United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 ... · 1 United States Budgetary Costs...
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1 United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion Neta C. Crawford 1 November 13, 2019 Summary Since late 2001, the United States has appropriated and is obligated to spend an estimated $6.4 Trillion through Fiscal Year 2020 in budgetary costs related to and caused by the post-9/11 wars—an estimated $5.4 Trillion in appropriations in current dollars and an additional minimum of $1 Trillion for US obligations to care for the veterans of these wars through the next several decades. 2 The mission of the post-9/11 wars, as originally defined, was to defend the United States against future terrorist threats from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations. Since 2001, the wars have expanded from the fighting in Afghanistan, to wars and smaller operations elsewhere, in more than 80 countries — becoming a truly “global war on terror.” Further, the Department of Homeland Security was created in part to coordinate the defense of the homeland against terrorist attacks. These wars, and the domestic counterterror mobilization, have entailed significant expenses, paid for by deficit spending. Thus, even if the United States withdraws completely from the major war zones by the end of FY2020 and halts its other Global War on Terror operations, in the Philippines and Africa for example, the total budgetary burden of the post-9/11 wars will continue to rise as the US pays the on-going costs of veterans’ care and for interest on borrowing to pay for the wars. Moreover, the increases in the Pentagon base budget associated with the wars are likely to remain, inflating the military budget over the long run. 1 Neta C. Crawford is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Boston University and a co-director of the Costs of War Project at Brown University’s Watson Institute and Boston University’s Pardee Center. 2 All budget costs here are in current dollars and numbers are rounded to the nearest billion or hundred billion.
Transcript of United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 ... · 1 United States Budgetary Costs...
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UnitedStatesBudgetaryCostsandObligationsofPost-9/11WarsthroughFY2020:$6.4Trillion
NetaC.Crawford1
November13,2019
Summary
Sincelate2001,theUnitedStateshasappropriatedandisobligatedtospendan
estimated$6.4TrillionthroughFiscalYear2020inbudgetarycostsrelatedtoandcausedbythepost-9/11wars—anestimated$5.4Trillioninappropriationsincurrentdollarsandanadditionalminimumof$1TrillionforUSobligationstocarefortheveteransofthesewarsthroughthenextseveraldecades.2
Themissionofthepost-9/11wars,asoriginallydefined,wastodefendtheUnited
StatesagainstfutureterroristthreatsfromalQaedaandaffiliatedorganizations.Since2001,thewarshaveexpandedfromthefightinginAfghanistan,towarsandsmalleroperationselsewhere,inmorethan80countries—becomingatruly“globalwaronterror.”Further,theDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywascreatedinparttocoordinatethedefenseofthehomelandagainstterroristattacks.
Thesewars,andthedomesticcounterterrormobilization,haveentailedsignificant
expenses,paidforbydeficitspending.Thus,eveniftheUnitedStateswithdrawscompletelyfromthemajorwarzonesbytheendofFY2020andhaltsitsotherGlobalWaronTerroroperations,inthePhilippinesandAfricaforexample,thetotalbudgetaryburdenofthepost-9/11warswillcontinuetoriseastheUSpaystheon-goingcostsofveterans’careandforinterestonborrowingtopayforthewars.Moreover,theincreasesinthePentagonbasebudgetassociatedwiththewarsarelikelytoremain,inflatingthemilitarybudgetoverthelongrun. 1NetaC.CrawfordisaProfessorandChairoftheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceatBostonUniversityandaco-directoroftheCostsofWarProjectatBrownUniversity’sWatsonInstituteandBostonUniversity’sPardeeCenter.2Allbudgetcostshereareincurrentdollarsandnumbersareroundedtothenearestbillionorhundredbillion.
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Overview
OneofthemajorpurposesoftheCostsofWarProjecthasbeentoclarifythetypesofbudgetarycostsoftheUSpost-9/11wars,howthatspendingisfunded,andthelong-termimplicationsofpastandcurrentspending.ThisestimateoftheUSbudgetarycostsofthepost-9/11warsisacomprehensiveaccountingintendedtoprovideasenseoftheconsequencesofthewarsforthefederalbudget.Sincethe9/11attacks,theDepartmentofDefenseappropriationsrelatedtotheGlobalWaronTerrorhavebeentreatedasemergencyappropriations,nowcalledOverseasContingencyOperations(OCO).3 Whenaccountingfortotalwarcosts,theDepartmentofDefenseandotherentitiesoftenpresentonlyOverseasContingencyOperationappropriations.
TheCostsofWarProjecttakesabroaderviewofwarexpensesbecausebudgetarycosts
ofthepost-9/11warsarenotconfinedtomilitaryspending.Table1summarizespost-9/11war-relatedcostsandthecategoriesofspending.NumbersandoccasionallycategoriesarerevisedintheCostsofWarestimateswhenbetterinformationbecomesavailable.Forexample,thisyear’sreportusesnewerinterestratedataincalculatingtheestimatedinterestonborrowingforOCOspending.Additionally,thisreportrevisestheestimateofincreasestothePentagonbasebudgetgivennewinformation,describedbelow,onpatternsofmilitaryspendingandtherelationsbetweentheOCObudgetandbasemilitaryspending.Further,theDepartmentofDefensebudgetforFY2020includednewcategories,denotingOCOspendingintendedforthebasemilitarybudget,reflectedinaseparatelineinTable1.
3SeeCongressionalBudgetOffice(CBO).(October2018).FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpendingCBOpublication54219.https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-10/54219-oco_spending.pdf.
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Table1.SummaryofWarRelatedSpending,inBillionsofCurrentDollars,FY2001–FY2020Roundedtothenearest$billion.
$Billions
OverseasContingencyOperations(OCO)Appropriations DepartmentofDefense4 1,959StateDepartment/USAID5 131
EstimatedInterestonBorrowingforDODandStateDeptOCOSpending6 925War-relatedSpendingintheDODBaseBudget
EstimatedIncreasestoDODBaseBudgetDuetoPost-9-11Wars7 803“OCOforBase”anewcategoryofspendinginFY2019andFY20208 100
MedicalandDisabilityCareforPost-9/11Veterans9 437HomelandSecuritySpendingforPreventionandResponsetoTerrorism10 1,054TotalWarAppropriationsandWar-RelatedSpendingthroughFY2020 $5,409EstimatedFutureObligationsforVeteransMedicalandDisabilityFY2020–FY205911 >1,000TotalWar-RelatedSpendingthroughFY2020andObligationsforVeterans $6,409
4Included:AppropriationsforMajorOCOinAfPakandIraq/Syria;OCOforOperationPacificEagle-PhilippinesinFY2019;andFY2019-2020andOCOfor“EnduringRequirements.”Notincluded:FY2020OCO“emergency”spendingfortheSouthernborderoftheUSandnon-wardisasterrelief.Basedonpubliclyavailabledocuments.Sourcesinclude:AmyBelasco.(December2014).TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11.CongressionalResearchService(CRS)https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf;BrendanW.McGarryandEmilyMorgenstern.(Updated6September2019)OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,CRS.https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf;OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(March2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-8.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.5ForAfghanistan,Pakistan,IraqandSyria.Sourcesinclude:McGarryandMorgenstern,OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,”andK.AlanKronstadt,andSusanB.Epstein,(2019,March12).DirectOvertU.S.AidAppropriationsforandMilitaryReimbursementstoPakistan,FY2002-FY2020.CRS,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf.6Source:CalculationsbyHeidiPeltier.Forthcoming.TheCostofDebt-financedWar:PublicDebtandRisingInterestforPost-9/11WarSpending,”CostsofWarProject.7Theseinclude:additionalexpensesthathaveincreasedthesizeofthe“base”budget,suchasspendingonOperationNobleEagleafter2004;theeffectsofpost-9/11warrelatedincreasedhealthcarecostsforactivedutysoldiers;andhigherpaytoattractandretainsoldiers.EstimatedasaportionoftheOCObudgetat50percentofOCOspendingfromFY2001–2006,40percentfromFY2007–2018,and25percentfromFY2019–2020.ThisestimateoftheinflationaryeffectsofmilitaryspendingwasrevisedontheunderstandingthattheDODsubsidizedthebasebudgetwithOCOmoneypriortoFY2018.Seethediscussionbelow.8InFY2019,theTrumpAdministrationintroducednewbudgetcategoriestoindicateOCOmoneyspentonbaserequirements.ThoseOCOappropriations“forbase”inFY2019andFY2020areincludedhere.9BasedonDepartmentofVeteransAffairsBudgets,FY2001-FY2020.AlthoughtheVAreportshealthcareforPost-9/11warveterans,DisabilityandCompensationarereportedforallGulfWarEraveterans.10BasedonDHSbudgetsasanalyzedbytheCRSandassumingthatspendingisconsistentsince2017.SeeWilliamL.Painter,8October2019,SelectedHomelandSecurityIssuesinthe116Congress,CRS.11BasedonLindaJ.Bilmes.(2016).ATrustFundforVeterans.Democracy:AJournalofIdeas,no.39.Retrievedfromhttp://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/a-trust-fund-for-veterans/andLindaJ.Bilmes.(2013).TheFinancialLegacyofIraqandAfghanistan:HowWartimeSpendingDecisionsWillCancelOutthePeaceDividend.CostsofWar,http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/The%20Financial%20Legacy%20of%0Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf.
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TheNeedforaComprehensiveAccountingAsChristopherMannoftheCongressionalResearchServiceacknowledges,“No
government-widereportingconsistentlyaccountsforbothDODandnon-DODwarcosts.”Thisleavesaholeinourunderstandingofthetotalcostsofthepost-9/11warsthatallowsforconfusionandpartialaccountingthatcanbemistakenforanassessmentoftheentirebudgetarycostsandconsequencesofthesewars.Further,Manncorrectlynotesthat,“Asaconsequence,independentanalystshavecometodifferentconclusionsaboutthetotalamount.”Because“widelyvaryingestimatesriskmisleadingthepublicanddistractingfromcongressionalpriorities”Mannarguesthatthatacomprehensiveaccountingwouldbeuseful.“Congressmaywishtorequirefuturereportingonwarcoststhatconsolidatesinteragencydata(suchashealthcarecostsforcombatveteransorinternationalaidprograms)inastandardized,authoritativecollection.”12
TheCostsofWarProjecthas,since2011,providedastandardized,andperhapsmore
important,transparentandcomprehensibleaccountingforthecostsofthepost-9/11wars(theGlobalWaronTerror),usingcategoriesthatincludeU.S.budgetarydataacrossrelevantagencies,andestimatesoffutureveterans’careandtheinterestonborrowingtopayforthewars.
Thereareotherwaystoestimatethecostsofthepost-9/11wars.Forexample,theDOD
regularlyproducesatabulationofthe“EstimatedCosttoEachTaxpayerfortheWarsinAfghanistanandIraq.”InMarchofthisyear,theirmostrecentpublicestimateconcludedthatDepartmentofDefenseOCOspendingforthewarsinIraq,Syria,AfghanistanandPakistancostatotal$7,623pertaxpayerthroughFY2018.13
Whileitisusefultohaveaper-personfiguretoillustratetheburdenofwaron
taxpayers,thiswayofestimatingthecostpertaxpayersissomewhatmisleadingforseveralreasons.Inthepast,previouswarswerepaidforwithtaxincreasesorbysellingwarbonds,oracombinationofthesetwosourcesofrevenue.Inthecaseofthepost-9/11wars,specifictaxeswerenotraisedtofundtheseoperations.Nor,apartfromafewPatriotBondssoldintheearlyyearsofthewars,wasthereadrivetoselllargenumbersofwarbonds.Indeed,beforethe9/11attacks,theUSwasinbudgetsurplus.TheUSwentintodeficitspendingafterthe9/11attacks,thusincreasingtheFederalbudgetdeficitandthenationaldebt.Thispatternofwarspendingandborrowinghavecontinuedthroughoutthewars.
ThetotalhereincludesDODOverseasContingencyOperationsspending.Buttherecan
besomeconfusionaboutDODOCOspendingwhenthePentagon’scategorieschangeand 12ChristopherT.Mann,(18April2019).U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11,CRS.https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11182.pdf.13TheDODcalculationincludesannualcostsinthewarzonesandthenumberoftaxpayerseachyear.DepartmentofDefenseComptroller.(March2019).EstimatedCosttoEachU.S.TaxpayerofEachoftheWarsinAfghanistan,IraqandSyria.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Section_1090_FY17_NDAA_Cost_of_Wars_to_Per_Taxpayer-March_2019.pdf.
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becausetheDODhasnotconsistentlyusedtheCongressionalOCOappropriationsfortheirintendedpurpose.14
Theothercoststhataredirectlyrelatedtothewarsarefoundinotherbudgetsacross
thefederalgovernmentandareincludedinthisestimate.Specifically,asdiscussedbelow,OCOspendingandwarhavetendedtoinflateDOD“base”spendingandsotheprojectestimateswar-relatedadditionstothePentagonbasebudget.ThebasebudgetisintendedtofundenduringcostsoftheDepartmentofDefenseandthearmedservices,thatwouldbeincurredeveniftheUSwerenotatwar.Inaddition,theprojectcountsOCOspendingfortheStateDepartmentinthemajorwarzones.TheStateDepartmentwarrelatedappropriationsaredesignatedasOCObytheCongressandareverycloselylinkedtoDODspending.Thisreportalsoestimatesthehealthcarecostsforpost-9/11warveterans;counterterrorismrelatedHomelandSecurityfunding,andestimatedinterestondebtforborrowingtopayforthewarsthroughFY2020.15EveniftheUnitedStateshaltedspendingonthewarsinFY2021,itwouldberesponsibleforadditionalinterestonborrowingtopayforwarstodate.Unlesssomemechanismisputinplacetopaydownthedebt,thiswilladdseveraltrilliondollarsinadditionalinterestcoststothetotalcostsofwar.
Further,becausethecostsofthepost-9/11warswillcontinueafterthefightingceases,
andtohighlighttheobligationsincurredtotheveteransofthiswar,thisaccountingincludesanestimateofthecostsoftheobligationsfortheofpost-9/11warveteransfuturecare,throughFY2059.Thesefutureestimatedcostsforveterans’healthcareanddisabilitycompensationareprovisionalbecause,thoughthenumberofUStroopdeployedinthewarzonesiscurrentlywindingdown,deploymentsmaycontinueforseveralmoreyearsandmayfluctuateinsize.Thus,wedonotyetknowthetotalnumberofveteranswhowillbeusingthemedicalcareanddisabilitybenefitstheyareentitledtobecauseoftheirservice.16
Thus,DODspendingforOverseasContingencyOperationsisonlyaportionofthecostsofthesewars.DODspendingfortheOCOsislessthan40percentoftotalpost-9/11warrelatedspendingthroughFY2020.Figure1illustratespost-9/11warrelatedspendingbycategoriesthroughFY2020incurrentdollars—notincludingfuturecostsofmedicaland
14SeeAmyBelasco,(2014)TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11andCBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending.15Numbersforsomespendingcategoriesareestimates.Somegovernmentdepartmentshavebecomelesstransparent.Estimatesforspendingwherethereisnocurrentdataarerootedinpastspendingbytherespectivedepartment.TheDepartmentofVeteransAffairsandtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityhaveaggregatedsomeoftheirGlobalWaronTerror/post-9/11-relatedspendingsothatitismoredifficulttoisolatespecificwar-relatedspendingfromtheirlargerbudgets.16ThisandpreviousCostsofWarProjectestimateshavenevercountedeverybudgetaryexpenserelatedtothesewars.Forexample,therearesubstantialcostsofwartostateandlocalgovernmentsintheUSthatarenotsubsidizedbythefederalgovernment,mostsignificantly,perhaps,thecostsofcaringfortheveteransofthesewars.ThisreporthasalsonotcountedthevalueofthegiftsinexcessmilitaryequipmenttheUSmakestocountriesinandnearthewarzones.SeetheExcessDefenseArticles(EDA)Database,http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-edaandSecurityAssistanceMonitor,http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Excess%20Defense%20Articles/.
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disabilitycareforveteransandfutureinterestpaymentsonborrowingtopayforwarsthatmustbeincludedinanytruereckoningofthebudgetaryburdenofthepost-9/11wars.
Figure1.EstimateofGlobalWaronTerrorSpendingthroughFY2020inBillionsofCurrentDollarsandPercentages.
Onepotentialbarrierforcivilianstounderstandingthetotalscaleandcostsofthepost-9/11warsisthechangesinthenamingofthewars.TheUSmilitarydesignatesmainwarzonesinAfghanistan,Pakistan,Iraq,andSyriaasnamedoperations.Thelongestwarsofar,inAfghanistanandPakistan,hashadtwonames:OperationEnduringFreedom,designatedthefirstphaseofwarinAfghanistanfromOctober2001;itwasdesignatedOperationFreedom’sSentinelon1January2015.17ThewarinIraqwasdesignatedOperationIraqiFreedomfromMarch2003to31August2010,whenitbecameOperationNewDawn.WhentheUSbegantofightinSyriaandIraq,thewarwasdesignatedOperationInherentResolve.Foreaseofunderstanding,thecostsarenotlabeledherebytheirOCOdesignation,butbymajorwarzone—namelyAfghanistanandPakistan,andIraqandlaterIraqandSyria.
17Operationshavechangednameswhenthemissionhaschanged,suchaswhenthewarinAfghanistan,OperationEnduringFreedombecameOperationFreedom’sSentinel.Similarly,OperationIraqiFreedombecameOperationNewDawnin2011andbecameOperationInherentResolvein2014whenthewarexpandedtoSyria.
DOD War Spending (OCO), $1,959 B, 36%
DOD OCO for Base, $100 B, 2%
Estimated Increase in Base DOD Spending Due to War, $803 B, 15%State Department OCO, $131 B, 2%
GWOT related Homeland Security Missions, $1,054 B,
20%
Interest on Borrowing for DOD and State OCO through
FY2020, $925 B, 17%
Medical and Disability for Veterans through FY2020, $437 B, 8%
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Further,withintheselargeroperations,thereareactivitiesinothergeographicareasthatdirectlysupportorinsomecasesarefarfromthenamedoperation.Forexample,OperationEnduringFreedom,focusedonAfghanistanandPakistan,includedactionsinJordan,Sudan,Yemen,andseveralotherlocations.18Similarly,thecurrentOperationInherentResolveinIraqandSyriahasincludedmilitaryoperationsinBahrain,Cyprus,Egypt,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Qatar,SaudiArabia,Syria,Turkey,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.
Theannualcostsofwarinthemajorwarzoneshavefluctuated,butare,ingeneral,
declining.TotalestimatedappropriationsfortheAfghanistanandPakistanwarbytheDODandStateDepartmentareabout$978billionfromFY2001throughFY2020.BeguninOctober2001,appropriationshavebeenonaverage,includingFY2020,nearly$49billioneachyear.TheappropriationsfortheIraqandSyriawarzonehave,onaverage,beenabout$44billioneachyear,withtotalappropriationsofabout$880billionfromFY2003throughFY2020.Figure2illustratestheOCOappropriationsforthemajorwarzones—AfghanistanandPakistanandIraqandIraqandSyria—fortheDODandtheStateDepartment.
Figure2.DODandStateDepartmentOCOAppropriationsfortheMajorWarZones,FY2001–FY2020inBillionsofCurrentDollars
ThereareotherOCOfundedoperations,includingintheUS,Europe,Africaandother
regions.ThesehaveincludedOperationNobleEagle(whichdefendstheUSairspaceandbases)fundedintheOCObudgetthroughFY2004andOperationPacificEagle–Philippines,bothofwhicharenowfundedinthebasebudget.IncludingallOCOdesignatedoperations 18Thecasualtiesforeachnamedoperationincludethoseotherlocations.See,DepartmentofDefenseCasualtyStatus,https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
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Afghanistan and Pakistan Iraq and Syria
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bytheDefenseandStateDepartments,theGWOThasaveragedmorethan$100billioncurrentdollarseachyear.
FollowingtheEver-ChangingDOD,DHSandStateDepartmentGWOTBudgetsThetotalsinthisreportdifferfromtheDOD,CongressionalResearchService(CRS)and
otherreportsforseveralreasons.First,thisreportattemptstoincludealltherelevantmajorpost-9/11war-relatedspending.Insomeinstances,DOD,StateDepartmentandDepartmentofHomelandSecurityBudgetsareopaque.Indeed,becauseofrecentchangesinbudgetarylabelsandaccountingatDOD,DHS,andtheStateDepartment,understandingthecostsofthepost-9/11warsispotentiallyevenmoredifficultthaninthepast.Thissectionexplainsthebudgetsandthechoicesmadehereaboutwhattoincludeandhowtocountwarandwar-relatedspending.
StartingwiththeDepartmentofDefenseportionofwarspending,apartfromthe
changingnamesofthemajorOCOoperationsinAfghanistanandPakistanandIraqandSyria,someOCOoperationshavecomeinandoutoftheOCObudget.Forinstance,OperationPacificEagle–Philippineswasdesignatedanoverseascontingencyoperationin2017,andremovedfromtheOCObudgetinMay2019,inthemiddleofthefiscalyear,eventhoughtheoperationcontinued.
Further,assuggestedabove,themechanismofappropriationsforthewarshas
sometimesmadeitdifficulttodifferentiatewarandwar-relatedspending.OCOspendingisconsideredemergencyspending.EmergencyappropriationsfortheDODarenotsubjecttothesamedetailedCongressionaloversightandlimitsasregular,or“base”budgetnon-emergencyappropriations,forcoststhatendurewhetherornottheUSisatwar.The2011BudgetControlAct(BCA)setlimitsonbothdefenseandnondefensespending.Theselimitswereenforcedby“sequestration,”theautomaticreductionofenactedappropriationsinexcessofthelaw’sprescribedlevels.UndertheBudgetControlAct,spendingdesignatedasOCOisexemptfromthebasebudgetcapsandsequestration.
SomeOCOappropriatedmoneyhas,formorethanadecade,beenusedtosupplement
thebaseDODbudget.ThiswasnottheintentionofCongress.Afterthe2011BudgetControlAct,the DOD began to charge additional expenses to the OCO budget that should have been funded through the base budget appropriation process in part to get around the budget caps and sequestration. It appears that none of these transfers were explicitly requested by the DOD or authorized by Congress.
InFY2019,theTrumpAdministrationmadethepracticeofshiftingemergencyOCO
appropriationsintothebasebudgetovertwhenitintroducednewwaysofcategorizingtheDepartmentofDefensespendingrelatedtotheOverseasContingencyOperations.Someofthefundingthatwaspreviouslydesignatedforspecificmilitaryoperationshasnowbeenmovedintoacategorycalled“OCOforEnduringTheaterRequirementsandRelatedMissions”andanother,“OCOforBaseRequirements.”19The DoD’s FY2019 OCO for base 19TheDODComptrollerexplained:
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was $2.5 billion. The FY 2020 budget request included $97.5 billion in OCO funding for base budget requirements and $35.3 billion for “Enduring Theater Requirements and Related Missions. AnothernewDODOCOcategoryforFY2020is“EmergencyRequirements,”moneyintendedfortheSouthernUnitedStatesborderwallanddisasterreliefforrecenthurricanes.
Thus,inFY2020,onlyabout$25billionofthe$173.8billionOCOrequestwere
designatedasforOperationInherentResolveinIraqandSyrianandOperationFreedom’sSentinelinAfghanistan.In the FY2020 request, theDODComptrolleralsoappliedsomeofthesenewcategoriesretroactivelytopreviousOCOfunding—respectively$2,$8,$18,and$17billionforFiscalYears2015to2019.20
Again, these changes are specifically and explicitly intended to get around Congressionally
imposed limits on the base defense budget. The Department of Defense FY2020 request explicitly stated as much: “These base budget requirements are funded in the OCO budget due to limits on budget defense caps enacted in the Budget Control Act of 2011. As base budget funding at the Budget Control Act level is insufficient to execute the National Defense Strategy, additional resources are being requested in the OCO budget.”21 TheFY2020OCOforbaserequirementsrequestalso,accordingtotheComptroller’sreport“includeground, air, and ship operations, base support, maintenance, weapons system sustainment, munitions, and other readiness activities, which are needed to prepare warfighters for their next deployment. This
“TheFY2020OCOrequestisdividedintothreerequirementcategories–directwar,enduring,andOCOforbase.DirectWarRequirements($25.4billion)–Reflectscombatorcombatsupportcoststhatarenotexpectedtocontinueoncecombatoperationsendatmajorcontingencylocations.Includesin-countrywarsupportforOperationFREEDOM’SSENTINEL(OFS)inAfghanistanandOperationINHERENTRESOLVE(OIR)inIraqandSyria.FundspartnershipprogramssuchastheAfghanistanSecurityForcesFund(ASFF),theCounter-ISISTrainandEquipFund(CTEF),theCoalitionSupportFund(CSF),andMiddleEastbordersecurity.OCOforEnduringRequirements($41.3billion)–Reflectsenduringin-theaterandCONUScoststhatwillremainaftercombatoperationsend.Thesecosts,historicallyfundedinOCO,includeoverseasbasing,depotmaintenance,shipoperations,andweaponssystemsustainment.ItalsoincludestheEuropeanDeterrenceInitiative(EDI),theUkraineSecurityAssistanceInitiative(USAI),andSecurityCooperation.Combined,enduringrequirementsanddirectwarrequirementscomprise“traditional”OCO.OCOforBaseRequirements($97.9billion)–Reflectsfundingforbasebudgetrequirements,whichsupporttheNationalDefenseStrategy,suchasdefensereadiness,readinessenablers,andmunitions,financedintheOCObudgettocomplywiththebasebudgetdefensecapsincludedincurrentlaw.”
OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-2.
20OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-4.21OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-8.
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OCO request for base requirements includes additional resources for non-DoD activities, which are described in detail under separate (classified) cover.”22
TheCongressionalBudgetOfficeandtheCongressionalResearchServicehavelong
expressedconcernthatDODaccountingpracticesareopaqueandthatthedistinctionbetweenenduringandemergencyfundinghasnotbeenwellobserved.Prior to this change, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Congressional Research Service have regularly pointed out the use of OCO money to fund the activities that should be funded in the DOD base budget. In 2014, for instance Amy Belasco, in her Congressional Research Service report on the costs of the post-9/11 wars said: “Sincethe9/11attacks,someobservershavecriticizedwarfundingas‘off-budget’ora‘slushfund’appropriatedlargelyinemergencysupplementalactsorfor“OverseasContingencyOperations”(OCO)wherenormalbudgetlimitsinannualbudgetresolutionsortheBudgetControlAct(BCA)donotapply.”Belascocontinued,“InrecenttestimonyonSeptember18,2014,forexample,formerSecretaryofDefenseChuckHagelacknowledgedtheseambiguities,saying“there’realotofdifferentopinionsaboutwhetherthereshouldbeanoverseascontingencyaccountornotandwhetherit’saslushfundornot’.”23
CRSandCBOhavecontinuedtobeconcernedaboutDODaccounting.Forinstance,in
early2019ChristopherMannoftheCongressionalResearchServicerecentlynoted,“EstimatesofthecumulativecostsofwararecomplicatedbytheuseofOCO-designatedfundsforbasebudgetactivities.”24Further,Mannsays,“TheuseoftheOCOdesignationforfundingbothwarandnon-warrequirementshascreatedambiguityaboutenduringcostsunrelatedtoongoingconflicts.”25ACBOreportin2018notedthat“AscontingencyoperationshavebecomethenormandDoDhasadjusteditsallocationofresourcestoaccommodatethem,ithasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttodistinguishbetweentheincrementalcostsofmilitaryconflictsandDoD’sregular,enduringcosts.”26TheCBOestimatedthat,fromFY2006toFY2018,$53billioninOCOfundingwasbeingusedforactivitiesthatshouldhavebeenfundedinthebasebudget.27
Which raises the question of what to count as a DOD cost of the post-9/11 wars. Clearly,
althoughtheDODputssomeactivitiesinitsrequestforOCOappropriations,noteverythingisacostofthesewars.Because the category isclearlynotwarrelated,fundsdesignated “EmergencyRequirements”—moneyintendedfortheSouthernUnitedStatesborderwallanddisasterrelief—arenotcountedhereaspartofthecostsofthepost-9/11OCOwars.The Costs of War project includes FY2019 and FY2020 funding categories “OCOforEnduringTheaterRequirementsandRelatedmissions”and“OCOforBaseRequirements”which
22OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-8.23Belasco,Amy.(2014,December8).TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11.CongressionalResearchService(CRS)p.20.24Mann,U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11.25Mann,U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11.26CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.10.27CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.2.
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reflecttheinstitutionalizationoftheGlobalWaronTerror,inthepreexistingCostofWarcategory“increasestothePentagonbase.”
ThePentagon’s“Base”budgethasbeeninflatedforthreeadditionalreasons.First,
smallincrementsofwarspendinghavealreadybeeninstitutionalizedinthebasebudget.Forexample,asalreadymentioned,OperationPacificEagle–PhilippinesmovedtothebasebudgetinFY2019,andin2004,spendingonOperationNobleEaglewasmovedfromOCOtothebasebudget.
Second,andmuchmoresignificant,overallUSmilitaryspendingforthebasehasbeen
increasedasaconsequenceoftheinstitutionalizationofcostsassociatedwiththeongoingwars.Forexample,repeateddeploymentshaveincreasedthewearandtearonsoldiers’mindsandbodiesand,asaconsequence,thehealthcarecostsforactivedutysoldiershasincreased.Further,thehigherpayassociatedwiththedesiretoattractandretainsoldiersduringthelongwarshasalsoboostedbasemilitaryspending.And,astheCBOhasnoted,thewarshavedrivenupoverallDODcostsforsoldiersbenefitsandcompensationthatnotonlykeeppacewithbutexceedincreasesduetoinflation.“Publicsupportforthemilitaryinwartimecandriveincreasesinpayandbenefitsnotonlyforforcesdeployedtocombatzonesbutforallservicemembers,includingthosewhohaveretired.”28AstheCBOnotes,thebenefitsincreaseswereatfirstthoughttobetemporaryandlimited,buttheyhavebeeninstitutionalized.
Forexample,in2004,nonbasefundingwasusedtoexpandTRICAREhealthinsurancebenefitstomembersofthereserveforcesforoneyear.ThatpolicywasextendedinsubsequentNationalDefenseAuthorizationActsuntil2007,whenitwasmadepermanentandfundingforitwasmovedintothebasebudget.Althoughtheexpandedbenefitswerenotdirectlyrelatedtothewarorlimitedtoreservistswhohaddeployed,thepolicychangesupportedallwhomightbecalledupontodeploy.
Similarlegislationthatexpandedlifeinsurancecoverageandsurvivor’sbenefitswasalsoinitiallyintendedtotemporarilysupportdeployedservicemembersbutwasextendedtotheentireforceandmadepermanent.29 Figure3illustratesthesteadygrowthinDepartmentofDefensebasebudget,which
oftenincreasesevenwhenOCOfundingdeclines.
28CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.14.29CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.14.
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Figure 3. DOD Base, OCO, and OCO for Base Spending Authorized and Requested FY2001-2020 in Billions of Current Dollars.30
Third,thePentagon’sbasebudgetspendinghaslikelygrownbecauseCongressseems
reluctanttotightenthereignsonoverallmilitaryspendingwhiletheUSisatwar.Thisappliesnotonlytoprocurementofnewweaponsandequipment,butalsotoinstallationscosts.Forexample,thePentagonestimatesthatithasexcesscapacitiesatitsbasesandinstallationsofabout20percent.Today,thereareabout800USmilitarybasesandinstallationsintheworld.31ThemostrecentoftheBaseRealignmentandClosure(BRAC)rounds,the2005to2011BRACprocess,ledtoanoveralldeclineinthenumberofDODbuildingsandotherstructures,fromover600,000individualbuildingsandstructuresonover30millionacresoflandbeforetheBRACinFY2003toabout585,800buildingsandstructureson26.9millionacresinFY2018.32YetthePentagon’sstateddesireforanotherroundofbaseclosuresseemstobethwartedbyaCongressunwillingorunabletodecideonanewroundofBRAC,eventhough,accordingtoseparateestimatesbytheHeritageFoundationandtheSustainableDefenseTaskForce,thiscouldsavebillionsofdollars.33
30Sourceofdata,DODComptroller,including,OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.1-4.31DavidVine.(2019)."ListsofU.S.MilitaryBasesAbroad,1776-2019,"AmericanUniversityDigitalResearchArchive,https://doi.org/10.17606/vfyb-nc07.DepartmentofDefense.(March2019).DoDBaseRealignmentandClosure,BRACRounds(BRAC1988,1991,19931995&2005),ExecutiveSummary,https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/budget_justification/pdfs/05_BRAC/BRAC_Exec_Sum_J-Book_FINAL.pdf.32Sources:DepartmentofDefenseBaseStructureReportsforFY2003andFY2018.See,forFY2003,https://archive.defense.gov/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf;andforFY2018,https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf.33SeeLeoShane,III.(15August2019).“PlansForANewBaseClosingRoundMaybeRunningOutofTime:Report,”MilitaryTimes,,https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/08/15/plans-for-a-new-base-closing-round-may-be-running-out-of-time-report/;FredericoBartels.(28November2017).“WithNewRoundofBaseClosures,U.S.CouldSave$2BilliononDefense,”theHeritageFoundation,https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/new-round-base-closures-us-could-save-2-billion-year-defense;CenterforInternationalPolicy,SustainableDefenseTaskForce.(June2019).“SustainableDefense:
0
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300
400
500
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
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Similarly,personnelcostsmayalsobeinflatedduetoadesiretodemonstratepatriotisminwar.AstheCBOnotes,“increasesinmilitarypay(inexcessofgrowthinprivate-sectorwages)andtotalretirementcompensationmayhavebeenmotivatedbyadesiretoshowsupportforalltroopsduringwartime.Suchchangestopayandbenefits,evensmallones,canhavelargeandlastingeffectsonDoD’scostsbecausetheypermanentlyincreasethecostsofcompensatingservicemembers.Thoseincreasedcostsarethencarriedovertofuturebasebudgets.”34
StateDepartmentOCOfundingisalsosometimeslessthantransparent.Thisreporthas
notincludedasacostofwarsomeOCOappropriatedtotheStateDepartment.Forexample,CRSgivesafigureof$162billioninOCOfundingfortheStateDepartmentthroughFY2019.Theirestimateincludesemergencyfundingforseveralnon-warrelatedcontingencies:“Theestimated$162billioninemergencyandOCOappropriationsenactedtodateforState/USAIDincludesmajornon-war-relatedprograms,suchasaidforthe2004tsunamialongIndianOceancoasts,2010earthquakeinHaiti,2013EbolaoutbreakinWestAfrica,and2015worldwideoutbreakoftheZikavirus;aswellasdiplomaticoperations(e.g.,payingstaff,providingsecurity,andbuildingandmaintainingembassies).”35TheCostofWarestimateforStateDepartmentOCOspendingisthuslowerthantheCRSfigurebecausethefocushereisonStateDepartmentandUSAIDoperationsinthemajorwarzonesanddoesnotincludefundingforthesenon-waremergencies.
Homelandsecurityspendingoccursinseveralagencies,includingtheDepartmentof
HomelandSecurity.TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityitselfplacesahighpriorityonprotectingandrespondingtoterroristattacks.Forexample,theFY2020budgetsummaryforDHSsays:“Nefariousactorswanttodisruptourwayoflife.Manyareincitingchaos,instability,andviolence.Atthesametime,thepaceofinnovation,ourhyperconnectivity,andourdigitaldependencehaveopenedcracksinourdefenses,creatingnewvectorsthroughwhichourenemiesandadversariescanstrikeus.Thisisavolatilecombination.Theresultisaworldwherethreatsaremorenumerous,morewidelydistributed,highlynetworked,increasinglyadaptive,andincrediblydifficulttorootout.The‘homegame’hasmergedwiththe‘awaygame’andDHSactionsabroadarejustasimportantasoursecurityoperationshereathome.”36Forexample,DHSsays,“Bordersecurityisnationalsecurity.”37TerrorismiscentraltomanyotherDHSmissions,aswell,fromtheCoastGuardtocybersecurity.Butbecausethecounterterrormissionhasbeeninstitutionalizedandmergedwithitsmainmissions,itisdifficulttofindacoherentanalysisoftheincrementaladditionofthecostofcounterterrorismwithintheDHSbudget.
Further,becausehomelandsecurityspendingoccursinmanyagencies,onehastoadd
thoseup.Inpreviousyears,theDHSbudgethighlightedexpendituresforallcounterterror MoreSecurity,LessSpending,”https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/fb6c59_59a295c780634ce88d077c391066db9a.pdf.34CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.14.35McGarryandMorgenstern,OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,p.23.36DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.(2019).FY2020BudgetinBrief,p.1.https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_FY-2020-Budget-In-Brief.pdf.37DHS,FY2020BudgetinBrief,p.2.
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missions,concatenatingallagencyexpendituresusingthecategories“PreventandDisruptTerroristAttacks,”“ProtectAmericans,CriticalInfrastructureandResources,”and“RespondandRecoverfromIncidents.”TheDHShasreorganizeditsreportingonspending.NowthesemissionsareessentiallymergedwithotherDHSmissionsandtheDHSdoesnothighlightisownorotheragencies’spendingonthesemissions.
Since2017,theWhiteHouseandDepartmentofHomelandSecurityhavenotprovided
abreakdownofDHSexpendituresbymissionsdevotedtopost-9/11counterterrorism.In2017,WhiteHouseOfficeofManagementandBudgetstatedinitsAnalyticalPerspectivesonthebudgetthat,“PreviousAnalyticalPerspectivesvolumesincludeda‘HomelandSecurityFundingAnalysis’chapter,andprovidedadditionaldetailedinformationontheInternetaddresscitedaboveandontheBudgetCD-ROM.P.L.115-31eliminatedthestatutoryrequirementforthisinformation.Therefore,thisinformationisnotincludedinthisyears'BudgetanditwillnotbeincludedinfutureBudgets.”38AsoftheFY2018budgetrequest,theDepartmentHomelandSecuritybudgetisnolongerexplainedbytheWhiteHouseOfficeofManagementandBudget.
TheCostsofWarestimateforhomelandsecurityrelatedspendingisthusbasedon
previousDHSspendingoncounterterrormissionsandworkbytheCRS.Specifically,WilliamPainterofCRSnotesthat“theagency-reporteddataonspendinginthreecategories—preventinganddisruptingterroristattacks;protectingtheAmericanpeople,criticalinfrastructure,andkeyresources;andrespondingtoandrecoveringfromincidents”showsthat“fromFY2003throughFY2017,theentireU.S.governmentdirectedroughly$878billion(innominaldollarsofbudgetauthority)tothosethreemissionsets.”39AssumingthatspendingforthecounterterrorismisroughlythesameastheaveragespendingannualspendingduringtheFY2003-FY2017period,thisreportestimatesthattheaverageannualspendingforFY2018toFY2020isabout$59billionincurrentdollars.
CostsofPost-9/11WarVeteransMedicalCareandDisabilityCompensation
In2018,therewere4.1millionpost-9/11warveterans,comprisingabout21percentof
allveteransand16percentofallveteransservedbytheDepartmentofVeteransAffairs(VA).40Thepost-9/11warveteransare,ingeneral,lesshealthythantheveteransofpreviouswars.Advancesintraumaandbattlefieldmedicine,havemeantthattheveteransofthesewars,alsocalledGulfWareraIIveterans,havesurvivedtolivewithmoreservice-connecteddisabilitiesthanveteransofpreviouswars.Theseveterans,exposedtodifferentfieldconditionsandwhooftenservedmultipledeployments,needmoreanddifferentkindsofmedicalcarethantheveteransofpreviouswarsandthosecostswillonlyrise.For
38OfficeofManagementandBudget.(2017).AnalyticalPerspectives:BudgetoftheU.S.Government,FiscalYear2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives39Painter,SelectedHomelandSecurityIssuesforthe116thCongress.40BureauofLaborStatistics,USDepartmentofLabor.(21March2019).EmploymentSituationofVeterans—2018.https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/vet.pdf.
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example,theVAestimatesthatthe10yearcostofcaringforpost-9/11veteranswithtraumaticbraininjuries(TBI)alonewillbe$2.4billionfrom2020to2029.41
Nearlyhalfoftheseveteranshaveserviceconnecteddisabilityassessedtobe60
percentorgreater.42Thoseveteranswitha“ServiceConnectedDisability”areeligibleforcompensationbasedontheirpercentageofdisability.43Further,thoseveteranswhoarerated60percentandabovedisabledareeligibleforindividualunemployabilitybenefitsiftheymeetspecificcriteria,includingtheinabilitytomaintaingainfulemploymentasaresultoftheirserviceconnecteddisabilities.“InSeptember2018,356,668VeteransreceivedIU,anincreaseof8,156casesoverSeptember2017.”44Further,thedependentsofveteransarealsoentitledtoreceivecompensationandthenumberofdependentsreceivingserviceconnectedcompensationisgrowing.45
TheVAcountstheveteransofthepost-9/11warsinthesamecategoryasthe650,000
peoplecurrentlyintheVAwhoare1990GulfWarveteransandthus,veteransfromtheentireperiodfrom1990tothepresentarecategorizedas“GulfWarEraVeterans”intheVAdisabilitycompensationrecords.46IntheirFY2020budgettheVAestimatedthatveteranswhoservedfrom2August1990tothepresentcomprise50.7%ofthecompensationobligationsforallveteransofUSwars.47Thefollowingfigure,reproducedfromtheDepartmentofVeteransAffairs,showstheactualandprojectedcaseloadsof
41DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.(2019).VolumeII,MedicalProgramsandInformationTechnologyPrograms,p.VHA-150,https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2020VAbudgetVolumeIImedicalProgramsAndInformationTechnology.pdf.42BureauofLaborStatistics,EmploymentSituationofVeterans—2018.43Thosecompensationratesvarydependingonwhethertheveteranhasaspouse,parentsand/orchildren.ForthecurrentCompensationBenefitsRatesTablesee,U.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairs,(2019)https://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/resources_comp01.asp#BM01.Inaddition,thespousesandchildrenofservicemembersareeligibleforDependencyandIndemnityCompensation(DIC),“ataxfreemonetarybenefitpaidtoeligiblesurvivorsofmilitaryServicememberswhodiedinthelineofdutyoreligiblesurvivorsofVeteranswhosedeathresultedfromaservice-relatedinjuryordisease.”DepartmentofVeteransAffairs,https://benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/types-dependency_and_indemnity.asp.44DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.(2019).VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,p.VBA-59.https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2020VAbudgetvolumeIIIbenefitsBurialProgramsAndDeptmentalAdministration.pdf.45DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,2020CongressionalSubmission,p.VBA-57.VAServiceConnectedDisabilityratesaretiedtoSocialSecurityAdministrationCostsofLivingAdjustments.46TheGulfWarEraisthustwoperiods:thefirstperiodisPre-9/11with763,337servicemembersdeployedandparticipatingintheGulfWarfrom2August1990to10September2001.SeeDepartmentofVeteransAffairs.(February2011).GulfWarEraVeteransReport:Pre-9/11:August2,1990toSeptember10,2001,p.5.https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/GW_Pre911_report.pdf.47“Benefitsinthecompensationprogramareestimatedtobedispersedto5,033,113Veteransand443,407Survivorsin2020and5,192,776Veteransand456,294Survivorsin2021.The2020VeteranandSurvivorcaseloadestimateisdistributedamongWorldWarIIandPrior(76,823),KoreanConflict(126,947),VietnamEra(1,717,752),GulfWar(2,702,897),andPeacetime(852,101)periodsofservice.”DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,2020CongressionalSubmission,p.VBA-56.
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veteranswithdisabilityandcompensation.Thetopline,forGulfWarEraveteransandsurvivorsisgrowing,projectedtonearlydoublebetween2014and2021.
Figure4.DistributionofDisabilityCompensationCaseloadsbyPeriodofService,FY2014toFY202148
ConclusionsThemajortrendsinthebudgetarycostsofthepost-9/11warsinclude:lesstransparency
inreportingcostsamongmostmajoragencies;greaterinstitutionalizationofthecostsofwarintheDODbasebudget,StateDepartment,andDHS;andthegrowingbudgetaryburdenofveterans’medicalcareanddisabilitycare.
Opportunitiesexistforincreasingtransparencyaroundwar-relatedbudgeting.TheDOD
could,forexample,bemoretransparentabouttheuseofOCOappropriationsforallnamedand unnamed OCO operations. The Department of Homeland Security could clarify thespending for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks and other post-9/11 warmissions.TheDepartmentofVeteran’sAffairscouldconsistentlybreakoutthespendingonveteransofthepost-9/11warsfromthespendingonveteransofthe1991GulfWaranditsassociatedoperations.
Finally, there are opportunities to reduce the long term costsof intereston the debt
associatedwithmilitaryspendingforwars,forinstance,bysellingwarbondsorinstitutingapost-9/11wartax.
48Source:DepartmentofVeteransAffairs,VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,FY2020CongressionalSubmission,p.VBA-57.
