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MUMBAI MUN 2013
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Study Guide
Agenda: The Situation in Timor-Leste
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expositor of international opinion and actions throughout its tenure, unlike any
other body in the world. Its purview has grown, to the chagrin of some member
nations. For example, the Security Council met in April 2007 to discuss global
climate change as a threat to that international peace and security, which met
with protests from members of the UN not on the Security Council, concerned by
the Councils appropriation of that topic. Relevant to Topic Area B, Standards for
Intervention, Resolution 1674 in 2006 reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138
and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity, a principle never before stated explicitly as a
responsibility of the Security Council. The timeliness and force of this
intervention, though, as the discussion of Topic B will consider, remains unstated,
along with the Security Councils authority to deal with the effects of climate
change in member states. As it stands, however, the mission of the Security
Council as laid out by the Charter is still broadly interpreted, and countries
maintain that humanitarian and ecological disasters, for example, are within the
purview of the Security Council and its resolutions. The topics to be discussed
allow for the exercise of the Councils extraordinary powers in the field of
international relations and a deep consideration of the Security Councils role on
the global diplomatic stage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste gained independence on May 20, 2002,
after a long history of Portuguese colonialism and, more recently, Indonesian rule.
The young nation, with a population of 1.1 million, has been aided by the United
Nations under several different mandates under which the U.N. has provided
peacekeeping, humanitarian, reconstruction and capacity building assistance to
establish a functioning government. The current United Nations Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is slated to withdraw from the nation at the end
of 2012. The independence of Timor-Leste (also known as East Timor) followed a
U.N.-organized 1999 referendum in which the East Timorese overwhelmingly
voted for independence. In response, Indonesian-backed pro-integrationist
militias went on a rampage, killing an estimated 1,300people and destroying
much of Timor-Lestes infrastructure. For several years thereafter, the
international communitys main concern focused on possible tensions in East
Timors relations with Indonesia. Since 2006 the main threat to East Timor has
been internal strife resulting from weak state institutions, rivalries among elites
and security forces, deep-set poverty, unemployment, east-west tensions within
the country, and population displacement. The situation in Timor-Leste in 2012 is
relatively calm compared with recent periods of political strife and insurrection.The country held Presidential elections in March and April, which led to the
election of Tuar Matan Rauk, a former army chief.
The U.N. described the polls as peaceful, smooth and orderly. Parliamentary
polls are due on July 7. Stability has been aided by the 2006 reintroduction of
peacekeeping troops and a United Nations mission, the flow of revenue from
hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea, and improved political stability. East
Timor has significant energy resources beneath the Timor Sea.
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That said, Timor-Leste faces many serious challenges as it seeks to establish and
deepen a stable democracy and develop its economy. Many institutions in the
young nation remain weak, and tensions remain between the young countrys
political elites and among security forces. TimorLeste remains one of Asias
poorest nations, ranking 147thout of 187 countries on the United Nations Human
Development Index. Generating economic opportunity and employment are
among the governments greatest challenges. Congressional concerns have
focused on security and the role of the United Nations, human rights, East Timors
boundary disputes with Australia and Indonesia, and the strengthening of the
nations political system and functioning of its parliament. Key challenges for
Timor-Leste include creating enough political stability to focus on building state
capacity and infrastructure, providing employment, and preventing the oil-and-
gas revenue stream from being squandered by corruption or poor investment
decisions.
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III. INTERNAL STRIFE AND POLITICAL TURMOIL, 2006-
2008
A police mutiny in 2006 led to the deterioration of Timor-Lestes internal securitysituation and the reintroduction of foreign peacekeepers, from Australia, New
Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia. The Australian military contingent was the
largest with some 1,100 troops in country. The peacekeepers were deployed at
the invitation of the Timor-Leste government. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1704 of August 25, 2006, established the United Nations Integrated Mission in
Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with up to 1,608 police personnel and up to 34 military
liaison and staff officers. UNMITs mission included supporting the Timor-Leste
government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democraticgovernance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders in
their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation. The turmoil of
2006 can be traced to former Prime Minister Alkatiris dismissal of 591 members
of the 1,500-man military in March 2006. Those dismissed had protested their
working conditions and pay and claimed discrimination against members of the
force from western districts of Timor-Leste. In July 2006, it was reported that the
police had broken into factions, with some taking their weapons to join rebels in
the hills. The March 2006 dismissal of the protesting troops led to rioting, looting,
a number of deaths, and the fleeing of tens of thousands of mostly eastern Timor-
Leste from the capital, Dili, beginning in April 2006. As a result, Alkatiri stepped
down. A U.N. investigation found Alkatiri to have failed to use his firm authority
to denounce the transfer of security sector weapons to civilians. Former Interior
Minister Rogerio Lobato was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for
authorizing the transfer of weapons to pro-Fretilin supporters and a Fretilin-linked
hit squad. Another dimension of the escalating violence in Timor-Leste is the
gangs of largely unemployed youth. With the collapse of law and order in the
wake of the May 2006 police and military clashes, gang violence swept through
Dili, leading to further deaths, the displacement of more Dili residents from the
capital, and the widespread destruction of property. One of the leaders of the
violent protests of March 2006, which resulted in the mutiny of soldiers from
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IV. OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
In addition to the U.N. peacekeeping operation, the international humanitarian
aid community in Timor-Leste includes the United Nations, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and donor governments that
provide contributions and in-kind bilateral assistance. The international
community works closely with the East Timor Red Cross (Cruz Vermelha de Timor-
Leste) and with other national and local organizations. Many of the civilians
displaced by civil disturbances and strife in 2006 returned to their homes in the
2008-2009 time period. By April 2008, internally displaced persons (IDPs) willing
to return received recovery and reintegration packages and the government
began to decommission some of the IDP camps (at the height of the crisis there
were reportedly 65 IDP camps.) The Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) oversaw
the returns process with assistance from international organizations such as the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). In November 2008, roughly
10,400 families received recovery packages and returned and approximately 21
camps closed, while transitional shelter sites were constructed and continued to
house some of the displaced. On February 28, 2010, the last transitional shelter
officially closed. On May 31, 2010, the MSS concluded the housing assistance
component. Unseasonable rains in July and August 2010 caused severe floods andlandslides necessitating a disaster-response effort. Timor-Leste no longer has a
humanitarian crisis. However, much of its population remains highly vulnerable
because the country continues to face challenges with regard to poverty. Along
with increasing food prices and shortages of dietary staples, scarcity of arable
land and the impact of natural disasters have been cited as the primary reasons
for deterioration in food security. Furthermore, the sustainability of returns has
been impacted by unsettled land disputes, condition of the homes destroyed or
damaged during the conflict, and fear of violence in home villages, all of whichhave continued to present difficulties with reintegration of IDPs into their original
communities. Local communities may develop resentment towards the
government if new land title laws prove to be disruptive to local residents, many
of which hold their land under customary practice. In December 2008, the U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) ended its formal
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mission in Timor-Leste. In 2010, the U.N. Deputy Special Representative for
Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination relinquished
the title of Humanitarian Coordinator, a further indication that the humanitarian
crisis was over. Support from UNOCHA continues for specific, long-term activities.
For example, on December 1 and 2, 2011, it helped organize a workshop on
disaster risk management, the focus of which was to review the state of
preparedness for natural disasters and the contingency planning process. Efforts
involving other U.N. entities have included climate change adaption strategies
and planning.
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V. THE ECONOMY
Timor-Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world with approximately half
of Timorese living on a dollar a day or less. Generating employment is one of the
governments most pressing challenges. Nearly 80% of the population lives from
subsistence farming. Unemployment and underemployment combined are as
high as 70%, with a 20% unemployment in urban areas and a 40% rate among
youth. The government estimates that around 40% of the population lives below
the poverty line, and per capita income is estimated at $542 per annum. Timor-
Leste is one of the most energy-dependent economies in the world, based on
revenues from development of oil and gas in the Timor Sea. It has developed
some small-scale agricultural exports, particularly coffee, and tourist arrivals have
risen rapidly, though still only reached 27,000 in 2009. The economy is almost
exclusively dependent on government spending and foreign donor contributions.
Much infrastructure development is needed. According to the State Departments
budget justification document for FY 2013: Non-existent or under-developed
infrastructure, high unemployment, and the potential for insecurity pose major
development challenges as the country tries to make the transition from post-
conflict recovery to long-term economic and political development.
Portugal, Australia, and New Zealand have been three of the more active
supporters of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste and Australia have a joint agreement for
the exploitation of the oil and gas resources in the seabed that lies beneath the
Timor Sea that separates the two nations. The largest oil and gas field is known as
Greater Sunrise. While the Greater Sunrise area has yet to achieve development
leading to full production, Timor-Leste has built up considerable reserve funds
from the smaller Bayu-Undan oil and gas field. These reserves are thought to be
worth approximately $6 billion. One key controversy involves the Australian
consortiums intensions to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant
offshore rather than in Timor-Leste. Timorese government officials have long
sought an onshore LNG facility to boost employment.
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VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
a. Health
The healthcare situation was by far the most troubling aspect of humanitarianassistance in the refugee camps. In speaking with aid workers, several issues
repeatedly presented the most pressing risk. The rainy season, which is normally
three to four months, has thus far lasted over six months. People in the camps
already living in difficult physical conditions are now living in continuous damp,
exacerbating respiratory and other illnesses. Once the rains stop, mosquitoes will
breed; a potential malaria catastrophe looms. The normal environmental
prophylactic of fumigation will be impeded, since spraying on plastic sheeting
wont work, and blue plastic UN tarps are abundant in the camps. Further, thereis a shortage of mosquito netting.
The most fundamental healthcare problem is inadequate capacity to deliver
healthcare services. Before the refugees arrived, a ratio of 15,000 to 20,000 West
Timorese per doctor was the norm. This ratio still exists for West Timorese, but
more than 100,000 refugees must also be served by the same doctors. There are
not enough healthcare workers to staff clinics in areas with refugee populations,
and there is a shortage of vital medicines. Further, as of April 1, the Governmentof Indonesia (GOI) cut medical support for the camps. Consequently, the
Indonesian Red Cross no longer assists East Timorese living there. The GOI has
also recently ended a program in which recently graduated medical students were
sent to rural areas, further weakening the healthcare infrastructure. Some
international NGOs, such as World Vision, have already left West Timor.
Connected to this is the general lack of attention refugees in West Timor receive
in terms of international aid as compared to East Timor - a frustration voiced by
some aid workers.
A Doctors Without Borders (MSF) worker at Tuapukan informed the delegation
that approximately 240 people had perished there. She said that while the
general level of health in the camps is adequate, conjunctivitis, malaria, diarrhea,
and respiratory illnesses are present throughout Tuapukan. Many refugees are
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afraid to seek out assistance from MSF when sick. Possible explanations for this
are fear of medical personnel (there is a long history of abuse on the part of GOI
healthcare providers in East Timor); lack of knowledge about MSFs programs in
the camp; fear of repatriation as a result of medical attention; or the
misconception that payment is required for treatment. No general health census
has been conducted in Tuapukan, but mortality rates should be available in a
matter of weeks. MSF so far plans on being there until July 1, with the possibility
of extension contingent on the status of the crisis. They are now engaged in
training refugees in door-to-door health outreach.
Before the refugee crisis in West Timor, tuberculosis was already at epidemic
levels in East Timor. Refugees forcibly deported to West Timor in September
brought TB with them, and crowded, damp conditions in the camps have onlyexacerbated the problem. Yet largely because it is unclear how long the camps
will be extant, and that the six month regiment required for treating TB entails
daily supervision of medicine ingestion (disruption of treatment gives rise to drug-
resistant TB strains), refugees are not being treated for the disease.
b. Food
Refugees in West Timor are scattered throughout two hundred sites. While some
refugees live in large camps of over 10,000, many live in sites consisting of five or
six families. Some even live with West Timorese relatives. Access to food in the
larger camps is basic. According to a Catholic Relief Services (CRS) worker in
Tuapukan, for example, the nutritional status of children is stable. Access to food
at the many smaller sites is sub-standard, in large part due to their widely
dispersed locales and a lack of international NGO resources. Some delegation
members noted children in the camps with reddish hair, a sign of malnutrition.
Another negative aspect of food distribution is militia control. In Belu, workersfrom CRS escorted the delegation to the Cassa camp area, where members of the
delegation observed food distribution being directed by young men in militia and
pro-autonomy t-shirts. While international organizations try to lessen the effect
of militia control, it is difficult to know who is and who is not a militia member.
Further, in spite of whether food is given out at a central location or is delivered
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on a more "door-to-door" basis, relief groups are not necessarily able to prevent
militias from taking a "food tax."
c. Education
When walking through the camps, the number of children wandering freely is
noticeable. Only a minority of refugee children attend local schools. A refugee at
Noelbaki camp described a "tent school" run by volunteer teachers, themselves
refugees. The school consists of two rooms for primary and two rooms for
secondary levels. Children at the "tent school" attend classes for a total of four
and one- half hours per week.
d. Transmigration
According to several different sources, there has been a low level of local
relocation of displaced East Timorese, but no transmigration to other islands. A
priest in Atambua maintained that this is due in part to the length of time and
effort involved in preparing for a transmigration program.
e. West Timorese
The East Timorese refugee crisis has stretched resources and increased tensions
throughout West Timor, one of the poorest provinces of Indonesia. Physicalborders rarely distinguish refugee camps from surrounding communities. In some
areas, refugees equal or outnumber the existing West Timorese population,
creating both a psychological and physical strain on the local community.
Increasing levels of conflict among the refugees, such as a recent shooting, create
panic among West Timorese citizens. Further, the Indonesian government has
taken land from West Timorese for the camps without compensating the owners.
The GOI is only recently beginning to talk about compensation. West Timorese
are increasingly resentful of international aid to East Timorese refugees. Severalchurch leaders in West Timor voiced concern that the refugees are too
demanding, both on aid agencies and on West Timorese. Church and government
officials with whom we met reiterated their desire for the refugee crisis to be
resolved expeditiously for the sake of peace and stability in West Timor. But West
Timors civilian government has limited power to push for that goal.
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in truckloads to disrupt the UNHCR meeting. Interestingly, the majority of militia
leaders are well-off financially.
During the delegations visit to Tuapukan and Noelbaki refugee camps in Kupang,
the UNHCR worker leading the delegation through the camps was visibly nervous.He described the situation as a "fiasco" and a "circus," referring to a lack of
Indonesian military (TNI) presence in the camps. The previous day, the regional
military commander had assured the delegation of the civilian nature of the
camps. Presumably to coincide with his statements, civilian police were in charge
of security in the camps that the delegation visited the following day. Civilian
police actually have no control over the camps, and the security consequences of
this left the aid worker worried. He also told the delegation that throughout
Kupang, international aid organizations are unable to hire local staff because ofpotential threats from militias.
The UNHCR has a tricky relationship with the TNI. While the TNI is a source of
many problems for the refugees and aid workers, the UNHCR also relies on them
to provide protection and help in repatriation. To this end, they are in daily
contact with each other. At the same time, the UNHCR has to regularly prod the
TNI to stop creating problems.
h. Refugees Taken Off Timor Island
Some 11,000 to 30,000 East Timorese taken off Timor island are believed to still
be missing. A representative from ICRC (who admittedly does not work directly on
this issue) was unable to provide much information about this problem, nor was
the U.S. Embassys point person on East Timor. But UNHCR and ICRC in Kupang
apparently do exchange information weekly about off-island refugees. One
international aid worker commented that, as far as he knows, East Timorese
taken to Flores and Alor are better off economically and suffer far less fromintimidation, and recently ICRC transferred some 60 or 65 people from Flores to
East Timor. According to U.S. Embassy staff, there has been no formidable
response to the idea that there are large numbers of people taken off-island still
unaccounted for. He did mention the possibility that a number of East Timorese
children were taken to Islamic religious schools in Java, but, again, was unable to
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confirm anything. There is clearly a lack of coordinated effort to track the fate of
all of those taken off-island, and a possible lack of resources available for such
inquiries.
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VII. KEY BILATERAL RELATIONS
a. United States
U.S. aid programs in Timor-Leste have sought to build a viable and self-sufficientfree market economy, develop basic public services such as healthcare, and
support good governance through an emerging democratic political system and
post-conflict democracy initiatives. Total U.S. foreign assistance to Timor-Leste in
FY2012 is estimated at $14.5 million. The total request for Timor-Leste in FY2013
equals $12.8 million. In May 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation
approved a $10 million three-year threshold program with Timor-Leste. U.S.
assistance has helped the economic and political development of Timor-Leste by
supporting independent media, civil society organizations, and political parties aswell as strengthening the electoral process, building judicial institutions, and
strengthening governmental capacity in areas including the management of fiscal
resources. In July 2011, the State Department and Chinas Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced a joint program to promote food security in Timor-Leste.
b. Indonesia
The leadership of Timor-Leste has taken a practical approach to relations with
their relatively giant neighbor of over 240 million by seeking to put the past
history of poor relations between the two states behind them. A final report
issued by the joint Indonesian-Timor-Leste Truth Commission in May 2008
blamed Indonesia for atrocities in 1999. Though the report stopped short of
recommending amnesty for Indonesian military and militia leaders, it was seen as
a tacit agreement to move past the traumatic history. Indonesian President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono expressed his deep regret over the human rights
violations. President Ramos-Horta urged Timor-Leste to move on and put the past
aside after the report was released. Indonesia is seen as the most enthusiastic
proponent of allowing Timor-Leste membership in ASEAN. The two sides have
explored energy cooperation and other economic linkages. Other programs have
moved slower, including more coordination in border management, and the
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possibility of visa-free travel between Timor-Leste and the neighboring
Indonesian province of West Timor.
c. Australia and New Zealand
Australias political support for the cause of the Timorese has played a crucial role
in the creation of the independent state of Timor-Leste. Many Australians have a
sense of debt to the Timorese for the assistance that they gave to Australian
troops fighting the Japanese there during World War
Australia and New Zealand have helped to provide stability and have helped to
preserve the law and order situation in Timor-Leste during periods of instability
since 1999. As the security situation has improved, Australia and New Zealand
have reduced their military presence in the country. Despite this involvement,
relations between Australia and Timor-Leste are strained by disagreements over
Timor Sea energy resources. Prime Minster Gusmao called on Australia to be
more frank in its negotiations over undersea hydrocarbon resources. It is
estimated by one source that Australia and Timor-Leste will share revenue of as
much as $30 billion from the Greater Sunrise field. Timor-Leste is reportedly
acquiring two Korean patrol boats in addition to the two Chinese patrol boats thatit recently acquired. This is viewed as an effort to reify Timor-Lestes
independence and distance itself from Australia which previously offered to
conduct maritime patrols for Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste has great wealth
underneath the seabed in a large oil and gas field know as Greater Sunrise
between it and Australia. Under a previous agreement, decisions on how to
exploit Timor Sea energy resources were to be made on a commercial basis.
Timor-Leste has been hoping that private companies would decide to build a
pipeline to Timor-Leste, rather than to Darwin, Australia. Such a decision wouldenable Timor-Leste to develop processing facilities in Timor-Leste. The depth of
the sea bed and the steep rise on the Timor-Leste side of the Timor Sea have
worked against Timor-Lestes case. Australian media reports say that private
companies have decided to build a floating platform in the Timor Sea rather than
a pipeline to either Darwin or Dili. Woodside Corporation has stated that it
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believes the offshore platform will be worth $13 billion each to Australia and
Timor-Leste.
d. China
China is providing assistance with construction of government buildings and has
recently sold patrol boats to Timor-Leste which should help Timor-Leste protect
its maritime resources. Timor-Leste took delivery of two Shanghai Class naval
patrol boats in June 2010. Timor-Leste loses an estimated $40 million a year to
illegal fishing in its waters. Chinese assistance to Timor-Leste may be motivated
by a desire to obtain energy resources from the country. Timor-Lestes decision to
purchase the patrol boats from China rather than join the Australiangovernments South Pacific patrol boat program may be motivated by their desire
to balance their relationship with Australia.
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VIII. Past UN Actions/Resolutions
Resolution 1704 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5516th meeting, on
25 August 2006
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