Uncovering Police Corruption in the Belgium Diamond … · Uncovering Police Corruption in the...

Diamond Intelligence Briefing 1

Diamond Intelligence BriefingBy Chaim Even-Zohar

Vol.32 No.873 N7 April 2016

Uncovering Police Corruption in the Belgium Diamond Sector

In every society there are some who commit crimes. An investigative free press will not hesitate to expose those individuals and companies. All of us trust and rely on law enforcement institutions to make sure that those who violate laws are held accountable – and pay the

price (including removal from society through prisons or death penalty). The police are there to ensure that the law is upheld – in fact, they represent the law, they are the face of the law. If the police themselves violate laws, fabricate evidence, make false arrests, use their power to extort, society cannot function. People start to fear the police – they may even feel compelled to take the law into their own hands.

In recent years, many diamantaires in Antwerp have lost their trust in those whose sole task it is to police the diamond sector. One sensed that there were corrupt elements in the diamond police. That there were policemen who broke their social contract and abused their power for personal gain. Some diamantaires and companies became victims – some went bankrupt as their inventories had been arbitrarily and unnecessarily seized.

Writing about this police corruption is seen as “taboo” – lest it might badly reflect on the industry. But keeping silent makes matters worse – by being open and honest about it, the fear of “coming forward” will evaporate, the discussion will be moved to seeking remedies and on how

Betrayal of TrustEXCLUSIVEInside: A conversation with Nanavati


J ust a few days before the horrendous Brussels terrorist attack, which captivated the public worldwide, there was – totally unrelated, of course – another shocking event that escaped the limelight: the long-

standing Antwerp Federal Police Commissioner and Head of the Diamond Squad, Agim De Bruycker, suspected of various alleged corruption and falsification of document charges, was arrested for a second time. He is currently held in custody.

The ‘Horror of the Diamond Sector’De Bruycker’s first arrest took place in March 2015

– and he remained in prison for three months. He was released on certain conditions and suspended from the police force for the duration of the investigation. His lawyer, advocate Gert Warson, said at the time that his client was innocent and that there was no incriminating evidence against him.1 Now, exactly a year after his first arrest, De Bruycker is again behind bars. Around the same time as De Bruycker’s second arrest, four other Antwerp policemen were jailed on suspicions of theft and extortion of foreigners in Antwerp, not necessarily diamond-related.

In terms of hierarchy, Agim De Bruycker holds the second highest rank in the Belgium Federal Police Corps. Only the Chief Commissioner is above him. De Bruycker has been involved, or initiated, virtually every criminal case in Belgium involving diamonds for the past 22 years!

to go forward. Seeing that the police are not considered above the law will restore the trust that has been lost and renew the social contract between citizens and the police. The sole purpose of this article is to somewhat advance that objective – and make sure it remains on our agenda until trust is fully restored. Or, as one Antwerp diamantaire reflected: “to make sure that we preserve Antwerp as the most attractive diamond center for our children.”

Flemish newspapers referred to him as the “Horror of the Diamond Sector” (Verschrikking) or the “Fright” of diamantaires. The federal diamond squad he heads employs some 16 investigators, some of which have been questioned as well.

Questions without AnswersWhy did the government fail to adhere to the best

“practice of rotation”? Why does such a highly sensitive position not have term limits? Is it possible that the alleged crimes now attributed to De Bruycker could have been committed without cohorts? If lower police officers see that “their boss” gets away with it, isn’t this seen as a “license” to do likewise?

What troubles most is the question of whether this is a situation of a lone cop that allegedly strayed, or is De Bruycker a symptom of a much wider systemic

institutional or societal problem. There is an overriding concern that nobody wants to raise in public – and even my sources whisper when they talk about, as if they themselves are afraid to hear it out loud: How much has law enforcement corruption potentially

damaged the Belgium diamond sector over time and in what ways? How often has there been miscarriage of justice, if at all? What has it done to the traditional integrity of the sector in Antwerp and beyond? With some hesitations, some of these issues will be addressed here – though answers may not be conclusive. Maybe they never will.

Pressures to Get Convictions – Rather Than the Truth

As an investigative journalist in the diamond sector, I myself have more than once been in contact with Agim De Bruycker. He was always helpful and correct – we had some frank discussions. Not so long ago there was a court case involving fraud at the HRD grading lab in Antwerp. The principals of three innocuous small Indian-owned Antwerp firms quickly confessed, signed convictions, and, I gather, they are now either in jail or awaiting sentencing.

It has always been my belief, based on my own journalistic sleuthing, that these companies merely acted as straw intermediaries, almost like “couriers” between major (criminal/industry) players

Uncovering Police Corruption

Agim De Bruycker


and the lab. The three companies were ostensibly buying and selling the stones submitted to the lab to create a smoke screen and distance the real perpetrators.

At the time, I remember a conversation with De Bruycker from which I understood that he may have had his own reservations, but he dismissed these concerns. He basically said (and I quote from memory): Chaim – I am a policeman. I have three signed confessions. This rarely happens. I don’t need more. End of story.

I realized then that De Bruycker was under tremendous pressure to deliver, to bring cases to court that lead to convictions. The thought crossed my mind that these “couriers” may actually have been, or will be, compensated for taking the fall. I still think so.

The Questionable Diamond Investigative Mechanism

However, De Bruycker is not a “one man show.” The decision-making process is shared. In the complex judiciary system, police investigations are accompanied and guided by an “investigative magistrate” or “investigative judges.” (One must differentiate between judges adjudicating cases in court and the law officers who work in the

Prosecutor’s Office, who essentially bring prosecutions.) In recent years, one investigative “diamond magistrate”

has been Peter van Calster, who has a reputation of being a relentless (and feared) investigator in the diamond sector. In recent months, he has not been in the news, but Van Calster’s own office also faced some kind of investigation a few years ago. Question marks around the entire diamond investigative mechanism are anything

but new. This is alarming indeed.It’s a strange system, at least to outsiders. A few

years, ago DIB published an exposé on an allegedly fraudulent bankruptcy in Canada, with links to a diamond conglomerate with offices in New York. We reported that a Belgian insurance company, Coface, had insured the diamond company that had supplied diamonds that remained unpaid and/or had gone missing.

What I later found out was that Coface had actually made an official payment to the Prosecutor’s Office to finance a police investigation. (Something like €50,000 or €75,000.) With this money, Commissioner De Bruycker and an Investigative Judge could travel to New York and Canada to collect additional evidence of a possible insurance fraud.

It’s puzzling. In what justice system must a victim of crime finance the criminal investigation conducted by the police? At the time of Commissioner De Bruycker’s arrest, March 2015, his investigation into the insurance case was about to be completed. Just a coincidence? The file apparently remains open…

De Bruycker’s and Abhay Nanavati’s ArrestsThe timing of the arrest was bewildering. In January 2015

and before, Commissioner De Bruycker had reportedly exchanged some $12,000 at an official currency exchange at the Falcon Square in Antwerp.2 (Apparently, he had frequented that exchange before, and reports suggest a total money exchange of €70,000.3] Nobody should have known better that such transactions, especially if they seem suspicious, would be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) – called CTIF-CFI in Belgium – which investigates money laundering suspicions. Indeed, they


Peter van CalsterPeter van Calster

Peter van CalsterAntwerp Diamond Bourse Trading Floor

Question marks around the entire diamond investigative mechanism are

anything but new.


were. These currency transactions constituted a formal excuse to conduct a search of De Bruycker’s home, where €50,000 in cash and about half a million euros worth of diamonds and gold were discovered and confiscated. But as these reports had been made a considerable time earlier, why did they wait until late March to conduct the search?

When interrogated, and after giving at first some clearly unconvincing explanations, De Bruycker then declared that he was keeping these diamonds on behalf of a friend, Abhay Nanavati, a member in good standing of the Antwerp Diamond Bourse. Nanavati was then arrested and parts of his stocks were seized. He was released from jail after a month – and no charges were filed. Some newspaper articles reported at that time that some of Nanavati’s stocks were held by De Bruycker, ostensibly because Nanavati feared that banks might seize his goods, or because he dreaded a raid by tax authorities. The reports say that the police don’t consider this explanation plausible. So far Nanavati has remained silent. Today he spoke up and talked to DIB. [His views appear on page 7.]

Encouraging Industry Reaction to ExposuresOver the years, diamantaires complained that seizure

of diamonds by Agim De Bruycker and his colleagues is a scary and destructive process. Says one interviewed diamantaire: “Literally or figuratively at gun-point, all diamonds are wiped from the tables, are emptied from a diamantaire’s vaults, all put together in large bags which then are closed. Often there is no precise weighing – or precise recording of each stone. Essentially, any

investigation may start with seizing the stocks. Questions will be asked later…. At that very moment, the diamond company ceases to operate. One will go bankrupt even if, a few years later, the case is totally dismissed by the court.”

The resolute actions by law enforcement against one of their own most favorite sons – and the apparent determination to get to the bottom of this – have resounded positively throughout the Antwerp industry. Many diamond industry players lost their “fear” of the police

and had the courage to break the “code of omerta” – a code of honor that places importance on silence, non-cooperation with authorities, and non-interference in the illegal actions of others.

This – and the fact that De Bruycker’s case is now being thoroughly investigated

– is possibly the best thing that has happened in the Antwerp diamond sector in the last few years – and may be a turning point decisive for its future.

This has led to a myriad of new revelations (or has given renewed impetus to earlier suspicions) to advance police investigations in the possible switching of seized diamonds while in police custody. While the Commissioner was behind bars, police investigators carefully checked the seized diamonds still held in the vaults of the Diamond Squad. According to published reports, irregularities were found in the procedures applicable to safe-keeping, and at least one seized parcel has raised questions.4

The positive reactions ought to be seen as just another momentum in a steady “mentality change” trend. The adoption of anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) laws made the reporting of suspicious activities in the diamond sector mandatory. But the Belgian diamantaires – and maybe not only them – feared getting involved with the police. To put it bluntly, many in the industry feared the Belgian police.

Diamond Dealers Rarely Reported Suspicious Activities

In 2011, the CTIF-CFI received a total of just over twenty thousand disclosures from financial and non-financial enterprises, professions and entities subject to suspicious reporting requirements. Of these, there were only six (i.e., 0.03%) directly from diamond dealers. In the two previous years, there had been one report annually. In the seven years between 2005-2012, the CTIF-CFI reported that a total of 10 reports were received from diamond dealers. This is next to nothing. (Of course, there were more diamond-


Antwerp Diamond Bourse


related disclosures, as banks, money exchangers, and foreign FIU’s also report suspicions involving diamonds.)

The Antwerp World Diamond Centre (AWDC) management recognized that, and devised a system to give comfort to an informer while ensuring that the information would reach the appropriate authorities. They correctly read the mood of the industry: They want to assist in fighting corruption – if they trust the mechanism with which to do so.

Explains AWDC’s Head of Communications Karen Rentmeesters: “In 2013, together with police authorities, we took the initiative to set up a dedicated SPOC – Single Point of Contact – within AWDC, aimed at lowering the threshold for people in the Antwerp diamond community to report all sorts of suspicious activities, ranging from security awareness, (cyber-)crime, unusual behavior, fraud, etc. The SPOC functions as a trusted go-between, and information gathered through this SPOC can be forwarded to the relevant authorities. This approach has proven to be successful.”

No More Tolerance for FraudIts success rate can only be understood if it is realized

that SPOC basically started from a zero base. Says Karen Rentmeesters: “The number of reports increased from 83 in 2013 to 257 in 2014, and no less than 490 reports were filed last year [by diamond dealers]. This initiative and the exponential increase in reports demonstrate that the Antwerp diamond community is committed to increase the level of transparency.”

It is hard to argue otherwise. One must add, however, that out of these reported cases, only a few actually

lead to a referral to the judiciary. And some of the cases that are being adjudicated are eventually dismissed by the court.

But it does indicate that the overwhelming majority of the industry itself clearly has no tolerance any more for fraud and is willing to take active steps to protect themselves and their colleagues. The AWDC has taken additional welcome initiatives

(seminars, AML helplines, compliance education, etc.), but that’s for a different story at another time.

De Bruycker’s Expanded InvestigationLet’s get back to the De Bruycker investigation. It has

recently been expanded to the United Nations in New York, probing his activities while serving on the UN Panel of Diamond Experts for Ivory Coast. His recent arrest seems to be related to discrepancies between the amounts of moneys he actually received from the UN and the amounts he said he was paid. More about that later. De Bruycker is apparently not cooperating with his interrogators.

He seems to be the only one sticking to the code of omerta. Who is he protecting? Or, worse, of whom is the “Horror of the Diamond Industry” himself afraid?

Economic Impact of Police Corruption What is more important to us is wondering what all of

this means for the Belgian diamond sector. Past and Future. A popular Belgium best-seller is a 231-page book titled “Everybody Does It!” It’s about tax evasion in Belgium. The author, Professor (and fiscal expert) Michel Maus in a quite humoristic way explains that “the cheapest way to paint the facade of your house white is in black.”5 He

estimates that 20% of the Flemish labor force works wholly or partly in the black. The hotel and restaurant business, the construction sector, the harbor work, are cited among the principal participants in the black (shadow) market. According to European Union research reports, Belgium’s shadow economy amounts to €61 billion – or 16.8% of GDP.6 In fact, that isn’t bad. In the 27 euro members, fourteen states have larger black economies measured in terms of their respective GDP.7 The diamond sector is no better or worse than the rest of Belgium from a taxation perspective.

Tax evasion is defined by the EU paper as “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to public authorities.” Corruption, the way the public perceives it, refers to bribery, extortion, fraud, smuggling, etc.


Peter van CalsterAWDC CEO Ari Epstein

AWDC’s Head of Communications Karen Rentmeesters

The resolute actions by law enforcement against one of their own most favorite sons – and the apparent determination to get to the bottom of this – have resounded

positively throughout the Antwerp industry.


Fundamentally, Belgium is not seen as a corrupt country. Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which relates to the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians by business people and country analysts, ranks Belgium as the 15th cleanest out of 174 rated countries. CPI scores range between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Belgium gets a score of 76.

From a diamond world perspective, Belgium is followed by Hong Kong, United States and the UAE. (South Africa ranks as the 44th country from the top (CPI 44) and India far lower as number 85 (CPIU 38). Angola, Zimbabwe and the DRC are rated as the highest corrupt countries.) The scale of the scourge is huge. Sixty-eight percent of countries worldwide have a serious corruption problem. Half of the G20 are among them. Not one single country, anywhere in the world, is corruption-free. So it’s important keep things in perspective.

Corruption is generally associated with (illegal or vulnerable) businesses that seek to operate securely (“protection”) by paying off the police, politicians, and judges (or to have “profit sharing schemes”) – but it isn’t a one way street. Businesses – and, for various reasons, especially the diamond sector – are also vulnerable to extortionary demands. Law enforcement authorities, ranging from the police to prosecutors and even judges – can demand bribes to overlook criminal law violations and limit penalties.

In the current situation, this certainly is something that warrants considerable attention at the highest levels of government. In a wider context, writes an expert, “corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state. Institutions designed to govern the interrelationship between the citizen and the state are used instead for personal enrichments and the provision of benefits to the corrupt.”8

Extortion is different from what euphemistically are called “facilitation payments” – moneys paid to expedite a service one is legally entitled to. Not so long ago,

these (illegal) facilitation payments were a recognized tax deductible expense in some countries. Extortion is something else. It is paid to get the recipient of the money to conduct a crime in return. In corrupt environments there is a pervasive fear, also by good and decent companies, of frivolous and false arrests. That’s reportedly the reason why the other policemen were arrested in Belgium (around the same time De Bruycker was locked up again.) In return for payments, it is alleged, illegal foreigners would not be arrested or deported. It’s a relief that these betrayers of the public trust were caught.

The fear of illegal or unwarranted arrests is real, especially in the diamond world – and not only in Belgium. It may create reputational damage, panic among workers, questions by banks, and many other nasty spillover effects. The knowledge that one has “nothing to hide” gives little comfort if there is no trust in either the investigation or the legal process in general. In such situations, innocent people can justify to themselves making a payoff only to avoid greater damage and harm. But the moment they do so, they are totally at the mercy of the “bribed official” and he may come back demanding (extorting) more.

De Bruycker’s Impact Beyond BordersRecently, in a public statement, largely ignored, the

OECD monitoring (working) group on the implementation of anti-bribery measures found that Belgium is failing in its “reform of the limitation period applicable to the foreign bribery offence, private sector whistleblower protection and the allocation of adequate resources to law enforcement and judicial authorities to prosecute transnational bribery, notably given the important caseload linked to transnational corruption cases involving European officials referred to the Belgian authorities by


Businesses – and, for various reasons, especially the diamond sector – are also

vulnerable to extortionary demands. Law enforcement authorities, ranging from the police to prosecutors and even judges – can demand bribes to overlook criminal

law violations and limit penalties.


the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).”9

The OECD concerns are not really a newsworthy event – it almost seems routine. Three years ago, the organization bluntly concluded that “fighting foreign bribery is not a priority in Belgium. Together with the flagrant lack of resources for Belgian law enforcement authorities, this has resulted in very few foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions. In the 14 years since the entry into force of the foreign bribery offence in Belgium, only one case of bribery of foreign public officials has been concluded.”10

Transnational bribery is seen as an opaque reference to the special relations between rough dealers and heads of state, members of their family, the political elites, military and other key officials – including Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) “gatekeepers” – in various African countries. In the cases in which there were sentences handed down within the diamond sector, they often focused on “foreigners” – dealers from Afro-

Lebanese origins, some Indians and Israelis. Call it pragmatism, hypocrisy or realism, depending

with whom one talks, looking “the other way” often seems the preferred course – but even this comes at a price. Commercial and economic interests need to be protected as well – in this, Belgium is no different than many other diamond countries.

In a way, that may have been inevitable. Belgium, which is still seen as the world’s largest rough diamond trading center, has a close relationship with virtually all African diamond-producing countries. Historically, from the world’s very first diamond discoveries up to 2015, 63.5% by volume, and 58.5% by value of all diamonds ever mined have come from Africa. According to a recent study, from the beginning of mining, some 5.15 billion carats were unearthed and the lion’s share of the cuttable parts were historically – and still today – marketed through Antwerp.11


Abhay Nanavati apparently is a man who likes to keep his finger on the pulse of what is happening in the world and how it impacts the global diamond industry.

He is administrator and one of the most active participants on a closed group chat on social medium “Telegram” where some 200 industry members share news and information on a daily basis. Following are extracts from a spontaneous conversation.

DIB: Some newspapers hinted that you may have been a corruption victim yourself who was pressured to do certain things. Your name appears on the CD-ROM disk with the names of account-holders with the HSBC bank. Agim de Bruycker was in charge of the HSBC investigations. That made you vulnerable to pressures. Is there any truth to this?Nanavati: Absolutely not. De Bruycker didn’t force me to do anything. The diamonds found in his house were all mine, and I am glad that the police also realized that and that I was released without any charges being filed.

DIB: So why did you give him these goods? Nanavati: Well at that point in time I had a family problem, this was all more than two years ago, and I thought that this would be the best place for me to keep the diamonds. Obviously, I couldn’t keep them in the office or give for safe-keeping to other family members. In Indian family situations many family companies are owned jointly and that may cause problems. You know, everyone wants to have his own business. Family trouble.

DIB: So you were concerned that banks could seize these goods? Nanavati: Yes, I had problems with my uncle, with my cousins, yes I was worried about that.

DIB: But didn’t you have your own issues with the banks?Nanavati: It is true that many years ago I faced some financial problems. That was in a company called Precidiam N.V. that was closed years ago. But I have overcome these problems and I have paid all my debts to the banks. I had also guaranteed debts of my uncle with the Bank Leumi in New York, and I paid these as well.

DIB: Thus you have only a court case with ABN-AMRO?Nanavati: No, nowhere in the world is there any court case outstanding against me. Not ABN-AMRO and no other bank.

Abhay Nanavati: “I helped De Bruycker with diamond valuations.”

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Many of the special ties with Africa are rooted in its old colonial days. There are many rough diamond dealers that engage in jurisdiction shopping for their business, though that trend is declining. The recently published Panama Papers will undoubtedly underscore that there is no way one can escape financial transparency and corporate compliance. Back to De Bruycker.

Searching for Conflict Diamonds and Corruption in Africa

The transnational corruption in diamonds is viewed as a special expertise of Agim de Bruycker, who was “loaned” at various periods between 2005 and 2008 to the United Nations. In 2006, UN Secretary Kofi Anan appointed De

Bruycker to the then-newly established Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire. He was the acknowledged “diamond expert” of the initial five (later only four) members. He had become an internationally recognized expert, often invited to international meetings on law enforcement to showcase the Belgian model. De Bruycker worked closely with the KPCS, especially with the KP Committee of Technical Experts.

From documents we have seen, there was a close (contractual) exchange of information agreements between Interpol and the UN experts. The intermingling of (simultaneously) holding functions at the Belgian Federal Diamond Police and the Sanction Committees enabled De Bruycker to pursue prosecution in Belgium courts against

diamond companies. The two positions gave him unlimited access to data sources – which others wouldn’t have. He was enormously powerful and feared.

In some Antwerp courts cases, the defense lawyers protested against “the dual role of the investigator as an expert at the UN in the West African conflict and secondly as investigator at the Federal Police.”13 In a specific case,


Monitoring alluvial mining sites in West Africa

DIB: But why did you pick De Bruycker, of all people, for safekeeping of your diamonds? How did you even know him? Since when were you friends? Nanavati: He was around in the market many years. Used to call me a few times for asking my help. For putting prices on some goods. He would ask for market information. I knew him from long ago. You remember the Brenig case?12 I was involved in that case. Then I got to know De Bruycker as I was detained for 4 or 5 days. He was very aggressive to me at that time. But thereafter we got to know each other as we saw each other in the market.

DIB: Did the police return the diamonds found in De Bruycker’s house to you?Nanavati: No, not yet. But my lawyer is very confident that we will get them. Some of these are my personal belongings. You know, I am just hoping that everything will be all right.

DIB: It seems that De Bruycker isn’t talking. Is he afraid of something? Or of somebody? Nanavati: I really wouldn’t know. I don’t really know anything about what he is doing. It’s now already a year ago. I haven’t been in contact.

DIB: Do you think that De Bruycker switched goods?Nanavati: I really don’t think so. You know, he is a straightforward Belgian guy. I really don’t think he would do something like that.

This wasn’t a planned interview. Rather a spontaneous conversation in which Abhay Nanavati spoke from his heart. He said what he felt. This is “his truth” and I sensed that he was genuine. The story is strange, actually, very strange. But weirder things have happened in our industry and Nanavati deserves to get all the benefit of the doubt.

The investigation will run its course. Before the conversation ended he asked me if I knew the meaning of his name, Abhay. I didn’t. It means “fearless” in Hindi. If all he said will bear out then, indeed, Abhay Nanavati should have no reasons to fear. Let’s hope so for him and his family.

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We interviewed a UN diamond expert serving in a later period. “The pressure exerted by the UN Headquarters in New York to deliver cases is enormous. Contracts are signed for one year. Renewal depends on a variety of factors, but the most important one is ‘results’. It takes considerable

time to develop contacts, to gain trust from local authorities and commercial entities, to ‘learn’ how the alluvial diggings operate, who does what, etc. It’s anything but easy. Each expert develops his own way of collecting evidence of sanction violators.”

“The ‘easy’ way,” continues my source, “is by paying informants for information. Then they come to you – and you just wait. That costs money. Often not much, for a few hundred dollar one can get a lot. But we are not supposed to work that way and, in any event, the United Nations will not reimburse you for such expenditures. As salaries are low, some experts may also generate income for themselves. One of the most despicable ways – hopefully occurring rarely but I know about these – is extortion. You say to someone you have caught (or say you caught) ‘I will shame you on a U.N. sanction list, unless you take care of me.’”

“Putting someone on a sanction list is easy; getting off the list is near impossible,” he explains. “When experts report a name or company to New York, bureaucrats in various positions will review, investigate, study, check and independently try to verify and validate the information. That’s however pure theory. In practice, the recommendation of an expert is virtually always accepted. His power is enormous.”

Agim De Bruycker, on his own LinkedIn profile, notes that he worked as a UN Expert from January 2005 until November 2008 (3 years 11 months).14 Concurrently, he remained in his position with the Belgian Federal Police. When it came to diamond-related sanctions in West Africa, he seemed omnipotent.

Access to All Sanction Working Files UN Experts are expected to come once a year to New York

and download all of their files into a computer network called POEIMS, which is an acronym for Panel of Experts Information Management System. The regulations state that “all material related to the work of expert groups is the property of the United Nations. Experts are required to submit all such material – properly classified, categorized and, to the extent possible, in electronic form in order to ensure continuity for future investigations and to preserve institutional memory.”

More interestingly, and this points to the “power” of the experts, “experts from all monitoring groups are able to use the system to identify leads, patterns of investigation and alleged sanctions violations that are relevant to the mandate of more than one expert group. The system will therefore facilitate knowledge-sharing across separate expert groups and also between former and current members of the same group.”

In practice, the POEIMS system is quite cumbersome. Papers need to be scanned in. Downloading one’s files can take full days or more. A failure to download leads to losing one’s last salary, say the rules, thus every departing expert gets to New York – even for no other purpose. Many experts, simply for convenience reasons, may only download part of their files. In practice, most experts retain copies of their files and also information they obtained from other experts or downloads.

If these files remain restricted and solely in the hands of trusted and honest parties, there is obviously no problem. One can compare it to WikiLeaks and the U.S. Government files. However, if information gets into unscrupulous hands, the consequences may be harmful and damage the integrity of the UN sanction enforcement mechanism.

Peter van CalsterUnited Nations headquarters in New-York

IN THE KITCHEN OF DIAMOND-SANCTION COOKING


De Bruycker had argued that certain diamonds that he had questionably labelled as “blood diamonds” by his own expert testimony had, in fact, been a conclusion based on deduction of statistical data rather than physical evidence.

DIB interviewed several individuals intimately acquainted with the workings of the UN’s Panels of Experts. In contrast to what some may believe, the monthly pay for living in countries such as Ivory Coast, where De Bruycker was an expert, isn’t high. In the years he was there, it would have been in the range of $7,000-$8,000 a month. The claim that he still has foreign currency from his UN days seems rather unlikely, unless of course these activities provided additional income. [See box.]

Ongoing CaseIn Belgium, the investigation of Agim De Bruycker is still

ongoing. I repeat again that he has not been charged yet with any crime, and one must assume his innocence.

But as time goes by and more information comes to light, and past decisions and ongoing court cases are reviewed, one can be sure that the government will take the right remedial steps and restore the integrity of the law enforcement community. It is positive that these issues have finally surfaced and are being investigated… better late than never.

Without jumping to conclusions, all relevant parties should also urge to extend these reviews to decisions and recommendations made by the relevant UN panels in which De Bruycker participated. Just as a false arrest can ruin one’s business, so can a mistaken listing on a sanction’s list. The difference is that appeals on UN sanction decisions are nearly impossible.

To quote the English historian, politician, and writer Sir John Dalberg-Acton (1837 to 1869): “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Let’s hope for the best.

Editorial and Research Management:Editor: Chaim Even-Zohar, Graphics: Anat Hod, Subscription and Circulation: Jacqueline Reardon

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Notes:

1. See: “Money Laundering Police Commissioner Freed from Jail”, HLN.BE, June 16, 2015 [in Flemish].2. See: “Top-Cop: ‘I held the diamonds as a favor to friends”, by PLA, in HLN.BE news website, March 26, 2015 [in Flemish].3. See: “Money Laundering Police Commissioner Freed from Jail”, HLN.BE, June 16, 2015 [in Flemish].4. See: Patrick Lefelon, “Police Searches Vaults of Federal Diamond Squad”, HLN, April 25, 2015 [in Flemish].5. Michel Maus, “Iedereen Doet Het!: Belasting Ontduiking in Belgie”, Borgerhoff & Lamberigts Publishewrs, Gent, Belgium, 2012.6. See: Robyn Boyle, “Belgium’s black economy amounts to €61 billion,” The Bulletin, October 17, 2014.7. See: Tax reforms in EU Member States, Taxation Paper 34 and European Economy 6/2012, European Commission 20128. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press, U.K., 1990, p. 99. From “Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on Belgium’s limited implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention,” February 24, 2016, OECD Anti-Corruption Division, Paris. 10. OECD, “Belgium should address “flagrant” lack of resources for fighting foreign bribery”, statement dated October 17, 2013. 11. Mike de Wit, Tsodilo Resources Ltd,, University of Pretoria, “Southern Africa Diamond Resources: A Summary”, presented to at the PDAC, March 7, 2016, Toronto. [Presentation based on research by some 17 experts, published as “The Mineral Fields of Africa”, 35th International Geological Congress (IGC), Capetown, 2016.12. This was in 2008. Gerald Brenig ran a scheme involving falsified invoices. Thirteen diamond companies (including six DTC sightholders) were said to be involved. 13. This is in reference to the Peri Diamonds case, but also Limo Diamonds, Lion’s Diamonds, and Erkadiam cases. See: Jan Heuvelmans, “Peri Diamonds: Smuggling in Blood Diamonds not Proven,: in Politics.be (the political website) [in Flemish]. 14. https://www.linkedin.com/in/agim-de-bruycker-710b5559.


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