UnitedStatesofAfrica•page� Paper�42•June2007

ISS Paper 142 • June 2007 Price: R15.00

United States of Africa Positioning the Pan-African Parliament and Court in the political union debateGodfrey M Musila

Introduction

Theneedtoassuregreaterhumansecurityinaworldexposed to the dangers of terrorism and civil wars;the necessity of pooling economic endeavour andconsolidatingmarketsandgeneratingeconomicgrowthinpovertystrickencommunities;andtheimperativesofpreservingdwindlingresourcesinamenacedglobalenvironment;alltheseseemtopreoccupymanyacrosstheglobe.Forthesereasons,amongothers,thelogicofunionsofonekindoranother,betheysub-regional,regionalorcontinental,dominatecontemporarypolicydebatesatnational,regionalandgloballevels.Consequentlytheverysuggestionthat the dream of a United States ofAfricashouldbeaffordedfurtherseriousconsideration is, despite the numerouspractical obstacles to its realisation, initselfconsideredtobealaudableidea.�

Indeed, this idea of African unity hasevolvedsubstantially:fromthechallengesof newly independent states to theimperativesofcontinent-wideunity,thetransformationinglobalandcontinentalrealities has not necessarily beenmatched by concomitant institutionalinfrastructure on the continent. Thetransition from the much criticised Organisation ofAfricanUnity(OAU)totheAfricanUnion(AU)anditsassociatedprogrammes suchas theNewPartnershipfor Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African PeerReview Mechanism (APRM) was widely celebrated.Nevertheless,thedesireforamoreappropriateentitythat can best confront the challenges of the modernworld, arising from perceived inadequacies of thecurrent initiatives, has remained alive. The presentdebateaboutthepossibilityofaUnitedStatesofAfricaispremisedontheserealities.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to offersome insights into the challenges inherent in thepractical implementation of this idea with respectto two institutions integral to the notion of a UnitedStates of Africa, namely the African Parliament and

African Court of Justice, and second, to offer somesuggestions, informed by comparative experiencesof theEUandUS,onwhat reformsmayneed tobeundertakenwithrespecttotheseinstitutionsandwhatothersupportinginstitutionalframeworkwouldrenderthedreamareality.

African Court of Justice and Human Rights

Current institutional arrangement

As the adjudicatory arm of government, the judicialbody is crucial regardless of the formof governmental configuration - be itfederal, confederate or unitary. The AUis no exception in this regard and haspreviously considered two courts: theAfrican Court of Justice (Justice Court)and the African Court on Human andPeoples’ Rights (the Human RightsCourt). This section revisits variousaspectsofthetwocourtsaswellasthenewcourt–AfricanCourtofJusticeandHumanRights(ACJ&HR),theresultofaresolutionoftheAUtomergethetwo.2

The merger into the African Court of Justice and Human Rights

The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice and Human Rights establishes the ACJ & HR(ProtocolontheAfricanCourtof JusticeandHumanRightsandAnnexedStatute2006)asthemainjudicialorganoftheAU(art4,StatuteontheAfricanCourtofJusticeandHumanRights)andvestsitwithamandatetocomplementtheprotectivefunctionsoftheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rights and theAfricanCommitteeofExperts,whichwasestablishedunder the Charter on the Rights and Welfare oftheChild.

In terms of the Statute of the Court of Justice andHuman Rights (court statute), which regulates thespecific functioning of the court, establishes twosections in the court. These are a General Affairs

Theneedtoassuregreaterhuman

securityinaworldexposedtomany

dangerspreoccupymanyacross

theglobe

UnitedStatesofAfrica•page2 Paper�42•June2007

Section composed of seven judges and a HumanRightsSectioncomposedoffivejudges(art�5).UnliketheEuropeanCourtof Justice, inwhicheachstate isrepresentedbyasinglejudge(usuallyitsnational),theAUdecidedtolimitthenumberofjudgestoregionalrather than national representation. The Statute doesprovide that theAssemblymay increase thenumbershould the need arise (art 3). The General AffairsSection will be competent to hear all cases thatmay be deemed to raise ‘essential concerns’ of theAU (arts �6(�) & 30), with the exception of thoserelating to alleged violations of human rights whichare reserved for the Human Rights Section of thecourt (art�6(2)).Theseessentialconcernsof theAUrelatetotheinterpretationofAUtreaties,includingtheConstitutive Act; acts and functions of the organs oftheAU;disputesbetweenstates;andtheirobligationsin international law generally (art 30). An importantaspectisthattheGeneralSectionCourtmayconstituteitselfintospecialchamberstoattendtomatterssuchastrade,economicsandtheenvironment(art�8(�)).

The court is open to a number of parties: stateparties to its protocol; organs of the AU authorisedby the Assembly, the Assembly itself and the Pan-AfricanParliament(PAP).Astaffmemberof theAUCommissionmayappealtothecourtinadisputeassetoutintheStaffRulesandRegulationsoftheUnion.Yet, there is no provision for a court or tribunal offirst resort for such cases. The court will also haveno jurisdiction over cases from non-AU members(art30(3)).AUstatesthathavenotratifiedthecourtprotocolmayappearbyspecialdispensationfromtheAssembly (art30(2))ormay,onnoticeof theCourtRegistrar, intervene in a case which concerns theinterpretationoftheConstitutiveAct(art60).

WithrespecttohumanrightsviolationsarisingundertheAfricanCharter, theWomenRightsProtocol, theAfricanCharterontheRightsandWelfareoftheChildandotheragreements,thepartiesthathaveautomaticaccess to the Court are the African Commission,the African Committee of Experts on the Rights andWelfare of the Child and African intergovernmentalorganisations(art32(a,b&c)).IndividualsandAfricannon-governmental organisations (NGOs) may onlybring cases against states that have accepted thisjurisdiction when ratifying the court protocol (art32(d)).Thereisnobartosuchdeclarationbeingmadeatalaterdatebyastateparty.

With respect to the admissibility of cases relating tohuman rightsprotection, theCourtProtocolholds tothe general rule established by the African Charter(arts 55 & 56) that domestic remedies have to beexhausted before the court can be approached (arts36,4�&42).

Thecourt’s jurisdiction isnot limited tocaseswherethere isadispute. Itmayrenderanadvisoryopinion

onanyquestionoflawattherequestoftheAssembly,theParliament, theExecutiveCouncil, thePeaceandSecurity Council, the Economic, Social and CulturalCouncil (ECOSOCC), the financial institutionsoranyotherorganof theAU thatmaybe soauthorisedbytheAssembly(art63).

Issues and parameters for the future judicial organ of the African Union

The design of a more integrated union, whether inthe nature of a political federation, a confederationoracommonmarket,impactsonanumberofissues,ranging from economical, monetary and trade topolitics,andthusrequiresseriouscontemplation.Theconfiguration of the judicial branch is critical in thisregard.Apartfromgeneralconcerns,specificconcernsarise from the multiplicity of issues that would haveto be addressed if the court did become the centraljudicial body of the proposed union. These includethefollowing:

TheprotectionofhumanrightsEffectivenessandefficiencyoftheinstitutionResources–financialandhumanIts supervisory role in the union (in the mannerof ‘checks and balances’) in the tripartitegovernmentarrangementHow the judicial functions should be distributed,given that therewill be a rangeof issues, severaljudicialorgansmaybeestablishedWhetherthecourtshouldbedividedintodifferentdivisionsandwhich issues themaincourt shouldthenaddressHowmanyjudgesshouldbeappointedtoensureabalancebetweenfairrepresentationandcoherenceofjurisprudence

Asthemainjudicialorganoftheunion,suchpowersmust vested in the court aswouldmake it effectivein its role of checking the political branches -Parliament and the Executive (whose functions maybe said tobe currently loosely exercisedby theAUCommission). For instance, itwould in this capacitymediate between the ‘Executive’ and union civilservants. Itwouldensure thatParliament’s legislativefunction (whatever scope itmaybeawardedby theconstitutinginstrument)conformstotheprinciplesoftheconstitutiveinstrument.

With respect to the protection of human rights, thenatureandstructureofthecourtmustbeinformedbyitsabilitytoprotecthumanrightseffectively.Giventhatfinancialandhumancostsalwaysneedtobeborneinmind,acumbersomeandexpensive structurewouldnotbeadvisable.Theeffectivenessandefficiencyofthecourtindeliveringonitsmandateisalsoamatterofgreatimportance.Inthelightofthehugesizeofthecontinentandthemultiplelayers,fromtheAUtotheactual implementationatstate level, thismayrequire

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supporting mechanisms that may not necessarily bejudicialinnature.

The effectiveness of the court in protecting humanrights, itsexecutionofothermandatesaswellas theneedtoreservecertaincorejudicialfunctionsforthehighest court, would determine the distribution ofjudicial functions in the Union. On the question ofjudges,theimperativeisthat‘jurisprudentialchaos’andpossibleconflictsshouldbeavoidedatallcosts.Thismaybeproblematicbecauseifeverystate,oreventhemajorityofstatesarerepresentedinthejudicialbodyin a union with a large membership, it may createa cumbersome institution with the attendant lack ofcoherenceinitsdecisions.

Theabove factorsmaybesaid to set theparameterswithin which a fitting continental judicial organ(s)mustbestructured.These issuesareaddressedmorespecificallyinthecomparativediscussionbelowandintherecommendationssetout in the finalsection.AnoutlineoftheEUandUSjudicialstructuresandtheirfunctionprovidesastartingpointforproposalsforanAfricanCourt.

The European Court of Justice and Supreme Court of the United States: a brief outline

TheEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ)wasestablished in terms of the Treaty ofRome3asoneofthefourmaininstitutionsoftheEU.4Itspurposeistointerpretthetreaties constituting the EUand todealwith disputes concerning those in theservice of the EU. In other words, it isthemainjudicialarmoftheEU,chargedwithensuringthatthelawisobservedintheinterpretationoftheTreatyofRome.ItsmountingcaseloadhasbeenrelievedbytheestablishmentoftheCourtofFirstInstance.5

While the ECJ is the main court in the EU judicialstructure, it isnot thehighestcourt towhichmattersthat have not reached definitive resolution at thenational level may be appealed. However, as is thepractice, national courts (usually the highest courts)referspecificmatters(relevanttotheinterpretationofEUtreatyissuesthatariseincasesbeforethem)totheECJforguidanceonthemeaningoftheEUtreatiesandhowtheyapplyatthenationallevel.TheECJ’srulingthenallows therelevantnationalcourt todisposeoffthe matter itself. [This means the ECJ and nationalcourts are not in the same system ie no hierachicalrelationshiphe with the ECJ-a case from a nationalcourtisnotappealabletotheECJ]

TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(USSupremeCourt) is the constitutional court and custodian ofthe Federal Constitution and as such is vested with

the powers to interpret the federal constitution (s�, Constitution of the United States of America).Interpretationrelatestoarangeofissues,fromhumanrights and the relationship between the branches ofgovernment to the relationship between the statesconstitutingthefederation.BelowtheSupremeCourtinthestructureoffederalcourtsarefederalcourtsofappealanddistrictcourts.Eachofthe50stateshasitsowncourtsystem.Comparatively,theECJstandsatthesamelevelastheUSSupremeCourtinthesensethatnoappealslietoitsdecisions(Georgeetal�997:�2�),althoughtheUSSupremeCourtsitsatopahierarchicalfederal and state judicial structure. As noted above,theECJdoesnot stand in thesamerelationshipwithnationalcourtsofmemberstates.

ThequestionthereforeishowtheAfricanCourtshouldbeanchored,incomparisontotheEUandUSsystems,particularly with regard to its function as a supremecourt. There is no doubt that some kind of judicialarrangementhas tobeput inplaceand inparticularthat thereshouldbeamajorcourt to interpretmajorissues in the envisaged union government. Indeed,

in the constitutions of regional systemsthe prevailing practice is to establishtribunalschargedwiththeinterpretationoftheconstituentinstruments,andhowthe polity is organised and functions.6Such tribunal furthermore mediate indisputes between the bodies of suchentities or between their bodies andemployees at federal, confederate orregional levels. As Bednar, FerejohnandGarrent(�996:280)note,thecourtsor tribunals in such systems increasethe confidence of members since it isassumed that they would be able tocheckthecentralgovernment.7

Structuring the African Court: Issues for consideration

The above outline offers several guiding questionswithrespecttothedesignoftheenvisagedcourtthatwould stand at the apex of the union: What shouldthe structureof suchcourtbe?Should theunion setup one or more judicial courts (tribunals) given themultiplicity of issues in a union government? Shouldthe merger between the Justice Court and HumanRightsCourt go ahead?Whatmandates should suchtribunal(s) have? What powers should the tribunal(s)wield? Who should have access to such tribunal(s)?Howshoulditsjudgmentsbeenforced?

On two further aspects decisions have already beentaken:theConstitutiveActoftheAUhasentrenchedtheACJ&HRas theprincipalorganof theAUandvariouspowershavebeenvestedinthenewcourtbyitsprotocol.Further,thereisnoothercourtortribunal,apart from the African Commission on Human and

Thequestionthereforeis

howtheAfricanCourtshouldbeanchored

withregardtoitsfunctionasasupremecourt

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Peoples’ Rights, whose protective mandate is to becomplementedbytheACJ&HR.

Since the merger has far-reaching implications, ithas to be addressed first. According to Africangovernmentsandexpertscommissionedby theAU,two principal reasons were said to motivate thismerger.8The firstwas tobringaboutsavingofbothfinancial and human resources and the second toavoid unnecessary duplication of mandates andefforts between an African Court and a separateHuman Rights Court. These issues were first raisedduring thenegotiationson thedraftprotocolon thecourtandinparticulardeliberationsrelatedtoarticle56(2), in2003.9This resource-based justification forasinglecourthasmerit since the issueof resourcesconstitutes a major challenge for institutions at theregionallevel.

However, this should be measured against furtherconsiderations, one of the most important of whichis the effective protection of human rights on thecontinent.Inthefirstplace,mergingthehumanrightstribunalwiththegeneralonecreatestherisk that this important matter may berelegated to the periphery. It is vitallyimportantthathumanrightsareseentobeprotected.Inthesecondplace,whilean attempt has been made to ensurespecificattentiontohumanrightsissuesby creating a human rights section, aninsufficientnumberofjudges(five)havebeen allocated to this division. Giventhenumberandseverityofhumanrightsabuse cases that will in all probabilitybe brought to this court, in spite ofthe existence of the Human RightsCommission, a bigger tribunal wouldberequired.

In the EU, the European Court of Justice does notdirectly interpret and apply human rights treaties;�0this function is reserved for a specialisedcourt - theEuropean Court of Human Rights - which has 46judges. A smaller, special human rights court maybe the correct option for the new AU, given thatthe General Affairs Division will be busy with themultitude of other core union issues, while the five-judge Human Rights Section is too small to ablyaddressthewholehostofhumanrightscasesfromtheentirecontinent.However, if savingof resourcesandavoiding duplication while maintaining an effectivehuman rights protection mechanism are the mainmotivations,theHumanRightsCommissioncouldbeabolished,aswasdonebytheEU.��Alltheresourcescould then be devoted to an expanded, separatehumanrightscourt.Intermsofprocedure,oneortwojudgescouldtakeoverthefunctionsatpresentfulfilledbytheHumanRightsCommission(forexamplevettingthe complaints to establishwhether they raise issues

that shouldbeconsideredbefore theyareput to thefull court (or section of court)). This practice is alsofollowedintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

InviewofthediversityandnumberofissuestheACJ& HR may be called upon to address, the secondcore concern is whether the unified tribunal willhave the competence and expertise to handle thediversity of matters, which is likely to range fromthe interpretationof theConstitutiveActof theAU,to disputes between international civil servants andthe different bodies, to disputes between states onenvironmental,tradeandintellectualpropertyissues.Inevitablysuchadiversityofissuesinahugepoliticaland economic union will need specialised judicialattention. Architects and proponents of the newgovernment have to decide whether the Union willbebestservedbyasingle tribunal;asingle tribunalwith specialisedchambers; a judicialorganwithanappellatestructure;oramajorcourt(suchasacourtofjustice)madeupofspecialisedtribunals,includingahumanrightscourt.

Intheopinionoftheauthortherearetwopossible options. The first is a scenariowith a single African Court of Justicewith integral special chambers. Each ofthe chambers could be dedicated tospecialisedmatters,suchashumanrights,unioncivilservicedisputesorotherissuesrelatingtothebodiesandfunctioningoftheAUgovernment.Thisissimilartothestructurecurrentlyproposedfor theACJ&HR,althoughtheredoesnotseemtobe clear guidelines on the jurisdictionof specialised chambers. In additionsuch specialised chambers could actas ad hoc tribunals (see art �8, ACJ &HRProtocol).

Thesecondscenarioenvisagestheestablishmentofamajortribunal,andalongsideit,satelliteorautonomousspecialised tribunals vested with specific mandatesfor the issuesmentionedabove. Inallprobability, asthe union develops and interactions become more‘sophisticated’, workloads will increase and matterstobeadjudicatedmorecomplicatedandspecialised.Then more permanent chambers or independenttribunalsspecialisinginaspecificcoreissuecouldbeestablished. It is likely that numerous cases will bereferredfromthehighestcourtsofnationalsystemsforan interpretation of how the union, and particularlyunion law, affects specific aspects of the nationallegalsystem.

TheEUhassuchasystemofspecialisedindependenttribunals.Apart fromthemaintribunal, theEuropeanCourtofJustice,andtheindependentEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,theTreatyofNicemakesprovisionfor the establishment of specialised tribunals to deal

Itislikelythatnumerouscaseswillbereferredfromthehighestcourtsofnational

systemsforaninterpretation

UnitedStatesofAfrica•page5 Paper�42•June2007

with special interests (TreatyofNice200�). There isinfactalreadyanEUCivilServiceTribunal,�2whileaEuropeanUnionPatentTribunalisbeingconsidered.�3The architects of a possible African government orunion will have to identify special interests, notnecessarily different or limited to those in the EU,anddesignappropriatetribunalstoprotectthem.Thiscouldbeanongoingprocess,butspecialcarewillhavetobetakentopreventasnowballeffectorduplicationof judicial functions. What is important is that thosespearheadingtheinitiativeshouldrealisethat,subjectonly to the availability of resources, these choiceshavetobemadeatonepointortheother.Itshouldbeborneinmind,however,thataunion,especiallyonethatapproximatesapropergovernment,onacontinentasvastasAfricawillnotcomecheap.Membersmustcommitthemselvesnotonlyideologically,butalsoinpracticalterms.

Regardless of the approach chosen, it is importantwith regard to human rights that the powers of thecourtbeclearlydelineatedandlimitedtoinstrumentsundertheAUframework.Theseinstruments,suchastheProtocolonWomen’sRightsandAUCharterontheRightsandWelfareoftheChild,complementtheidealsofthemainCharter.ThepresentACJ&HRProtocol(art30,StatuteACJ&HR)seemstohaveaddressed the problems of the �998Human Rights Court Protocol, whichsuggestedthatitsmandatecouldextendto the interpretation of non-AU humanrightstreaties(somecommentatorsfearedthat this could lead to ‘jurisprudentialchaos’ if it had been maintained) (seearts3(�)&7�998,HumanRightsCourtProtocol; Heyns 200�:�67; Naldi andMagliveras�998:435).

Apart fromthemergerandmultiplicityofissuestobeaddressedbymeansoftribunals,athirdmajorissuerelatestoparticipationintheACJ&HRbymemberstatesoftheenvisagedunion.TheproblemarisesfromthefactthatAUstatesthatarenotpartiesto the ACJ & HR court protocol have no access totheACJ&HR,either.AsinthecaseoftheEU,itwillbeimperativethatallmemberstatesratify thecourtprotocol and by extension the new Human RightsDivison, perhaps as a condition for continued AUmembership.�4 Members should commit themselvesin advance to certain ideals espoused by the AU.Many observers have noted that one main reasonwhytheOAUfailedisbecauseoftheunconditionalmembership,whichmeantthatstatesdidnothavetocommitthemselvestoestablishedidealsoftheOAU,suchasdemocracy,therespectforhumanrightsandtheruleof law.Initsexpansionprogramme,theEUrequired that aspiring member states meet certainbasicrequirements,andthattheyshouldsubscribetothebasicidealsoftheEU.

A fourth issue that needs to be dealt with relates toaccessbyindividualsandNGOstotheHumanRightsDivision.TheroleofNGOsintheprotectionofhumanrightsinAfrica,inparticularfilingofpetitionsbeforetheAfricanCommission,hasbeenrecognisedandlauded.Theimpositionofonerouspreconditions,inparticularthe requirement that states should specificallyacceptthisjurisdictionwhenratifyingthecourtprotocol,maymilitate against human rights protection. It is a well-known fact that states are unlikely to willingly allowthemselves to be sued by individuals. Although it isassumedthattheAfricanCommissionwillbringcasesonbehalfof individuals (as in theAmericansystem),shuttingoutNGOsmaywellbecounterproductiveandamajorsetback.Ifallstatesarerequiredtosubscribeto the court, it would have the effect of avoiding afragmented judicial system in which some states donot participate and ensuring that effective humanrightsprotectionmechanismsexist at the continentallevel, which are accessible to all citizens who meetinternal procedural requirements as regulated by thecourtitself.

The permanency of the court(s) alsoneeds to be considered. The currentdesign is that the ACJ & HR will be apart-timetribunal,withonlythepresidentworking on a full-time basis (art 8(4),StatuteofACJ&HR).Thissituationwilldefinitelyhavetobechanged.Numerouslegal issues that need to be addressedwill arise from interactions within theunion,betweeninstitutionsoftheunionthemselves, the institutions and statesand other international players, as wellastheinstitutionswiththeiremployees.

The ACJ & HR’s decisions ought tobe underwritten by a mechanismof enforcement. It is not a sufficient

provision that the Court should notify the Assemblyannually about its orders and their implementation.An appropriate political body, such as the CouncilofMinisters,shouldhave thepower to followuptheCourt’s orders with the individual states concerned.InviewoftheirnationalresponsibilitiestheAssemblyof Heads of States and Government is perhaps notthe ideal body to exercise the supervisory function.Evenwiththebestintentions,theAssemblylacksboththe time and space to address such matters. In thepast, members of the Assembly have been accusedof demonstrating loyalties to fellow members thathave prevented them from taking decisive actionagainst suchmembers.Akokpari (2004:469-470)haslamentedthissadreality.

Apart from a firm commitment as a prerequisite formembership, the ideal situationwould thusbe if thetask of monitoring compliance with court orders isassignedamoreresponsiblebody. Inthecaseof the

Itisimportantthatthepowersofthecourtbe

clearlydelineatedandlimitedto

instrumentsundertheAUframework

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European Court of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms,forinstance,finaljudgmentsofthetribunalmust in termsofarticle46,asamendedbyProtocolNo��,betransmittedtotheCommitteeofMinisters.Thiscommitteeischargedwithdutyofoverseeingtheexecutionofthedecisionsofthecourt.Thecommitteehas been successful in ensuring compliance (for adiscussion of role of the Committee of Ministers seeRobertson&Merrills�993andHarrisetal�995).

The Pan-African Parliament

Before outlining the features and roles of the PAP, itis important to describe the criteria and/or factorsthat are critical when considering the structure of aparliament of this nature. These include legislation,oversight,abudgetandprotectionofhumanrightsandpromotionofdemocracy.�5

The extent of political integration defines both thestructureandthelegislativepowersthatwillbevestedin such an institution (e.g. a future PAP). However,byexamining thePAPas it is currently formulated itwill be possible to determine whether the PAP hassufficientpowerstoenableitplayadecisiveroleinamoreintegratedpolity.Withregardto thelegislation,parliaments generally exercise oversight on mattersof policy formulation and major appointments. Thebudgetary role of a parliament, related as it is tooversight,isanimportantconsideration,andmustbein line with the nature of the union. The protectionof human rights and promotion of democracy is atthe core of the role of parliaments in general andindeedtheobjectivesofthepresentAU.Inthisregardquestions that will have to be answered will relatefirstly to whether the parliament itself sufficientlyembodieshumanrightsanddemocracyintheformofpopularparticipation,andsecondlywhetheritwouldbeabletoeffectivelyperformitsroleasaguardianofhuman rightsandpromoterofdemocracy in theAUin its present form. The latter will in part take placethroughthearticulationofstandards,inthiscaseintheformoflegislation.�6

The Pan-African Parliament in historical perspective

Althoughthe ideaofaPAPprecededtheAU, itwasonly established in March 2004 and as one of theeightmainorgansoftheAU(arts5&�7,ConstitutiveActoftheAfricanUnion).Itisoneoftheninebodiesprovided for in the Treaty Establishing the AfricanEconomicCommunity,andwaseventuallygiveneffectbythePAPProtocol.�7TheprotocolwasadoptedwhentheOAUwas inplace,but it isnowoneof theAUtreatiesand thereforeall references to theOAU in itmustbereadtorefertotheAU.

ThepurposeofthePAPis‘toensurethefullparticipationofAfricanpeoplesinthedevelopmentandeconomic

integration of the continent’ (art �7(�), ConstitutiveAct). In terms of the PAP Protocol, its objectivesinclude(art3,PAPProtocol):

FacilitationoftheeffectiveimplementationofthepoliciesandobjectivesoftheAUPromotionof theprinciplesofhuman rights anddemocracyinAfricaEncouragementofgoodgovernance,transparencyandaccountabilityofmemberstatesFamiliarisation of the peoples of Africa withthe objectives and policies aimed at integratingthe African continent within the framework oftheAUPromotionofpeace,securityandstabilityContribution toamoreprosperous future for thepeople of Africa by promoting collective self-relianceandeconomicrecoveryFacilitation of cooperation and developmentinAfricaStrengtheningofcontinentalsolidarityandbuildinga sense of common destiny among the peoplesofAfricaFacilitation of cooperation among regionaleconomic communities (RECs) and theirparliamentaryfora(art3,PAPProtocol)

Itspowersareexpressedasfollows(art��(�)–(9),PAPProtocol):

Toexamine,discussorexpressanopiniononanymatter,eitheronitsowninitiativeorattherequestof the Assembly or other policy organs and tomake any recommendations it may deem fitrelatingto,interalia,matterspertainingtorespectofhumanrights, theconsolidationofdemocraticinstitutionsandthecultureofdemocracy,aswellas the promotion good governance and the ruleoflawTo discuss its budget and the budget of theCommunityandmakerecommendationsthereonpriortoitsapprovalbytheAssemblyToworktowardstheharmonisationorcoordinationofthelawsofthememberstatesTomakerecommendationsaimedatcontributingto the attainment of the objectives of the AUand draw attention to the challenges facingthe integration process in Africa as well as thestrategiesfordealingwiththemTorequestofficialsoftheAUtoattenditssessions,produce documents or assist in the discharge ofitsdutiesTopromotetheprogrammesandobjectivesoftheAU,intheconstituenciesofthememberstatesTo promote the coordination and harmonisationof policies,measures, programmes andactivitiesoftheRECsandtheparliamentaryforaofAfricaToadoptrulesofprocedure,electitsownpresidentandproposetotheCouncilandtheAssemblythesizeandnatureofthesupportstaffofthePAP

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Measuredagainst theoutlinedcriteria forParliament,the following may be said of the PAP. First, the PAPdoes not have any legislative powers at present,although thismayhappenat theendof its first termof five years (art 2(3), PAP Protocol). At present thepowertoenactpoliciesandlegislationisvestedintheAU Assembly (art 9(�)(a), Constitutive Act). For thisreasonalone,Hirpo(2006:�5)questionswhether thePAPmeets thedefinition fora traditionalparliament.The PAP must thus strive to achieve its objectivesand perform its functions with only advisory andconsultativecapabilities(art��,PAPProtocol).ThisisinsharpcontrasttotheEuropeanParliament.

Second, while recognising that it is a new initiativeandshouldevolvegradually, itsdemocraticattributesarequestionable.Itsmembersarenotdirectlyelected,butappointedbynationallegislaturesorothernationaldeliberativeorgans(art4(�),ConstitutiveAct)(thePAPProtocoldoesenvisageafutureparliamentofdirectlyelected members) (art 2(3), PAP Protocol). It furtherreferstonationaldiversityintheseappointmentsandrequires that one out of five national representativesshouldbeawoman(art4(2),ConstitutiveAct), which is not in line with genderequity.Whileprescription isnotalwaysadvisable, the suggestion should bemade that in the light of decisions byvarious human rights bodies, statesshouldundertakemorerobustmeasuresto ensure substantive participation ofwomeninpublicaffairs.ThePAPcouldhavesetanexamplebyrequiringabetterratio ofwomen tomen. This should infactalsoapplytotheAUitself.

Third,thePAP’sbudgetarypowershaveno real bite, because it merely makesrecommendations to the Assembly,while the latter is the body chargedwith adopting and approving the budget of the AU,including that of the PAP (art 9(�)(f), ConstitutiveAct).Again,thiscontrastswiththepositionintheEU.Fourth, on its role of protection and promotion ofhuman rights and democracy, it has relatively weakcapabilities. Fifth, the Assembly of the AU has thepowertomaketheimportantdecisionsrelatingtothePAP, including whether legislative powers should bevested in thePAP.This is sure tocreateproblems infuture, for as Magliveras and Naldi (2002:225) note,allAUmembersareparties to thePAPProtocol (seerecommendationssectionbelow).

The European Parliament and US Congress: Lessons for the PAP

AlllegislativepowervestsintheUSCongress,whichcomprisesoftheHouseofRepresentativesandSenate(generally,art�,ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates).TheUSconstitution setsoutall federal legislativepowers

andonly the remainingpowers are exercisedby thestatelegislatures(art�,s8,ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates). It is unlikely that the African continent willfollowtheUSmodel in thenear future, ifatall,andthereforeitsrelevancetothisdiscussionislimited.

Until �979 the European Parliament functioned asan appointed advisory body, after which membersweredirectlyappointedforthefirsttime(Georgeetal�997:�20).Uptothistimeitneitherhadcontroloverthebudgetof theEuropeanCommunitynoreffectiveability to influence legislative outcomes (Demeke2004:56; Maurer 2003:227). The powers were laterexpandedboththroughpracticeandsuccessivetreatyamendments(Andrew�998:47).

ThroughthecooperationprocedureintroducedbytheSingleEuropeanActin�987,theEuropeanParliamenttoday has the power, together with the council, toadopt European laws (directives, regulations, etc)and can accept, amend or reject the content ofEuropeanlegislationproposedbythecouncil.Further,it has ‘power of political initiative’ which means

it may present legislative proposals tothecouncilarising fromitsexaminationof the commission’s annualprogrammeof work.�8 The Maastricht Treaty,complementedbytheAmsterdamTreatyof �999, introduced the ‘co-decisionprocedure’bywhichthesameweightisgiventotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCounciloftheEuropeanUniononawiderangeofmatters, suchas transport, theenvironment and consumer protection.TwothirdsofEuropeanlawsareadoptedjointly by the European Parliament andthecouncil.�9InthecaseofsomematterstheEuropeanParliamenthasaveto.TheEuropeanParliamentisthereforethefirstchamber of the legislature, while the

councilactsasa secondchamber from time to timeratherthanasaministerialdirective(Maurer2003:227;Demeke2004:56).Itshouldbenotedthatwithrespectto some important policy issues (such as taxation),theEuropeanParliamentplaysanadvisoryroletothecouncil (Demeke 2004:57). Clearly, the EuropeanParliament does not yet have the same full powerssuchtheUSCongresswithinitsfederalstructure.

TheEuropeanParliamentdoeshaveeffectivepowersofoversightovertheactivitiesoftheEU.First,citizenshave a right of petition the European Parliament totake action on a specific issue that falls under itsauspices.Second,throughaninquiriesproceduretheEuropean Parliament sets up commissions to inquireinto incorrect applications of European law. Third,theEuropeanParliamenthasarightofrecoursetotheCourtof Justice toseekclarityon issuesandenforcethe treaties. Finally, it has financial control in theeconomic and monetary spheres through oversight

ThePAPmustthusstrivetoachieve

itsobjectivesandperformitsfunctionswithonlyadvisory

andconsultativecapabilities

UnitedStatesofAfrica•page8 Paper�42•June2007

and appointments.20 The European Parliament andthe council together constitute the EU’s budgetaryauthority, which decides annually on its expenditureandrevenueandtheEuropeanParliamentmayrejectthe budget if it feels it does not meet the needs oftheUnion(Demeke2004:58).Overall, theEuropeanParliament exercises democratic control over thecommissionand limitedparliamentaryoversightoverthecouncil.2�

A comparative view of the PAP

Thefollowingcanbesaidof thePAPincomparativeto particularly the European Parliament. Unlike itsEuropeanandUScounterparts,thePAPdoesnothaveanylegislativepowers.ButitissimilartotheEuropeanParliament in that itcanseekadvisoryopinions fromthe Court of Justice and Human Rights on any legalquestionandespeciallyitsparticularfunctions(art63,StatuteofCJ&HR).ThiswillhelptoresolveconflictswiththeotherAUorgans.IncontrasttotheEuropeanParliamentandUSCongress,whichhasawide,legallyentrenchedsupervisorymandateoverallEUandUSfederal22 activities respectively, the PAPhasnosuchpowers.Itisnotclearwhetherarticle25��(�)ofthePAPProtocol,whichprovides that the PAP may on its owninitiativeexamine,discussorexpressanopiniononanymatterincludinghumanrights, consolidation of democracy,promotionofgoodgovernanceand theruleof law,allows thePAP toestablishcommissionsofinquiryintosuchissues.However, one must conclude that onthewhole thePAPcannotexerciseanymeaningful oversight over the activitiesoftheAssemblyandcommission.

PAP members are not directly elected,incontrasttomembersoftheEuropeanParliament. This is a serious lack and will have tobe addressed so as to begin to bring it to paritywithwhat obtains in the EU,on thepath to amoreclosely integrated political union. Unlike in the EU,the PAP has no provision for citizens to petition itdirectly, a condition that would serve to promotecitizen participation in union matters. The EuropeanParliamentusesthisfunctiontogoodeffecttoensurethat member states attend to the situations raised inthepetitions.

Given that the questions of direct election of themembersofthePAPandvestingoflegislativepowersinthePAPhaveelicitedmuchdebate,itisconsideredinmoredetailhere. It shouldbenotedat theoutsetthat the two aspects neednot necessarily be linked.This position contradicts the views of Gutto (inMashele:2006)23 who argues that the exercise oflegislative power by PAP would complicate mattersas it is linked to direct election of members, which

impacts on the national electoral laws of memberstates. While it is true that legislative powers wouldhaveimplicationsforelectoralandotherlaws,includingnationalconstitutions(asdiscussedbelow)theexerciseof such power is not in the opinion of the authorlinked todirectelectionofmembersof thePAP.Theimplications for electoral laws would arise becausesuch members would be directly elected at thenational level (wherereformshavetobeundertaken)and not because elected members of the PAP willexercise legislative power. Members nominatedthrough national processes (as is the current case)couldstillexercise legislativepower.Therewouldbeindeednolegalbartothis,providedthattheProtocolconferslegislativepowersonthePAP.24Theonlyissuewouldbethelegitimacyofsuchpower.

Other issues raised by direct election of membersrelate to the basis of election. In most countriesmembers of national legislatures represent a specificconstituency, but on supra-national levels membersordinarily represent the national constituency inthe continental parliament.25 The question centres

on the size of the PAP constituencies(states) and whether each state shouldbe represented by an equal number ofmembersorwhetheritshouldbebasedon population size. If population sizeis the criterion,problemsarisebecauseof large extremes, with Nigeria at over�30millionpeopleontheonehandandsmall stateswith less than amillionontheother.26Thiscould lead todisputes,as happened in the EU on adoptionof the Nice Treaty, with Germanydemanding greater representation andFrance opposing the move. A furtherquestion is how members should beelected. The best solution may be toholdseparateelections(especiallywhere

thetermofthePAPdoesnotcoincidewiththatoftheparticularnationallegislature)toelectmembersatthenationallevel(asisdoneintheEU).

Above all, the PAP Protocol and national electorallaws would have to be harmonised to reflect anagreedmodelandapproach,whichmustnecessarilyentailcompromiseonkeyissues.AsisthecaseattheEuropean Parliament, members elected to the PAPmay be organised along ideological lines or policypositionsonkeyissues.

Onthedifficultissueoflegislativepower,ithasalreadybeenarguedthatthereisnoneedtoretainaPAPwithnorealutilityintheAU.Oncethereisagreementthatitshouldbevestedwithsomeformoflegislativepower,the next question is how this should be done. Theproblemarises inpart from the relationshipbetweenthePAPandtheAU’scurrentexecutiveorgans,andinpartfromthefactthatmemberstatesretain,andwill

UnlikeintheEU,thePAPhasnoprovisionfor

citizenstopetitionitdirectly

UnitedStatesofAfrica•page9 Paper�42•June2007

continuetoretainsovereigntythatincludeslegislativepowers. Even in Europe where states have cededsomeof their legislative sovereigntyonkey issues inexchangeforgreatsuccessesbytheEU,theycontinuetojealouslyguardagainstfurtherencroachment.

In an attempt to grapple with the challenges ofbequeathing legislative function to the PAP, someobservers have circumvented the question of statesovereignty, or to avoid antagonism with states,proposedthatthePAPshouldbeenabledtoproposemodellawstostates.27Thiswell-intentionedproposaldoes not advance the issue a great deal. Since it isunlikely that states would be obligated to acceptsuch legislative proposals, the situation would be nodifferent from the current recommendations the PAPmakes in its ineffectual advisory capacity. 28 Perhapsthelegislativeproposalroutecouldbeastartingpoint,but thefinalaimshouldbeclearlydefinedlegislativefunctionsover specific issueswhose scope couldbegraduallyexpandedthroughagreementbystates.

There are a number of issues over which states nolonger have absolute control, such ashumanrightsandthismaybeastartingpoint for thePAP’s legislative functions.Furthermore,itseemsasifAfricanstateswill seek economic unity ahead of amore integrated political union, whichis the more pragmatic and less radicalapproach tounionbuildingas thecaseoftheEastAfricanCommunityillustrates.Insuchascenariostateswouldbewillingtocede legislative functionsona rangeofeconomicconcernstothePAP.SothePAPcouldinitiallyhavepowersonlawsrelevant to trade, immigration and freemovement of people within the union.At the same time national legislaturescouldstillretainthepowerto‘fillintheblanks’bygivingsubstance toPAP ‘framework laws’.ThelattershouldbedirectlyapplicableatthenationallevelasisthecaseintheEU.29Sinceareasandissuesover which the PAP would have legislative powerwouldbestated,nationallegislatureswouldalsoretainlegislative function over the remaining issues. Thesecould gradually decrease as the union becomes amorepoliticallyintegratedentity.TheAfricanCourtofJusticewould,inturn,adjudicateontheapplicationoftheselawsatthenationallevelincasesofdisputes.

ThewaytheEastAfricanLegislativeAssembly(EALA),whichhas legislativepower (art49 (�),Treatyof theEastAfricanCommunity),approachedmattersprovidessomeguidelinesforthePAP.Sinceitsinaugurationin200�theEALAhasadoptedsixbillsproposedbytheCouncil into Acts,30 all of which relate to economicissues.Forinstance,theEastAfricanTradeNegotiationsActestablishedabodyfortheEastAfricanCommunitystatestoundertakejointtradenegotiationswithmajor

internationalentitiessuchastheEUandWorldBank,while theCustomsUnionManagementAct regulatesissuesrelatedtotheEACustomsUnion.ThefactthatEALAandvariouscommitteesthatwereestablishedareempoweredtoliaisewithnationalassembliesonissuespertaining to the East African Community eliminatespotential disputes between the parties (art 49(2)a,TreatyEstablishingtheEastAfricanCommunity).

Twoissuesneedtobeemphasisedhere.ThefirstisthatthePAP’spowerscouldbesharedwiththeAssemblyand the AU’s executive organs, bearing in minddemocratic ideals in which a parliament, especiallywhenelected,shoulddominatelaw-makingprocesses.ThisiswheretheexampleoftheEUcouldbeusedasaguideline.Second,itcannotbeemphasisedenoughthat national political structures, and particularlyparliaments,wouldneedtobereformedtobringtheirdiminishing law-making functions in line with thenewdispensation.Forinstance,itwouldbeinefficientto retain cumbersome and expensive multilayeredlegislativeinstitutionswhichhavelimitedpowersatthenationallevelinthelongrun.However,theprinciple

of subsidiarity,3� which is revered inthe EU and is indeed central to anyfederal dispensation,woulddictate thatappropriatelegislativeorgansberetainedatthenationalandsub-nationallevelstodeal with local specificities and ensurethat decision-makingpowersover localissuesareretained.

Conclusions

In this paper the provisions inthe Constitutive Act of the AU andinstruments relating to the ACJ & HRand the PAP were outlined. This wasfollowedineachcasebyacomparisonwith EU and US institutions to inform

the reform debate on these two African institutionsastheycouldoperateinacontinentalgovernment.Inconclusion,itisimportanttopointoutthatascurrentlyconstituted, the AU is not a fully-fledged union. Inthis regard, Oluwu (2003:220) has rightly observedthat ‘the Constitutive Act does not contemplate animmediate pursuit of a regional unification agenda’.Indeed,attheverybestitismerelyaroadmaptotherequired regional understanding for future continent-widecooperationand integration inAfrica.Thiswasthepointofdepartureforthecurrentdiscussion.Thoseenvisaging a future continental government mustrealisethatitcannottakeplaceovernight.Afterall,theEUtook50yearstoreachitscurrentstructureyetitisstillshyofafullfederalarrangement.

Whatisimportantistheexistenceofthewilltomoveinthatdirection,aswellasagreatdealofpatienceandastute leadership. This, together with a convergenceofpurposeofmember states,willbemoreeasilybe

ItisrecommendedthatallAUstates

berequiredtoparticipateinallits

maininstitutions

UnitedStatesofAfrica•page�0 Paper�42•June2007

achieved if the architects of an African governmentcanprovideconcretereasonstomotivatewhysuchanarrangementisnecessaryandwhatitwouldtaketoputitinplace.Stateshavetorealisethattheyhavetogiveupsomeoftheirsovereigntyinallareasofgovernment(depending on the union envisaged) to enable it towork.CommentatorshaverightlypointedoutthatthemainreasonwhytheEUhascomethisfarisbecausestateswerewillingtocedesovereigntytotheEUanditsinstitutions(seeforinstanceBedi2007:20).

ForanyoftheAUinstitutionstowork,particularlyina more integrated political union, difficult decisionswillhavetobemade.Whenallissaidanddone,andwhetherthecurrentcallsforanAfrica-widegovernmentareseriousormererhetoric,onlytimewilltell.

Recommendations

The African Court

Createwithin the expandedAfricanCourt a typeof ‘grand chamber’ with a president and judgesto decide on the ‘essential issues of the union’and ensure that the corpus of jurisprudenceiscoherent.Judges who are appointed must be trained ininternationallaw.EstablishaunioncourtoffirstinstancetolessentheburdenontheCourtofJusticeinrespectofcasesnotrelatedtothecorefunctionsandinstrumentsoftheunion,toactasafilter.ThenewAfricanCourtofJusticeshouldliaisewithmunicipalcourts,sothatthelattercanrefermattersrelating to interpretation of the regional treatiesor theirapplication indomestic jurisdictions to it.As the European experience shows, disputes willcertainlyariseinmunicipaljurisdictionsrelatingtotheinterpretationoftreatiesoftheregionalbody.Reform and align existing national court systemsso that theyareable toapply thoseregional lawswhichareapplicableatdomesticlevel.Withrespecttohumanrightsforinstance,nationaltribunalscanplayamajorroleinlimitingtheburdenonregionalcourtsbyaddressingviolationsatthatlevel.Municipal courts could possibly be vested withpowerstodeterminesomeunion-relatedissuesonanationalbasis,withadvicefromtheAfricanCourtofJustice.Appealscouldthenbemadetoregionaltribunal(s)toensureconsistentinterpretations.

The African Parliament

ThePAP’scurrentmandate,compositionandpowerswouldbeinadequateinamoreentailingunion.Itis only suitable for its present widely couchedobjectives.Theseaspectswillhavetobechangedtoreflectthenatureoftheneworganisation.Accordingly, AU legal instruments, including theConstitutiveActandthePAPProtocol,willhaveto

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berevised toavoidoverlaps in themandatesandrolesofthe‘new’AUbodies.The PAP’s weak mandate also results inrecommendationsonly,whicharenotbinding,andwould not be conducive to the strong oversightrole that would be required in a more entailingUnion. Therefore the PAP should be vested withsomeformoflegislativefunctiontofacilitateamoreactiveroleintheunion.Vesting of legislative powers would of necessityimpact not only on the legislative sovereigntyof states, exercised through various nationalassemblies, but also on the decision-makingpowers of the present executive organs of theAU. Therefore the powers of the PAP should beclearlydelineated,startingwitha limitedrangeofissuesandprogressivelyincreasingitsmandateinameasuredandpragmaticmanner.There are numerous challenges including legaltraditionsandlanguagearisingfromdiversityonthecontinentthatwillneedtobesurmounted.Thereforea‘bottomup’approachinsettingoutthesepowersshould be explored, so that powers of the PAPincreasesincrementallythroughcollaborationwithnationalandregionalparliaments.In view of the grand purpose of the PAP as ‘aplatform forAfricanpeoples and their grass-rootsorganisationstobemoreinvolvedindiscussionsanddecision-making on the problems and challengesfacingthecontinent’,amoredemocraticstructureshouldbeadoptedbyamendingthePAPProtocoltoprovidefordirectelectionofmembers,withdueconsiderationtogender.ThePAPshouldbegivenmorebudgetarypowers,especiallywithregard to itsoversight functions. Itshouldalsoplayanenhancedroleintheappointmentofunionfunctionaries,suchasjudges.Given the differences in population sizesof member states, it is recommended thatproportional representation in an elected PAP beconsidered early on, to ensure democratic andlegitimaterepresentation.Toavoid theconflict thatmayarise from the factthat Assembly makes important decisions withrespect to the PAP, while some of its membershavenotratifiedthePAPProtocolandarethereforenot represented in the deliberations of PAP, it isrecommended that all AU states be required toparticipate in all its main institutions, includingtheCourtofJusticeandHumanRights.ItisvitallyimportantthatmembershipintheAUbepredicatedonadherencetocertainfundamentalideals.

Notes

� Suggestion made by President Kuffuor of Ghana andsupportedbyotherAfricanleaders.PoliticalintegrationhasbeenidentifiedasaprimarygoaloftheAU.SeeAU‘GuidelineDocument’AfricanCommission,May2004,at22citedinCilliersandMashele2005.

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UnitedStatesofAfrica•page�� Paper�42•June2007

2 See decision of Assembly/AU/Dec 83 (V) adopted bytheFifthOrdinarySessionoftheAssemblyoftheUnionheldinSirte,Libya,inJuly2005.

3 Article �65 (amended) Treaty of Rome (�957) whichestablished the European Economic Community andtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity.Thistreatyissupplementedbytwoothers:theTreatyoftheEuropeanUnion, the Maastricht Treaty (�992) and the Treaty ofNice(200�)whichtogetheranchortheEU.

4 TheothersaretheEuropeanCommission,theCouncilofMinistersandtheEuropeanParliament.

5 Article�68a,TreatyofRome(amendmentintroducedbySingleEuropeanAct,SEA).

6 George et al (�997:��6) note that after the AmericanRevolutiontheconceptofaconstitutiondevelopedasanessentialgovernmentinstrument,oneinwhichthefixedprinciplesofreasonandfixedobjectsofthepublicgoodarestatedspecificallyinaformalbasicdocument.

7 See Bednar et al (�996:280) noting that the relevantcourt (in this case the highest) has the function ofrestraining federal power and ‘[preventing] the centrefrom encroaching on the domain of the memberstates, and to prevent member states from rationallyanticipating encroachment’ and that ‘the adjudicationof federal disputes by a politically independent courtwould, in theory, increase the confidence of memberstatesthatthecentrewillrespecttheirautonomy’.

8 See AU Commission Report on the decision of theAssemblyoftheUniontomergetheCourtonHumanand Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of theAfrican Union, EX CL/�62 (VI) Sixth Ordinary Session24-28January2005,pp�-4.

9 SummaryofProceduresoftheFirstMeetingofExperts/JudgesandthePRConthedraftprotocolof theCourtof Justice of the African Union, 22-24 April 2003,ExptJudg/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt(�); Ministerial Conferenceon the Draft Protocol of the Court of Justice of theAfricanUnion,7–8 June2003,GrandBaie,Mauritius,Min/Draft/Prot/ACJ/Rpt.

�0 The ECJ only applies human rights indirectly asprinciplesof theEUwhen interpreting the instrumentsthatconstitutetheEU.

�� Protocol �� to the European Convention on HumanRights (ECHR) abolished the commission and enabledindividualstoapplydirectlytothehumanrightscourt

�2 Arising from the Nice Treaty, European Civil ServiceTribunal (ECST)wasestablishedon2December2005bytheCounciloftheEU.Thisnewspecialisedtribunal,composed of seven judges will adjudicate in disputesbetween the European Union and its civil service.Previously,thisfunctionwasperformedbytheCourtofFirstInstanceuntil2005.DecisionsoftheECSTwillbesubjecttoappealonquestionsoflawonlytotheCourtofFirstInstanceand,inexceptionalcases,toreviewbytheECJ.

�3 ThesinglenewcentralisedEuropeanPatentTribunalwilldealwithalldisputesrelatingtotheinfringementand/orthevalidityofcommunitypatents.

�4 Observershavenotedthattheunconditionalmembershipto the AU has meant that states need not commit

themselvestoestablishedidealsoftheUnion,includingrespectforhumanrights.

�5 SeeHirpo(2006:�8-25)discussingsomeoftheseintermsofthegeneralattributesoftheinstitutionofparliament.SeealsogenerallyCopelandandPatterson�994.

�6 On some specifics on human rights and democracywithinthecontextofPAPseeHirpo2006:22-3�.

�7 ProtocoltotheTreatyEstablishingtheAfricanEconomicCommunityRelatingtothePan-AfricanParliament(PAPProtocol) signed in Abuja, Nigeria �99�. For a briefhistory and overview, see Magliveras and Naldi 2003andHirpo(2006).

�8 SeeEUPresidency,Parliament’spowersandprocedures:an overview, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=46&pageRank=�&language=EN.

�9 Asabove.20 Asabove.2� Asabove.22 ByvirtueoftheWarPowersAct(�973),theUSCongress’s

role was enhanced under new budget rules. Equally,Congressusesitsappropriationsfunctiontoinvestigateorcheckexecutivepower.SeePynn�993:362.

23 See comment at http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=5&slink_id=3686&link_type=�2&slink_type=�2&tmpl_id=3(accessedon20April2007).

24 SeeHirpo(2006:37),whohasraisedthisquestion.25 This approximates to the US case where two directly

electedmembersrepresenteachstateintheUSSenate.26 The situation in ECOWAS, where Nigeria, the most

populousnationintheblochas35outof�20membersmaybeinstructive.

27 See report on the PAP seminar on the harmonisationof regional economic communities and regionalparliamentary assemblies in Arusha, Tanzania wheredelegatesmadethisproposal

28 ForsomediscussiononthePAP’sactivityinthisareaseegenerallyPMashele2005.

29 The question of the validity of EU laws was settledin twocases in�963and�964.As elaboratedby theECJ, European law has direct application (priority) atthedomesticlevelinmemberstates.InthisregardseeVan Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Adminstratie derBelastingen (�963) and Costa v Enel (�964). See alsoMancini(�99�:504)andBedi(2007:20-2�).

30 EastAfricanTradeNegotiationsAct(2003);EastAfricanCustomsUnionManagementAct.

3� Intermsofsubsidiarity,importantdecisionsoverspecificissues of concern to a particular region, or localityshouldberetainedbythatregionorlocality.Thecentremaymakebroaddecisionsoverpolicyandprinciples,butparticularimplementationrestswiththe‘periphery’.

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About this paper ThedreamofaUnitedAfricahasbeenalivesincetheheydayofthegreatandvisionaryAfricanleaderssuchasKwameNkrumah.Attractiveas theideais inaworldinwhichsmallentities tendtowards joiningtogether to formbiggereconomicandpoliticalunits,thedecisiontoformsuchaunionisonlyonestepinajourneythatmayprove,ashistoryteaches,tobeoneofathousandmiles.Ahostofpreliminaryissuesrequirecriticalreflection.Joiningthereflectiononwhatitwouldtaketoinstituteacontinentalpoliticalunion,thispaper,whichofferssomethoughtsonthesubject,focusesontwoarmsofthepossiblegovernment:thePan-AfricanParliamentandthefutureAfricanCourtofJusticeandHumanRights(aproposedmergerbetweentheAfricanCourtofJusticeandtheAfricaCourtofHumanRights).Thepaperarguesthatwhatevermodelmaybechosenforthepoliticalunion,reformsofthetwoinstitutionsascurrentlyconstitutedwillbeanabsolutenecessity.WithrespecttotheAfricanCourt,thesuggestionismadethatreformshouldtaketheformofthreepossiblemodels:theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(thehighestcourtinafederalsystem),theEuropeanCourtofJustice(thehighestcourtina‘confederate’system)orahybridformat,dependingonthepowersvestedinit.WithrespecttotheAfricanParliament,theargumentalongsimilarlinesisthatthescopeofitslegislativemandatewilldependonthenatureandstructureofthepoliticalunionadopted.InthepapersomeoftheelementsoftheinstitutionsinEuropeandtheUSAthatmayenlightenthecurrentpoliticalendeavourareoutlined.

About the author GODFREYMMUSILAisadoctoralresearchfellowattheSouthAfricanInstituteforAdvancedConstitutional,Public,HumanRightsandInternationalLawandaPhDcandidateattheUniversityoftheWitwatersrand,Johannesburg.TheauthorwishestoheartilythankJakkieCilliersandJohnOsogoAmbanifortheirassistanceduringthewritingofthispaper.

FunderThispaperandtheresearchuponwhichitisbasedwasmadepossiblethroughthegenerousfundingoftheSwitzerlandEmbassyinEthiopia,theDanishEmbassyinEthiopiaandtheDeutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit(GTZ).