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UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April...
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Transcript of UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April...
UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations
Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009
Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO
Bond in a blue beret?
Not exactly…
Total deployment in September 2008: 111,60088,754 uniformed personnel and 20,690 civilians
From 119 countries
DPKO HQ supportBudget for 01 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: Near $USD 7.1 billion1,000+ HQ staff supporting 100,000+ in the field
DPKO Directive on JOC DPKO Directive on JOC and JMAC was approved and JMAC was approved by USG DPKO on 1 July by USG DPKO on 1 July 2006 upon the advice of 2006 upon the advice of the DPKO Senior the DPKO Senior Management Team.Management Team.
Issued to all DPKO-led Issued to all DPKO-led missions on 12 July 2006.missions on 12 July 2006.
New DirectiveNew Directive
Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold:Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold:
Support integrated mission management.Support integrated mission management.
Support mission security. Support mission security.
Support informed decision-making across all Support informed decision-making across all components.components.
Not a decision-making bodyNot a decision-making body and does not replace and does not replace existing management or command structures at any existing management or command structures at any level. level.
It It supportssupports decision-making, operations decision-making, operations management and mission security.management and mission security.
The JMAC ApproachThe JMAC Approach
CASE STUDY: MINUSTAH
The Capstone Doctrine:
“A PKO must continuously analyse its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent… and must have the political and analytical skills… to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent.”
Information provided by locals helped the UN in making arrests.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE:
Working with the HNP
An opportunity and a challenge…
Imagery intelligence
Aerial imagery allowed MINUSTAH to produce useful maps, identify weapons storage sites, hiding places for victims of kidnapping, the rebel leaders’ bases and to map out dozens of potential sniper positions.
Success… despite the lack of signals intelligence
“MINUSTAH’s JMAC established the gold standard for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate.”
United Institute of Peace Report 2008
CASE STUDY: MONUC
MONUC’s JMAC: about military operations… and much more.
Stabilisation Plan for Eastern DRC – a JMAC plan
Transformed access to and by the local population.
UNOPS: building roads a kilometre at a time.
UN agencies and others benefitted from the more secure environment.
No SIGINT but…
Local staff have access to humint that international staff might otherwise lack.
JMAC: The Challenges
• Lack of clarity of concept• Lack of buy-in by Mission leadership• Competition and duplication with
mission political affairs, civil affairs, military operations and intelligence and security
• Poor staff choices• Inadequate mission direction
Questions & Comments?