UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT KNOXVILLE … · 01.06.2016 · CHIEF PHILIP K. POTTER, ... DUSTIN...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

KNOXVILLE DIVISION

ANNISSA COLSON, ))

Plaintiff, ))

v. ) NO. _________________)

CITY OF ALCOA, Tennessee, ) Jury of Twelve Demandeda governmental entity, )

)CHIEF PHILIP K. POTTER, individually, )and in his official capacity as Chief of )Police of the Alcoa Police Department, )

)KEITH FLETCHER, individually, and in )his official capacity as Lieutenant of the )Alcoa Police Department, )

)DUSTIN COOK, individually, and in his )official capacity as Patrol Officer of the )Alcoa Police Department, )

)ARIK WILSON, individually, and in his )official capacity as Patrol Officer of the )Alcoa Police Department, )

)BLOUNT COUNTY, Tennessee, a )governmental entity, )

)SHERIFF JAMES L. BERRONG, )individually, and in his official capacity )Sheriff of Blount County, Tennessee, )

)JENNIFER RUSSELL, individually, and in )her official capacity as Corrections Nurse )of the Blount County Sheriff’s )Department, )

)MANDY ENGLAND, individually, and in )her official capacity as Corrections Officer )of the Blount County Sheriff’s Department,)

Case 3:16-cv-00377-RLJ-CCS Document 1 Filed 06/23/16 of 61 PageID #: 1

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, )employees of the Alcoa Police Department )and/or Blount County Sheriff's )Department, individually, and in their )official capacities, )

)Defendants. )

______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES_______________________________________________________________________________

COMES Annissa Colson (“Plaintiff”), by and through her attorney, and

brings this Complaint against the Defendants, City of Alcoa, Tennessee (“Alcoa”),

Police Chief Philip K. Potter (“Chief Potter”), Keith Fletcher (“Fletcher”), Dustin

Cook (“Cook”), Arik Wilson (“Wilson”), Blount County, Tennessee (“Blount

County”), Sheriff James L. Berrong (“Sheriff Berrong”), Jennifer Russell (“Nurse

Russell”), Mandy England (“England”), and John and Jane Does 1-10 (“Doe

Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. NATURE OF ACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

III. PARTIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

A. Plaintiff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

B. Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

A. Plaintiff Suffers From a Severe Anxiety and Severe PanicDisorder and Its Effects Made Her Particularly Vulnerable asan Arrestee and Inmate.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

B. A Pattern of Escalating Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

C. Cook Arrests Plaintiff and Transports Her to Blount MemorialHospital for a BAC Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

D. Plaintiff Experiences a Severe Panic Attack, Asks for Help. . . . . . 20

E. Cook and Wilson Ignore Plaintiff’s Severe Panic Attack andBegin to Forcibly Place Her in Cook’s Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

F. Wilson Violently Strikes the Plaintiff’s Knee, Causing a TibialPlateau Fracture and Tearing Plaintiff’s Right ACL and LCL.. . . . 21

G. Cook and Wilson Disregard Plaintiff’s Injuries, Fail to ProvideHer Medical Care, Despite Being Feet Away from theEmergency Room Doors, and Continue to Force Plaintiff IntoCook’s Vehicle.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

H. Cook and Wilson Are Ordered by Fletcher to Transport thePlaintiff to Blount County Jail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

I. Plaintiff’s Arrival at the Blount County Jail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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J. Cook, Wilson, England, and Other Corrections OfficersContinued to Ignore Plaintiff’s Injuries and Forcibly Placed Herin Restraints in a Restrain Chair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

K. Nurse Russell Performs a Slipshod Medical Examination.. . . . . . 25

L. England Struck the Already Injured, Agonizing, and Panic-Stricken Plaintiff in the Face Under the Pre-Text Plaintiff HadAttempted to Bite Her. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

M. England and Other Corrections Officers Refuse to PermitPlaintiff to Go to the Restroom, Forcing Her to Urinate OnHerself Multiple Times, and Laugh at Her, All While Plaintiff isin Constant and Severe Pain and Continuing to Suffer a SeverePanic Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

N. England and Other Officers Forced a Helmet Onto thePlaintiff’s Head and Kept Her Restrained in a Chair – As SheContinued to Suffer From the Painful Injuries That Had BeenInflicted On Her – For Five More Hours, Until Her Release.. . . . . 27

O. Released From Jail, Plaintiff Finally Received MedicalTreatment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

P. No Investigation of Cook, Wilson, Fletcher, England, Russell,or Other Officers’ Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Q. Alcoa and Blount County Systematically Violate theConstitutional Rights of Inmates With Severe Mental Disorders.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

V. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

VII. JURY DEMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

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I. NATURE OF ACTION

1. Annissa Colson (“Plaintiff”) is a 5N 5O female who suffers from multiple

anxiety disorders, including severe panic disorder. She was arrested early in the

evening of June 23, 2015 by Officer Dustin Cook (“Cook”) of the Alcoa Police

Department (“Alcoa PD”). Though initially entrusted to the Alcoa PD, Plaintiff was

subsequently transported to the Blount County Jail (“Jail”) operated by the Blount

County Sheriff’s Department (“BCSD”). Over the course of the next few hours,

Plaintiff endured a nightmare of terror, vicious assaults, and mental abuse by

officers of both departments, suffering disabling injuries to her knee and

contusions, abrasions, and bruising to her face, neck, chest, arms, legs, and feet.

2. Plaintiff also suffered substantial psychological injuries during her

confinement. Tormented by her captors, she was strapped down and restrained

to a chair; forced, despite being claustrophobic, to wear a helmet; deprived of

adequate medical care; of bathroom breaks; and of water; forced to urinate on

herself in front of a cadre of laughing male and female officers; and ultimately

found hours later sitting alone in a restraint chair in a pool of her own urine.

3. By the time her mother obtained her release early the next morning

by posting bail, Plaintiff was a battered and bruised woman, with a fractured knee

and torn ligaments, and unable to walk on her own. Her condition was such that

emergency room personnel assumed she was the victim of horrific domestic abuse.

4. Plaintiff was forced to endure:

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# a jugular notch pressure point tactic to force her tosubmit, despite having a severe panic attack thataltogether crippled her ability to comply with commands;

# a violent strike to her knee which caused an audible“pop” and resulted in tears to her ACL and LCL kneeligaments and a tibial plateau fracture;

# yet another pressure point tactic – this time a claviclepressure point by a second officer, while still physicallyand emotionally crippled by the severe panic attack;

# a hard and violent strike directly to her face, by yet athird officer, as Plaintiff was strapped down to a chair,immobilized by four-point restraints;

# grabbing, pushing, pressing, and other offensivemanhandling by a cadre of ill-trained officers;

# being deprived of bathroom breaks, forced to urinateon herself multiple times in front of several laughingmale and female officers;

# being left alone for several hours, a helmet coveringher head, with her arms and legs strapped to a chair;unable to sleep, use the bathroom, or drink water;

# constant verbal abuse, humiliation, and threatsdirected at her by no fewer than five corrections officers;

# lack of adequate medical care; and

# being forced to bear the excruciating pain caused bythe fracture and torn knee ligaments for approximatelyseven hours, with nothing to alleviate her pain.

5. The evening began at about 7:30 when Plaintiff was involved in a

single-vehicle accident on Springbrook Road in Blount County, Tennessee. The

accident left Plaintiff facing several charges, including DUI, violation of the implied

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consent law, and reckless endangerment. After refusing a field sobriety test,

Plaintiff relented to consent to a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) test.

Accordingly, Cook transported her to Blount Memorial Hospital for the test. Once

they arrived at Blount Memorial Hospital, however, Plaintiff exited Cook’s vehicle,

but then withdrew her consent to be tested. She was ordered to get back inside

of the vehicle. At this point, Plaintiff began to suffer a crippling panic attack,

gasping for breath, in obvious distress, pleading with Cook and Alcoa PD officer

Arik Wilson (“Wilson”) to let her breathe.

6. Despite being just a few feet away from the hospital’s emergency room

doors, with an ambulance and stretcher in plain view, Cook and Wilson

inexplicably decided to disregard Plaintiff’s obvious mental distress and transport

her to the Jail. Stating on a video recording that they believed Plaintiff was

“resisting” commands, Cook and Wilson decided to force the panic-stricken

diminutive Plaintiff into the back of Cook’s patrol car.

7. Unfortunately, neither Cook nor Wilson made an effort to

“de-escalate” the situation, choosing instead to physically force Plaintiff back into

Cook’s vehicle. Cook was inside the vehicle, trying to pull Plaintiff into the vehicle.

Wilson was pushing the Plaintiff into the vehicle. At one point, Wilson violently

struck Plaintiff’s right knee with his own knee and a loud “pop” was heard and

recorded by Cook’s Body-Worn Camera (“BWC”). Plaintiff had just suffered three

debilitating and excruciatingly painful injuries to her right knee: a tibial plateau

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fracture, a torn anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”), and a torn lateral collateral

ligament (“LCL”).

8. Wilson, sensing the severity of Plaintiff’s injury, immediately informed

Cook what had just transpired. Undeterred, and disregarding that Plaintiff was

screaming in pain (from physical injuries) and fear (from a paralyzing panic

attack), Cook and Wilson continued with their efforts to physically force the

Plaintiff back into Cook’s vehicle, with both officers using pressure point tactics

– Cook, a clavicle pressure point, and Wilson, a jugular-notch pressure point.

Eventually, they maneuvered Plaintiff back into Cook’s vehicle.

9. With Plaintiff inside his vehicle screaming in pain and crying for her

mother, Cook contacted Lieutenant Fletcher (“Fletcher”), his supervisor, for

instructions. Wilson, who had heard Plaintiff’s knee make the loud “pop,” asked

Cook to ask if they should have Plaintiff’s knee examined. Fletcher instead

directed the officers to transport her to the Jail.

10. Cook transported the Plaintiff to Jail. They were met by BCSD

Corrections Officer Mandy England (“England”), who escorted Plaintiff into a

room, where she was surrounded by corrections staff and eventually strapped into

a restraint chair.1 For the next seven hours, Plaintiff became a crippled and

1The restraint chair is “a restraining device that has led to many seriousabuses, including torture and death. Belts and cuffs prevent the prisoner’slegs, arms, and torso from moving.” Anne-Marie Cusac, Investigative Reporter,The Devil’s Chair, The Progressive (April 2000).

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helpless target of cruel and inhumane physical and mental abuse by several

BCSD officers, lead by England.

11. Corrections Nurse Jennifer Russell (“Russell”) examined Plaintiff’s

knee. After a cursory examination, Russell pronounced that there was nothing

wrong with Plaintiff’s knee and left the room. Shortly afterwards, Russell re-

entered the room to draw blood from Plaintiff. England was pressing hard on

Plaintiff’s chest with her hand and Plaintiff tried to move England’s hand with her

chin. England reacted by violently striking the restrained Plaintiff in the face.

12. Plaintiff repeatedly asked if she could use the bathroom, to no avail.

Surrounded by male and female officers, Plaintiff wound up urinating on herself

multiple times, enduring the humiliating laughs of the officers.

13. Male officers held Plaintiff’s neck while England forced a helmet onto

her head. Plaintiff, in unspeakable physical and emotional pain, was left strapped

to a restraint chair for approximately another five hours.

14. Plaintiff should have been safe and protected in the custody of law

enforcement officers. Instead, she was brutalized, caused to suffer severe pain

and substantial mental anguish, requiring medical treatment and surgery – all at

the hands of Alcoa PD and BCSD officers. For all of this, Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages.

15. Despite Plaintiff’s obvious physical injuries and mental disturbance,

not one officer made a serious effort to assist her or provide adequate medical

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treatment to her, even though Cook and Wilson had her in their custody mere feet

away from Blount Memorial Hospital.

16. By the time she was released from Jail, Plaintiff was the victim of

serious physical injuries, including a tibial plateau fracture, a torn ACL, a torn

LCL, and contusions, abrasions, and bruises to her neck, chest, foot, and arms.

She was also caused to suffer severe pain and substantial mental anguish – all as

a result of Defendants’ physical and mental abuse. The incident and resulting

injuries grossly impaired Plaintiff’s quality of life. See Photographs, #’s 1-5,

attached hereto.

17. The moving force behind the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional

rights was Alcoa and Blount County’s policies, customs, or practices to employ

and apply the same protocols, conventions, customs, or rules of conduct in

handling suspects or inmates who suffer severe mental disorders, here, a severe

anxiety and panic disorder, as they do in handling other un-afflicted inmates.

This practice is accepted as a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the

safety of suspects or inmates who suffer from debilitating mental disorders.

18. Defendants knew, or should have known, by Plaintiff’s actions,

statements, and medications, that Plaintiff suffered from a severe mental disorder.

And there should have been little doubt that Plaintiff – confronted by ill-trained

officers – would react as she did. The officers responded just as they would have

to any non-compliant suspect or inmate, disregarding her severe mental disorder.

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19. Alcoa, the Alcoa PD, Blount County, the BCSD, and their officers are

all required to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of all those in-

custody and inmates, and have a duty to protect them. Here, they failed to take

such measures to protect the Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges claims for:

# the unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjustified use offorce against Plaintiff;

# the unconscionable policy or custom of the Alcoa PDand BCSD of deliberate indifference to the physical andpsychological well-being of Plaintiff and other suspectsand inmates who suffer severe anxiety disorders;

# the cruel and unusual use by the BCSD of a “restraintchair” on Plaintiff and other suspects and inmates whosuffer from severe mental disorders;

# failure of the Alcoa PD and BCSD to provide adequatemedical care to Plaintiff, after she had experiencedtraumatic physical and mental injuries;

# failure to protect Plaintiff from officers intent oncausing her serious bodily and psychological harm;

# the failure of Alcoa and Blount County to properlytrain and supervise officers with respect to theappropriate procedure for using force, for handlingcitizens with severe mental disorders, and for obtainingproper medical care for persons injured in their custody;

# ratification or acquiescence of the use of excessiveforce by officers, demonstrating deliberate indifference tothe physical and psychological well-being of citizens; and

# assault and battery, false arrest, outrageous conduct,and negligence.

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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

20. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1343 over Plaintiff's claims arising under the Constitution of the United

States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any claims brought

under Tennessee law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367, as such claims are so related

to claims in the action within the original jurisdiction of this Court that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.

22. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Tennessee because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

Plaintiff's claims occurred in Blount County. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

III. PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

23. Annissa Colson, during all relevant times, was a citizen and resident

of the City of Maryville in Blount County, Tennessee.

B. Defendants

24. The City of Alcoa, Tennessee (“Alcoa”) is a political subdivision of the

State of Tennessee, the duly-formed municipal government for, and the political

entity that governs Alcoa, Tennessee. Alcoa may be served with process through

Mayor Donald R. Mull, 223 Associates Boulevard, Alcoa, Tennessee 37701-1948.

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25. Alcoa possesses the power and authority to adopt policies and

prescribe rules, regulations, and practices affecting all facets of training,

supervision, control, employment, assignment, and removal of individual members

of the Alcoa Police Department (“Alcoa PD”), and to assure that said actions,

policies, rules, regulations, practices and procedures of the Alcoa PD and its

employees and agents comply with the laws and constitutions of the United States

and the State of Tennessee.

26. Alcoa and the Alcoa PD are answerable for the safekeeping of persons

in their custody and responsible for all matters relating to the selection,

supervision, promotion, training, and discipline of employees, including uniformed

and non-uniformed employees.

27. At all relevant times, Chief Philip K. Potter (“Chief Potter”) was

employed by the Alcoa PD. He is sued in his individual and official capacities and

as principal on his official bond. Chief Potter was operating under color of law.

He is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount County and

may be served with process at 2020 North Wright Road, Alcoa, TN 37701-1948.

28. At all relevant times, Lieutenant Keith Fletcher (“Fletcher”), was

employed by the Alcoa PD. He is sued in his individual and official capacities and

as principal on his official bond. Fletcher was operating under color of law. He

is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount County and may

be served with process at 2020 North Wright Road, Alcoa, TN 37701-1948.

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29. At all relevant times, Officer Dustin Cook (“Cook”), was employed by

the Alcoa PD. He is sued in his individual and official capacities and as principal

on his official bond. Cook was operating under color of law. He is, upon

information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount County and may be served

with process at 2020 North Wright Road, Alcoa, TN 37701-1948.

30. At all relevant times, Officer Arik Wilson (“Wilson”), was employed by

the Alcoa PD. He is sued in his individual and official capacities and as principal

on his official bond. Wilson was operating under color of law. He is, upon

information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount County and may be served

with process at 2020 North Wright Road, Alcoa, TN 37701-1948.

31. Blount County, Tennessee (“Blount County”) is a governmental entity

and political subdivision of the State of Tennessee, duly organized. It may be

served through its chief executive officer, County Mayor Ed Mitchell, at 341 Court

Street, Maryville, TN 37804-5906.

32. Blount County possessed the power and authority to adopt policies

and prescribe rules, regulations, and practices affecting all facets of the training,

supervision, control, employment, assignment and removal of individual members

of the BCSD, and to assure that said actions, policies, rules, regulations, practices

and procedures of the BCSD and its employees and agents comply with the laws

and constitutions of the United States and of the State of Tennessee.

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33. Blount County and the BCSD are answerable for the safekeeping of

persons in their custody and responsible for all matters relating to the selection,

supervision, promotion, training, and discipline of employees, including uniformed

and non-uniformed employees.

34. The Blount County Jail is operated by the BCSD. The Blount County

Sheriff has a statutory duty to take charge and custody of the jail and inmates

housed therein, Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4-101, and may appoint jailers, for whose

actions he is civilly liable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4-101.

35. At all relevant times, Sheriff James L. Berrong (“Sheriff Berrong”) was

the duly-elected Sheriff of Blount County, Tennessee, statutorily responsible for

the screening, hiring, firing, training and the supervision of the BCSD personnel;

and responsible for the safety and welfare of those in custody. Sheriff Berrong is

statutorily responsible for the operation of the Blount County Jail; for the

screening hiring, firing, training and the supervision of the jailers, deputies,

corrections officers, and other jail personnel; and responsible for the safety and

welfare of those housed in the Jail. Tenn. Code Ann. §41-4-101.

36. Sheriff Berrong is sued in his individual and official capacities and as

principal on his official bond. Sheriff Berrong was operating under color of law.

Sheriff Berrong is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount

County and may be served with process at the BCSD, 940 E. Lamar Alexander

Parkway, Maryville, Tennessee 37804.

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37. At all relevant times, Corrections Officer Mandy England (“England”),

was employed by the BCSD. She is sued in her individual and official capacities

and as principal on her official bond. England was operating under color of law.

She is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of Blount County and

may be served with process at the BCSD, 940 E. Lamar Alexander Parkway,

Maryville, Tennessee 37804.

38. At all relevant times, Corrections Nurse Jennifer Russell (“Russell”),

was employed by the BCSD. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.

Russell was operating under color of law. She is, upon information and belief, a

citizen and resident of Blount County and may be served with process at the

BCSD, 940 E. Lamar Alexander Parkway, Maryville, Tennessee 37804.

39. Plaintiff also sues the fictitious Defendants, Does 1-10, as their true

identities and/or capacities and/or other facts showing their culpability are

presently unknown. These Defendants are sued in their individual and official

capacities as Alcoa PD and/or BCSD officers, deputies, or employees, and as

principals on their official bonds.2 They include unknown officers or deputies of

the Alcoa PD and BCSD who used excessive force on the Plaintiff, subjected her

to cruel and unusual punishment, failed to protect her from harm and/or failed

2Under Rules 4(m) and 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,Plaintiff will seek leave of this Court to amend her Complaint to set forth thetrue names and capacities of such Defendants when their identities areascertained.

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to insure that she received medical attention. Plaintiff is informed and believes

that certain of the Doe Defendants were supervisors and policy makers for the

Alcoa PD and/or BCSD.

40. Various persons or entities not made Defendants in this lawsuit,

including but not limited to Alcoa officials, commissioners, or Alcoa PD employees

or Blount County officials, commissioners, or BCSD employees, have participated

as co-conspirators with Defendants in the violations asserted herein and have

performed acts and made statements in furtherance thereof. Plaintiff reserves the

right to name some or all of these persons as Defendants at a later date.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Plaintiff Suffers From a Severe Anxiety and Severe PanicDisorder and Its Effects Made Her Particularly Vulnerableas an Arrestee and Inmate.

41. Plaintiff, Annissa Colson, is a 5N5O, 36-year old single mother. She

has a bachelor’s degree in psychology and is gainfully employed. Until June 23,

2015, Plaintiff had never been arrested. She suffers from multiple anxiety

disorders, including severe panic disorder. To treat her mental disorders, Plaintiff

takes the physician-prescribed anxiolytic and anti-convulsant drug, Klonipin.

Klonipin is used to treat severe panic disorder.3 Among other reactions, Klonopin

itself may cause behavioral disturbances, irritability, anxiety, problems with

3http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM225680.pdf

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www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM225680.pdf

coordination, speech problems, and disordered memory or cognition.4

42. Mental health experts have described imprisonment as a “toxic”

environment for those who suffer from mental disorders. Plaintiff’s severe anxiety

and panic disorder made her a particularly vulnerable suspect and inmate,

especially when entrusted to officers who did not differentiate her from other, non-

afflicted persons. Inmates with mental disorders may find it difficult, if not

impossible, to comply consistently with rules. Some exhibit their disorder through

disruptive behavior, belligerence, aggression, or violence, while others refuse to

follow straightforward routine orders to, for example, get into a car.

43. Panic disorder affects an estimated 1.6% of American adults ages 18

to 54, and usually develops in early adulthood. According to the Mayo Clinic, a

panic attack is “a sudden episode of intense fear that triggers severe physical

reactions when there is no real danger or apparent cause. Panic attacks can be

very frightening. When panic attacks occur, you might think you're losing control,

having a heart attack or even dying. . . . [I]f you’ve had recurrent, unexpected

panic attacks and spent long periods in constant fear of another attack, you may

have a condition called panic disorder.”5

The symptoms of a panic attack include somecombination of the following: sweating, hot or cold

4http://whatmeds.stanford.edu/medications/clonazepam.html:

5http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/panic-attacks/basics/definition/con-20020825.

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http://whatmeds.stanford.edu/medications/clonazepam.html:

flashes, choking or smothering sensations, racing heart,labored breathing, trembling, chest pains, faintness,numbness, nausea or disorientation. Some experiencingan attack may feel like they are dying, losing control orlosing their mind. Panic attacks typically last about fiveto 10 minutes but can be shorter or as long as an hour. During the attack, the physical and emotional symptomsincrease quickly in a wave-like fashion and then slowlysubside. A person may feel anxious and jittery for manyhours after experiencing an attack.

See National Alliance on Mental Illness, Panic Disorder Fact Sheet (Feb.

2013)(http://www2.nami.org/factsheets/panicdisorder_factsheet.pdf).

44. People with panic disorder are at increased risk of developing other

mental illnesses. Half of them may eventually be diagnosed with major depressive

disorder. Alcohol and drug abuse can also be a serious problem, both as a trigger

for panic attacks and as a type of self-medication that can quickly get out of

control. See Panic Disorder Fact Sheet. Approximately one in 20 Americans are

diagnosed and treated for panic disorder every year. Females are twice as likely

to be affected than males. See Panic Disorder Fact Sheet.

45. Panic attacks begin quickly and build to a peak rapidly (usually 10

minutes or less). They are often accompanied by a sense of imminent danger or

impending death and an urge to escape. They are often described as “the most

terrifying experience I’ve ever had.” They leave the person emotionally drained,

frightened, feeling vulnerable, and anxious. See Canadian Psychological

Association, “Psychology Works” Fact Sheet: Panic Disorder (May

2009)(http://www.cpa.ca/docs/File/Publications/FactSheets/PsychologyWork

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sFactSheet_PanicDisorder.pdf). Attacks often happen at times of stress/strain,

after an unpleasant or traumatic experience, or may occur unexpectedly.

46. While the experience of a panic attack is different for each individual,

there is one universal truth for all who suffer from them: they are terrifying. See

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/21/panic-attack-feeling_n_5977998

.html. According to Todd Farchione, a clinical psychologist at the Center for

Anxiety and Related Disorders at Boston University, “when someone suffers from

one of these disorders, it’s completely debilitating.”

47. A prominent psychologist writes:

Imagine that you’re taking a stroll in the countryside. Everything is going well. The trees are in bloom; the skyis blue; the cool breeze is refreshing. You’re hummingyour favorite tune when suddenly you hear a bloodcurdling scream.

Now imagine that out of nowhere, a repulsive creaturehas stepped into your path. He’s got a grotesque body,horns on his head and a menacing smile. You freeze interror as this hideous face stares into yours! Thoughyou desperately wish to flee, you find yourself helplesslyfrozen. Your heart is racing. Your chest is pounding.You can’t catch your breath. You feel lightheaded. Youfeel faint. You think you might die right there on thespot.

Now imagine feeling this very same terror when there’sno creature in your path. What would your experiencebe? Would you feel mystified? Bewildered?Embarrassed? Wonder if you’re going crazy?

This is the experience of those who endure panicattacks. Many keep their experiences secret, for they areembarrassed and at a loss for words to describe what

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happens to them. Nobody else has ever had such areaction, or so they believe. Panic attacks, however, aremore common than you may think.6

48. In an effort to understand what it is really like to suffer a panic

attack, the Huffington Post invited the Twitter and Facebook communities to

explain what a panic attack physically feel like. In an H-P article entitled, “This

Is What A Panic Attack Physically Feels Like,” H-P’s Lindsay Holmes selected a few

of the descriptions she received:

# “Mine are like I can’t stand up, I can’t speak. All I feelis an intense amount of pain all over, like something isjust squeezing me into this little ball. If it is really bad Ican’t breathe, I start to hyperventilate and I throw up.”

# “It feels like every wall is closing in towards me; like Ican’t see straight and my vision suddenly becomesspotty. Tunnel vision describes it perfectly.”

# “It feels like being trapped and suffocated as if thebuilding was on fire with no escape. It feels urgent andfrightening.”

B. A Pattern of Escalating Force

49. According to the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and

Developmental Disabilities, while behaviors associated with panic attacks do not

6See Sapadin, L., What a Panic Attack Feels Like, Psych Central (2013)(retrieved on June 21, 2016, fromhttp://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2013/03/11/what-a-panic-attack-feels-like/).

-17-


normally lead people into the criminal justice system, an individual may

experience a panic attack as a result of an encounter with law enforcement or

corrections. http://www.naminc.org/nn/blet/tncurriculummod2MentalIllness.pdf

50. Corrections officers have a difficult job in the best of circumstances.

The difficulties and frustrations of work are compounded when prisoners have

mental disorders. Few corrections officers have the training in and understanding

of the nature of mental disorders that would help them cope better with the

challenges posed by offenders with such disorders. They come to their jobs with

the fears and prejudices of the general population towards the mentally ill. The

correctional culture of order, obedience, and discipline in which they were trained

leaves them ill-prepared for handling inmates whose behavior is either chronically

or episodically ruled by their mental disorder.

51. Steve Martin, a well-known corrections consultant and use of force

expert, describes a pattern of escalating force typical in cases involving inmates

with mental disorders. According to Martin, the strange, often violent, and

irrational behavior of such persons and their protracted struggle against being

restrained can scare correctional officers into acting more aggressively than they

should. “What is very evident in these cases is the officers are simply frightened

of the detainee. . . . they perceive the detainee as an utter immediate threat to

their physical well-being. It’s a dynamic created almost from the get-go.”

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www.naminc.org/nn/blet/tncurriculummod2MentalIllness.pdf

C. Cook Arrests Plaintiff and Transports Her to BlountMemorial Hospital for a BAC Test

52. On June 23, 2015, Alcoa PD Investigator Jason Ewing came upon the

Plaintiff and her 10-year old son on Springbrook Road. Plaintiff’s son had exited

her vehicle, and Plaintiff, trying to get her son back in her vehicle, ran her Toyota

SUV into a ditch. Alcoa PD Officer Dustin Cook (“Cook”) was dispatched. He

asked Plaintiff if she would submit to field sobriety tests, but she refused. He then

summoned another Alcoa PD officer, Arik Wilson, to the scene to assist him.

53. Cook informed Plaintiff that she was under arrest for DUI.7 Plaintiff

was placed into the back seat of Cook’s vehicle and asked if she would voluntarily

submit to a BAC test. Plaintiff eventually relented to a BAC test when Cook

informed her that she had no choice, as they were going to have her blood drawn

after obtaining a search warrant.

54. Cook, with Wilson following in another vehicle, transported Plaintiff

to Blount Memorial Hospital to have the test performed. Upon arriving at the

hospital, Wilson pulled up behind Cook’s vehicle. Cook asked Plaintiff to step out

of the vehicle. She complied. But she then informed Cook that she had changed

her mind and would not consent to a BAC test. Cook called a Blount County

Assistant District Attorney for instructions.

7Other charges were also eventually brought against the Plaintiff,including felony reckless endangerment, violation of the implied consent law,resisting arrest, and assault.

-19-


D. Plaintiff Experiences a Severe Panic Attack, Asks for Help.

55. At this point, Officer Cook instructed Plaintiff to get back into the

vehicle, as they are going to obtain a search warrant to draw her blood. At that

moment, Plaintiff began experiencing a severe panic attack and asked Cook and

Wilson if she could have a few seconds to “breathe” before getting back into the

vehicle. One of the officers started quickly “counting down” and then both officers

began to physically force the Plaintiff into the back of the vehicle.

56. Plaintiff began experiencing shortness of breath, a rapidly increased

heart rate, was sweating and trembling, became very afraid and confused, and did

not know what was happening. Indeed, video from Cook’s BWC8 shows the

Plaintiff in the throes of a severe panic attack that appears to last from that

moment through at least the period in which Cook and Wilson deliver her to the

Blount County Jail. Plaintiff was unable to communicate anything to the officers

except, “I need to breathe. Please let me breathe.”

E. Cook and Wilson Ignore Plaintiff’s Severe Panic Attack andBegin to Forcibly Place Her in Cook’s Vehicle.

57. Despite being just a few feet away from the Emergency Room9 at the

onset of Plaintiff’s attack, Cook and Wilson decided to force Plaintiff into Cook’s

vehicle, leave the hospital and deliver the Plaintiff to the Jail.

8In 2015, L3 Body Worn Cameras were issued to all uniformed patrolofficers.

9Indeed, a video recording from Cook’s BWC shows that an ambulanceand a stretcher were in plain view, just a few feet away.

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58. At one point, the officers switched sides, with Wilson pushing the

Plaintiff’s body against the vehicle and Cook grabbing her arms and trying to pull

her into the vehicle. Either failing to recognize that the Plaintiff was in the midst

of a severe panic attack and needed medical attention or simply ignoring her

pitiful plight and symptoms, Cook reported that Plaintiff:

“became extremely belligerent and combative towardsOfficers Wilson and I. Ms. Colson was given severalverbal commands to get back into the vehicle, butrefused to comply. At that point, Officer Wilsonattempted to apply a jugular notch pressure point, in anattempt to get Ms. Colson in the vehicle.”10

F. Wilson Violently Strikes Plaintiff’s Knee, Causing a TibialPlateau Fracture and Tearing Plaintiff’s Right ACL and LCL.

59. At that point, Cook was in the back of his vehicle attempting to pull

Plaintiff into the car. Wilson stated that he “heard and felt” Plaintiff’s knee “pop”

as he “was applying pressure to her knee” and she “screamed in pain.” According

to Cook, Wilson “summoned” him over to the side of the vehicle and told him:

“while he was holding Ms. Colson against the car, heheard her knee (right) ‘pop’. Ms. Colson complainedbriefly about her knee, but then continued resisting ourefforts to put her in the car.”

10According to self-defense literature, the jugular notch pressure point islocated at the base of the neck just above the breastbone; pressure to thisnotch could distract and take away balance. Pressure from fingers jabbed intothe notch incurs intense pain that causes an opponent to withdraw from thepressure involuntarily.

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60. In truth, in his efforts to force the debilitated Plaintiff to “comply,”

Wilson violently kicked/kneed Plaintiff in her right knee, causing a tibial plateau

fracture11 and tearing Plaintiff’s anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”)12 and lateral

collateral ligament (“LCL”).13

11The tibial plateau is one of the most critical load-bearing areas in thehuman body; fractures of the plateau affect knee alignment, stability, andmotion. See http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1249872-overview. Tibial plateau fractures occur by three main mechanisms. The first is by amedial or lateral based force (such as the so called “bumper fracture” when acar’s bumper strikes the outside of a person’s leg creating a valgus, or inward,force across the knee). The second mechanism is by a pure axial, orcompressive force (such as a fall from height). The third mechanism is by acombination of both axial and medial or lateral directed force. Seehttp://www.sportsmd.com/knee-injuries/tibial-plateau-fracture/.

12The ACL is one of the major ligaments in your knee (it joins the upperleg bone with the lower leg bone). The ACL keeps the knee stable. ACL injuriesmost commonly occur during sports that involve sudden stops, jumping orchanges in direction. Seehttp://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/acl-injury/home/ovc-20167375. An ACL injury may occur as a result of receiving a direct blow to the knee,such as a football tackle. Signs and symptoms of an ACL injury usuallyinclude a loud “pop” or a “popping” sensation in the knee, severe pain andinability to continue activity, swelling that begins within a few hours, loss ofrange of motion, a feeling of instability or “giving way” with weight bearing. Seehttp://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/acl-injury/symptoms-causes/dxc-20167379. An ACL injury may be diagnosed by a doctor during a physicalexam, moving the knee into a variety of positions to assess range of motion andoverall function of the joint. Tests may be necessary to rule out other causesand to determine the severity of the injury. See http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/acl-injury/diagnosis-treatment/diagnosis/dxc-20167388.

13The lateral or “outside” collateral ligament (“LCL”) connects the femur tothe smaller bone in the lower leg (fibula). The collateral ligaments control thesideways motion of your knee and brace it against unusual movement. Seehttp://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00550. Injuries to the collateralligaments are usually caused by a force that pushes the knee sideways. Blows

-22-


http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1249872-overview.

http://www.sportsmd.com/knee-injuries/tibial-plateau-fracture/.

http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00550.

61. Notably, Wilson’s BWC was not functioning at the time he kicked the

Plaintiff, and Cook’s BWC was directed elsewhere.14

G. Cook and Wilson Disregard Plaintiff’s Injuries, Fail toProvide Her Medical Care, Despite Being Feet Away fromthe Emergency Room Doors, and Continue to ForcePlaintiff Into Cook’s Vehicle.

62. After Wilson’s kick fractured Plaintiff’s right leg and caused tears to

her ACL and LCL, the officers still continued to force Plaintiff – who at this point,

was not only suffering from a severe panic attack but also in excruciating pain –

into the backseat of Cook’s vehicle. Cook even threatened to use pepper spray on

the Plaintiff immediately after she was injured. The officers switched sides yet

again, according to Wilson. Cook then used a “pressure point” on Plaintiff’s

clavicle area “in an attempt to bring her under control.” According to Cook, this

“worked,” as Wilson grabbed Plaintiff’s arms and pulled her into the vehicle.

63. Cook’s report states that Plaintiff “struck” him in the knee.15 Cook is

heard telling Wilson, “she’s getting a resisting now and an assault where she tried

to kick me,” as Plaintiff is overheard screaming and crying in the background.

Wilson advised Cook to notify a supervisor.

to the inside of the knee that push the knee outwards may injure the lateralcollateral ligament. See http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00550.

14According to Cook, Wilson was wearing a BWC when Plaintiff wasarrested, at Blount Memorial Hospital, and at the Jail. “However,” according toCook, “for reasons unknown, the BWC did not record the events at BMH or atthe jail.” Wilson’s report states that his BWC “malfunctioned.”

15Officer Wilson stated that Plaintiff “attempted to kick” Officer Cook.

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http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00550.

H. Cook and Wilson Are Ordered by Fletcher to Transport thePlaintiff to Blount County Jail.

64. Cook contacted his supervisor, Lieutenant Fletcher, and advised him

of the circumstances. As the officers were still at the hospital, Wilson asked Cook

(while he was talking to Fletcher), “does he want to get her knee looked at?”

Fletcher directed Cook to take Plaintiff “to the jail and have the jail nurse examine

her knee and perform the mandatory blood draw.” Plaintiff is heard in the

background of the video crying hysterically, asking for her mother.

I. Plaintiff’s Arrival at the Blount County Jail

65. Cook transported Plaintiff to the Jail to be seen by a Corrections

Nurse. They were met at the Jail by several BCSD employees, including, among

others, Jennifer Russell, a BCSD Nurse, and Mandy England, a BCSD Corrections

Officer. There was no concern for Plaintiff’s injuries, as Cook was merely

concerned about his own liability. According to him, Plaintiff exited his vehicle

“and walked into the pat-down room under her own power and did not appear to

have any trouble walking, although she did complain of some knee pain.”

J. Cook, Wilson, England, and Other Corrections OfficersContinued to Ignore Plaintiff’s Injuries and Forcibly PlacedHer in Restraints in a Restrain Chair.

66. As England escorted Plaintiff into the Jail, Cook's BWC was not

focused on the Plaintiff. But she can be heard screaming about her knee. As she

comes back into view, however, it is evident that she had either fallen or been

knocked to the floor, and the video shows England using both of her arms to grab

-24-


Plaintiff under her arms to jerk her back to her feet. England is heard yelling at

the Plaintiff, who is heard screaming in pain, to “stand up!”

67. The corrections staff strapped Plaintiff into a restraint chair. Cook is

heard whispering to another officer, “I recorded her walking just fine,” and is also

heard complaining about Plaintiff ripping the rubber out of his car door.

K. Nurse Russell Performs a Slipshod Medical Examination

68. Nurse Russell instructed Plaintiff to do a series of exercises and asked

to look at Plaintiff’s other leg (to compare). Russell concludes, after an

abbreviated examination, “I don’t see no swelling, ok.” According to Wilson,

Russell noted “there was no swelling or visible injury.” According to Cook, Russell

“determined that Ms. Colson’s knee appeared fine and the corrections staff

accepted her into the jail.” Notably, Russell did not provide Plaintiff with so much

as a brace, a walker, or any device to assist her mobility.

L. England Struck the Already Injured, Agonizing, and Panic-Stricken Plaintiff in the Face Under the Pre-Text PlaintiffHad Attempted to Bite Her.

69. Cook walked out of the room to ask Russell to take a blood draw from

the Plaintiff. Soon after, Cook said, “hold on, I’m going to record this,” and rushed

into the room where no fewer than five Corrections Officers were either on top of

the Plaintiff or standing over her as she had fallen or been knocked to the floor.

Suddenly, Cook’s BWC stopped recording. Later, Cook began to record with a

handheld camera. By the time he began recording again, Plaintiff was strapped

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to a restraint chair with several officers surrounding her. No video appears to

exist of what transpired while Officer Cook’s BWC’s was not recording.

70. Russell began the process of taking a blood draw. Plaintiff asked,

“what did I do that warranted me being in this chair?” England yelled at the

Plaintiff, “you listen to me!” Plaintiff is heard to say, “I’m in a restraint chair, what

are you going to do to me?” England said, “Here’s what’s going to happen: we’re

going to withdraw that mother-fucking blood whether you like it or not.”

71. According to Cook, the injured and distressed Plaintiff, who was in

restraints and fixed to a restraint chair, “became combative,” and “bit or tried to

bite Corrections Officer Mandy England.” Cook stated that he was “unsure” if

Plaintiff actually bit England. A recording of the event reveals that Plaintiff did

not, in fact, “bite” England, but was trying to nudge England’s hand, which was

pressing down forcefully on Plaintiff’s chest, away from her chest. At that point,

as Plaintiff was fully restrained, England struck her hard in the face with an open-

handed slap. Not one of the officers standing over Plaintiff so much as flinched.

M. England and Other Corrections Officers Refuse to PermitPlaintiff to Go to the Restroom, Forcing Her to Urinate OnHerself Multiple Times, and Laugh at Her, All WhilePlaintiff is in Constant and Severe Pain and Continuing toSuffer a Severe Panic Attack.

72. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for permission to go to the bathroom, but

England responded, “I don’t give a fuck what you asked for,” and refused to allow

Plaintiff a bathroom break. England was eventually overheard saying, “we don’t

-26-


even have to worry about it, she’s already peed.” Plaintiff wound up urinating on

herself multiple times, as England and other officers laughed at her.

73. England said “when I signed up for this job, I decided to become a

bitch.” A male officer then put Plaintiff into a semi-choke hold. When the Plaintiff

told the officer he was hurting her neck, he responded, “good.” Plaintiff continued

to plead with the male officer to let go of her neck, and said “I know where the

camera is.” England then looked directly toward the camera and smiled. Plaintiff

finally said, “you all are wonderful,” and rattled off all the things the officers had

done to her since she had arrived. She asked England, “what did you do to an

inmate?” England responded, “uh, nothing, nobody saw it in our custody.”

N. England and Other Officers Forced a Helmet On Plaintiff’sHead and Kept Her in a Restraint Chair – As She Continuedto Suffer From the Painful Injuries That Had Been InflictedOn Her – For Five More Hours, Until Her Release.

74. The officers left Plaintiff tied down in the restraint chair and England

placed a helmet on her head. Plaintiff, who suffers from claustrophobia, asked the

officers to remove the helmet, but she was ignored. Inexplicably, the camera was

then taken out of the room. The last thing on the recording is England stating,

“she's done now that she’s pissed everywhere.”

75. Plaintiff remained alone in a cell, arms and legs restrained, in a

helmet, with a fractured leg, torn ACL, torn LCL, with contusions, abrasions, and

bruises all over her body, for approximately another five hours. Eventually,

approximately 7 ½ hours after her knee was injured, she was released on bond.

-27-


76. Nothing was done by anyone to help her. Nothing was provided to her

for the unbearable pain, not even an aspirin; nothing was provided for her knee,

not even a brace or a crutch. She could barely stand up.16 Plaintiff was released

on June 24, 2015, the day following her arrest and incarceration.

O. Released From Jail, Plaintiff Finally Received MedicalTreatment

77. Plaintiff was hospitalized at Blount Memorial Hospital after her

release from Jail. When the medical staff examined all of her injuries, they

initially believed Plaintiff had been the victim of a domestic assault and asked if

Plaintiff wanted them to contact the police. It was determined that Plaintiff had

suffered a fractured tibial plateau, torn ACL, torn LCL, and multiple contusions,

abrasions, and/or bruising of her face, neck, chest, arms, and foot.

78. According to her doctor, the muscles in Plaintiff’s knee are strong,

but the knee joint itself is unstable. Plaintiff must undergo surgery on her right

knee and endure months of physical therapy thereafter. However, Plaintiff is a

TennCare enrollee,17 and TennCare has refused to pay for her surgery.

16Cook’s BWC is responsible for the majority of video recording of theincidents. However, even Cook’s BWC is disabled for several minutes at theJail and much of what occurred is therefore not recorded. For example, Cookwalks out a room while Plaintiff is standing. He re-enters the same room andPlaintiff is on the floor surrounded by officers. Wilson’s BWC malfunctionedand fails to record the incident in which Plaintiff’s knee was injured. Cook’sBWC failed to record that incident, although it did record the “popping” soundof Plaintiff’s knee. Plaintiff has not been provided any video by Blount County.

17TennCare is the State of Tennessee’s Medicaid program.

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79. Plaintiff’s knee “pops” frequently and she is in constant pain. She

cannot walk up or down the steps to her apartment without pain. She suffered

immeasurable psychological harm, conscious physical pain, loss of enjoyment of

life, and humiliation. Her sleep is constantly disrupted by severe pain.

P. No Investigation of Cook, Wilson, Fletcher, England, Russell, or Other Officers’ Actions.

80. The actions related above required an independent inquiry. To

Plaintiff’s knowledge, although her attorney has requested copies of reports,

statements, videos, and files, neither the Alcoa PD nor the BCSD has conducted

an investigation into the circumstances of Plaintiff’s treatment on June 23, 2015.

Certainly, no officer involved received any form of discipline.

Q. Alcoa and Blount County Systematically Violate theConstitutional Rights of Inmates With Severe MentalDisorders.

81. Alcoa and Blount County are systematically violating the

constitutional rights of some of their most vulnerable citizens. The use of

excessive force, failure to provide adequate medicare care, and failure to protect

the Plaintiff on June 23, 2015 were all performed in conjunction with a policy,

custom, or usage, to wit: it is a regularly recurring practice of the Alcoa PD and

the BCSD to employ and apply the same protocol, conventions, customs, or rules

of conduct in handling of suspects and inmates with severe mental disorders as

they do in handling other inmates. This practice is illustrated by other specific

cases and by an utter failure to consider and appreciate that suspects and

-29-


inmates suffering from severe mental disorders require a different level of care and

a heightened standard of patience and self-restraint than other inmates.

82. For instance, less than two weeks before Plaintiff’s arrest, another

Blount County citizen, Mr. Larry Glen Hodge, a local businessman suffering from

severe dementia, was accosted and assaulted by a BCSD employee, who

approached Hodge, pointed his weapon at him, pulled him out of his vehicle,

threw him onto the pavement, and caused traumatic injuries to Hodge’s head and

face, all for potentially having committed a misdemeanor moving violation. See

Complaint in Hodge v. Blount County, et al., No. 3:16-cv-00317 (E.D. Tenn.).

83. Plaintiff alleges that the violations against her were committed as a

result of the policies and pervasive and long-standing customs and practices of

the Alcoa PD and BCSD, and that Alcoa and Blount County are liable under the

theory of respondeat superior for the torts committed by individual Defendants.

84. Defendants, with deliberate indifference, gross negligence, and in

reckless disregard to the safety and security and rights of Plaintiff (and all persons

similarly situated), maintain, enforce, condone, tolerate, permit, acquiesce in, and

apply policies, practices, or customs and usages of, among other things:

# subjecting suspects and inmates who suffer fromsevere mental disorders to unreasonable, unnecessary,and excessive uses of force and cruel and unusualpunishment;

# failing to properly train or supervise personnel on theproper procedures for engaging suspects or inmates whosuffer from severe mental disorders;

-30-


# failing to adequately train, supervise, and controlemployees in the advantages of de-escalation tactics onsuspects or inmates who suffer severe mental disorders;and

# condoning and encouraging officers in the belief thatthey can wantonly violate the rights of suspects orinmates who suffer from severe mental disorders withdeliberate indifference or impunity.

85. Citizens like the Plaintiff, who suffer from severe mental disorders, live

in fear of violence. Here, Plaintiff was assaulted, humiliated, deprived of adequate

medical care, and punished merely because officers either deliberately chose to

disregard her symptoms of a severe mental disorder or simply misinterpreted

Plaintiff’s mental disorder as “resistence.” Either action was not only

unconstitutional, but inhumane. The policies and procedures of the Alcoa PD and

BCSD showed deliberate indifference to her safety and rights.

86. For all of these reasons, Alcoa, the Alcoa PD, Blount County, and the

BCSD have abdicated their governmental responsibilities to provide a safe and

secure incarceration environment to suspects suffering severe mental disorders.

87. In Plaintiff’s case, the policy and procedures of Alcoa, the Alcoa PD,

Blount County, and the BCSD, as described herein were substantial factors in

causing her injuries.

V. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

88. Alcoa and Blount County have waived immunity for negligence of

employees, misconduct of officers or deputies acting under color of law, and for

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the negligence of officers, deputies, or employees of Alcoa, the Alcoa PD, Blount

County, or the BCSD, as set out in Tenn. Code Ann. §29-20-305, and for

intentional acts or misconduct done by officers, deputies, or employees under

color of law, as set out in Tenn. Code Ann. §8-8-302-302.

89. There is no immunity for individuals for criminal conduct, or conduct

which is willful or malicious.

VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988

Use of Unlawful and Excessive Force(Against Wilson)

90. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the above allegations as if fully

set forth herein.

91. Excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment is objectively

unreasonable conduct that, given the facts and circumstances, would “shock the

conscience” and amount to an arbitrary exercise of governmental power. Plaintiff

had a constitutional right to be free from the unlawful and excessive use of force,

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, and to be free of cruel and unusual

punishment, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.

92. The force used by Wilson amounted to unlawful force that carried

with it a high risk of causing serious bodily harm to Plaintiff, was unnecessary

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and unreasonable under the circumstances then and there existing, and violated

Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

93. Plaintiff was in the midst of a severe and debilitating panic attack that

affected her physical and emotional reactions. In an attempt to force Plaintiff into

a patrol car, Wilson violently struck her in her right knee, causing Plaintiff to

suffer a tibial plateau fracture, a torn ACL, and a torn LCL.

94. As Plaintiff was suffering a severe panic attack, Wilson also applied

a jugular-notch pressure point maneuver on Plaintiff to force her into Cook’s

vehicle. Plaintiff’s severe mental disorder made her, at that very moment, entirely

incapable of comporting herself to even basic instructions or disciplinary rules.

Her disability was completely ignored by Wilson and Cook.

95. Plaintiff’s conduct hardly justified Wilson’s actions. Wilson violated

Plaintiff's civil rights by using a degree of physical force not objectively reasonable

under the circumstances. No reasonable officer would have acted as he did.

96. The assaults on Plaintiff by Wilson were carried out maliciously and

sadistically, not part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, and

by either actual malice or deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's civil rights and

severe mental disorder.

97. Neither Alcoa nor the Alcoa PD, headed by Chief Potter took any

disciplinary action against Wilson (or any other Defendant, for that matter),

despite evidence demanding suspension, termination, or other reprimand.

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98. Application of the reasonable force standards requires a particularized

inquiry into the totality of the circumstances, including a consideration of the

suspect’s mental and physical attributes (Plaintiff was suffering a severe panic

attack), whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others (Plaintiff is 5N 5O and was cuffed), and whether the suspect is actively

resisting arrest (Plaintiff was having a severe panic attack, not trying to flee).

99. Wilson’s actions proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff.

100. Wilson is also individually liable for the violation of Plaintiff’s civil

rights. Plaintiff suffered substantial and serious physical and psychological injury

to her body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses, and will suffer

future pain and suffering and incur future medical expenses.

COUNT TWO


Use of Unlawful and Excessive Force(Against Cook)


set forth herein.

102. As a result of the acts of Cook described herein, Plaintiff was also

subjected to unlawful and excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment.

In an effort to force Plaintiff into his patrol car, Cook applied a clavicle pressure

point tactic to Plaintiff immediately after Wilson had violently struck Plaintiff’s

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right knee, causing substantial injuries and pain, and as Plaintiff continued to

suffer a severe panic attack.

103. The force used by Cook amounted to unlawful force that carried with

it a high risk of causing serious bodily harm to Plaintiff, was unnecessary and

unreasonable under the circumstances then and there existing. No reasonable

officer would have acted as Cook did.

104. Neither Alcoa nor the Alcoa PD have taken any disciplinary action

against Cook (or any other Defendant, for that matter) despite overwhelming

evidence demanding suspension, termination, or other reprimand.

105. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the right to make

an arrest necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical

coercion or threat thereof to effect it. However, the application of the

reasonableness standard requires a particularized inquiry into the totality of the

circumstances. As described above, Plaintiff, in the midst of a severe panic attack,

posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and, with a

fractured knee and torn knee ligaments, could not hardly have actively resisted

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

106. On or about June 23, 2015, Cook acted under color of law and his

acts deprived Plaintiff of rights secured to her under the Constitution. His actions

proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff and his disregard of Plaintiff’s civil rights

was done by either actual malice or deliberate indifference.

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107. Cook is also individually liable for the violation of Plaintiff’s civil


to her body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.

COUNT THREE


Use of Unlawful and Excessive Forceand Cruel and Unusual Punishment

(Against England)


set forth herein.

109. As a result of the acts of England described herein, Plaintiff was

subjected to unlawful and excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment.

The force used by England amounted to unlawful force that carried with it a high

risk of causing serious bodily harm to Plaintiff, was unnecessary and

unreasonable under the circumstances then and there existing.

110. England violently struck the Plaintiff in the face as she was strapped

to a chair. England’s assault on the helpless Plaintiff was captured on video.

While England stated that Plaintiff attempted to “bite” her, this is not at all

depicted by the recording. Rather, England had her hand pressing against the

Plaintiff’s chest, and Plaintiff, immobile other than her neck and head, tried to

nudge England’s hand from her chest with her chin.

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111. This conduct by Plaintiff hardly justifies her being struck by England.

No reasonable officer would have acted as England did.

112. No one, not Blount County, the BCSD, Sheriff Berrong, or any other

supervisors named herein took disciplinary action against England.

113. The totality of circumstances, as fully described above, reveals that

England’s blow to Plaintiff’s face was unreasonable, unnecessary, an excessive

use-of-force, and cruel and unusual punishment.

114. On or about June 23, 2015, England acted under color of law and her

acts deprived Plaintiff of rights secured to her under the Constitution. Her actions

proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff and her disregard of Plaintiff’s civil rights

was done by either actual malice or deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s civil rights.

115. England is also individually liable for the violation of Plaintiff’s civil


to his body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.

COUNT FOUR


Use of Unlawful and Excessive Forceand Cruel and Unusual Punishment(Against All individual Defendants)


set forth herein.

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117. On June 23, 2015, Defendants violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by using

a degree of physical force unnecessary and not objectively reasonable under the

circumstances and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the Plaintiff.

Their collective actions proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff and their disregard

of Plaintiff’s civil rights was done by either actual malice or deliberate indifference.

118. Defendants are individually liable for the violation of Plaintiff’s civil

rights. Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and serious psychological injury to

his body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.

COUNT FIVE

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW42 U.S.C. §§, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988

(MONELL CLAIM)(Against Alcoa and Blount County)


set forth herein.

120. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Alcoa and Blount County from

having any custom, policy, or procedure which would constitute the proximate

cause of its officers’ deprivation of any citizen’s constitutional rights.

121. Where such a custom, policy, or procedure has resulted in its officers’

deprivations of a citizen's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, sovereign

immunity is removed.

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122. This claim is to redress this deprivation, under color of authority,

statute, ordinance, regulation, policy, custom, practice or usage of a right secured

to Plaintiff by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

123. The policy described above – whereby suspects or inmates who suffer

severe mental disorders are not differentiated from other inmates insofar as

discipline, use of force, and punishment are concerned, and whereby officers are

not trained or educated to address the special needs of such suspects or inmates,

among other things – is a policy of reckless or deliberate indifference, such that

the reasonably foreseeable consequence of this failure included deprivation of

constitutional rights and serious bodily and psychological injuries to Plaintiff.

124. Alcoa and Blount County:

# failed to train staff to properly handle suspects orinmates suffering from severe mental disorders;

# adopted a policy or condoned or ratified a policy ofpunishing such suspects or inmates for negativebehavior, including use of excessive force;

# ratified or condoned a policy exhibiting a failure toprotect such suspects or inmates;

# adopted, ratified, or condoned a policy of failure toinstruct officers how to properly address the disciplineand punishment of such suspects or inmates; and

# adopted, ratified, or condoned a policy of failure toappropriately supervise and monitor use of force.

125. The individual Defendants’ use of excessive force and cruel and

unusual punishment against Plaintiff, who was then and there suffering from a

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severe panic attack, evidences a complete lack of training in proper procedures

and methods related to dealing with individuals such as the Plaintiff.

126. These actions were done in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights under

color of state law, and constituted a systematic custom, policy, practice, and

procedure made to deny the civil rights of such vulnerable suspects or inmates.

127. It is also the policy and/or custom of the Alcoa PD and BCSD to

inadequately supervise and train officers concerning the handling of suspects or

inmates suffering from severe mental disorders and to fail to protect such persons.

128. As a result of the above-described policies and/or customs,

Defendants believed their actions would not be properly monitored by supervisory

officers and that misconduct would be tolerated and accepted.

129. Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and psychological injury to her

body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.

COUNT SIX

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

Failure to Train and Supervise and Acquiescing inUnconstitutional Conduct of Subordinates

(Against Potter, Fletcher, and Berrong)


set forth herein.

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131. None of the officers whose actions injured the Plaintiff received

disciplinary action of any kind. No one was terminated, suspended, reprimanded,

demoted, or even had so much as a warning placed in their personnel file.

132. Despite the self-serving depictions of Plaintiff’s actions by Wilson and

Cook, the force utilized on the female Plaintiff was unnecessary, unreasonable,

excessive, and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff was, for the

majority of her time in-custody, was cuffed or otherwise retrained, obviously

unable to offer much “resistance” while under the dominion of multiple officers.

133. Fletcher, Chief Potter, and Sheriff Berrong all had an opportunity to

implement corrective action against the various officers involved, but they did not.

Instead, they implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in those

officers’ conduct, implicitly acquiescing in the use of excessive force and cruel and

unusual punishment as well.

134. Chief Potter and Sheriff Berrong both had a duty to train and

supervise their departments’ officers to avoid the use of excessive force, cruel and

unusual punishment, and deprivation of adequate medical care. Yet, they failed

to train and supervise those officers properly and failed to competently and

properly investigate the use of excessive force.

135. It is highly unlikely that incidents such as those described herein

would not have been reviewed by Chief Potter and Sheriff Berrong and other

supervisors. Nevertheless, none of the officers involved were disciplined.

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136. Ratification of such conduct by Chief Potter, Fletcher, Sheriff Berrong,

and other supervisors sent a message that officers are allowed to do whatever they

want, whenever they want, to whomever they want, irrespective of the

Constitution. Chief Potter and Sheriff Berrong were involved, at least in part, in

creating and enforcing their departments’ policies. Here, they did not punish

officer misconduct, including the use of excessive force and failure to provide

adequate medical care, but “rubber stamped” that misconduct.

137. Defendants’ actions proximately caused injuries to the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and serious psychological injury to her body

and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses, and will also incur such

expenses in the future.

138. The conduct of the Individual Defendants, in their individual

capacities, was intentional, malicious, willful, wanton and in reckless disregard

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or grossly negligent in that this conduct

shocks the conscience and is fundamentally offensive to a civilized society.

COUNT SEVEN

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW42 U.S.C. §§, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988

(MONELL CLAIM)(Against Alcoa and Blount County)


set forth herein.

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140. Alcoa and Blount County had a duty of care to the Plaintiff to ensure

that its officers and agents were properly trained in the appropriate procedure for

the use-of-force and provision of adequate medical care, particularly with respect

to especially vulnerable citizens, like the Plaintiff. This duty extends to ensuring

that officers and agents were properly trained concerning the limits of their

authority to use force or withhold medical care, particularly as to especially

vulnerable citizens. The duty further extends to ensure that supervisory officers

are properly trained not to overlook or condone unnecessary and unreasonable

uses-of-force and deprivation of adequate medical care by its officers and agents,

particularly as to especially vulnerable citizens. Alcoa and Blount County also

have a duty to train sworn officers to report officer abuse and unreasonable uses-

of-force. These duties were all breached, as described herein.

141. Alcoa and Blount County also had a duty to properly supervise

officers and employees and to ensure that supervisory officers would not condone

unnecessary force by its officers and employees. Here, during Plaintiff’s nightmare

while in the custody, care, and confinement of the Alcoa PD and BCSD on June

23, 2015, the petite and panic-stricken Plaintiff was physically and mentally

assaulted by numerous officers, as described above.

142. By ratifying Plaintiff’s mistreatment, Alcoa PD’s Chief Potter and

Blount County Sheriff Berrong acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates through the execution of their job functions.

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143. These actions of the individual officers’ superiors constitute

ratification and render Alcoa and Blount County liable to Plaintiff.

144. Alcoa and Blount County’s failure to develop and promulgate lawful

policies outlining the guidelines for the appropriate use-of-force and provision of

adequate medical care and to properly train officers and agents to follow such

guidelines constitute deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of citizens.

145. The excessive force used by Wilson and Cook of the Alcoa PD and by

England of the BCSD evidences a complete lack of training in the proper methods

related to dealing with suspects and citizens such as the Plaintiff. The failure of

supervisors to recognize or appreciate the gravity of those officers’ actions implies

that they, too, found no wrong in the officers’ conduct, giving them and other

officers the “green light” to violate the civil rights of citizens.

146. The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits Alcoa and Blount County

from having any custom, policy, or procedure which would constitute the

proximate cause of its officers’ deprivation of any citizen’s constitutional rights.

147. Official policy usually exists in the form of written policy statements,

ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice

that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy.

148. The acts and omissions of the aforementioned officers and supervisors

demonstrate that prior to June 23, 2015, Alcoa and Blount County had developed

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and maintained a policy, custom, or practice exhibiting deliberate indifference to

the unreasonable use of force and deprivation of adequate medical care, which

ultimately caused violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

149. Here, Cook, Wilson, and England believed that their actions would not

be properly monitored or corrected by supervisory officers and that his

misconduct would be tolerated and accepted. Their beliefs were right.

150. All of these actions were done in violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights

under color of state law and constituted a systematic custom, policy, practice, and

procedure instituted for denial of civil rights.

151. All of these failures demonstrate a widespread practice or custom that

resulted in the deprivation of Constitutional rights in this case. Alcoa and Blount

County, while having established certain “policies and procedures” regarding the

procedure for the use-of-force and provision of medical care, fail to enforce those

policies and/or to appropriately discipline and/or sanction those who disregard

those policies and procedures, establishing, by custom and usage, a de facto

policy of, among other things, allowing the unnecessary and unreasonable use-of-

force to go unchecked.

152. Such acts and omissions on the part of all Defendants, including the

Doe Defendants, constitute a violation of §1983 and were done to deprive Plaintiff

of her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

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153. The actions of Defendants were done with actual malice and willful

and wanton indifference toward the Plaintiff and with deliberate disregard for her

Constitutional and statutory rights, constitute deliberate indifference, and were

the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

154. Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and serious psychological injury

to her body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses, and will incur

substantial medical expenses and pain and suffering in the future.

COUNT EIGHT

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS42 U.S.C. §§, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988

(MONELL CLAIM)Use of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

(Against Blount County)


set forth herein.

156. At all times material hereto, Sheriff Berrong authorized the use of a

“restraint chair” at the Blount County Jail and Blount County authorized the

expenditure for one or more “restraint chairs,” knowing that they were to be used.

157. The use of the “restraint chair” under the facts of this case on an

inmate who suffers from a severe mental disorder constituted cruel and unusual

punishment, which violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

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158. Blount County and the BCSD owed a duty of care to Plaintiff to

ensure that its agents were properly trained in the use of punishment, particularly

as to inmates who suffer severe mental disorders, such as severe anxiety or panic

attacks; the limits of the authority to impose punishment on inmates, particularly

as to inmates who suffer severe mental disorders,; and that supervisory officers

not condone the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, particularly as to

inmates who suffer severe mental disorders.

159. Blount County and the BCSD owed a duty of care to properly train

those officers and personnel working at the jail concerning the appropriate use of

the “restraint chair.”

160. The use of the “restraint chair” is expressly prohibited by the policies

and procedures of many corrections facilities, but Sheriff Berrong has known that

the “restraint chair” at the Blount County Jail was being used as punishment for

certain inmates, including inmates with severe mental disorders. He failed to take

action to prevent the abuses.

161. Blount County and the BCSD’s failure to develop and promulgate

policies outlining the guidelines for appropriate use of force, failure to train

officers and jail personnel and investigators to follow those guidelines, and failure

to train officers and jail personnel on use of force and use of the “restraint chair,”

particularly as to inmates who suffer severe mental disorders, constitute

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

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162. These failures demonstrate a widespread practice or custom that

resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. Blount County and the BCSD,

while establishing “policies and procedures” regarding the use of the “restraint

chair,” fail to enforce those policies and/or to appropriately discipline and/or

sanction those who disregard those policies and procedures, and have established,

by custom and usage, a de facto policy of permitting the “restraint chair” to be

used as a punishment against inmates who suffer from severe mental disorders,

here, in violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment.

163. Blount County and the BCSD had actual or constructive knowledge

that the “restraint chair” was being used in a manner that was coercive and in

violation of the rights of inmates to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,

yet acquiesced to the continued unconstitutional use of the “restraint chair.”

164. As a result, Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and psychological

injury to her body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses.

COUNT NINE

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS UNDER COLOR OF LAW(42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care(Against All Defendants)


set forth herein.

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166. After Plaintiff exited Cook’s vehicle at Blount Memorial Hospital, she

began having a severe panic attack, exhibiting many tell-tale symptoms of severe

panic attacks. Plaintiff has a severe panic disorder. Panic attacks are paralyzing

and debilitating. Nevertheless, Cook and Wilson, just a few feet away from the

Emergency Room, refused to seek medical attention for the Plaintiff. Then,

Wilson injured the Plaintiff’s knee, heard Plaintiff’s knee make a loud “pop,” and

knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff had just suffered a serious injury to

her knee. In fact, Wilson stopped what he was doing and informed Cook about

the “pop.” Cook immediately called Fletcher, his supervisor, for instructions.

Wilson asked Cook if they should get medical help for the Plaintiff, but Fletcher

instructed them to take her to jail instead of having Plaintiff’s knee examined.

167. All the while, Plaintiff is in obvious physical distress, and is heard

screaming in pain for her mother and mentally agonizing due to the continuing

panic attack. Feet away from the Emergency Room doors, Cook and Wilson decide

to disregard the Plaintiff’s continuing screams and cries for help and transport her

to the Blount County Jail, where, for the next several hours, Plaintiff was further

traumatized, struck in the face, grabbed and pulled by her arms and neck,

pushed, strapped to a chair in a helmet and restraints and left alone in a cell,

deprived of any medical care, the use of a bathroom, and water. As Plaintiff was

in obvious physical and mental distress, this failure to provide medical care was

intentional, and not inadvertent.

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168. All of this demonstrates that each officer’s failure to attend to

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs or provide medical care to her constituted a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

169. Why was it necessary to get the Plaintiff to a hospital? First, Plaintiff

suffers from severe anxiety disorder, specifically, a severe panic disorder. She

began having a severe panic attack, accompanied by innumerable crippling

symptoms, soon after Cook ordered her to get back into his patrol car, in front of

the Emergency Room of Blount Memorial Hospital. This panic attack completely

overwhelmed and controlled every function by the Plaintiff, including,

unfortunately, her ability to comply with commands and cooperate with Cook and

Wilson. By not seeing to Plaintiff’s medical needs, Cook and Wilson unnecessarily

caused the situation to escalate into one in which they unreasonably and

incorrectly viewed Plaintiff’s involuntary behavior as that of a resisting and

combative suspect. Everything that followed during Plaintiff’s nightmare of

confinement was the direct result of this single ill-advised, unreasonable, and

inexcusable decision to ignore Plaintiff’s mental disorder.

170. Second, the failure of Cook, Wilson, Fletcher, et al., to provide

adequate medical care to Plaintiff after Wilson injured her knee resulted in hours

of excruciating pain and suffering for the Plaintiff. Beyond this, Plaintiff is on

TennCare, and TennCare refused to pay for the knee surgery recommended by

Plaintiff’s orthopedist.

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171. If Cook and Wilson had taken the Plaintiff inside the hospital and

allowed her to be examined, medical personnel would have properly diagnosed the

Plaintiff’s injuries and Alcoa may have (and should have) accepted responsibility

for Plaintiff’s surgery-related medical bills, as they resulted from Wilson’s actions.

Instead, they transported the Plaintiff to the Blount County Jail, where Nurse

Russell performed a slipshod examination of Plaintiff’s knee, grossly mis-

diagnosing Plaintiff as having no injury at all, and forced Plaintiff to suffer

needlessly for the next seven hours, minus any form of medicine care to ease her

immense pain and suffering. While confined, Plaintiff fell or was pushed or

knocked to the ground at least once, pulled up to her feet, forcing Plaintiff to bear

weight on her knee. Forcing Plaintiff to bear weight on her severely injured right

knee directly contradicted the treatment for the specific type of injuries she

suffered. There is verifying medical evidence that establishes the detrimental

effect of the delay in medical treatment.

172. This failure to provide medical treatment rose to a Constitutional

violation. As a proximate result of the conduct of these Defendants, Plaintiff

suffered personal injury, emotional distress, psychological injury, and incurred

general and specific damages for the deprivation of his Constitutional rights.

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COUNT TEN

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988

Failure to Protect(Against All Defendants)


set forth herein.

174. Defendants, including the Doe Defendants, who observed and

recorded his or her fellow officer assaulting the Plaintiff, yet did nothing to stop

the use of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, are equally liable for

this violation, as are the Defendants who failed to intercede to provide Plaintiff

with adequate medical care.

175. From the moment of Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendants owed a duty of care

to avoid harming her and to protect her. Therefore, a special relationship existed

between Plaintiff and the Defendants, which gave rise to their duty to protect her.

Defendants’ breached that duty by striking the Plaintiff, strapping her into a

restraint chair, leaving her strapped down for approximately seven hours, and by

withholding medical care from the clearly injured Plaintiff.

176. Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff from violence at the hands

of Alcoa PD and BCSD personnel. Defendants’ deliberate indifference and reckless

disregard for Plaintiff’s safety subjected her to Cook’s, Wilson’s, and England’s use

of excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment.

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177. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to protect the

Plaintiff, Plaintiff suffered substantial physical and serious psychological injury

to her body and mind, pain and suffering, and medical expenses, and will suffer

further medical expenses and pain and suffering in the future.

COUNT ELEVEN

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-8-301 Et. Seq.(Against Cook, Wilson, and England)


set forth herein.

179. The above-described actions by Cook, Wilson, England and others,

acting under color of law and in the course and scope of their employment,

constitute assault and battery against the Plaintiff.

180. Cook, Wilson, and England did intentionally attempt to do and did

serious bodily harm to Plaintiff and caused her to suffer substantial psychological

trauma. Each Defendant possessed a contemporaneous and/or appearance of the

present ability to cause such harm and trauma. Accordingly, Cook, Wilson, and

England each committed an assault against the Plaintiff and made contact with

the Plaintiff in a harmful and offensive way, committing battery against her.

181. Defendants Alcoa and Blount County are responsible for the acts of

their employees and agents pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior and

are liable to Plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-301 et seq.

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182. Plaintiff suffered physical and psychological injuries as a proximate

result of the assault and battery by Cook, Wilson, and England.

COUNT TWELVE

OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT/ INTENTIONALINFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(Against All Defendants)


set forth herein.

184. The actions alleged herein against the individually named Defendants,

while they were acting under color of law, were outrageous and utterly intolerable

in a civilized society, and were done with a reckless disregard of the probability of

causing emotional distress.

185. The conduct of the individually named Defendants was outrageous.

Defendants, and each of them, knew, or should have known, that their conduct

would result in injuries and severe emotional distress to Plaintiff, and their

conduct was perpetrated with the intent to inflict, or with reckless disregard of the

probability of inflicting, mental anguish upon Plaintiff.

186. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were done knowingly,

intentionally, and maliciously, for the purpose of harassment, oppression and

inflicting injury upon the Plaintiff, and in reckless, wanton and callous disregard

of his safety, security, and civil rights. By reason thereof, Plaintiff claims punitive

damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

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187. As a result of the conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff sustained and

suffered personal injuries, as elsewhere alleged.

188. The wrongful acts of the individually named Defendants were willful,

oppressive, intentional and malicious; therefore, punitive damages should be

assessed against Defendants in an amount deemed sufficient to punish and deter

Defendants and others in similar positions of authority from engaging in similar

conduct in the future.

189. Alcoa and Blount County are liable to Plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 8-8-301, et seq.

COUNT THIRTEEN

TENNESSEE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT/NEGLIGENCE

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101(Against All Defendants)


set forth herein.

191. Alcoa and Blount County were responsible for the operation and the

supervision of the Individual Defendants.

192. Pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, the

Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care to be free from excessive force and cruel

and unusual punishment and to provide him with a safe environment and

adequate medical care while he was detained in their custody.

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193. Defendants breached the duty of care as set forth herein and are

therefore liable to Plaintiff.

194. Plaintiff seeks money damages in the maximum amount allowed

under Tennessee law.

VII. JURY DEMAND

195. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiff demands

a trial by jury of all of the claims asserted in this Complaint so triable.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays:

A. That the summons be issued and that Defendants be duly served with

a copy of this Complaint and required to answer same;

B. That the Court find that Defendants have engaged in the conduct and

statutory and common law violations alleged herein;

C. That Plaintiff be awarded such damages as will fully compensate her

for all of the injuries caused by Defendants’ actions and that a judgment in her

favor be entered;

D. That Plaintiff be awarded compensatory damages in an amount to be

determined by the trier of fact, not to exceed $500,000;

E. That Plaintiff be awarded punitive damages in an amount to be

determined by the trier of fact, not to exceed $1,500,000;

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F. That Plaintiff recover costs for this suit, including reasonable

attorneys’ fees and discretionary costs, as provided by law;

G. That Plaintiff be awarded pre-judgment and post-judgment interest

as permitted by common law or applicable statute and such other or further relief

as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of June, 2016.

/s/ Lance K. Baker Lance K. BakerTenn. Bar #: 032945THE BAKER LAW FIRM550 Main Street, Suite 600Knoxville, TN 37902Tel: 865-525-7028Fax: [email protected]

Counsel for Plaintiff

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mailto:[email protected]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT KNOXVILLE … · 01.06.2016 · CHIEF PHILIP K. POTTER, ... DUSTIN...

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Transcript of UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT KNOXVILLE … · 01.06.2016 · CHIEF PHILIP K. POTTER, ... DUSTIN...