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Tenue au Palais de Chaillot, Paris,le vendredi 19 novembre 1948, a11 Mures.

President : M. H. V. EVATT (Australie).

CENT-SOIXANTE-DEUXIEME SEANCEPLENIERE

La resolution adoptee par la Commission aete inspiree par une proposition presentee parla France (A/C.1/3 ~ 5). Les passages essentIelsde la proposition presentee par ~a Fr~nce r?com­mandent au Conseil de Securlte d etahlir unsysteme de contr6le pour la reduction gener~led(1 armements de type classique, et de faIl't!rapport a I'Assemblee generale, au cours de saprochaine session, sur l'execution de cetterecommandation. L'Assemblee sera alors enmesure de prendre d'autres mesuras concernantle desarmement, conformement aux huts etprincipes de la Charte des Nations Unies.

On a propose comme base du systeme decontr61e la creation d'un organisme d.e con~r61~des a~mements de type classiqu~1 ~nvestl .~pouvOlr~ propres, et la COIDmumcatlOn a. ~organisme de declarations periodiques des dive;:Etats interess~s concernant leurs armements .:'"type classique. Ces declarations seraieDtomir ·)e

81. Suite de la discussion sur l'interdie­lion de l'arme atomique et la reduceition d'un tiers des armements et desforces armees des membres perma·nents dl~ Conseil de securite : rap"port de la Premiere Commission(A/722 et A/722/Corr~1); projelde resolution presente par l'Uniondes Republiques socialistes sovieti~ques (Aj723)

M. SCHUMAN (Fra:uce) indique que la Premiere, Commission a discute sur un texte presente par

la delegation de I'URSS (A/l) 58). Le projet ~eresolution qui a ete adopte et qui est SOUIlUSa l'Assemblee s'ecarte cependant de la prop.o- I

sition initiale de l'URSS. La Premiere CommIs-, .sion a decide, ala majorite, qu'avant de realisertoute reduction des armements, il est necessairede creer un organisme de contr6le ,international.

520 19 November 19'le seul progres qui soit realisable. M. Rollconclut par un appel it tous ses collegues, SaDsexception, puur que l'Assemblee fasse ce que lemonde attend d'elle dans ce domaine.

HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECONDPLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palaz's de Chaillot, Paris,on Friday, 19 November 1948, at 11 a.m.President : Mr. H. V. EVATT (Australia).

81. Continuation of the discussion onthe prohibition of the atomicweapon and reduction by one-thirdof the armaments and armed forcesof the permanent members of theSecurity Council: report of theFirst Committee (A/722 and A/722jCorr.l) ~ draft resolution propose,lby the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics (Aj723)

Mr. SCHUMAN (France) said that the discussionin the First Committee had been based on atext put forward by the delegation of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics (A/658). The~raft resolution that was subsequently adoptedand that was hf'fore the Assr]Dbly departed,however, from the original USSR proposal.The majority of the First Committee had decidedthat, bdore any armaments reduction tookplace, it was necessary to provide for an inter­national control agency.

The resolution adopted by the Committeehad been inspired by a French proposal (A/C .1/325), the essf'ntial part of which contained arecommendation to the Security Council for theestabli~hment of a control sysft m for the generallimitation of conventional armaments and fora report thereon to the General Assfmbly atits next regular session on the way in whichthat recommendation had been implemented.The Asspmbly would then be in a position totake further steps in respect of disarmament,in conformity with the purposes and principlesof the United Nations Charter.

The bases of the control system would be theestablishment of a control agency for conven­tional armaments with proper authority, andthe communication to that agency of periodicstatements from the various States concerned,regarding their conventional armaments. Suchltatements would be verified by the control

162nd plenary meeting

possible progress along the road to the reduc­tion of armaments. Mr. Rolin concluded byan appeal to all his colleagues, withollt exception,to ensure that the Assembly would do in thatfield what the world expected of it.

The meeting rose at 11 p.m.

il I

162' seance pl6mere

tr6Iees par l'organisme et ensuite puhliees parle Secretaire general.

L'exemple de la Societe des Nations montrequ'il est possible it un Etat de mettre rapidementsur pied une puissante armee, s'il possede lesarmements et le materiel de guerre necessaire.Ce fait est ampJ~m.ent demontre par la recons­titution de l'armee allemande entre 1935 et1940, de I'armee des Etats-Unis entre 1942et 1946, et de l'armee de l'URSS apres Sta­lingrad. La reduction des forces armees serainutile si elle ne s'accompagne pas du contr6leet de l'interdiction des armes de destruction,si les Etats n'acceptent pas l'institution d'uncontr6le effectif des armements et d'un systemede securite collective. Pour atteindre ce but, desgaranties sont necessaires. Ces garanties exigentque tous les Etats publient periodiquement desstatistiqnes relatives it leurs forces armees ainsiqu'a certains elements de leur potentiel, de leurbudget et de leur industrie. En outre, on devracreer, dans le cadre du Conseil de securite et aumoyen d'une convention, un organisme qui nesoit pas soumis it la regIe du veto. Enfin, cetorganisme devra ~tre autorise a verifier commeil convient tous les renseignements qui luiseront fournis.

De I'avis de la delegation fran«;aise, un Etatpeut executer des propositions d'une grandeportae sans s'exposer it ~tre dupe ou victimede sa bonne foi, La reduction des armementspourra alors s'effectuer progressivement, nonseulement . ( la base du potentiel des diversEtats, maL, aUdsi sur la base de leur situationgeographique et de leur statut juridique.

M. Schuman est silrpris que, dans aucune despropositions visant au desarmement, on n'aitadmis la priorita du contrMe. C'est pour cetteraison que la delegation de la France s'opposeaux propositions presentees par I'URSS etpar la Pologne. L'organisme de contrMe devraag r des le debut de la reduction des armements,afin de s'assurer que cette reduction est effective.Un systeme de reduction sans contrMe ne seraqu'ilJusoire. On peut se servir de cette formuledans un but de propagande, mais elle ne peutassUrer la reduction des armements.

La France a finalement retire au cours de laseptieme seance en faveur d'un texte presentepar la delegation de la, Belgique (A/C.l/SC.I7./2),la proposition .qu'elle avait pl'eSentee it la Sous­Commission 12. Les deux tedes ont cependantete inspires par la m~me idee, et la resolutionfinalt a ete amelioree et compIetee au cours desdiscussions qui ont eu lieu it la Premiere Com-. .miSSion.

La Commission a decide que le fonctionnementde l'organisme international de contr61e ne

19 novembre 1948 52!

agency and finally published by the Secretary­General.

The experience of the League of NationJshowed that it was possible to organize a power­ful army rapidly if the country concerned hadthe necessary arms and materials of war. The.re-organization of the German army between1935 and 1940; of the United States armybetween 1942 and 1946, and of the USSRarmy after Stalingrad, gave abundant proofof that fact. The reduction of armed forceswould be meaningless if it were not accompa­nied by the control and abolition of the wea­pons of destr~ction and unle~s all States accep­ted the establIshment of effective control of armsand a system of collective security. For thatpurpose guarantees were necessary. Those guar­antees would mean that all States would have'to publish, periodically, stetistics relating totheir armed forces and military strength, aswell as certain particulars regarding their indus­trial potential and budget. Furthermore, itwould be necessary, by means of a convention,to set up within the framework of the Security·Council a body which would not be subject tothe veto regulation. That body would haveto be allowed to verify, in whatever manner'was required, all information submitted to it... In the opinion of the French delrgation, the'most far-r,eaching proposals could be workedout without a State running the risk of becom­ing the dupe or victim of its own good faith.The reduction of armaments could then takeplace in progressive stages, on the basis notonly of the potential strength of the various.States, but also of their geog['aphical and juri -·ical status.

Mr. Schuman was surprised that the priorityof control was not recognized in rrgard to anyproposal for disarmament. It was for thatreason that the French delegation would r('jnctthe USSR and Polish proposals. The controlage~cy .would have to be active from the verybeglDDlng of armaments reduction to see thati~ was ~arried out e.ffectively. A system of re(hlC­t~on WIthout control would merely be an illu­SIOn. Proposals to that end could be used for,propaganda purposes, but they would notensure armament reduction.

The French proposal had finally been with­~raw~ at the 7th meeting of Sub-Committee 12ID favo?r of a text put forward by the BelgiandelegatIOn (A/C.l/SC.l~/2). The two texts,however, had been motivated by the same ideaand the fin~l resolution had bp-en improved andcompleted lD the course of the discussions in·the First Committee.

. . The Committee had decided that the rune­tionin; of the international control body should

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M. DULLEB (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) attireI'attention sur le fait que l'AssembIee se trouvef.lll face de deux propositions capitales : la reso­lution de la Premiere Commission et la contre­proposition de I'TJRSS, qui a ete repoussee parla Commission mais qui est presentee de nouveaua l'AssembIee. La resolution de la Commissionreconnatt qu'il est important d'eviter le rear-­mement qui peut, en lui-m~me, constituer unmotif de conflit et qui imposera aux peuples lalourde charge de depenses militaires impor-­tantes. Elle recommande donc, comme unepremiere mesure, qU6 le Conseil de securite,par l'intermediaire de la Commission des arm~ments de type classique, recherche les possl­hilites d'etablir un organisme international decontr61e pour la reception, la verification et lapublication d'informations a fournir par tousles Etats Membres.

La resolution de I'Union sovietique recom­mande que cinq pays, a savoir : la Chi~e, laFrance, le Royaume-Uni, I'Union des Repubhquessocialistes sovieti~ues et les Etats-Unis d'Atne­rique reduisent d un tiers, pendant une anne~,toutes leurs forces armees. Elle recommand~

Les declarations qui doivent ~tre faites aeetorganisme, ainsi que leur verification et leutpublication, doivent ~tre effectuees assez rapi­dement. La France est toujours convaincue quela securite collective peut ~tre garantie par ledesarmement pluMt que par le rearmement.Mais les desaccords qui persistent malheureu­sement entre les grandes Puissances sur desquestions essentielles, maintiennent et aggra­vent le manque de confiance reciproque. Lesdeclarations periodiques fait~s par les grandesPuissances sur leurs forces armees et sur leursarmements, et dont l'exactitude sera v'<,,:,ifieepar l'organisme de contr61e, ,contribuerait gran­dement it ameliorer l'atmosphere internationale.Elles permettront de faire un premier pas versla fin de la course aux armements et peuvent,par consequent, constituer la base d'une reduc­tion equitable de ces armements.

La delegation de la France appuie donc entie­rement le texte qui a ete propose.

19 November 1948doit pas dependre de sa reconnaissance par tOlIBles Etats, mais seulement de l'accord des memnresdu Conseil desecurite. Sur la proposition de laFrance, il a ete decide que le vote du Conseil,instituant un organisme internutional de con;.tr61e conferera ipso facto ace dernier la comp~tence et l'autorite necessaires pour lui permettrede remplir immediatement sa tache. L.a dele­gation franQaise espere que la resolution seraapp~yee par une forte majorite des Membresde I AssembIee generale. '

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Mr. DULLES (United States of America) drew:attention to the fact that the Assembly was facedwith two main propositions : the First Commit­tee's resolution and the USSR alternative thathad been rejected by the Committee, but wasnow re-introduced in the Assembly. The Com­mittee's resolution recognized the importance ofavoiding re-armament, which might itself be' acause of war and which would impose upon thepeoples the heavy burden of great militaryexpenditure. It therefore recommended as afirst step that the Security Council, workingthrough the Commission for Conventional Arma­ments, should explore the possibilities of estab­lishing an international control agency for thereceiving, checking and publication of informa­tion to he supplied hy all Member States.

The Soviet Union resolution recommended th8.t'five countries, China, France, the United King­dom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics andthe United States of America, should each,during the current year" reduce their armedforces by one-third. It also recommended the

162nd plenary meeting . 522

not depend upon its acceptance hy all States,but only upon the adherence of the membersof the Security Council. On the suggestionof the French delegation, it had been decidedthat the Council's vote, setting up an interna­tional control body would, ipso facto, conferupon the latter the necessary competence andauthority for it to begin to carry out its functionsimmediately. The French delegation hopedthat the resolution would be supported by theoverwhelming majority of the Members of theGeneral Assembly.

The statements to be made to that body andthe verification and publication thereof, shouldhe undertaken fairly rapidly. France was stillconvinced that collective security could bestbe guaranteed by disannament rather thanby re-armament. However, the disagreementwhich unfortunately persisted among the great,Powers on questions of substance maintainedamI ag~ravated a spirit, of mutual lack of confi­dence. The very existence of periodic state­ments from the great Powers concerning theirarmed forces and armaments, the acr'lracy ofwhich would, in turn, be verified through thecontrol agency, would be an important contri­bution to the improvement of the internationalatmosphere. It would permit a first steptowards ~!lding the armaments race und suhse­quently might constitute the basis for an equi­table reduction of those armaments.

The French delegation, therefore, fully sup­ported the text that had been proposed.

162' seance plemere

egalement l'institution d'un organisme auquelces cinq nations communiqueront des donneesofficielles concernant l'etat de leurs armements.Cet organisme ne sera autorise a exercer' parlui-m~me aucun contr6le ni aucune verification.Des deux propositions, celle de l'URSS est laplus sensationnelle, mais elle atteint cet effeten simplifiant le probleme aoutrance.

Les cinq Etats mentionnes ne sont pas lesseuls qui possedent des armements importants.La repartition de ces armements dans les cinqEtats differe aussi totalement. Le GouV'crnementde la Chine, qui n'a qu'un materiel de guerrereduit, est engage dans une ~Uf ~ d civile deses­peree; si l'AssemhIee lui recommande de reduired'un tiers ses forces armees, cela equivaudra alui demander de capituler devant des forcesarmees plus puissantes qui echappent au con­tr6le de l'AssembIee. .

Ala suite de l'occupation allemande, la Francea ete, pour ainsi dire, depouillee de ses arme­ments et, aujourd'hui, Hs ne sont pas ala mesurede ses responsabilites et de son statut de grandePuissance. Apres avoir reduit leurs armementsd'une fac;on rigoureuse, le~ Etats-Unis ont,dans une certaine mesure, renforce leur puis­sance militaire pour equilibrer les forces qui sedressent devant l'Europe accidentale. Gr~ce

a cette mesure, les Etats-Unis esperent qu'ilsera suppIee par des forces locales, et non pardes forces etrangeres, a l'absence pratiqued'autorites constituees que la guerre a provo­quee dans cette partie de fEurope. En depitde cela, les effectifs de l'armee des Etats-Unisrepresentent actuellement 12 pour 100 dece qu'ils etaient penda;~1t la guerre. M. Dunescroit savoir que le chiffre correspondant pourle Royaume-Uni est de 15 pour 100. D'apresles meilleures estimations dont elle dispose, laCommission a pu etablir que I'URSS a actuel­lement sous les armes 35 a 55 pour 100 deseffectifs qu'elle avait pendant la guerre.

D'autre part, la proposition presentee parI'URSS ne fait aucune mention de l'inspectionet de !a verification par des organismes inter­nationaux. Chacune des cinq nations se horneraafournir ses propres chiffres et l'on sait que l'onne peut se fier ades rapports officiels. L'exemplefourni par les clauses du Traite de Versaillesrelatives au desarmement montre qu'il existede nombreux moyens d'eluder le contr6le,par exemple en ne declarant pas officiellement, entant qu'organisations militaires, les formation!paramilitaires tenes que les societes de tir, leacompagnius de travailleurs, les mouvements dejeunesse, les clubs athMtiques, etc. Le rapportde la Premiere Comtnission fait ressortir d'unefac;on pertinente que la premiere condition pourresoudre ce prohleme est d'obtenir des rensei-

Furthermore, the USSR proposal did"notmake any suggestion for international inspectionor verification. Each of the five nations wouldmerely submit its own figures and it was well­known how unreliable some official reports couldbe. Experience in regard to the disarmamentclauses in the Treaty of Versailles showed thatmany ways of evasion existed, as for example~?ugh the exclusion from officially reportedmilitary establishments of quasi-military for­!Dations, such as shooting clubs, labour battal­Ions, youth movements, athletic clubs and so on.The First Committee's report m'lde it ahun­danHy cle'lr that the first requirement in thatmatter was to obtain comprehensive information.That by itself would create eonfi.lence and woulddo away with th.J present risk that nations were

i9 novembre 1948 . ~'123

establishment of a body to which those fivenations would submit official data on their arma­ments. That body, however, would not itselfhave any right of independent inveetigation orverification. Of the two proposals, that of theUSSR was the more dramatic1 but it achieveddrama at the expense of over-simplifying theproblem to an almost impossible extent.

. The five countries named were not the onlycountrie's that had- substantial armaments. Nei­ther were they by any means equal as regardsthe allocation of armaments. The Governmentof China, with only meagre military equipment,was engaged in a desperate ~ivil war; for theAssembly to recommend that its armed forcesshould be reduced hy one-third would he torecommend its capitulation to large and heavilyarmed forces which were not under the controlof the Assembly.

As a result of German occupation, France wasvirtually stripped of armaF Jnts 'and today itsarms were not commensurate with its responsi­hilities and status as a great Power. After adrastic reduction of armaments, the UnitedStates had somewhat increased its militarystrength in order to halance the power confrontingWestern Europe. By. that means, it hoped tomake it more likely that that area, which thewar left almost in a state of vacuum of power,would be filled by native rather than by alienforces. Even so, the number of men under armsin the United States was now 12 per cent ofthe number during the war. The comparabl~

figure for the United Kingdom he understoodto be 15 ·per cent. The hest estimates that theCommittee could find for the USSR indicatedthat it had under arms between 35 and 55 percent of the number of troops it had during thewar.

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The United States delegation hoped that theFirst Committee draft resolutiob. would he adop­ted unanimously and that it would be imple­mented during the following year. That stepwould represent work which was perhaps un­spectacular, but it would he honest work and itwould pro~de a solid foundation upon which theAssembly, at its following session, could pro­ceed to develop further the essential hases ofpeace.

Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said his delega­tion supported the draft resolution submitted bythe First Committee, in the hope that it mightprove to he a first step on the road to the regu­lation and ultimate reduction of conventionalarmaments.

The USSR dele/gation had stated, in committeeat any rate, that it regarded the hasis of thatproposal as unworkable and unacceptable. Itwas to be hoped that it would not persist in thatattitude if the Assembly. adopted the resolution.The Soviet Union Government could, of co-urse,make it impossible to take even that first stepof notification and verification, hut he hoped itwo:uld co-operate through the Commission for

lOud pleaary meeting

re,.arming in order to meet the imagined arma­ments'f others.

Ignorance, fear and susJ)icion could lead to anarmamAnts race that would ~tself he provocativeof war. The First Committee's draft resolutionproposed, first of all, to develop a sound foun­dation for the cont:".ol of armaments; that founda­tion was knowledge, sufficiently verified to heahove suspicion.

19 Noventhr 1:

gnements complets. Cela suffiraacreer une a_sphere de confiance et eeartera le risque de Vl'>itlea nations rearmer pour repondre au rear-.mement imaginaire d'autres nations.

L'ignorance, la crainte et la suspicion peuventconduire aune COUl'se am: armements qui ame­nera elle-m~me la guerre. Le projet de resolutionde la Premiere Commission propose d'etahlirtout d'ahord une base solide pour le contr6ledes armements. Cette base, c'est l'assuranced'obtenir des renseignements suffisamment con~tr6les pour qU'ils ne puissent ~tre sujets acaution.

There were some nations which, in the Certaines nations se refusent, au nom de leUl'name of sovereignty, refused to .accept inter- souverainete, aaccepter le contr61e d'organismesational controls. They contended that nation- internationau::. Elles pretendent que les affir..al promises· and national reports ought to he an mations et les rapports de ces Gouvernementsacceptable suhstitute for international control peuvent remplacer d'une fa~on satisfaisante leand international verification. The fact was that contr6le et la verification pardes organismes intef~

such promises and unverified reports would not nationaux. Or, en realite, ces affirmations et cesGervc to allay suspicion. History haCl too often rapports non verifies ne suffiront pas a dissiperproved their unreliahility. Perhaps govern- les soup~ons. L'histoire a montre trop souventments would no longer be deceitful or unre- que l'on ne pouvait s'y fier. Peut-~tre, un jour,liable, hut the lessons of history were'too recent les Gouvernements ne feront plus preuve deand too bitter to be disregarded at the present fourberie et l'on pourra se fier aleurs paroles,time. Rightly or wrongly, suspicion \lnd fear mais les le~ons de l'histoire sont trop recentes etwould persist unless there were efi'ective inter- trop ameres pour ~tre actuellement negligees.national controls and any nation that refused to A tort ou araison, la suspicion et la crainte per~

do what was necessary to allay fear and suspicioL, sisteront, it moins que l'on n'etabIisse un con-was itself a contributor to the conditions that tr61e international effectif; toute nation qui S~

led to war. , refuse it prendre les mesures Decessaires pourdissiper la crainte et la suspicion, contribue elle~

m~me it creer <les ~onditions qui menent a laguerre.

La delegation des Etats-Unis espere que leprojet de resolution de la Premiere Commissionsera adopte it l'lmanimite et qu'il sera mis aexecution au conrs de l'annee prochaine. Cepas en avant ne sera sans doute pas spectacu­laire, mais cc sera un geste honn~te qui per­mettra d'etablir une base solide, sur laquelleI'Assemblee generale pourra continuer, lors desa prochaine session, it edifier les bases essen­tielles de la paix.

M. McNEIL (Royaume-Uni) c.leclare que sadelegation appuie le projet de resolution presentepar la Premiere Commission, en esperant quecette resolution constituera une premiere etapedans la voie de la reglementation et de la reduc­tion definitive des armements.

La delegation de I'URSS a declare en commis­sion qu'elle considere les bases de cette propo­sition comme absolument inapplicables et inac­ceptables. 11 faut esperer qu'elIe ne persisterapas dans son attitude si l'Assemh!ee ~dopte .laresolution. Le Gouvernement de I UnIOn SOVla­tique peut, bien entendu, emp~cher de prendr,ecette premiere mesure que constituent la not~...ficat~on et la verification des renseignements, ma18

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IS~ 16211 seance pUniire

le representant do. Royaume-Uni espere ~ue caGouvernement contribuera cependant, par I inter­mediaire de la Commission des armements detype elassique, a elaborer un plan utile et pra­tique en s'inspirant des grandes lignes de laresolution.

En ce qui concerne le projet de resolution del'URSS, la de16gdion du Royaume-Uni, commebeaucoup d'autres, a deja expose longuementses objections. Toutefois, si la position de rUnionsovietilque etait de nouveau exposee en detaille representant du Royaume-Uni espere que lePresident permettrait aux autres delegationsd(lJ faire connattre leur reponse.

De l'avis du representant du !'loyaume-Uni,on n'a pas repondu d'une fac;on pertinente,au cours des seances de la Premiere Commissionet de la Sous-Commission 12, aux objectionspresentees a la proposition de l'URSS. En fait,les appuis que la proposition de l'Union sovie­tique a recueillis ont confirme l'opinion de ladelegation du Royaume-Uni qu'il ne s'agit la,en mettant les choses au mieux, que d'un gestede propagande. Au pis, cette proposition n'an­nonce rien de bon, et eUe est, en eHe-m~me,

inequitable sur le plan pratique. On comprenddifficilement comment la delegation de I'URSSpeut presenter une propm,ition semblable sansmAme tenir compte, sewjle-t-il, des difficultesque rencontrera son exeeution et de l'impos­sibilite dans laqueHe se trouveront les autresPuissanct}!'l d'accepter de faire, dans les circons­tances actuelles, ce pas en avant lea yeuxbandes. On comprend au.ssi difficilement com­ment la delegation de rURSS pe\~t meconnattred'une fac;on si complete et si inexcusable latache deja accomplie de,ns ce domaine par laCommission de I'energifJ atomique, au cours deces deux dernieres anr,ees.

En attendant que l'on parvienne a un accordsur la reglementation et la reductioi.l des arma­ments, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ad"ti se resoudre, contre son gre, a assurer la secu­rite de son pays et la paix de l'Europe en rear­mant moderement. Ainsi que l'h deja declarele representant du Royaume-Uni, l'effectif desforces armees de son pays a ete reduit depuis1945, de 5.090.000 hommes a 787.000.Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeresdu Royaume-Uni a deja declare a la 144e seancepIeniere de l'AssembIee generale, qu'il etaittragique, en verite, que son Gouvernement aitete dans l'obligation de prendre une telle mesurea un moment Oll il voudrait pouvoir utilisertoutes ses ressources a la reconstruction dupays.

Est-il cependant possible de proceder autre­ment dans le climat de IDefiance. qui prevautactuellement? On estime que les forces armeesde l'URSS ont un effectif cinq fois superieur it

As regards the USSR draft resoiution, theUnited Kingdom delegation, in common withmany others, bad already stated at length itsobjections to it. Should the Soviet Union caseagain be advanced in detail, however, he assumedthat the President would permit other deleua­tions to reply.

In his opinion, the objections to the USSRproposal that had been made in the First Com­mittee and Sub-Committee 12, had not beenadequately answered. In fact, such ~upporf; asthe Soviet Union proposal had attracted l~ad

confirmed the United Kingdom delegation's viewthat it was at best nothing but a propagaJ1dagesture. At the worst, it was sinister and, bydefinition, inequitable in its application. It wasdifficult to understand how the USSR ~elegation

could put forward such aproposal without appar­ently having given consideration to the diffi­culties which would he involved in implementingit, or to the impossibility of the other Powersconcerned agreeing, in such circumstances, totake that step blindfolded. It was, equallydifficult to understand how the USSR delegationcould flatly and unapologetically ignore nIl thework done on that subject during the past twoyears by the Atomic Energy Commission.

I' novembre 1948

Conventional Armaments in producing a usefulana workable scheme on the lines broadly laiddown in the resolution.

Pending the reaching of an agreement on theregulation and. reduction of armamen\ theUnited Kingdom Government had been "" ",edreluctant1.y to the (}onclusion that it must pro­tect the uafety of the country and the peace ofEurope by a modest measure of re-armament.As he had stated before, since 1945 the mili­tary manpower of his country had been reducedfrom 5,090,000 to 787,000. As the UnitedKing~,om Secretaryuf State for Foreign Affairshat., said at the 144th plenary meeting of the~eneral Assembly, it was indeed a tragic neces­SIty that, at a time when his Government wishedto be able to concentrate all the resources of thecountry on reconstruction it should have heenforced to take that step.

However, what other choice was there in therresent atmospher,e of lack,of confidence? The

SSR forces were believed to be five times thesize of the UnitEid Kingdom's and the political

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ts26 19 November 1948

celui des forces armees du Royaume-Uni, eton insiste constamment, en les exagerant m~mesur les divergences politiques qui opposent le~deux pays. Le marechal Staline a lui-m~me recem­ment accuse d' incitation a la guerre ce qu'ilapp~lle les milieu;x d~rigeants britanniques, et,obelssant a des dll'ectIves emanant, croit-on, deMoscou, les communistes Sf;; livrent a des atta­ques contre lea institutions. nationales et lapolitique interieure du pays. 11 n'existe doneaucune autre possibilite de remedier aux fai­blesses des moyens de derense que le Royaume­Uni esperait, il y a peu de temps encore, nepas ~tre appeIe a utiliser.

Lorsque le representant du Royaume-Unia pose une question aM. Vychinsky, celui-ei luia dit de s'occuper de ses propres affaires. 11avait parfaitement le droit de le faire, mais itdevrait aussi reconn.:\itre que le fait de limiterses preoccupations aux seuls inter~t8 nationauxpeut difficilement favoriser la cooperation inter­nationale et ne peut guere contribuer aretablirla confiance mutuelle qui est un facteur secon­daire, sinon primordial, de la question audesarmement.

L'importance de l'effectif et de l'armement desforces armees britanniques est connue et lesera toujours; par contre, celle des forces armeesde l'URSS ne l'est pas et il est peu probablequ'elle soit reveIee. Il est vrai que les demo­eraties parlementaires, en agissant de la sorte,ne trompent pas ceux qui ne sont pas leursamis; il est egalement vrai qu'elles ne trompentpas leur propre peuple. Selon le m~me principe,I'AssembIee generale determinera qui a faitdes efforts sinceres en vue du desarmement etqui a jalousement dissimuie l'importance de sondispositif militaire. .

L'historique des activites de la Commissionde l'energie atomique, de la Commission desarmements de type classique et du Comited'etat-major a prouve, ainsi que M. MeNeil atente de l'exposer en detail a la Premiere Com­mission, que, malheureusement, la politique duGouvernement de l'URSS a mis tous les paysdans l'impossibilite de s'occuper de leurspropres affaires sur le plan international. Pourl'instant, ce Gouvernement a decide, pour desraisons qu'on ignore, qu'iI n'y aurait pas desysteme mondial de securite collective. Les demo­craties parlementaires se sont done vues dansl'obligation d'elaborer un plan de derensecommun. En cela, elIes s'occupent de Ieurspropres affaires, car chaque Gouvernement al'obligation absolue de derendre le peuple qu'ilveut representer.

Les obligations qu'assume le Gouvernementdu Royaume-Uni depassent de loin le cadre duterritoire metropolitain. En fait, si l'on compare

The history of the Atomic Energy Commission~

of the Commission on Conventional Armamentsand of the Military Staff Committee, as Mr.McNeil had sought to show in the First Commit­tee by detailed examination, led to the unfor­tunate conclusion that the policy of the USSRGcvernment had made it impossible for anyState to mind its own business on an interna­tional scale. For the present, that Governmenthad, for reascns not disclosed, detex-mined thatthere would be no system of world collectivesecurity. In consequence, therefore, the par­liamentary democracies had been forced to de­velop a system of collective defence. In thatfashion, they were minding their own business,for every Government had an over-riding obliga­tion to defend the people it sought to rep~esent.

In reply to a question he had put to Mr. Vy­shinsky, the latter had told him to mind hisown business. He had a perfectly legal rightto do so, but he would also have to recognizethat J! preoccupation with narrow, national inter­ests was hardly a good basis for internationalco-operation, nor would it contribute to thebuilding of the mutual confidence that was acoincidental, if not a preliminary, factor in re­spect of disarmament.

The United Kingdom Government had obli­gations extending far beyond its metropolitanterritory. In fact, the population of the United

The figures of British armed forces and arma­ments wer€,' known and would continue to beknown; those of the USSR were not, nor wasthere any indication that they were likely to bemade known. By their action, the parliamen­tary democracies did not, it was true, deceivethose who were not their friends. It was alsotrue that they did not deceive their own people.By just the same tp-ken, the General Assemblywould decide who was in earnest in their effortsfor disarmament and who zealously concealedthe degree of their own mobilization.

162nd plenary meetins

differences between the two countries werebeing constantly emphasized al1d even exaggera­ted. Generalissimo Stalin himself had recentIyaccused what he called the ruling circles in theUnited Kingdom of warmongering, and unuerwhat was suspected of being close direction fromMoscow, communist attacks were being made onnational institutions and internal politics. Inthose circumstances there was no alternative but torepair some of the weaknesses in the defenceswhich, but a short time ago, it was believed hiscountry would not be called upon to use.

I

l I

162' seance pleniere

la population du Royaume-Uni, augmentee dela population des territoires d'outre-mer relevantde ce pays, a celle de i'URSS, on constate que leRoyaume-Uni auralt le droit d'entretenir uneforce armee aussi importante que celle de i'URSS.Les projets du Royaume-Uni sont beaucoupmoins vastes que ceux de i'URSS, mais, ens'occupant de ses affai1.'es, c'est-a-dire en prepa­rant la derense contre l'agression, le Royaume­Uni a coopere avec ses allies traditionnels, lespeuples des democraties parlementaires. Cetteassociation n'est pas exclusive, on l'a nettementmontre; mais e'est un groupement d'hommes etde femmes qui n'a aucunement besoin qu'onr excuse. L'histoire montrera que les pays demo­cratiques ont sans honte recherche la pan, carils n'ont pas de desseins agressifs.

M. McNeil ne cherche pas a pretendre devantr AssembIee que les democraties parlemen­taires desarment; bien au contraire. 11 ne leurreste d'autre possibilite que de continuer a serearmer moderement en se justifiant puhli­quement. Si cette mesure, comme elles l'esperentsincerement, modifir; la situation de maniere qu'ildevienne possible de proceder a un desarme­ment dans des"conditions justes et satisfaisantes,les Puissances occidentales entreprendront cettetache sur une ba.se equitable. Toutefois, eUessont pr~tes, pour prouver leurs intentions,a apFliquer les dispositions envisagees dans laresolution de la Premiere Commission en vued'aboutir a un arrangement efficaee et appro­prie en ce qui coneerne la reglementationdes armements. Lel representant du Royaume­Uni ne voit pas pourquoi rURSS s'abstL:.1draitde cooperer a cette premiere mesure, si se~1 protestations de paix sont sineeres. ~omme M. M\cNeill'a deja souligne, e'est un molt€ste debut, maisqui n'en est pas moins un effort honn~te envue de la solution de cette question complexeet delicate du desarmement, qui pourrait, enverite, comme I'a fait ohserver le representantdes Etats-Unis, permettre a l'Assemblee gene­rale de prendre l'annee suivante une mesureplus hardie.

C'est essentiellement pour cette raison ~ue ladelegation du Royaume-Uni appuie le proJet deresolution de la Premiere Commission en espe­rant que I'AssembIee generale saura l'adopterunanimement.

M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Repuhliques soeia­listes sovietiques) declare que I'AssembIee est entrain d'examiner une question d'une portee etd'une importance historique considerables, ques­tion soulevee par la delegation de I'URSS.

11 est presque inutile, pour le moment, d'exa-.miner en detailles raisons de l'echee des travauxentrepris par la Commission de l'energie ato­mique et par la Commission dite des armements

fS27

It was primarily for that reason that his dele­gation supported the First Committee's draftresolution and hop~d that the General Assemblywould find it possible to endorse it unanimously.

19 novembre 1948

Kingdom, together with those of the dependentterritories overseas, as compared with the popu­lation of the USSR, should entitle it to maintainalmost as large a force as the Soviet Union. Itsplans, however, were much less grandiose, butIII attending to its business - the business ofdefent'e against aggression - it had eo-operatedwith its traditional. allies, the peoples of theparliamentary democracieb. It was not an exclu­sive association; that fact had heen made clear,but it was a company of men and women forwbom none needed to apologize. History wouldno(.e that, having no aggressive designs, theysought peace unashamedly.

. Mr:VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­IIcs) said that the Assembly was discussing a9uestion of tremendouf:, significance and histor­Ical importance, which had been raised by theUSSR delegation.

There was hardly any need to consider indetail at preeent the reasons for the collapse ofthe work of both t.c.a Atomic Energy Commissionand of the so-called COfunission for Conven-

For those reasons, Mr. McNeil could not pre­tend to the Assembly, nor would he seek to doso, that the parliamentary democracies weredisarming. On the contrary, they ha.d no choicebut to continue their moderate and publiclyexplained re-arma.llent. By those means, if, asthey sincerely hopt rI, circumstances chauged topermit of satisfactory and equitable disarma­ment, the Western Powers would start the pro­cess from a fair basis. Nevertheless, as proof oftheir intentions, they were ready to take thesteps, envisaged in the First Committee's reso­lution to secure a proper and effective arrange­ment for the regulation of armaments. In hisopinion, there was no reason why the USSRshould not eo-operate in that first step, if itwere sincere in its peaceful protestations. Ashad been pointed out before, the step was asmall one, but however limited in dimension, itwas an honest move in the complex and difficultbusiness of disarmament. It might, indeed, asthe United States representative had said, allowthe General Assembly to take a much more ambi­tious step the following year.

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19 November 194Id~"!

de type classique qui ont ete invitees aelaborepet Et presenter Et l'Assemblee generale des propo..sitions appropriees. Le probleme a ete longue-.ment etudie Et propos du premier point de l'ordl'edu jour de la Premiere Commission.

La deMgation de l'Union sovietique estimeque sen devoir est de reveler les activites aux­quelles on se livre dans les couloits de l'Organi­sation (~t dans maints autres endroits, comme lesMinisteres delaguerre du Royaume-Uni, des Etats­Unis et d'autres pays, qui s'app.liquent, sansrelache, Et preparer la guerre contre I'URSS et lesnouvelles democraties de I'Europe orientale.

Au debut de la session actueUe de l'AssembIee(143° I'seance pIeniere), la delegation de I'Unionsovietique a declare que les millions d'hommesde la rue qui ont paye de leur sang les. crime~ deschefs fascistes responsables de la deuxlemeguerre mondiale ne veulent pas laisser, et nelaisseront paG eclater une nouvelle guerre mon"diale qui ferait suhir Et l'humaniM des souffrancesatroees.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement de I'URSS apropose (A/658) d'interdire les armes ato­miques et de reduire d'un tiers les armements ~tles forces armees des cinq grandes Puissances. Laraison fondamentale en est qu'une telle reductionsatisfait aux conditions indispensables du ret~..hlissement d'une paix solideetdul'enfo!cementdede la securite internationale, ainsi qu'aux inter~tsdes peuples qui veulent ~tre liheres du loa.:rdfardeau economique que font peser sur eux le!

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For those reasons, the Government of theUSSR had submitted its proposal (A/658) forthe prohibition of atomic weapons and thereduction by one-third of the armaments andarmed forces of the five great Powers. Itsfundamental consideration was that such a re l '1uc­tion met the necessary requirements for theestablishment of a solid peace 9.11d for strength­ening international security, and also that it wasin the jntp're~t of the people~ who wanted to be

land plenary meeting

tional Armaments which had been asked towork out and submit to the General Assemblyappropriate proposals on that question. ThesubJect had heen discuss(,d at length in connexionwith the first item on the agenda of the FirstCommittee.

Nevertheless, some delegations, particularly, Quelques delegations, et notamment celles desthose of the United States and the United King- Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni, ont neanmoinsdom, had again outlined their objections to the repete les objections qu'elles avaient formuleesSoviet Union proposals. Mr. McNeil had just contre les propositions de I'Union sovietique.said that he could not understand how the USSR M. McNeil vient de declarer qu'il ne comprenaitcould have presented proposals which were so pas comment I'URSS a pu presenter des propo-utterly unrealistic, particularly in present cir- sitions tenant aussi peu compte des realites,cumstances when no reduction of armaments alors que les circonstances actueUes ne permet-could ,~ven he envisaged. For that reason, the tent m~me pas d'envisager une reduction desSoviet Union delegation felt it was essential to armements. Aussi la delegation de I'Union sovic-reiterate the motives which had prompted the tique estime-t-elle qu'il est indispensable d'expo-ussn Government to submit its proposals.. ser Et nouveau les motifs qui ont pousse le Gou­

vernement de l'URSS_ositions.The Sovicl ~niO~ delegation had already La delegation de IGIniQ~ti.~ a deja

drawn attentIOn 0 e frenzied and ever-quick- signale que les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et unening armaments race taking place in the United certain nombre d'autres pays du bloc anglo-States, the United Kingdom and a number of americain sont lances dans une course frenetiqueother countries which were members of the aux armements, chaque jour plus accentuee.Anglo-American hloc. It had also drawn atten- Elle a egalement fait remarquer la psychose detion to the war psychosis raging in those coun- guerre qui sevit dans ces pays. Elle a montre la

, tries. It had pointed out the growing mobiliza- mobilisation croissante de~ forces de la reactiontion of the forces of reaction which were not qui ne se flent plus Et leur avenir et excitentsure of the future and which were working up cyniquement l'opinion puhlique, en suscitant lapublic opinion' in utterly unbridled fashion, haine contra l'URSS et en poussant Et la g~erre.

mciting hatred against the USSR and indulging .in warmongering.

The Soviet Union delegation believed it wasits duty to reveal the activities going on behindthe I1cene~ iJi the United Nations and in manyother places, such as the war ministries of theUnited Kingdom, the United States and othercountries which were working unceasingly toprepare war against the USSR and the countriesof the new democracy in Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the present session (143rdplenary meeting), the Soviet Union d"5Iegationhad pointed out that milliOIll' of ordinary humanbeings, who had paid with their blood for thecrimes of the fascist organizers of the SecondWorld War, did not want to allow, and indeedwould not allow, a new world war which wouldbring frightful suffering upon mankind.

I~ I

C'est.la une fort noble cause, et, en depit desdifficultes de tout ordre, il ne faut epargneraucun effort pour resoudre le problemeaussirapidemcnt et aussi totalement que possible.

La premiere etape serait de reduire d'un tierspendant une annee toutes les forces armees descinq grandes Puissances. Cette mesure impor­tante comporterait egalement l'interdiction desarmes atomiques, sans laquelle il serait impos­sib!e de parvenir a aucun resultat dans ce do­maIne.

IJe Gouvernement de l'URSS insiste avec laderniere energie pour que les questions de lared.uction des armements et des forces armees etde l'interdiction des armes atomiques soientexaminees et resolues sirmdtanement comme unseul et m~me probleme.

Or, le projet de resolution soumis par les Etats­Unis, le Royaume-Uni et par plusieurs autrespays qui appuient d'habitud e les propositionsde ces deux pays, ne mentionne m~me pas la ques­tion de l'interdiction des armes atomiques,question fondamentale de toute premiere impor­tance.

Ce projet de resolution presente par la majo­rite de la Premiere Commission se contente d'in­diquer que l'on ne pourra proceder aune reduc­tion des armements et des forces armees que si latension internationale s'apaise, ce qui implique,comme le declare le pl'ojet de resolution, lacreation etl'application d~un systeme de contrt»lede l'anergie atomique comportant l'interdictiondes armes atomiques. Ne pouvant s'opposer ouver­tement al'interdiction des armes atomiques touten n'etant pas disposees adeclarer ouvertementqu'eUes acceptent cette interdiction, puisquec'est faux, ces delegations ont decide de redigerun texte vague, qui dissimule leurs veritahlesintentions et qui dedare que le projet de resolu­tion «implique notamment la mise en reuvre ducontr6le de l'energie atomique comportant l'in­terdiction de l'arme atomique ».

Si la resolution recommande l'interdiction del'arme atomique, pourquoi ne pas le declarernettement et ouvertement; les peuples dumonde sauront ainsi a quoi s'en tenir, la decla­ration sera enregistree, la confiance indispen­sable sera retahlie, ou tout au moins il seta.possible de prendre des mesures acet eltet.

Au lieu de se proclamer ouvertement enfaveur de l'interdiction de l'arme atomi~ue,

ces delegations declarent craintivement et tuni­dement que la resolution implique cette inter­diction. Or le projet de resolution ne contientrien de tel, bien au contraire. La question est

34

1621 seance pleniere

budgets militaires excessifs et sans cesse crois­sants de certains pays.

The draft resoiution suhmj,tted by the major­ity of the First Committee confined itself toindicating that the reduction of armaments andarmed forces could only be achieved if the pre­sent international tension were relieved, which,as the draft resolution said, entailed the estab­lishment and implementation of control ofatomic energy, involving the prohibition ofatomic weapons. Consequently, heing unahle tostate openly that they objected to the prohihitionof atomic weapons but heing at the same timeunwilling to state directly that they agreed tosuch a prohibition - because they' did not ­those delegations chose the following vaguewording to camouflage their true intentions :they stated that the draft resolution «implies inparticular the application of control of atomicanarer involving the prohibition of the atomicweapon. "

H the resolution implied the prohibition ofthe atomic bomb, why not say so openly andclearly so that 1he peoples of the world mightknow all ahout it so that the statement shouldbe on record, and so that the essential a,tmos­~here of confidence could he created, or ateast that steps could be taken in that direction?. Instead of openly proclaiming that they wereIn f~vour of the prohibition of the atomic~e~pon, those delegations ~tated bashfully &ndt~ldly that the resolution implied such a prohi­1it~on. He ventured to say that the draft reso­utlon implied nothing of the sort - far from

However, the draft resolution submitted by theUnited States, the United Kingdom and severalother countries which usually supported theirproposals, did not even touch upon the prohibi­tion of atomic weapons - that most importantand fundamental question.

19 novemh~e 1948

relieved of the heavy economic burden placedupon their shoulders by the excessive and ever­growin.g expenditure for armaments in variouscountrIes.

That was a great cause, indeed, and. regardlessof all difficulties, no effort should be spared tohave the problem solved as rapidly and as com­pletely as possible.

Areduction by cne-third of aU present armedforces of the five gr.'eat Powers within one yearwould he the first. step towards solving theproblem. That important measure would. alsoinclude the prohibition of atomic weapons with­out which no positive result could be achievedin that field.

The USSR Government stressed most stronglythat the two problems of reduction of armamentsand armed forces and prohibition of atomicweapons should be considered and solved simul­taneously as an organic entity.

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19 November 1941

trop importante pour ~tre presentee en tCl'lDlllvagues. C'est la le defaut fondamental de laresolution, qui devient ainsi inacceptahle pourtous ceux qui veulent vraiment voir cette terriblearme d'agression effectivement mise hors la loi,hannie, et eliminee des armements nationaux.

Une telle resolution est retrograde par rapportaux resolutions 1 (I) et 41 (I) de I'Assembleegenerale. Apres une si longue periode, l'Assem..bIee ne peut se cnntenter d'une phrase depourvuede sens qui laisse entendre que la resolutionimpliqueen principe le recours a l'interdictionde 1'arme atomique et al'applieation du systemedu contr61e de l'energie atomique pour arruHior6l'les relations internationales. L'AssembIee peut..elle se horner it cette declaration, au lieu d'adop­ter des mesures efficaces en vue de l'interdictionde rarme atomiqueY L'adoption de telles me..sures contribuerait vraimen.t, dans une largemesure, it dissiper la mefiance et les souPQo~~,

et ainsi a fail'e renaUre la confiance dans lemonde et a ameliorer les relations internatio..nales. On peut eYidemment repondre que laquestion de l'interdiction de l'arme atomiquea deja ete etudiee comme premier point del'ordre du jour de l'Assemblee gem3rale, en rela..tion avec le rapport de la Commission de l'ener·gie atomique, et que l'on s'est prononce, commeil convient, sur la politique a suivre uiterieu·'rement dans ce domaine.

Cependant, la resolution (A/690) adopteepar l'AssembIee generale au cours de sa 157'seance pIeniere ne contient aucune propositionconcrete et pratique en vue de l'interdictiou del'arme atomique. Elle .ramene toute la questionit une consultation entre ses six promoteurs, envue de determiner s'il existe une hase d'accordpermettant de soumettre l'energ{e atomique auncontr61e international et d'eliminer l'arme ato~

mique des armements des Etats Membres.

Cette resolution est inutile si on la compareaux resolutions 1 (I) et 41 (I) qui~ elIes, ~vaie~treellement un sens, car eUes ImposaIent. a1'0rganisation des Nations Unies ou ala Co~s~sion Je l'energie atomique l'obligation de roed~gerdes propasitions concretes visant a e~lllerrarme atomique des armements natlOnanx.Elle represente une concession aux forcesreactionnaires qui considerent la homb.e at~·'mique comme leur derniere chance de mamteIllrleur influence clans le monde. Hest etrange,par consequent, de voir certains representantss'efforeer de prDuver que la resolution pr~senteepar la Premiere Commission, c'est-a-dlre ccqu'on appelle le projet de resolution de la Bel­gique, constitue un pas en avant et represent~ lemaximum de ce que l'on peut realiser it l'hem:e

aiJtuelle, en d'autres termes, que I'on ne sauratt

16200 plenary meeting 530

it. The question was too important for a.nyvague phraseology. That was the fundamentaldefect of the resolution; a defect which made itunacceptable to all those who sincerely wantedthat frightful weapon of aggression to he effec­tively outlawed, banned and removed fromnationalarmamenw.

Such a resolution would be a step backwardwhen oompared to resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I)of the Genera! Assembly. The Assembly couldnot after all that time confine itself to, and becontent with, a meaningless sentence .to iheeffect that the resolution implied in principle theprohibitic,ll of the atomic weapon and the appli­cation of the control of atomic energy as ameasure for improving international relations.Could the Assembly rest content with that state­ment instead of adopting effective measures forthe prohibition of the atomic weapon whichwould, indeed, be a most important factor inremoving mutual suspicion and mistrust which,if the resolution were adopted, would he replacedhy international confidence and improved inter­national relations. Of course, some could retortthat the prohibition of the atomic weapon hadalready been considered as the first item of theGeneral Assembly's agenda, in connexion withthe report of the Atomic Energy Commission,and that appropriate decisions had heen adoptedindicating the future direction of action in thatfield. .

However, the resolution (A/690, A/690/Corr. 1) adopted hy the General Assembly at its157th plenary meeting on 4 November 1948did not include any concrete, .practical proposalfor th~ prohibition of the atomic weapon. Itconfined the whole question to some consulta­tion hy the six sponsoring Powers as to whetherthere existed a basis for agreement on interna­tional control of atomic energy and for theremol-a! of the atomic weapon from the armamentsof Member States.

That resolution was useless when compared tothe resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) which, indend,..vere significant for they placed the UnitedNations, or the Atomic Energy Commission,under the obligation to draw up concrete pro­posals for the remoyal of the atomic weapon fromnational armaments. It was a concession tothose forces of reaction which regarded theatomic homb as their last hope for maintainingtheir influence throughout the world. It wasstrange, therefore, to see some representativesattempting to proye that the resolution sub­mitted by the First Committee, namely, the SG­

called Belgian draft resolution, was a step for­ward and represented the maximum of whatcould be done at present, in other words, thatit was the greatest possible achievement andthe greatest possible consummation of the efforts

il I

There was a deliberate confusion between theprocedure for the solution of questions in theeontrol agency and the procedure for the settle..ment of problems arising hefore the SecurityCouncil. The principle of unanimity did notarise in the former case and the Soviet Unionhad never raised it. In the Security Council,

•I ,

Those allegations were without any founda­tion whatever. In the opinion of the USSRdelegation, international control and inspectionwere of very great importance, as had alreadyheen stressed hy Generalissimo Stalin in hisconversation with Mr. Harold Stassen in April1947 and with the President of the UnitedPress agenc.y. The attitude of the Soviet Unionregarding that question should he clear to everyunbiased and objective person. However, theinternational control advocated by the UnitedStates, which alleged that theirs was the only justand equitable form of contrel, did not meet theneeds of effective international control. Theform of control contemplated by Messrs, Baruch,Acheson and Lilienthal was utterly unaccept­able. Responsible United States leaders hadalleged in that connexion that the USSR hadrejected the plan hecause it endangered nationalscvereignty. They also alleged that in the opin­ion of most countries the right of veto shouldnot he recognized in the control agency, whilethe Soviet Union maintained the contrary. TheUSSR had made it abundantly clear, however,that the right of veto could not possibly apply in~he control agency and had never pressed forIts application to that body.

9 Dovembre 1948 53! 162- sea.ce pladere

made to implement the resolutions of 24 January faire miem pour mettre en application les resolu-and 14 December 194ft tions des 24 janvier et 14 deeemhre 19lt6.

Both the resolution of4 November and the Ni dans la resolution du 4 novembre, ni dansone hefore the Assembly ignored practical and celle dont l'AssemhIee est saisic actuellement,declive measures for the implementation of the il n'est question de mesures pratiques et effi-decisions already -debated and adopted hy the caces qui permettraient de mettre en applicationGeneral Assembly in 1946. They had been les decisions deja debattues et adoptees parintroduced merely to side-track the question and I'AssemhIee generale en 1946. On ne les ato create a suitable smokescreen. presentees que pour reIeguer la question au

... second plan et pour creer en quelque sorte un..' ecran de fmnee.

The USSR proposed an international control L'URSS, par contre, propose une orgarisationorganization in accordance with the United internationale de contr6le conforme ala CharteNations Charter. The question had already heen des Nations Unies. La qu~stion a deja ete soule--

.raised in various bodies of the General Assembly vee devant divers organes de I'AssembIee gene-and in the Assembly itself. It could not he raIe et aI'Assemhlee elle-m~me. On ne saurait,passed over in silence, however, as a num.~r of toutefois, eviter d'y revenir, car un cer\Wnrepresentatives had alleged that it was the nombre de representants ont pretendu q'1leSoviet Union which opposed the control and, c'etait I'Union sovietique qui s'opposait. auwhich adopted such an uncooperative attitude contr6le, qui etait hostile cl toute collaborationand refused to conclude an international agree- et qui refusait son concours a un accord intel'-ment for the control of the atomic weapon. national destine a organiser le contr6le de

l'arme atomique.Or, les allegations de ces representants sont

denuees de tout fondement. De l'avis de la dele­gation de l'URSS, le contr6Ie et rinspection al'echello internationale sont d'une importanoecapitale, comme l'a deja souligne le marichalStaline au cours de conversations qu'il a eups avecM. Harold Stassen en avril1947 et avec le presi­dent de la United Preu. L'attitude de l'Unionsovietique en la matiere devrait sauter aux yenxde toute personne jugeant objectivement et sansparti prise Toutefois, la forme. de contrMeinternational que demandent les Etats-Unis, etqu'ils presentent comme la seule forme equi..table, ne repond pas aux necessites dtUB con­tr61e international efficace. La forme de contr6lequ'envisagent MM. Baruch, Acheson et Lilien­thal est ahsolument in~cceptahlc. Des person..nalites diTigeantes des Etats-Unis ont pretendu,a ce propos, que, si rURSS a repou8se oe plan,c'est parce qu'il portait atteinte au principede la souverainete nationale. lis soutiennentegalement que, de l'avis de la plupart des pays,le droit de veto ne doit pas ~tre raconnu au seinde l'organisme de contr6le, alors qu'a les encroire, l'Union sovietique soutiendrait le con..traire. Or, rURSS a laisse entendre clairement,a maintes reprises, que le droit de veto etaitinadmissihle au sein de rorganisme de contr6le;elle n'a jamais insiste pour qu'il ffit reconnuaux membres de cet organisme.

C'est de propos delihere que l'on cowond lapl'ocedure de reglement des questions parl'organismc de contr61e avec la proced.ure pourla solution des problemes qui se posent auConseil de steurite~ Dans le premier cas, leprincipe de J'unanimiM n'a pas a intervenir etrUnion sovietique n'a jamais songe al'invoquer.

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In such circumstances, the majority of the.control ag~ncy would be completely at liberty toact according to its own free will without consid­ering either the interests or tb43 security ofother States. The USSR had proposed, there­fore, that international control should be hasedon another principle. The Soviet Union pro­posals related to the extraction of raw materialsand the production of atomic energy, and hadbeen submitted to the Commission on 11 June1947, and subsequently published in the ThirdReport of the Atomic Energy Commission.~hey had been rejected, however, by the

Umted States and the United Kingdom and hadbeen systematically rejected ever since. Thewhole policy of the United States was to concen­trate control on the extraction of atomic rawI?aterials and to delay control of the produc­~10n of all atomic products for as long as poss­ible.

According to Professor Oppenheimer, a mem­ber of the hoard of consultants to the UnitedStates Department of State, and on6' of thegreatest eocperts in the field of atomic research,the atomic weapon remained a weapon of aggres­sion, and elements of surprise and terror wereas intrinsic to it as were the fissionable nuclei.That statement threw light on the suspiciouscharacter of the United States atomic policy.The United States plan for transferring the

"'-t ..

16Bnd plenary meeting 1532 19 November 1:

however, the principle of unanimity of the per- Au ConseiI de securite, par contre, le principe~f i

manent members of the Council should in l'unanimite des membres permanents du Conseila~cordance with the Charter, apply to all ques- doit, conformement a la Charte, s'appliquer atuins of substance. For that reason the USSR toutes les questions de fond. C'est pour cettehad defended, was defending and would defend raison que I'URSS a defendu, defend et defendrathat principle, for without it there would be no ce principe, car sans lui I'Organisation desUnited Nations at all. Nations Unies n'existerait pas. .

Mr. Vyshinsky believed that the United States De l'avis de M. Vychinsky, le plan de contr6leplan of international control jeopardized the international presente par les Etats-Unis menacefundamental sovereignty of other States. That lea fondements m~mes de la souveraineteplan, which was based on the so-called Baruch- d'autres Etats. Ce plan, fonde sur ce qu'onAcheson-L~enthal proposals, with its principle appelle les propositions Baruch-Acheson-Lilien..of progressIve stages of control, was 'utterly un- thal, avec son principe de contr61e par stades,aoceptable because any system of control built est ahsolument inacceptahle, car tout systeme

.,;. u.pon that principle opened the door to abuses de contr61e qui serait edifie sur ce principeby the control agency whose super-authority donnerait lieu ades ahus de la part de I'orga-..and super-prerogatives under the United States msme de contrble; en e1£et, l'autorite et lep,plan ~ould by far excee~' the authority and pre- prerogatives exagerees que lui confiH.ie le planro,~tlves. of .any sovereIgn State. An eminent des E,tats-Unis depasseraient de loin ceDes deBritIsh SCIentIst, Professor Blackett, had published n'importe quel Etat souverain. Un eminenta hook, Military and Political Consequences of savant britannique, le professeur Blackett, aAtomic Energy, criticizing the Baruch Plan, puhlie un livre : Military and Po litical Come-with its ~ystem ~f control by stages, as it would quences of Atomic £nercy, dans lequel iI critique~ut the mternatlOnal control agency in a posi- le plan Baruch et son systeme de contr61e partIOn to state that some countries had failed to stades, car si ce systeme etait applique, l'orga..com~ly wi~h their obligations regarding the msme international de contrMe pou'frait declarer,preVIOU& ~tage of the control plan, and then par exemple, que certains pays ne se sont pasdecide against proceeding to the next stage of acquittes de leurs obligations aun ~ertain stadecontrol. du plan de contr6le, et decider de ne pas passer

au stade suivant.Dans ces conditions, la majorite de l'organisme

de contrMe serait entierement fihre d'agir it saguise, et ne tiendrait comp.te ni des interAtsni de la securite d'autres Etats. C'est pourquoil'URSS a propose de fonder le contrMe inter­national sur un autre principe. Les propositionsde I'Union sovietique se rapportent al'extractiondes matieres premieres et a la production dpl'energie atomique; elles ont ete presentees ala Commission le 11 juin 1947 et puhlieesensmte dans le troisieme rapport de la Commis­sion de l'energie atomique.

Elles ont toutefois ete repOU!l sees par lesEtats-Unis et le F.toyaume-Uni et, depuis lors,on u'a cesse de les repousser systematiquement.Toute la politique des Etats-Unis eonsiste afaire porter le contrMe sur I'extraction desmatieres premieres atomiques et a differer ,leplus longtemps possible le. contrMe de la pro­duction de tous les produits atomiques.

Selon le professeur Oppenhei~er, m~rF!'e du ,conseil d'experts du Departement d Etat desEtats-Unis, qui est l'un des plus grands expertsdans le domaine de la recherche atonuque,l'arme atomique demeure une arme d'agressionet les elements de surprise et de terreur en restentdes caracteristiques aussi evidentes qu~ ~afission du noyau. Cette declaration fait ress0rbrle caractere suspect de la politique me.nee e~les Etats...Unis en mati.e,e d'energie atoDl1qtle.L~

~III!I

ILI

Those were the main defects of the Baruch­~cheso~-Lilienthal proposals, and several meet­mgs nught be needed to review them all.

Professor Blackett had come to the conclusionthat the plan jeopardized any development ofatomic industry even for the most peaceful pur­p~8es. Any development of atomic industryWIthout the permission of the majority of theco~trol agency would be regarded under theUmied States plan as an international felony.By ~ejeeting the principle of unanimity i" con­neXlOn with the punishment of any would-be

Furthermore, the United States plan for theorganization of an international control agencyprovided for the distribution of atomic energystations on the basis of strategic considerationsand not in accordance with the interests of theeconomic development of any country. Theassumption that atomic energy resources wouldhe fairly distributed by a disinterested andunbiased international body was an illusion.Professor Blackett had pointed out. that thedifferences in the distribution of natural resour­ees, in the degree of industrialization and inthe standard ,)f living of various countriesmade it impossible to speak of any fair distri­hution by the so-called unbiased and disinter­ested international control organs.

Indeed, many features of the Baruch-Acheson­Lilienthal proposals aroused doubts regardingthe seriousness of their authors' intentions toreach aty agreement on the establishment ofany international control agency. They werebased upon the assumption that the internation­al hody for the conh'ol of atomic energy wouldhe run by administrators completely free of anyinfluence or pressure flom their governments.That was illusory. Professor Blackett believedthat they would be the tools of the economicand political policies of their governments.

19 novembre 1948 533 1628 seance pleniere

rights of ownership over the production of plan des Etats-Unis visant a transferer a rorga-atomic war materials and atomic research to the nisme international de contrMe les droits deinternational control agency had been met with propriete relatiis a la production des matieresmuch critical comment all over the world. There premieres atomiques et ala recherche atomiquehad even heen direct accusations by United a fait I'objet de nombreuses critiques dans leStates representatives that in advancing the plan monde entier. Des representants des Etats-Unisof control in such an unacceptable form, ont m~me accuse directement MM. Baruch,Messrs. Baruch, Acheson and Lilienthal were Acheson et Lilienthal d'agir, en presentant leacting in the interests of a gr(Ulp which in fact plan de contr6le sous cptte forme inacceptable,was opposed to any international control what- dans l'interM d'un groupa qui, en fait, estsoever. Professor Blackett, in his book, con- hostile a tout contrt-Ie international. Dans soneurred with that view and said that support for livre, le professeur Blackett se range a cettethe Baruch Plan might be designed to prevent opinion et declare que cem: qui appuient le Planany control whatever. Baruch cherchent peut-~tre a emp~cher tout

contr6le, quel qu'il soit.En fait, bien des caracteristiques des propo­

sitions Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal font douterque leurs auteurs aient serieusement I'intentiond'aboutir aun accord quelconque sur la creationd'un organisme international de contr6le. Elless{mt en efl'et fondees sur I'hypothes6 que I'orga­nisme internatiOl.l.aI de contr6le de l'energieatomique sera dirige par des administrateursabsolument degages de toute influenc~ et detoute pression de la part de leur Gouvernement.Or, cela est illusoire. Le professeur Blackettestime que ces administrateurs ne seraient que lesinstruments des visees economiques et politiquesde !eur Gouvernement.

D'autre part, le plan des Etats-Unis relatifa la creation d'un organisme internationalde contrMe prevoit, pour les stations d'lmergieatomique, une repartition fond6e sur des consi­derations strategiques et non sur l'inter~t dudeveloppement economique d'un pays quel­conque. Supposer que les ressources en ~nergie

atomique puissent ~tre equitablement repartiespar un organisme international desinteresse etexempt de parti pris, c'est se bercer d'illusions.Le professeur Blackett a fait ressortir queI'inegalite des divers pays quant ala repartitiondes ressources naturelles, au degre d'industria­lisation et au niveau de vie, fait qu'il est impos­sible de concevoil' une repartition tant soit peuequitable par rorganisme international de con­trMe, que l'on pretend de'linteresse, et exemptde parti prist

Tels sont les principaux defauts des proposi­tions BBtl'uch-Acheson-Lilienthal ; il faudrait peut­~tre plusieurs seances pour les passer tous enrevue.

Le professeur Blackett a abouti ala conclusion~ue ce plan entraverait tout developpement de1industrie atomique, m~me am: fins les pluspacifiques. Tout developpement de l'industrieatomique sans la permission du bloc detenant lamajoriM au sein de l'organisme de contrt-le seraitconsidere, aux termes dv plan des Etats-Unis,comme un crime internationd. En rejetant leprincipe de l'unanimite en ce qui concerns le

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162nd plenary meeting

transffressors, the Baruch Plan would createa situation whereby any violation, whether trueor fictitious, might be used by the majority tounleash a third world war.

The United States control plan was incompat­ible with the fundamental principles and pur­poses which should be pursued by any possibleinternational control agency. It was clear thatit neither could nor would be accepted by theUSSR and a number of other States whichstrove to achieve real prohibition of the utili­zation of atomic energy for purposes of warand effective prohibition of the atomic weapon.

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19 NoveDlher 1948

chfitimeut de tous les cOlltrevenants eventuelsle plan Baruch creerait un etat de choses teique le bloc majoritaire pourrait prendre pretextede toute violation, reelle ou fictive, pour dechai­ner une troisieme guerre ffi9ndiale.

Le plan de coutr61e des Etats-Unis est incom­patible avec les principes et les buts fondamentaurque devrait poursuivre tout organisme inter­national de contr61e. II est evident qu'il nepeut ~tre, ni ne sera, accepte par l'URSS, nonplus ~uc par un certain nornbre d'autres Etats,qui s e.,orcent d'aboutir a l'interdiction reeilede l'emploi de l'energie atomique it des fins deguerre et a l'interdiction effective de rarmeatomique.

Le pretendu contr61e international mettrait,non seulement l'industrie de l'energie atomique,mais encore toute l'ecollomip nationale d'unEtat quelconque a la merci des decisions arbi­traires du pretenc1u organisme international decontrMe, ou le bloc rnajoritaire aurait toujoursla faculte de faire pression sur la vie economiqued'un pays quelconque. Une telle tendance nepeut Atre consideree que comme une attpinte auprincipe do la souverainete nationale. Ce n'estpas par pure coincidence que les promoteurs dece plan proclament ouvertement, ainsi que l'afait M. Spaak, que l'idee de la souverainetenationale est un concept l'etardataire et reac­tionnaire et qu'il faut I'extil'per au plus t6t.

La derniere invention dans ce domaine est laproposition du cornte Sforza, ministre desAffaires etrangeres d'Italip , qui a invite les paysd'Europe arenoncer en partie aleur souverainetePOUl' creer des Etats-Unis d'Europe occidentaleou une sorte d'association internationale desouverainetes nationales. Cette proposition estsi ridicule qu'eHe se passe de commentaires.La raison qui motive toutes Cl'S propositions estque la souverainete nationale est l'obstacleprincipal qui s'oppose a la mise en applicationdu plan presente par les Etats-Unis. D'ou. lacampagne contro la souvorainete nationale, qui acommence a la deuxieme session de l'Assemblecgenerale et se poursuit encore al'heure actuelle.II importe de souligller qu'une telle campagne n'aaucune chance de l'eussir.

On peut definir les buts poursuivis par le plandes Etats-Uuis si l'on se refere aux declarationsfaites devant une commission du Slmat desEtats-Unis par M. Charles A. 'l'homas, un desvice-presidents et directeurs de la MonsantoChemical Company, qui a parM des propositionsBaruch-Acheson-Lilienthal apropos du plan decontr61e international. Ses paroles ont deja etecitees par M. Katz-Suchy, representant de laPologne, ala 1ltoo seance de la Premiere Com­mission, mais eUes meritent d'Atre rappelBes.Il a declare a la, commission du Senat que, selonle projet des Etats-Unis, toutes les resqources

534

The aims pursued by the United States plancould be gathered from the statements madebefore a committee of the United States Senateby Mr. Charles A. Thomas, a vice-presidentand director of the Monsanto Chemical Company,who spoke on the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthalproposals in connexion with the internationalcontrol plan. He had already been quotedhy the Polish representative, Mr. Katz-Suchy,at the 1lt6th meeting of the First Committeehut his words had to be recalled once more.He had told that Senate committee that (( accord­ing to our project we will have all the Russian

The so-called international control would placenot only the atomic energy industry but thewhole national economy of any State at the mercyof the arbitrary decisions of the so-called inter­national control agency where the majority wouldalways have the opportunity of bringing pres­sure to bear upon the economic life of any coun­try. Such a tendency could not be regardedas anything else than a threat to national sove­reignty. It was no coincidence that the cham­pions of that plan were openly proclaiming, ashad been done by Mr. Spaak, that nationalsovereignty was a backward and reactionarynotion and that it should be eradicated as soonas possible.

The latest invention in that field was the pro­posal of the Italian Foreign Minister, CountSforza, who had called upon European coun­tries, in particular, to waive part of their sove­reignty to create a United States of WesternEurope, or some sort of international poolof national sovereignties. The proposal wasso ludicrous that it needed no comment. Thereason for an those proposals was that nationalsovereignty was the main obstacle to the imple­mentation of the United States plan. Hencethe campaign against national sovereignty whichhad begun at the second session of the GeneralAssembly and was still going on. It shouldbe pointed out that such a campaign had nochance of success.

19 novemhre 1948

uranium resources at the disposal of the inter­national control agency; in other words, allthe radio-active material all over the world willbe at the disposal of the organization. ~'irst

of all we shall maintain in Russia a group ofgeologists who will prospect the whole territoryof the Soviet Union and who wiU gather infor­mation on uranium deposits n. Replying toSenator McKellar of Tennessee, who had askedhim whether the Lilienthal Report recommen­ded an agreement with the USSR on that point,Mr. Thomas replied, (( Yes, and this must heachieved hefore anything else". In other words,those who subscrihed to such a conventionshould do more than merely sign a document j

they should agree to subject their raw materialresources to geological prospecting and tohand over the basic raw material, namely ura­mum.

It was no coincidence that a number of un­biased and objective persons sounded the alarmwhen analysing the United States plan of so­called international control. Professor Blacketthad written that if the Soviet Union agreedto the United States control plan, the atomicenergy control agency would be able to hinderthe development of atomic energy resources forpeaceful ends, while the Soviet Union neededall the atomic energy it could obtain for peacefuland industrial purposes. He had also pointedout that the USSR would he compelled to revealthe location of its militarv factories and industrieswhich would give the ·United States chiefs ofstaff an opportunity of compiling a complete'map of all military objectives in the SovietUnion. He had also stated that the USSRwould not have sufficient guarantees that theUnited States would destroy its atomic weapons,even if the Soviet Union complied with all therequirements set forth in the plan.

Could the Assembly remain deaf, dumb andblind hefore the aggressive' character of theUnited States plan which was represented as agenerous move?

The USSR had also put forward proposalsfor the establishment of control over atomicenergy to the Atomic Energy Commission morethan eighteen months ago'! The plan, whichwas compatible with the interests of interna­tional security and national sovereignty, providedfor the conclusion of a special convention forthe control of atomic energy including the in­spection of atomic energy enterprises. Thosewho criticized the Soviet Union proposals did

I SOl' Official Records oJ the Atomic Energy Commissionsecond rep'ort to the Security Council, p. 88.

535 162' seance pIeniere

en uranium de l'URSS seraient mises ala dispo­sition de l'organisme de contr61e international,et que, en d'autres termes, toutes les matieresradio-actives du monde entier seraient Et ladisposition de l'organisation. Il a ajoute que,en premier lieu, les Etats-Unis conserveraienten Russie un groupe de geologues qui prospec­terait tout le territoire de l'Union sovietique etreunirait des renseignements sur les gisementsd'uranium. En reponse Et M. McKellar, senateurdn Tennessee, qui lui demandait si le rapportJJilienthal recommandait un ar:cord avec I 'URSSsur ce point, M. Thomas a declare : Cl Dui, etcela doit 8tre realise avant toute chose". Autre­ment dit, ceux qui souscriraient a une telleconvention devraient faire plus que signer sim­plement un document: ils devraient accepter desoumettre leurs ressources en matieres premieresa la prospection geologique et de livrer leurmatiere premiere de base, asavoir l'uranium.

Ce n'est pas par pure coincidence qu'un cer­tain nombre de personnes impartiales ait d.onnel'alerte, apres avoir analyse le plan des Etats­Unis dit cle contrOle international. Le professeurBlackett a ecrit que si l'Union sovietique acceptaitle plan de contrOle des Etats-Unis, l'organismede contr3le de l'energie atomique sel'ait am~med'emp8cher la mise en amvre cles ressourcesd'energie atomique a des fins pacifiqucs, alorsque I'Union sovietique a besoin de toute saproduction d'energie atomique en vue de sonutilisation a des fins industrieHes et paci£ques.Il a egalement signale que l'URSS serait forceede reveler l'emplacem ent de ses usines et de sesindustries de guerre, cc qui fournirait aux chefsd'etat-major des Etats-Unis l'occasion de dresserune carte detaiUee de tous les objectifs militairessur le territoire de l'Union sovietique. Il a ega­lement declare que, m~lDe si rURSS se confor­mait atoutes les exigences clu plan, eHe n'auraitpas de garanties suffisantes sur la destruction,par les Etats-Unis, de leurs armes atomiques.

L'Assemblee peut-elle rester a la fois sourde,IDuette et aveugle devant le caractere agl'essif duplan des Etats-Unis que I'on essaie de faire passerpour une proposition genereuse.

J/URSS, eHe aussi, a soumis des propositionsen vue d'instituer un contr6le de l'energieatomique. Ces propositions ont ete presenteesa la Commission de l'lmergie atomique il y aplus cle dix-huit moist. Ce plan, qui etaitcompatible avec les intel'~ts de la securiteinternationale et de la souverainete nationale,prevoyait la conclusion cl'une convention spe­ciale sur le contr61e de l' energie atomique corn­pronant l'inspection de toutes les entreprises

1 Voir les PrOCB8-lJerbaua: oJliciols do la Commission de l'tfneriU:atomiq«e, deuxieme rapport au Con6tlil de ~ecurite, p. 88.

31r A.

536162ncl plenary meeting

not dare to outline those proposals fully. Theplan laid down that sufficient authority shouldbe conferred upon the international controlagency to enable it to carry out the necessarycontrol.

According to the USSR plan the internationalcontrol agency would have the right to investi­gate the activities of enterprises producingatomic energy and fuel and to control andsupervise the stock-piling of atomic materialand nuclear fuel to ensure that accumulationsof atomic fuel would only be intended for peace­ful purposes. It would also supervise theimplementation of those functions with regardto the technical exploitation of the enterprises,and would have the authority to prescribe therules and regulations of technological controlfor aH those enterprises throughout the world.It would draw up regulations for the produc­tion of atomic energy and nuclear fuel and forthe refinement of atomic raw materials. Itcould investigate any suspected violations ofthe convention for the production of atomicweapons and make recommendations to theSecurity Council. It could also carry out thenecessary measures to prevent the activities ofpossible violators of the convention.

The proposal of the USSR for the organizationof the control agency included measures toprevent the clandestine use of atomic energyby giving the agency the right of access to allpremises wherein atomic materials were pro­duced or stored. It would have the right tomeasure and analyse the raw materials andstockpiles in aH factories. Mr. Vyshinsky statedthat although he could not list in detail aH thepowers which would be conferred on that body,he would request everyone to relinquish anybias he might have had in connexion withthe Soviet Union plan concerning the preroga­tives and obligations of the international controlagency. That control agency had to be effective,thorough-going and strictly international. Itshould also fully respect national sovereigntywhile ensuring the interests of inter.oationalsecurity. The USSR proposal would lead tothe establishment of a genuine internationalcontrol .agency because it removed all obstaclespreventing agreement on that point. It didnot, however, prevent the drawing up of anagre<>ment with regard to the prohibition ofatomic energy for warlike purposes.

Mr. Vyshinsky then turned to considerationof the other proposal which had been submit­ted to the General Assembly by the USSR con­cerning a reduction by one-third of the arma­ments and armed forces of the five great Powers.

19 November 1948

d'exploitatioll de l'energie atomique. Ceux quicritiquent les propositions de l'Union sovietiquen'osent pas souligner ces propositions. Le planspecifiait que l'organisme international de con­tr61e serait pourvu d'une autorite suffisante pourlui permettre d'executer le contr61e necessaire.

Selon le plan de !'URSS, l'organisme inter­national de contr61e aurait le droit d'enqu~ter

sur les activites des entreprises prod uctricesd 'energie et de combustible atomiques, ainsique de contr61er et surveiller le stockage cl ematieres atomiques et de combustible nllcleaire,afin de s'assurer que les accumulations de com­bustible atomique ne soient destinees qu'a desfins pacifiques. Il surveillerait egalement la miseen vigueur des fonctions relatives al'exploitatiolltechnique de ces entreprises et il aurait le pouvoirde prescrire la reglementatioll cl u contr61ptechnologique de toutes ces entreprises dans lemonde entier. n redigerait des reglements surla production d'energie atomique et de combus­tible nuclElflire et sur le raffinage des matierespremieres atomiques. Il pourrait proceder a desenqu~tes sur toutes les violations prtSsumees dela convention sur la production des armes ato­miques et pourrait faire des recoIllmandations auConseil de securite. n poul'l'ait egalementprendre les mesures necessaires en vue d'emp~­cher toute violation de la convention.

La proposition de l'URSS sur l'organisationd'un organisme de contr61e contient des mesuresvisant a interdire l'usage clandestin de l'energieatomique en donnant a cet organisme le droitd'acces a tous les locaux OU les matieres atomiquessont produites ou stockees. n aurait le droit deproceder au pesage et a l'analyse des matierespremieres et des stocks dans toutes les entre­prises. Bien qu'il ne puisse fournir une listedetaillee de tous les pouyoirs qui seraient confe­res a 'cet organisme, M. Vychinsky invite lesrepresentants aabandonner toute idee precon~ue

sur le plan de 1'Union sovietique concernant lesprerogatives et les obligations de l'organisme decontr61e international. Celui-ci devrait M1'estrictement international et d'une efficacitetotale. n devrait aussi respecter pleinement lasouvel'ainete nationale tout en garantissant lesinter~ts de la securite internationale. La propo­sition de 1'URSS concluirait a l'etablissementd 'un veritable organisme international de con­t1'61e parce qu'eHe dissiperait tous les obstaclesemp~chant la conclusion d'un accord sur cepoint. EHe n'exclut pas cependant la redactiond'un accord concernant l'interdiction d'utiliserl'ene1'gie atomique a des buts de guerre.

M. Vychinsky fait ensuite l'examen de 1'aut1'epropositiolJ soumise al'Assemblee generaIe parl'URSS concernant une reduction d'un tiers desarmements et des forces armees des cinq grandesPuissances. A la Premiere Commission, un ce1'-

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tain nombre de delegations, comprenant cellesdu Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique,se 30nt opposees a cette proposition; celle-cia ete mal interpretee et deformee. M. McNei~,

representant du Royaume-Uni> a declare devantla Premiere Commission que I'URSS cherchaita g~ner la conclusion d'un reglement pacifiqueavec rAUemtlgne et m~me 8'y opposait, hienqu'un tel reglement soit rune des conditionsessentieUes necessaires a la creation d'une atmo­sphere de confiance internation.ale. Il est appnruaussit6t que la declaration de M. McNeil n'etaitpas conforme aux faits. Des novembre 1947,ala reunion du Conseil des Ministres des affairesetrangeres tenue a Londres, le Ministre desaff3ires etl'angeres de l'URSS a soumis despropositions visant a la redaction immediate d'untraiM de paix avec l'Allemagne. Or, ces proposi­tions ont eM rejetees par les Miaistres desafl'aires etrangeres des Etats-Unis d'Amerique etdu Royaume-Uni, s()utenus par le Ministre desaffaires etrangeres de France. Cependant, un anplus tard, on informe I'Assemhlee qu'un traitede paix avec l'Allemagne est un facteur importanten vue du retahlissement de la confiance inter­nationale. Dans ces conditions, M. Vychinsky sedemande pourquoi les propositions de son paysont ete rejetees en novemhre 1947 .

M..McNeil a egalement parM de l'inter~t qu'ily aurait ~ regIer le prohleme du traite de paixavec le Japon. Un accord a ete signe entre lesEtats-Unis d'Amerique, le Royaume-Uni etl'Union des Repuhliques socialistes sovietiquesconcernant I'ordre et la procedure de I'elabora­tion d'un traite de paix avec le Japon, accord quidevait ~tre execute parallelement a la redactiond'un traite de paix par le Conseil des Ministresdes affaires etrangeres. Or, les representantsdu Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis d'Ameriqu')et de la France ne tiennent plus compte de cetaccord; Hs veulent maintenant que cette tAchesoit confiee aune conference de paix extraordi­naire et non plus au Conseil des Ministresdes affaires etrangeres. Le Gouvernement del'URSS estime que la mise sur pied d'une confe­rence de pail: extraordinaire serait une violationdes accords enstants. On a dit que cette dernlEu-eobjection etait une tentative de l'Union sovie­tique destinee aemp~cher la mise en reuvre d'unreglement pacificre avec le Japon. M. Vychinskyse demande si c est la un argument bona fide.

Les representants des Etats-Unis d'Ameriqueet du Royaume-Uni ont essaye de prouver queles possihilites de retahlir la C'Jnfiance interna­tionale ont ete sapees par I'unss. Selon eux,c'est I'Union sovietique, et non pas Jes Etats­Unis, qui possede un reseau de bRses et de gar­nisons militaires reparti dans le monde entier.C'est un fait cependant que I'URSS n'a pas etabli

153719 novembre 1948

That proposal had also been opposed in theFirst Committee by a number of delegationsincluding those of the United Kingdom and theUnited States of America. It had been theohject of misinterpretation and distortion. Mr.McNeH of the United Kingdom had stated inthe First Committee that the USSR was hinder­ing and even objecting to the conclusion of apeaceful settlt:lment with Germany, althoughsuch a settlement was one of the essential condi­tions for the establishment of an atmosphereof international confidence. It had immediatelybecome apparedt that Mr. McNeil's statementdid not conform to the facts. As early as Novem­ber 1947, at the London meeting oi the Councilof Foreign Ministers, the USSR Minister ofForeign Affairs had submitted proposals suggest­ing that a peace treaty with Germany shouldhe drawn up at once. Those proposals were,however, rejected by the Foreign Secretariesof the United States of America and the United

t

Kingdom, with the support of the Minister ofForeign Affairs of France. Nevertheless, a yearlater the Assembly was being informed that apeace settlement with Germany was an impor­tant factor in the establishment of internationalconfidence. In the face of that declaration,he w~ndered why the USSR proposals had beenrejected in November 1947.

Mr. McNeil had also mentioned the importanceof arriving at a peaceful settlement with Japan.An agreement had been sip;ned hy the UnitedStates of America, t.he United Kingdom and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics with respectto the order and procedure of the elaborationof the peace treaty with Japan which was to becomplied with and implemented in ,connexlonwith the drawing up of a peace treaty by theCouncil of Foreign Ministers. That agreementwas heing ignored by the representatives ofthe United Kingdom, the United States of Amer­ica and France who insisted that a specialpeace conference and not the Council of ForeignMinisters should be entrusted with that task.The USSR considered that to call a special peaceconference would be to violate the existing~greements. It had heen said that that objec­tion hy the Soviet Union was an attempt toh~nder the achievement of a peaceful settlementWith Japan. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered if thatco~d he called a bona fide argument.

The representatives of the United States ofAmerica and the United Kingdom had been?tte~pting to prove that the possibilityof achiey­mg mternational confidence had heen under­mined by the USSR. According to those repre­sentatives it was the Sovi(lt Union and not theUnited States which had a network of basesand military garrisons all over the world. It

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162nd plenary meeting tS88

was a fact however that the USSR did not estab­lish military bases for land or air forces any­where beyond the limits of its own territory.Its armies were not maintained in foreignterritories except in cases provided for by inter­national agreements to which the United Statesof America had subscribed. He pointed outthat the USSR had removed its forces fromNorthern Korea although United States forceswere still occupying Southern Korea. In spiteof those facts, it was still maintained that theSoviet Union was responsihle for the existinglack of international confidence. He wonderedif that statement could he made in good faith.

The USSR considered that those distortionsof the truth were designed to camouflage theaggressive plans of the United States of Americaand the United Kingdom. The false declara­tions of the representatives of those countrieswer~ designed to foster the impression thatit was not the United States and. the UnitedKingdom which were suffering from war psy­chosis and which were elaborating plans ofaggression against the Soviet Union and thecountries of the new democracies.

When the Soviet Union proposal had beenconsidered in the First Committee, there hadbeen un attempt to show that the proposal wasover-simplified and incapable of implementa­tion. Mr. M~Neil had declared that the USSRplan wa'1 unrealistic and unworkable, and hehad wondered that the Soviet Union could havepresented such a proposal without havingtaken into account the difficulties involved inthe adoption of that plan. MI'. Vyshinsky wish\"\dto explair, incidentally, that he had never re­fused to discuss any questions bearing on theforeign policies of any States but that he hadof course never agreed to discuss any questionshearing upon the internal affairs of any State.

Returning to the objection which had beenrai-sed that the USSR plan was oversimplifiedand unrealistic, Mr. Vyshinsky suggested thatthat same argum~nt had been presented twentyyears earlier at the eighth session of the Leagueof Nations when the French delegation hado,pposoo the Soviet Union proposal for disar­mament on the basis of those same arguments.Mr. Vyshinsky suggested that if it were desiredto raise any effective -objections to the currentUSSR proposal, some new arguments shouldbe brought forth.

Representatives of the United States and theUnited Kingdom had attempted to prove thattheir Governments had already effectecl disar­mament and reductIOn of armaments. Therepresentative of the United States, Mr. Dulles,had reiterated some of the arguments put for­ward hy the representative of China to tbe effect

19 NoveutI,er 1,

de bases militaires pour ses forces terrestres 00aeriennes ou que ce soit audela deses pro~ei

frontieres. Elle ne maintient pas de forc£$ arrn~eB

dans des territoires etrangers, sauf dans les·eatI I

prevlls par les accords internationaux auxquelsles Etats-Unis d'Amerique ont souscrit. M. VI­chinsky signale que rURSS a retire ses forcesde la Coree du Nord, hien que les forces desE't:ats-Unis occupent toujours la Coree dn Sud,Ep, depit de ces faits, on persiste Et tenir 1'Unioasovietique pour responsahle du manque deconfiance internationale qui existe Et l'heure ae­tuelle. Il se demande si on peut faire une _em.­blahle declro:ation en toute honne foie

Le Gouvernement de 1'URSS estime que Cef\

deforma60ns de la verite sont destinees Et camou­fier les plans d'agression des Etats-Unis d'Ame.rique et du Royaume-Uni. Les fausses declara­tions des representants de ces pays sont destineesa feire croire que ce nb sont pas les Etats-Uniset le Royaume-Uni qui souffrent d'une psychosede guerre et qui elaborent des plan~ d'agressioncontre l'Union sovietique et les democratiesnouvelles.

Lorsque la proposition de l'Union sovietiqueest venue en discussion devant la PremiereCommission, on a essaye de prouver qu'elleetait simpliste et impossible a realiser. M. McNeila declare que le plan de l'URSS ne tenait pag~ompte des realites et etait impraticable, et ils'est etonne que I'Union sovietique ait pu'presenter une telle proposition sans avoir tenucompte des difficultes qu'entrainerait I'adoptionde ce plan. M. Vychinsky veut expliquer, acapropos, qu'il n'a jamais refuse de discuter dequestions interessant la politique exterieure d'unEtat quelconque, mais qu'il n'a, bien entendu,jamais acr.-epte de discuter de questions jnteres­sant les afl'aires interieures d'un Etat.

Revenant a i'ohjection soulevee coni,rr leplan de l'URSS, a savoir, qulil est simpliste etne tient pas compte des realiMs, M. VychinskyI'appelleque le m~me ar~ent a eM preS(:.~tevingt ans plus t6t, a la huitieme session de laSociete des Nations, lorsque la delegationfranc;aises'est opposee ala proposition de I'Unionsovietique sur le desarmement en se fondant suriles m~mes arguments. Si l'on desire eIever desobjections solides contre la proposition de I'URS~il convient de fournir de nouveaux arguments.

Les representants des Etats-Unis et du Royal1­me-Uni ont essaye de prouver que leurs GOUVdf­nements ont deja procede a une reducti~ deleurs armements. Le repre,csentant deB ntutu­Unis, M. Dulles, a repete cert;ains des 81'gum­avan~es par le representant de la Chine, s~nlesquels if serait impossible ala Chine, en raJS0a

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M. Dulles a declare que les Etats-Unis d'Ame­rique estiment necessairp. de maintenir requilihredes forces armees et que la France, qui n'a pasde potentiel militaire en raison des devastationscausees par la deuxieme guerre mondiale, n'estpas en mesure de desarmer. Il semhlerait doncque i'Union sovietique et les Etats-Unis soientles deux seuls pays qui doivent desarmer.

De nombreuses questions ont ete posees auxrepresentants de rURSS a la Premiere Com­mission. Ces representants ne repondront ilu'auxquestions concernant le potentiel militaire derURSS soulevees par la creation de rorganismeinternational de contrMe tel qu'il est prevu dansles propositions de rUnion sovietique. Le Gou­vernement de I'URSS est pr~t a fournir desdonnees officielles et authentiques concernanttous ses armements et forces armees a conditionque les autres Puissances fassent de m~me simul­tanement.

Il a ete declare devant la Premiere Commis­::tinn que l'URSS avait qtlat:r~ millions d'hommessous les armes. Puisque e'~st une affirmationperemptoire, M. Vychinsky ne voit pas de raisond'y repondre. Dans nn ouvrJlge recemmentpublie et intituIe The Militarization 0/ America,l'effectif des forooe arme6s des Etats-Unis estevalue a plas de trois millions d'hommes. Sil'on trace un parallele entre ea ch~ff're et les don­nees fournies par certains representants sur lesforces armees de l'URSS, il apparatt clairementqu'aucune des catastrophes predites n'est acraindre. Eu egard aux chiffres de quatre millionsd'hommes d'une part, et de trohs millions et demide l'autre, une reduction d'un tiers ne peutguere provoquer de desequilibre. Les objectionsaux propositions de I'URSS reposent sur lanecessite d'obtenir une proportion ou un equi­lihre des armements. La notion de I'equilibredes forces des representants qui s'opposentau plan de l'URSS se traduirait sans doute parune proposition tendant arednire les armementsde l'URSS de 75 pour 100 et ceux du Royaume­Uni de 15 pour 100 sealement.

Si la puissance prinoipale de I'URSS sembleresider dans s:es forces terrestres, il est de faitque la puissance des Etats-Unis et du Royaume­Uni reside dans d'autres categories d'armes OU

.,

539 162e seenee plemere

de la guerre civile, de reduire ses armees d'untiers, pnisque cette mesure aboutirait a la capi­tulation des armees gouvernementales chinoisesdevant les communistes. De l'avis de M. Vychinskyc'est la une exageration des faits et commel'expression d'un manque de foi dans les amleesgouvernementales thinoises.

]9 .~vembre 1948

that in view of the Chinese civil war it wouldbe impossible for China to reduce its armiesby one-third since that would he tantamountto the capitulation of China's governmentalarmies to the Communists. Mr. Vyshinskysuggested that such a statement was an exagger­ation of the facts. He considered it rather anexpression of a .lack of faith in the Chinesegovernment arIDles.

Mr. DuUes had stated that the United Statesof America deemed it necessary. to balance itsarmed forces; France had no military potentialbecause of the ravages it had suffered duringthe Second World War and therefore couldnot be expected to disarm; it would thus appearthat the only two countries which should disarmwould he the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates.

Many questions were asked of the USSRrepresentatives in the First Committee. Thoserepresentatives would only answer questionswith regard to the USSR military potentialposed hy the international control agency, aswas provided in the Soviet Union proposals.The USSR was ready to submit complete officialand authenticated data as to all armamentsand armed forces of that country provided thatthe other Powers would simultaneously do thesame.

H it seemed that the principal might of theUSSR Vias contained in its land forces, it was.. fact that the might of the United States andthe United Kingdom was in other kinds of arms

It had heen stated in the J.i'irst Committeethat the Soviet Union had four million soldiersunder arms. Since that statement had beenauthoritatively asserted, Mr. Vyshinsky saw noreason to offer a reply. In a recently publishedyolume entitled The Militarization of Americathe numher of the armed forces of the UnitedStates was given as more than three millionmen. From a comparison of that figure withthe data furnished hy certain representativeson the armed forces of the USSR, it wmud seemclear that none of the catastrophic circumstancespredicted were likely to occur. In view of the

. figures of four million soldiers on the one handand three and a half million on the other, a one­third reduction would hardly produce any dise­quilibrium. The representatives objecting ~othe Soviet Union proposa~s wanted proportionor .balance of armaments. Their brand ofbalance would be a P:l.'9posal to the effect thatthe. USSR should reduce its arms by 75 per cent~hile the United Kingdom would only reduceIts arms hy 15 percent.

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C'est ainsi que I.~s adversaires des proposi­tions de l'URSS confioivent la reduction desforces armees. M. Vychinsky s'etonne que leGouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne declare pas .sans ambages qu'iI n'a pas veritablement l'in­tention de desarmer. C'est dans ces circonstaneesque les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uw prennentla t~te du mouvement dirige contre I'Unioll,sovietique et les democraties nouvelles. On peu~

affirmer que les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Umont prepare pour la conduite d'une nouveIleguerre une machine qui, a l'heure actuelle,fonctionne a plein rendement. n est hors dedm1te que les declarations faites par M. Alexan­der, par M. MarshaH et d'autres ont jete I'inquie..tude chez les peuples epris de la paix dans lemonde. 11 n'est pas douteux que M. Marshalla declare que I'URSS menait actuellement

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19 November 19'48"1la balance penche en leur faveur. Conformementau principe de la proportionnalite, chacun devraitoperer des reductions d'un tiers dans les branchesd'armements ou il est le plus fort. L'applicationequitable de ce principe ferait que les Etatsayant de faibles forces terrestres mais des foreesnavales importantes et disposant, par exemple,de hombeEl atomiques seraient affectes dans lam~me mesure que d'autres Etats ayant des foreesterrestres importantes mais pa~l de bombesatomiqlles.

n ne s'agit pas d'une question d'un inter~t

purement theorique; il s'agit du i16sir de I'Unionsovietique de voir reduire les armements d'untiers. L'URSS a precise que sa proposition n'etaitqu'un premier pas dans la voie de la reductiondes armements et des forces armees.· M. Vychinskyne peut pas comprendre pourquoi les autresEtats ne desirent pas soutenir sa propositionni pourquoi la resolution de la Belgique se gardebien d'en faire mention. n estime que la reso­lution beige marque un net retour en arriere,

M. McNeil a declare qUt\1 le desir de desarme­ment des autres Etats est mentionne dans cetteresulution, mais ~'est inexa,l}t. nest notoire queles Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni sont en pleinecourse aux armements. M. Herbert Morrison adeclare en septembre ala Chambre des Commu­nes que la demobilisation des forces armeesserait ~mspendue pendant trois mois. 11 a declarepar la suite que les plans de demobilisation duRoyaume-Uni ne pouvaient ~~tre executes et qu'iletait m~me necessaire d'augmenter les forcesarmees du pays. M. Morrison a ete soutenu alaChambre des Comm"lnes par M. D. V. Alex8.nder,Ministre de la guerre du Iloyaume-Uni, lequela precise que la production des armementsserait intensifiee et que l'armee de reserve seraitegalement renforcee.

162nd plenary meeting 540

where there existed a disequilibrium in theirfRvour. Under the principle of proportionalityf>veryone should reduce by one-third the mostmighty factor in its armaments. The equitableapplication of that principle would mean thatthose States which had small land forces butlarge fleets and the atomic bomb, for example,would be affected to the same extent as otherStates having large land forces but no atomicbomb.

The point involved was not one of academicinterest; it concerned the desire of the SovietUnion for a one-third reduction of arms. TheUSSR had made it clear that the proposal wasonly the first step towards the reduction of arma­ments and armed forces. Mr. Vyshinsky couldnot understand why the other States did notw; "h to support that suggestion nor why theBelgian resolution avoided the point. He consid­ered that the Belgian resolution representeda definite step backward.

Mr. McNeil had stated that the desire of otherStates for disarmament was included in thatl'ef30lution, but that was not the fact. It wasknoWh that the United States and the UnitedKingdom were in the throes of an armamentsra.ce. In September, Mr. Herbert Morrisonhad declared in the House of Commons that thedemohilization of armed forces would be heldup for three months. He later stated that the

.plans for British demobilization could not becarried out, even add.ing that it was necessaryto improve the armed forces of the country.In those statements Mr. Morrison was su.pportedin the House of Commons by Mr. D. V. Alexander,the Secretary of State for War of the UnitedKingdom, who specified that the productionof armaments would be increased and that thereserve army would also be expanded.

Such was the reduction of armed forces accord­ing to the plan of the opponents of the: USSRproposals. Mr. Vyshinskywondered why itwas not stated bluntly that the nnited Kingdomdid not wish to disarm seriously. It was inthose circumstances that the United States andthe United Kingdom were takiDg up a leadingrole against the Soviet Union and the newdemocracies. It could be stated that the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom had prepareda machine for the conduct of a new war whichwas at that time in high gear. There was nodoubt that the statement made by Mr. Alexanderand Mr. Marshall and others had caused alarmamongst peace-loving peoples of the world.There was no doubt that Mr. Marshall had saidthat the USSR was conducting a peace offensivefor the purpose of propaganda. The peac~-

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a des fins de propagande, une offensive de paix.Les peuples du monde qui aiment la paix desirentque celle-ei soit universellement etahlie, maisil semble que certains soient convaincus que lapropagande tendant a la pm est une dangereusepropagande. L'un des membres les plus emi­nents de l'Assemblee a m~me declare, dans uneconversaHon privee, qu'il y avait un danger reelde voir soudain la p,aix eclater. Cela signifie,en realite, que les Etats-Unis et le Royaume­Uni ne sont pas desireux de s'entendre avecI'URSS, parce qu'une politique d'entente sape­r9it les positions des faut~mrs de guerre et ahou­tirait it l'organisation de la paix. Cette ideeemane de ceux qui S'qpposent a l'interdictionde l'arme atomique et it la reduction d'un tiersdes armements et des forces armees des cinqgrandes Puissances.

M. Vychinsky passe ensuite it l'examen desobjections elevees contre les propositions del'Union sovietique. Il evoque le cas du repre:­sentant de la Belgique, M. Rolin, qui a declareit la 161 e seance pleniere que la question desgaz asphyxiants et celle de l'interdiction desarmes atomiques n'avaient rien de communet a ajoute que M. McNeil avait deja expliqueawec toutes les precisions voulues pourquoielles ne presentaient aucune similitude. fdaisM. McNeil n'a pas repondu it la question posee;il n'a pas dit pourquoi il etait impossible d'in...terdire l'emploi de l'arme atomique tout commeon avait, en 1928, interdit celui des gaze On a ditque l'analogie etait inexaete parce qu'il s'agis.­sait dans un cas de l'utilisation et, dans l'autre,de la production. L'argument n'est pas valableparce que dans les deux cas il s'agit de produc­tion en vue d'une consommation a des fins nonmilitaires. Il est evident que l'on doit produiroI'energie atomiqu€:', mais il n'est pas moins evi­dent qu'il faut rutiliser exclusivement a des finspacifi-]ues. Il s'agit simplement d1interdire l'em­ploi d'uu prod-uit et non le produit h."i-m~me .M. Vychinsky cite rJ~emple des gaz toxiques,qui sont extr~mement utiles dans certainesindustries, ce qui n'emp~che pas que leur emploiit des fins militaires est interdit.

M. Vychinsky ne peut comprendre pourquGiles representants de la Belgique et du Royaume­Uni ne reconnaissent pas cette similitude. Ona dit que certaines delegations 'etaient demeureesconfondues par la reponse que l'URSS a donneesur ce point au, sein de la Premiere Commission.Il est exact que I'Italie a en recours aux gazdans la guerre d'agression qu'elle a meneecontre I'Ethiopie. Mais le fait ne change rien ala convention qui interdit l'emploi des gaztoxiqueu a des fins de guerre.

19 novemhre 1948 54!

loving peoples of the world universally desiredpeace. There was apparently a conviction,however, ,that peace propaganda was dangerouseropaganda. One of the leading members ofthe Assembly had even declared privately thatthere was a danger that peace might suddenl~r

break O'1t. That meant in effect that the UnitedSta.tes and the United Kingdom did not wishto agree with the USSR because a policy ofagreement would undermine the position ofthe warmongers and would lead to the organi­zation of peace. 'That point of view was inspiredby those who opposed the prohibition of atomicbombs and reduction by one-third of the arma­ments and armed forces of the five great Powers.

Mr. Vyshinsky then turned to 2. considerationof the arguments which had been raised againstthe Soviet Union proposals. He cited the factthat the representative of Belgium, Mr. Rolin,had at the 161st plenary meeting declared thatthe question of gas warfare and the questIOnof the prohibition of the atomic weapon hadnothing in common and had further gone on tosay that Mr. McNeil had already completelyexplained why that analogy did not exist. Mr.McNeil, powever, had not replif}d to the questionwhy it was impossible to prohibit the use ofatomic weapons just as the use of gas had beenprohibited in 1928. It had heen stated thatthe analogy was incorrect because in one casea question of utilizetion was involved while inthe other it was a question of production. Thatargument was not valid because in both casesthere was the question of production for utili­zation for non-warlike ends. It was obviousthat atomic energy must be produced but itwas equally obvious that it should be utilizedonly for peaceful ends. It was merely a questionof prohibiting the use of 8. product and notthe product itself and he cited the example oftoxic gases which were extremely useful in cer­tain industries, although that fact did notprevent their use from being prohibited forwarlike purposes.

Mr. Vyshinsky could 1\ot understand why therepresentatives of Belgium and the United King­dom did not recognize t.h&t analogy. It hadheen said that some delegations had beenconfused by the USSR reply to that point inthe First Committee. It was true that Italyhad used gas weapons in its war of aggressionagainst Ethiopia. That fact howe .'er did not~ter the convention which prohibited the util­Ization of toxic gases for warlike purposes.

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Il convient tout d'ahord d'elaborer une con­vention interdisant toutes violations. n fautensuite creer un .organisme de contr6le inter­national qui serait charge des problemes d'inl­pection et de contr6le. La delegation de I'Unionsovietique ne saurait admettre que l'on puissejustifier une violation d'une convention surl'interdiction de l'emploi de l'arme atomiquedans la guerre en eta:blissant un parallele entrel'energie atomique et les gaz asphyxiants, quiont fait l'objet d'une convention vioIee parI'Italie.

Le delai d'une annee que les propositionsde I'URSS prevoient pour la reduction des forcesarmees a fait, lui aussi, l'objet de critiques.Il ne signifie pas que des reductions seraienteffectuees pendant une annee et que les arma.­ments seraient retablis it l'expiration de cetteperiode. Le texte de l'Union sovietique enonceclairement que la reduction des armementsdoit ~tre achevee dans un delai d'un an. Cetteeroposition ne constitue qu'une premiere etape.Etant donne la complexite du prohleme, on s'est

Si l'on croit que le Conseil de securite agiraitde la m~me maniere que le Conseil de la Societedes Nations, il est superflu de regler la question.ft.ahlir une distinction entre la production degaz asphyxiants et celle de I'energie atomique,c'est vouloir deliberement donner uno imageinexacte des faits. La delegation de l'URSSpretend qu'une analogie complete existe entrel'interdiction d'utiliser les gaz asphyxiants etcelle d'utiliser I'arme atomique P.4 des fins mili­taires.

542 19 November 1948

Cependant la question de l'agression italien.aeest Iegerement differente. Au printemps da1936, l'Italie a eu recours aux gaz asphyxiantsdaas la guerre qu'elle menait alors contral'Ethiopie. IJe Conseil de la Societe des Nationsa convoque une session speciale en vue d'exami­ner les mesures it prendre. Le negus d'Ethiopies'est presente d3vant la Societe des Nations eta demande l'application de sanctions contrel'agresseur italien. Mais c'est en vain qu'il ademande I'aide des Puissances occidentales etde la Societe des Nations. On lui a reponduque des sanctions contre I'Italie etaient inutiles,et m~me dangereuses, car elles poUf.'~aient

dechainer la guerre dans toute l'Europe. L'unapres l'autre, les Etats ont refuse d'appliquerdes sanctions contre l'Italie, hien que celle-cietH viole la convention interdisant l'emploi desgaz asphyxiants it des fins militaires, et ils ontrepris des relations normales avec I'Italie. Dansces conditions, la Societe des Nations a dll avouerson impuissance devant la violation grave de laconvention.

If it were believed that the Security Councilwould act in the same way as had the Councilof the League of Nations, it would be uselessto attempt to settle the question. To speakof a distinction between the production of toxicgases filld atomic energy would mean a delib­erate misrepresentation of the facts. The USSRdelegation contended that the prohibition oftonc gases was completely analogous to the pro­hibition of atomic weapons in warfare.

162nd plenary meeting

The Italian question was a rather tJifferentone, however. In the spring of 1936 toxicgases had heen used hy Italy in the war againstEthiopia. The Council of the League of Nationshad called a special session to consider whataction it should take. The Negus of Ethiopiahad appeared before the League of Nations anddemanded the application of sanctions againstthe Italian aggressor. The Negus of Ethiopiahowever had called in vain on the WesternPowers and the League of Nations. In answerto his plea it had been stated that san~tions

against Italy were useless and even dangerousbecause they might lead to war all over Europe.One after another, States had refused to applysanctions against Italy despite the fact that ithad violated the convention prohibit.ing the util­ization of toxic gases for warlike purposes, andthey had renewed normal relations with Italy.In the face of that situation the League of Na­tions had had to confirm its capitulation beforethe gross violation of the convention.

It was necessary in the first place to draw upa convention to prohibit any violations. Itwas then necessary to establish an internationalcontrol agency to deal with the problems of in­spection and control. The Soviet Union dele­gation could not agree that a violation of a con­vention on the prohibition of the use of atomicenergy in warfare could possibly be justifiedby making an analogy between atomic energy,and toxic gases, the convention on which hadbeen violated by Italy.

The time limit of one year, included in theUSSR proposals as the period in which reduc­tion of armed forces should take place, had alsoheen criticized. It did not mean that duringone year reductions would he effected and thatat the end of that period there would be a res­toration of armaments. The Soviet Union textclearly stated that the reduction in armamentsshould be consummated wit~n one year. Thatproposal was only a first step. Since the matterwas a complicated one, a period of one year had

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Si la Commission a estime qu'il etait essentiela la cause du desarmement que l'on disposed'informations completes, pourquoi ne l'a-t-ellepas dit expressement ? M. Vychinsky estur.1c tropvague et trop imprecise la resolutiondans sonensemble. Le cinquieme paragraphe dit quel'etude de ces questions devrait ~tre poursuivie.Au sixieme paragraphe, on indique que I'As­sembIee ernet le vreu que certaines mesuressoient prises. Ceux qui ont appuye le projet deresolution declarent qu'il represente les dispo­sitions au dela desquelles on ne peut aller pourle moment, mais il semble qu'ils aient sous­estime la puissance creatrice de l'AssembIeegenerale. n est exact, evidemment, que la poli­tique de la majorite de I'Assemblee, sous l'in­fiuence des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni, estopposee aux pl'opooitions de I'URSS et de laPologne qui ont apporte une solution ala ques­tion de la reduction des armements et des forcesnrmees, question alaqueHe les peuples du mondequi aiment la paix attachent une importancecapitale.

La delegation de l'Union sovietique ne peutcroire que le projet de resolution presente al'Ansemblee generale repr6sente le meilleur texteque les Nations Unies puissent elaborer sur ceprobleme. Le cinquieme paragraphe .fe cetteresolution recommande all Conseil de securitede ponrsuivl'e l'etude dn probleme, mais M.Vy­chinsky desire souligne. que le pl'obleme de lareduction des armements est a l'etude depuisplus d'un quart de siecle. Il insiste pour quel'AssembIee ne renouvelle pas la triste experiencede la Societe des Nations.

Le point essentiel du projet de resolutionpresente par la majorite de la Premiere Com­mission figure au sixieme paragraphe, OU l'onse borne a emettre le vreu que la Commissiondes armements du type classique accorde auprobleme dont elle est saisie toute l't'ttentionvoulue, Mais si cette Commission ne repondpas a cette invitation, aucune disposition neprevoit de mesures garan'issant que sera examinele probleme de la r9daction de propositionspour la reception, la verification et la publicationdes informations.

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543 162' ""'00 pI_lire

arr0te au delai d'un an, de maniere a donneraux Etats le temps de reduire leurs armements.Rearrner a l'expiration d'une annee repres90­terait en effet un pas en arriere, et ce de sont pasla les fins auxquelles tend la proposition del'URSS. La seconde etape ne saurait consisterqu'a poursuivre le desarmement. Toute autredecision serait ridicule. La delegation de I'Unionsovietique St) refuse a croire que M. llolin aitpu serieusement proposer l'interpretation qu'ila cherche a donner au texte de l'URSS.

19 novembre 1948

been designated in order to allow States timeto reduce their armaments. To rearm at theend of a year would indeed represent a stepbackward and that ~as not the purpose of theUSSR proposal. The only possible secondstep would be further disarmament. Any otherc.ourse would be ridiculous. The Soviet Uniondelegation could not believe that Mr. Rolinhad been serious in the interpret.ation he hadwished to give to the USSR text.

The Soviet Union delegation could not believethat the draft resolution offered to the GeneralAssembly represented the best text that theUnited Nations could produce on the question.The fifth paragraph of that resolution recom­mended the Security Council to continue thestudy of the problem hut Mr. Vyshinsky wishedto point out that the problem of reduction ofarmaments had been the subject o~ considerationfor more than a quarter of a ·century. Heurged the Assembly not to repea1t the miserableexperience of the League of Nations.

The basic point of the draft resolution presen­ted by the majority of the First Committee wascontained in the sixth paragrt'lph, which merelytrusted that th~ Commission for ConventionalArmaments would devote its first attentionto the pr9blem in hand. If that Commissiondid not do so, however, no provisi011 was madefor measures to be taken to ensure that the proh­lem of formulating proposals for the receipt,checking and publication of information wouldhe considered.

If the Committee had consider'ed that it wasessential to the cause of digarmament to havecomplete information, why had it not said socategorically? Mr. Vyshinsky considered thatthe resolution as a whole was too vague anduncertain. In the fifth paragraph it was statedthat the questions involved should be studiedfurther. In the sixth paragraph it was sta~edthat the Assembly trusted that certain actionwould be taken. The supporters of the draftresolution stated that it was the maximumwhich could be achieved at that time but itwould seem that the creative powers of theGen~ral Assembly were not fully appreciated.It was true, of course, that on account of theinfluence of the United States and the UnitedKingdom the po]icy of the majority of the Assem­hly was opposed to the USSR and Polish pro­~osals which had offered a solution to the ques­tIon of reduction of armaments and limitatic,n?f armed forces, a question which was of vitallllter'est to the peace-loving peoples of theWorld.

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Le Gouvernement de I'Union des Republiquessocialistes sovietiques, en envoyant ses repra­sentants a I'Assemblee genera.:e, leur a donnamandat de defendre et de servir cetta noblecause.

19 November 1948

Les propositions de I'Union sovietique et dela Pologne tiennent compte de l'exr.erience ne-.quise au cours des vingt-cinq derDleres anneeset des moyens materiels necessaires pour sur~

monter lea difficultes techniques 9ue siouleveraitcette question. On ne saurait oubher que, depuisun quart de siecle, des travaux ont ete accomplisdana ce domaine, b1en qu'il faille reconnnttrequ'ils n'ont abouti a aUCUll resultat concretoCes travaux ont neanmoins mis ala dispositionde l'Organisation des Nations Unies une docu~

mentation qui pourrait faciliter la solution dece probleme complexe. 11 faut utiliser cette docu~

mentation, hien que la majorite de la PremiereCommission ne semble pas le desirer.

Sept Etats ont presente des projets de l'eso~lution sur la question. Le seul qui ait ete presenteal'Assemblee generale est celui, fort insi~niflant,

de la Belgiquv, qui a re~m l'appt'i de la majorite.Le representant de I'URSS declare a nouveau,au nom de 8a delegation, que la resolutionpresentee marque un recul et qu'il ne sert en rienla cause de la reduction des armements et del'interdiction de l'arme atomique, notammentpar les cinq grandes Puissances. La quectionn'en rey~t pas moins une importance extr~me etdoit ~tre resolue.

Les propositions de I'U~ion sovietique ne se. bornent pas a proposer une simple reduction

des armements et des forces armees des cinqgrandes Puissances. L'URSS a, par des liensorgall1iques, rattache cette proposition al'inter­diction de l'arme atomique; elIe considere eneffet que ces deux idees perdent leur sens sion les examine separement. Telles sont les pro­positio.u.s esspntielles fo:nnulees par le Gouver­nement de l'URSS. Si elles etaieilt adoptees,elles apporteraient une solution al'ensemble dela question. Elles representeraient un pas degeant dans la voie de la cooperation internatio­nale, du raffermissement de la paix et de lasecurite des nations. C'est a quoi tendent lesdesirs de centaines de millions d'~tres humairis,des millions d'habitants et du Gouvernementde I'URSS.

The representatives of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics had been sent to the GeneralAssembly to defeDd and promote that greatcause.

The meeting ro;;;e at 1.05 p. m.

162nd plenary meeting 544

The proposals of the Soviet Union and Polandtook into account the experience gatheredduring the preceding twenty-five years and th~

materials necessary for overcoming the technicaldifficulties which would arise in connexion withthat question. It should not be forgotten thatfor over a quarter of a century work had beandone in that field although it was true that ithat! not achieved any positive results. Thatwork had nevertheless placed at the disposalof the United Nations certain materials whichmight be useful for the solution of the complexproblem. Those materials should be used,although the majority in the First Committeedid not seem to wish to do so.

Seven States had pruposed draft resolutionson the question. The only one of those presen­ted to the General Assembly was the very weakBelgian resolution which had been supportedby the majority. The representative of the USSRrepeated that his delegation considered that theresolution represented a step backward and thatit did not in any way promote the cause of theI'eduction of armaments and the prohibitionof atomic weapons, especially by the five greatPowers. The question was nevertheless anextremely important one which had to besolved.

The Soviet Union had not confined its propo­salsto a mere reduction of armaments and armedforces by the five great Powers. It had organi­cally linked that proposal with the prohibitionof atomic weapons because it considered thatthose ideas were meaningless when consideredseparately. Such were the basic demands ad­vanced by the USSR Government. They wouldamount to a solu.tion of the whole question ifthey were adopted. They would amount toa great and tremendous step forward towardsprogress in international co-operation, ~he

strengthening of peace and the security ofnations. That was the desire of hundreds ofmillions of human beings; that was the desireof the mal1Y millions living in the Soviet Union,that was the desire of the USSR Government.