United States v. Peake, 1st Cir. (2015)
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Transcript of United States v. Peake, 1st Cir. (2015)
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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit
No. 14- 1088
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,
Appel l ee,
v.
FRANK PEAKE,
Def endant , Appel l ant .
APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF PUERTO RI CO
[ Hon. Dani el R. Dom nguez, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]
Bef or e
Tor r uel l a, Lynch, and Thompson,
Ci r cui t J udges.
Davi d Oscar Mar kus, wi t h whomMona E. Markus, A. Margot Moss,and Mar kus & Mar kus, PLLC, wer e on br i ef , f or appel l ant .
Shana M. Wal l ace, At t or ney, U. S. Depar t ment of J ust i ce,Ant i t r ust Di vi si on, wi t h whom Wi l l i am J . Baer , Assi st ant At t or neyGener al , Br ent Snyder , Deput y Assi st ant At t or ney Gener al , Cr ai g Y.Lee and J ames J . Fredr i cks, At t or neys, U. S. Depar t ment of J ust i ce,Ant i t r ust Di vi si on, wer e on br i ef , f or appel l ee.
Oct ober 14, 2015
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. As a r esul t of hi s convi cti on
f or par t i ci pat i ng i n one of t he l ar gest ant i t r ust conspi r aci es i n
t he hi st or y of t he Uni t ed St at es, Def endant - Appel l ant Frank Peake
( "Peake") r ai ses a number of cl ai med er r or s wi t h r espect t o hi s
t r i al and sent enci ng f or a ser i ous pr i ce- f i xi ng of f ense i n
vi ol at i on of Sect i on 1 of t he Sher man Act , 15 U. S. C. 1
( "Sect i on 1") . Peake chal l enges: ( 1) t he val i di t y of hi s
i ndi ct ment ; ( 2) t he scope of t he sear ch war r ant execut ed by the
gover nment ; ( 3) t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s pr e- t r i al mot i on
t o change venue; ( 4) i mpr oper r emarks made by t he pr osecut or dur i ng
t r i al ; ( 5) t he di str i ct cour t ' s rul i ng per mi t t i ng pr ej udi ci al
t est i mony; ( 6) t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s request f or a
t heor y- of - def ense i nst r ucti on; ( 7) t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of
hi s r equest f or a mi st r i al dur i ng j ur y del i ber at i ons, and ( 8) t he
l ength of hi s sent ence, whi ch was based on t he amount of commerce
af f ected by t he charged conspi r acy, and whi ch Peake cont ends t he
cour t i ncor r ect l y comput ed. Fi ndi ng no er r or s and concl udi ng t hat
t he di st r i ct cour t mar shal ed t hi s t r i al i n a commendabl e manner , we
af f i r m. Af t er a br i ef over vi ew of t he f act ual backgr ound, we wi l l
t ake each of t he i ssues one by one.
I. Background
We r ecount t he f act s i n t he l i ght most f avor abl e t o t he
j ury ver di ct , as suppor t ed by t he r ecor d. See Uni t ed Stat es v.
Andr ade, 94 F. 3d 9, 10 ( 1st Ci r . 1996) . Si nce 2002, wat er bor ne
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cabotage bet ween Puer t o Ri co and t he mai nl and has been domi nat ed by
f our f r ei ght car r i er s: Hor i zon Li nes, Sea St ar , Cr owl ey, and
Tr ai l er Br i dge. See I n r e Puer t o Ri can Cabot age Ant i t r ust Li t i g. ,
815 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 n. 3 ( D. P. R. 2011) . And, because of Puert o
Ri co' s geogr aphi cal si t uat i on, Puer t o Ri co' s consumer s r el y on
t hese car r i er s t o t r anspor t most goods i mpor t ed t o t he i sl and. See
Mer chant Mar i ne Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66- 261, 41 St at . 988, 999
( 1920) ( codi f i ed as amended at 46 U. S. C. 55101, et seq. ) .
Seeki ng t o maxi mi ze r evenues, Hor i zon Li nes and Sea St ar agr eed not
t o under cut each ot her i n pr i ce and al l ocat ed pr eci se mar ket shar e
quot as t hr ough an extensi ve conspi r acy that i ncl uded bi d r i ggi ng
and car ef ul pl anni ng, coor di nat i on, and t he ki nds of day- t o- day
sel f - enf orcement common of i l l egal agr eement s.
Thi s behavi or const i t uted an agreement i n r est r ai nt of
t r ade f or bi dden by Sect i on 1. Peake, t he f or mer Presi dent and
Chi ef Oper at i ng Of f i cer ( "COO") of Sea St ar , pl ayed a managi ng r ol e
i n t he conspi r acy, coor di nat i ng wi t h compet i t or s t hr ough meet i ngs,
phone cal l s, and emai l s, and at t endi ng t o pr i ci ng or consumer -
al l ocat i on di sput es t hat hi s subor di nat es coul d not r esol ve on
t hei r own.
For exampl e, dur i ng a meet i ng i n Or l ando i n 2006, Peake
coor di nat ed wi t h Hor i zon Li nes execut i ves t o r esol ve exi st i ng
di sput es by agr eei ng t o keep t he market shar es at t hei r cur r ent
l evel s, r at her t han r ei nstat i ng t he spl i t i n ef f ect pr i or t o hi s
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j oi ni ng t he conspi r acy i n 2005. Lat er t hat year , t he mar ket
al l ocat i on became i mbal anced when Wal greens, a maj or i mpor t er of
consumer goods t o Puer t o Ri co, deci ded not t o di vi de f r ei ght
cont r act s bet ween Hor i zon Li nes and Sea St ar , and i nst ead al l ocat ed
al l of i t s f r ei ght t o Hor i zon Li nes. Peake qui ckl y agr eed wi t h an
execut i ve f r om Hor i zon Li nes t hat t he company woul d compensat e by
shi f t i ng car go t o Sea St ar vessel s or usi ng Tr anspor t at i on Ser vi ce
Agr eement s, whereby Hor i zon Li nes woul d pay Sea St ar t o car r y i t s
car go even t hough i t had capaci t y t o t r anspor t i t i n i t s own
vessel s.
Whi l e t he conspi r acy was i n f ul l swi ng, a Sea St ar seni or
execut i ve worki ng wi t h Peake became a government i nf or mant . Based
on hi s descr i pt i on of t he conspi r acy, t he gover nment i ni t i at ed an
ext ensi ve i nvest i gat i on t hat i ncl uded an FBI sear ch of Sea St ar ' s
headquar t er s i n 2008. Four of Peake' s co- conspi r at or s wer e char ged
wi t h ant i t r ust vi ol at i ons and pl eaded gui l t y bef or e t he U. S.
Di str i ct Cour t f or t he Mi ddl e Di str i ct of Fl or i da, J acksonvi l l e
Di vi si on. Fol l owi ng t hese event s, a gr and j ur y i n San J uan, Puer t o
Ri co, r etur ned an i ndi ct ment agai nst Peake i n November 2011 on one
char ge of conspi r acy t o suppr ess and el i mi nat e compet i t i on by
agr eei ng t o f i x r at es and sur char ges f or f r ei ght ser vi ces i n
i nt erst ate commerce between t he Uni t ed St ates and Puert o Ri co.
Peake' s co- conspi r at or s t est i f i ed agai nst hi m at t r i al ,
r eveal i ng hi s i nvol vement i n t he conspi r acy and t hei r di scussi ons
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about set t i ng sur char ges, f ees, and mar ket shar e al l ocat i ons. One
such i nci dent i nvol ved an emai l exchange between Peake and a
compet i t or r egar di ng pr i ces of f er ed t o a cl i ent i n an at t empt t o
"avoi d a pr i ce war . "
Af t er a ni ne- day t r i al , whi ch t ook pl ace over t he cour se
of t hr ee weeks, t he j ur y f ound Peake gui l t y of par t i ci pat i ng i n a
conspi r acy t o f i x t he pr i ces of Puer t o Ri co f r ei ght ser vi ces, i n
vi ol at i on of Sect i on 1. The di st r i ct cour t sent enced Peake t o
si xt y mont hs' i mpr i sonment .
Thi s appeal ensued.
II. The Indictment
Bef or e addr essi ng t he mai n i ssues i n t hi s appeal , we
br i ef l y addr ess an i ssue t hat , al t hough Peake i s r ai si ng on appeal
f or t he f i rs t t i me, he cl ai ms woul d f or ecl ose our j ur i sdi ct i on on
t hi s mat t er . 1 Peake ar gues t hat Puer t o Ri co i s not a st at e, yet
t he i ndi ct ment char ges Peake under Sect i on 1, whi ch pr ohi bi t s
agr eement s i n r est r ai nt of t r ade or commerce "among t he several
1 " [ J ] ur i sdi ct i onal chal l enges t o an i ndi ct ment may be r ai sed atany t i me, " Uni t ed St at es v. Rosa- Or t i z, 348 F. 3d 33, 36 ( 1st Ci r .2003) , but al l ot her mot i ons r egar di ng a def ect i ve i ndi ct ment , suchas f ai l ur e t o st at e an of f ense, must be made bef or e t r i al , Fed. R.
Cr i m. P. 12( b) ( 3) ( B) , and t hus can onl y be r evi ewed f or pl ai n er r ori f r ai sed f or t he f i r st t i me on appeal , see Uni t ed St at es v.Turner , 684 F. 3d 244, 255 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) . Her e, i t mat t er s notwhet her we t r eat Peake' s argument as a j ur i sdi ct i onal chal l enge, oras an unt i mel y- made f ai l ur e- t o- st at e- a- cl ai m ar gument t o ber evi ewed f or pl ai n er r or , because, as we expl ai n, Peake wascor r ect l y char ged under Sect i on 1, so t her e was no er r or at al l .
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St at es, " and t hat hi s convi ct i on must t her ef or e be vacat ed. 2 There
ar e at l east t wo i nsurmount abl e pr obl ems wi t h thi s ar gument .
Fi r st , i t i s wel l - set t l ed t hat , f or pur poses of t he Sher man Act ,
Puer t o Ri co i s " t o be t r eat ed l i ke a st at e and not l i ke a
t er r i t or y, " t her ef or e, Secti on 1 f ul l y appl i es t o Puer t o Ri co.
Crdova & Si monpi et r i I ns. Agency I nc. v. Chase Manhat t an Bank
N. A. , 649 F. 2d 36, 38, 44 ( 1st Ci r . 1981) . Second, t he evi dence i n
t he r ecor d shows t hat par t of t he f r ei ght car r i ed by the compani es
i n t he conspi r acy or i gi nat ed i n one st at e bef or e bei ng t r anspor t ed
t o a por t i n a second st at e t o be shi pped t o Puer t o Ri co.
Ther ef or e, t he commer ce af f ect ed by t he conspi r acy was not onl y
between a st ate and Puert o Ri co, but al so among t he st ates. Thus,
Peake was cor r ect l y char ged, and t he i ndi ct ment i s not def ect i ve.
We now move on to Peake' s appeal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
deni al of hi s mot i on t o suppr ess, and t hen addr ess hi s ot her t r i al -
r el at ed cl ai ms, bef or e f i nal l y t ur ni ng t o t he appeal of hi s
sentence.
2 Peake ar gues that he shoul d i nst ead have been charged underSect i on 3 of t he Sher man Act , whi ch cont ai ns t he same pr ohi bi t i ons,but appl i es t o t er r i t or i es. 15 U. S. C. 3( a) ( "Ever y . . .conspi r acy[ ] i n r est r ai nt of t r ade or commer ce . . . bet ween anysuch Ter r i t or y and anot her , or bet ween any such Ter r i t or y orTer r i t or i es and any Stat e or Stat es . . . i s decl ar ed i l l egal . " ) .
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III. Motion to Suppress
Peake appeal s t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s mot i on
t o suppr ess t he gover nment ' s sear ch of hi s per sonal el ect r oni cs.
For t he f ol l owi ng r easons, we af f i r m t he deni al .
A. Standard of Review
I n r evi ewi ng a chal l enge t o t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al
of a mot i on t o suppr ess, "we vi ew t he f act s i n t he l i ght most
f avor abl e t o t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r ul i ng, " and "r evi ew t he di st r i ct
cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act and credi bi l i t y det er mi nat i ons f or cl ear
er r or . " Uni t ed St at es v. Camacho, 661 F. 3d 718, 723 ( 1st Ci r .
2011) ( ci t at i on and i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) . However , we
r evi ew t he l ower cour t ' s l egal concl usi ons, i ncl udi ng i t s
determi nat i on of whether t he government exceeded t he scope of t he
war r ant , de novo. Uni t ed St at es v. Fagan, 577 F. 3d 10, 12- 13 ( 1st
Ci r . 2009) .
A sear ch war r ant must "descr i b[ e] t he pl ace to be
sear ched" and t he " t hi ngs t o be sei zed. " U. S. Const . amend. I V.
The aut hor i t y conf er r ed by t he war r ant " i s ci r cumscr i bed by t he
par t i cul ar pl aces del i neat ed i n t he war r ant and does not extend t o
ot her or di f f er ent pl aces. " Fagan, 577 F. 3d at 13. Sear ch
war r ant s al so have a speci f i ci t y requi r ement , meani ng " t hat
war r ant s shal l par t i cul ar l y descr i be t he t hi ngs t o be sei zed, "
whi ch "pr event s t he sei zure of one t hi ng under a war r ant descr i bi ng
anot her . " Mar r on v. Uni t ed St at es, 275 U. S. 192, 196 ( 1927) . Even
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t hough sear ch war r ant s ar e l i mi t ed t o t he par t i cul ar pl aces and
t hi ngs descr i bed i n t hem, t her e i s some br eat hi ng r oom i n our
anal ysi s, si nce "sear ch war r ant s and af f i davi t s shoul d be
consi dered i n a common sense manner , and hyper t echni cal r eadi ngs
shoul d be avoi ded. " Uni t ed St at es v. Bonner , 808 F. 2d 864, 868
( 1st Ci r . 1986) ( ci t i ng Spi nel l i v. Uni t ed St at es, 393 U. S. 410,
419 ( 1969) ) .
A dr af t warr ant pr esent ed t o a magi st r ate j udge may be
al t er ed or modi f i ed by t he j udi ci al of f i cer or at hi s di r ecti on.
See Uni t ed St ates v. Hang Le- Thy Tr an, 433 F. 3d 472, 481 ( 6t h Ci r .
2006) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Kat oa, 379 F. 3d 1203, 1208 ( 10t h Ci r .
2004) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Ar enal , 768 F. 2d 263, 267 ( 8t h Ci r . 1985) .
When par t of a war r ant i s consi der ed i nval i d, "evi dence sei zed
under t he val i d por t i on may be admi t t ed. " Uni t ed St at es v. Geor ge,
975 F. 2d 72, 79 ( 2d Ci r . 1992) . Fur t her mor e, when a war r ant i s
l i mi t ed t o aut hor i ze t he sei zur e of onl y cer t ai n obj ect s,
"cont ai ner [ s] si t uat ed wi t hi n r esi dent i al pr emi ses whi ch ar e t he
subj ect of a val i dl y- i ssued war r ant may be sear ched i f i t i s
r easonabl e t o bel i eve t hat t he cont ai ner coul d conceal i t ems of t he
ki nd por t r ayed i n t he war r ant . " Uni t ed St at es v. Roger s, 521 F. 3d
5, 9- 10 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) .
B. The Search Warrants
I n t hi s case, a magi st r at e j udge was pr esent ed wi t h a
dr af t war r ant f or hi s consi der at i on. Upon r evi ewi ng i t , he cr ossed
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out a paragr aph under At t achment A, whi ch descr i bed t he pr emi ses t o
be searched. The st r i cken paragr aph al l owed t he sear ch of
"br i ef cases, l apt op comput er s, hand- hel d comput er s, cel l phones,
Bl ackberr i es, and other movabl e document cont ai ners f ound on t he
pr emi ses descr i bed. "3 I n At t achment B, t he magi st r at e j udge al so
st r uck t he f ol l owi ng t ext f r om t he descri pt i on of t he pr oper t y to
be sei zed: "memor y cal cul at or s, pager s, per sonal di gi t al assi st ant s
such as Pal mPi l ot hand- hel d comput er s. " The magi st r at e j udge l ef t
st andi ng, however , ot her r ef er ences t o el ect r oni cal l y st or ed
document s and r ecords. As amended, At t achment B descr i bed t he
pr oper t y to be sei zed as f ol l ows:
As used above, t he t erms r ecords, document s, pr ogr ams,document at i on, appl i cat i ons or mat er i al s i ncl ude but ar enot l i mi t ed t o r ecor ds, document s, pr ogr ams, appl i cat i onsor mat er i al s cr eat ed, modi f i ed or st or ed i n any f or m,i ncl udi ng any opt i cal , el ect r i cal , el ect r oni c, ormagnet i c f or m ( such as any i nf or mat i on on an opt i cal ,el ect r i cal , el ect r oni c or magnet i c st or age devi ce) ,i ncl udi ng f l oppy di sks, har d di sks, ZI P di sks, CD- ROMs,
3 The f ul l t ext of t he par agr aph st r uck st at ed:
I n or der t o mi ni mi ze t he pr ospect of t he removal andsubsequent dest r uct i on of any of t he document s andr ecor ds i dent i f i ed i n Exhi bi t B t o t he Sear ch War r ant ,t he sear ch wi l l i ncl ude t he br i ef cases, l apt op comput er s,hand- hel d comput er s, cel l phones, Bl ackber r i es, and ot hermovabl e document contai ner s f ound on t he premi ses
descr i bed above, and i n t he possessi on of , or r eadi l yi dent i f i abl e as bel ongi ng to SEA STAR management ,pr i ci ng, and sal es per sonnel i ncl udi ng, but not l i mi t edt o, FRANK PEAKE, PETER A. BACI , CARL FOX, NED LAGOY, NEI LPERLMUTTER, ALEX CHI SHOLM, MI KE NI CHOLSON, EDWARD PRETRE,and WI LLI AM BYRNES.
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opt i cal di sks, backup t apes, pr i nt er buf f er s or ot herdevi ce memor y buf f er s, smar t car ds . . . emai l server s,as wel l as opened and unopened e- mai l messages and anypr i nt out s or r eadout s f r om any opt i cal , el ectr i cal ,el ect r oni c, or magnet i c st or age devi ce . . . .
Addi t i onal l y, t he magi st r at e j udge added t wo handwr i t t en passages
t o t he por t i on of t he dr af t war r ant gover ni ng t he sei zur e of
comput er s and ot her el ect r oni c devi ces, and or der ed t hat any
sei zed comput er s or el ect r oni c devi ces wi t hi n t he scope of t he
war r ant be r et ur ned wi t hi n t hi r t y days of sei zur e. Speci f i cal l y,
t he f ol l owi ng l anguage was i nser t ed:
I n the event t hat comput er equi pment and ot her el ect r i calst or age devi ces must be t r anspor t ed t o t he appr opr i at el abor at or y, r at her t han sear ched on t he pr emi ses, t hesearch of comput er equi pment and other el ect r oni c st oragedevi ces must be compl eted wi t hi n 30 days of sei zure.
and
I f no evi dence i s f ound i n the comput er equi pment andel ect r oni c st or age devi ces by t he end of t he 30 dayper i od, or i f any el ect r oni cal l y st or ed i nf or mat i on i sout si de of t he scope of t he war r ant , such shal l ber etur ned pr ompt l y.
Fol l owi ng t he gui dance pr ovi ded i n t he war r ant , t he FBI
r ai ded Sea St ar ' s headquar t er s on Apr i l 17, 2008, and sei zed
Peake' s personal l apt op and Bl ackberr y. The i t ems were i maged
( t he data was copi ed) and r etur ned t o Peake on- si t e the same day.
Thi s evi dence was not i mmedi at el y r evi ewed, as t he FBI was under
t he i mpr essi on t hat Sea St ar ' s ser ver s st or ed copi es of al l sei zed
i nf or mat i on r el evant t o t he i nvest i gat i on. I mages of Peake' s
comput er and Bl ackber r y were event ual l y sent t o t he Depar t ment of
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J ust i ce i n Washi ngt on, D. C. Mor e t han f our years passed bef or e
t he government sought and obt ai ned another sear ch warr ant f r om a
magi st r at e j udge i n Washi ngt on, D. C. , aut hor i zi ng a sear ch of
t hese dat a copi es. Thei r r evi ew r eveal ed emai l s t yi ng Peake t o
t he conspi r acy, whi ch t he government submi t t ed as evi dence at
t r i al .
C. Appeal of the Suppression Ruling
Peake ar gues t hat t he i nf or mat i on col l ect ed f r om hi s
personal comput er and Bl ackber r y shoul d be suppr essed because t he
t wo i t ems wer e out si de t he scope of t he i ni t i al war r ant , and
t her ef or e i l l egal l y sei zed. He cont ends t hat when t he magi st r at e
j udge st r uck t he par agr aph i n At t achment A speci f yi ng comput er s
and Bl ackber r i es as pl aces t hat coul d be sear ched, doi ng so
speci f i cal l y di sal l owed any sear ch and sei zur e of sai d i t ems. A
good f ai t h except i on t o t he pur por t ed vi ol at i on of t he i ni t i al
war r ant , Peake cont i nues, cannot appl y i n the pr esent case wher e
t he pr oper t y sei zed was expr essl y di sal l owed by the i ssui ng
magi st r at e j udge.
Peake al so ar gues t hat t he government di d not have
aut hor i t y t o i mage t he sei zed el ect r oni cs, and t hat t he second
war r ant f r om t he magi st r at e j udge i n Washi ngt on, D. C. , di d not
cur e t he vi ol at i on because i t coul d not aut hor i ze a sear ch of
mat er i al out si de t he scope of t he or i gi nal war r ant , especi al l y
af t er t he t hi r t y days per mi t t ed by the f i r st war r ant had passed.
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1. The First Warrant
Appl yi ng de novo r evi ew, we concl ude t hat t he i nf or mat i on
col l ect ed f r omt he comput er and Bl ackber r y was wi t hi n t he scope of
t he or i gi nal sear ch war r ant . We t hi nk Peake i s mi st aken i n hi s
r el i ance on t he st r i cken par agr aph; ot her , i nt act passages i n t he
warr ant expr essl y demonst r ate t hat t he magi st r ate j udge appr oved
sear chi ng f or al l document s and r ecor ds t hat per t ai ned t o the
conspi r acy st or ed i n "an el ect r oni c or di gi t al f or mat . " That t he
war r ant l i st ed document s st or ed i n el ect r oni c f or m on an
el ect r oni c st or age devi ce, i ncl udi ng emai l messages, and r ef er r ed
i n At t achment B t o Bl ackber r y addr ess books, conf i r ms t he l egal i t y
of t he FBI ' s sear ch.
Thi s case i s anal ogous t o Uni t ed St at es v. Roger s, wher e
we hel d t hat t he gover nment ' s sei zur e of a vi deot ape was val i d,
even though vi deot apes wer e not l i st ed i n t he war r ant , because t he
warr ant ment i oned "photos, " and a vi deot ape was a pl ausi bl e
r eposi t or y f or a phot o. 521 F. 3d at 10. Or Uni t ed St at es v.
Gi annet t a, 909 F. 2d 571, 577 ( 1st Ci r . 1990) , wher e we hel d t hat
t he of f i cer s coul d l ook i n movabl e cont ai ner s and wher ever t hey
had r easonabl e suspi ci on t o thi nk "document s coul d be hi dden,
whi ch woul d i ncl ude pocket s i n cl ot hi ng, boxes, f i l e cabi net s and
f i l es, " because "[ a] s t o document sear ches especi al l y, t he easi l y
conceal ed natur e of t he evi dence means t hat qui t e br oad searches
ar e per mi t t ed. "
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Her e, gi ven t hat Peake' s per sonal el ect r oni c devi ces wer e
on t he pr emi ses t o be sear ched, and t he war r ant speci f i cal l y
ment i oned el ect r oni cal l y- st or ed document s, t he FBI act ed wi t hi n t he
scope of t he warr ant when i t sear ched Peake' s devi ces. And t he
f act t hat t he i ssui ng magi st r at e j udge had hand- wr i t t en on t he
warr ant t hat comput ers and el ect r oni c devi ces must be r etur ned
wi t hi n t hi r t y days i s evi dence enough t hat t he scope of t he war r ant
i ncl uded t hese obj ect ed- t o i t ems. Fut her mor e, t he gover nment ' s
i magi ng of t he comput er and Bl ackber r y di d not const i t ut e a
warr ant l ess sei zure because doi ng so was cont empl ated by t he
or i gi nal war r ant , whi ch expl i ci t l y aut hor i zed t he gover nment t o
sei ze el ect r oni cal l y- st or ed emai l s and document s.
Nor does t he f act t hat t he magi st r at e j udge crossed out
l anguage i n t he war r ant af f ect our concl usi on. The war r ant
aut hor i zed a sear ch of t he "premi ses" of Sea St ar ' s headquar t er s;
t hus, as t he di st r i ct cour t hel d i n denyi ng t he mot i on t o suppr ess,
t he magi st r ate j udge coul d have r easonabl y cr ossed out t he i t ems
ment i oned i n At t achment A, "br i ef cases, l apt op comput er s, hand- hel d
comput ers, cel l phones, Bl ackberr i es and ot her movabl e document
cont ai ner s, " i n or der t o i ndi cat e t hat t he gover nment shoul d not be
l i mi t ed t o sear chi ng sol el y i n t hose pl aces f or r ecor ds document i ng
t he conspi r acy, but shoul d be per mi t t ed t o sear ch t he ent i r e
pr emi ses. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Br adl ey, 644 F. 3d 1213, 1266
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( 11t h Ci r . 2011) ( observi ng t hat war r ant t o sear ch "pr emi ses"
per mi t t ed sear ch of t he ent i r e bui l di ng) .
As t o t he magi st r at e j udge' s cr ossi ng out of "per sonal
di gi t al assi st ant " i n At t achment B, we concl ude t hat t he cr ossed-
out t ext shoul d si mpl y be t r eat ed as nonexi st ent . 4 Peake does not
poi nt us t o any case l aw est abl i shi ng t hat el i mi nat i ng a par t of
t he t ext f r om a dr af t war r ant necessar i l y means t hat t he cr ossed-
out s t at ement s have cont i nued si gni f i cance. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v.
Thomas, 489 F. 2d 664, 672- 73 ( 5th Ci r . 1973) ( st at i ng t hat wher e a
magi st r at e j udge cr ossed out " i n t he dayt i me" whi l e l eavi ng t he
phr ase "at any t i me i n t he day or ni ght , " t he war r ant "coul d be
served at any t i me, day or ni ght " ) . Thus, t he agent s woul d have
been per mi t t ed t o sei ze Peake' s Bl ackber r y, so l ong as t he
r emai ni ng t ext of t he war r ant was val i d and aut hor i zed t hem t o do
so. As we expl ai ned above, t he sei zur e and sear ch of t he
Bl ackber r y was aut hor i zed by t he i nt act par agr aphs of t he war r ant .
We t her ef or e concl ude that t he Bl ackber r y was al so l awf ul l y sei zed
and searched.
4 Al t er nat i vel y, t he magi st r at e j udge may have i nt ended t oel i mi nat e per sonal i t ems f r om t he sear ch, and l i mi t t he agent s t osei zi ng company proper t y onl y. See Bi vens v. Si x Unknown Named
Agent s of Fed. Bur eau of Nar cot i cs, 403 U. S. 388, 395 n. 7 ( 1971)( " [ T]he Four t h Amendment conf i nes an of f i cer execut i ng a sear chwar r ant st r i ct l y wi t hi n t he bounds set by t he war r ant . " ( quot i ngMarr on, 275 U. S. at 196) ) . But Peake does not appear t o argue t hatt he i nf or mat i on f r om hi s comput er and Bl ackber r y shoul d have beensuppr essed because t hey were personal , and not company pr oper t y, sowe wi l l not go down t hi s r oad.
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2. The Second Warrant
Peake cor r ect l y ar gues t hat i f hi s comput er and
Bl ackber r y had been i l l egal l y sei zed, t he gover nment shoul d not
have been permi t t ed t o l ater obt ai n a more expansi ve warr ant f r om
an ar guabl y f r i endl i er f or umi n or der t o sear ch pr evi ousl y- excl uded
i t ems, as doi ng so woul d weaken i mpor t ant Four t h Amendment
pr ot ect i ons. But her e, we have concl uded t hat t he sei zed and
i maged evi dence Peake seeks suppr essed was wi t hi n t he scope of t he
f i r st war r ant . We do not f i nd t hat t he gover nment used t he second
war r ant t o unl awf ul l y si dest ep t he f i r st one, and we need not
consi der whether t he second warr ant was i nval i d. Nor do we need t o
r each t he quest i on whet her t he good f ai t h except i on appl i es. I n
sum, t he suppr essi on mot i on was pr oper l y deni ed. We t ur n now t o
Peake' s pre- t r i al mot i on f or change of venue.
IV. Motion for Change of Venue
Because Peake was i ndi ct ed i n Puer t o Ri co - - whi l e hi s
co- conspi r at or s' cases wer e br ought i n J acksonvi l l e, Fl or i da - -
Peake f i l ed a pr e- t r i al mot i on f or change of venue under Feder al
Rul e of Cr i mi nal Procedur e 21( b) " f or t he conveni ence of t he
par t i es, any vi ct i m, and t he wi t nesses, and i n t he i nt er est of
j ust i ce. " Fed. R. Cr i m. P. 21( b) . I n hi s mot i on, Peake di scussed
t he f act or s consi der ed i n Pl at t v. Mi nnesota Mi ni ng & Manuf act ur i ng
Co. , 376 U. S. 240, 243- 45 ( 1964) , st r essi ng t hat i t was
i mpr act i cabl e t o hol d a t r i al i n Puer t o Ri co, si nce most per sons
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i nvol ved i n t he conspi r acy and t he i nvest i gat i on wer e i n
J acksonvi l l e. See al so Uni t ed Stat es v. Qui l es- Ol i vo, 684 F. 3d
177, 184 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ( appl yi ng t he Pl at t f act or s i n a cr i mi nal
case) . Peake l at er f i l ed suppl ement al br i ef i ng, ar gui ng t hat
change of venue was al so proper under Federal Rul e of Cr i mi nal
Procedur e 21( a) because i t woul d be i mpossi bl e t o obt ai n a f ai r and
i mpar t i al j ur y composed of Puer t o Ri can consumer s.
The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i on, r easoni ng t hat any
i nconveni ence suf f ered by Peake was out wei ghed by t he i nt erest of
havi ng t he case hear d i n t he j ur i sdi ct i on most ser i ousl y af f ect ed
by t he conspi r acy. I t al so expl ai ned t hat under Rul e 21( a) ,
t r ansf er i s a mandat or y r emedy i f t he cour t f i nds " an unaccept abl e
l evel of pr ej udi ce, " such as wher e "per vasi ve pr et r i al publ i ci t y
has i nf l amed passi ons i n t he host communi t y past t he br eaki ng
poi nt . " Uni t ed St at es v. Wal ker , 665 F. 3d 212, 223 ( 1st Ci r . 2011)
( ci t i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Angi ul o, 497 F. 2d 440, 440- 42 ( 1st Ci r .
1974) ( per cur i am) ) . The di st r i ct cour t concl uded t hat t her e was
no per vasi ve pr e- t r i al publ i ci t y i nf l ami ng t he passi ons i n t he
communi t y t o the poi nt t hat Peake coul d not have a f ai r and
i mpar t i al t r i al i n Puer t o Ri co, and t hus t he cour t al l owed t he
gover nment t o exer ci se i t s r i ght t o choose the venue at i t s
pr osecut or i al di scr et i on.
A di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of t he r equest f or a change of
venue i s revi ewed f or abuse of di scr et i on. Qui l es- Ol i vo, 684 F. 3d
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at 181. We f i nd no such abuse i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al .
Peake di d not al l ege any out si de i nf l uence or publ i ci t y t hat coul d
have af f ected, f r om t he out set of t r i al , t he j ur y' s consi der at i on
of t he evi dence pr esent ed. Thus, we af f i r m t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
r ul i ng on t he mot i on t o change venue.
V. Trial
Peake' s next set of i ssues on t hi s appeal per t ai ns t o
mat t er s t hat ar ose at t r i al , and can be boi l ed down i nt o f our
cl ai ms: t he f i r st i s Peake' s cl ai mt hat he shoul d have been gr ant ed
a new t r i al on t he basi s of pr osecut or i al mi sconduct , t he second i s
t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n per mi t t i ng pr ej udi ci al t est i mony,
t he t hi r d i s t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n denyi ng hi s r equest
f or a j ur y i nst r uct i on r egar di ng hi s t heor y of def ense, and t he
f our t h i s t hat t he di st r i ct cour t shoul d have decl ar ed a mi st r i al
when, dur i ng del i ber at i ons, t he j ur y sent t he j udge a not e st at i ng
t hat i t coul d not come t o a ver di ct . As we wi l l expl ai n, we f i nd
no er r or i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s handl i ng of each of t hese mat t er s,
but f i r st , we begi n by pr ovi di ng some addi t i onal backgr ound on what
happened dur i ng t he t r i al .
Peake' s t r i al was hel d i n San J uan, Puer t o Ri co, i n
J anuar y 2013, and l ast ed ni ne days. I n i t s openi ng ar gument on t he
second day of t r i al , t he gover nment made r ef er ences t o mul t i pl e
nat i onal r et ai l chai ns and f r anchi ses whose busi nesses pur por t edl y
exper i enced ar t i f i ci al l y hi gher shi ppi ng cost s as a r esul t of t he
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ant i t r ust conspi r acy, and st at ed t hat even t he cost of school
l unches had been af f ect ed by t he conspi r acy. Peake obj ect ed t o
t hese comment s, whi ch we wi l l descr i be i n mor e det ai l l at er , and
f i l ed a mot i on f or mi st r i al . I n hi s mot i on, he ar gued t hat t he
government had communi cat ed t o t he j ur y t hat hi gher pr i ces were
bei ng passed on t o t hem as di r ect l y af f ect ed consumer s, and
r easoned t hat i f j ur or s f el t t hei r per sonal f i nanci al i nt er est s
wer e af f ected by t he conspi r acy, t hei r j udgment woul d be cl ouded.
The di st r i ct cour t t ook not e of t he mot i on on t he mor ni ng of t he
t hi r d day of t he t r i al , and gr ant ed t he gover nment t hr ee days t o
f i l e i t s r esponse.
As t he t r i al cont i nued, t he gover nment cal l ed Peake' s co-
conspi r at or s, Gabr i el Ser r a, Gr egor y Gl ova, and Pet er Baci , t o t he
st and t o pr ovi de t est i mony t hat est abl i shed t he exi st ence of a
conspi r acy. On cr oss- exami nat i on, Peake al so el i ci t ed t est i mony
f r om t he co- conspi r at or s t hat he ar gues was excul pat or y, but
cont ends t hat , because t he j ur or s at t hi s poi nt bel i eved t hemsel ves
t o be "af f ect ed consumer s, " t hey wer e unabl e to f ai r l y consi der
t hi s pur por t ed excul pat or y t est i mony t hat was cr i t i cal t o hi s
def ense. 5
5 For exampl e, Baci t est i f i ed t hat , dur i ng par t of t he conspi r acy,Peake pushed f or per f ect l y l egal st r at egi es t hat woul d negat i vel yaf f ect t he st abi l i t y of t he "Fl or i da 50/ 50" ar r angement - - t he namegi ven t o t he st r at egy of al l ocat i ng equal mar ket shar es bet weenHor i zon Li nes and Sea St ar . One such pr o- compet i t i on st r at egy t hatPeake had advocat ed f or was f or a thi r d shi p t o ser ve t he Puer t oRi co- J acksonvi l l e r out e; anot her was a "sl ap st r at egy" wher eby Sea
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On t he f our t h day of t r i al , t he di st r i ct j udge had a
di scussi on wi t h the par t i es r egar di ng the remar ks made by t he
government dur i ng t he openi ng st at ement s when Peake rai sed an
obj ect i on t o the gover nment cal l i ng wi t nesses whose ret ai l and
consumer busi ness oper at i ons i n Puer t o Ri co wer e af f ect ed by t he
hi gher shi ppi ng r at es gener at ed by t he conspi r acy. Peake ar gued
t hat t he ef f ect on mar ket pr i ces f or consumer s had not hi ng t o do
wi t h whether t here was an agr eement amongst compet i t or s t o f i x
t hei r pri ces. That i s, Peake cont ended t hat t he i ssue bef or e t he
j ury shoul d be l i mi t ed t o t he agr eement , r egar dl ess of i t s ef f ect s,
and ar gued t hat al l owi ng t he t est i mony of wi t nesses f r om af f ect ed
busi nesses was i n l i ne wi t h t he gover nment ' s i nappr opr i at e r emar ks
dur i ng openi ng st at ement s t hat t he conspi r acy af f ect ed Puer t o Ri can
consumers. The government argued t hat t he wi t nesses' t est i mony was
necessar y to demonst r at e t he ant i t r ust har mt o di r ect consumer s of
t he shi ppi ng compani es ( and not t o i mpl y t hat members of t he publ i c
who pat r oni zed t hose busi nesses, or i ndi r ect consumer s, wer e
af f ected) , 6 because t he government needed t o est abl i sh t hat t he
St ar woul d pur sue t he busi ness of any company that t r i ed t o st ealt hei r cl i ent s. I n hi s t est i mony, Ser r a conf i r med Baci ' s st at ementt hat Peake want ed t o add a t hi r d shi p. He al so t est i f i ed t hatPeake aut hor i zed compet i t i ve shi ppi ng r at es and t hat t hei r meet i ngs
wer e st r i ct l y l egal . I n addi t i on, on t he st and, Gl ova coul d noti dent i f y any di r ect r ef er ences t o Peake i n hi s r ecor ds ofcommuni cat i ons made i n f ur t herance of t he conspi r acy.
6 Gener al l y, t her e i s a di st i nct i on bet ween di r ect and i ndi r ectconsumer s i n ant i t r ust cases. See Hanover Shoe, I nc. v. Uni t edShoe Mach. Corp. , 392 U. S. 481, 492- 94 ( 1968) . The harm t o be
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conspi r acy af f ect ed i nt er st at e commer ce, a r equi r ed el ement of t he
charged of f ense.
The di st r i ct j udge agr eed t hat t est i mony r egar di ng t he
ef f ect on t he wi t nesses' compani es showed t hat t he conspi r acy had
i mpact ed i nt erst ate commerce, whi ch was an el ement of t he of f ense,
and t hus r ul ed t hat t est i mony t o t hat ef f ect woul d be al l owed.
However , t he di st r i ct cour t war ned t he pr osecut or s agai nst
el i ci t i ng t est i mony beyond t hat scope, and not ed t hat t he
i mpl i cat i on i n t he gover nment ' s openi ng t hat school l unch pr ogr ams,
and t her ef or e chi l dr en, had been af f ect ed by t he conspi r acy was
"r eal l y way out of bounds. " The di st r i ct j udge al so of f er ed,
notwi t hst andi ng t he yet - undetermi ned out come of t he mot i on f or
mi st r i al , t o gi ve a cur at i ve i nst r uct i on t o t he j ur y t hat day t hat
woul d addr ess Peake' s concerns about t he pr osecut or ' s openi ng
st at ement and cl ar i f y t hat j ur or s shoul d not t ake i nt o account t he
i mpact of t he conspi r acy on Puer t o Ri co' s ci t i zens. At t he cour t ' s
i nvi t at i on, t he par t i es submi t t ed pr oposed cur at i ve i nst r uct i ons,
and t he di st r i ct j udge gave a ver si on of t he cur at i ve i nst r uct i on
t o t he j ur y that day. 7
consi der ed i s onl y t hat t o di r ect consumer s. See I l l . Br i ck Co. v.I l l i noi s, 431 U. S. 720, 752 ( 1977) ( "Li mi t i ng def endant s' l i abi l i t y
t o t he l oss of pr of i t s suf f er ed by di r ect pur chaser s woul d t husal l ow t he ant i t r ust of f ender t o avoi d havi ng t o pay the f ul l soci alcost of hi s i l l egal conduct i n many cases i n whi ch i ndi r ectpur chaser s f ai l ed t o br i ng sui t . ") .
7 Near t he end of t r i al , t he cour t i ssued a memorandumopi ni on andor der denyi ng Peake' s mot i on f or a new t r i al , f i ndi ng no mi sconduct
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Over Peake' s obj ect i ons, t he gover nment t hen cal l ed t o
t he st and Gabr i el Laf i t t e, who wor ked f or t he oper at or of Bur ger
Ki ng r est aur ant s i n Puer t o Ri co, who t est i f i ed t hat t he conspi r acy
af f ect ed t he cost s pai d by Bur ger Ki ng f or pr oduct s i t sol d on t he
i sl and. Lat er i n t he t r i al , Ron Reynol ds, a U. S. Depar t ment of
Agr i cul t ur e r epr esent at i ve, t est i f i ed t o bei ng of f er ed
"t ake- i t - or - l eave- i t " r at es f or shi ppi ng ser vi ces f or f ood f or
school l unch pr ogr ams i n Puer t o Ri co.
Af t er cl osi ng ar gument s, t he j ur y began del i ber at i ons on
t he af t er noon of Fr i day, J anuar y 25, 2013. Whi l e del i ber at i ng on
t he f ol l owi ng Monday - - J anuar y 28 - - t he j ur y sent t he di st r i ct
j udge t wo not es, i n whi ch i t st at ed t hat i t coul d not r each a
unani mous agr eement . The second not e, del i vered on Monday eveni ng
af t er t en hour s of del i ber at i on, st at ed t hat each j ur or had r eached
a per sonal ver di ct , but t hat t he j ur y as a whol e was unabl e t o
r each unani mi t y. Af t er t he second not e, Peake asked f or a mi st r i al
and the government asked f or an Al l en char ge, 8 bot h of whi ch t he
di st r i ct cour t deni ed. I nst ead, t he cour t asked t he j ur y t o
"r et ur n [ t he next day] t o cont i nue del i ber at i ons. " On Tuesday, t he
on t he basi s of t he pr osecut or ' s openi ng st at ement , but , evenassumi ng mi sconduct , concl udi ng t hat any pr ej udi ce was cur ed by t hef act t hat t he r emar ks wer e i sol at ed, t he j ur y was gi ven a det ai l edcur at i ve i nst r uct i on, and t he obj ect ed- t o st at ement s di d not bearon any el ement s of t he char ged of f ense.
8 An Al l en char ge i s "[ a] suppl ement al j ur y i nst r uct i on gi ven byt he cour t t o encour age a deadl ocked j ur y, af t er pr ol ongeddel i ber at i ons, t o r each a ver di ct . " Bl ack' s Law Di ct i onar y ( 10t hed. 2014) ; see Al l en v. Uni t ed St at es, 164 U. S. 492 ( 1896) .
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j ury del i ber at ed f or anot her t hree hours and f i nal l y r eached a
unani mous gui l t y ver di ct .
Af t er t he ver di ct , Peake f i l ed a Mot i on f or New Tr i al and
a Mot i on f or J udgment of Acqui t t al under Feder al Rul es of Cr i mi nal
Pr ocedur e 33 and 29 r espect i vel y, ar gui ng, i nt er al i a, t hat t he
di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n al l owi ng t he gover nment t o appeal t o j ur y
bi as and pr ej udi ce, i n r ef usi ng t o gi ve a t heor y- of - def ense j ur y
i nst r uct i on, and i n or der i ng t he j ur y t o cont i nue del i ber at i ons. 9
The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i ons. We t urn now t o Peake' s
appeal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s var i ous tr i al - r el at ed r ul i ngs.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
We addr ess f i r st Peake' s ar gument t hat t he di st r i ct cour t
shoul d have gr ant ed hi m a new t r i al on gr ounds t hat t he
government ' s openi ng st atement i mpl i ed t he conspi r acy had i mpact ed
consumer s, and ther ef or e t he j ur or s t hemsel ves, t hus "poi soni ng the
wel l . " 10
9 Peake does not appeal t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r ul i ngs on t he ot heri ssues r ai sed i n t he Rul e 33 and 29 mot i ons, whi ch chal l enged t hedi st r i ct cour t ' s deni al s of : ( 1) Peake' s r equest t o submi t hear sayevi dence f r omone of t he co- conspi r at or s; ( 2) Peake' s obj ect i on t ot he admi ssi bi l i t y of f i nanci al di scl osur es; and ( 3) Peake' s r equestf or a new t r i al on gr ounds t hat t he gover nment had f ai l ed t odi scl ose excul pat or y evi dence i n vi ol at i on of Br ady v. Mar yl and,373 U. S. 83 ( 1963) .
10 Peake addi t i onal l y cl ai ms t hat he was i ncor r ect l y pr ohi bi t edf r om di mi ni shi ng t he negat i ve ef f ect s of t hose st at ement s becauset he gover nment moved successf ul l y t o pr ohi bi t hi mf r omar gui ng t hat- - despi t e t he ant i t r ust conspi r acy - - shi ppi ng cost s r emai nedr easonabl e and f ai r . But whether t he agr eed- upon pr i ces char ged byt he conspi r at or s wer e nonet hel ess f ai r or r easonabl e does notaf f ect our concl usi on. A per se Sect i on 1 vi ol at i on i s not excused
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I n i t s openi ng st at ement s, t he gover nment t ol d t he j ur y
t hat "most consumer goods t r avel t o Puer t o Ri co f r om t he shi ppi ng
l anes" af f ect ed by the conspi r acy; t hat t he conspi r acy "was so
si gni f i cant t hat i t af f ect ed bi l l i ons of dol l ar s of f r ei ght t o and
f r omPuer t o Ri co"; and t hat "[ b] usi nesses l i ke Bur ger Ki ng, Of f i ce
Max and Wal gr eens, busi nesses t hat have st or es al l over Puer t o
Ri co, t hey wer e al l payi ng mor e than t hey shoul d have t o shi p
f r ei ght t o Puer t o Ri co because Sea St ar and Hor i zon wer e
conspi r i ng, not compet i ng. " The gover nment al so t ol d t he j ur y t hat
Bur ger Ki ng' s shi ppi ng cost s af f ect ed t he pr i ce of hambur ger s sol d
t o cust omers, and t hat t he f ederal government had i ncur r ed hi gher
cost s f or t he school l unch pr ogr am, l eavi ng i t wi t h " l ess money .
. . t o buy f ood f or school chi l dr en. " The gover nment added t hat
t he ant i t r ust l aws under whi ch Peake was char ged had been enact ed
out of t he "concern[ ] t hat consumers need t o buy thi ngs t o f eed and
cl ot he t hei r f ami l i es. "
I mpr oper r emarks by pr osecut ors ar e r evi ewed de novo.
Uni t ed St at es v. Rodr guez, 675 F. 3d 48, 61 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ( ci t i ng
Uni t ed St at es v. Ayal a- Gar c a, 574 F. 3d 5, 16 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) ) .
Even i f mi sconduct occur r ed, we woul d st i l l need t o consi der
whet her i t was har ml ess. Uni t ed St at es v. Gonzl ez- Pr ez, 778 F. 3d
by a showi ng t hat t he supr a- compet i t i ve pr i ces were somehow st i l lr easonabl e. Uni t ed St at es v. Socony- VacuumOi l Co. , 310 U. S. 150,212- 13 ( 1940) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Topco Assoc. , I nc. , 405U. S. 596, 610 ( 1972) ( " [ N] aked r est r ai nt s of t r ade ar e [ not ] t o bet ol er at ed because t hey ar e wel l i nt ended or because t hey ar eal l egedl y devel oped t o i ncr ease compet i t i on. " ) .
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3, 19 ( 1st Ci r . 2015) , cer t . deni ed, 135 S. Ct . 1911 ( 2015) . I n
doi ng so, we determi ne whether t he mi sconduct "so poi soned t he wel l
t hat t he t r i al ' s out come was l i kel y af f ect ed, t hus war r ant i ng a new
t r i al . " I d. ( quot i ng Rodr guez, 675 F. 3d at 62) . "I n maki ng t hi s
det er mi nat i on, we f ocus on ( 1) t he sever i t y of t he mi sconduct ,
i ncl udi ng whet her i t was i sol at ed and/ or del i ber at e; ( 2) whet her
cur at i ve i nst r uct i ons wer e gi ven; and ( 3) t he st r engt h of t he
evi dence agai nst t he def endant . " I d. at 19 ( ci t i ng Rodr guez, 675
F. 3d at 62) .
Here, we agr ee t hat t he pr osecut or ' s r emarks were
i mpr oper . We t her ef or e di r ect our i nqui r y at whet her t hese
st atement s were nonethel ess harml ess. As we expl ai n, because of
t he ext ent and t he l evel of det ai l t he di st r i ct cour t i ncl uded i n
i t s cur at i ve i nstr uct i on; t he f act t hat t he di str i ct j udge
i nt er vened r epeat edl y i n t he exami nat i on of wi t nesses t o avoi d any
r ef erence t o end consumers; and t he over whel mi ng amount of
cor r obor at i ng document ar y evi dence t hat t i ed Peake t o t he
conspi r acy, we concl ude that t he ef f ect s of t he pr osecut or i al
mi sconduct di d not so poi son t he wel l t hat a new t r i al woul d be
warr ant ed.
Fi r st , t he day af t er Peake f i l ed hi s mot i on f or a
mi st r i al , t he di st r i ct cour t gave t he j ur y t he f ol l owi ng
compr ehensi ve and det ai l ed cur at i ve i nst r uct i on:
The f act t hat Puer t o Ri co may have pot ent i al l y beenaf f ect ed or consumer s and/ or pr i ces and/ or busi ness i snot t o be consi dered by [ you] i n your j udgment as t o t he
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i nnocence or gui l t of t he def endant . The ef f ect onpr i ces or consumer s i n Puer t o Ri co i s not per se anel ement of t he [ of f ense] .
You ar e not t o deci de t hi s case based on pi t y andsympat hy to Puer t o Ri can busi nesses, t o Puert o Ri co, or
t o Puert o Ri can consumers.
The ef f ect on Puer t o Ri co onl y i s mat er i al as t opot ent i al l y est abl i shi ng an ef f ect on i nt er st at ecommer ce. Thi s case i s about a pot ent i al conspi r acy i nvi ol at i on of t he ant i t r ust l aw, and whet her or not t hedef endant , Mr . Frank Peake, j oi ned t he conspi r acy.
Sympat hy to Puer t o Ri co i s, t her ef or e, t o pl ay absol ut el yno r ol e i n your consi der at i on of t hi s case. Anyst at ement t hat may have i mpl i ed or t hat you may haveunder st ood t hat t hi s i s a case r el at i ng t o t he ef f ect on
Puer t o Ri co i s an er r oneous i nt er pr et at i on, and I don' twant you t o have t hat i nt er pr et at i on. So, t her ef or e, anyef f ect on Puer t o Ri co i s not t o be consi der ed at al l .
The cour t ' s i nst r uct i on was ar guabl y mor e det ai l ed t han t he
pr oposed i nst r uct i on Peake submi t t ed. 11 I n addi t i on, t he di str i ct
j udge i nt er vened i n t he quest i oni ng of t he gover nment ' s wi t nesses
t o pr event undue r ef er ence t o t he conspi r acy' s ef f ect on Puer t o
11 Peake' s pr oposed cur at i ve i nst r uct i on r ead as f ol l ows:
I woul d l i ke t o i nst r uct you t hat t hi s case i s not aboutpr i ci ng ef f ect s i n Puer t o Ri co or whet her pr i ces i nPuer t o Ri co have gone up or down. The onl y quest i ons f oryou are whether t here was a conspi r acy as al l eged i n t hei ndi ct ment and whether Fr ank Peake knowi ngl y andi nt ent i onal l y j oi ned t hat conspi r acy. I al so i nst r uctyou t hat t he pr osecut or ment i oned i n openi ng st atementt hat t hi s case af f ect ed Puer t o Ri co and Puer t o Ri cans.Thi s was i mproper . Thi s case i s not t o be deci ded basedon t hose f act or s. Ther ef or e, I i nst r uct you t o di sr egar dt hose comment s. You shoul d j udge t hi s case onl y on t heevi dence and not an appeal t o sympathy or bi as. Any suchat t empt s by t he pr osecut i on i n i t s openi ng st at ement ori n t he quest i oni ng of i t s wi t nesses shoul d bedi sr egar ded.
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Ri can consumer s, and t he i nst r uct i ons gi ven t o t he j ur y af t er
cl osi ng argument s agai n st r essed t hese poi nt s. For exampl e, t hey
emphasi zed t hat t he j ur y "must not be i nf l uenced by any personal
l i kes or di sl i kes, pr ej udi ces or sympat hy. " The si xt h i nst r uct i on
cl ar i f i ed t hat " [ a] r gument s and st at ement s by l awyer s are not
evi dence. The l awyer s ar e not wi t nesses. What t hey say i n t hei r
openi ng st at ement s . . . and at ot her t i mes . . . i s not evi dence. "
And t he t went y- f i r st i nst r uct i on, l abel ed "What Not t o Consi der , "
cont ai ned t he exact same cur at i ve i nst r uct i on gi ven t o t he j ur y on
t he f our t h day of t r i al , wi t h one i mpor t ant addi t i on: i nst ead of
t el l i ng t he j ur or s t hat t he cour t di d not want t hem t o "have" an
"er r oneous i nt er pr et at i on" about st at ement s i mpl yi ng t hat t hi s case
r el at ed t o t he ef f ect on Puer t o Ri co, t he cour t i nst r uct ed, "I
st er nl y or der you not t o t ake such st at ement s i nt o consi der at i on. "
We have st at ed t hat t her e i s no mi scarr i age of j ust i ce
r equi r i ng a new t r i al when t her e ar e cur at i ve i nst r uct i ons and t he
evi dence does not "pr eponder at e[ ] heavi l y agai nst t he ver di ct . "
Uni t ed St at es v. Mangual - Gar c a, 505 F. 3d 1, 14 ( 1st Ci r . 2007)
( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Mooney, 315 F. 3d 54, 61 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) ) .
The degr ee of consi der at i on and ef f or t on t he par t of t he di st r i ct
cour t t o respond t o the def endant ' s val i d concer n over t he
pr osecut or s' appeal t o t he j ur y' s per sonal i nt er est s al l ows us t o
concl ude t hat i t cur ed any pr ej udi ce. I ndeed, cur at i ve
i nst r uct i ons ar e "or di nar i l y an appr opr i at e met hod of pr eempt i ng a
mi st r i al . " Uni t ed St at es v. Tr i ni dad- Acost a, 773 F. 3d 298, 308
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( 1st Ci r . 2014) ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Sot omayor - Vzquez, 249
F. 3d 1, 18 ( 1st Ci r . 2001) ) . We pr esume t hat j ur i es f ol l ow
i nst r uct i ons, Uni t ed St at es v. Gonzal ez- Vzquez, 219 F. 3d 37, 48
( 1st Ci r . 2000) , and t her e i s not hi ng i n t he r ecor d t o suggest t hat
t he i nst r uct i on r egar di ng t he gover nment ' s r emarks was di sr egar ded
by t he j ur y.
The st r ength of t he gover nment ' s cor r obor at i ng evi dence
agai nst Peake al so suppor t s our concl usi on i n t hi s mat t er . See
Mangual - Garc a, 505 F. 3d at 14 ( "Nor can we say t hat t he cumul at i ve
ef f ect of t he al l eged er r or s, gi ven t he cur at i ve i nst r uct i ons t hat
wer e gi ven and t he st r engt h of t he ot her evi dence, const i t ut es a
mi scar r i age of j ust i ce. " ) ; Mooney, 315 F. 3d at 60 ( " [ W] e not e t hat
any l i nger i ng pr ej udi ci al ef f ect f r om t he r emar ks pal es i n
compar i son wi t h t he overwhel mi ng st r engt h of t he government ' s
evi dence agai nst t he def endant . " ) . Her e, t he gover nment ' s case was
r obust . The t est i mony of co- conspi r at or s and di r ect cust omer s of
t he shi ppi ng compani es est abl i shed t hat t her e was a conspi r acy t o
f i x pr i ces, t hat Peake knowi ngl y par t i ci pat ed, t hat t he conspi r acy
had t he ef f ect of i ncr easi ng shi ppi ng r at es and sur char ges, and
t hat t hi s af f ect ed i nt er st at e commer ce. The gover nment al so
i nt r oduced numer ous exhi bi t s, i ncl udi ng emai l s sent by Peake
hi msel f f r om hi s company emai l , est abl i shi ng t he exi st ence of a
conspi r acy. For exampl e, i n one emai l f r om J ul y 11, 2005, Peake
t ol d Baci , hi s co- conspi r at or and subor di nat e, t hat he had l ear ned
t hat Hor i zon Li nes had t ol d Sea St ar ' s cl i ent s t hat Hor i zon Li nes
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was wi l l i ng t o "wor k wi t h t hem, " and i nst r uct ed Baci t o come up
wi t h a "sl ap. " Baci sent Hor i zon Li nes an emai l t he next day,
expr essi ng concer n about t he " l evel of di st r ust " bui l di ng bet ween
Sea St ar and Hor i zon Li nes.
I n another exchange between Peake and Ser r a f r om March
22, 2008, Peake compl ai ned t o Serr a t hat Hor i zon Li nes had been
"hur t i ng" hi m by negot i at i ng wi t h Sea St ar cl i ent s "Fl exi , Goya,
At ek and BK. " Peake added a warni ng: " I f you' r e swi ngi ng at
Cr owl ey[ , one of t he ot her f r ei ght car r i er s, ] you ar e mi ssi ng and
hi t t i ng me. " Ser r a r esponded wi t h det ai l ed i nf or mat i on about
Hor i zon Li nes t ar get i ng cer t ai n cl i ent s and ment i oned wher e he
t hought Sea St ar woul d set pr i ces. He concl uded, " I ' l l have t o go
wi t h t he best i nf o I have. Not sur e communi cat i on and avai l abi l i t y
i s wor ki ng as wel l as i t used t o. " Peake r esponded:
BK I amnot al l t hat concerned about ( we don' t have muchof t hat ) .
I am t he onl y one t hat wi l l l ose on ATEC, I f I l ose i t( 10 l oads a week) I wi l l have t o f i r e back.Agr ee that t hi ngs aren' t wor ki ng as wel l as t hey wer e.Pet e [ Baci ] has si mi l ar compl ai nt s.Fl exi i s about f uel and you gave t hem a BSC di scount .Ti sk t i sk.Goya i s about you not char gi ng f or t he over wei ghtper mi t s. Agai n t i sk t i sk. Same as cut t i ng t he r at e i n mybook.
Ser r a wr ot e back, "I ' l l check t hem al l . . . you ar e cer t ai nl y not
t he t ar get . "
Gi ven t hi s f ai r l y di r ect evi dence of t he conspi r acy' s
exi st ence, ai ms, and obj ect i ves, we f i nd t hat t he evi dence
pr esent ed at t r i al di d not preponder at e agai nst t he ver di ct . To
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t he cont r ar y, t he st r engt h of t he gover nment ' s case wei ghs i n f avor
of f i ndi ng t hat t he mi sconduct was har ml ess. 12 Thus, whi l e we are
concer ned by the i mpr opr i et y of t he pr osecut ors' r emar ks, we ar e
conf i dent t hat t he di st r i ct cour t act ed t i mel y and deci si vel y t o
i nst r uct t he j ur y i n gr eat det ai l t o di sr egar d t he of f endi ng
st at ement s. And we ar e consci ous t hat we shoul d "not set gui l t y
per sons f r ee si mpl y t o puni sh pr osecut or i al mi sconduct . " Uni t ed
St at es v. Vzquez- Bot et , 532 F. 3d 37, 59 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) . The
gover nment ' s r emar ks di d not so poi son t he wel l as t o necessi t at e
a new t r i al , and we af f i r m t he di str i ct cour t ' s deni al of a
mi st r i al on gr ounds of pr osecut or i al mi sconduct .
B. Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence
Peake ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t al so er r ed i n
per mi t t i ng t he t est i mony f r om wi t nesses i nvol ved i n busi nesses
harmed by t he conspi r acy because t he t est i mony i mpl i ed t hat t he
conspi r acy i mpact ed Puer t o Ri can consumer s, t her ef or e agai n causi ng
t he j ur or s t o consi der t hemsel ves vi ct i ms of t he char ged
conspi r acy. Peake cl ai ms t he t est i mony shoul d have been excl uded
under Feder al Rul es of Evi dence 402 and 403 ei t her as i r r el evant or
because i t caused "unf ai r pr ej udi ce" and had an "undue tendency t o
12 On t hi s f i nal poi nt , we cannot i gnor e t hat a per se vi ol at i onof Sect i on 1 onl y r equi r es t hat "an ant i t r ust pl ai nt i f f [ pr esent ]ei t her di r ect or ci r cumst ant i al evi dence of def endant s' ' consci ouscommi t ment t o a common scheme desi gned t o achi eve an unl awf ulobj ect i ve. ' " Ever gr een Par t ner i ng Gr p. , I nc. v. Pact i v Cor p. , 720F. 3d 33, 43 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) ( quot i ng Monsant o Co. v. Spr ay Ri t eSer v. Cor p. , 465 U. S. 752, 764 ( 1984) ) .
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suggest deci si on on an i mpr oper basi s, commonl y, t hough not
necessar i l y, an emot i onal one. " Fed. R. Evi d. 403 advi sor y
commi t t ee' s not e to 1972 pr oposed r ul es; see al so Fed. R. Evi d. 402
( "I r r el evant evi dence i s not admi ssi bl e. ") ; Fed. R. Evi d. 403 ( "The
cour t may excl ude rel evant evi dence i f i t s pr obat i ve val ue i s
subst ant i al l y out wei ghed by a danger of . . . unf ai r
prej udi ce . . . . " ) .
We r evi ew a t r i al cour t ' s obj ect ed- t o evi dent i ar y r ul i ngs
f or abuse of di scr et i on. Uni t ed St at es v. Romer o- Lpez, 695 F. 3d
17, 22 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Rodr guezBer r os, 573
F. 3d 55, 60 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) . That i ncl udes a t r i al cour t ' s
determi nat i on under Rul e 403 t hat evi dence i s more pr obat i ve t han
pr ej udi ci al . See Uni t ed St at es v. Ram r ez- Ri ver a, Nos. 13- 2285,
13- 2289, 13- 2291, 13- 2320, 2015 WL 5025225, at *26 ( 1st Ci r . Aug.
26, 2015) ( ci t i ng Wal ker , 665 F. 3d at 229) .
Rul e 403 " r equi r es t he t r i al cour t t o excl ude t he
evi dence i f i t s pr obat i ve val ue i s subst ant i al l y out wei ghed by ' t he
danger of unf ai r pr ej udi ce. ' " Uni t ed St at es v. Var oudaki s, 233
F. 3d 113, 121 ( 1st Ci r . 2000) ( quot i ng Fed. R. Evi d. 403) . Thi s
anal ysi s "' i s a qui nt essent i al l y f act- sensi t i ve ent er pr i se' whi ch
t he di st r i ct cour t i s i n t he best posi t i on t o make. " Uni t ed St at es
v. Soto, Nos. 13- 2343, 13- 2344, 13- 2350, 2015 WL 5011456, at *17
( 1st Ci r . Aug. 25, 2015) ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. J ouber t , 778
F. 3d 247, 255 ( 1st Ci r . 2015) , cer t . deni ed, 135 S. Ct . 2874
( 2015) ) . Al l evi dence i s by desi gn pr ej udi ci al , Var oudaki s, 233
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F. 3d at 122, but unf ai r pr ej udi ce r ef er s " t o t he capaci t y of some
concededl y r el evant evi dence t o l ur e t he f act f i nder i nt o decl ar i ng
gui l t on a gr ound di f f er ent f r om pr oof speci f i c t o t he of f ense
char ged. " Uni t ed St at es v. Di Rosa, 761 F. 3d 144, 153 ( 1st Ci r .
2014) ( quot i ng Ol d Chi ef v. Uni t ed St at es, 519 U. S. 172, 180
( 1997) ) . One such exampl e i s when " t he evi dence ' i nvi t es t he j ur y
t o r ender a ver di ct on an i mpr oper emot i onal basi s. ' " Uni t ed
St at es v. Landr y, 631 F. 3d 597, 604 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) ( quot i ng
Var oudaki s, 233 F. 3d at 122) .
An abuse of di scr et i on f i ndi ng on a Rul e 403 r ul i ng " i s
not an easy one t o make" and "onl y i n ' ext r aor di nar i l y compel l i ng
ci r cumst ances' " woul d we r ever se the j udgment of t he di st r i ct
cour t . Di Rosa, 761 F. 3d at 154 ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Doe, 741
F. 3d 217, 229 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) ) ; see al so Landr y, 631 F. 3d at 604
( "Rul e 403 j udgment s ar e t ypi cal l y bat t l ef i el d det er mi nat i ons, and
gr eat def er ence i s owed t o t he t r i al cour t ' s super i or coi gn of
vant age. " ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Shi nder man, 515 F. 3d 5, 17 ( 1st
Ci r . 2008) ) ) .
Gui ded by t he above f r amework, we do not f i nd t hat t he
di st r i ct cour t abused i t s di scret i on i n per mi t t i ng t he t est i mony of
r epr esent at i ves f r om busi nesses af f ect ed by t he conspi r acy. The
wi t nesses never st at ed t hat t he hi gher cost s i ncur r ed by t he di r ect
cust omer s of t he shi ppi ng compani es wer e i ndi r ect l y t r ansf er r ed t o
t hei r consumer s, and t he def ense was al so al l owed t o st r i ke
quest i ons r egar di ng t he ef f ect of t he i ncr eased cost s on t he
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busi nesses' bot t oml i ne. The t est i mony el i ci t ed by t he gover nment
pr oper l y est abl i shed t he ef f ect s of f i xi ng pr i ces and r i ggi ng bi ds.
Af t er al l , t he conspi r acy' s ef f ect on i nt er st at e commer ce was an
el ement of t he of f ense t he gover nment was r equi r ed t o est abl i sh.
See Nat ' l Col l egi at e At hl et i c Ass' n v. Bd. of Regent s of Uni v. of
Okl a. , 468 U. S. 85, 104 ( 1984) ( "Under t he Sherman Act t he
cri t er i on t o be used i n j udgi ng t he val i di t y of a r est r ai nt on
t r ade i s i t s i mpact on compet i t i on. " ) . The gover nment ' s
exami nat i on of t he wi t nesses was l i mi t ed t o est abl i shi ng t hat
el ement . Ther ef or e, we f i nd no abuse of di scr et i on, and af f i r mt he
di st r i ct cour t ' s r ul i ng per mi t t i ng t he wi t nesses' t est i mony.
C. Theory of Defense Instruction
Peake next ar gues t hat he i s ent i t l ed t o a new t r i al
because he was i mpr oper l y deni ed hi s r equest ed t heor y- of - def ense
j ury i nst r uct i on. Speci f i cal l y, Peake r equest ed t he f ol l owi ng
i nstr uct i on:
Mr . Peake does not cont est t hat t here was a conspi r acyt hat exi st ed bet ween Gabr i el Ser r a, Kevi n Gi l l , Gr egor yGl ova, and Pet er Baci . Rat her , he cont ends t hat he di dnot knowi ngl y and i nt ent i onal l y par t i ci pat e i n t hi sconspi r acy and di d not knowi ngl y and i nt ent i onal l y j oi nt he conspi r acy as a member . Mr . Peake f ur t her cont endst hat any di scussi ons he had wi t h Gabr i el Ser r a wer el egi t i mat e and compet i t i ve di scussi ons and notant i - compet i t i ve conspi r acy r el at ed. Mr . Peake al socont ends t hat he was compet i ng wi t h Hor i zon, i ncl udi ng onmarket share and pr i ce.
Al t hough t hi s i s Mr . Peake' s def ense, t he bur den al waysr emai ns on t he government t o pr ove t he el ement s of t heof f ense beyond a r easonabl e doubt . I f you do not bel i evet he gover nment has proven beyond a r easonabl e doubt t hat
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Mr . Peake i nt ent i onal l y and knowi ngl y j oi ned t heconspi r acy, you must f i nd hi m not gui l t y.
A def endant i s " ent i t l ed t o an i nst r uct i on on hi s t heor y
of def ense so l ong as t he theor y i s a val i d one and t her e i s
evi dence i n t he r ecor d t o suppor t i t . " Uni t ed St at es v. McGi l l ,
953 F. 2d 10, 12 ( 1st Ci r . 1992) ( i nt er nal ci t at i on omi t t ed) .
However , " t he def endant has no r i ght t o put wor ds i n t he j udge' s
mout h. So l ong as the char ge suf f i ci ent l y conveys t he def endant ' s
t heor y, i t need not par r ot t he exact l anguage t hat t he def endant
pr ef er s. " I d. A di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of a t heor y of def ense
i nst r uct i on i s revi ewed de novo. Uni t ed St at es v. Bai r d, 712 F. 3d
623, 627- 28 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) . But a t r i al cour t ' s ref usal t o gi ve
a par t i cul ar i nst r ucti on const i t ut es rever si bl e er r or onl y i f t he
r equest ed i nst r uct i on ( 1) was cor r ect as a mat t er of l aw, ( 2) was
not subst ant i al l y i ncor por at ed i nt o t he char ges as r ender ed, and
( 3) was i nt egr al t o an i mpor t ant poi nt i n t he case. I d. at 628.
Here, r egardl ess of whether Peake shoul d have been
gr ant ed hi s i nst r uct i on, t her e i s no r ever si bl e er r or because t he
di st r i ct cour t of f er ed essent i al l y t he same i nst r uct i on Peake
r equest ed, j ust i n i t s own wor ds. Fi r st , t he i nst r uct i ons t he
di st r i ct cour t gave st at ed t hat " t he Gover nment [ must pr ove t o t he
j ury] t hat Mr . Peake i s gui l t y of t he cr i me wi t h whi ch he i s
char ged beyond a r easonabl e doubt . " Second, t hey ment i oned t hat
t he government bear s t he bur den of pr ovi ng t hat Peake "knowi ngl y
and i nt ent i onal l y became a member of t he conspi r acy" and that t he
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"conspi r acy . . . af f ect ed i nt er st at e commer ce. " Thi r d, t he
i nst r uct i ons r ef er enced t he possi bi l i t y that "compet i t or s may have
l egi t i mat e, l awf ul r easons t o have cont act wi t h each ot her , " and
t hat "si mi l ar i t y of conduct . . . does not necessar i l y est abl i sh
t he exi st ence of a conspi r acy, " because "t her e woul d be no
conspi r acy . . . [ i ] f act i ons wer e t aken i ndependent l y by t hem
sol el y as a mat t er of i ndi vi dual busi ness j udgment . " Compar i ng
t hese passages wi t h Peake' s pr oposed i nst r uct i on, we cannot
concl ude t hat anyt hi ng Peake asked f or was excl uded. There i s
t her ef or e no r ever si bl e er r or .
D. Jury Deliberations
The l ast t r i al - r el at ed ar gument Peake r ai ses i s t hat t he
di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n i t s r esponse t o t he t wo not es f r om t he
j ury, bot h r ecei ved on t he second day of del i ber at i ons, i n whi ch
t he j ur y st at ed i t was not abl e t o r each a unani mous ver di ct . Bot h
t i mes, t he di st r i ct j udge sent a not e back t o t he j ur y, aski ng t he
j uror s t o "cont i nue del i ber at i on. " Peake ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct
cour t shoul d have decl ar ed a mi st r i al af t er t he second not e because
i t was cl ear t hat t he j ur y was at an i mpasse. Peake al so ar gues
t hat , i f t he cour t was goi ng t o r espond t o t he not e, i t was at
l east r equi r ed t o i ncl ude i n i t s r epl y t he t hr ee el ement s nor mal l y
r equi r ed i n an Al l en char ge.
For some backgr ound, when a j ur y i s deadl ocked, t he t r i al
cour t may del i ver an Al l en char ge, di r ect i ng t he j ur y t o deci de t he
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case i f at al l possi bl e. Gi ven t he pot ent i al coer ci veness of such
an i nst r uct i on, our case l aw hol ds t hat such a char ge must be
bal anced by i nst r uct i ons t hat ( 1) communi cat e t he possi bi l i t y of
t he maj or i t y and mi nor i t y of t he j ur y reexami ni ng t hei r per sonal
ver di ct s; ( 2) r est at e t he gover nment ' s mai nt enance of t he bur den of
pr oof ; and ( 3) i nf or m t he j ur y that t hey may f ai l t o agr ee
unani mousl y. Uni t ed St at es v. Angi ul o, 485 F. 2d 37, 39 ( 1st Ci r .
1973) .
We r evi ew t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on not t o decl ar e a
mi st r i al or t o pr ovi de addi t i onal gui dance t o a j ur y f or abuse of
di scret i on, Uni t ed St at es v. Vanvl i et , 542 F. 3d 259, 266 ( 1st Ci r .
2008) , and we f i nd t here was no abuse of di scr et i on here.
Fi r st , we not e t hat t he j ur y sent i t s not es on Monday
af t er noon and eveni ng, dur i ng i t s f i r st f ul l day of del i ber at i ons,
af t er havi ng del i ber at ed f or onl y hour s on Fr i day. I t was t hus not
an abuse of di scret i on f or t he di st r i ct cour t t o concl ude t hat ,
par t i cul ar l y af t er a ni ne- day t r i al , t he j ur y needed mor e t i me t o
consi der t he evi dence bef or e a mi st r i al mi ght be consi der ed.
Second, t he di st r i ct j udge' s r esponse t o t he j ur y,
i nst r uct i ng i t t o "cont i nue del i ber at i ons, " was not an Al l en
char ge, and t her ef or e di d not r equi r e t he suppl ement al bal anci ng
i nst r uct i ons nor mal l y requi r ed i n an Al l en char ge. 13 I n a si mi l ar
case, Uni t ed St at es v. Fi guer oa- Encar naci n, 343 F. 3d 23, 31- 32
13 I ndeed, we agr ee t hat i t woul d have been pr ematur e t o gi ve oneat t hi s ear l y poi nt i n t he del i ber at i ons, af t er a ni ne- day t r i al .
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( 1st Ci r . 2003) , we hel d t hat a di st r i ct j udge' s i nst r uct i on t o t he
j ury t o go home, r el ax, and cont i nue del i ber at i ons t he f ol l owi ng
day cont ai ned no coerci ve el ement s and, as such, was not an Al l en
char ge r equi r i ng suppl ement al i nst r uct i ons. Li kewi se, her e, t he
di st r i ct cour t si mpl y asked t he j ur y t o r est and come back i n t he
mor ni ng t o cont i nue del i ber at i ons. Thi s was no Al l en char ge.
Accor di ngl y, we f i nd no abuse of di scret i on i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
r esponse t o t he j ur y' s not es dur i ng del i ber at i on.
VI. Sentencing
As a f i nal mat t er , Peake ar gues t hat , even i f hi s
convi ct i on i s not over t ur ned, he shoul d be r esent enced. Peake
r ai ses onl y one ar gument r egar di ng hi s sent ence: t hat t he di st r i ct
cour t i ncor r ect l y cal cul at ed t he vol ume of commer ce af f ect ed by the
conspi r acy, and t her ef or e i mpr oper l y appl i ed, among ot her of f ense-
l evel enhancement s, a t wel ve- l evel enhancement under sect i on 2R1. 1
of t he Uni t ed St at es Sent enci ng Gui del i nes ( U. S. S. G. ) . We deny t he
appeal of t he sent ence, f i ndi ng t hat t he di st r i ct cour t cor r ect l y
appl i ed t he sent enci ng gui del i nes.
We r evi ew a di st r i ct cour t ' s i nt er pr et at i on and
appl i cat i on of t he sent enci ng gui del i nes de novo. Uni t ed St at es v.
St oupi s, 530 F. 3d 82, 84 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) . However , "we wi l l not
upset t he sent enci ng cour t ' s f act - based appl i cat i on of t he
gui del i nes unl ess i t i s cl ear l y er r oneous. " Uni t ed St at es v.
Sant os- Bat i st a, 239 F. 3d 16, 21 ( 1st Ci r . 2001) .
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For ant i t r ust of f enses af f ect i ng a vol ume of commer ce of
mor e t han $1 mi l l i on, t he sent enci ng gui del i nes pr ovi de t hat t he
of f ense l evel shoul d be adj ust ed by a cer t ai n number of l evel s
accordi ng t o t he vol ume of commerce t hat was af f ect ed by t he
conspi r acy, as i ndi cat ed by a t abl e pr ovi ded t her ei n. See U. S. S. G.
2R1. 1( b) ( 2) . The di st r i ct cour t f ound t hat mor e t han $500
mi l l i on i n commer ce was af f ect ed, and t hat a t wel ve- l evel
enhancement appl i ed under 2R1. 1( b) ( 2) ( F) . Peake argues t he
vol ume of commerce was, at most , appr oxi matel y $386. 2 mi l l i on, and
t heref ore onl y a t en- l evel enhancement shoul d have been appl i ed
under 2R1. 1( b) ( 2) ( E) . He cont ends t hat , i n cal cul at i ng t he
vol ume of af f ect ed commer ce, t he di st r i ct cour t er r oneousl y
i ncl uded commer ci al act i vi t y that t ook pl ace bef or e 2005, whi ch i s
when the i ndi ct ment char ged Peake wi t h j oi ni ng the conspi r acy, and
t hat t he cour t al so i ncl uded commerce that was unaf f ected by the
conspi r acy.
Af t er a thor ough r evi ew of t he sent enci ng r ecor d, we f i nd
t hat t he di st r i ct cour t di d not er r i n det er mi ni ng t hat t he
af f ected vol ume of commerce was more t han $500 mi l l i on. Fi r st , t he
r ecor d shows t hat t he di st r i ct cour t woul d have r eached i t s mor e-
t han- $500 mi l l i on number f or t he vol ume of af f ect ed commerce even
wi t hout i ncl udi ng commerce that mi ght have occur r ed bef ore 2005,
when Peake i s charged wi t h j oi ni ng t he conspi r acy. So we wi l l move
on t o Peake' s second ar gument t hat t he di st r i ct cour t i ncor r ect l y
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i ncl uded i n i t s cal cul at i on what he cont ends was " unaf f ect ed"
commer ce.
I n cal cul at i ng t he "vol ume of commer ce, " t he di st r i ct
cour t i s t o consi der not j ust " t he damage caused or pr of i t made by
t he def endant , " but t he over al l amount of sal es dur i ng t he
conspi r acy. I d. at 2R1. 1( b) ( 2) & cmt . 7 ( " [ T] he vol ume of
commer ce at t r i but abl e to an i ndi vi dual par t i ci pant i n a conspi r acy
i s t he vol ume of commerce done by hi m or hi s pr i nci pal i n goods or
ser vi ces t hat wer e af f ect ed by t he vi ol at i on. ") ; see al so Uni t ed
St at es v. Andr eas, 216 F. 3d 645, 678 ( 7t h Ci r . 2000) ( "[ I ] t i s
r easonabl e t o concl ude that al l sal es made by def endant s dur i ng
t hat per i od ar e ' af f ect ed. ' " ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. SKW Met al s
& Al l oys, I nc. , 195 F. 3d 83, 90 ( 2d Ci r . 1999) ) ( emphasi s added) ) .
Al t hough t her e i s a pr esumpt i on t hat al l sal es made dur i ng t he
conspi r acy wer e af f ect ed, and shoul d t her ef or e be i ncl uded i n t he
vol ume of commer ce cal cul at i on, t hi s i s a pr esumpt i on t hat t he
def endant may r ebut by of f er i ng evi dence t hat some sal es were not
af f ect ed. Uni t ed St at es v. Gi or dano, 261 F. 3d 1134, 1146 ( 11t h
Ci r . 2001) .
I n t hi s case, t he di st r i ct cour t had bef or e i t dat a
pr oduced by Sea St ar i ndi cat i ng t hat i t s t ot al r evenue bet ween 2005
and 2008 amount ed t o over $565 mi l l i on, and i t used t hi s number t o
concl ude t hat t he t wel ve- l evel enhancement appl i ed. Peake argues
t hat t hi s was an er r or because t he f ol l owi ng r evenue was
"unaf f ect ed" commerce and shoul d have been subt r acted f r om t he
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t ot al : ( 1) r evenue f r omnon- cont ai ner f r ei ght t hat he cont ends was
not a par t of t he ant i t r ust conspi r acy, ( 2) r evenue f r om 2, 634
cust omer s t hat wer e never di scussed i n t he conspi r acy, ( 3) r evenue
f r om f uel surchar ges, whi ch Peake argues woul d have been charged
even i f t her e had been no conspi r acy, and ( 4) r evenue f r om
Tr anspor t at i on Ser vi ces Agreement s, whi ch Peake cl ai ms wer e r out i ne
and ent i r el y l awf ul , and di d not af f ect i nt er st at e commer ce.
However , i n or der t o excl ude t hi s r evenue f r om t he vol ume of
af f ected commerce cal cul at i ons, Peake was r equi r ed t o show t hat
t hese t r ansact i ons wer e "compl et el y unaf f ect ed" by t he conspi r acy.
Andr eas, 216 F. 3d at 678- 79. The di st r i ct cour t f ound t hat Peake
f ai l ed t o do so.
Thi s i s essent i al l y a f act ual quest i on, and we f i nd no
cl ear er r or i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs t hat t he obj ected- t o
r evenue shoul d have been i ncl uded i n t he vol ume of commerce
cal cul at i on. Test i mony, par t i cul ar l y Baci ' s, and document ar y
evi dence, i ncl udi ng var i ous emai l s, pr esent ed at t r i al showed t hat
t he conspi r at or s had col l uded t o f i x t he f uel sur char ges, and t hat
r evenue f r om t he f uel sur char ge was t her ef or e a par t of t he
conspi r acy. The f i xed sur char ges af f ect ed al l car go t r anspor t ed,
t hus af f ect i ng al l sal es, i ncl udi ng r evenue f r om non- cont ai ner
f r ei ght and f r om al l cust omer s, even i f t hat f r ei ght and t hose
cust omer s had never expl i ci t l y been made a par t of t he conspi r acy.
Fi nal l y, evi dence at t r i al showed t hat Tr anspor t at i on Ser vi ces
Agr eement s were used i n f ur t herance of t he conspi r acy. Thus,
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f i ndi ng no er r or i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s comput at i on of a vol ume of
af f ect ed commer ce i n excess of $500 mi l l i on, we af f i r m t he
sentence.
VII. Conclusion
For t he f or egoi ng r easons, t he convi ct i on and sent ence of
Def endant - Appel l ant Fr ank Peake i s
AFFIRMED.