UN Security Council report on Syria chemical weapons

8/13/2019 UN Security Council report on Syria chemical weapons

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United Nations A/68/663 S/2013/735

General AssemblySecurity Council

Distr.: General13 December 2013

Original: English

13-61784S (E) 040214*1361784*

General AssemblySixty-eighth sessionAgenda item 33Prevention of armed conflict

Security CouncilSixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 13 December 2013 from theSecretary-General addressed to the President of theGeneral Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith the final report of the United NationsMission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the SyrianArab Republic (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present final report, the letter of transmittal and itsappendices could be brought to the attention of the Members of the GeneralAssembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed ) BAN Ki-moon


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Annex

Letter of transmittal

Having completed our investigation into the allegations of the use of chemical

weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic reported to you by Member States, and furtherto the report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use ofChemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter, the United NationsMission) on allegations of the use of the chemical weapons in the Ghouta area ofDamascus on 21 August 2013 (A/67/997-S/2013/553), we have the honour to submitthe final report of the United Nations Mission.

To date, 16 allegations of separate incidents involving the use of chemicalweapons have been reported to the Secretary-General by Member States, including, primarily, the Governments of France, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.On the basis of the sufficiency and credibility of the information received, theUnited Nations Mission decided to further investigate the following 7 of the16 allegations reported to the Secretary-General by Member States: Khan Al Asal,of 19 March 2013; Sheik Maqsood of 13 April 2013; Saraqueb of 29 April 2013;Ghouta of 21 August 2013; Bahhariyeh of 22 August 2013; Jobar of 24 August2013; and Ashrafiah Sahnaya of 25 August 2013. The United Nations Mission didnot receive sufficient or credible information in respect of the alleged incidents inSalquin on 17 October 2012, Homs on 23 December 2012, Darayya on 13 Marchand 25 April 2013, Otaybah on 19 March 2013, Adra on 24 March and 23 May2013, Jobar between 12 and 14 April 2013 and Qasr Abu Samrah on 14 May 2013.

On the basis of our analysis of the evidence gathered during our investigation between April and November 2013 and the laboratory results obtained, theconclusion is that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict betweenthe parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, not only in the Ghouta area of Damascus on21 August 2013 as concluded in (A/67/997-S/2013/553), but also on a smaller scalein Jobar on 24 August 2013, Saraqueb on 29 April 2013, Ashrafiah Sahnaya on25 August 2013 and Khan Al Asal on 19 March 2013. This result leaves us with thedeepest concern.

We appreciate the indispensable support provided by the United NationsSecretariat, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of LegalAffairs, the Department of Safety and Security and the Office of the Joint SpecialRepresentative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria andthe innumerable Secretariat officials who have assisted us in Beirut, Damascus,Geneva, Nicosia, The Hague and New York.

We extend our thanks to the Directors-General of the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organization(WHO) for their unfailing support and to all staff who assisted us in ourinvestigation. We also reiterate our gratitude for the efficient and effectiveassistance provided by the OPCW-designated laboratories in Finland, Germany,Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
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We also wish to thank you, Sir, for the confidence you have placed in us. Wehave been honoured for the opportunity to serve in this important fact-findingmission.

(Signed

) Professor keSellstrm (Head of Mission)

(Signed ) Mr. Scott Cairns (Signed ) Dr. Maurizio BarbeschiHead of and signing for (Head of and signing forthe OPCW component) the WHO component)


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United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Useof Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

Final report

Contents Page

I. Terms of reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. Allegations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. Chronology of the activities of the United Nations Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

IV. Methodological considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

V. Narrative and results of the United Nations Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

VI. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendices*1. Relevant legal instruments, guidance and other agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2. Methodology used during the United Nations Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Khan Al Asal, 19 March 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4. Saraqueb, 29 March 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5. Ghouta, 21 August 2013: Final laboratory results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

6. Bahhariyeh, 22 August 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

7. Jobar, 24 August 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

8. Ashrafiah Sahnaya, 25 August 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

9. Sheik Maqsood, 13 April 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

10. Standard questionnaire provided to reporting States on the basis of the requirements ofappendix I of documentA/44/561 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

11. Composition of the United Nations Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

* Appendices are issued in the language of submission.
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I. Terms of reference

1. The Secretary-General decided to establish the United Nations Mission toInvestigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian ArabRepublic (hereinafter, the United Nations Mission) based on his authority underGeneral Assembly resolution42/37 C and Security Council resolution620 (1988).The purpose of the Mission is to ascertain the facts related to the allegations of useof chemical weapons, to gather relevant data, to undertake the necessary analysesfor this purpose and to deliver a report to the Secretary-General.

2. For the purpose of ascertaining the facts related to the allegations of use ofchemical weapons, gathering relevant data and undertaking the necessary analyses,the Secretary-General requested the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (hereinafter, the OPCW) to put its resources at his disposal, including providing a team of experts to conduct fact-finding activities. The Secretary-Generalsimilarly requested the World Health Organization (hereinafter, the WHO) to provide technical support in assessing the public health, clinical and event-specifichealth aspects of the allegations that have been brought to his attention.

3. The United Nations Mission1 has conducted its investigation and all relatedactivities in accordance with the terms of reference issued by the Secretary-Generalto the United Nations Mission, including the above provisions, as well as others oncooperation, methods of work and scope and reporting. In discharging its mandate,the United Nations Mission was guided by the United Nations Guidelines andProcedures for the Timely and Efficient Investigation of Reports of the Possible Useof Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons (A/44/561)(hereinafter, the Guidelines), and, as appropriate and to the extent applicable, theOPCW provisions as identified in article I(5)(a) of the Supplementary Arrangementto the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

4. Other relevant legal instruments governing the cooperation between the United Nations and OPCW and WHO and guiding the work of the United Nations Missionare set out in appendix 1.

II. Allegations

Khan Al Asal, 19 March 2013

5. In a letter dated 19 March 2013, the Permanent Representative of the SyrianArab Republic to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General and thePresident of the Security Council of its allegation that, at 0730 hours on 19 March2013, armed terrorist groups had fired a rocket from the Kfar Deil area towardsKhan Al Asal in the Aleppo governorate. According to the letter, the rocket had

travelled approximately 5 kilometres and fell 300 metres away from a Syrian ArabRepublic army position. Following its impact, a thick cloud of smoke had leftunconscious anyone who had inhaled it. The incident reportedly resulted in thedeaths of 25 people and injured more than 110 civilians and soldiers who were takento hospitals in Aleppo.

__________________1 For the composition of the United Nations Mission, see appendix 11.
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6. In a letter dated 20 March 2013, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Syrian ArabRepublic requested the Secretary-General to establish a specialized, impartialindependent mission to investigate the alleged incident in the Khan Al Asal area.

7. In a letter dated 21 March 2013, the Permanent Representative of France to the

United Nations and the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations jointly informed theSecretary-General of recent allegations from various sources that chemical weaponshad been used in the Syrian Arab Republic, including at Khan Al Asal in Aleppo on19 March 2013, among other incidents resulting in civilian deaths and seriousinjuries.

8. In a letter dated 14 June 2013, the Permanent Representative of the UnitedStates of America to the United Nations reported to the Secretary-General, inter alia,its updated assessment alleging that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republichad used the chemical warfare agent Sarin in an attack on the Aleppo suburb ofKhan Al Asal on 19 March 2013.

9. In response to requests from the Secretary-General for additional information

on the basis of appendix I to the Guidelines contained in documentA/44/561 with aview to verifying any alleged use of chemical weapons, replies were received fromthe Syrian Arab Republic on 25 March 2013, from the United Kingdom on25 March 2013 and from France on 26 March 2013.

Otaybah, 19 March 2013

10. In the aforementioned letter dated 21 March 2013 from the PermanentRepresentative of France and the Deputy Permanent Representative of the UnitedKingdom, those Governments informed the Secretary-General of the alleged use ofchemical weapons at Otaybah in the vicinity of Damascus, resulting in civiliandeaths and serious injuries.

11. In response to requests from the Secretary-General for additional informationon the basis of appendix I to the Guidelines with a view to verifying any alleged useof chemical weapons, replies were received from the United Kingdom, on 25 March2013 and on 23 May 2013, and from France on 26 March 2013.

Homs, 23 December 2012

12. In the aforementioned letter dated 21 March 2013 from the PermanentRepresentative of France and the Deputy Permanent Representative of the UnitedKingdom, those Governments informed the Secretary-General of allegations of theuse of chemical weapons in Homs on 23 December 2012. The Government of Qatar,in its letter dated 22 March 2013, also reported the alleged use of chemical weaponsagainst unarmed civilians in Homs.

13. In response to requests from the Secretary-General for additional informationon the basis of appendix I to the Guidelines with a view to verifying any alleged useof chemical weapons, replies were received from the United Kingdom, on 25 March2013 and on 23 May 2013, and from France on 26 March 2013.


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Darayya, 13 March 2013

14. On 26 March 2013, the Government of the United Kingdom presentedinformation to the Secretary-General pertaining to, inter alia, the alleged use ofchemical weapons in Darayya in March 2013. The Government of Qatar, in its letter

dated 22 March 2013, also reported the alleged use of chemical weapons againstunarmed civilians in Darayya.

Adra, 24 March 2013

15. On 23 May 2013, the Government of the United Kingdom reported to theSecretary-General an allegation of the use of chemical weapons in Adra nearDamascus on 24 March 2013.

Darayya, 25 April 2013

16. On 23 May 2013, the Government of the United Kingdom reported to theSecretary-General an allegation of the use of chemical weapons in Darayya nearDamascus on 25 April 2013, and subsequently presented information to the Head of

Mission.Saraqueb, 29 April 2013

17. On 23 May 2013, the Government of the United Kingdom reported to theSecretary-General an allegation of the use of chemical weapons at Saraqueb on29 April 2013. In a letter dated 27 June 2013, the Government of France reported tothe Secretary-General that, in the course of consultations held with the Head ofMission in Paris on 4 June 2013, it had shared information in its possession, which,in its view, indicated that Sarin had been used in that incident.

Salquin, 17 October 2012

18. In its aforementioned letter dated 26 March 2013, the Government of Francereported the alleged use of chemical weapons at Salquin near the border with Turkeyon 17 October 2012.

Sheik Maqsood, 13 April 2013

19. In its aforementioned letter dated 14 June 2013, the Government of the UnitedStates of America reported to the Secretary-General that the Government of theSyrian Arab Republic had used the chemical warfare agent Sarin against theopposition in an attack on the Aleppo neighbourhood of Sheik Maqsood on 13 April2013.

Qasr Abu Samrah, 14 May 2013

20. In its aforementioned letter dated 14 June 2013, the Government of the UnitedStates reported to the Secretary-General that the Government of the Syrian ArabRepublic had used unspecified chemicals against the opposition in an attack on QasrAbu Samrah on 14 May 2013.


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Adra, 23 May 2013

21. In its aforementioned letter dated 14 June 2013, the Government of the UnitedStates reported to the Secretary-General that the Government of the Syrian ArabRepublic had used unspecified chemicals against the opposition in an attack on Adra

on 23 May 2013.Jobar, 12-14 April 2013

22. In its aforementioned letter dated 27 June 2013, the Government of Francereported to the Secretary-General that, in the course of consultations held with theHead of Mission in Paris on 4 June 2013, it had shared information in its possession pertaining to the alleged use of Sarin in Jobar between 12 and 14 April 2013.

Ghouta, 21 August 2013

23. On 21, 22 and 23 August 2013, multiple Member States reported allegations ofthe use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013and requested the Secretary-General to instruct the United Nations Mission, then in

Damascus, to immediately conduct on-site investigations of the incident.Bahhariyeh, 22 August 2013

24. In a letter dated 28 August 2013, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republicreported to the Secretary-General that at 2120 hours on 22 August 2013, severalsoldiers in Bahhariyeh in the eastern Ghouta region had inhaled poison gases andhad complained of respiratory and other symptoms, as well as itching and redness ofthe eyes. Eighteen of them had been immediately taken to Martyr Yusuf Al AzmahMilitary Hospital to receive emergency care.

Jobar, 24 August 2013

25. In its aforementioned letter dated 28 August 2013, the Government of theSyrian Arab Republic reported to the Secretary-General that at 1100 hours on24 August 2013, as a group of soldiers had approached a building near the river inJobar, they had heard a muffled sound and then had smelled a foul and strangeodour, whereupon they had experienced severe shortness of breath and blurredvision. Four of them had been immediately taken to Martyr Yusuf Al AzmahMilitary Hospital to receive emergency care. The Government further reported thatin its search of the buildings immediately surrounding the above-mentioned site, ithad discovered some materials, equipment and canisters, examination of which hadconfirmed that they had contained Sarin. Analysis had confirmed that one of the soilsamples taken from that site had also been reported by the Syrian Governmentlaboratory to be contaminated with Sarin.

Ashrafiah Sahnaya, 25 August 2013

26. In its aforementioned letter dated 28 August 2013, the Government of theSyrian Arab Republic reported to the Secretary-General that at 1900 hours on25 August 2013, cylindrical canisters had been fired using a weapon that resembleda catapult at some soldiers in the Ashrafiah Sahnaya area in Damascus Rif. One ofthe canisters had exploded, emitting a medium-loud sound. A black, foul-smellingsmoke had then appeared, causing the soldiers to experience blurred vision and


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severe shortness of breath. Five of them had been immediately taken to MartyrYusuf Al Azmah Hospital to receive emergency care.

III. Chronology of the activities of the United Nations Mission

27. In his letter to the Secretary-General dated 20 March 2013, the Deputy PrimeMinister of the Syrian Arab Republic alleged the use of chemical weapons in KhanAl Asal in the Aleppo governorate on 19 March 2013, and requested the Secretary-General to conduct a specialized, impartial and independent investigation of thealleged incident. On 21 March 2013, the Secretary-General established the United Nations Mission based on the authority extended to him by the General Assembly(resolution 42/37 C) and endorsed by the Security Council (resolution 620 (1988)).In a letter received on the same day, the Governments of France and the UnitedKingdom requested an investigation, using the same mechanism provided for inresolution 42/37 C, into the alleged use of chemical weapons in the two locations ofKhan Al Asal in Aleppo and Otaybah in the vicinity of Damascus on 19 March2013, as well as in Homs on 23 December 2012.

28. On 26 March 2013, the Secretary-General appointed Professor ke Sellstrm(Sweden) as the Head of Mission and tasked the United Nations Mission to ascertainthe facts related to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons, to gather relevantdata and to undertake the necessary analyses for this purpose in accordance with theabove-mentioned terms of reference and Guidelines.

29. For the purpose of ascertaining the facts related to the allegations of the use ofchemical weapons, gathering relevant data and undertaking the necessary analyses,upon request of the Secretary-General, OPCW put its resources at his disposal.2 Furthermore, upon the request of the Secretary-General, WHO provided technicalsupport to the United Nations Mission in assessing the public health and the clinicaland event-specific health aspects of the allegations that have been brought to hisattention.3

30. The members of the United Nations Mission assembled in The Hague on2 April 2013, in preparation for travel to the Syrian Arab Republic. In anticipationof an early agreement on the modalities of cooperation with the Government of theSyrian Arab Republic, the Secretary-General requested the Head of Mission todeploy to Cyprus with an advance team in order to complete the necessary logisticalarrangements for expediting their travel to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct theiron-site activities. On 7 April 2013, the advance team deployed to Cyprus andremained there until 12 May 2013.

__________________2 For the purposes of the Mission, cooperation between the United Nations and OPCW was

guided by paragraph 27 of part XI of the Verification Annex of the Chemical WeaponsConvention and the Supplementary Arrangement concerning the Implementation ofarticle II(2)(C) of the United Nations-OPCW Relationship Agreement signed on 20 and14 September 2012, respectively.

3 For the purposes of the Mission, cooperation between the United Nations and WHO was guided by the Agreement between the United Nations and WHO adopted by the f irst World HealthAssembly on 10 July 1948 and by the Memorandum of Understanding between WHO and theUnited Nations concerning WHO support to the Secretary-Generals Mechanism forInvestigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons of 31 January 2011.
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31. From March to May 2013, in letters from the Secretary-General and the HighRepresentative for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations consistently conveyedto the Syrian authorities that the Secretary-General had received additionalallegations of the use of chemical weapons within the Syrian Arab Republic, and, inaccordance with General Assembly resolution 42/37 C, the Secretary-General had toconsider all credible allegations brought to his attention by any Member State inorder to ensure the integrity and impartiality of the United Nations Mission.

32. Pending agreement on the modalities of the United Nations Missionsdeployment to the Syrian Arab Republic and its on-site access in the country, inaccordance with the Guidelines, the United Nations Mission continued to monitordevelopments, collected and analysed information made available by MemberStates, developed a concept of operations and tools for planning, established criteriafor the selection of witnesses and the conduct of interviews and received securityand relevant technical training. From April to October 2013, the Head and membersof the United Nations Mission travelled to and met with various Governmentofficials and technical experts from France, Germany, the Russian Federation,Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. From 24 to 28 June,

and again from 4 to 6 July 2013, the United Nations Mission also conducted fact-finding activities in Turkey, including conducting interviews and collecting biomedical samples during an autopsy of a deceased victim, which was overseen bymembers of the United Nations Mission, in relation to the Saraqueb incident of29 April 2013.

33. At the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the HighRepresentative for Disarmament Affairs and the Head of Mission visited Damascuson 24 and 25 July 2013 and reached agreement on the way forward with the DeputyPrime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Vice-Minister for ForeignAffairs. Following subsequent consultations at United Nations Headquarters, themodalities of cooperation were agreed upon in an exchange of letters on 13 and14 August 2013.

34. The United Nations Mission travelled to Damascus on 18 August 2013 and began its fact-finding activities in the Syrian Arab Republic on 19 August 2013 withthe understanding that it would conclude its visit within 14 days, unless extended bymutual agreement. The United Nations Mission was intended to simultaneouslyinvestigate the reported allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Khan Al Asal,Saraqueb and Sheik Maqsood, which were deemed credible, to discuss otherallegations and to visit the related sites in parallel.

35. However, following the tragic events of 21 August 2013, and the receipt ofdozens of requests from Member States, the Secretary-General called for the United Nations Mission, already working in Damascus, to investigate the allegation of theuse of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 as amatter of priority. The Security Council met on the same day and supported the

Secretary-Generals call for a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation.36. Consequently, the United Nations Mission refocused its fact-finding efforts inorder to immediately investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghoutaarea. Pursuant to the joint understanding reached between the High Representativefor Disarmament Affairs and the Syrian Government on 25 August 2013, as well asseparate arrangements agreed upon on an ad hoc basis with the other parties to theconflict, a temporary ceasefire was effectively in place for five hours daily from


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26 August to 29 August 2013. During this period, the United Nations Missionconducted a wide range of fact-finding activities related to the Ghouta incident.

37. Meanwhile, in a letter dated 28 August 2013, the Deputy Prime Minister of theSyrian Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General of three additional incidents

of alleged use of chemical weapons in Bahhariyeh, Jobar and Ashrafiah Sahnaya inthe Damascus area on 22, 24 and 25 August 2013, respectively. The Syrian ArabRepublic requested that the Secretary-General make use of the United NationsMission already in the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate these allegations. On30 August 2013, the United Nations Mission therefore visited Martyr Yusuf AlAzmah Military Hospital in Damascus as part of its evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic in its report.

38. The United Nations Mission departed from the Syrian Arab Republic on31 August 2013. It was understood that it would be allowed to return at a mutuallyagreed date to resume its fact-finding activities for the pending allegations. In thereport of the United Nations Mission on the alleged use of chemical weapons in theGhouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 (A/67/997-S/2013/553), issued by theSecretary-General on 16 September 2013, the United Nations Mission concludedthat chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the partiesin the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on arelatively large scale.

39. The United Nations Mission returned to the Syrian Arab Republic on25 September 2013 to follow up on and conclude its investigation of pendingallegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic reported tothe Secretary-General by Member States. From 25 to 29 September 2013, the United Nations Mission conducted fact-finding activities for the most recent allegationsrelating to Jobar, Bahhariyeh and Ashrafiah Sahnaya, including visiting a militaryhospital in Damascus where it interviewed patients, doctors and nurses and took blood and DNA samples. In addition, the United Nations Mission concluded its fact-finding activities for the allegations relating to Khan Al Asal, Saraqueb and SheikMaqsood. Upon completion of its fact-finding activities in the Syrian ArabRepublic, the Head of Mission, in consultation with the Syrian Government,established 30 September 2013 as the date of the United Nations Missionsdeparture from the Syrian Arab Republic.

IV. Methodological considerations

40. In discharging its duties and conducting its investigation, the United NationsMission adhered to the Guidelines and Procedures for the conduct of investigationsset out in documentA/44/561. The United Nations Mission also adhered to the moststringent protocols available and relied on objective criteria and standardquestionnaires, as well as the most advanced technologies and standards availablefor such an investigation, as set out in appendix 2 hereto. In particular, the following procedures provided a strict chain of custody. The retrieval of samples wererecorded and witnessed, samples were sealed, detailed documentation was prepared,samples were transported to the preparatory laboratory under the supervision of themembers of the United Nations Mission, seals were confirmed and then broken andthe samples were representatively subdivided. The re-sealed samples were thendistributed to the OPCW-designated laboratories with guidance documents, again


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under the same supervision. The laboratories conducted their activities usingstandardized procedures (including quality assurance and quality control checks) forreceiving, storing and analysing samples. The results were then returned undersupervision to the United Nations Mission for review. Each transfer of material wasaccompanied by handover receipts.

41. The most relevant methods for collecting and evaluating the credibility ofinformation for the United Nations Missions investigation of allegations of the useof chemical weapons are described in part II of its report on the Ghouta incident(A/67/997-S/2013/553). These included, inter alia: the independent assessment andcorroboration of background information; the conduct of interviews with survivorsand other relevant witnesses; the assessment of the symptoms of survivors; thecollection of hair, urine, tissues and blood samples for subsequent analysis; thecollection of environmental samples for subsequent analysis; and/or thedocumentation of munitions and their subcomponents identified by the team.

42. The United Nations Mission did not rely on samples, information and/orinvestigation reports presented to the United Nations Mission by external sources,including by Governments of Member States, unless the United Nations Missioncould independently and unambiguously verify the chain of custody and thecredibility of any such information. In this connection, each allegation had to beinitially assessed and substantiated by underlying information describing the allegedincident and its effect in sufficient detail. For this purpose, each reporting State wasrequested to respond to a standard questionnaire, found in appendix 10 hereto,elaborated further to, but on the basis of, the requirements of appendix I toA/44/561.

43. In that connection, the United Nations Mission consulted with variousGovernments that had reported incidents of alleged use, including the Governmentsof France, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States, toseek clarification from their experts on the information they provided. Additionalinformation was provided by Germany, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Turkey,as well as by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry for the SyrianArab Republic established by the United Nations Human Rights Council(hereinafter, the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry). The United Nations Missionmade use of that information, insofar as it was possible, in its analysis and planning.

44. The United Nations Mission required sufficient or credible information tosubstantiate each allegation in order to further investigate the alleged incident.Furthermore, taking into account the allowed time and other constraints, the United Nations Mission considered two main factors in deciding whether to conduct anon-site visit: (a) the scientific and probative value of the on-site visit and (b) the riskassessment of conducting such visits in the midst of the ongoing armed conflict inthe Syrian Arab Republic. In this connection, the United Nations Mission consultedwith the United Nations Designated Security Officer for the Syrian Arab Republic

and refrained from certain on-site visits for security reasons.

V. Narrative and results of the United Nations Mission

45. On the basis of the sufficiency and credibility of the information received, theUnited Nations Mission decided to further investigate the following 7 of the16 allegations reported to the Secretary-General by Member States: Khan Al Asal of


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19 March 2013, Sheik Maqsood of 13 April 2013, Saraqueb of 29 April 2013,Ghouta of 21 August 2013, Bahhariyeh of 22 August 2013, Jobar of 24 August 2013,and Ashrafiah Sahnaya of 25 August 2013. The United Nations Mission did notreceive sufficient or credible information in respect of the alleged incidents inSalquin on 17 October 2012, Homs on 23 December 2012, Darayya on 13 Marchand 25 April 2013, Otaybah on 19 March 2013, Adra on 24 March and 23 May2013, Jobar between 12 and 14 April 2013, and Qasr Abu Samrah on 14 May 2013.

46. The following summarizes the basic results of the United Nations Missionsinvestigations. The United Nations Mission notes that the nature and scale of theallegations varied widely, including, inter alia, in respect of the number of allegedvictims and survivors, the extent of the alleged use, the alleged means of delivery ordissemination, the quality and quantity of information and the passage of time between the alleged incident and the conduct of the investigation.

Khan Al Asal, 19 March 2013 4

47. In response to the United Nations Missions standard questionnaire, theGovernment of the Syrian Arab Republic provided a relatively detailed picture ofthe incident alleged in Khan Al Asal.48. Ultimately, while an on-site visit was not possible due to security reasons, theUnited Nations Mission conducted thorough interviews with survivors and withmilitary and civilian first-responders from Aleppo who were brought by theGovernment to Damascus. The United Nations Mission also met with doctors fromthe Syrian Ministry of Health specializing in emergency medicine.

Narrative

49. Based on the interviews conducted by the members of the United NationsMission, it can be ascertained that an incident occurred on 19 March atapproximately 0700 hours, in the Haret Al Mazar neighbourhood, which consists of

a one-story building surrounded by a farming area. The location is close to theshrine of Sheikh Ahmad Al Asali located at the southern part of the Khan Al Asalvillage in the vicinity of a position held at the time by the armed forces of the SyrianArab Republic in the Aleppo governorate.

50. During the ongoing shelling in the area, deaths, with no signs of wounds, and persons exhibiting symptoms of intoxication were suddenly observed and reportedto survivors and first responders. The interviewed witnesses reported onexperiencing or observing the following symptoms: irritation of skin, miosis,impaired vision, foaming from the mouth, weakness, convulsions, shortage of breathand loss of consciousness.

51. One survivor stated that the air was static and filled with a yellowish-greenmist and filled of a strong pungent smell, possibly resembling sulfur.

52. On 20 August 2013, the Syrian Government, in its own investigation report,attributed the death of 20 individuals and the intoxication of 124 survivors to thisincident. Six hospitals received alleged victims, including Aleppo UniversityHospital as the main one.

__________________4 See also appendix 3.


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53. The Syrian Governments report referred to statistics of symptomscommunicated from these hospitals including miosis, blurred vision, conjunctivitis,foaming at the mouth, coughing, rhinorrhea, respiratory distress, bronchospasm,nausea, vomiting, cyanosis and headache. Those affected had been givensymptomatic treatment with a few patients requiring intensive care.

54. The Syrian report of 20 August 2013 further stated that some of the blood testsconducted had found cholinesterase activity to be reduced. Autopsies had been performed on 14 individuals who had died, including 7 males, 6 females and 1 malechild. The report stated the cause of death as respiratory depression and cardiacfailure following the inhalation of a toxic (gas) material.

Weather conditions in Khan Al Asal on 19 March 2013

55. Weather information from Aleppo on the morning of 19 March 2013 showtemperatures falling at 0500 hours and rising again at 0800 hours as the sun wascoming up (worldweatheronline.com), with 32 to 62 per cent overcast and anorth-north-east to east-north-east wind at 3 miles per hour. There was probablylittle movement of the wind in any direction. Chemicals like Sarin, dispersed inthose conditions, would migrate slowly in the direction of the wind.

Information about munitions

56. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the United Nations Mission was notable to conduct an on-site visit to Khan Al Asal and therefore was not in a positionto collect primary evidence relating to the number or type of munitions and/ordelivery system that was used in the incident.

Information concerning environmental samples

57. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the United Nations Mission was notable to conduct an on-site visit to Khan Al Asal and therefore was not in a position

to collect environmental samples. In addition, six months following the incident, the probative value of such samples would be negligible.

58. The Russian Federation presented the United Nations Mission with its ownreport relying on environmental samples collected by a Russian investigation team,which found remainders of Sarin. The United Nations Mission studied the report butcould not independently verify the chain of custody for the sampling and thetransport of the samples.

Information concerning symptoms

59. The survivors observed and experienced symptoms such as: irritation of skin,miosis, impaired vision, foaming from the mouth, weakness, convulsions, shortageof breath and loss of consciousness.

Information concerning biomedical samples

60. The United Nations Mission collected blood samples from two survivors inorder to use DNA tests to authenticate the blood samples expected to be receivedfrom the Syrian Government. The Government could not recover the biomedicalsamples they had previously collected and the bodies of the deceased victims couldnot be exhumed for security reasons. No traces or signatures of any chemical


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warfare agent were detected in any of the samples collected by the United NationsMission.

The epidemiological perspective

61. The Khan Al Asal incident was relatively large and as such affected severalcomponents of the local society, warranting the application of an epidemiologicalapproach for its assessment. The United Nations Mission applied the standards forepidemiologic determination of cause-and-effect and assessed that anorganophosphorous intoxication was the cause of the rapidly onsetting massintoxication taking place on the morning of the 19 March 2013. Based on itsinterviews and the assessment of the medical records obtained from five hospitalsreceiving the alleged victims, the United Nations Mission did not determine anyalternative explanations for the symptoms. Furthermore there were no othersuggestions as to the cause of the intoxication raised by any of the Member States intheir reports brought to the Secretary-Generals attention concerning the possibleuse of chemical weapons in Khan Al Asal.

Saraqueb, 29 April 20135

62. The Saraqueb incident was called to the attention of the Secretary-General bythe Governments of France and the United Kingdom, which reported that smallamounts of toxic substance had been used.

Narrative

63. A source close to the opposition claimed that, on 29 April 2013, a helicopterhad been seen passing above the western part of Saraqueb flying from north to southand that the helicopter allegedly dropped items at three locations. The first point ofimpact was reportedly in the northern area of the town, the second in the middle ofthe courtyard of a family house and the third was close to an opposition checkpointon the roads to Idlib and Aleppo.

64. A trail of white smoke was reported coming down from the helicopter asimprovised munitions were allegedly observed being dropped.

65. An improvised device reportedly fell into the courtyard of a private house andallegedly intoxicated some of the family members. The patients were transferred toShifa Hospital and were treated there for organophosphorous intoxication.

66. One severely intoxicated patient, a female with underlying medical conditions,had later died, whereas the less severely intoxicated patients had all recovered.

Weather conditions in Saraqueb on 29 April 2013

67. Weather information from Idlib on the afternoon the 29 April 2013 shows thetemperature to be between 34C and 33C at 1600 hours (worldweatheronline.com),with no clouds and a north to north-east wind at 4 to 5 miles per hour. In thoseconditions, chemicals like Sarin would disperse quite rapidly, especially consideringthe small volumes allegedly used, while migrating a short distance in the directionof the wind.



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68. The United Nations Mission was not able to conduct an on-site visit and wasnot able to collect any primary information on munitions.

Information concerning environmental samples69. The United Nations Mission was not able to conduct an on-site visit andtherefore was not able to collect any environmental samples.

70. The French Government presented a report containing results of environmentalsamples testing positive for Sarin. The United Nations Mission studied the report but could not independently verify the chain of custody for the sampling and thetransport of the samples.


71. One patient was severely intoxicated, allegedly, from close encounter with themunitions used. She arrived at the first clinic in Saraqueb unconscious. She wasgiven cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and was intubated and put on oxygenand thereafter received atropine. The patient was transported to Turkey. The patients health conditions, however, deteriorated and she was declared dead between 2230 and 2245 hours just before arriving at the final hospital in Turkey.


72. During an autopsy that was observed by members of the United NationsMission, samples of several organs from the deceased womans body wererecovered for subsequent analysis. The results from most of these organs clearlyindicated signatures of a previous Sarin exposure.

Sheik Maqsood, 13 April 2013 6

73. The incident was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General by theGovernment of the United States, which reported that the Government of the SyrianArab Republic had used a small amount of chemical warfare agent Sarin against theopposition in an attack on the Aleppo neighbourhood of Sheik Maqsood.

74. According to witness statements provided to the United Nations Mission bythe UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, the alleged incident affected 21 persons andcaused one death. Victims were allegedly transported to a hospital in Afrin fortreatment. The United Nations Mission sought to conduct fact-finding activities pertaining to this incident from the territory of a bordering country, havingdetermined that such an investigation held the prospect of producing additionalinformation. The United Nations Mission was ultimately unable to obtain any suchinformation.

75. The United Nations Mission interviewed Syrian Government officials inDamascus who did not have any information to offer about the alleged incident.

76. In the absence of any further information, the United Nations Mission wasunable to draw any conclusions pertaining to this alleged incident.



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Ghouta, 21 August 2013 7

77. The United Nations Missions full report on the alleged use of chemicalweapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, set out in documentA/67/997-S/2013/553, forms an integral part of this final report. Since that report

was submitted to the Secretary-General on 15 September 2013, the United NationsMission has received additional analytical results of environmental samples, whichare set out in appendix 5 hereto. These results further confirmed the conclusions ofthe United Nations Missions Ghouta report.

Bahhariyeh, 22 August 2013 8

Narrative

78. Based on information gathered from various interviews conducted by theUnited Nations Mission, it can be ascertained that on 22 August 2013, at around1700 hours, a group of soldiers were reportedly fighting from two buildings inBahhariyeh. The alleged attack started with a number of objects being fired at thesoldiers, one of which fell about 5 metres away from them. The witnesses stated that

there had been no explosion, just the release of some blue-coloured gas with a very bad odour, which had been moved into the soldiers direction by the wind. Theobject was collected by one of the soldiers and later seen and assessed by the United Nations Mission.

79. The symptoms of the four alleged victims were described by treating doctorsas nausea, vomiting, tearing, bronchial problems and flaccid paralysis. One patientwas confused, one was semi-conscious and two patients had bradycardia. In thatsame afternoon, an additional nine soldiers without any records of previoustreatments arrived at the emergency room of Martyr Yusuf Al Azmah MilitaryHospital. The patients were conscious, with breathing difficulties and the feeling ofa tight chest, burning eyes and throat, with some having miosis. A number of theinterviewed alleged victims stayed six days in the hospital until they were released.

One individual mentioned that he still had some difficulty breathing, and had chestand back pain at the time of the interview.

Weather conditions in Damascus on 22 August 2013

80. Weather information from Damascus on the afternoon the 22 August 2013shows the temperature to be 33C at 1600 hours (worldweatheronline.com). Therewere almost no clouds, with a west-south-west wind at 10 miles per hour. Mostchemical weapons spread in those conditions would disperse quite rapidly whilemigrating a short distance in the direction of the wind.


81. The United Nations Mission was not able to conduct an on-site visit and was

therefore not able to collect any primary information about the munitions used inthis incident.

__________________7 See also appendix 5.8 See also appendix 6.


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82. The United Nations Mission was not able to conduct an on-site visit and wastherefore not able to collect any environmental samples.

Information concerning symptoms83. The most common signs and symptoms reported from the interviewed patients,from treating clinicians and from medical records are the following: shortness of breath, laboured breathing, eye irritation, blurred vision, nausea, headache, fatigueand coughing.

84. The patients were given symptomatic treatment. The average length of stay inthe hospital was three days.


85. Blood and urine samples were collected from the most severely intoxicated patients. The analysis results tested negative for any of the chemical warfare agents.

Jobar, 24 August 2013 9

Narrative

86. Based on interviews conducted by the United Nations Mission, it can beascertained that, on 24 August 2013, a group of soldiers were tasked to clear some buildings under the control of opposition forces. Around 1100 hours, the intensity ofthe shooting from the opposition subsided and the soldiers were under theimpression that the other side was retreating. Approximately 10 metres away fromsome soldiers, an improvised explosive device reportedly detonated emitting a lownoise and releasing a very bad-smelling gas. A group of 10 soldiers was evacuatedin armoured personnel vehicles to the field medical point with breathing difficultiesand with, not further specified, strange symptoms. One alleged victim mentioned

blurred vision. Four soldiers were severely affected. They were only partiallyconscious and not able to support themselves. They were treated before being sentto Martyr Yusuf Al Azmah Military Hospital. Another 20 alleged victims came laterwith similar symptoms, but they were in stable condition and could, after some time, be sent back to their units.

87. At around noon, the admitting physician at the emergency room of the militaryhospital observed that all four patients complained of a tight chest, wheezing anddifficulty breathing and that two patients had saliva coming from the mouth, redeyes with blurred vision and miosis. In addition, the patients were exhausted anddisoriented. The patients were washed and given two to three doses of atropine andHI-6 (asoxime chloride) intravenously. One of the patients was unconscious and wastransferred to the intensive care unit. The medical records state, however, that the patients were conscious and responsive with restricted pupils and bronchial spasmsat the time of admission to the emergency room. A medical doctor reported itchyeyes in the evening after examining the patients.



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88. At the hospital, the patients were treated. Two of the soldiers stayed in thehospital for eight days before release. The medical records state that all four allegedvictims were granted additional sick leave after release from the hospital.


89. Weather information from Damascus at noon on 24 August 2013 shows thetemperature to have been 30C at 1100 hours (worldweatheronline.com). There werealmost no clouds, with a west-south-west wind at 10 miles per hour. Sarin spread inthose conditions would disperse quite rapidly while migrating a short distance in thedirection of the wind.


90. While the United Nations Mission visited the site, the fragments of the allegedmunitions had already been removed. The United Nations Mission therefore has no primary information about the munitions used.

91. Also, the site was compromised by previous demining activities and by visits

of representatives of the Syrian Government, who had reportedly moved theremnants of two explosive devices alleged to be the munitions used in the incident.The United Nations Mission visited the storage location and examined the remnants.


92. While the United Nations Mission visited the site, it found the site to have been corrupted by mine-clearing activities. As such, there was no probative value incollecting samples.

93. The Syrian Government allegedly recovered soil samples from the impact sitethat tested positive for Sarin. The United Nations Mission could not verify the chainof custody for this sampling and subsequent analysis.


94. The interviews with patients and clinicians and the review of medical recordsrevealed that the most common signs and symptoms were shortness of breath, blurred vision, loss of consciousness, headache, nausea, eye irritation, miosis,fatigue and hyper-salivation. The average length of hospitalization was seven days.


95. The United Nations Mission was given four samples reportedly withdrawn bythe Syrian Government on 24 August 2013 upon the victims arrival to the hospital,which were all positive for Sarin exposure.

96. The United Nations Mission collected four blood samples on

28 September 2013, one of which tested positive for Sarin exposure.97. All samples were subjected to DNA testing to confirm the origin of the presented whole blood samples. The analyses confirmed that the four samples provided by the Syrian Government matched those of the four alleged victimsinterviewed and sampled.


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98. The medical records received from Martyr Yusuf Al Azmah Military Hospital provided corroborating evidence of cholinesterase inhibition indicating Sarinexposure in two of the four patients.

Ashrafiah Sahnaya, 25 August 2013 1 0

Narrative

99. Based on interviews conducted by the United Nations Mission, it can beascertained that there were around 15 military personnel deployed at one of theGovernment checkpoints controlling entry to rebel-held areas near AshrafiahSahnaya in the Damascus Rif. On 25 August 2013, continuous fighting reportedlyoccurred in the area. At the entrance of Sahnaya next to scattered local houses, theopposition side started to throw objects with a catapult around 1800 hours. Atapproximately 2000 hours, an object was thrown at a group of five soldiers locatedin one of the local houses and landed about 10 to 15 metres away. Something with a bad smell was released, but no explosion was heard. There were differing opinionswhether there had been no smoke or a colourless smoke. Symptoms such as blurredvision and difficult breathing started to develop in the alleged victims. Forty-fiveminutes later, they were evacuated by a rescue team to the field medical point andsubsequently taken to Martyr Yusuf Al Azmah Military Hospital by ambulance.

100. Blood samples were taken and the patients were treated. The patients weredischarged from the hospital after 6 to 10 days.


101. Weather information from Damascus in the evening the 25 August 2013 showstemperature to be falling and to be 27C at 2000 hours (worldweatheronline.com).There were almost no clouds, with a west-south-west wind at 10 miles per hour.Sarin spread in those conditions would disperse quite rapidly while migrating ashort distance in the direction of the wind.


102. The United Nations Mission did not visit the site of the alleged incident andwas therefore not in a position to collect primary information concerning themunitions. According to witnesses, a catapult allegedly threw unidentified objectsaiming at the military checkpoint.


103. The United Nations Mission did not visit the site of the alleged incident andwas therefore not in a position to collect environmental samples.


104. Interviews with survivors and clinicians and medical records revealed that themost severe signs and symptoms were shortness of breath, difficult breathing andeye irritation. This was followed by blurred vision, miosis, loss of consciousness,headache, fatigue and coughing.



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105. On 29 September 2013, the United Nations Mission was given five samplesallegedly drawn by the Syrian Government on 25 August 2013 upon the arrival ofthe patients at the hospital.

106. The United Nations Mission drew its own blood samples on 26 and28 September 2013.

107. All samples were subjected to DNA testing to confirm the origin of the presented whole blood samples. The analyses confirmed that the samples provided by the Syrian Government matched those of the alleged victims interviewed andsampled. The five blood samples drawn on 25 August 2013 all tested positive forSarin exposure, whereas those drawn on 26 and 28 September tested negative.

VI. Conclusions

108. The United Nations Mission concludes that chemical weapons have been used

in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.Ghouta, 21 August 2013

109. The United Nations Mission collected clear and convincing evidence thatchemical weapons were used also against civilians, including children, on arelatively large scale in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013.

110. This conclusion was based on the following:

(a) Impacted and exploded surface-to-surface rockets, capable to carry achemical payload, were found to contain Sarin;

(b) Close to the rocket impact sites, in the area where patients were affected,the environment was found to be contaminated by Sarin;

(c) The epidemiology of over 50 interviews given by survivors andhealth-care workers provided ample corroboration of the medical and scientificresults;

(d) A number of patients/survivors were clearly diagnosed as intoxicated byan organophosphorous compound;

(e) Blood and urine samples from the same patients were found positive forSarin and Sarin signatures.


111. The United Nations Mission collected credible information that corroboratesthe allegations that chemical weapons were used in Khan Al Asal on 19 March 2013against soldiers and civilians. However, the release of chemical weapons at thealleged site could not be independently verified in the absence of primaryinformation on delivery systems and of environmental and biomedical samplescollected and analysed under the chain of custody.

112. This assessment is based on the following:


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(a) The epidemiology, based on witness statements of medical staff andmilitary personnel participating in the rescue operation and on the documentationfrom the local health sector provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, corroborates theoccurrence of a rapidly onsetting mass intoxication by an organophosphorouscompound in the morning of the 19 March 2013. There are no other suggestions asto the cause of the intoxication;

(b) Interviews with secondary exposed survivors confirm symptoms of anorganophosphorous intoxication;

(c) None of the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic denied the use ofchemical weapons in Khan Al Asal. The evaluation of the information provided bythe Government of the Syrian Arab Republic as well as by the Governments ofFrance, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States indicatedthat chemical weapons were used in Khan Al Asal.

Jobar, 24 August 2013

113. The United Nations Mission collected evidence consistent with the probable

use of chemical weapons in Jobar on 24 August 2013 on a relatively small scaleagainst soldiers. However, in the absence of primary information on the deliverysystem(s) and environmental samples collected and analysed under the chain ofcustody, the United Nations Mission could not establish the link between thevictims, the alleged event and the alleged site.


(a) Interviews with survivors and clinicians and medical records confirmsymptoms of organophosphorous intoxication;

(b) Blood samples recovered by the Syrian Government on 24 August 2013and authenticated by the United Nations Mission using DNA techniques tested positive for signatures of Sarin;

(c) One of the four blood samples collected from the same patients by theUnited Nations Mission on 28 September 2013 tested positive for Sarin.

Saraqueb, 29 April 2013

115. The United Nations Mission collected evidence that suggests that chemicalweapons were used in Saraqueb on 29 April 2013 on a small scale, also againstcivilians. However, in the absence of primary information on the delivery system(s)and environmental samples collected and analysed under the chain of custody, theUnited Nations Mission could not establish the link between the alleged event, thealleged site and the deceased woman.


(a) Interviews with treating clinicians corroborating symptoms oforganophosphorous intoxication;

(b) Supporting witness statements and medical records substantiating thetransfer of a patient from the Shifa Hospital in Saraqueb to a hospital in Turkey;


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(c) Samples of several organs from the deceased victim recovered during anautopsy performed in the presence of members of the United Nations Mission tested positive for signatures of Sarin.

Ashrafiah Sahnaya, 25 August 2013

117. The United Nations Mission collected evidence that suggests that chemicalweapons were used in Ashrafiah Sahnaya on 25 August 2013 on a small scaleagainst soldiers. However, in the absence of primary information on the deliverysystem(s) and environmental samples collected and analysed under the chain ofcustody, and the fact that the samples collected by the United Nations Mission oneweek and one month after the alleged incident tested negative, the United NationsMission could not establish the link between the alleged event, the alleged site andthe survivors.


(a) Interviews with survivors and clinicians and medical records confirmsymptoms of organophosphorous intoxication;

(b) Blood samples recovered by the Syrian Government on 24 August 2013,authenticated by the United Nations Mission using DNA techniques, tested positivefor signatures of Sarin.

Bahhariyeh, 22 August 2013

119. In the absence of any positive blood samples, the United Nations Missioncannot corroborate the allegation that chemical weapons were used in Bahhariyehon 22 August 2013.


(a) Blood samples collected by the Syrian Government on 22 August testednegative for any known signatures of chemical weapons;

(b) Blood samples collected by the United Nations Mission on 25 September,tested negative for any known signatures of chemical weapons.

Sheik Maqsood, 13 April 2013

121. In the absence of further information relevant to the incident, the United Nations Mission cannot corroborate the allegation that chemical weapons were usedin Sheik Maqsood on 13 April 2013.

122. The United Nations Mission remains deeply concerned that chemical weaponswere used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arabic Republic,which has added yet another dimension to the continued suffering of the Syrian people.


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Appendix 1

Relevant legal instruments, guidance and other agreements

1. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or

Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 GenevaProtocol)

2. Guidelines and Procedures for the Timely and Efficient Investigation ofReports of the Possible Use of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) orToxin Weapons (A/44/561)

3. Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and theSupplementary Arrangement concerning the Implementation of Article II (2) (C)of the United Nations-OPCW Relationship Agreement

4. Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organization(WHO) adopted by the World Health Assembly and the Memorandum ofUnderstanding Between WHO and the United Nations Concerning WHOsSupport to the Secretary-Generals Mechanism for Investigation of the AllegedUse of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons

5. Exchange of letters of 13 and 14 August 2013 between the United Nations andthe Syrian Arab Republic setting out the modalities of cooperation to ensurethe safe, secure and efficient conduct of the work of the United NationsMission


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Appendix 2

Methodology used during the United Nations Mission

The Mission was guided by the United Nations Guidelines and Procedures for the

timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (A/44/561), as well as the modernscientific standards applied by OPCW and WHO for their respectivespecializations.a

The three pillars of modern investigative methodology are:

Appropriate chain of custody of procedures applied to all collection ofevidence.

Validated methodology used for acquiring and analysing evidence.

Personnel used must have the appropriate training.

This United Nations Mission collected the following types of evidence: biomedicalsamples, environmental samples, witness interviews/statements (collected as audioand video records) and documents/photos/videos received from Government oropposition representatives or witnesses.

The following procedures, in particular aimed at ensuring the probatory chain ofcustody, were applied during the present United Nations Mission:

All witness statements/interviews were recorded and the recordings weredocumented as evidence.

Local medical professionals under the supervision of United Nationsinspectors collected all biomedical samples. Inspectors in the United NationsMission office completed biomedical sample pre-processing.

All solvent-impregnated sampling wipes were pre-prepared by the United

Nations Missions chemists using analysis-grade solvents and material. Such pre-prepared wipes were sealed (with red frangible seals) in clean vials for use by the field teams. The whole process was recorded on video.

The collected samples were in the possession of at least one United Nationsinspector from the time of collection to the transport back to the United Nations Mission office.

At the United Nations Mission office, the environmental samples were fullydocumented, packaged, sealed and packed appropriately for safe transport.

The integrity of the samples was ensured through tamper-proof seals and/orthrough their physical possession by a United Nations inspector until thehandover to the OPCW laboratory personnel upon arrival in the Netherlands.The handover was documented, photographed and witnessed, whereapplicable, by Syrian Government representatives.

a Paragraph 18 of (A/44/561) stipulates that As early as the convention on prohibition of chemicalweapons enters into force, the Secretary-General should cooperate, as appropriate, with theorgans provided for in the convention, in carrying out investigations in accordance with theseguidelines and procedures and the relevant provisions of the chemical weapons convention.


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The collection, packaging, sealing and handover of the samples weredocumented through video and photo records.

All seals and accompanying documentation were confirmed correct/intact priorto the issuance of handover/takeover receipts.

Table 2.1OPCW Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Working Instructions (WI)for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons applied in thepresent investigation

1 QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU01:Standard Operating Procedure for Evidence Collection,Documentation, Chain-of-Custody and Preservation Duringan Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons

2 QDOC/INS/SOP/GG011: Standard Operating Procedure for Managing InspectionLaptops and Other Confidentiality Support Materials

3 QDOC/LAB/SOP/OSA2: Standard Operating Procedure for Off-Site Analysis ofAuthentic Samples

4 QDOC/LAB/WI/CS01: Handling of Authentic Samples from Inspection Sites andPacking Off-Site Samples at the OPCW Laboratory

5 QDOC/LAB/WI/CS02: Preparation and Analysis of Control Samples andCorresponding Matrix Blanks at the OPCW Laboratory

6 QDOC/LAB/WI/CS03: Documentation, Chain of Custody and Confidentiality forHandling Off-Site Samples at the OPCW Laboratory

7 QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA3: Chain of Custody and Documentation for OPCW SamplesOn-Site8 QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA4: Packing of Off-Site Samples

EpidemiologyThroughout the present United Nations Mission, an epidemiological investigativeapproach was applied. The epidemiological investigation substantially contributedto the teams overall understanding of the events. Methods for interviews, sampling,and review of documentation followed well-established methodologies developedand enforced by the WHO and in accordance with the Guidelines.

Standards for epidemiologic determination of cause-and-effect were first laid out ina systematic fashion by Hill in 1965. b The criteria to be fulfilled can be distilleddown to three basic elements:

There must be a biologically plausible link between the exposure and theoutcome.

There must be a temporal relationship between the exposure and the outcome. There must not be any likely alternative explanations for the symptoms.

b A. B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, Proceedings of the RoyalSociety of Medicine, 58 (1965), 295-300.


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The epidemiological investigation included a review of all documentation related toan alleged incident, epidemiological description of the incident, interviews with presenting witnesses, health-care workers and first responders, first-hand interviewswith survivors, and on-site assessments of symptoms and signs, includingassessments of the clinical severity of their syndromes. Further informationregarding the treatment and outcomes of the alleged victims were retrieved frommedical files and further interviews with treating clinicians. The epidemiologicalinvestigation yielded valuable information about the scale of each event, and provided contextual and geographic information that was later cross-checked andcorroborated by the environmental sampling teams. This was especially relevant forthe investigation of larger events encompassing the many elements of the societyaffected by the incident, like the Ghouta and Khan Al Asal incidents.

The epidemiological and clinical methodologies adopted, as well as the descriptionof the different types of interviews performed, are described in detail in reportA/67/997-S/2013/553.

In most of the investigation, the significant time delay between the alleged eventand the conduct of the on-site investigation was a critical factor, which affected the probative value of sampling and analysis.

Analytical procedures

In addition to the procedures described above for securing the chain of custody ofcollected samples from the site to the OPCW laboratory in The Hague, similarstringent procedures were applied when distributing the samples to the designatedlaboratories for the analysis of the samples in accordance with the Guidelines.

The United Nations Mission used OPCW-designated laboratories for the analysis ofthe samples collected. These laboratories are designated by the OPCW for theanalysis of authentic samples in accordance with relevant decisions taken by theStates parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC).The OPCW-designated laboratories meet the following criteria:

(a) Have established an internationally recognized quality assurance systemin accordance with relevant standards (ISO/IEC 17025:2005 or equivalent);

(b) Have obtained accreditation by an internationally recognizedaccreditation body for the analysis of chemical-warfare agents and relatedcompounds in various types of samples; and

(c) Regularly participate and perform successfully in inter-laboratory proficiency tests.

The OPCW proficiency tests are based on primarily qualitative analysis of testsamples with unknown sample composition to determine the presence of essentiallyany number of possible chemicals relevant to the CWC. The salient features of thetest listed below demonstrate it to be one of the most challenging proficiencytesting, which requires highly competent analytical skills and stringent qualitycontrol.

Covers a diverse nature of chemicals


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Involves blind testing for an almost infinite number of chemicals in complexmatrices

Does not prescribe a method

Requires detailed reporting of results

Allows for only a short timeline

Involves a zero tolerance for false positives

Involves a performance rating

Environmental samples

The methods used by the designated laboratories for the analysis of theenvironmental samples collected by the United Nations Mission are validated in theOPCW proficiency testing and in the accreditation of the laboratories, describedabove. The laboratories followed their standard operating procedures for sample preparation (extractions, derivatizations, concentration, etc.) followed by analysisutilizing primarily gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (electron impactionization). Secondary techniques included gas chromatography-atomic emissiondetection, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (chemical ionization), liquidchromatography-mass spectrometry, liquid chromatography-tandem massspectrometry, and/or nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy.

Biomedical samples

The methods used by the designated laboratories for the analysis of the biomedicalsamples collected by the United Nations Mission are currently being evaluatedthrough confidence-building exercises for the analysis of biomedical samples.

For the analysis of biomedical samples, the United Nations Mission used designatedlaboratories involved in the OPCW confidence-building exercises for biomedical

samples.Biomedical samples were analysed for Sarin signatures, i.e. for free Sarin and its breakdown products, and in addition, for Sarin adducts to proteins available in thehuman body, mainly cholinesterase and albumin. Protein-bound Sarin was analysedfollowing the established fluoride reactivation sample preparation proceduredescribed by Holland et al, 2008,c and van der Meer et al, 2010.d The biomedicalsamples were analysed by each laboratory using standard operating procedures(extractions, derivatizations, concentration, etc.) to prepare the urine samples foranalysis. The plasma or blood samples were prepared for analysis using the fluorideregeneration method. Techniques used for the analysis included gaschromatography-high resolution mass spectrometry, gas chromatography-tandemmass spectrometry, liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry and/or gaschromatography-flame photometric detection.

c K. E. Holland, et al, Modifications to the organophosphorus nerve agent-butyrylcholinesteraseadduct refluoridation method for retrospective analysis of nerve agent exposures, Journal ofAnalytical Toxicology, 32 (2008), 116-124.

d J. A. van der Meer, et al, Comprehensive gas chromatography with Time of Flight MS and largevolume introduction for the detection of fluoride-induced regenerated nerve agent in biologicalsamples, Journal of Chromatography B, 878 (2010), 1320-1325.


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DNA analysis

Comparative investigations based on DNA analysis were performed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), in response to a request made by the United Nations Mission.

A comparative DNA investigation at the NFI was conducted in three successivesteps: the DNA analysis, the DNA profile interpretation and, finally, the DNA profile comparison and the statistical evaluation.

The NFI is accredited by the Dutch Accreditation Council according to ISO/IEC17025 standards.

Staff training

Sampling, interviews and all other collection of evidence was performed byqualified and fully trained inspectors. In addition, staff training was regularly performed and documented in the various subtopics essential for the performance ofsafe and efficient inspections.

Ethical issues and considerations

In conducting the clinical assessments and detailed interviews, full considerationwas given to the privacy and protection of participants. All information was keptconfidential and the identity of survivors protected at all times. An identity numberwas assigned to each survivor and this number was used for the processing of data.The master list with the names of the witnesses was kept secure with the United Nations Mission. Throughout the investigation, the United Nations Mission made allefforts to respect religious values and norms, national customs, and the personal pressures and traumas associated with exposure to conflict.


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Appendix 3


In a letter dated 19 March 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic reported its allegation

that, at 0730 hours on 19 March, armed terrorist groups had fired a rocket from theKfar Deil area towards Khan Al Asal in the Aleppo governorate. According to theallegation, the rocket travelled approximately 5 kilometres and fell 300 metres awayfrom a Syrian Arab Republic army position. Following its impact, a thick cloud ofsmoke left unconscious anyone who inhaled it. The incident reportedly resulted inthe deaths of 25 people and injured more than 110 civilians and soldiers, who weretaken to hospitals in Aleppo.

Other Member States, including France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States also reported allegations that chemicalweapons had been used at Khan Al Asal in Aleppo on 19 March 2013, resulting incivilian deaths and serious injuries.

Pending agreement from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the

modalities for the proper, safe and efficient conduct of the investigation, from Aprilto August 2013, the Head and members of the United Nations Mission travelled to,and met with, various Government officials and technical experts from France,Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the UnitedStates of America. The United Nations Mission also received additional informationfrom the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the alleged incident, includinga list of names of people killed or injured from the alleged chemical weapon attack.The United Nations Mission also received a video pertaining to the incident and areport from the Government of the Russian Federation, providing the results of itsown investigation of the incident.

From 19 to 22 August 2013 and from 25 to 30 September, the United NationsMission also conducted fact-finding activities in the Syrian Arab Republic,

including interviews with civilian survivors, military officers, doctors, and militaryand civilian responders to the incident. Based on the security assessment of thesituation at Khan Al Asal, the United Nations Mission could not conduct on-siteactivities. Detailed interviews with civilian survivors, military officers, doctors, andmilitary and civilian responders took place from 21 to 22 August 2013 at theSheraton Hotel in Damascus. In addition, the United Nations Mission collected biomedical samples in Damascus on 22 August 2013 from two alleged victims.

Based on the evaluation of the information provided by the Member Statesconcerned in their reports of alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan Al Asal andduring the visits to the respective capitals, and based on the interviews conducted,the United Nations Mission could ascertain the following.

The location of the incident is the Haret Al Mazar neighbourhood close to the shrineof Sheikh Ahmad Al Asali located at the southern part of the Khan Al Asal village inthe vicinity of a position held at the time by the armed forces of the Syrian ArabRepublic in the Aleppo governorate (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). In the neighbourhood,there are one-story buildings with farming areas around the house. According towitness statements, the incident took place on 19 March 2013 at approximately 0700hours.


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Figure 3.1

The Khan Al Asal area west of Aleppo is indicated in red. This figure also illustratesthe location of the Kfar Deil area, as well as some hospitals and some militaryinstallations.


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Figure 3.2

The impact point (upper yellow pin) can be noted south of the Aleppo-Idlib road.The location of an interviewed witness is illustrated as the lower yellow pin north ofthe M 45 road. As indicated by the two red pins, most victims were, according to thewitness, located south of the Aleppo-Idlib road and west from the release point.

The village of Khan Al Asal was under the control of Syrian Government forces on19 March 2013. At the time of the incident, there was ongoing shelling withopposition forces located in areas surrounding this village. At about 0700 hours anobject (munition) landed near a living quarter approximately 300 metres from amilitary checkpoint. The munition released gas on its impact. The air stood still andwitnesses described a yellowish-green mist in the air and a pungent and strongsulfur-like smell.

The witnesses reported seeing people scratching their faces and bodies. They alsoobserved people lying in the streets, some unconscious, some having convulsionsand foaming from the mouth, and some complaining about vision problems. Thewitnesses also observed dead cattle, dogs, cats and chickens at the site.

Alleged victims were evacuated to six hospitals, namely the al-Raja hospital(25 individuals), the Zahi Azraq public hospital (25 individuals), the Syrianspecialized hospital (30 individuals), the Shahba private hospital (6 individuals), theMilitary Hospital in Aleppo, and the Aleppo University Hospital (63 individuals).After initial treatment, some of the alleged victims were later referred to the AleppoUniversity Hospital.

Local civilians aided by military personnel rescued and evacuated those affected,since the centrally organized Emergency Response Infrastructure had been disrupted by the ongoing conflict. Witnesses referred to first responders encounteringsecondary contamination as the rescue effort went on.


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According to witness statements, at least one affected family buried their deceasedin a family cemetery in Khan Al Asal as martyrs, without being washed and in theclothes they were wearing.

Environmental fact-finding activities

Due to the security conditions in the area of the alleged dispersion of chemicalweapons, the United Nations Mission was not able to conduct an on-site visit toKhan Al Asal.


The United Nations Mission received contradicting information as to how chemicalweapon agents were delivered in the Khan Al Asal incident. Witness statementscollected by the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, provided to the United NationsMission, supported the position by the Syrian Arab Republic that a rocket was firedfrom the neighbourhood. However, according to other witness statements to theUNHRC Commission of Inquiry, an overflying aircraft had dropped an aerial bombfilled with Sarin.

The United Nations Mission was not able to collect any primary information or anyuntouched artifacts relevant to the incident and necessary for an independentverification of the information gathered.

Environmental samples

The United Nations Mission did not conduct an on-site visit the Khan Al Asal siteand therefore did not collect any environmental samples.

The United Nations Mission received from the Government of the RussianFederation its report of the results of the analysis of samples obtained from Khan AlAsal from 23 to 25 March 2013, which identified Sarin and Sarin degradation products on metal fragments and in soil samples taken at the site of the incident.

The analysis of the samples was conducted by a laboratory that has established aninternationally recognized quality assurance system and performs successfully in theOPCW inter-laboratory proficiency tests. However, after the evaluation of thereport, the United Nations Mission could not independently verify the informationcontained therein, and could not confirm the chain of custody for the sampling andthe transport of the samples.

Biomedical fact-finding activities

On 14 August 2013, prior to its deployment to Damascus, the United NationsMission sent a detailed request for the Syrian Government, which included, interalia, the plan for the initial meetings, the information needed to advance the on-sitedata collection, the name of individuals (survivors, witnesses, first responders,health-care personnel, etc.) required for interviews, and the type and nature ofsamples needed.

On 20 August 2013, the Syrian Government submitted the following information:

i. List with names of 12 civilian and military first responders

ii. List with names of 20 deceased cases

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