Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)...
Transcript of Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)...
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Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach
Soham De Department of Computer Science
Joint work with: Dana S Nau (Department of Computer Science)Michele J Gelfand (Department of Psychology)
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SOCIAL NORMS
Human societies all around the world interact and accomplish different tasks by developing and maintaining social norms.
Examples:- Walking on a specific side of the pavement- Right of way while driving- Shaking hands when meeting someone new
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SOCIAL NORMSEmpirical studies show marked differences in the strength of social norms around the globe.
Tight Societies: High norm-adherence. High punishment of norm deviations.E.g. Indonesia
Loose Societies: Weaker norms. More tolerance for deviations from norms.E.g. Netherlands
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SOCIAL NORMSEmpirical studies show marked differences in the strength of social norms around the globe.
Tight Societies: High norm-adherence. High punishment of norm deviations.E.g. Indonesia
Loose Societies: Weaker norms. More tolerance for deviations from norms.E.g. Netherlands
How do such norms emerge & change in different societies?
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WHY STUDY NORM CHANGE?
• How/when will a society become unstable?
• How can we predict a shift in norms?
• How likely are social uprisings and turmoil?
How do such norms emerge & change in different societies?
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WHY STUDY NORM CHANGE?
• How/when will a society become unstable?
• How can we predict a shift in norms?
• How likely are social uprisings and turmoil?
How do such norms emerge & change in different societies?
First work to provide a model of how cultural differences affect norm change
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EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)
Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics
Application of game theory to evolving populations
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EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)
Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics
Application of game theory to evolving populations
Setting (for this talk):
✦ Large population structured on a network:• Individuals arranged on the nodes• Edges represent social connections
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EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)
Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics
Application of game theory to evolving populations
Setting (for this talk):
✦ Large population structured on a network:• Individuals arranged on the nodes• Edges represent social connections
✦ Individuals interact with neighbors using a gameGame Strategies Possible Behaviors
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EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)
Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics
Application of game theory to evolving populations
Setting (for this talk):
✦ Large population structured on a network:• Individuals arranged on the nodes• Edges represent social connections
✦ Individuals interact with neighbors using a game
✦ Individuals observe neighbors’ strategies and payoffs and imitate/learn from them
Game Strategies Possible Behaviors
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FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
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FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
Each strategy used by some proportion of the population
Individuals interact with each of their neighbors using a 2-player game
Payoffs depend on both the individual’s strategy and neighbors’ strategies;Total payoff = sum of individual payoffs
Humans imitate others, learn from others; Successful strategies are more likely to be adopted by others (more on this later)
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FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
Each strategy used by some proportion of the population
Individuals interact with each of their neighbors using a 2-player game
Payoffs depend on both the individual’s strategy and neighbors’ strategies;Total payoff = sum of individual payoffs
Humans imitate others, learn from others; Successful strategies are more likely to be adopted by others (more on this later)
![Page 14: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
Each strategy used by some proportion of the population
Individuals interact with each of their neighbors using a 2-player game
Payoffs depend on both the individual’s strategy and neighbors’ strategies;Total payoff = sum of individual payoffs
Humans imitate others, learn from others; Successful strategies are more likely to be adopted by others (more on this later)
![Page 15: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
Each strategy used by some proportion of the population
Individuals interact with each of their neighbors using a 2-player game
Payoffs depend on both the individual’s strategy and neighbors’ strategies;Total payoff = sum of individual payoffs
Humans imitate others, learn from others; Successful strategies are more likely to be adopted by others (more on this later)
![Page 16: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
FRAMEWORKCurrent Population
Interactions(stage game)
Payoffs(relative fitness)
Transmission(evolutionary fitness)
Next Population
Each strategy used by some proportion of the population
Individuals interact with each of their neighbors using a 2-player game
Payoffs depend on both the individual’s strategy and neighbors’ strategies;Total payoff = sum of individual payoffs
Humans imitate others, learn from others; Successful strategies are more likely to be adopted by others (more on this later)
![Page 17: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
TRANSMISSION OF BEHAVIORSInterpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
Fermi Rule
Each individual compares its payoff to a randomly chosen neighbor
Individual switches to neighbor’s strategy with probability depending on the difference in payoffs:
1
4
2 3
5
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TRANSMISSION OF BEHAVIORSInterpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
Fermi Rule
Each individual compares its payoff to a randomly chosen neighbor
Individual switches to neighbor’s strategy with probability depending on the difference in payoffs:
1
4
2 3
5
ua
un
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TRANSMISSION OF BEHAVIORSInterpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
Fermi Rule
Each individual compares its payoff to a randomly chosen neighbor
Individual switches to neighbor’s strategy w.p.depending on the difference in payoffs:
p =
1
1 + exp(s(ua � un))
1
4
2 3
5
ua
unua , un = individual’s and neighbor’s payoffss ≥ 0 is the selection strength
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TRANSMISSION OF BEHAVIORSInterpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
Fermi Rule
Each individual compares its payoff to a randomly chosen neighbor
Individual switches to neighbor’s strategy w.p.depending on the difference in payoffs:
p =
1
1 + exp(s(ua � un))
ua , un = individual’s and neighbor’s payoffss ≥ 0 is the selection strength
Probp
ua � un
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TRANSMISSION OF BEHAVIORSInterpret game-theoretic payoffs as reproductive fitness
Fermi Rule
Each individual compares its payoff to a randomly chosen neighbor
Individual switches to neighbor’s strategy w.p.depending on the difference in payoffs:
p =
1
1 + exp(s(ua � un))
ua � un
Proportion of agents using a strategy shrinks/grows depending on how well it performs (in terms of payoffs)
Probp
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Individuals don’t always learn from neighbors
Sometimes, they try out a completely new behavior to see how it does
EXPLORATION
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Individuals don’t always learn from neighbors
Sometimes, they try out a completely new behavior to see how it does
EXPLORATION
Modeled by modifying the Fermi Rule:
Let S = {all available strategies}
At each step, each agent chooses a strategy s at random from S with a small probability µ
• regardless of whether strategy s is currently successful
• regardless of whether any agent is currently using strategy s
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• Human interactions are very complicatedEGT models use highly simplified abstractions
• Designed to capture only the essential nature of the interactions
• Can’t give exact numeric predictions of what would happen in real life
WHAT CAN THIS ACCOMPLISH?
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• Human interactions are very complicatedEGT models use highly simplified abstractions
• Designed to capture only the essential nature of the interactions
• Can’t give exact numeric predictions of what would happen in real life
WHAT CAN THIS ACCOMPLISH?
• It can provide explanations of the underlying dynamics
• Establish support for causal relationships and identify trends
• Evolution of human culture over time virtually impossible to study in lab settings or field studies. EGT can help out!
But…
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STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
Denote possible norms as actions in a game
How do we set up tightness/looseness as a game-theoretic model?
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STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
Denote possible norms as actions in a game
How do we set up tightness/looseness as a game-theoretic model?
Use a closely-related concept:
Need For Coordination
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Loose societies:Low need for coordinationIndividualistic agents. Payoffs depend less on neighbors.
STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
Tight societies: High need for coordinationPayoffs depend much more on strategies of neighbors
Denote possible norms as actions in a game
How do we set up tightness/looseness as a game-theoretic model?
Use a closely-related concept:
Need For Coordination
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Loose societies: Low need for coordination
Tight societies: High need for coordination
STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
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Loose societies: Low need for coordination
Tight societies: High need for coordination
Game-theoretic model of need for coordination
STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
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Loose societies: Low need for coordination
Tight societies: High need for coordination
Study how the need for coordination affects norm change in societies
Game-theoretic model of need for coordination
STUDYING NORM CHANGE IN TIGHT & LOOSE SOCIETIES
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Mc A BA a , a 0 , 0B 0 , 0 b , b
Mf A BA a , a a , bB b , a b , b
Extreme Tight Society Extreme Loose Society
Coordination Game Fixed-Payoff Game
PROPOSED MODELAssume two possible norms denoted by A and B
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Mc A BA a , a 0 , 0B 0 , 0 b , b
Mf A BA a , a a , bB b , a b , b
Extreme Tight Society Extreme Loose Society
Coordination Game Fixed-Payoff Game
M = c Mc + (1-c) Mf
PROPOSED MODELAssume two possible norms denoted by A and B
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Mc A BA a , a 0 , 0B 0 , 0 b , b
Mf A BA a , a a , bB b , a b , b
Extreme Tight Society Extreme Loose Society
Coordination Game Fixed-Payoff Game
M A BA a (1-c) aB (1-c) b b
M = c Mc + (1-c) Mf
c denotes the level of tightness
PROPOSED MODELAssume two possible norms denoted by A and B
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HOW TO STUDY NORM CHANGE?
Using this model, how do we study norm change in societies?
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HOW TO STUDY NORM CHANGE?
Using this model, how do we study norm change in societies?
We look at two key aspects of norm change:
✦ Cultural Inertia: amount of resistance of a society to changing a norm
✦ Exploration Rate: how willing are agents to try out new behaviors at random
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CULTURAL INERTIASetting:
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CULTURAL INERTIASetting:
• Individuals arranged on the nodes of a grid
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CULTURAL INERTIASetting:
• Individuals arranged on the nodes of a grid
• Initially, norm B has a higher payoff than A (b > a), with majority of the population playing B
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CULTURAL INERTIASetting:
• Individuals arranged on the nodes of a grid
• Initially, norm B has a higher payoff than A (b > a), with majority of the population playing B
• After some time, structural shock: represents a catastrophic incident in a society, where suddenly there is abrupt change in the payoffs for actions A and B.
Payoff of A increases over B (a > b)
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CULTURAL INERTIASetting:
• Individuals arranged on the nodes of a grid
• Initially, norm B has a higher payoff than A (b > a), with majority of the population playing B
• After some time, structural shock: represents a catastrophic incident in a society, where suddenly there is abrupt change in the payoffs for actions A and B.
Payoff of A increases over B (a > b)
How does a tight/loose society react?
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CULTURAL INERTIA
Tight
Intermediate
Loose
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CULTURAL INERTIA
Tight
Intermediate
Loose
Structural Shock
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CULTURAL INERTIA
Tight
Intermediate
Loose
No Change
Eventual Change
Fast Change
Structural Shock
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CULTURAL INERTIA
Tight
Intermediate
Loose
No Change
Eventual Change
Fast Change
Structural ShockHigher needs for coordination
(tighter societies)
Higher cultural inertia
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Why study exploration rates?
• How likely is an agent to learn socially?
• How fast are norms adopted in a population?
EXPLORATION RATESIn all past work, exploration rate is kept constant
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Why study exploration rates?
• How likely is an agent to learn socially?
• How fast are norms adopted in a population?
EXPLORATION RATESIn all past work, exploration rate is kept constant
To study how tightness/looseness affects exploration:
Let exploration rates evolve as part of agent’s strategy
Study evolution in a changing environment using regular structural shocks
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Why study exploration rates?
• How likely is an agent to learn socially?
• How fast are norms adopted in a population?
EXPLORATION RATESIn all past work, exploration rate is kept constant
To study how tightness/looseness affects exploration:
Let exploration rates evolve as part of agent’s strategy
Study evolution in a changing environment using regular structural shocks
In a static environment, no exploration is always better in the long run
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EVOLVING EXPLORATION RATES
Same experiment with agents on a grid using Fermi Rule
Now we introduce structural shocks at regular intervals of 75 generations
Agents can choose an exploration rate from the set{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} as part of their strategy
Tight
Loose
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EVOLVING EXPLORATION RATES
Same experiment with agents on a grid using Fermi Rule
Now we introduce structural shocks at regular intervals of 75 generations
Agents can choose an exploration rate from the set{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} as part of their strategy
Tight
Loose
Lower Exploration
Higher Exploration
![Page 51: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
EVOLVING EXPLORATION RATES
Same experiment with agents on a grid using Fermi Rule
Now we introduce structural shocks at regular intervals of 75 generations
Agents can choose an exploration from the set{0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} as part of their strategy
Tight
Loose
Low Exploration
High Exploration
Higher needs for coordination(tighter societies)
Lower exploration rates
![Page 52: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
CONTRIBUTIONS
![Page 53: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
CONTRIBUTIONS✦ Main Results:
Societies with higher needs for coordination (tighter societies) have:• Higher cultural inertia• Lower exploration rates
Using EGT model, we establish direct causal relationships
![Page 54: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
CONTRIBUTIONS✦ Main Results:
Societies with higher needs for coordination (tighter societies) have:• Higher cultural inertia• Lower exploration rates
Using EGT model, we establish direct causal relationships
✦ Main qualitative findings robust to a wide range of parameter values Please check paper for more details and theoretical justifications
![Page 55: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
CONTRIBUTIONS✦ Main Results:
Societies with higher needs for coordination (tighter societies) have:• Higher cultural inertia• Lower exploration rates
Using EGT model, we establish direct causal relationships
✦ Main qualitative findings robust to a wide range of parameter values Please check paper for more details and theoretical justifications
✦ Broader Takeaway:
Previous work have not accounted for the substantial societal differences in how individuals interact and influence each other. Incorporating concepts from the social and behavioral sciences, and modeling them using game theory can lead to better insights!
![Page 56: Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic … · EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT) Recently being used to model the evolution of cultural characteristics Application](https://reader033.fdocuments.us/reader033/viewer/2022050608/5faf4f0b05105a7c470169f1/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
THANKS!Feel free to get in touch!
Extended version on arXiv: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.04720.pdf
email: [email protected]: https://cs.umd.edu/~sohamde/
Soham De Michele J GelfandDana S Nau