Ulster Is Well over the Horizon

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Fortnight Publications Ltd. Ulster Is Well over the Horizon Author(s): Ralph Atkins Source: Fortnight, No. 303 (Feb., 1992), p. 23 Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25553291 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 13:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Fortnight Publications Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Fortnight. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 141.101.201.167 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:02:58 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Transcript of Ulster Is Well over the Horizon

Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Ulster Is Well over the HorizonAuthor(s): Ralph AtkinsSource: Fortnight, No. 303 (Feb., 1992), p. 23Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25553291 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 13:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Kinnock the cautious?in a hung parliament he might be

tempted to go for 'a safe pair of hands'

Ulster is well

over the horizon

Ralph Atkins

T1 i HE BRIGHT LIGHT of a spring morning streamed through the window as Neil Kinnock rose from his desk in his Downing Street office to greet the white-haired, slightly

,_I academic man who had just entered. "Ah, Kevin. Thank you for coming at such short

notice," the prime minister said warmly. "I wanted to tell you in person why I can't offer you the

job of Northern Ireland secretary." It is a scenario many inside the Labour party and outside believe, or fear, could become reality

if Labour won the general election. As Labour's chances of ending 13 years of Conservative rule

have increased, more of a question mark has hung over the fate of Kevin McNamara, Labour's

Northern Ireland spokesperson since 1987.

Mr McNamara does not lack ability, intelligence or diligence. His comments in the Commons

betray consistency and attachment to principle. He does not laze, safe in the knowledge that

political debate on Northern Ireland at Westminster is usually rare and undemanding. His problem is that he is too bold in espousing eventual Irish unification by consent. Labour's

policy has been developed beyond unification as merely a vague aspiration, a goal that might be

achieved in the far-distant future. Mr McNamara sees Ireland as increasingly integrated?in

particular, by building on the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. He backs a bill of rights as part of a

policy of making unity freely accepted by the people of Northern Ireland.

Labour policy has travelled a long way since the party was last in office?perhaps going even

further on unification than some members of the Social Democratic and Labour party. But Mr

McNamara can find himself at odds even with Labour sympathisers over his nationalism?as seen

from some of the audience when he addressed a meeting of the cross-party pressure group New

Consensus at Westminster last month.

His policy would require the investment of a huge amount of political capital. The backlash

from unionists would be unpredictable, but

certainly savage?Mr McNamara's Catholi

cism would be enough to raise unionist suspi cions. But he is adamant that unionists must not

be allowed to set the agenda, to hinder progress. If Labour were elected with a large major

ity, it might indeed choose to go down that path.

Certainly Mr Kinnock has taken a proactive role in Labour's policy review and is unlikely to have approved a stand on Northern Ireland

with which he disagreed. But if the majority were small, the dangers to the government's

stability could be profound. Following Labour

policy as currently set out would alienate the 13

unionist MPs at Westminster?at least half-a

dozen of whom might be expected to support a

Labour government that promised a 'firm' line

on security and constitutional stability. If La

bour's majority was only a handful of votes,

Labour's whips and Mr Kinnock would not

want to spend every night cajoling every last

member and predicting the actions of unionist

MPs arising from the government's stand on

Northern Ireland.

Labour has higher priorities than Northern Ireland, which hardly registers as an electoral

issue on the 'mainland'. Kick-starting the

economy and improving the health service, education and training are priorities a Labour

government would not want to see overshad

owed. And Mr McNamara is not an elected

member of Labour's shadow cabinet, so he

does not automatically have to be selected by Mr Kinnock for high office.

Indeed, mathematics may well work against him. There are 18 elected members of the

shadow cabinet, plus Mr Kinnock and Roy

Hattersley, the deputy Labour leader. Mr Kin

nock would also have to choose a lord chancel

lor and a leader of the Lords. The number of

paid cabinet posts is 22?leaving little room for

manoeuvre, although some cabinet members

need not be paid. All that does not rule out Mr McNamara

becoming secretary of state. A policy can be

implemented at various speeds. Mr McNamara

would, in any circumstance, want to establish

his credentials as someone who rejected any

suggestion of being influenced by paramili taries. A not insignificant part ofthe parliamen

tary Labour party would be alarmed if he were

not appointed. In the short term, he is committed to picking

up the efforts to start round-table talks still

occupying Peter Brooke, the Northern Ireland

secretary. Mr McNamara could decide, or be

persuaded, that more radical measures would

have to wait. His chances of getting the job

might depend on what he agreed with Mr Kinnock in the early days after a general elec

tion victory. Who are the alternatives to Mr McNamara?

Northern Ireland is not widely regarded as a

desirable or high-profile job, and if Mr McNa mara was not appointed it would imply that a

safer, less ambitious, pair of hands was re

quired. Speculation centres on the less well

known members ofthe shadow cabinet?Frank

Dobson, shadow energy secretary, or Michael

Meacher, social security spokesperson. Martin

O'Neill, Labour's dutiful defence spokesper son?also not an elected member of the shadow

cabinet?is another possibility. The problem for Mr Kinnock would then be

what job, if any, to offer Mr McNamara.

FORTNIGHT FEBRUARY 23

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