United Nations Security Council · 2006-09-28 · 2 commended for his efforts, the 1st Temas, and...

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UFRGS Model United Nations 2006

United Nations Security Council

Dear Delegates,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the UFRGSMUN 2006 United Nations Security Council.

Our staff has been employing serious work for the past months to assure you will attend a

world class conference, experiencing the most a simulation can offer, learning and enjoying

yourselves at the same time.

The Council’s agenda for this year’s session is very punctual and pragmatic. You will

emerge as state representatives, seeking solutions through negotiation, to improve the Ivorian

and Lebanese scenarios. Both of the topics require a deep understanding of the regional

factors that influence the fragile stability of Cote d’Ivoire and Lebanon, as well as a strong

background on their past and present in order to the resolution attack the agenda’s key issues.

The UNSC team is composed of, for the first time in the four editions of UFRGSMUN, a

mix of Law and International Relations students, which promises to add an even more

versatile spirit to the Council. Ms. Cyntia Sandes Oliveira is an International Relations

student and will be working as a Director in this years UNSC edition. Ms. Oliveira is

surprisingly taking part on a security council for the first time. Her previous experiences in

model UN were in a completely different type of committee. She first started UN modeling

in 2004 as a UFRSMUN delegate, since then she embraced the idea and joined the

UFRGSMUN staff, as an assistant director of the SOCHUM were her moderating skills were

of notice and generated such a change of committees. In 2005 she was also a delegate of the

8th AMUN were she was well commended for her efforts.

Mr. Érico Teixeira de Loyola is one of the Directors of this year’s United Nations Security

Council. Mr. Loyola’s first experience with UN modeling was in 2003, attending this very

Security Council as a British ambassador, earning an Honorable Mention award. Since then

he has participated in several simulations, for instance the 7th AMUN, where he was as well

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commended for his efforts, the 1st Temas, and 2004 UFRGSMUN edition as a Spanish

delegate at SPECPOL. In 2005 he was chosen to participate in the Security Council as an

Assistant-Director, later accepting the opportunity to, together with Ms. Oliveira, chair this

committee in 2006.

Mr. Carlos Augusto Cardoso Gorito is a 4th semester International Relations student and will

join this committee as an Assistant-Director. Mr. Gorito has found the participation on

modeling UN a great experience therefore, after taking part in last year's UFRGSMUN

Security Council, he decided to apply the subscription for this year’s staff in which his

diplomatic and researching skills led him to join this UNSC edition. According to him, MUN

conferences are a great way to learn, exchange experiences and voice new ideas.

Mr. Daniel Hirtz, an International Relations student, has been working in Topic Area A –

The Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, designated as Assistant-Director. Mr. Hirtz has previously

participated in UFRGSMUN 2005 as the Venezuelan delegate at the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development, being granted the Honorable Mention Award

Certificate, and soon invited to take part in this years’ edition.

Mr. Filipe Scherer Oliveira will occupy the position of Committee Academic Secretary,

functioning as a handy-man within the Council, assisting the remainder of the chairs in the

areas of research and moderation. Mr. Oliveira, currently enrolled in the 5th year of the Law

School, is well experienced with Model UN. Last year, he cumulated the duties of Director

of the UNSC and Under-Secretary-General for Academics Affairs, being responsible for all

the UFRGSMUN academic issues. Mr. Oliveira has also been an awarded delegate in UN

Models such as AMUN and SOI, participated in International Law Moot Court Competitions

and was an exchange student at the University Of Texas School Of Law as a member of a

FIPSE-CAPES exchange program.

We wish that this simulation gives you the excitement, challenge and knowledge you are

looking for. UFRGSMUN is a terrific opportunity to enhance debating and negotiation skills,

and to learn more about the UN system as a whole. We hope you enjoy every second you

spend in Porto Alegre in late October and early November. We must remind you that

although the Study Guides were written to provide you with a comprehensive view of both

topics, they must not be your only source of research: read them, but do not read only them.

Also, please join the UNSC e-group ([email protected]) so

you can get online with your fellow delegates and chairs.

In case you have any doubts or questions prior to the conference, do not hesitate in

contacting us! It will be our utmost pleasure to have you as guests in our University and city!

Yours truly,

The Security Council’s Staff.

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INTRODUCTION

UNSC’s General Background

The Security Council, according to Chapter V of the UN Charter, is the body, within the UN

framework, assigned with the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security. The

Council was created on October 24th, 1945, as the most important body of the UN, being the

only committee capable of imposing binding resolutions upon nations. Its binding nature

turns to be a great difference from the other UN forums, and in many ways, ends up defining

it.

When crafted, the Security Council had only 11 seats and reflected the balance of global

powers of the time. Although the number of seats has been changed to 15, after an

amendment to article 23 of the UN Charter in 1965, many aspects of the composition of the

Security Council are still targets of criticism, and studies on the reformulation on the Council

are currently being conducted. The committee has five permanent members, frequently

referred to as P-5, which reflect the most powerful nations of the time in which the Council

was created: Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. These member states have

the power to block any substantive decision, in what is commonly referred to as “veto

power”: if any of them votes against any resolution or clause, for instance, it automatically

fails.

The remaining 10 countries are elected by the General Assembly, which has demonstrated

through the years the tendency to elect five members from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern

Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other states. The

sessions of 2006 will have the following composition: Argentina, China, Congo, Denmark,

France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Slovakia, United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of

America. The Presidency of the body is held in turns, of one calendar month each, by its

members in the English alphabetical order of their names.

Its function within the UN and international framework makes the Security Council issue

resolutions on key issues of international politics, affecting directly the lives of millions.

Although it is empowered to make use of force, the Council, while dealing with threats to

peace and security, has a practice of employing all possible efforts to persuade the parties to

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reach a friendly agreement, and helping the ceasing of the dispute, either by further

investigating or by mediating it. The body has the power to nominate Special

Representatives or request the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative of its

own to follow more closely any crisis that might emerge. The Council also frequently uses

sanctions, such as embargoes, to create pressure on a given nation or nations, so the

controversies can be resolved. Moreover, the committee is allowed, by Chapter VII of the

UN Charter, to make use of force, authorizing unilateral and multilateral military operations,

as well as the deployment of peacekeeping operations.

Finally, the UN Charter recognizes the right of a member state which does not have a seat in

the Council to participate of its sessions, without the right to vote, when the Council

considers that the matter being discussed specially affects the interests of that member.

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TOPIC AREA A

The Situation in Côte d’Ivoire

By Érico Teixeira de Loyola and Daniel Hirtz

“The Ivoirians must reconnect with the peaceful history of their country so that it may continue to be an engine of integration and progress in West Africa. This requires vision, firm political will and an unflinching determination to work together”.

Kofi Annan, 25 January 2003

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to facilitate the understanding of the current events and the identification of the main

characters and their roles in the struggle that is taking place in Côte d´Ivoire it is essential to

previously explain the political development of the country since its independence in 1960.

Félix Houphouët-Boigny ruled Côte d’Ivoire since 1960 until his death in 1993. Mr.

Houphouët-Boigny and his party, the Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (hereinafter

PDCI), were first empowered after a single-party candidature election in November 27th of

1960, and from that moment on they were reelected several times for five-year terms.

Côte d’Ivoire was, if compared to its neighbors in West Africa, a successful case of

economical and political stability. The one-party regime established at the moment of

independence guaranteed a good environment for investments, controlling popular uprisings,

easing ethnic and religious tensions and opening the country’s economy to foreign investors.

This policy attracted many enterprises, mainly French, which made large investments in the

primary sector, leading to a great economical growth during the first two decades after

independence. Moreover, besides allowing important infrastructural revenues, the

development of Côte d’Ivoire stimulated immigration of workers from neighboring

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countries, such as Ghana, Burkina Faso and Liberia, who were gradually occupying the

northern part of the country.1

However, the situation started changing in the second half of the 1970s: a combination of

droughts and low prices in the world market resulted in a dramatic income reduction and the

country entered a period of recession during the eighties.2 This situation generated social

unease, which eventually resulted in changes in governmental economic practices and in a

slight democratization of the political and electoral systems.

In 1990 Houphouët-Boigny approved a law authorizing the first multiparty elections. In

October of that year, concurring with one of the founders of the Front Populaire Ivorien

(hereinafter FPI), the historian and trade union leader Laurent Gbagbo, was elected receiving

82% of the votes.3 Three years later, Houphouët-Boigny died, paving the way to Henri

Konan Bedié, who was the president of the National Assembly at that time and first in the

succession line to become the country’s Head of State. However, despite the pressure from

his political rivals from the FPI and the Rassemblement des Républicains (henceforth RDR,

led by the Burkinabe descendant Alassane Ouattara4) to deepen the reform of the electoral

system, Bedié, who was as well as his predecessor a member of PDCI, was reelected in 1995

with 95% of the ballots in a very questionable voting process, that was boycotted by the FPI

and RDR.5

The government of Bedié was marked by the outbreak of ethnical tensions. Trying to

maintain his status, the newly elected president started advocating the concept of “Ivoirité”,

or “Pure Ivoirians”. This resulted in the approval, by the National Assembly, of a vicious

reformulation of the conditions to have granted the Ivoirian citizenship and to acquire and

maintain land tenure in the hands of those considered “not-Ivoirians”, stipulating that,

besides being born in Côte d’Ivoire, to be acknowledged as “Ivoirian,” both of one’s parents

should also be born as Ivoirians. Therefore, because only those who fitted the mentioned

conditions were allowed to vote and run for offices, many immigrants were left out of the

political process.6 Among those affected by this segregating legal reform was the leader of

the RDR, Alassane Ouatarra, who although born in Côte d’Ivoire soil, had Burkinabe

parentage, and for this reason was considered ineligible.

Dissatisfaction grew, and as the conflict amongst different ethnic groups was hardening and

the economical situation was deteriorating, a coup d’État led by low rank militaries ousted

Bedié from the presidency in the end of 1999. Hereupon this event General Robert Guei was

invited and accepted to replace the deposed president, promising to work for “national

1 GBERIE, Lansana; “The Crisis in Ivory Coast”. Available at: www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5769. Last accessed: 14 May 2006. 2 Country Data Website. Available at: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-6953.html. Last acessed: 14 May 2006. 3 L’etat de Droit Website. Available at: www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/chronologie/ivorycoast.html. Last accessed: 14 May 2006; 4 Alassane Ouattara was the prime-minister of Houphouët-Boigny’s government during the 1990-1993 period. 5 VAN HEMELDONCK, Marijke; Côte d’Ivoire: Embellie Durable?. Le Courrier, edition 166, Bruxelles, 1997, p. 35/38. 6 R.G.C. “Conflict, Crisis and Soccer in Côte d’Ivoire”; Available at: http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/630/63/. Last accessed: 14 May 2006

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reconciliation”.7 However, his promises were never fulfilled: the electoral model adopted by

Bedié was kept intact and it was utilized to hinder Alassane Ouattara’s participation in the

year 2000 suffrage.

Debates heated up and the political climate worsened when the PDCI decided not to offer a

presidential candidate and Alassane Ouattara from the RDR had his candidacy disqualified

by the Supreme Court based on the citizenship laws. With only 37% of the electorate

voting,8 Robert Guei declared his victory over his only strong contender, Laurent Gbagbo

from the FPI, and proclaimed himself as the new president. This fact caused violent

demonstrations all across the country, and eventually the Supreme Court declared Laurent

Gbagbo as the winner and Guei fled the country.

Notwithstanding, restlessness between rival ethnical groups resumed, as members of the

RDR were still demanding reforms in the citizenship laws, as well as the appointment of new

elections. In 2002 a major unrest flared all across the country:9 cities such as Abidjan – the

administrative capital – and Bouaké witnessed demonstrations and the action of a well

equipped militia group, self-proclaimed Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI).

This militia conquered in a short time the northern part of the country and took the northern

suburbs of the capital Yamoussoukro. Meanwhile, President Gbagbo used the loyal divisions

of the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and managed to repel the attacks

against Abidjan, the financial heart of Côte d’Ivoire, holding the coastal area and south

region. Nonetheless, Gbagbo also invoked an old defence treaty with France, which sent

troops (the Licornes) to protect its own nationals and intimidate the rebel forces.10 This was

followed by the deployment of military personnel under the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) command.11 In the meantime two other rebel groups emerged:

the Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement Pour la

Justice et la Paix (MPJ), which captured cities in the western area of the country, close to the

border with Liberia and Guinea.12

In January of 2003, with the support of ECOWAS and France (which in that very month had

its military presence recognized and approved by the United Nations Security Council) a

cease-fire was signed and the Ivoirian political forces gathered for round talks. There they

accorded to establish what would be acknowledged as the “Linas-Marcoussis Agreement”,

that a “Government of National Reconciliation” should be established under the leadership

of Côte d’Ivoire’s Prime Minister.13 However, on 13 May 2003 the Security Council

7 RGC. “Conflict, Crisis and Soccer in Côte d’Ivoire”… 8 BALDÉ, Sory; “Côte d’Ivoire: Situation Institutionnelle”; Available at: http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/institutionnel/cotivoir.html. Last accessed: 14 may 2006. 9 9 GBERIE, Lansana; “The Crisis in Ivory Coast”… 10 RGC. “Conflict, Crisis and Soccer in Côte d’Ivoire”… 11 This force was baptized MICECI: Mission de la CEDEAO (Communauté Économique pour le Développement des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) en Côte d´Ivoire. 12 ECOWAS; “Côte d’Ivoire”; SAS ECOWAS PART 2 DEF; Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004. After the Linas-Marcoussis agreement the three major rebel groups (MPCI, MPIGO and the MPJ) were reunited under the “umbrella name” Forces Nouvelles, as a reference to their new role on Côte d’Ivoire’s future (see ECOWAS; “Côte d’Ivoire” SAS ECWOWAS PART 2 DEF). For further information on this group, check this website: http://www.fnci.info. 13 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Available at: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/ cote_divoire_01242003en.html. Last accessed 14 May 2006.

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established MINUCI, the Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire, which in April 2004

became a regular Peacekeeping Operation. It absorbed ECOWAS and MINUCI troops under

the Operation des Nations Unies en Cote d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and establish a close liaison with

Licorne forces as an attempt to boost effectiveness and to secure the observance of Linas-

Marcoussis Agreement and subsequent accords,14 which were being steadily disrespected,

insufflating a dangerous breach to peace.15

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Currently the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is the following: the country is still divided in a

government controlled south and a rebel hold north, separated by a west/east buffer zone

established in the central area of the territory by French and ECOWAS troops, whose

presence is legitimated by the United Nations Security Council. Worth mentioning is that the

elections programmed to take place in the end of 2005 as part of the national reconciliation

accords were not respected by President Gbagbo, who postponed them to October 2006.

Moreover, he reluctantly concedes prerogatives to the transitional Prime Minister appointed

by foreign mediators, Charles Konan Banny,16 who by his turn is being pushed by politicians

to take decisive steps to contain the recurrence of violent outbreaks among different ethnic

groups and reform the citizenship and naturalization laws.

Furthermore, as general elections approach (they are scheduled for the end of October 2006),

skirmishes between rival ethnical, political and religious groups tend to become more

frequent. Thus, it is utterly necessary to analyze the factors and characteristics of the

Ivoirian conflict, as well as to be acquainted with the interests involved and its consequences

in West Africa, in order to better comprehend the present situation.

2.1 The ethnical and religious intolerance

The country is composed of several ethnical groups and subgroups, being the most important

the Akan (42.1%), the Krous (11%), the Southern Mandes (10%), the Voltaiques or Gur

(17.6%) and the Northern Mandes (16.5%). The Akan, Krous and Southern Mandes inhabit

coastal south areas, from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro, and are overwhelmingly Christians,

while the other groups inhabit the north and are mainly Muslims originally from francophone

West African States.17

14 For further information on these treaties check the “Previous International Actions” section in this Study Guide. 15 United Nations. Lansana Gberie & Prosper Addo - Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’ Ivoire - Report on an Expert Workshop by KAIPTC and ZIF. Monograph No 105. Date of Adoption: August 2004 . 16 CIA World Factbook Website. Available at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html. Last accessed: 14 May 2006. 17 CIA World Factbook Website, …

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In this scenario of diversity, the question of the Ivoirian identity has always been raised by

governmental authorities - especially after the electoral reforms of 1990 - in moments of

economical difficulties or to undermine certain politicians’ candidacies.18 In contrast to

President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who, due to his awareness of the fragility of Côte

d’Ivoire’s social fabric, always tried to have the diversity of cultures and ethnics represented

in his governmental cabinet. The recent leaders of Côte d’Ivoire underestimated or neglected

this issue. The policy of Ivoirité, implanted by Henri Konan Bedié, can be analyzed as an

Akan ethnic group policy, and more specifically a bauolé subgroup one, which supposedly

would have ascendancy over the other groups due to allegedly having “imbued aristocratic

values through the centuries”.19

This ideological conceptualization, which was in some ways similar to the one that justified

the massacres in 1994 in Rwanda, where an “ethnicalization” of politics resulted in the

separation the country in two distinct areas: the South, composed by Christian Akan and Kur,

and the Muslim North, populated by the Mandes, dioulas and other ethnic groups from

surrounding countries. Moreover, this policy intensely affected Côte d’Ivoire’s economy,

especially the plantations, which are suffering from a deficit of manpower due to the fleeing

of Burkinabes and Malians.20

The racial and religious intolerance has also resulted in a humanitarian tragedy. Besides the

scores of people killed in clashes since 2002, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are

calculated to be 700,000.21 Summary executions, torture, participation of kids in the armed

forces, illegal confiscation of every sort of goods and cases of sexual violence are also very

frequent in both Forces Nouvelles22 and government controlled areas.23

Despite the efforts of ONUCI, UN specialized agencies and NGOs, it seems that the situation

in Côte d’Ivoire is rather far from normality. The recent increment on the UN presence in the

area24 is a proof that there is still much to be done to reach a solid national unity, which is

extremely necessary to avoid a definitive disruption of the country.

2.2 The struggle for power: the political rivalry

It is clear that the death of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny caused great impact in Côte

d’Ivoire’s internal affairs. He was a very skilled politician, and as the head of the Parti

18 RGC. “Conflict, Crisis and Soccer in Côte d´Ivoire”… 19 JOLIVET, Elen; L’Ivoirité: de la Conceptualisation a la Manipulation de L´Identité Ivoirienne; 2003; Available at: www.rennes.iep.fr/IMG/pdf/jolivet.pdf; Last Accessed: 21 May 2006. 20 PAWSON, Lara; “Ethnic Split Stirs Ivory Coast Crisis”; BBC News, published in 18 February 2004; Available at: www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/3496069.stm; Las Accessed: 15 May 2006. 21 DIEYE, Abdoulaye Mar; Système des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire : Communique De Presse Du Coordonnateur Humanitaire ; Available at : http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2140; Last Accessed : 21 May 2006. 22 Check reference n.13 of this Study Guide. 23 ONUCI - Division des Droits d l´Homme; Rapport sur la situation des Droits de l’Homme en Côte d’Ivoire; January/February 2005; Available at: http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/onuci/jan_feb_2005.pdf. Last accessed: 21 May 2006. 24 By 31 March 2006 the UNOCI had 7,589 uniformed military personnel. For more information check http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unoci/facts.html.

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Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) he implanted a very efficient administrative body and

established good relations with all ethnic groups, who were represented in his ministerial

cabinet and in the National Assembly.25

A political void was created after 1993 with the ascension of Henri Konan Bedié and later

with the 1995 general elections. In 1997 Côte d’Ivoire had around 90 parties acting within its

territory,26 but only three of them had a nationwide political activism: the already mentioned

PDCI, RDR and FPI. As for the rebel movements that arose during the 2002 crisis, there are

those established under the umbrella name Forces Nouvelles, which were formed to go

against the leadership of the present president, and several small pro-Gbagbo militias such as

the Young Patriots.

The PDCI is a centrist party, and has the support of the south Christian baoulé, a large

ethnical group who occupies the south and coastal area. Although its political view can be

considered “centrist”, in its early stages it had an internal structure very similar to the French

Communist Party.27 In its rows, the segregationist concept of Ivorité grew stronger,28

resulting in the controversial legal reforms on the grounds to obtain the Ivoirian citizenship.

The PDCI is the most traditional party of Côte d’Ivoire republican history and its major

financial resources come from wealthy plantations owners.

The FPI is led by the current President of Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo. It is considered a

socialist party,29 emerging in the country’s universities as an alternative to the one-party

regime of the PDCI. Nowadays, however, the party supposedly backs several pro-Gbagbo

militia groups such as the Young Patriots and the Front pour la Libération du Grand Ouest.

It also has the control of the FANCI, the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire.30

For its turn, the RDR has its roots in the northern area of Côte d’Ivoire, being very accredited

by immigrants, especially Burkinabé. Politically centrist, its main leader, Alassane Ouattara,

was Prime Minister of the country during Houphouët-Boigny government.31 It has close

links to the Forces Nouvelles, more specifically with the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte

d’Ivoire, the most important rebellious group in activity, led by Guillaume Soro. Moreover,

the party allegedly has the support of Burkina Faso’s government and some Liberian

warlords.32

All the political forces mentioned were signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

However, their capacity to commit to peace and mutual respect is utterly necessary to bring

stability to the country. Democracy is still a fragile concept in Côte d’Ivoire, and the major

parties, as well as the most notable insurgent movements, have all failed in their obligations

towards the international community. Moreover, there is great concern whether the elections

25 ABDOURHAMANEH, Boubacar Issa; “Ivory Coast Institutional Situation - Political Process; Available at: ttp://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/institutionnel/ivorycoast.html; Last Accessed: 16 May 2006. 26 GBAGO, Laurent; Le Courrier, edition n. 166, p. 49. 27 Country Studies Website; Available at: http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/9.htm; Last Accessed: 16 May 2006. 28 See page 2 of this Study Guide. 29 Front Populaire Ivorien Website; www.fpi-ci.org; Last accessed: 16 May 2006. 30 ECOWAS; “Côte d´Ivoire”; SAS ECOWAS PART 2 DEF; Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004. 31 Rassemblement des Républicains Website; www.le-rdr.org; Last accessed: 17 May 2006. 32 ECOWAS; “Côte d’Ivoire”; SAS ECOWAS PART 2 DEF; Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004.

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scheduled to take place in October will happen and if so, the parties will respect its

upcoming result.

2.3 The Foreign Interference and Cross-Border Effects of the Crisis

The ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire undeniably has transnational factors that interfere in

the current political turmoil. Located in a strategic point of West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire,

which is the second largest economy of ECOWAS, has been affected by the instability of

countries such as Liberia and Burkina Faso, and surely the present crisis is causing a great

impact in the sub-region as a whole. Some of the cross-border aspects of this in-progress

conflict are the flows of returnees and refugees (specially into Mali, Guinea, Liberia and

Burkina Faso), the disruption of regional trade, the existence of links between political elites

and rebel groups in neighboring countries, the involvement of regional powers in the Ivoirian

internal affairs and the illicit flow of goods and resources such as diamonds and timber.33

One of the most representative elements of this influence is the alleged control of the former

Liberian leader Charles Taylor over antigovernment groups in Côte d’Ivoire such as the

Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement por la Justice

et la Paix (MJP). These forces control the western part of country and are used to protect

Charles Taylor’s army’s east flank against the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire

(MPCI). Meanwhile Gbagbo himself is accused of supporting Liberian anti-Taylor forces

who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire.34

As for Burkina Faso, a poor country ruled by the authoritarian president Blaise Compaoré

since 1987, it is attributed to this state the logistical assistance to the strongest rebel group in

activity in Ivoirian soil, considered the spine of the Forces Nouvelles: the MPCI. The 2002

unrest was supposedly planned in Burkina Faso, and following the ethnical clashes

thousands of Burkinabé have returned to their country. This resulted in an economical

recession in both Côte d’Ivoire, whose plantation productivity diminished, and in Burkina

Faso, which is now dealing with the heavy burden represented by the returnees. It is also

unable to utilize the port of Abidjan to ship its exportation goods, which negatively act on its

already fragile economy.35

The ECOWAS and France also play an important role in Côte d’Ivoire politics and security.

The presence of the first within the ONUCI, as well as the Licorne forces of the latter in the

central area of the country is essential for the maintenance of the fragile equilibrium between

the militias and the government. Notwithstanding, UN and French troops are commonly

attacked by groups connected to both Forces Nouvelles and FANCI, which raises some

uncertainty over the veracity of the factions engagement towards peace process.

33 HUSSEIN, Karim and GNISCI, Donata; Conflict and development policy in the Mano River region and Côte d’Ivoire: the regional stakes for stability and reconstruction – Summary Conclusion; Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/26/36195128.pdf; Last Accessed: 21 May 2006. 34 International Crisis Group; Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over; nº72, 28 November 2003. 35 ECOWAS. SAS ECOWAS Part 2 DEF – Burkina Faso. Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004.

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3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The situation in Côte d’Ivoire became a matter of serious concern in the Security Council for

the first time in late 2002, most specifically on December 20th, when it expressed its regret

for the country’s political crisis, condemning the use of force to overthrow the elected and

therefore legitimate government, emphasizing the constitutional order and respect to human

rights, and international law. The Council pleaded the President to seek a pacific solution for

the political instability, a solution which was to involve all parties in the negotiation.

Rhetoric aside, the Security Council established its support to the Economic Community of

West African States’ involvement in Côte d’Ivoire, under Senegal’s leadership. It also

encouraged ECOWAS mediation and further efforts to bring a pacific end to the conflict.

Along with the African Union, the Council commended France for its efforts of reaching a

pacific solution and hosting any further agreements.

From this date onward, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire increasingly gained importance in the

Security Council’s agenda. On 4 February 2003 (meeting 4700) it adopted resolution 1464,36

which endorsed the “Linas-Marcoussis Agreement” - signed by the Ivoirian political forces

in France, on 23 February 2003 – emphasizing the importance of its full and ready

implementation, the mediation of ECOWAS and French troops, and the necessity of the

former to report actions to the Council. In the referred agreement, a Government of

Reconciliation was set out with the objective of restoring peace and stability. All political

prisoners should be released, groups disarmed and ceasefire assured. A Prime Minister,

indicated by the President together with other political parties, was to lead such Government

until the upcoming elections, scheduled for 2005. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement also

planned a program to deal with the prime causes of instability: the controversies related to

citizenship and to the status of foreign nationals; the voting system and the eligibility to run

for the presidency; and the land tenure system. The Agreement became the most realistic and

effective option to resolve the conflict, stabilize the country and promote national

reconciliation and territorial integrity.

The President’s reluctance to trust the Prime Minister with the authority needed to put the

Agreement in practice, the emergence of new armed groups, the challenge of organizing the

2005 elections, among other difficulties, all placed serious barriers to the Linas-Marcoussis

Agreement. It became important, in the carrying out of the peace process, to create a United

Nations mission that would coordinate activities in the country. The Mission des Nations

Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) was therefore organized for the reported purposes. On 13

May 2003 (meeting 4754) a new resolution was elaborated by the Council.37 The document

still placed major hopes on the Agreement as the most efficient means of reaching a pacific

solution and political stability. Improvement was seen in Côte d’Ivoire’s situation, when the

Forces Nouvelles announced the end of the groups’ suspension in the participation in the

Government of National Reconciliation. The rebels had withdrawn from the political posts 36 S.C. Resolution 1464, UN Doc. S/RES/1464 (2003). 37 S.C. Resolution 1479, UN Doc. S/RES/1479 (2003).

13

claiming that their personal security was at risk, but also as an opposition to the appointment

of the Ministers of Defense and of National Security.

On 10 November 2003, the Security Council received a message from the President of the

Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in which he requested the presence of a United Nations

peacekeeping operation, in order to support the stabilization process. As a result, the Council

issued resolution 1527,38 which aimed at extending MINUCI’s mandate, and announced the

deployment of the requested peacekeeping unit. Resolution 152839 established then the

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which took on MINUCI’s and

ECOWAS’ authority. UNOCI was to share logistical and administrative facilities with other

missions acting in West Africa, and, most importantly, working together with the United

Nations Missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, with the particular objective of preventing the

passage of arms and fighting groups through common borders. Other than that, the

Operation focused on the restoration of the internal security services, such as civilian police,

and the judiciary system; it placed major concern in the observance of Human Rights.

It was a predictable measure set out in late 2004 and February 2005: the Security Council,

through resolution 1572,40 established an arms embargo and travel bans, demanding all

countries to “take the necessary measures” for the success of the decision.41 The following

resolution (1584) made clear the responsibility of UNOCI and French forces in carrying and

monitoring the embargo.42

Since late 2002, the Council has adopted seventeen resolutions concerning the situation in

Côte d’Ivoire.43 The latest resolutions (S/RES/1652, from January 2006, and S/RES/1657,

from February 2006) seem to, unfortunately, have lost the faith in the Linas-Marcoussis

Agreement. The endorsement of the Agreement is no longer among the preambulatory

clauses. A preoccupying phrase, however, remains: “Expressing its serious concern at the

persistence of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and of obstacles to the peace and national

reconciliation process from all sides”. The situation remains critical and stability remains

distant.

3.1 The Accra III Agreement

The Agreement was the third signed in Ghana’s capital city since September 2002, when the

crisis initiated. In its 5018th meeting, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the

Agreement signed on 30 July 2004 by President Laurent Gbagbo, Prime Minister Seydou

Diarra - representing the Government of National Reconciliation - and the representatives of

38 S.C. Resolution 1527, UN Doc. S/RES/1527 (2004). 39 S.C. Resolution 1528, UN Doc. S/RES/1528 (2004). 40 S.C. Resolution 1572, UN Doc. S/RES/1572 (2004). 41 Press Releases Concerning the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1572 (2004) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc United Nations. /committees/CI/CIPressEng.htm. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 42 S.C. Resolution 1584, UN Doc. S/RES/1584 (2005). 43 United Nations Website: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006.

14

Ivoirian political parties, signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.44 The summit was

an invitation of President of Republic of Ghana and ECOWAS’ President in Office, John

Agyekum Kufuor, and of the United Nations’ Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Several

African Heads of State were present.45 The Accra III Agreement gave continuity to the

Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and previous Accra decisions. It focused on the matter of

eligibility for Presidency and future elections, as well as militia’s disarmament.

3.2 The Pretoria Agreement

Signed on 6 April 2005, in Pretoria, South Africa, the Pretoria Agreement was an initiative

of the African Union, mediated by South African President, Thabo Mbeki, which urged the

states to carry on with their responsibilities settled by the Linas-Marcoussis and Acra III

Agreements.46 The meeting was attended by President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister

Seydou Diarra, who represented the Government of National Reconciliation; by former

President Henri Konan Bédié, representing the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire; by

former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Quattara, representing the Rassemblement de

Républicains; and by Minister of State Guillaume Soro, Secretary-General of the Forces

Nouvelles. Among its major decisions were: to end the hostilities and the use of force, to

honor the Linas-Marcoussis, Acra II and Acra III Agreements, as well as United Nations

resolutions and to reaffirm their commitment to the success of upcoming elections, which

included the creation of an independent electoral commission. The National Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Plan (PNDDR) was to be set out after the meeting of the

Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the Armed

Forces of the Nouvelles Forces (FAFN). The Agreement also dealt with guaranteeing

security in the region controlled by the Forces Nouvelles and to its government members,

and with the composition of the Board of Directors of the Ivoirian Radio and Television

(RTI).

4 BLOC POSITIONS

China has closely followed the situation in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 coup. It currently

maintains seven integrants in United Nations Peacekeeping operation, two of them acting in

44 ReliefWeb. Security Council welcomes 30 July agreement aimed at consolidating Côte d’Ivoire peace process, 5 August 2004. Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/50bea5c1e3981e8185256ee7006f335a. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 45 BusinessAfrica.net. Available at: http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accraIII_agreement.php. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 46 Pretoria Agreement – Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa. Available at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/ivor0701.htm. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006.

15

Abidjan.47 The Asian country strongly believes in the ability of Ivorians to reestablish peace

and political stability.

Denmark has among its priorities the strengthening of the Security Council and the situation

in the African Continent.48 Confident in International Law and in United Nations’ main

organs, most specifically, the Security Council, Denmark hopes to cease Côte d’Ivoire’s

crisis through the full implementation of UN’s resolutions, as well as the Linas-Marcoussis,

the Accra III, and Pretoria Agreements.

France, with the support of the United Nations, kept significant military presence in the

country since the September 2002 coup. As a legacy of the colonization past, the country has

always carried close relations with Côte d’Ivoire, which included defense agreements and

assistance. France’s original goal was to protect its nationals in West Africa, but its

participation grew and the Licorne (France’s peacekeeping unit) became a major actor,

preventing total bloodshed and deterioration.49 France truly believes in the necessity of

United Nations Peacekeeping Force’s (UNOCI) reinforcement as a means to guarantee the

full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria Agreements. Present

contingents are of 6240 men in UNOCI, and 4000 under French command.

Ghana, as a member State of the Economic Community of West African States, has been

deeply involved in seeking a peaceful solution for the neighboring conflict. John Agyekum

Kufuor, president of Ghana and former ECOWAS president, played a major role in the

struggle for stabilization and national reconciliation through the Accra agreements. The

decision reached in the capital contributed to reaffirm the previous commitments of the

Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to cease Côte d’Ivoire’s stalemate.50

Japan encourages African and Ivorian efforts in the struggle for peace and political stability.

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) can be taken as an

example of how the country addresses problems in Africa. Ms. Yoriko Kamaguchi, Minister

for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in 2002,51 expressed the importance of “social harmonization”

and refugees’ assistance. In Sierra Leone, Japan assists in a reintegration program of former

combatants. The East-Asian country stresses the importance of addressing African conflicts

as regional challenges, commends ECOWAS, African Union, and United Nations’ efforts in

the region and is happy to help the AU through the AU Peace Fund.

The Russian Federation early expressed, in January 2004, through the statement of its

Deputy Permanent Representative in the United Nations, Alexander Konuzin, the country’s

47 China Daily. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/21/content_514288.htm Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Available at: http://www.um.dk/en/menu/ForeignPolicy/PeaceSecurityAndInternationalLaw/UNSecurityCouncil/ Last accessed: 14 May 2006. 49 France Diplomatie. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/crises-conflits_1050/afrique-ouest_1090/cote-ivoire_10607.html. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 50 BusinessAfrica.net. Available at: http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accraIII_agreement.php. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 51 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/fmv0208/ethiopia.html. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006.

16

concern with West Africa situation.52 It still places great hopes in the completion of the

Linas-Marcoussis, the Acra III, and the Pretoria Agreements. The Federation gives special

role to the ECOWAS and UN’s presence in Côte d’Ivoire, emphasizes the need for the

National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program implementation and calls

for international assistance reinforcement.

The United Kingdom, together with France, has a history of colonization in the African

Continent. UK’s policy is represented through the New Partnership for Africa’s

Development (NePAD), which has among its main goals to reduce poverty and

marginalization in the Continent and to maintain peace.53 Some of its measures are debt

relief, supporting infrastructure, health and education improvement, agricultural

diversification and access to trade and resources. The UK has elaborated on the Sub-Saharan

Strategy for conflict Prevention in order to address African instability problems, to support

peacekeeping operations, and to work in coordination with ECOWAS. It has closely

operated with UN’s Mission in Sierra Leone to resolve the conflict, and bring hope to the

sub-region.

The United States of America provides security assistance to Côte d’Ivoire with the main

objective of bringing stability and reestablishing national unity.54 The US is concerned with

the possibility of a general sub-region strife, which weakens democracy, economic growth,

and Ivoirian institutions. The American government is trying to engage the African country

in the war on terrorism: Abidjan is home to several Lebanese who are claimed to support

terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. Activities focus on border patrolling, refugees’

assistance and child trafficking combat. The United States also stresses the fight against the

spread HIV. The country has set out the International Military and Education Training and

the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

Other member States, namely Argentina, Republic of the Congo, Greece, Peru, Qatar, and

Slovakia, Republic of Tanzania, act mainly through the United Nations Security Council.

The former urge for the commitment to UN’s resolutions, as well as to the Linas-Marcoussis,

the Accra III, and the Pretoria Agreements, and strongly supports the organizing of Ivoirian

elections before the end of 2006.

5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER

5.1 Are the measures taken by the Security Council until this moment adequate to tackle the

ongoing crisis?

52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Available at: http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/393E35BDFF65DE78C3256E28002CEAD7?OpenDocument. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 53 Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236283472. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006. 54 U.S. Department of State. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64638.htm. Last Accessed: 14 May 2006.

17

5.2 Are the warring factions committed to the peace treaties signed? If not, how can the

Council help enforcing them?

5.3 Is it possible to implement open democratic institutions and national reconciliation in

Côte d’Ivoire? How can it be done in a country with such a cultural and ethnical diversity?

5.4 How can Human Rights be observed in Côte d’Ivoire and violators be punished?

5.5 Is there any credible linkage between Côte d’Ivoire’s disputes and other insurgent

movements in the West Africa sub region? Can this struggle be prevented from spreading to

neighboring countries?

5.6 What role should play the United Nations if the elections scheduled to October 2006

come into reality? How can the UN guarantee stability and the rule of law?

6 REFERENCES

6.1 UN and International Organizations/Institutions Documents

ECOWAS. SAS ECOWAS Part 2 DEF – Burkina Faso. Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004.

ECOWAS. SAS ECOWAS PART 2 DEF – Côte d´Ivoire. Day of Adoption: 26 April 2004.

Institute for Security Studies. Lansana Gberie & Prosper Addo - Challenges of Peace

Implementation in Côte d’ Ivoire - Report on an Expert Workshop by KAIPTC and ZIF.

Monograph No 105. Date of Adoption: August 2004.

International Crisis Group. Côte d´Ivoire: The war is not yet over. N. 72. Day of Adoption:

28 November 2003.

United Nations. DIEYE, Abdoulaye Mar; Système des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire :

United Nations. OCHA - Communique De Presse Du Coordonnateur Humanitaire ;

Available at : http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=2140; Last Accessed : 21 May

2006.

United Nations. ONUCI - Division des Droits d l´Homme; Rapport sur la situation des

Droits de l’Homme en Côte d’Ivoire; January/February 2005.

United Nations. S.C. Resolution 1464, UN Doc. S/RES/1464 (2003)





18













6.2 Articles from Periodicals

GBAGO, Laurent; Interview conceded for Le Courrier, edition n. 166, p. 47/49.

VAN HEMELDONCK, Marijke; Côte d’Ivoire: Embellie durable?. Le Courrier, n. 166,

Bruxelles, November 1997, p. 35/38.

6.3 Articles from the Internet

BALDÉ, Sory; “Côte d’Ivoire: Situation Institutionnelle”; Available at:

http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/institutionnel/cotivoir.html. Last accessed: 14 May

2006.

R.G.C.; “Conflict, Crisis and Soccer in Côte d’Ivoire”; Available at:

http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/630/63/. Last accessed: 14 May 2006.

GBERIE, Lansana; “The Crisis in Ivory Coast”. Available at:

www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5769. Last accessed: 14 May 2006.

JOLIVET, Elen; L’Ivoirité: de la Conceptualisation a la Manipulation de L´Identité

Ivoirienne; 2003; Available at: www.rennes.iep.fr/IMG/pdf/jolivet.pdf; Last Accessed: 21

May 2006.

19

PAWSON, Lara; “Ethnic Split Stirs Ivory Coast Crisis”; BBC News, published in 18

February 2004; Available at: www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/3496069.stm;

Las Accessed: 15 May 2006.

ABDOURHAMANEH, Boubacar Issa; “Ivory Coast Institutional Situation - Political

Process; Available at:

ttp://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/institutionnel/ivorycoast.html; Last Accessed:

16 May 2006.

HUSSEIN, Karim and GNISCI, Donata; Conflict and development policy in the Mano River

region and Côte d’Ivoire: the regional stakes for stability and reconstruction – Summary

Conclusion; Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/26/36195128.pdf; Last

Accessed: 21 May 2006.

6.4 Websites Consulted

CIA World Factbook Website.

Available at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html. Last Accessed: 13 May

2006.

L´etat de Droit Website.

Available at: ww.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/chronologie/ivorycoast.html. Last

accessed: 14 May 2006.

Country Data Website.

Available at: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-6953.html. Last acessed: 14 May

2006.

Country Studies Website.

Available at: http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/9.htm. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Front Populaire Ivorien Website.

Available at: www.fpi-ci.org; Last accessed: 16 May 2006.

Rassemblement des Républicains Website.

Available at: www.le-rdr.org. Last accessed: 17 May 2006.

Press Releases Concerning the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to

Resolution 1572 (2004) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire

20

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/CI/CIPressEng.htm. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/227/22/PDF/N0622722.pdf?OpenElement.

Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

Available at: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/ cote_divoire_01242003en.html.

Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Pretoria Agreement

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/44427.htm. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Pretoria Agreement – Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa

http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/ivor0701.htm. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Pretoria Agreement

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/pre-cot-06apr.pdf. Last Accessed: 16 May

2006.

Accra III Agreement

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/50bea5c1e3981e8185256ee7006f335

a. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Business Africa – Accra III Agreement

http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accraIII_agreement.php. Last Accessed: 16 May

2006.

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/crises-conflits_1050/afrique-

ouest_1090/cote-ivoire_10607.html. Last Accessed: 16 May 2006.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page

&cid=1094236283472. Last Accessed: 17 May 2006.

Russian Federation Statement

21

http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/393E35BDFF65DE78C3256E28002CEAD7?OpenDocume

nt. Last Accessed: 17 May 2006.

USA Department of State

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64638.htm. Last Accessed: 17 May 2006.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/fmv0208/ethiopia.html. Last Accessed: 17 May 2006.

China Daily

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/21/content_514288.htm. Last Accessed:

18 July 2006.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

http://www.um.dk/en/menu/ForeignPolicy/PeaceSecurityAndInternationalLaw/UNSecurityC

ouncil/. Last Accessed: 18 July 2006.

22

TOPIC AREA B

The Situation in Lebanon

By Cyntia Sandes and Carlos Gorito

“Can we immunize ourselves from blowback from the middle east? We can, but for that we need a strong State, a solid economy and a genuine

security.” Michel Samarra

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout the existence of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was a part of Syria. With the end

of World War I, the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist and a mandate55 on Syria, together with

Lebanon, was assigned to France. It was under this mandate that France separated Lebanon

from Syria, as there was a majority of Muslims in Syria and of Maronite Catholics in

Lebanon.56

Lebanon became independent in 1943. According to its distribution of political forces, the

National Pact was created: the Lebanese system of government that guaranteed the

proportional presence of each representative group in power, with a Christian President, a

Sunni Muslim Prime Minister and a Shia Muslim as the Speaker of Parliament. It outlined

equal distribution of seats in the Parliament and regional neutrality for Lebanon.57

55 Within the end of World War I the chapter of the “age of empires” was closed, as would say the history researcher Eric Hobsbawm. Following the arrangements of power and the raise of the European new forces, France was granted with the mandate over the area correspondent to Syria and Lebanon. That mandate last until 1946, year right after the end of the World War II, when Lebanon became a sovereign country and entered the United Nations. 56 See CountryReports.org. Available at: http://www.countryreports.org/history/lbtoc.aspx?countryid=139&countryName=Lebanon. Last accessed: 25 June 2006. 57 See International Crisis Group. Conflict History: Lebanon. Available at : http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=62. Last accessed: 18

23

The situation began to change in 1948 with the continuous entrance of Palestinian refugees,

which became one of the combined elements that have spread war over Lebanon on the

subsequent decades. Palestinians were not included in the society until 1969, when their

military (controlled by the Palestinian Liberation Organization - PLO) and civil presence

were recognized through the Cairo Agreement, according to which the sovereignty of

Lebanon should be respected. However, the inclusion of the Palestinians was not effective

and the Cairo Agreement failed to succeed, as the number of refugees dramatically increased

with the arrival of those expelled from Jordan.58

The shock59 between the Phalangist group60 (radical Christians) and Muslims in 1975

signaled the beginning of a series of events that have characterized the Lebanese civil war.

On 1976 the conflict generalized with the massacres of Muslims on a refugee camp and on

the town of Damour as well as with the arrival of the Syrian army in order to oppress the

Palestinian forces. This intervention was subsequently authorized by the Arab League at the

meeting of Ryad and lead to shocks between the Syrian army and the Christian militias.61

Furthermore, in 1978, Israel occupied southern Lebanon, in order to support the Christian

militias and diminish the Palestinian resistance. In accordance with the Lebanese government

requests, the United Nations (UN) condemned the Israeli presence by adopting Resolutions

425 and 426, which called upon for an immediate cease fire and established the United

Nations Interim Force on Lebanon (UNIFIL). Following these events, Israeli troops left

Lebanon.62

In addition, the Shiite group, until then politically excluded from the government, created the

AMAL (in English, hope) movement. It was first associated with the PLO but, not long after,

separated as a consequence of the rise of the conflicts in South Lebanon. With the Iranian

Revolution on 1979, AMAL became one of the most important political and military

components of Lebanon.63

In June 1982, once again, Israel intervened on Lebanon aiming to eradicate the Palestinian

presence. This time the action was even more oppressive with the support to the Phalangist

group and the massacres at the refugee camps of Chabra and Chatila, carried on by pro-

Israeli groups.

In 1984, the AMAL militias took over the Muslim sector of Beirut while its leader called for a

unified stable Lebanon through a radical change on the representative system. Yet, AMAL May 2006. 58 See GlobalSecurity.org. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/lebanon/history.htm Last accessed: 25 June 2006. 59 See Find Articles. Available at: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200104/ai_n8932104. Last accessed: 25 June 2006. 60 The Phalangist group is a radical Christians group which is responsible for the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon, when killed 27 civilians in bus attack. For additional information, see: International Crisis Group. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=62. Last accessed: 25 June 2006. 61 See International Crises Group – Lebanon: Managing the gathering Storm. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3818&l=1. Last accessed: 25 June 2006. 62 See DROZ, Bernard & ROWLEY, Anthony. Histoire Générale du XXe Siècle. Paris, Editons du Seuil, 1992, p. 298. 63 See EL KARA, Bechara. The political mobilization of the Shiite community in the Middle East. Available at: http://www.amcips.org/PDF%20books/BookII9.pdf. P. 3-6.

24

Shiites supported by Syrian and Muslims organizations (The Islamic Jihad and the

Hizbollah) fought over the control of the Palestinian refugee camps. Although Israel left

Lebanon on 1985, the crisis did not diminish.

The year of 1988 marked the division of the government into two, due to difficulties of

dialog among the representatives. Nonetheless, the Taef Agreement of 1989 ended the civil

war, transferred power away from the Maronite president and allocated it equally between

Christians and Muslims. It also determined the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Unfortunately this agreement has not generated the expected results, and the clashes

continued to happen – now with Hizbollah, AMAL, the Phalangists and Syrian troops. In

1990 the Second Lebanese Republic was proclaimed over the action of the Syrian army.64

The 1990’s saw the growing of the militias and the remaining of the Israeli occupation on

southern Lebanon, as well as the Syrian one. The situation changed in June 2000 with the

withdrawal of the Israeli troops in accordance to the UNSC Resolution 425, confirmed by

the Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council.65

In 2004 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1559 that reaffirmed the support of the UN to

Lebanon’s sovereignty, expressed its concern to the continued presence of armed militias in

Lebanon and called upon for their disbanding and withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces

from Lebanon.66 Therefore, Syria was forced to finally withdrawal from Lebanon as a

consequence of its actions toward the extension of Lebanese president Emile Lahoud’s term

and of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.67

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The murder of the Lebanese former Prime Minister had set off a series of related events

beginning with the Syrian withdrawal and proceeding with elections and the formulation of a

new government, as well as with the UN Report on the Hariri’s killing produced by the

German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. This section will mainly address the consequences of the

Syrian withdrawal and its reflections on the electoral process along with the menaces to the

Lebanese sovereignty caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.1 Lebanon after Syria

64 See DROZ & ROWLEY. Histoire Générale du XXe Siècle, p. 299. 65 Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations. Issues in the Security Council Agenda: Lebanon. Available at: http://64.237.101.231/greeceun/content/Document.aspx?d=-1&rd=0&f=1365&rf=177853028&m=2176&rm=21873846. Last accessed: 18 May 2006. 66 United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1559 (2004). Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement 67 See Arabic News Weekly Edition, Lebanon – Week of August 29, 2005. Available at: http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Weekly/Lebanon/20050829.html. Last accessed: 24 June 2006.

25

The efforts of the pro-Syrian sectors in the Lebanese political scene to extend the mandate of

the president Emile Lahoud, a pro-Syrian Maronite supported by Damascus, caused serious

constraints in the international community, as seen in the UNSC Resolution 1559, which

evokes “the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political

independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of

Lebanon throughout Lebanon” and “Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw

from Lebanon.”68

The subsequent protests, led by the Sunni former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri were viewed

with suspicion by the Syrian sectors, resulting in his killing, on February 14th 2005. Then,

Beirut was crowded by hundreds of civilians asking for the immediate withdrawal of the

Syrian troops – and also by pro-Hizbollah activists who supported the Syrian-fond

president.69 Other factors, such as international pressure,70 coming remarkably from the Arab

world – with the Egyptian and Saudi declarations,71 called for the immediate withdrawal of

the Syrians from the Lebanese territory.

The Syrian withdrawal in April 200572 reflected the success of the international community’s

action, freeing Lebanon from the pax syriana73 for the first time in almost 30 years. The

Lebanese elections held in May and June 2005 showed that the political scenario was not

simply split into pro-Syrian and pro-west; instead, it was composed by many other factors –

especially by the action of the militias.

Mouad Siniora, the Prime Minister elected, reflects the interests of the Sunnis, the same

group of the former Prime Minister Hariri. He is part of a new group led by Hariri’s son,

Saad al-Hariri, called “The Future Bloc”. This bloc privileges the relations with the west,

which has been seen with reserve by opposite groups. The Mehli’s report, a result of the

efforts proposed by the Resolution 159574 and supported by the Sunnis,75 is appointed by the

68 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1559. UN Doc S/RES/1559 (2004). Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement 69 United Nations Security Council. First semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2005/272. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/272&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 70 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1595. UN Doc S/RES/1595 (2005). Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1595%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 71 “A series of remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal to Al-Sharq al-Awsat in the days following the assassination spoke volumes about Saudi policy. He called the cover story promoted by the Lebanese government "ridiculous," yet repeatedly urged it to perform a "quick investigation" and to "reach results quickly" before the issue is internationalized.” See BRADAN, TONY. Saudi-Syrian Relations after Hariri. Mideast Monitor. Vol. 1, nº 1, Feb 2006. Available at: http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0602/0602_2.htm. Last accessed: 18 May 2006. 72 United Nations Security Council. First semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2005/272. UN Doc S/2005/272 Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/272&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 73 The pax syriana concept is exposed in AJAMI, Fouad. “The Autumn of The Autocrats”. In: Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005. 74 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1595. UN Doc S/RES/1595 (2005). Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1595%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 75 ICG Report, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, 5 Dec. 2005. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/48_lebanon_managing_the_gathering_storm_arabic.pdf. Last accessed: 18 May 2006.

26

opposition – basically Lahoud allies, Hizbollah and AMAL - as “unprofessional and

politicized”.76

President Lahoud did not lose his political support, despite the controversies over his

mandate extension. The Christians (Maronites) and the Shiites, about 60% of the population,

support his continuing mandate.77 These sectors judged most of the accusations as a

consequence of his political position toward Syria.

Hizbollah, a powerful movement composed of Shiites and supposedly supported by Syria,

also supports the president, since the international alliance proposed by “The Future Bloc”

evokes Resolution 1559 calling for “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and

non-Lebanese militias”, which directly affects their actions. Simultaneously, Hizbollah has

participation in the Siniora government and the cabinet has decided that the disarmament

would be resolved solely by consensus.78

The struggle for power between the two political groups and their foreign influences showed

above is object of concern. Lebanon has not been totally free from Syrian influence, since

the two countries have strong historical and economic ties. On the other hand, the opposition

and a considerable part of the Sunnis disagree with what some call the ”occidentalization” of

Lebanon – the current foreign policy focuses on the relations with the west and not with

Syria or other Arab countries anymore.79

2.2 The Militias and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The south of Lebanon has been caught up in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

receiving a large number of refugees and serving as base of action for different Palestinian

armed groups. The sovereignty of the Lebanese government in the region has been facing

difficulties since then, with the militias controlling most of the region.

Frequently, the Lebanese airspace is invaded by Israel with the reasoning to combat anti-

Israeli actions,80 a situation that has not changed in recent times.81 The absence of the

Lebanese army in the southern region and the consequent lack of authority in the area favors

the action of those militias, since they continue to be armed and acting, despite the allegation

of the Lebanese government that the Palestinians can not leave their refugee camps armed.82

76 ICG Report, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm. 77 ICG Report, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm. 78 ICG Report, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm. 79 ICG Report: Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon___lebanon_after_syria.pdf 80 United Nations Security Council. First semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2005/272. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/272&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 81 Al-Manar TV. Israeli aggressive warplanes violate Lebanon's airspace. Monday, 1 May 2006. Available at: http://www.almanar.com.lb/story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=649000. Last accessed : May 18 2006 82 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2004/777. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2004/777&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

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The lack of a definition concerning the Shaba’a Farms, a territory requested by the Lebanese,

especially Hizbollah is in the middle of the question. The government of Lebanon alleges

that Hizbollah is a “national resistance movement”, whose objective is to reacquire the

region.83 Although the UNSC has already stated that the area is in Syrian territory,84 the

situation remains without solution.

In Resolution 1559, the Security Council supported the extension of the control of the

Government of Lebanon over the whole Lebanese territory,85 although the recent actions of

the Palestinian armed elements in the south and Hizbollah attacks shows that this has not

been achieved.86 The Security Council called for a more effective presence of the Lebanese

army in the region, however as evidenced by the report of the Secretary-General on the

UNIFIL of January 2006,87 no increase in the Lebanese army forces has occurred and the

region, so-called Blue Line,88 remains for the most part under Hizbollah control.

Disarming the militias and integrating them into politics was also a measure contained in the

Resolution 1559, in order to ensure the sovereignty of the Lebanese government in the south

and to contribute to the peace construction in the region. However, the attacks provoked by

remaining armed actions of some groups, especially Hizbollah, discourages others to apply

to the disarmament.89

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

In this session we shall approach the international developments over the situation on

Lebanon. In accordance to those we will analyze the role of the UNIFIL, paying special

attention to its reactions to the most remarkable events on the Lebanese history since its

entrance. Also, we will focus on the importance and content of the UN Mehli’s Report,

previously approached as a consequence of the Resolution 1595.

83 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2004/777. 84 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc S/2004/777. 85 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1559. UN Doc S/RES/1559 (2004). Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement 86 The Daily Star. Fresh round of clashes erupts at Lebanon-Israel border. Thurday, 24 November 2005. Available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=20270. Last accessed: 18 May 2006. 87 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. UN Doc S/2006/26. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2006/26&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 88 For an introduction in the Blue Line issue, see: SCHIFF, Ze’ev. Thin Blue Line. Avaiable at: http://www.4mothers.org.il/lebanon/blue.htm 89 ICG Report, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm.

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3.1 UNIFIL

UNIFIL was created in 1978 as a direct answer from the UN to the Israeli occupation of

most of the Southern territory of Lebanon.90 The interim force was created for three solid

purposes: confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, reinstate international peace and security

and support the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in

the area.91

On the second Israeli invasion to Lebanon the UNIFIL remained with a non-active

participation on the conflict: at a first moment its actions were directed to provide

humanitarian assistance and protection to civilians. Even though Israel had officially left

Lebanon on 1985, its presence remained with the continuous hostility between Israeli and the

Lebanese groups – the Lebanese de facto forces (DFF) and the so-called "South Lebanon

Army" (SLA).92 Once more, UNIFIL acted the best way possible within the protection of the

population of the area and use of all possible efforts to minimize the conflict. Along with

UNIFIL’s actions, it is relevant to mention the work of the Secretary General, which used all

of its diplomacy to persuade Israel to leave the territory.

Israel would only formally agree with the Resolutions 425 e 426 from 1978 on April 2000

confirming its withdraw from the Lebanese territory. In accordance to the Israeli action, the

UN Secretary General sent a special delegation to meet with the governments involved, as

well as other concerned States to examine and address the technical issues on the

implementation of Resolutions 425 and 426. Through these actions the disbanding of the

area was completely successful a few months later.93 The Israeli withdrawal would be

confirmed with the follow implementation of the Secretary-General’s 22 May report.94

As the deployment of the armed forces was an essential element of the return to the effective

authority of the government in the area, the UNIFIL helped the government to conduct the

deployment of them to the place left vacated by the Israeli troops on the South, which would

only happen with the total withdrawal of the Israeli presence. Yet by July there were still

several violations of the Blue Line by Israel, those would only be corrected months later with

the constant assistance of the UNIFIL and guidance of the Secretary General.95

On 27 July 2000, UNIFIL’s mandate was extended for the first time in answer to the request

of the Lebanese Government according to the necessities exposed. With the adoption of the

Resolution 1310 the Council called once more to the Lebanese Government to ensure its

90 According to the UN, the Israeli occupation was a direct response to the attack occurred in March over the Israeli-Lebanese border that has killed several Israeli lives. 91 See UNIFIL. Background. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html. Last accessed: 18 May 2006. 92 See UNIFIL. Background. 93 United Nations Security Council. The Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425(1978) and 426(1978). UN Doc S/2000/460. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2000/460&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 94 See the endorsement Statement by the President of the Security Council, 23 May 2000. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/444/09/PDF/N0044409.pdf?OpenElement 95 See United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 17 January to 17 July 2000). UN Doc S/2000/718. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2000/718&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

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effective authority return and presence in the affected southern region.96 In this same month

the UNIFIL forces were reinforced with two units from Sweden and Ukraine and also the

reinforcement of the pre-existent units.97

UNIFIL worked ever since with the administration of the area through ground and air patrols

and a network of observation posts. It acted in order to correct violations of the so-called

Blue Line that separates Israel from Lebanon and to stimulate the Lebanese government to

take control over this territory, which failed to exist.

An important concern of UNIFIL is related to the clearance of mines and unexploded

ordnance. Regional mine action cells were established with the help of the United Nations

Mine Action Service.98

The Secretary General does not cease to emphasize the importance of the occupation by the

Lebanese government of the whole region previously occupied by Israel. Also, he is forceful

in pointing out the fact that if Lebanon’s government does not do so, the Lebanese territory

will continue to serve as an arena for the conflict of others.99

By January 2001, two of the three UNIFIL primary objectives were fulfilled. Therefore, with

the continuous entrance of former refugees back to Lebanon, UNIFIL turns itself to the focus

on the restoration of international peace and security.100

The large number of mines and unexploded ordnance remained a matter of concern. The data

collected by UNIFIL so far suggest a high level of mine saturation affecting the whole area

formerly controlled by Israel. Clearing them will require a concerted effort, including foreign

assistance. On this matter exposed by the Report, UNIFIL highlights the necessity of

international cooperation in order to finance the disarmament of the land mines.

In accordance to the Resolution 1337, UNIFIL’s mandate was once more extended for a

period of six months. The new aspect was that UNIFIL would be submitted to a

reconfiguration so as to guarantee the maintaining of the cease fire along the Blue Line.

That resolution also: welcomed the establishment of checkpoints by the Government of

Lebanon in the vacated area and encouraged the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm

environment throughout the south, including through the control of all checkpoints, and also

endorsed the general approach for reconfiguration of UNIFIL, as outlined in paragraph 23 of

the report of the Secretary-General of 22 January 2001, and requested the Secretary-General

to submit to the Council a detailed report by 30 April 2001 on UNIFIL reconfiguration plans

96 See United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1310 (2000). 97 See United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 17 January to 17 July 2000). UN Doc S/2000/718. 98 See The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon website. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/ 99 See United Nations Security Council. Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force on Lebanon (2000). UN Doc S/2000/1049 Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2000/1049&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 100 See United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 18 July 2000 to 18 January 2001). UN Doc S/2001/66. Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/218/09/IMG/N0121809.pdf?OpenElement

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and on the tasks that could be carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization (UNTSO).101

During the subsequent years, UNIFIL dealt with virtually the same issues, as violations of

the Blue Line continued to happen. In addition to that, the measures of Hizbollah on the area

have restricted the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in several occasions.

Several times the UNIFIL’s mandate was renewed. Nine resolutions were made since the

year of 2001, all of them expressing the high concern of the Security Council over the

respect to the Blue Line area. Moreover, an alarming preoccupation of the Council is related

to the security of the UN officials that have been subject to a series of constraints in the past

few years.102

The situation in the Lebanese south border seems to be motionless; over the past ten years

only a few changes were observed. Nevertheless the difficulties appear to be hardly the same

as the violations of the Blue Line continues. The last UN resolution on that matter renewed

UNIFIL’s mandate until 31 July 2006, this resolution welcomed the Government’s recent

establishment of a Lebanese Armed Forces liaison office at UNIFIL headquarters.

Furthermore, the resolution reinforces the urgency to put an end to the Blue Line violations

and to the preservation of UNIFIL personal safety.

3.2 The Mehlis Report

The Mehlis Report addresses the murder of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The

Report is structured in six parts: the preface, the background, the crime, the Lebanese

investigation, the Commission investigation and the conclusions. With a solid argumentation

Detlev Mehlis, a German UN international investigator, builds the UN’s official version of

the crime.

Working on the Mehlis Report, the Commission has stated a series of considerations over the

Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s murder. On the report it has put together a structure of

six parts in which the assassination is approached from the previous political actions to the

posterior answers. Initially, the report formulates a chronological time line followed by the

background of the murder. Later, it follows to describe the murder and the versions of the

Lebanese investigation and their own.

In the report there are several interviews with people involved in the question. Hariri’s son,

Saad al Hariri, claims that the Syrian president Bashar Assad had threatened his father and

family with death, if President Lahoud’s term was not extended. Several declarations

compiled by the Commission point at Hariri’s death as a consequence of Syrian interests in

Lebanon. The Commission is very objective on declaring that the cause of the death was

political.

101 See United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1337 (2001). Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1337%20(2001)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 102 See United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html. Last accessed: 25 June 2006.

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In addition to that, the Commission points out that the future of the investigation should be

carried out primarily by the Lebanese police, which has shown comprehension and

willingness towards the work of the Commission. Also, it suggests in this matter an

international cooperation to solve the issue by prosecuting the guilty.103

In the final part of its conclusions, the Commission states that it is Syria’s incumbency to

clarify a considerable part of the unresolved questions, since a large number of its security

officials are suspect of involvement on the killing of the former Lebanese Prime Minister.

The Syrian Arab Republic government has not yet clarified its posture towards the issue, as

the answers for the proposed questions by the Commission lead to a series of mistaken

information.104

At the end of the document, the Commission mentions that several people have been arrested

and charged since the beginning of the investigation; nevertheless it questions those arrests

stating that every suspect should be considered firstly innocent instead of guilty.105

Resolution 1636 of the Security Council advocates that the UN answer to the Mehlis Report,

which was used as the official UN version of the crime. According to this resolution all

States shall take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their

territories of the individuals involved in the crime, as well as freeze all funds, financial assets

and economic resources that are on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or

indirectly, by such individuals. Most importantly, this resolution refers to the possible

involvement of another State in the murder as a serious violation of its obligations to work to

prevent and refrain from supporting terrorism, as well as a serious violation of its obligation

to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. Finally, it urges Syria to

cooperate unconditionally with the prosecution of the guilty.106

Notwithstanding, the Mehlis Report raised some contentions as some considered it a pro-

United States report, in a sense of forcing Lebanon to surrender to Western and US demands.

Besides, some measured it as a clear introduction of Palestinian groups residents in Arab

countries as the elements behind terrorist attacks, not to mention the consideration of Islamic

Charity Institutes in Arab and Muslim countries as terrorists.107 Nonetheless, other

international sources point out the Mehlis report as a way of punishing Syria for its

international posture.108

103 See “Mehlis Report”. The Report of the international independent investigation commission established persuant to Security Council. UN Doc S/2005/662. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/docs/mehlisreport/. Last accessed: 28 May 2006 104 See “Mehlis Report”. 105 See “Mehlis Report”. 106 For further information see United Nations Security Council Resolution. UN Doc S/RES/1636. Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1636%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC 107 See “Mehlis Report: A Political Game”. Available at: http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2005%20Opinion%20Editorials/October/23o/Mehlis%20Report%20A%20Political%20Game%20By%20Abdallah%20Albasha.htm. Last accessed on 30 March 2006 108 See “Lebanon: People Want 'Truth,' But Not All Welcome Mehlis Report”. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/2e20ad03-c1fb-4fb1-a532-44b0443f992c.html. Last accessed: 30 March 2006.

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4 BLOC POSITIONS

Argentina gives great importance to the actions of the UNIFIL in South Lebanon and

believes that the elected government is able to contribute to the implementation of the

Security Council resolutions concerning Lebanon, especially the statements of the

Resolution 1559 concerning the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias disarmament.109

The People’s Republic of China supported the efforts of the International Commission and

condemned all terrorist acts which occurred in Lebanon.110 The country supports that the

results of the commission can contribute not only to stabilize the situation in Lebanon but

also in the rest of Middle East.111

Congo welcomes the cooperation between UN and the Lebanese authorities in the

investigation process of the Mehli’s report. In this sense, Congo supports the plans to the

establishment of an international court to judge the responsible for the killing of the former

Prime Minister Hariri. Besides, the country expressed great concern with the tense situation

in southern Lebanon.112

Denmark, according to official statements made by its government, believes that Lebanon’s

neighbors must bear in mind their obligations to respect the Lebanese sovereignty, and

supports all actions towards to the maintenance of Lebanon’s unity, stability and

independence. The country also welcomes the achievements of the International Commission

on the murder of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.113

France has strong historical ties with Lebanon, being the biggest Lebanese trade partner.

Besides that, the former Prime Minister Hariri was a close friend of the French president

Jacques Chirac.114 The country was one of the most favorable to the Resolution 1559,

stressing the necessity of withdrawing the Syrian troops from the Lebanese territory.

Accordingly, France urges a more effective presence of the Lebanese forces throughout the

South.115

Greece demands full cooperation of all those involved in Rafik Hariri’s murder with the

International Commission. The country also believes that the full implementation of the

109 Permanent Mission of Argentina to the UN. Available at: http://www.un.int/argentina/espanol/discursos/discursos.htm. Last accessed: 24 June 2006 110 Permanent Mission of China to the UN. Available at: http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t183887.htm 111 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680 30 Mar 2006 Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8680.doc.htm. Last accessed: 24 June 2006 112 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680 30 Mar 2006. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8680.doc.htm. Last accessed: 24 June 2006 113 Statement by H.E. Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations Ambassador Ellen Margarethe Løj to the Security Council on 30 March 2006. Available at: http://www.sikkerhedsraadet.um.dk/nr/exeres/4743e043-a6a1-42ac-83db-45e27fe893db.htm. Last accessed: 24 June 2006 114 International Crisis Group Report: Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm. Available at www.crisisgroup.org 115 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8299 28 Jan 2005 Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8299.doc.htm. Last Accessed: 24 June 2006

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previous Security Council resolutions can help restoring local security and stability and in

the Greater Middle East area. 116

Peru supports the creation of an international tribunal in order to prosecute the guilty of the

murder of former Prime Minister Hariri. Besides, the country supports that this tribunal must

have the largest number of Lebanese elements as possible.117

The government of Qatar’s position states that cooperation between the elements involved

must be the key to the construction of a stable and sovereign Lebanon. Nonetheless, Qatar

urges the Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanese Shaba’a Farms and its respect to the limits of

the Blue Line.118

Russia considers the process of reaching peace in Lebanon an impossible task without a

comprehensive Middle East settlement. The country recalls the resolutions of the Security

Council covering the matter and adds the importance of mutual relation cooperation between

Syria and Lebanon.119 Also, the Russian government expresses its concern over the shooting

attack from Lebanon to the Israeli positions mostly occurred in Shaba’a Farms stating that

these actions only make the situation in the Israeli-Lebanese government more fragile.120

Slovakia gives full support to the efforts of the Lebanese authorities in order to achieve the

extension of their sovereignty to regain full control over the entire national territory.

Nonetheless, it states the completion of the investigation into the assassination of former

Prime Minister Hariri as imperative to the achievement of stability and reconciliation on the

area. Besides, it supports the creation of the tribunal of an international character to bring the

perpetrators to justice, and states that the success of it is dependent on the balanced Lebanese

and international involvement on it.121

The United Kingdom expresses an enormous concern over the situation in Lebanon, with a

special attention to the reported arms transfers across the Lebanese-Syrian border.122 Also,

the concernment of the country over terrorist groups’ actions in the Lebanese territory is very

stressed by its representatives.123

The United States of America played a key role in Lebanon, urging for the withdrawal of

foreign troops from the Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the country emphasizes the

necessity of implementing all prescriptions of Resolution 1559, especially the disarmament

116 Adoption of SC Resolution 1636 on the situation in the Middle East, Explanation of Vote. Available at: http://www.greeceun.org/greeceun/content/Document.aspx?d=3&rd=12106234&f=1352&rf=-818407304&m=2453&rm=12290410&l=1. Last accessed: 24 June 2006 117 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680. 118 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680. 119 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680. 120 Commentary Regarding a Question from ITAR-TASS Concerning Israeli Flyovers of Lebanese Territory 3 May 2006. Available at: http://www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/2DD1D00455C863B0C3257163003BCE7A?OpenDocument. Last accessed: 24 June 2006. 121 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680. 122 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8680. 123 STRAW, Jack. Upholding the long term vision of peace in the Middle East. In: Jewish Chronicle, 19 Dec 2002. Available at http://www.ukun.org/search/Search_show.asp?Aid=534&T=1

34

of militias and the restoration of sovereignty by the Lebanese government in Southern

Lebanon.124

Yet, the country strongly condemns the continuous disregard toward the Blue Line. Also, it

states that the continually asserted position of the Lebanese Government that the Blue Line

was not valid in the Shaba’a farms area was not compatible with Security Council resolution

and should not be used as an excuse for favoring particular interests of the country.

Furthermore, the United States of America solemnly states that the lack of authority of the

Lebanese government within the area is a serious threat to the world peace and security.125

Tanzania states that the act that murdered the Former Prime Minister Hariri was

undoubtedly a criminal terrorist act. In this sense the country fully supports the investigating

commission work on the area done so far in collaboration with the Lebanese and Syrian

authorities in order to identify individuals, groups and organizations behind the crime.126

5 CURRENT SITUATION

The explosive tension on the southern border of Lebanon led into the collapse of the

situation described so far. Hizbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006,127 led to the ultimate

escalation of hostilities in Lebanon. A gathering of circumstances shall be taken into account

in the approach to these new events. Israel continued to occupy the contested Sheeba Farms

territory, although it had officially left Lebanon in 2000. In addition to that, the conflicts

across the Blue Line involving militias, especially Hizbollah, continued to grow. Syria, in the

other hand, persisted in exercising its influence on Lebanese politics even after the murderer

of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the withdrawal of its troops.128

The 34 days war started with the kidnap of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbollah, officially

ending on 12 August 2006, with the acceptation of the UNSC Res1701 by Israel and

Hizbollah.129 The resolution 1701 was unanimously approved on 11 August and recalled all

previous resolutions on the matter, emphasizing the need of the immediate ceasefire between

the two parties involved. Other then that, the resolution called for the creation of a

peacekeeping operation with the reinforcement of the UNIFIL’s role in the region, extending

124 International Crisis Group Report: Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria… 125 United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/8299. 126 Statement by H.E. Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania on Security Council support to the International Independent Investigation Commission on the Beirut Bombing of 14 February 2005 in the Security Council during consultations on the situation in the Middle East. Available at: http://tanzania-un.org/index.asp?pgid=22. Last accessed: 29 March 2006. 127 See United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006). Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement. Last accessed: 10 September 2006. 128 See International Crises Group. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2743&l=1. Last accessed: 10 September 2006. 129 See Folha OnLine: Cronologia da Crise entre Israel e o Hizbolah. Available at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u98496.shtml. Last accessed: 10 September 2006.

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its mandate until 31 August 2007. Besides, up to 15.000 UN soldiers should help the

Lebanese troops to take control over the area.

The UNSC Res1701 calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire. The Blue

Line shall be respected, “including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani

river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the

Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”.130 In addition to that, it establishes that all armed

groups shall be disarmed, emphasizing at the same time that no weapons and authorities

other than those of the Lebanese State will be tolerated.131

In accordance with the exposed situation, the UNSC shall also focus its attention on the

current events. The full implementation of the Res1701 demands all its efforts in order to

achieve a long term solution, constituting the basis of this Council’s future work on the area.

6 QUESTIONS TO PONDER

6.1 Which guidelines could the UNSC provide in order to help Lebanon becoming a stable

self determined country?

6.2 What is the importance of the equal division of political power? How can the country

govern itself with such a relatively strong presence of Palestinian refugees?

6.3 How can UNIFIL contribute to full peace implementation on Lebanon? How should the

Peace keeping operations be operated?

6.4 Can Lebanon eradicate the militias? How can the UNSC act in order to disarm these

militias?

7 REFERENCES:

7.1 UN and International Organizations/ Institutions Documents

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. Conflict History: Lebanon. Available at :

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=6

2. Last accessed: 18 May 2006.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm. Available

at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_confl

130 See United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006). 131 See United Nations Security Council. UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006).

36

ict/lebanon/48_lebanon_managing_the_gathering_storm_arabic.pdf. Last accessed: 18 May

2006.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria. Available

at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_confl

ict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon___lebanon_after_syria.pdf. Last accessed: 18 May 2006.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Resolution 1559. Doc S/RES/1559 (2004).

Available at:


Last accessed: 18 May 2006.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Resolution 1595. UN Doc S/RES/1595

(2005). Available at: http://daccess-

ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1595%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC.


UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Resolution 1636. UN Doc S/RES/1636.

Available at: http://daccess-

ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1636%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC.


UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. First semi-annual report of the Secretary-

General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). UN Doc

S/2005/272. Available at: http://daccess-

ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/272&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC. Last accessed:

18 May 2006.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Report of the Secretary-General on the

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 17 January to 17 July 2000).

UN Doc S/2000/718. Available at: http://daccess-


18 May 2006.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Report of the Secretary-General on the United

Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period from 18 July 2000 to 18 January 2001).

UN Doc S/2001/66. Available at:

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/218/09/IMG/N0121809.pdf?OpenElement.


UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Report of the Secretary-General on the

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. UN Doc S/2006/26. Available at: http://daccess-


10 September 2006.

37

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. “Mehlis Report”. The Report of the

international independent investigation commission established persuant to Security Council.

UN Doc S/2005/662. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/docs/mehlisreport/. Last

accessed: 28 May 2006. Last accessed: 10 September 2006.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Resolution 1701. UN Doc S/RES/1701.

Available at:


Last accessed: 10 September 2006.

7.2 Articles from Books and Periodicals

AJAMI, Fouad. “The Autumn of The Autocrats”. In: Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.

DROZ, Bernard & ROWLEY, Anthony. Histoire Générale du XXe Siècle. Paris, Editions du

Seuil, 1992.

PONGO, Martin. Perspectivas comparadas de mercados de violência. Mexico, Ed. Alfa

omega, 2003.

7.3 Articles from the Internet

AL MANAR TV. Israeli aggressive warplanes violate Lebanon's airspace. Monday, 1 May

2006. Available at: http://www.almanar.com.lb/story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=649000.

Last accessed: May 18 2006.

ALBASHA, Abdallah. “Mehlis Report: A Political Game”. Available at:

http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2005%20Opinion%20Editorials/October/

23o/Mehlis%20Report%20A%20Political%20Game%20By%20Abdallah%20Albasha.htm.

Last accessed on 30 March 2006.

ARABIC NEWS. Weekly Edition: Lebanon – Week of August 29, 2005. Available at:

http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Weekly/Lebanon/20050829.html. Last accessed: 24 June

2006.

BRADAN, TONY. Saudi-Syrian Relations after Hariri. In: Mideast Monitor. Vol. 1, nº 1,

Feb 2006. Available at: http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0602/0602_2.htm. Last


EL-GHOUL, Adnan. Fresh round of clashes erupts at Lebanon-Israel border. In: Daily Star,

Thursday, 24 November 2005. Available at:

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=20270. Last


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EL KARA, Bechara. The political mobilization of the Shiite community in the Middle East.

Available at: http://www.amcips.org/PDF%20books/BookII9.pdf. P. 3-6. 10. Last Accessed:

September 2006.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE. Country Profiles. Available at:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page

&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1018721190906. Last Accessed:

September 2006.

FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO. Folha OnLine: Cronologia da Crise entre Israel e o Hizbolah.

Available at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u98496.shtml. Last accessed:

10 September 2006.

PERMANENT MISSION OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. Issues in the

Security Council Agenda: Lebanon. Available at:

http://64.237.101.231/greeceun/content/Document.aspx?d=-

1&rd=0&f=1365&rf=177853028&m=2176&rm=21873846. Last accessed: 18 May 2006.

SAMII, Bill. “Lebanon: People Want 'Truth,' But Not All Welcome Mehlis Report”.

Available at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/2e20ad03-c1fb-4fb1-a532-

44b0443f992c.html. Last accessed: 25 June 2006.

SCHIFF, Ze’ev. Thin Blue Line. Available at: http://www.4mothers.org.il/lebanon/blue.htm. Last

Accessed: September 2006.

STRAW, Jack. Upholding the long term vision of peace in the Middle East. In: Jewish

Chronicle, 19 Dec 2002. Available at

http://www.ukun.org/search/Search_show.asp?Aid=534&T=1. Last Accessed: September

2006.

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