERCODE§36.001(2009);UTAHCODE§73‐3‐1(2009);VT.STAT.tit.10,§48(2009);VA.CODE§62.1‐1(2009);WASHREV.CODE § 90.44.100 (2009); Groundwater Protection Act,W. VA. CODE § 22‐12‐1 (2009);WIS.STAT.§281.34(2009);WYO.STAT.ANN.§41‐2‐101(2009). 261. GreatLakes‐St.LawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompact,Pub.L.No.110–342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008); Act of June 9, 2008, No. 199, § 1390, 2008 Vt. ALS 199(LexisNexis);ActConcerningtheSustainableUseofandPlanningforWaterResources,ch.399,2007Me.LawsS.P.610—L.D.1743(2007). 262. MICH.COMP.LAWS§324.31702(1)(2009).263. Id.264. Id.§§324.31701(j)and(q).265. Id.§324.32723(1).


permitwaswhetherornotthewithdrawal“willresult in[ ] individualor cumulative adverse resource impacts.”266 An “adverse resourceimpact” was defined as decreasing either the flow of a stream or thelevel of a body of surfacewater such that thewater body’s “ability tosupportcharacteristicfishpopulationsisfunctionallyimpaired.”267Thestatutesdonotspecifypermitterms,buteachstatemayrevokeapermitif it “determines following ahearing, basedupon clear and convincingscientificevidence, that thewithdrawal is causinganadverseresourceimpact.”268ThepermitprocessandappealsaresubjecttotheMichiganAdministrative Procedures Act.269 Water bottlers subject to the stateSafeDrinkingWaterActsubscribedtoessentiallythesamestandards.270

Beyondthegeneralreformstowaterwithdrawallaw,theMichiganstatute also subjects bottled water producers to many additionalstandardsandrequirements.Thestatutesubjectswaterbottlerstoafarlowerpermit threshold(newor increasedwithdrawalof200,000gpd)andrequiredthemtomeetthefollowingstandards:

• The person will undertake activities, if needed, to addresshydrologic impacts commensurate with the nature andextentofthewithdrawal.Theseactivitiesmayincludethoserelatedtothestreamflowregime,waterquality,andaquiferprotection.

• Advance consultation with local government officials andinterestedcommunitymembers.

• Advance public notice and an opportunity for publiccomment.271

The statute alsomakes clear thatwater packaged in containers of5.7 gallons or less (most bottled water products) is not a prohibiteddiversion under Michigan law.272 Since 1985, Michigan law hasprohibited diversion of water out of the Great Lakes watershed,effectively prohibiting almost any bulk diversion of water from thestate.273 However, because there has been some reason for concernabout theConstitutionalityof thisblanketprohibition, thenewstatuteexpresslyprovidesthatifthelawfindstheprohibitioninvalid,thennewdiversions are subject to the approval of the legislature’s public trustduties.274

It is worth noting that almost all of the state’s leading business,municipal,agricultural,andenvironmentalorganizations(includingthebottledwater industry) supported the passage of the legislation. Thegeneral consensuswas thataproactivepermittingsystem, rather thancommonlawlitigationoverwaterrights,wouldbetterservebothwater

266. Id.§324.32723(6)(b).267. Id.§324.32701(1)(a).268. Id.§324.32723(11).269. Id.§324.32723(12).270. Id.§324.32723(13)(c);§§325.1004(3),(4).271. Seeid.§325.1017(3).272. Id.§324.32701(1)(k).273. Id.§324.32703.274. Seeid.§324.32703a.


usersandenvironmentalists.Michigan revisited its water withdrawal statutes in 2008 in

connection with the state’s approval of the Great Lakes‐St. LawrenceRiver Basin Water Resources Compact.275 The Great Lakes CompactgenerallybansthediversionandexportofGreatLakeswateroutsideoftheGreatLakesbasin;alleightGreatLakesstates,aswellasCongress,approved this compact.276 The compact defines water in containersgreaterthan5.7gallonsasadiversion,andprohibitsdiversionsof thissize.277 However, the compact leaves to the individual states thedecisionofwhethertotreatwaterincontainersof5.7gallonsorless–meaningbottledwater–asaprohibiteddiversion.278Ifastatedoesnottreatbottledwaterasabanneddiversion,itisstillsubjecttonumerousprotective standards to ensure water conservation, environmentalprotection,andreasonableuse.279NoneoftheeightGreatLakesstates,includingMichigan, has elected to permanently ban the diversion andexport of Great Lakes water in bottled water pursuant to the GreatLakes Compact, and will instead regulate bottled water withdrawalspursuanttotheGreatLakesCompact’sstandardsandstatelaw.280

Michigan did, however, enact stronger regulatory measures forbottled water than most other water withdrawals in the 2008legislation.281 Michigan now regulates bottled water pursuant to the

275. See generallyGreat Lakes‐St. Lawrence River BasinWater Resources Compact,Pub.L.No.110–342,122Stat.3739,3755‐56(2008). 276. GreatLakes‐St.LawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompact,Pub.L.No.110–342,122Stat.3739,3752(2008).ForacompleteanalysisoftheGreatLakesCompact,seeNoahD.Hall,TowardaNewHorizontalFederalism:InterstateWaterManagementintheGreatLakesRegion,77U.COLO.L.REV.405,443‐44(2006)(discussingthecompact’streatmentofbottledwater). 277. GreatLakes‐St.LawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompact,Pub.L.No.110–342,122Stat.3739,3757,§4.12(10)(2008).278. Id.279. Id.at3755‐56,§4.11.280. See Dave Dempsey, Despite Federal Protection, Great Lakes Remain TroubledWaters,DETROITNEWS,Aug.6,2008,at1B. 281. ThemajorfocusofMichigan’s2008statutoryreformswasastrengtheningofitswaterwithdrawalprogrambyexpandingitspermitsystemandcreatinganassessmentprocess todeterminewhetheraproposedwithdrawalmaycauseanadverse resourceimpacttoriversystems. SeeMICH.COMP.LAWS§324.32723(2008);MICH.COMP.LAWS§324.32706a (2008). Permits are now required for all new or increasedwithdrawalsover 2 million gpd from any source, and these withdrawals are only allowed if theycomplywith theGreat Lakes Compact and do not violate public or private rights andlimitations imposedbyMichiganwater laworotherMichigancommon lawduties.SeeMICH.COMP.LAWS§324.32723(2008). ThemostsignificantadvancementofMichigan’s2008 statute is the development of a water withdrawal assessment process thatdeterminestheimpactofaspecificwithdrawalonriversystemsbycalculatingtheeffectof the stream flow reduction on fish populations. Id.; GROUNDWATER CONSERVATIONADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE MICH. LEGISLATURE 9, 11‐14 (2007).The assessmentprocesshelpspotentialusersandthestateascertainwhetheraneworincreased“largequantitywithdrawal”(withdrawalsofover100,000gpdaveragedovera30‐dayperiod)from streams, rivers, or groundwater is prohibited because it causes an adverseresourceimpact.SeeMICH.COMP.LAWS§324.32701(2009);MICH.COMP.LAWS§325.1017(2009).


GreatLakesCompactbyrequiringwaterbottlerstoobtainapermitforneworincreasedwithdrawalsofmorethan200,000gallonsperday(afar lower threshold than forotherwaterusers).282 Thestatewillonlygrantapermitforthewithdrawalofwaterforbottledwateriftherearenoindividualorcumulativeadverseresourceimpacts,thewithdrawalisreasonable under state common law principles, and thewater bottlerhas certified that it is in compliance with water conservationmeasures.283 Further, the state requires significant public notice andconsultation procedures for proposed bottled water withdrawals.284Withthesemeasures, theGreatLakesCompactandMichiganstatutorylawprotectbothnaturalresourcesandthepublic’sinterestfrombottledwaterwithdrawalsfarmorestrictlythananyothertypeofwateruse.

2. TheNotSoBad:ModestregulatoryreformsinNewEngland

Bottledwater controversiesalso recently led to legislative reformsinNewEngland.Vermontsignificantlyreviseditsgroundwaterpolicyin2008,285 requiring greater regulation and garnering nationalattention.286 Virginia Lyons, a Democratic state senator behind thereform, declared that a goal of the new legislation was to “protect[Vermont’s]groundwaterforthenextseveralgenerations.”287 Muchofthe push for the reform came in the form of treating groundwatersimilarly to surface water in Vermont.288 Republican State SenatorDiane Snelling, also a primary sponsor of the legislation, stated thatcomparedtosurfacewater,“[groundwateris]thesamepublicresource;there’s no sharp divide between surface water and groundwater.”289Manymediacommentatorsechoedsimilarsentiments.290

Vermont’s2008legislationsignificantlyamendedthe“GroundwaterProtection” Chapter in Title 10 of the Vermont Statutes.291 Thelegislation set a new tone for groundwater management in Vermont.The opening section of the chapter now recognizes that groundwatershouldberegulated“inamannerthatbenefitsthepeopleofthestate;iscompatible with long‐range water resource planning, propermanagement, and use of the water resources of Vermont; and isconsistentwithVermont’spolicyofmanaginggroundwaterasapublicresource for the benefit of all Vermonters.”292 Most of the public

282. MICH.COMP.LAWS§325.1017(3)(2009).283. Id.§325.1017(4).284. Id.§325.1017(5)‐(6). 285. ActofJune9,2008,No.199,§1390,2008Vt.ALS1,1(LexisNexis). 286. For example, the change ingroundwaterpolicywas reportedby theNewYorkTimes.SeeBarringer,supranote24.287. See Tom A. Peter, Though Awash in Water, Vermont Set to Protect Springs,CHRISTIANSCI.MONITOR.,Apr.29,2008,at2.288. SeeJoelBannerBaird,TownDebatesWaterFlow,BURLINGTONFREEPRESS,Feb.26,2008,atB1.289. Id.290. See,e.g.,Editorial,GroundwaterRulesMakeSenseforState,BURLINGTONFREEPRESS,Apr.17,2008,atA6. 291. ActofJune9,2008,No.199,2008Vt.ALS1,1‐3(LexisNexis). 292. VT.STAT.tit.10,§1390(2)(2009).


attentiongiventothelegislation,however,hasbeenitsrecognitionthatthe “groundwater resources of the state are held in trust for thepublic.”293

The legislation details several requirements for users of largeamountsofgroundwater.Userswithdrawingmorethan20,000gallonsperday,averagedoveronemonth,mustreporttheirwithdrawalstothestate’s secretary of natural resources.294 More restrictively, new orincreased extraction of more than 57,600 gallons a day from a singlewellorspringrequiresagroundwaterwithdrawalpermit.295Toreceivea permit, the proposed withdrawal must meet a number ofrequirements including efficiency of use; consistency with watermanagementplans;noundueadverseeffectsonexistingwateruses,thepublicwatersupply,orwetlands;and“anyotherconsiderationthatthesecretary determines necessary for the conservation of water orprotectionofgroundwaterquality.”296

Theseeminglystrongstatute,however, containsbroadexemptionsinboth the reporting andpermitting requirements. Manyof themostsignificantwateruses, includingdomestic, farming,dairy,publicwater,andgeothermalheating,areexemptfrommostoftheserequirements.297Similarly, the statute undermines the recognition of groundwater as apublictrustresourcebylimitingtheapplicationofthedoctrine.298Thelegislatureaccomplishedthisbygrantingapresumptionofcompliancetocertaintypesofgroundwateruses.299Publictrustpresumesdomesticuse,publicwatersystems,farminguse,anddairyuseasvalid.300

TheVermontlegislationappearstogivespecialtreatmenttobottledwater by specifically excluding bottled water from the list of usespresumed valid under the public trust,301 as well as providing foradditional requirements for approval of a source permit for bottledwatermanufacturers.302 However, bottledwater is singled out in thestatute in order to correct a potential loophole in the legislation.Regulations under Vermont law treat bottledmanufacturers as publicwater systems.303 So the legislature made sure that bottled watermanufacturers could not also use these exemptions, as public watersystemsaregivenspecialexemptionsbythenewregulations.

Introduced with considerable fanfare, the original version of theVermont legislation was significantly different than the final version.Importantly,thestandardsfirstproposedweresignificantlystricterand

293. Id.§1390(5).294. Id.§1417(a).295. Id.§1418(a).296. Id.§1418(e).297. Id.§1417(b)298. Id.§1418(i).299. Id.300. Id.301. Id.§1418(i)(3).302. Id.§1675(g).303. Id.§1671(5)(B).


had far fewer exemptions. In the bill’s final version, the legislaturedoubledthethresholdamountofgroundwaterallowedtobewithdrawnwithout registration, modestly raised the threshold amount allowedwithoutapermit,anddelayedtheimplementation.304 Additionally,theoriginalversionofthebillplacedtheburdenofproofontheapplicanttoprove that a proposed withdrawal complied with all requirements.305Finally,theoriginalversionofthebilldidnotcontaintheexemptionstothe permitting and reporting processes that appear in the finalversion.306 TheSenateCommitteeonNaturalResourcesrecommendedadding most of the exemptions, while the House Committee on Fish,Wildlife,andWaterResourcesrecommendedaddingthedairyindustrytotheexemptions.307Thelegislaturelikelycreatedtheseexemptionsinordertoquietoppositionandincreasethelikelihoodofpassage.308

The final version of the Vermont legislation minimized languagerelating to the public trust as much as possible. Though the originalversionrequiredthatnopermitwouldbegrantedif ithadan“adverseaffect on the public good,” the final version of the bill removed allreferencestothe“publicgood.”309Thefinalversionofthebilldeletedaproposed section that grantedautomatic standing to anyperson suingunderthestatute’spublictrustcauseofaction.310Finally,thelegislatureaddedthelistofpresumptivelyvalidusesunderthepublictrusttothefinal version of the bill,311 further limiting the practical and legalimportanceofthepublictrustprovision.

Despitethesechanges,theVermontlegislationstillgarneredpraiseupon its passage. Environmental groups in Vermont considered it apromisingsteptowardsthefuture.312However,thebillwasnotwithoutitscritics.Onecommentator,findingthatthelawdidnotgofarenough,pointed out that the regulationwould still allow largewithdrawals ofgroundwater, thereby endangering the resource.313 Similarly, the

304. Compare§1418(a)(afterJuly1,2010,amountrequiringreportingwillbe20,000gallonsperdayandtheamountrequiringapermitwillbe57,600),withS.B.304,2007Leg.,Reg.Sess. (Vt.2008) (after July1,2008,originalamountrequiringreportingwas10,000gallonsperdayandtheoriginalamountrequiringapermitwas50,000gallonsperday). 305. S.B.304,2007Leg.,Reg.Sess.(Vt.2008).306. Id.307. Id.308. See generally Barringer, supra note 24 (discussing the controversial nature ofwaterlawreforminVermont).309. CompareVT.STAT. tit.10,§1418(2009)withS.B.304,2007Leg.,Reg.Sess.(Vt.2008).310. CompareVT.STAT.tit.10,§1418(2009)withActofJune9,2008,No.199,§1390,2008Vt.ALS1,1(LexisNexis). 311. VT.STAT.tit.10,§1418(i)(2009).312. See, e.g., Johanna Miller, Op‐Ed., Lawmakers Took Long View in Protecting theState’sGroundwater,BRATTLEBOROREFORMER,June7,2008(“TheLegislature’saction...istimelyandessential.”);VermontNaturalResourcesCouncil,VNRCCelebratesSuccessfulEffort to Help Protect Vermont's Groundwater, Aug. 2008, available athttp://www.vnrc.org/article/articleview/7093/1/632/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009)(“Vermont, finally, has a law in place that will help protect our drinking water fromoverconsumption,depletionandprivatization.”).313. SeeTomA.Peter,supranote287.


business community found that the bill “duplicated existingrequirements”andfellshortofrealreform.314ItisstilltooearlytotellhowmuchthenewlegislationwillimpactthewaterbottlingindustryinVermont. Given the amount of discretion the secretary of naturalresourceshasingrantingpermits,thewaythesecretaryimplementsthelaws will likely have a great bearing on the state’s bottled waterbusiness.

In response to bottled water controversies, Maine also recentlyamended its water policy.315 In 2007, Maine passed legislation thatcreatedtheWaterResourcesPlanningCommittee(“WRPC”)andcreateda permit system for groundwater extraction.316 The new legislationrequirestheWRPCto“planforthesustainableuseofwaterresources”by reviewing current water use, investigating watersheds at risk, andmakingpolicy recommendations in theevent that the committee findsthatthe“oversubscriptionofwateruse”ispresent.317

Thelegislationalsorequirespermitsfortheoperationof“significantgroundwaterwells”(“SGWs”).MainedividesSGWsintotwocategories:(1) Anymethod or device used to obtain groundwater that is located500feetorlessfromanyfreshwaterbodyorwetlandandwithdrawsatleast“75,000gallonsduringanyweekoratleast50,000gallonsonanyday”qualifiesasasignificantgroundwaterwell;318and(2)Beyond500feet,anymethodordeviceusedtoobtaingroundwatermustwithdraw“atleast216,000gallonsduringanyweekoratleast144,000gallonsonany day” to qualify as a significant groundwater well.319 For thedepartment togrant apermit, anapplicantmustdemonstrate that thewithdrawal “will not have an undue unreasonable effect onwaters oftheState... [and]water‐relatednaturalresourcesandexistinguses.”320Thenewstatuterequiresthedepartmenttoconsider“thedirecteffectsoftheproposedwithdrawalanditseffectsincombinationwithexistingwaterwithdrawals.”321 AswithVermont, someexceptionsexist to thepermitsysteminMaine, includingpublicwatersystems(butnot thoseusedsolelytobottlewater),domesticuses,andagriculturaluses.322

As was the case in Vermont, Maine’s legislation went throughsignificantrevisionsbeforepassageofthefinalversion.TheoriginalbillproposedfarmoreextensiverevisionsofMaine’swaterpoliciesthanthe

314. SeeBarringer,supranote24.315. SeeAssociatedPress,MaineWaterExtractionBillPasses,AFXINT’LFOCUS,June21,2007(describingarecurringreferendumcampaignregardinggroundwaterthatistobedisbandeduponpassageofthelegislation). 316. AnActConcerningtheSustainableUseofandPlanningforWaterResources,ch.399, 2007 Me. Laws 610 available athttp://janus.state.me.us/legis/ros/LOM/LOM123rd/PUBLIC399.asp. 317. ME.REV.STAT.tit.5§3331(8)(2009). 318. ME.REV.STAT.tit.38§480‐B(9)(A)(A).319. Id.320. Id.§480‐D(10).321. Id.322. Id.§480‐B(9‐A)(B).


enacted version. The original bill called for the creation of theFreshwaterResourceBoard(“FRB”)withfargreaterpowersthanthoseoftheWRPC.323TheoriginalbillrequiredtheFRBto“takeallreasonablemeasurestoensureanadequatesupplyofusablegroundwater.”324Theoriginal bill did not set forth any of the groundwater withdrawalstandardsfoundinthefinalversion,presumablybecausetheFRBwouldhavedonesothroughadministrativeregulations.325Inadditiontothesechanges, the final version of the legislation completely removed threesubstantive and contentious issues: a prohibition on bulk watertransport for commercial purposes, the adoption of the Restatementreasonable use doctrine for groundwater, and the examination of thepublic trustdoctrineand itsapplicability togroundwater tobecarriedoutbytheFRB.326 Theoriginalbill’struemotivationandfocusisinitssummary, which specifically mentions bottled water.327 Almost asthough expecting opposition to the legislation, the summary explainsthat“[t]hebillprovidesforthecontinuationofwaterremovalbywaterbottling interests when the removal of water does not threaten [thegoalsofprotectingMaine’speople,surfacewater,andwildlife].”328

Thepassageofthewaterreformlegislationin2007wasneitherthebeginningnortheendofthegroundwaterdebateinMaine.Inprevioussessions,failedproposalsincludedanattempttoadoptareasonableusedoctrine for groundwater,329 and a bill that would have madegroundwater a public resource in Maine.330 As of early 2009, anotherproposalisgainingtractionthatwouldplaceataxonbottledwater.331

Clearly,somegoodhascomefromthebottledwatercontroversiesinNew England, as the legislatures (and presumably the public) inVermont and Maine became aware of the need to better managegroundwater resources. However, in both states the resultinglegislation fell short of the initial promise. In Vermont, bottledwateropponents “won” legislative recognition of the public trust doctrine ingroundwater, but with somany concessions that the recognitionmayhavenorealimpactonmajorwaterusers. InMaine,whatbeganasaneffort to provide more comprehensive water protection ended as amodestpermittingstatute,withverylimitedcoverageandapplicability.Astheselawswererecentlypassed,timewilltelliftheyareeffectivein

323. ME.REV.STAT.tit.5§3331(8)(2009);S.610,123dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.,§410‐R(1‐2)(Me.2007). 324. S.610,123dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.,§410‐R(2)(Me.2007). 325. ME.REV.STAT.tit.5§3331(8)(2009);S.610,123dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.,§410‐R(1‐2)(Me.2007). 326. ME.REV.STAT.tit.5§3331(8)(2009);S.610,123dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.,§§410‐T,410‐U,410‐V,2007(Me.2007). 327. S.610,123dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.,§§410‐T,410‐U,410‐V,2007(Me.2007).328. Id. 329. S.725,122dLeg.,2dReg.Sess.(Me.2006). 330. H.1046,122dLeg.,1stReg.Sess.(Me.2005).331. See Noel K. Gallagher, Challenges Piling up for Poland Spring, PORTLAND PRESSHERALD (Me.), Feb. 6, 2009, at A1, available athttp://pressherald.mainetoday.com/story.php?id=237364&ac= (last visited Dec. 1,2009).


resolving bottled water controversies or simply create anotherbureaucratichurdlealongtheway.

3. TheReallyUgly:Michigan’sBottledWaterMoratoriumExecutiveOrder

Before Michigan took a big step forward with its water policy inresponsetobottledwaterdisputes, it facedmanychallengesfirst fellastep back. In 2005, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm issued amoratoriumonbottledwaterpermitsforcompaniesintendingtoexportwater outside the Great Lakes Basin.332 The Executive Directive wassignedinlateMayof2005,andwasspecificallyaimedattheagreementfor water supply made between the City of Evart and Nestlé WatersNorth America.333 Governor Granholm described her reasons for theorder in the directive itself.334 Referencing Michigan’s vast waterresources,thegovernorpointedoutthat“abundanceisnotalicensetobereckless,foolish,orwasteful.”335Thegovernorfurthernotedthelackof clarity in Michigan law “regarding the regulation of waterwithdrawals and water bottling.”336 Finally, the governor cited thelegislature’sfailureto“seriouslydebateandactonthisissue.”337

Forthesereasons,thegovernoreffectivelyhaltednewbottledwaterexport outside of the Great Lakes Basin.338 The Executive Directiveordered all state departments and agencies to halt issuing permits orapprovals for bottled water processors unless the applicant certified“that the delivery or sale of all bottled water production [would] belimited to the Great Lakes Basin.”339 The directive concluded with arequestthatMichiganbeequippedwithpoliciesandlegaltoolstomake“principled determinations concerning the impact and consequencesfuturewaterbottlingproposals.”340

In the same year that the ExecutiveDirectivewent into effect, theMichigan Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) issuedseveral permits to Nestlé regarding its water extraction from a wellownedbytheCityofEvart.341Thedepartmentattachedseveralspecialconditionstoeachofthepermits.342Thefirstofthesespecialconditionsrequired Nestlé to certify that the water purchased from the City ofEvart be “distributed solely within the Great Lakes Basin.”343

332. Exec.DirectiveNo.2005‐5(May26,2005).333. Id.334. Id.335. Id.336. Id.337. Id.338. Id.339. Id.340. Id. 341. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6‐7, NestléWatersN.Am.,Inc.v.Chester,No.1:05‐cv‐00421(W.D.Mich.Oct.5,2005).342. Id.343. Id.


Presumably, MDEQ placed this requirement on the permit to complywiththegovernor’sExecutiveDirective.Challengingitslegality,though,NestléinitiatedlegalproceedingsagainstthedirectorofMDEQ,aswellasGovernorGranholm,bothintheirofficialcapacities.344

In its complaint, Nestlé challenged the special condition on thepermit and the Executive Directive as violations of the “dormant”Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.345 Nestlé alsochallengedtheWaterResourcesDevelopmentActof1986(“WRDA”),afederal law requiring every governor of the “Great Lakes States” toapprove any diversion from the Great Lakes Basin,346 as not beingapplicabletotheirwaterextractionaswellasviolatingtheUnitedStatesConstitution.347 In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, thedefendantsfiledamotiontodismiss,arguingthatthecourtshouldapplythe federal abstention doctrine because of unresolved, complex statelawissuesthatweretobedecidedbyMichigancourts.348Opposingthemotion, Nestlé argued that the federal interests under the dormantcommerceclauseweretooimportantforafederalcourttoabstainfromtheproceedings.349 Nestléalsoarguedthattherelatedstatecourtcaseon which plaintiffs relied was distinct, in that it only challenged thepermits under state law, whereas the federal proceedings challengedthepermitsunderthefederalConstitution.350

Less than a year after the case began and even before the partiesargued the motion to dismiss, Nestlé dropped the suit and GovernorGranholm lifted the moratorium on out‐of‐state bottled waterpermits.351Essentially,asettlementcameintheformofpassageoflong‐awaited comprehensive water management laws by the MichiganLegislature(describedabove).352 Since the legislationexemptedwaterincontainersof5.7gallonsorlessfromtheprohibitiononout‐of‐basindiversions,353Nestléhadnoreasontocontinueitssuit,as itcouldnowobtain a permit to sell bottledwater out of the state ofMichigan, andoutsideoftheGreatLakesBasin.

This controversy demonstrates the pitfalls of knee‐jerk politicalreactions tobottledwaterdisputes. While the courtnever consideredNestlé’schallengebecauseofthesettlementofthesuit,Michigan’sinitial

344. Id.at2‐3.345. Id.at8‐10. 346. 42U.S.C.§1962d‐20(d)(2006). 347. FirstAmendedComplaint forDeclaratoryand InjunctiveReliefat11‐21,NestléWatersN.Am.,Inc.v.Chester,No.1:05‐cv‐00421(W.D.Mich.Oct.5,2005).348. SeeDefendants Steven E. Chester’s and Jennifer M. Granholm’s Reply Brief inSupportofMotiontoDismissor,intheAlternative,toStaytheProceedings,at1,NestléWatersN.Am.,Inc.v.Chester,No.1:05‐cv‐00421(W.D.Mich.Feb.7,2006).349. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in theAlternative,toStaytheProceedings,at1,NestléWatersN.Am.,Inc.v.Chester,No.1:05‐cv‐00421(W.D.Mich.Jan.24,2006).350. Id.351. See John Flesher, Company Drops Bottled Water Lawsuits, MUSKEGON CHRONICLE(Mich.),Mar. 15, 2006, at B2, available at http://www.mlive.com/chronicle/archives/(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).352. Id. 353. MICH.COMP.LAWS§324.32701(1)(p)(2009).


approachtobottledwatercontroversiescertainlyraisedlegitimatelegalandpolicyconcerns. Further,Michigan’smoratoriumonbottledwaterand limitation on the distribution of bottled water within the GreatLakes basin would do nothing to protect the overall health of waterresources or otherwater users fromwaterwithdrawals. Fortunately,reason and good policy prevailed, and after themoratoriumMichiganultimatelyenactedthesoundwaterwithdrawalpolicydiscussedabovethatprotectstheGreatLakesandotherwaterresourcesfromallwaterwithdrawals,includingbottledwater.

IV. NEWSTRATEGIES:WATERISNOTFORSALE(UNLESSTHESTATEGETSPAID)

As the case studies illustrate, even the best state efforts formanagingwater resources in response tobottledwaterdisputes leavebottledwateropponentsunsatisfied. Tosomeextent, this is typicalofthe legal system and water law in particular, which tends to favoroptimal utilization of water resources balancing multiple competinginterests. State laws and judicial opinions that address the conditionsfor a water bottler’s withdrawal, but leave unanswered fundamentalquestionsofownership,control,andtherighttoprofit fromwaterwillalsofrustratebottledwateropponents.Withthiscollectiveexperience,bottledwateropponentshave turned to twootherapproaches thatgobeyond improved regulation: the public trust doctrine and taxingbottledwater. So far, neither has proven legally or politically fruitful,but that has not done anything to diminish the hope that opponentshaveforbothstrategies.

A. THEFALSEHOPEOFTHEPUBLICTRUSTDOCTRINE

Disappointed by judicial and regulatory outcomes, bottled wateropponentshaveturnedtheirattentionto thepublic trustdoctrineasatool for addressing their concerns. Maude Barlow, one of the leadingopponentsofbottledwaterandwatercommoditization,354toldTheNewYork Times that reliance on the public trust doctrine to protectgroundwater is critical in the fight againstbottledwater andpreparesstatesfor“thedaywhendemandforgroundwateroutstripssupply.”355Similarly, author David Dempsey claims that the public trust doctrineprovides thestrongestargument that states “can ‘just sayno’ towaterexportsanddiversions”includingbottledwater.356

Hundreds of law review articles have extensively analyzed,discussed, andwritten about the public trust doctrine since Professor

354. PressConference,UNGeneralAssembly,PressConferencebyGeneralAssemblyPresident on Water‐Related Human Rights (Dec. 9, 2008), available athttp://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/081209_Water.doc.htm (last visitedDec.1,2009)(showingMs.BarlowistheSeniorAdvisoronWatertothePresidentoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly). 355. Barringer,supranote24. 356. DEMPSEY,supranote4,at4.


JoeSaxreintroducedtheconceptintoenvironmentallawin1970357andneeds only a brief introduction here. At its core, the public trustdoctrine protects public rights in navigablewaters by ensuring publicaccesstonavigablewatersandlimitingthestate’sabilitytodivestitselfofnavigablewatersforprivategain.358

However, there are two significant problems with relying on thepublictrustdoctrinetoopposebottledwaterwithdrawals.First,almostall contentious bottled water disputes involve small springs andgroundwater, and very few states have extended the public trustdoctrinetonon‐navigablespringsandgroundwater.359 Second,even ifthepublictrustdoctrinedidapplytothesmallspringsandgroundwaterusedbymanywaterbottlers,thereisnolegalauthoritytosuggestthatbottling and selling water infringes on public rights to the water andthusviolatesthepublictrustdoctrine’sprinciples.

Asurveyofthepublictrustdoctrine’sapplicationindicatesthatonlyahandfulofstates–notablyCalifornia,360Hawaii,361andmostrecentlyVermont362 – have explicitly extended the public trust doctrine togroundwater. Numerous states have expressly rejected attempts toexpand the public trust doctrine beyond its historic navigable watersroots.363Legalscholars,armedwithscientificargumentsdemonstratingthe clear hydrologic connection between groundwater and surfacewaters and the slow pace of groundwater regulation reforms, haveurged legislatures and courts to expand the public trust doctrine togroundwater.364 While modern scientific knowledge of groundwater‐surface water hydrology certainly gives somemerit to this argument,the law of the public trust doctrine itself makes it an odd fit forgroundwaterresources.

Thepublictrustdoctrineservesfourprimarypurposes:(1)itlimitstosomeextentastate’sability todivest itselfof,orotherwise transfertitle to, public trust assets to private parties; (2) it provides publicaccess for the exercise of traditionally protected public rights such asfishingandnavigation;(3)itprovidesabasisforgovernmentregulationto protect natural resources; and (4) it may provide a legal cause ofaction for citizens seeking to prevent environmental harm to a

357. See Joseph L. Sax,The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: EffectiveJudicialIntervention,68MICH.L.REV.473(1970). 358. IllinoisCent.R.R.v.Illinois,146U.S.387,436(1892).359. Seeinfranotes360‐363andaccompanyingtext. 360. Nat'lAudubonSoc'yv.Sup.Ct.,658P.2d709,721(Cal.1983)(holdingthat thepublic trustdoctrineapplies tonon‐navigablewaters that are tributary toanavigablewater, which could then apply to groundwater when hydrologically connected tonavigablewaterway).361. SeeInreWaterUsePermitApplications,9P.3d409,447(Haw.2000).362. SeeVT.STAT.tit.10,§1390(5)(2009)(“groundwaterresourcesof. . . [Vermont]areheldintrustforthepublic”).363. See, e.g., Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Mich. 1982);Evansv.Cityof Johnstown,410N.Y.S.2d199,207(1978);Gwathmeyv.Dep’tofEnv’t,Health, and Natural Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 686 (N.C. 1995); Rettkowski v. Dep't ofEcology,858P.2d232,239(Wash.1993).364. See,e.g.,Tuholske,supranote75,at213,230‐31.


resource.365 To consider themerits andneed for extending thepublictrustdoctrinetogroundwater,itisusefultoexamineeachpurposeasitrelatestogroundwater.

(1) The public trust doctrine limits, to some extent, a state’sabilitytodivestitselfof,orotherwisetransfertitleto,publictrustassets to privateparties. This principlewas first established by theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinIllinoisCentralRailroadv.Illinois.366 Inthis famous decision, the Supreme Court held that the state of IllinoiscouldnotconveytitletoacriticalportionofLakeMichiganshorelinetoa railroad company.367 However, it remains unclear whether thislimitationissubstantiveormerelyprocedural–thatis,thepublictrustdoctrine may only require certain procedures to guarantee publicaccountability when the state conveys trust property to a privateparty.368 Even if the public trust doctrine provides only a proceduralcheckon thestate’sability to transfer title topublic trust resources toprivateparties,itisstillanimportantandvaluableprotectionforcriticalpublictrustresources.

However,thispurposeofthepublictrustdoctrineisnotapplicabletogroundwater. Unlike thenavigablewatersand their shorelinesandunderlyingbeds,whichthepublictrustdoctrineprotects,moststatesdonothold title to thegroundwaterwithin theirborders.369 Thus, stateswould not generally be in a position to transfer title to groundwaterresources to a private party. While many states have statutes whichdefine“watersofthestate”toincludegroundwater,thisisforpurposesof regulatory authority, not ownership.370 Ohio provides a clearexample of this point. Ohio’swater use statute defines “waters of thestate” broadly to include “all... watercourses, waterways, wells,springs,... and other bodies or accumulations of water, surface andunderground... regardless of the depth of the strata in whichundergroundwaterislocated,thataresituatedwhollyorpartlywithinor border upon this state False”371 However, courts havemade clearthatthestateofOhiodoesnot“own”thegroundwater,andcanevenbeliableforatakingwhenitinterfereswithprivategroundwaterrights.372

365. JACKH.ARCHERETAL.,THEPUBLICTRUSTDOCTRINEANDTHEMANAGEMENTOFAMERICA’SCOASTS3,4,8,51UNIV.MASS.PRESS(1994). 366. IllinoisCent.R.R.v.Illinois,146U.S.387,436(1892).367. Id.at460.368. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty inNatural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 642‐43(1986).369. See,e.g.,McNamarav.Rittman,838N.E.2d640,643(Ohio2005).370. See, e.g., CONN.GEN. STAT. §22a‐15 (2009);MASS.GEN. LAWS ch. 21L, §1 (2009);NEV.REV.STAT.§533.025(2008);N.J.STAT.§58:11A‐2(b)(2009). 371. OHIOREV.CODE§1501.30(A)(6)(2009).372. McNamara,838N.E.2dat643.


(2)Thepublic trustdoctrineprotects traditionalpublic rightssuchas fishing,navigation,and insomestatesrecreationaluseofpublic trust waters.373 Public access for navigation, fishing, andrecreation is themost fundamental and well‐established purpose andlegal implication of the public trust doctrine.374 For example, theNorthwestOrdinanceof1787provided that “navigablewaters leadinginto the Mississippi and Saint Lawrence, and the carrying placesbetween the same, shall be common highways, and forever free.”375However, protecting traditional public rights such as fishing andnavigation is simply not applicable to groundwater. One cannotnavigate, fish, or otherwise use groundwater for recreation. Whilegroundwaterflowstoasurfacewatermaybenecessarytoensurethatthesurfacewatercansupportprotectedpublicnavigation, fishing,andrecreation,376theprotectedpublicinterestisstillinthenavigablewateritself.

(3) The public trust doctrine has been cited as a basis forgovernmentregulation toprotectnaturalresources. Governmentshavelimitedregulatorypower,andinsomecircumstancesmaylacktheconstitutional authority to regulate certain private conduct that couldharmanaturalresource.377Inthesecircumstances,somearguethatthepublic trust doctrine gives governments another legal basis forregulation.378 However, every state already has ample authority toprotect groundwater and groundwater‐dependent natural resourceswithout the groundwater itself being subject to the public trustdoctrine.379 State constitutions, statutes, and the police power allowstates to regulate water use, including groundwater withdrawal,withoutexpandingthepublictrusttogroundwater.380

(4)Thepublictrustdoctrinemayprovidealegalcauseofactionforcitizensseekingtopreventenvironmentalharmtoaresource.ThiswasthehopeforthepublictrustdoctrinewhenProfessorJoeSaxlaunched themodernpublic trustdoctrine into theenvironmental lawfield in 1970.381 However, since 1970 the need for the public trustdoctrine as a cause of action for citizen lawsuits to protect theenvironmenthasdiminished.382 This isdue in largepart to theriseofstatutory environmental protections with citizen enforcementprovisionssince1970.383AnironicexamplecomesfromProfessorSax’sworkinMichigan,whichpassedthelandmarkMichiganEnvironmentalProtection Act (“MEPA”), authored in large part by Professor Sax to

373. See,e.g.,Glassv.Goeckel,703N.W.2d58,73‐74(Mich.2005). 374. H.Doc.No.398,ORDINANCEOF1787,art.IV,at47(1787).375. Id.376. SeeROBERTGLENNON,supranote76,at41.377. SeeJosephL.Sax,supranote357,at474. 378. RichardJ.Lazarus,supranote368,at655. 379. COLO.REV.STAT.§37‐90‐102(1)‐(2)(2009).380. Id. 381. JosephL.Sax,supranote357,at474.382. SeeRichardJ.Lazarus,supranote347.383. SeeAlexandra B. Klass,Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights andIntegratingStandards,82NOTREDAMEL.REV.699,714‐15(2006).


further the public trust doctrine’s goals.384 MEPA provides that “anypersonmaymaintainanactionin...court...againstanypersonfortheprotectionoftheair,water,andothernaturalresourcesandthepublictrust in theseresources frompollution, impairment,ordestruction.”385Thus, MEPA, and similar statutes in other states, give citizens a legalcause of action to prevent environmental harm to groundwater andgroundwater‐dependent natural resources. Even without expressstatutory authority, common law groundwater and riparian doctrinesgivecitizenswithprotectablewaterrightslegalreliefforharmtowaterresources.386

Thus,expansionofthepublictrustdoctrinetogroundwatermaynotbeaslegallysignificantasproponentswouldhopeoropponentswouldfear. The primary purposes of the public trust doctrine are eitherinapplicable to groundwater or duplicative of existing Constitutionaland statutory law.387 It seems that expansion of the public trustdoctrinetogroundwaterisprimarilyastrategybasedontheideologyofwaterownershipratherthanthelegalrealitiesofthelikelyoutcomes.388

Nonetheless,thereisroomforamodestpragmaticproposaltoapplythepublic trustdoctrine to somegroundwaterwithdrawals (includingthose for bottled water) that have the potential to impact navigablewaters. Somegroundwaterwithdrawals(individuallyorcumulatively)could diminish the flows of navigable surface waters that the publictrust doctrine protects under applicable state law.389 All branches ofgovernment (legislative, judicial, and executive) should guard againstthisdiminutionconsistentwith thepublic trustdoctrine. Legislatures,agencies,andcourtsshouldnotallowanywithdrawalofgroundwatertoimpair or diminish the public trust in connected navigable surfacewaterssubjecttothepublictrustdoctrine.Forexample,ifgroundwaterwithdrawals were to threaten navigation on a navigable river, thosegroundwaterwithdrawalsshouldnotbeallowed,astheywouldviolatethe public trust doctrine. Similarly, if groundwater withdrawalsloweredlakelevelsonanavigableinlandlakesuchthatthepubliccouldno longer access it for fishing or hunting, those groundwaterwithdrawals should not be allowed as they would violate the publictrustdoctrine.

Putting aside the potential for direct and indirect impacts ontraditionalpublicrightsinnavigablewaters,thereissimplynocaselaw

384. Id.at721. 385. MICH.COMP.LAWS§324.1701(1)(2009). 386. A notable exception is the “rule of capture” applied by some states togroundwaterdisputes,whichdoesnotgivegroundwaterusersanylegalreliefforharm.Seesupranotes141‐146,249andaccompanyingtext.387. Seesupranotes360‐372andaccompanyingtext.388. See Tuholske, supra note 75, at 236 (“Adoption of the public trust to protectwaterresourcesprovidesanimportantstatementthatcanshiftpublicviewsinfavorofprotecting public resources. The public trust crosses over from the law to a purestatementofsocietalvision.”[internalquotationsandcitationsomitted]).389. SeeJamesM.Olson,NavigatingtheGreatLakesCompact:Water,PublicTrust,andInternationalTradeAgreements,2006MICH.ST.L.REV.1103,1129(2006).


from any state suggesting that the public trust doctrine prohibitspumpinggroundwaterforbottlingandsale,regardlessofwhetherthatwater issubjecttothepublictrustdoctrineornot. It isnotfor lackoftrying; bottled water opponents often have a zealous and ideologicalpassion for the public trust doctrine.390 Rather, no court has acceptedtheargumentfrombottledwateropponentsthatthebottlingandsaleofwater(even fromawaterbodyprotectedby thepublic trustdoctrine)violatesanyofthedoctrine’sprinciples.391

Itisalsoworthnotingthatthepublictrustdoctrinewouldnotoffera defense to a NAFTA or GATT challenge to a state law limiting theexport of bottled water, as some commentators have suggested.392WhileNAFTA andGATT allow export restrictions for “conservation ofexhaustible natural resources,”393 there is no similar provision forexport restrictions pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Justifyingrestrictionsonbottledwaterwiththepublictrustdoctrinemaysatisfysomeopponents’ ideologicalconcerns,butwoulddonothingtodefendsuchrestrictionsfromchallengespursuanttointernationaltradelaw.

B. IFWATERISGOINGTOBESOLD,THESTATESHOULDSHAREINTHEPROFITS

While some bottled water opponents claim that the public trustdoctrine should limit the bottling and sale of water, other opponentssimply want to ensure that the state gets a share of the profits. Forexample, inearly2009,GovernorCharlieCristofFloridaproposeda6cents‐per‐gallon water extraction tax on bottled water producers.394Governor Crist noted that over twenty companies, including NestléWaters of North America, Coca‐Cola, and Pepsi, profit ten to onehundred timesoff of the cost of eachbottle of bottledwater since theonlycosttopumpandextractwaterisaone‐time,$150waterpermit.395

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”),working with Governor Crist, estimates that a 6 cents‐per‐gallonextractionfeeonwaterbottlerswouldapplytoabout5.4milliongallonsadayandwouldgeneratearound$56million in the first year.396 Thegenerationof$56millionisinstarkcontrasttothe$15milliondeficitonwhichtheDEP isnowoperatingwithregardstowaterprojects.397TheDEPreportedthatifthefeewerepassedontocustomers,thecustomer

390. InreTownofNottingham,904A.2d582,588‐89(N.H.2006).391. Id.at590. 392. JamesM.Olson, supranote389, at1130‐32 (discussing theauthor’sbelief thatwater subject to the public trust doctrine cannot be transferred orwithdrawn unlessdoingsowouldpromoteapublicpurpose). 393. GATT,supranote118,art.XX(g);NAFTA,supranote117,art.2101. 394. Marc Caputo & Steve Bousquet, Gov. Charlie Crist Sees Bright Spots with StateBudget, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 20, 2009, available athttp://www.miamiherald.com/news/legislature/story/914452.html(lastvisitedDec.1,2009). 395. MaryEllenKlas,Charlie CristWants to Stop Free Flow forBottledWater,MIAMIHERALD, Mar. 3, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/legislature/v‐print/story/929571.html(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).396. Id.397. Id.


would see an increase in cost on a pint‐sized bottle of less than apenny.398TheDEPwouldphaseinthetaxandusethemoneyraisedtofinancealternativewatersupplysources,suchasdesalinationplants.399

In response to Governor Crist’s proposal, Kent Koptiuch, agroundwater professional and the Natural Resource manager for aNestléWatersNorth America bottling facility, counters that thewaterbottlingcompaniesdidnot“causetheoverdevelopmentthathas ledtowater shortages” and that the “taxwill donothing to preventmore of[the water shortages] from happening.”400 Koptiuch also argues thatbecausewater is a renewable resource, itsuseandwithdrawal shouldnotbetaxed.401 TheproblemFloridafacesisnotduetowaterbottlingcompanies, Koptiuch suggests, but rather, the problem is due toFlorida’s mismanagement of development and the water resourceitself.402Thetaxwouldnotcreateanincentiveforcommunitiestosavewater, and it singlesoutwaterbottling companieswhileotherbottleddrinkssuchascarbonatedbeveragesandsportsdrinksarenotsubjecttothetax,althoughtheyusewateraswell.403 KoptiuchpointsoutthateventhosecompaniesthatfreezethewatertheyextractandsellitasicewillnotbetaxedunderGovernorCrist’sproposal.404

Maine has also attempted several variations on taxing waterextraction by water bottlers. In 2004, Jim Wilfong, a former MainelegislatorandleaderofH2OforME,pushedfora20cents‐per‐gallontaxongroundwaterextractionsforbottledwater.405Wilfongsuggestedthattherevenuefromsuchataxcouldgenerate$80to$100millionayearandcouldbeusedforaWaterDividendTrusttosupportsmallbusinessdevelopment and to monitor the water extractions from Maine’saquifers.406 However, when Maine passed a new water managementstatutein2007,itdidnotincludeanextractiontax.407

New Hampshire also considered a tax on extractions by waterbottlers.408 In 2004, the New Hampshire legislature confronted a

398. Id.399. Id. 400. KentKoptiuch,Crist’s Tax PlanDoesn’tHoldWater, TAMPATRIB.,Mar. 18, 2009,available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/mar/18/na‐crists‐tax‐plan‐doesnt‐hold‐water/news‐opinion‐commentary/.401. Id.402. Id.403. Id.404. Id.405. GroupPlansWaterExtractionsTax,AsksStateSupport,U.S.WaterNewsOnline,Aug. 2004, available athttp://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcpolicy/4grouplan8.html(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).406. Id.407. SeediscussionofMaine’swaterwithdrawalstatute,supraPartIII.B.2;seealsoS.610,123dLeg.,1stReg.Sess.,§3331(Me.2007)(Westlaw).408. NewHampshireBillWouldTaxWaterBottlers5CentsPerGallon,U.S.WaterNewsOnline, Jan. 2004, available athttp://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcpolicy/4newxhamp1.html(lastvisitedDec.1,2009).


proposal fora5cents‐per‐gallonwatertax.409 WhilebothRepublicansandDemocrats agreed that a tax on commercialwater bottlers’waterextractions would discourage the bottled water business in the state,theydifferedonthefundamentalquestionofwhetherthestatewantedto discourage water bottling.410 Representative Mark Carter, whoproposed the tax, believed that it would discourage businesses fromputtingpressureonthestate’swaterresources,andthetaxwouldbea“unique approach to managing water resources.”411 Opponentsquestionedwhetherthelawwouldnegativelyimpactjobsandwhetherthe tax on the water would be worth the negative impact.412 RenePelletier,who ran the state’s public drinkingwater program, said thatthe agency was already protecting water resources and could orderbusinessestopumplesswaterifproblemswithwithdrawalsarise.413Arepresentative ofMonadnockMountain SpringWater Company statedthatthetaxwouldharmthebusinessandwouldeliminatejobsandtheNewHampshirepropertytaxesthatthecompanypays.414

Statepolitical leadersarealways lookingforanewrevenuesourceforboththeirgeneral fundsandtheirwaterprotectionefforts. Taxingbottledwatermakes some political sense, as it is a profitable and notalwayspopular industry. Chargingwaterbottlersamodest fee for thewater that they then turn aroundand sell for a buck abottlemakes acompellingpoliticalargument. Theproposedtaxescouldbeavaluablesourceoffundingforcash‐strappedstatewaterprotectionagencies,andtheagenciescouldevenusethefundingtodirectlyprotectandmanagestate groundwater resources. However, taxingwater bottlers but notother water users could create a dangerous incentive for state waterregulators to favor bottled water over other uses that would notgeneraterevenuefortheirdepartments’budgets.Thisdebatewilllikelygrowasbottledwaterbecomesmorecontroversialandstates look fornewwaystoshareintheprofits.

CONCLUSION

Alongwithclimatechange,globalizationmaybethemostsignificantchallengeforstatewaterlawinthetwentyfirstcentury.Thepressureson water resources are no longer limited to local users and propertyowners but now include supply for a global water market. Bottledwateristheoldestandmostmaturewatermarketthattranscendsstatelines. Bottled water disputes have forced state courts and politicalleaderstoreevaluateolddoctrinesandwatermanagementregulations.Inmostcases,bottledwaterdisputeshaveledtomeaningfulandusefullegal reforms, especially in the area of groundwater management.However, in some cases bottled water disputes have exposed

409. Id.410. Id.411. Id.412. Id.413. Id.414. Id.


problematic flaws in state water law and protectionist knee‐jerkreactions by state political leaders that would do nothing to betterprotectwater resources. Unsatisfied bymodest reforms in the courtsandlegislatures,bottledwateropponentshaveturnedtheirhopestothepublic trust doctrine and taxing water bottlers, strategies withsignificant legal and political weaknesses. Instead, bottled wateropponentsandstateleadersshouldtakethechallengeofbottledwateras an opportunity to further reform water management law with anemphasis on resource protection, science‐based decision making, andwater conservation. These approaches will help protect waterresourcesfromthepressuresofglobalizationwhilerespectingpropertyrightsandinternationaltradelawrules.

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER WATER LAW REVIEWcase discussed in Part III. (The views presented in this...

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