UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS · 2017-04-15 · 2This and otherdefects...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

C O N SU M ER FIN A N C IA L P R O TEC T IO NB U R EA U ,

P laintiff,

v.

C A SH C A LL, IN C ., W S FU N D IN G, LLC ,D ELB ER T SER V IC ES C O R P ., andJ. P A U L R ED D A M ,

D efend ants .

))))))))))))

N o.1:13-cv-13167(GA O )

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTIONTO TRANSFER VENUE TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DISMISS ALL CLAIMS AGAINST J. PAULREDDAM FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

D ated : A pril11, 2014

D onn A . R and allC arolE. K am mB U LK LEY ,R IC H A R D SO N A N D GELIN A S,LLP125H ighStre e t, O liverStree t TowerO liverStree t Tower,16thFloorB os ton, M A 02110

N eilM . B arofsky (ad m itte d pro hac vice)K atyaJe s tin (ad m itted pro hac vice)B rian J. Fischer(ad m itte d pro hac vice)JEN N ER & B LO C K LLP919Third A venu eN ew Y ork, N Y 10022

Attorneys for Defendants CashCall, Inc.,WS Funding, LLC, Delbert Services Corp.,and J. Paul Reddam

Case 1:13-cv-13167-GAO Document 32 Filed 04/11/14 of 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P R ELIM IN A R Y STA TE M E N T .....................................................................................................1

STA TE M E N T O FFA C TS ..............................................................................................................3

A . The A m end e d C om plaint’s A llegations ...................................................................3

B . The A ction’s Lack ofC onnection to M as sachu s e tts ................................................4

A R GU M EN T ...................................................................................................................................6

I. T H E A C T IO N SH O U LD B E TR A N SFER R ED T O T H E C EN TR A LD ISTR IC T O FC A LIFO R N IA ............................................................................................6

A . Transferis W arrante d B ecau s e This C ou rt Lacks P ersonalJu ris d iction O verM r. R e d d am .................................................................................6

1. M r. R e d d am Lacks the R equ ired P ersonalC ontacts withM as sachu s e tts ..............................................................................................7

2. ForcingM r. R ed d am To Litigate H ere W ou ld B eU nreasonable..............................................................................................12

3. Transferofthe A ction is the M os t Efficient O u tcom e ..............................14

B . Transferis A lso W arrante d on Forum Non Conveniens Grou nd s .........................16

1. The C hos en Foru m B ears an Insignificant R elationshiptothe C as e ......................................................................................................16

2. Transferto C aliforniaW illP rom ote P arty and W itne s sC onvenience ...............................................................................................19

3. Transferto C aliforniaW illP rom ote Ju d icialEfficiency ...........................19

II. A LTER N A T IV ELY , T H E C LA IM S A GA IN ST M R . R ED D A M M U STB E D ISM ISSED FO R LA C K O FP ER SO N A L JU R ISD IC T IO N ....................................20

C O N C LU SIO N ..............................................................................................................................20


In re spons e to the M arch21, 2014Firs t A m end e d C om plaint (“A m end e d C om plaint”or

“A C ”)ofplaintiffC ons u m erFinancialP rotection B u reau (“B u reau ”), d efend ants C ashC all, Inc.

(“C ashC all”), W S Fu nd ing, LLC (“W S Fu nd ing”), D elbert Services C orp. (“D elbert”)

(collectively, “Entity D efend ants”), and J. P au lR ed d am (“M r. R ed d am ”)(togetherwithEntity

D efend ants , “D efend ants”), pu rs u ant to Fed . R . C iv. P . 12(b)(2)–(3)and 28U .S.C . § 1404(a),

re spectfu lly requ e s t that this C ou rt transferthe action to the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniaor, in

the alternative, dism is s the claim s agains t M r. R e d d am forlack ofpersonalju ris diction.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The B u reau ’s A m end e d C om plaint alleges that the Entity D efend ants m ad e m aterial

m is s tatem ents and om is sions in s ervicingcons u m erins tallm ent loans to re sid ents ofsixte en

s tate s (“Su bject State s”), in violation ofthe C ons u m erFinancialP rotection A ct of2010, see

12U .S.C . §§ 5531(a), 5536(a).1 In pu rs u ingthes e claim s here, the B u reau has m ad e

incom patible choices. O n the one hand , it s u e d in M as sachu s e tts ,based on am iniscu le

percentage ofthe loans at is s u e havingbeen m ad e to M as sachu s e tts re sid ents . O n the other

hand , the B u reau nam ed the Entity D efend ants’C alifornia-resid ent owner, M r. R e d d am , as a

d efend ant, d e spite his lack ofrelevant personalcontacts withM as sachu s e tts .

The B u reau ’s choice offoru m thu s carries acos t. B ecau s e s u it agains t M r. R ed d am in

this d is tant foru m wou ld offend d u e proces s , the claim s agains t him m u s t be d ism is s e d shou ld

the case rem ain in M assachu s e tts . The m ore expeditiou s cou rs e , however, and the only one

consis tent withthe D u e P roces s C lau s e and the goals ofvenu e , wou ld be to transferthe cas e to

1The Su bject State s are A labam a, A rkansas , A rizona, C olorad o, Illinois, Ind iana, K entu cky,M as sachu s e tts , M innesota, M ontana, N ew H am pshire, N ew Jers e y, N ew M exico, N ew Y ork,N orthC arolina, and O hio.


2

the C entralD is trict ofC alifornia, where venu e and personalju ris diction u nqu e s tionably exis t

overallD efendants .

A lternatively, the action shou ld be transferred to the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniafor

party and witnes s convenience and in the interes t ofju s tice. The chos en foru m is practically

alien to the litigation:no party re sid e s oris locate d in M as sachu s e tts;cou ns elforthe parties are

els ewhere;the pertinent bu sine s s d ecisions were m ad e els ewhere;incred ibly few ofthe s u bject

d ebts were owed by M as sachu s e tts re sid ents;allcollection on the s e loans ceased overayear

ago;and s u chresid ents’te s tim ony willbe ofm arginalrelevance (ifany)to re solu tion ofthe

is s u e s . B y contras t:allD efend ants re sid e orare located in C alifornia;the d ebt-collection

cond u ct at is s u e occu rred in C alifornia;key witne s s e s and d ocu m ents are located in C alifornia;

and even s everalofthe B u reau ’s own attorneys in this m atterare C alifornia-based (and are

as signed to othercas e s in C alifornia).

The A m end e d C om plaint was filed afterD efend ants s u bm itte d theirinitialvenu e and

personalju ris diction m otion, see EC FN o.22, and was clearly refram ed in an attem pt to ad d re s s

the ju ris d ictionalinfirm ities ofthe B u reau ’s initialcom plaint. B u t the B u reau ’s efforts fallfar

short. Ins tead ofshowingpersonalju ris d iction overM r. R e d d am , the B u reau throws a

sm atteringofnew— bu t u navailing— allegations agains t the wallin the hope that one orm ore

wills tick. A nd ratherthan s trengthen the case forvenu e , the A m end ed C om plaint actu ally

weakens it significantly by d ou blingthe nu m berofid entified Su bject State s from eight (in the

initialcom plaint)to sixteen (in the A m end ed C om plaint), fu rtherd ilu tingthe action’s alm os t

nonexis tent connection to M as sachu s e tts .

A im ed at linkingM r. R e d d am to M as sachu s e tts , the B u reau ’s late s t efforts only confirm

the im propriety ofs u it in this foru m . Thu s , whetherto rem ed y ad efect in personalju ris d iction


3

orto prom ote the convenience ofparties and witne s s e s , this C ou rt shou ld transferthe action to

the C entralD is trict ofC alifornia. O therwise, the C ou rt m u s t d ism is s the claim s agains t

M r. R e d d am . Eitherway, the B u reau ’s choice ofvenu e and d efend ants cannot s tand .

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A . The A m end ed C om plaint’s A llegations

This repre s ents the firs t laws u it by the B u reau in its pu blicized qu e s t to regu late

on-res ervation lendingcond u ct by Indian tribes and tribalm em bers . The u ns ecu red cons u m er

ins tallm ent loans at is s u e here were originated by, and pu rchas ed from , non-party W e s tern Sky

Financial, LLC (“W es tern Sky”), atribal-m em ber-owned com pany operatingon the C heyenne

R iverInd ian R e s ervation within the exteriorbou nd aries ofSou thD akota. See A C ¶ 19.

P os t-origination, the loans were pu rchas ed by W S Fu nd ingand s erviced by C ashC alland

D elbert. See id. ¶ 21.

In its A m end e d C om plaint, the B u reau alleges that the Entity D efendants’servicingof

thes e loans , whichcarry intere s t rate s com m ens u rate withtheirhighrisk ofd efau lt, violated

federal cons u m erlaw insofaras as sorte d state laws, were they to apply, wou ld rend erthe loans

void oru ncollectible in whole orpart. See id. ¶¶ 26–31,60,65,69. The A m end e d C om plaint

id entifies the sixteen Su bject State s , inclu dingM as sachu s e tts ,and s e ts forthprovisions

governingcons u m erloan licens u re and interes t-rate requ irem ents in each. See id. ¶¶ 11–16.

The B u reau ’s im aginative theory— as s ertingfed erallaw violations solely by virtu e of

alleged s tate law transgre s sions— s u ffers from nu m erou s fatallegalflaws. M os t prom inently, the

B u reau is barred by its own anim atingstatu te from im posingany s tate’s interes t rate capon a

cons u m erloan. D enyingthe B u reau “au thority to im pos e u s u ry lim it[s],”the C ons u m er

FinancialP rotection A ct s tate s that none ofits provisions “shallbe cons tru e d as conferring

au thority on the B u reau to e s tablishau s u ry lim it applicable to an extension ofcredit offered or


4

m ad e by acovered person to acons u m er, u nle s s explicitly au thorized by law.” 12U .S.C .

§ 5517(o). Ju s t as this lim itation bars the B u reau from craftinganationwid e intere s t-rate ceiling

forcons u m erloans ,it also prohibits the B u reau from circu m ventingthat barby transform ing

alleged s tate u s u ry infractions into fed eralviolations .2

B . The A ction’s Lack ofC onnection to M as sachu s e tts

The B u reau ’s A m end e d C om plaint fails to id entify am eaningfu lconnection between this

d ebt-collection lawsu it and M as sachu s e tts . In particu lar, the A m end e d C om plaint offers no

s u pport forwhy this laws u it based on alleged nationwid e cons u m erviolations em anatingfrom

C aliforniawas filed in this ju ris d iction as oppos e d to any other. In fact, ju s t 3.2% ofW es tern

Sky loans to borrowers in the Su bject State s were m ad e to M as sachu s e tts re sid ents ,and ofall

W e s tern Sky loans evers erviced by C ashC allorD elbert, only 1.2% were m ad e to M as sachu s e tts

re sid ents . A ffid avit ofD anielB aren (“B aren A ff.”)¶ 6. N o collection has occu rred on thos e

loans in m ore than ayear. Id. ¶ 10;see infra note 5.

N ord oes the A m end e d C om plaint e s tablisham eaningfu lconnection between the foru m ,

the claim s , and M r. R e d d am . A fteracknowled gingM r. R ed d am ’s C aliforniaresid ence, and

failingto allege his generalpres ence in M as sachu s e tts , the B u reau attem pts to prem is e personal

ju ris d iction overM r. R e d d am on his role with, and the bu sine s s activities of, the Entity

D efend ants . Specifically, the A m end e d C om plaint recite s M r. R e d d am ’s s tatu s as “the C EO ,

pre sid ent, sole d irector,and sole ownerofC ashC all;the pre sid ent, m anager, sole m em ber, and

sole ownerofW S Fu nd ing;and the d irectorand sole ownerofD elbert.” A C ¶ 8. It avers that

M r. R e d d am “actively m anaged the activities ofC ashC alland d evised m ajorcom pany policies ,”

id. ¶ 51, and it qu ote s M r. R e d dam ’s own s tatem ents to this effect, see id. ¶ 52. The A m end e d

2This and otherd efects in the B u reau ’s approachwillbe expos ed in am otion to d ism is s .


5

C om plaint sim ilarly alleges M r. R e d d am ’s s tatu s “as acontrolperson forD elbert,”id. ¶ 54, in

whichcapacity he “signed D elbert’s application fora[M as sachu s e tts]d ebt-collection licens e ,”

id. ¶ 53. It conclu d e s by notingM r. R ed dam ’s “centralrole”in bringingabou t the arrangem ent

by whichthe Entity D efend ants pu rchas ed and s erviced W es tern Sky loans , id. ¶ 55,inclu d ing

that he “signed []the agreem ents be twe en his com panies and W e s tern Sky,”id. ¶ 56.

M ore im portant are s everalfacts and m u chd e tailthat the A m end ed C om plaint om its .3

M r. R e d d am has over20years’experience in the cons u m erand m ortgage lend ingind u s trie s .

A ffidavit ofJ. P au lR ed d am (“R ed d am A ff.”)¶ 4. In 2003, he fou nd e d C ashC allas an

u ns ecu red cons u m erins tallm ent lend er. B aren A ff. ¶ 4. Since then, the com pany has grown into

ad iversified cons u m erand m ortgage lend er, at one point em ployingalm os t 2,000people. Id.

C ashC allis incorporated and based in C alifornia, where the com pany’s m anagem ent,its

corporate record s , and the overwhelm ingm ajority ofits em ploye e s re sid e. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.

D elbert was fou nd e d in 2008. A ffidavit ofC e sarGu zm an (“Gu zm an A ff.”)¶ 4.

A lthou ghincorporated and principally based in N evad a, D elbert m aintains aC aliforniaoffice,

where the com pany’s pre sid ent and nearly three-fou rths ofits em ploye e s are located . Id. From

2010to the pre s ent, D elbert has s erviced avariety ofcons u m erand m ortgage loans for

twenty-six s eparate clients , inclu d ingC ashC all. Id. ¶ 5.

M r. R e d d am re sid e s in C alifornia. R ed d am A ff. ¶ 1. H e has neverlived in, owned

property in, oreven s tepped foot in M as sachu s e tts . Id. ¶ 5 H e pos s e s s e s no ownershipinteres t

in any bu sine s s enterpris e that is based orincorporated in M as sachu s e tts , nord oes he sit on the

board ofd irectors ofany M as sachu s e tts-bas ed com pany. Id.

3O fcou rs e , “consid eration ofm aterials ou tsid e the com plaint is appropriate in ru lingon am otion to d ism is s forlack ofpersonalju ris d iction.” Callahan v. Harvest Bd. Intern., Inc.,138F. Su pp. 2d 147, 152–53(D . M as s . 2001).


6

M r. R ed d am has no personalbu sine s s d ealings in M as sachu s e tts . Id. ¶ 6. In particu lar,

he m ad e no d ecision whe therto fu nd any W e s tern Sky loan to aresid ent ofM as sachu s e tts (noris

he even alleged to have m ad e any s u chd ecision). Id. ¶ 7. To his knowled ge, he has never

interacted withany W e s tern Sky borrower(in M as sachu s e tts orels ewhere)whos e loan was

s erviced by C ashC allorD elbert, norhas he personally collected orinitiated , electronically or

otherwise,any loan paym ent by s u chaborrower. Id. ¶ 6. M r. R e d dam is not personally

involved in C ashC all’s orD elbert’s s ervicingofloans, except to ins tru ct C ashC alland D elbert

m anagers and s u pervisors to ens u re that allapplicable laws are obeye d . Id.

ARGUMENT

I. THE ACTION SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OFCALIFORNIA

This C ou rt shou ld transferthe entire action to the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniafortwo

ind epend ently s u fficient reasons . O ne , M as sachu s e tts lacks personalju ris d iction over

M r. R e d d am . C ons equ ently, becau s e the claim s agains t M r. R e d dam are virtu ally id enticalto

thos e as s erte d agains t the Entity D efendants , the C ou rt shou ld transferthe action to the C entral

D is trict ofC aliforniato obviate are-filingagains t M r. R e d d am alone in C aliforniaand piecem eal

litigation on opposingshorelines . Two, given the insignificant connection between foru m ,

D efend ants , and controvers y, alongwiththe inefficiency oflitigatingin M as sachu s e tts—

u nd erm ined fu rtherby an inescapable inference ofB u reau foru m shopping— the C ou rt shou ld

transferthe action to the C entralD is trict ofC alifornia“[f]orthe convenience ofparties and

witne s s e s”and “in the intere s t ofju s tice.” 28U .S.C . § 1404(a).

A . Transferis W arranted B ecau s e This C ou rt Lacks P ersonalJu ris diction O verM r. R e d d am

W ithexceptions not relevant here, afed eraldis trict cou rt has personalju ris d iction overa

d efend ant “who is s u bject to the ju ris d iction ofacou rt ofgeneralju ris d iction in the s tate where


7

the d is trict cou rt is locate d .” Fed . R . C iv. P . 4(k)(1)(A ). A ccord ingly, “notwiths tandingthat this

is afed eralqu e s tion case,”the “inqu iry m u s t focu s on M as sachu s e tts law concerningpersonal

ju ris d iction,”inclu d ingrelated cons titu tionalcons traints . United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers

of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960F.2d 1080, 1086(1s t C ir. 1992).4 W here,as here, a

d efend ant is not d om iciled orotherwise “at hom e”in the foru m , Daimler AG v. Bauman,

134S. C t. 746,760(2014), the exercise of“specific”personalju ris d iction m u s t bothsatisfy

M as sachu s e tts’long-arm s tatu te and com port withd u e proces s , see Morris v. UNUM Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 66M as s . A pp. C t. 716, 721(2006)(citingM as s . Gen. Laws. ch. 223A , § 3);see also

Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530F.3d 22, 26(1s t C ir. 2008)(collapsingstatu tory and

cons titu tionalqu e s tions).

The Firs t C ircu it em ploys “atripartite te s t forthe ascertainm ent ofspecificju risdiction”:

(1)the claim “m u s t d irectly arise ou t of, orrelate to, the d efend ant’s foru m -s tate activities”;

(2)the “in-s tate contacts m u s t repre s ent apu rpos efu lavailm ent ofthe privilege ofcond u cting

activities in the foru m s tate”;and (3)“the exercise ofju ris d iction m u s t, in light of[certain]

Ges talt factors ,be reasonable.” 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960F.2d at 1089. The B u reau bears

“the u ltim ate bu rd en”ofe s tablishingeachofthes e requ irem ents forevery d efendant. Adams v.

Adams, 601F.3d 1, 4(1s t C ir.2010). The A m end e d C om plaint falls wellshort ofm akingthe

neces sary showingas to M r. R e d d am .

1. M r. R e d d am Lacks the R equ ired P ersonalC ontacts withM as sachu s e tts

D e spite the A m end e d C om plaint’s attem pt to link M r. R ed d am to M as sachu s e tts , the fact

rem ains that he lacks the requ ired contacts withthe C om m onwealth. Lu m pingallD efend ants

together, the B u reau claim s that personalju ris d iction exis ts “becau s e the cau s e s ofaction arise

4The Entity D efend ants d o not challenge personalju ris d iction overthem in this laws u it.


8

from D efendants’transactingbu sine s s in this com m onwealth,contractingto s u pply s ervices in

this com m onwealth, orcau singtortiou s inju ry in this com m onwealthby an act orom is sion

ou tsid e this com m onwealth.” A C ¶ 2. B u t M r. R e d dam is not alleged personally to have d one

any ofthes e things. Su it agains t him in M as sachu se tts is thu s im perm is sible.

The “properlens”throu ghwhichto view personalju ris d iction is “whetherthe

defendant’s actions connect him to the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 134S. C t. 1115, 1124(2014)

(em phasis in original). C ritically, M as sachu s e tts fe d eraland s tate cou rts ad here to the general

ru le “that ju ris diction overacorporate officerm ay not be based on ju risd iction overthe

corporation its elf.” Interface Grp.-Mass., LLC v. Rosen, 256F. Su pp. 2d 103, 105(D . M as s .

2003). R ather,personalju ris d iction overcorporate officers and em ploye e s is as s e s s e d “on the

basis ofthe natu re and extent oftheirindivid u alcontacts withM as sachu s e tts .” UNUM Life Ins.

Co., 66M as s . A pp. C t. at 721;see id. at 721–22(affirm ingfindingoflack ofpersonal

ju ris d iction overnon-re sid ent em ploye e s who alleged ly “participated in aschem e”with

corporation to inju re plaintiff, bu t whos e in-s tate contacts were “isolated ”);see also Escude Cruz

v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619F.2d 902, 906(1s t C ir. 1980)(notingnon-im pu tation ru le and

requ iringallegation that individ u als “have transacted personalbu sine s s within”foru m orthat

they “have engaged in personalbu sine s s activities u singthe corporate form as ashield ”).

A ttem ptingto m u s terat leas t som e ind ivid u alized allegations , the B u reau plead s that

M r. R e d d am (a)“d evised m ajorcom pany policies”forC ashC alland D elbert, A C ¶¶ 51–52;

(b)previou sly d eclared to s tate regu lators that he “coord inate[d ]allm arketingand ad vertising”

forC ashC all, id. ¶ 52;and (c)“personally signed D elbert’s application”foraM as sachu s e tts

d ebt-collection licens e , id. ¶ 53. Thes e scattershot contentions failto es tablishpersonal

ju ris d iction.


9

First, even ifM r. R ed dam s e t com pany policy forthe Entity D efendants , this sort of

m anagerialactivity— u nd ou bte d ly com m on am ongs t virtu ally allcorporate officers— is farfrom

enou ghto s u pport personalju ris diction overM r. R e d d am ind ivid u ally. B asingpersonal

ju ris d iction on corporate d ecision-m akingalone e s s entially m andates the d efens e ofs u it in a

foru m “becau s e ofthe position whichthe d efend ant hold s withthe corporation.” Yankee Grp.,

Inc. v. Yamashita, 678F. Su pp. 20, 22(D . M as s . 1988). It also eviscerate s the ru le that “[e]ach

d efend ant’s contacts withthe foru m State m u s t be as s e s s e d ind ivid u ally.” Keeton v. Hustler

Magazine, Inc., 465U .S. 770,781n.13(1984)(hold ingthat personalju ris diction over

m agazine’s fou nd er, owner, and ed itor-in-chiefd id “not au tom atically follow from ju ris d iction

overthe corporation whichem ploys him ”);see also Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco Inc.,

649F.2d 169, 170(2d C ir. 1981)(holdingpersonalju ris d iction lackingover“C aliforniaresid ent

[who was]P re sid ent and sole s tockhold erof”entity, d e spite exis tence ofpersonalju ris d iction

overentity);Roy v. Roy, 47M as s . A pp. C t. 921, 921(1999)(affirm ingthat even “beingofficer

and directorofaM as sachu s e tts corporation”confers no personalju ris d iction withrespect to

“claim havingnothingto d o with”individ u al’s M as sachu s e tts contacts).

EachofC ashC all, D elbert, and W S Fu nd inghas its own ju ridicalid entity,and

M r. R e d d am him s elfis not alleged to have, forexam ple, contacted borrowers , pu rchased loans ,

ors erviced loans . To the contrary,he d id not visit M as sachu s e tts in connection withthe Entity

D efend ants’bu sines s , aim ed no d iscrete personalcond u ct at M as sachu s e tts , m ad e none ofthe

relevant fu nd ingd ecisions , com m u nicated withno W e s tern Sky borrowerin M as sachu s e tts ,and

was not personally involved at allwiththe Entity D efend ants’interactions withthos e sam e

borrowers . See supra at 5–6;see also Walden, 124S. C t. at 1124(rejectingclaim ofpersonal

ju ris d iction overnon-re sid ent who “nevertraveled to, cond u cted activities within, contacted


10

anyone in, ors ent anythingoranyone to”foru m ). N ord oe s M r. R e d d am ’s havingsigned

u nid entified “agreem ents be tween his com panies and W e s tern Sky”enhance the cas e for

ju ris d iction, A C ¶ 56,where “[t]here is no evid ence that [any s u ch]alleged contract was m ad e in

M as sachu s e tts orcalled forsignificant perform ance in M as sachu s e tts ,”Roy, 47M as s . A pp. C t. at

921(citations om itte d );accord Roberts v. Legendary Marine Sales, 447M as s . 860,864(2006).

In short, M r. R e d dam ’s execu ting, on behalfofC aliforniacom panies and while in C alifornia,

contracts withares ervation-based Sou thD akotaLLC cannot s u pport the exercise ofspecific

personalju ris diction in M as sachu s e tts overanon-party to thos e agreem ents .

Second, M r. R ed d am ’s s tatem ent in certain licens e applications that he has coord inated

ad vertisingactivities forC ashC allwarrants no d ifferent conclu sion. See A C ¶ 52. O n its face,

the s tatem ent refers to C ashC alland not to W e s tern Sky, the com pany that originated the loans at

is s u e in this s u it. M oreover, to the extent the targete d solicitation ofbu sine s s from

M as sachu s e tts cons u m ers has been held to s u pport personalju ris d iction forens u ingtort claim s ,

it “was one part ofabroad errange ofactivities”by the sam e d efendant “am ou nt[ing]to the

transaction ofbu sine s s in M as sachu s e tts .” Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416M as s . 763, 769

(1994);accord Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94F.3d 708,715–17(1s t C ir.1996)(viewing

solicitation ofM as sachu s e tts cu s tom ers as single facet of“ongoing”and “s u bs tantial”cou rs e of

d ealingforju ris d ictionalpu rpos e s). B u t the B u reau d oe s not now— and cannot ever— allege that

M r. R e d d am personally solicited bu sines s from any M as sachu s e tts borrowerorthat he otherwise

engaged in any ongoingcou rs e ofcond u ct d irecte d at M as sachu s e tts . M r. R ed d am has not even

d irected that an advertis em ent foracons u m erloan be ru n in M as sachu s e tts . R e d dam A ff. ¶ 8.

In any event, none ofthe loans at is s u e was the re s u lt ofadvertisingby C ashC all, rend eringany

allegation abou t C ashC alladvertisingm isplaced .


11

Third, that M r. R e d d am execu te d D elbert’s application foraM as sachu s e tts

d ebt-collection licens e sim ilarly fails to s u pport s u it here. See A C ¶¶ 52–54. Specific

ju risd iction requ ire s “ad em ons trable nexu s be twe en aplaintiff’s claim s and ad efend ant’s

foru m -based activities , s u chas when the litigation its elfis fou nd e d d irectly on thos e activities .”

Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142F.3d 26, 34(1s t C ir. 1998). Y e t

D elbert’s M as sachu s e tts licens e “is not the s u bject m atterofthis litigation, noris the u nd erlying

cau s e ofaction related to the [licens e].” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433U .S. 186, 213(1977)(refu sing

to grou nd personalju ris d iction in foru m -relate d property tangentialto claim ).

The B u reau alleges no inju ry cau s e d by D elbert’s s u cces sfu lapplications forthird -party

d ebt-collection licens e s , whetherin M as sachu s e tts orels ewhere. R ather, its claim s are bas ed on

D efend ants’alleged ly m is s tatingthat W e s tern Sky loans “did not have to com ply withs tate

licensingand u s u ry laws”at all. A C ¶ 55;see id. ¶ 28(recognizingthat “W e s tern Sky . . . d id

not hold acons u m er-lend inglicens e in any s tate”). D elbert s ecu red variou s s tate d ebt-collection

licens e s to s ervice its portfolio ofloans exclusive ofthos e originated by W es tern Sky. Gu zm an

A ff. ¶ 8. Fu rther, the B u reau as s erts d ebt-collection violations agains t C ashC all,which, d u ring

the relevant period , held cons u m erlend inglicens e s in ju s t two ofthe Su bject State s— bu t not in

M as sachu s e tts . B aren A ff. ¶ 9. The pre s ence orabsence ofaM as sachu s e tts licens e forD elbert

is besid e the point,and that licens e in no way “give[s]birth”to the claim s agains t M r. R e d d am .

Interface Grp.-Mass., 256F. Su pp. 2d at 108(hold ingd efendant’s role as C hairm an and C E O of

entity ins u fficient to s u pport personalju ris diction overcontractu alclaim in absence ofnexu s

be tween d efend ant’s “specificM as sachu s e tts contacts”and alleged inju ry).


12

2. ForcingM r. R ed d am To Litigate H ere W ou ld B e U nreasonable

R equ iringM r. R ed d am to litigate this action in M as sachu s e tts wou ld also be

u nreasonable. P ersonalju ris d iction m u s t re s t u pon not only requ isite foru m contacts ,bu t also

cons titu tionalreasonablene s s , an inqu iry controlled by the “ges talt”factors:

(1)the d efend ant’s bu rd en ofappearing, (2)the foru m s tate’s intere s t inad ju d icatingthe d ispu te , (3)the plaintiff’s intere s t in obtainingconvenientand effective relief, (4)the ju d icialsys tem ’s intere s t in obtainingthe m os teffective re solu tion ofthe controvers y, and (5)the com m on interes ts ofallsovereigns in prom otingsu bs tantive socialpolicies .

Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26F.3d 201,209(1s t C ir.1994). The scale is slid ing:

“the weakerthe plaintiff’s showing”ofrelevant foru m -s tate contacts , “the les s ad efendant ne e d

show in term s ofu nreasonablene s s to d efeat ju ris d iction.” Id. at 210;accord Harlow v.

Children’s Hosp., 432F.3d 50, 67(1s t C ir.2005). H ere , the ge s talt factors cem ent the abs ence

ofpersonalju ris diction overM r. R e d d am .

First, “[t]he bu rd en as sociated withforcingaC aliforniaresid ent to appearin a

M assachu s e tts cou rt is onerou s in term s ofd is tance,”aconcern “entitled to s u bs tantialweight in

calibratingthe ju ris d ictionalscales .” Ticketmaster, 26F.3d at 210–11(notingcou rts’obligation

to “gu ard agains t haras sm ent”by lawsu its farfrom d efend ant’s place ofre sid ence orbu sine s s).

Second, insofaras any s tate m ay have an intere s t in rem ed iatingalleged cons u m erharm ,

“the foru m has am ild erthan u s u alinteres t”in this case. Id. at 211. Loans to M as sachu s e tts

re sid ents accou nted for3.2% oftotalloans m ad e by W e s tern Sky to borrowers in the sixte en

Su bject State s and ju s t 1.2% ofW e s tern Sky loans to borrowers nationwid e. B aren A ff. ¶ 6.

A d d itionally,as ares u lt ofpriors tate proceedings , no W e s tern Sky loan collection has occu rred


13

at allin M as sachu s e tts in overayear, sappingthe foru m s tate’s intere s t in re solvingd u plicative

fed eralclaim s based on the sam e, now-d efu nct loans . Id. ¶ 10.5

Third, there is no ind ication that “tryingthe cas e in M as sachu s e tts wou ld be m ore

convenient forplaintiffthan tryingit in C alifornia.” Ticketmaster, 26F.3d at 211. Q u ite the

opposite . A part from its beingafed eralagency withnationwid e litigation au thority, the B u reau

d isplays no prom inent connection to M as sachu s e tts . The B u reau so farhas litigated this case

throu ghits enforcem ent attorneys in C alifornia, N ew Y ork, and W ashington, D .C .— bu t not in

M as sachu s e tts . The s e realities d efeat any B u reau claim to foru m convenience. See Prairie Eye

Ctr., 530F.3d at 30(hold ingexercise ofspecificju risdiction u nreasonable where, as here,

plaintiffhad no “ongoingconnection to M as sachu s e tts”and d efendant’s headqu arters and

witne s s e s were located els ewhere).

Fourth, the s ys tem icintere s t in efficient resolu tion ofthe controvers y has alread y been

s tym ied by s u it in M as sachu s e tts , arisky choice that invited apred ictable d ispu te overpersonal

ju ris d iction and venu e, d ivertingthe parties’and C ou rt’s re sou rces . N one ofthis wou ld have

occu rred in C alifornia,where the B u reau has previou sly filed s u it agains t C aliforniaresid ents it

5To the extent the B u reau s eeks equ itable reliefforalleged violation ofM as sachu s e tts’sm allloan laws, see A C ¶ 15(citingM as s .Gen. Laws ch.140, §§ 96, 110), the M as sachu s e ttsSu prem e C ou rt has squ arely held s u chreliefu navailable to State agencies , see Commonwealth v.Stratton Fin. Co., 310M as s . 469, 471,472–74(1941)(barringcivilenforcem ent s u it claim ing,as here, that loans m ad e in violation of§§ 96and 110“be d eclared void;and that the d efend antsbe enjoined from collectingthem ”). Ignoringthis holding, on A pril4,2013, the M as sachu s e ttsD ivision ofB anks (“D ivision”)is s u e d an ex parte C eas e O rd erd irectingC ashC alland W SFu nd ingto halt collections on W e s tern Sky loans m ad e to M as sachu s e tts re sid ents and to refu ndallpaym ents received . The C eas e O rd eris beingchallenged on appealbefore the M as sachu s e ttsSu periorC ou rt. Ifthat cou rt affirm s the C eas e O rd er, then M as sachu s e tts’intere s t willbe fu lly(thou ghwrongly)vind icated . W hetherthe ord eris affirm ed orvacated , orthe parties s e ttle , theforu m s tate its elfwillhave no proverbiald ogleft in this fight. It is notable that the D ivision,inpu rs u ingsu chrelief, did not nam e M r. R ed d am as ad efend ant orotherwise attem pt to claim thatM as sachu s e tts enjoyed personalju ris d iction overM r. R ed d am .


14

has accu s e d ofnationwid e m iscond u ct,6and where it m ay ye t pu rs u e allclaim s as s erte d in the

A m end e d C om plaint agains t allD efend ants .

Fifth, the com m on intere s ts ofs tate sovereigns (ifs u chexist)wou ld be sim ilarly

vindicated by s u it ju s t abou t anywhere, insofaras the laws ofm any s tate s are pu rporte d ly

relevant to whetherD efend ants have engaged in fed erally actionable u nfair, d eceptive, or

abu sive cond u ct. See A C ¶¶ 26–31, 60, 65, 69. O n the B u reau ’s theory, whatevercou rt

u ltim ately pre sid e s willhave to sift throu ghthe lendinglaws ofthe sixte en s tate s nam ed in the

A m end e d C om plaint. M oreover, no fed eralforu m has greaterexpertis e than any otherin

cons tru ingfed erals tatu te s that are am atteroffirs t im pres sion, s u chas thos e at is s u e here.7

3. Transferofthe A ction is the M os t Efficient O u tcom e

U pon aru lingthat it lacks personalju ris d iction overM r. R e d dam , the C ou rt m ay (and

here, re spectfu lly, ou ght to)transferthe whole case to the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniapu rs u ant

to 28U .S.C . §§ 1406(a)and 1631. A s athreshold m atter, and as d em ons trated above, this action

cou ld have been brou ght initially in that dis trict, where allD efend ants re sid e , are located , orare

d oingbu sines s . See supra at 5–6.

M oreover, althou gh§ 1406(a)by its term s “applies in cases where venu e [is]im proper,”

the s tatu te “has also been interprete d to perm it transferforlack ofpersonalju ris diction.”

Pedzewick v. Foe, 963F. Su pp. 48, 50(D . M as s . 1997)(citingGoldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,

369U .S. 463, 466–67(1962));accord Cioffi v. Gilbert Enters., ---F. Su pp. 2d ----, 2012W L

6See C om pl. ¶¶ 5–6, CFPB v. Morgan Drexen, N o. 13-cv-1267(JLS)(C .D . C al.);C om pl.¶¶ 7–12, CFPB v. Gordon, N o.12-cv-6147(R SW L)(C .D . C al.);C om pl. ¶¶ 9–12, CFPB v.Jalan, N o.12-cv-2088(A G)(C .D . C al.).7N o cou rt has ye t d ecid ed whetherthe B u reau m ay es tablishfed erally enforceable u s u ry lim itsforcons u m erloans d e spite the expre s s ,contrary lim itation at 12U .S.C . § 5517(o). N orhas anycou rt ru led on whetherthe s tatu tory prohibition on “u nfair, d eceptive, orabu sive act[s]orpractice[s],”12U .S.C . § 5536(a)(1)(B ), silently incorporate s allfifty s tate s’lend inglaws.


15

6195772,at *7(D . M as s . 2012);W. Inv. Total Return Fund Ltd. v. Bremner, 762F. Su pp.2d

339, 341(D . M as s . 2011). Sim ilarly,althou ghit has ye t to d ecid e the qu e s tion, the Firs t C ircu it

has s tate d that it is “inclined ”to cons tru e the term “ju ris d iction”in § 1631— “Transferto cu re

want ofju ris diction”— to inclu d e personalju ris diction, perm ittingtransferforlack ofpersonal

ju ris d iction u nd erthat s tatu te as well. Cimon v. Gaffney, 401F.3d 1, 7n.21(1s t C ir. 2005);see

also Bremner, 762F. Su pp. 2d at 341(canvassingau thority before agreeingthat § 1631perm its

transfers to cu re lack ofpersonalju ris diction).

R elevant here, the Firs t C ircu it favors transferoverd ism is salofan im properly laid

action. See, e.g., Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 462F.3d 41, 43(1s t C ir. 2006). In

every case, however, acou rt m u s t “consid erthe consequ ences ofbothtransferand d ism is salin

d ecidingwhichcou rs e ofaction to follow.” Britell v. United States, 318F.3d 70, 75–76(1s t C ir.

2003). Su chexam ination here m akes plain that “transfer, ratherthan dism is sal,is the option of

choice.” Id. at 74. D ism is salofclaim s agains t M r. R e d d am — althou ghwelcom e— invite s anew

proceed ingagains t him in C alifornia, the type of“inord inately was tefu l. . . d ou ble filing”and

d u plicative litigation that the transfers tatu te s are d e signed to prevent. Id. Fu rther, althou gh

som e cou rts have interprete d §§ 1406(a)and 1631to perm it transferoffewerthan allclaim s, a

transferto C aliforniaofonly the claim s agains t M r. R ed d am wou ld be no d ifferent from a

d ism is salfollowed by the B u reau ’s filingsu it agains t M r. R e d dam alone in C alifornia. Either

scenario wou ld re s u lt in expensive and inefficient parallellaws u its .8

8Fu rtherm ilitatingagains t s everance, the transfers tatu te s reference an entire “case”(§ 1406)or“action”(§ 1631). See, e.g., Freund v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 745F. Su pp. 753, 755n.5(D . M e. 1990)(expres sing“grave d ou bts”that § 1406allows transferof“only part ofacasebrou ght agains t m u ltiple d efend ants”).


16

A ccordingly,acom plete transferis in the intere s ts ofju s tice. See, e.g., Stars for Art

Prod. FZ, LLC v. Dandana, LLC, 806F. Su pp.2d 437, 449(D . M as s . 2011)(transferringcase to

d is trict that “wou ld have personalju ris diction overallD efend ants and be an appropriate venu e ,”

where M as sachu s e tts lacked personalju ris diction oversom e d efend ants).

B . Transferis A lso W arrante d on Forum Non Conveniens Grou nd s

A lternatively, this C ou rt can exercise its broad discretion to transferthe action “[f]orthe

convenience ofparties and witne s s e s”and “in the interes t ofju s tice.” 28U .S.C . § 1404(a);see

Karmaloop, Inc. v. ODW Logistics, Inc., 931F. Su pp. 2d 288,290(D . M as s . 2013)(reiterating

§ 1404(a)’s conferralof“broad d iscretion in m akingtransferd ecisions”).

The pu blicand private intere s ts gu id ingaforum non conveniens analysis favors u cha

transfer. See Atari v. UPS, 211F. Su pp.2d 360, 362(D . M as s . 2002)(lis tingfactors s e t forthin

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454U .S.235, 241n.6(1981)). P rivate consid erations inclu d e the

convenience ofparties and witne s s e s , the relative eas e ofacces s to proof, the ability to s ecu re

te s tim ony ofnon-party witne s s e s ,and any hu rd le s to proceed ingexpeditiou sly and

inexpensively. See id. P u blicconsid erations inclu d e avoid ance ofu nnece s sary problem s in

conflicts oflaws, the localintere s t in havinglocalized controversie s d ecid e d by localcou rts and

ju ries , and any ad m inis trative difficu ltie s flowingfrom cou rt conges tion. See id.

1. The C hos en Foru m B ears an Insignificant R elationshipto the C as e

A s an initialm atter, “where the plaintiffis not bringingsu it on its ‘hom e tu rf,’plaintiff’s

choice offoru m carries little weight.” Transamerica Corp. v. Trans-Am. Leasing Corp.,

670F. Su pp. 1089, 1093(D . M as s . 1987). The B u reau , throu ghits cou ns el, litigate s this action

from C alifornia, N ew Y ork, and the D is trict ofC olu m bia— bu t not M as sachu se tts . A m ong

feasible locales , therefore, C alifornia“s eem s to be as convenient forplaintiffas M as sachu s e tts ,”

ifnot farm ore. Id.;see also SEC v. Kasirer, 2005W L 645246, at *3(N .D . Ill.2005)(observing


17

that agency’s bu rd en oflitigatingfrom C aliforniaoffice was “farles s than the bu rd en im pos e d

on the individ u ald efend ants in litigatingnearly two thou sand m iles from theirhom e d is trict”).

A relatively m eagerconnection to “the operative facts ofthe case”fu rtherlim its achosen

foru m ’s pres u m ptive force. Ondis v. Woonsocket, 480F. Su pp. 2d 434, 437(D . M as s . 2007)

(qu otation m arks om itted ). W hetherornot that connection here is “s u bs tantial”within the

m eaningof28U .S.C . § 1391(b), see Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244F.3d 38, 42–43

(1s t C ir. 2001)(d iscu s singsu bs tantiality requ irem ent), it is too ins u bs tantialto require s u it in

M as sachu s e tts in the face ofavalid transferrequ e s t. A s alread y note d , M as sachu s e tts accou nte d

foronly 3.2% ofW e s tern Sky loans to borrowers in the Su bject State s and 1.2% ofW e s tern Sky

loans overall. B aren A ff. ¶ 6. A lls u chloans are now d efu nct. Id. ¶ 10. Literally nothingm ore

connects M as sachu s e tts to the action. Cf. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428F.3d 408,

433–34(2d C ir.2005)(hold ingantitru s t venu e im properu nd er§ 1391(b)(2)where 6of176

(3.5%)ofid entified jobapplicants received rejection le tters in d is trict and alleged

anti-com petitive d ecisions were m ad e els ewhere);Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters,

Inc., 743F.2d 947,955–56(1s t C ir. 1984)(hold ingM as sachu s e tts venu e im properu nd er

precu rsorto § 1391(b)forclaim ofinfringing“sales throu ghou t the cou ntry,”ofwhich

“M as sachu s e tts sale s am ou nte d to only six to fou rte en percent,”becau s e “[v]irtu ally allofthe

d ecisions”by d efend ants occu rred els ewhere).

The u nnatu ralvenu e choice rais e s an inference offoru m shopping. This appears to be the

firs t B u reau action brou ght in M as sachu s e tts . It is acu riou s choice foran initialforay into this

foru m . N ot only has the B u reau elected to bringwhat am ou nt to m u ltiple s tate law claim s in a

fed eralcou rt,bu t it has chos en an arbitrary grou pofsam ple s tate s and an arbitrary s tate within


18

that grou pin whichto s u e . The chos en s tate is nowhere nearand , ind e ed , thou sand s ofm iles

away from D efend ants’principalplaces ofbu sine s s .

Fu rther, this action pres ents noveland im portant is s u e s ofagency au thority, see supra

note 7, and it m ay be the firs t ofm any intend e d B u reau actions relatingto on-re s ervation

lending. O n M arch19,2014, m onths afterfilingthe com plaint in this case, the B u reau

com m enced an action in the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniato enforce civilinves tigative d em and s

is s u e d agains t tribal-affiliated lend ers . See CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, N o. 14-cv-2090

(M W F)(C .D . C al.). The B u reau ’s eagerne s s to com m ence that lim ited proceed ingin C alifornia

agains t entitie s based in O klahom aand Lou isianam akes it allthe m ore bafflingwhy the B u reau

here avoid ed filingsu it in C aliforniaagains t C alifornia-based d efend ants . O ne logical

conclu sion is that the B u reau s e eks to lim it the negative cons equ ences ofapotentialadvers e

ru lingby proceedingin this foru m as oppos e d to in the expansive N inthC ircu it, which

encom pas s e s farm ore Ind ian land than d oe s the Firs t C ircu it. H owever, the venu e provisions are

not m eant to “perm it[]te s t case s farfrom the site ofthe actu alcontrovers y.” Clegg v. U.S.

Treasury Dep’t, 70F.R .D . 486, 490(D . M as s . 1976)(qu otation m arks om itted );see also Symbol

Techs., Inc. v. Quantum Assocs., Inc., 2002W L 225934, at *2–*3(D . M as s . 2002)(transferring

case to C alifornia, d ispu te’s “centerofgravity”and where plaintiffhad offices , given “s trong

ind ication”that M as sachu s e tts filingconstitu te d “foru m shopping”).9 Thu s , while the B u reau

m ay perceive M as sachu s e tts as arelatively “safe”foru m , that d oe s not m ake it aconvenient—

m u chles s as ensible— one.

9O fcou rs e , the very id eaforacons u m erfinancialprotection bu reau was born in M as sachu se ttsas the signatu re proposalofthen P rofe s sorand now SenatorElizabethW arren,and herrole in itsform ation was avery pu blicpart ofhercam paign forthe Senate . The im pact ofthat cam paignm ay also have been apart ofwhy the B u reau s elected M as sachu s e tts .


19

2. Transferto C aliforniaW illP rom ote P arty and W itne s s C onvenience

A lthou gh§ 1404(a)m entions “the convenience ofparties ,”ad om inant “pu rpos e of

s tatu torily specified venu e is to protect the defendant agains t the risk that aplaintiffwills elect an

u nfairorinconvenient place oftrial.” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443U .S. 173,183–84

(1979)(com m entingthat plaintiff’s venu e choice is not “u nfettere d ”). H ere , the B u reau has not

m erely chos en aforu m that is alien to allparties ,bu t one that is on the opposite end of the

country from allD efend ants . N o cou ntervailingbenefit ju s tifies this grave inconvenience,

e specially where, as here, allconceivable party witne s s e s live and work in C alifornia. See B aren

A ff. ¶ 8;Gu zm an A ff. ¶ 7;see also Transamerica Corp., 670F. Su pp.at 1093.

Fu rther, while the B u reau m ay intend to callM as sachu s e tts borrowers as witne s s e s , the s e

witne s s e s willbe no m ore vital(ifneces sary at all)than awitne s s from any otherSu bject State .

Ind e e d , ifthis cas e s u rvives am otion to d ism is s , its ou tcom e willhinge on application oflegal

principles to u nd ispu te d contractu allangu age and to the im plem entation ofd efendants’loan

s ervicingpractices , while d epend ingm u chles s (ifat all)on the te s tim ony ofany borrowers . See

Johnson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 2013W L 1003432, at *2(D . M as s . 2013)(accord ingm inim al

weight to exis tence ofM as sachu s e tts witne s s e s in transferanalysis given focu s on d efend ants’

practices occu rringand policies d eveloped els ewhere). In s u m , whateverthe bu rd en ofthe

B u reau ’s callingborrowerwitnes s e s from nearerto C alifornia, “it wou ld be farm ore cos tly for

D efend ant[s]to proceed withthis action in M as sachu s e tts .” Malekniaz v. N.Y. Univ., 2006W L

2521406,at *3(D . M as s . 2006)(transferringcase u nd er§ 1404(a)where nearly allprospective

party witne s s e s were d efend ant’s em ploye e s located in transferee d is trict).

3. Transferto C aliforniaW illP rom ote Ju d icialEfficiency

Transfer“wou ld bringabou t an earlierre solu tion ofthe m atterthan wou ld [occu rin]the

overbu rd ened M as sachu s e tts cou rt.” Ashmore v. Ne. Petroleum Div., 925F. Su pp. 36, 39–40


20

(D . M e. 1996). C ivilcase s in this d is trict average twenty-nine m onths from filingto trial, as

com pared withtwo-third s that longin the C entralD is trict ofC alifornia.10 This qu icker

re solu tion willnot sacrifice localcom petence becau s e, on the B u reau ’s theory, eitherdis trict

cou rt willhave to apply the often nu anced lend inglaws ofat leas t fifte en others tate s . See

Princess House v. Lindsey, 136F.R .D . 16, 23(D . M as s . 1991)(d e em ing“fact that M as sachu s e tts

law govern[ed ]one claim ofs everal”ins u fficient to d e tertransfer).

Finally, where,as here, allegations ofpersonalju ris d iction overad efendant are

“problem atic,”atransferavoid s nee d les sly havingto d ecid e acons titu tionalis s u e . Blue Mako,

Inc. v. Minidis, 472F. Su pp. 2d 690,702(M .D .N .C . 2006)(basingtransferin part on lack of

evid entiary s u pport forim pu tingforu m contacts ofclos ely held corporation to principal);see

also Leroy, 443U .S.at 181(bypas singu ns e ttle d personalju ris d iction qu e s tion in favorofvenu e

analysis);Mathis v. Geo Grp., Inc., 535F. Su pp. 2d 83, 86(D .D .C . 2008)(sam e).

II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE CLAIMS AGAINST MR. REDDAM MUST BEDISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Ifthe C ou rt were to hold that it lacks personalju ris diction overM r. R e d d am ,bu t were

d isinclined to transferthe action on that (orany other)basis , then the claim s agains t M r. R ed d am

m u s t be d ism is s e d forthe reasons ad vanced in P art I.A .1–2.

CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoingreasons , D efend ants re spectfu lly requ es t that this C ou rt transferthe

action to the C entralD is trict ofC aliforniaor, alternatively, d ism is s the claim s agains t

M r. R e d d am forlack ofpersonalju ris diction.

10See U .S. C ou rts , Fed eralC ou rt M anagem ent Statis tics (D ec. 2013), http://www.u scou rts .gov/viewer.aspx?d oc=/u scou rts/Statis tics/Fed eralC ou rtM anagem entStatis tics/2013/d is trict-fcm s-profiles-d ecem ber-2013.pd f& page=1(visite d A pril7, 2014).


21

D ated :A pril11,2014

R espectfu lly s u bm itte d ,

/s/ Carol E. KammD onn A . R and all(B B O #631590)C arolE. K am m (B B O #559252)B U LK LEY ,R IC H A R D SO N A N D GELIN A S,LLP125H ighStre e t, O liverStree t TowerO liverStree t Tower,16thFloorB os ton, M A 02110P hone:(617)368-2520Fax:(617)368-2525Em ail:ckam m @ bu lkley.com

/s/ Neil M. BarofskyN eilM . B arofsky (ad m itte d pro hac vice)K atyaJe s tin (ad m itted pro hac vice)B rian J. Fischer(ad m itte d pro hac vice)JEN N ER & B LO C K LLP919Third A venu eN ew Y ork, N Y 10022P hone:(212)891-1600Fax:(212)909-0608Em ail:nbarofsky@ jenner.com

Attorneys for Defendants CashCall, Inc.,WS Funding, LLC, Delbert Services Corp.,and J . Paul Reddam

1745211v1


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS · 2017-04-15 · 2This and otherdefects...

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