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Burkina Faso: Overview of

corruption and anti-corruption

Burkina Faso is trying to overcome a legacy of bad governance and corruption. Bribery and bureaucratic

corruption are widespread, permeating all sectors of society and affecting the daily lives of Burkinabés.

The extractive industries sector, the judicial system and the public health sector are particularly vulnerable

to corruption risks.

Nevertheless, following popular protests which ousted a long-serving president in 2014, Burkina Faso has

initiated a wave of institutional and legislative reforms supported by citizen pressure to curb corruption

and ensure a sustainable democratic regime.

Author(s): Iñaki Albisu Ardigo

Reviewer(s): Matthew Jenkins, Transparency International and Guillaume Nicaise, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

Date: 04 November 2019

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Burkina Faso: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

Query

Please provide an overview the current situation regarding corruption and anti-corruption in Burkina Faso

Contents

1. Overview of corruption in Burkina Faso

2. Corruption by sector

3. Legal and institutional anti-corruption

framework

4. References

Overview of corruption in Burkina Faso

Background

The Republic of Burkina Faso is a landlocked

country in West Africa, belonging to the Sahel

region of Africa. The country gained independence

from France in 1960 as the Republic of Upper

Volta, experiencing multiple military coups until

1983. In 1983, then prime minister and army

captain Thomas Sankara staged a coup with

support from the military. Sankara undertook

ambitious socio-economic reform, nationalising

natural resource extraction and negotiating with

international financial institutions to reduce debt

pressure. Crucially, Sankara’s rhetoric focused

heavily on anti-corruption principles, going so far

as renaming the country Burkina Faso (land of

honest/incorruptible men) (Hagberg 2015).

In 1987, the regime was overthrown by military

general Compaoré, who undertook a gradual

democratisation of the country through a 1991

constitutional reform that guaranteed multi-party

elections and began a process of decentralisation

(Hilgers and Mazzocchetti 2010). In 1991,

Compaoré was the only candidate for election,

winning with a low 25% participation (Bertelsmann

Stiftung 2018; Bonnecase 2015).

Through networks of clientelism and patronage

(Santiso and Loada 2003) and the deployment of

harsh military repression of opposition

movements, as well as amendments to the

Main points

1. Bribery is present at all levels of the

Burkinabé state and business sector,

but perceptions of corruption are

below the average in Africa.

2. Various sectors suffer from corruption

in Burkina Faso, but the available

literature focuses on corruption in the

extractive industries, public service

provision in health and education, and

the judiciary.

3. Popular protests in 2014 led to the

resignation of the president and

subsequent anti-corruption reforms.

4. More than half of Burkinabé

respondents to the 2019 GCB believe

that corruption has decreased in the

past year and that the current

government is doing a good job

countering corruption.

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constitution, Compaoré managed to stay in power

until 2014 (Bonnecase 2015).

In October 2014, following news of Campaore’s

intention to once again reform the constitution to

abolish term limits, popular protests supported by

military groups led to Compaoré’s resignation and

to the establishment of a national democratic

council. In 2015, a coup by military guards loyal to

Compaoré failed due to massive street protests and

intervention by other troops (Asante 2015). Fair

and free elections were held later that year, where

Christian Kaboré was elected, the first civilian to

hold the post of president in the history of the

country (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Since Kaboré’s election, the country has been

gripped by rising security threats, with over 400

violent incidents reported since 2016 and around a

third of the territory no longer under state control

(Le Monde 2019). While the current administration

accuses Compaoré and religious extremists of

orchestrating the violence, observers point to a

range of domestic factors driving people into the

arms of insurgent groups, including bad

governance, injustice, and human rights abuses on

the part of the military (Le Monde 2019). Studies

indicate that many officials appointed to posts in

the north of the country have “become rich on the

proceeds of trafficking, corruption and

racketeering”, which has generated considerable

local grievances and fuelled conflict (International

Crisis Group 2017). In addition, the head of the

Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat et de Lutte

contre la Corruption identifies growing corruption,

particularly with regards to the black box that is

defence spending, as crippling the state’s ability to

respond effectively to these challenges (Le Monde

2019).

Violence has escalated in 2019, as seven to nine

different armed groups contest the central

government’s authority in the north of the country.

As the number of internally displaced persons has

risen from 87,000 in February 2019 to 500,000 in

October, Western officials reportedly fear the total

collapse of state authority (Reuters 2019; Le Monde

2019).

Burkina Faso is a parliamentary democracy with a

president as head of state and a prime minister as

head of government. The current 1998 constitution

establishes a decentralised system of appointed

regional governments and communes with limited

fiscal autonomy, governed by local mayors and

councils (Dafflon and Madies 2012), as well as a

special administrative government for

Ouagadougou, the national capital. Freedom House

considers Burkina Faso to be a partly free

democracy (Freedom House 2019), and 89% of

Burkinabé respondents to the 2017 Afrobarometer

survey consider the country to be a democracy,

though 25% of respondents cite major problems

(Afrobarometer 2017).

Burkina Faso is considered one of the least

economically developed countries in the world:

with a GDP per capita at only US$1,900 (CIA

World Factbook 2019). The average life expectancy

is around 60 years (World Bank 2019), and the

country has a human development index score of

0.402, among the lowest in the world (Bertelsmann

Stiftung 2018). Approximately 76.4% of the

population lives under the poverty line, and 3% of

the working-age population is unemployed

(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Inequality is

significant in Burkina Faso, as shown by the

country's 2017 Gini index score of 35.3. The

Burkinabé economy is dominated by ore and

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mineral mining and agriculture, particularly cotton

(CIA World Factbook 2019).

Extent of corruption

International surveys on corruption show that

corruption in Burkina Faso is a widespread

problem. Burkina Faso ranks 78 out of 180

countries in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions

Index, with a score of 41, slightly below the global

average of 43, but above the average score for sub-

Saharan Africa of 32 (Transparency International

2019a). The 2017 Mo Ibrahim Index of African

Governance reflects a similar situation, giving

Burkina Faso a score of 57.1 out of 100, above the

African average of 49.9 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation

2018). Finally, the World Governance Indicators

shows that Burkina Faso is in the 53 percentile

rank for control of corruption, a notable increase

from the 38.5 percentile rank held in 2014

(Kaufmann and Kray 2018).

These perceptions tend to correlate to national

opinion surveys on corruption. In the 2017

Afrobarometer survey, 30% of respondents from

Burkina Faso believe all or most government

officials to be corrupt (Afrobarometer 2017). It is

important to note, however, that the same

Afrobarometer survey shows that 53% of

respondents believe corruption to have decreased

in the last year, a result echoed by the 2019 Global

Corruption Barometer (GCB), where 54% of

respondents believed corruption to have decreased

in the last 12 months.

Bribery is present at all levels of the Burkinabé

state and business sector. In the 2019 GCB, at least

16% of respondents in Burkina Faso stated that

they had paid a bribe in some form, below the 28%

average in the rest of Africa (Transparency

International 2019b). The results of the 2017

Afrobarometer show a lower rate of bribery, as just

2% of respondents claimed to have bribed officials

to obtain documents they needed, 5% bribed to get

medical attention at a public hospital or clinic, and

2% paid a bribe or did a favour for a government

official to access public services (Afrobarometer

2017). Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption

(REN-LAC), a local civil society organisation, also

undertook a national survey on corruption in 2017

and found 39.3% of respondents had paid a bribe

in the last year (REN-LAC 2017).

The private sector is also affected by corruption.

The latest (2009) Enterprise Survey reported that

9.7% of enterprises surveyed considered corruption

to be a major constraint for their businesses.

Meanwhile, 9.8% of firms experienced a bribe

request, and 18.8% of the firms surveyed report

being expected to give gifts to win government

contracts (World Bank 2018a). In the World

Economic Forum's 2018 Global Competitiveness

Index, specifically the corruption and ethics

indicator (which measures bribery incidence

among businesses, solvency and transparency of

public funds and corruption perceptions among

business), Burkina Faso has a score of 42, ranking

it number 63 out of 140 countries in the Index

(World Economic Forum 2018).

Forms of corruption

Patronage and bureaucratic corruption

Before the 2014 protests, the executive branch of

government controlled most appointments of civil

servants and controlled the remuneration and

transfer of resources to local governments

(Hagberg et al. 2017). The use of strategic,

clientelistic hiring practices and petty corruption at

local level was a key electoral tactic that Compaoré

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used to stay in power (Hilgers and Loada 2013).

Cases of corruption of high-level officials were

rarely brought forward during Campaore’s rule

(Akouwerabou and Bako 2015), and when they

were, it was generally before elections to ramp up

support for the government, as was the case of the

2011 corruption case brought against the head of

Burkina Faso’s customs ministry (Salisbury 2018).

In 2004, a public accounts court audit showed that

151 retired civil servants were still receiving their

salaries, amounting to US$860,000. The Ministry

of Finance claimed ignorance about these

retirements, deepening the debate about the

ministry’s capacity to control its accounts

(Transparency International and Damiba 2006).

Since 2014, reforms have been made to

professionalise and incorporate merit into

government appointments and hiring. Despite

advances in this area, observers are not overly

optimistic as regards efforts to curb corruption in

the public administration, given that the well-

established patronage and clientelist networks

forged under Compaoré still persist (Hagberg et al.

2017; Bonnecase 2015). These networks originated

during the decentralisation process in the 1990s, as

local leaders, especially in rural areas, were co-

opted by Campaoré’s faction via the selective

transfer of administrative powers and public

services (Odaro 2012). This has led to the general

perception that local governments rely on the

largesse dispensed by political parties’ war chests

to maintain support and clientelist practices

(Hagberg et al. 2017).

In 2014, shortly after the protests, massive

interventions were undertaken in most ministries,

as well as in local governments, where special

delegations were assigned to assume

administrative roles until the new local

governments could be elected in 2016. The

transitional government further cracked down on

exiting mayors, charging many with financial

crimes and corruption (Hagberg et al. 2017). The

special delegations, in many cases, were likewise

accused by local populations of corruption,

particularly with financing political parties with

local funds ahead of the 2015 elections (Hagberg et

al. 2017; Lierl 2017).

In 2016, the Higher Authority for State Control and

the Fight Against Corruption (ASCE-LC) published

a report where it found many instances of

patronage and corrupt adjudication of public

service employment and public contracts by the

transitional government (Bertelsmann Stiftung

2018). Various civil society organisations were

highly critical of the adjudication of public offices

by the transitional government, noting many

instances of vote buying and nepotism (Hagberg et

al. 2017).

By 2019, the government hopes that 50% of all

government hirings will be carried out through a

digital platform to avoid nepotism and cronyism in

the civil service (Open Government Partnership

2019).

In terms of petty corruption in public service

delivery, data from the 2019 Global Corruption

Barometer suggests that after police officers (21%),

public officials working in utilities agencies are the

most likely to solicit bribes from citizens (12%),

followed by officials providing documents (11%),

teachers (9%) and health workers (5%)

(Transparency International 2019b).

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Private sector corruption and tax evasion

With the return to multi-party democracy in the

early 1990s, there was an explosion of investment

by private enterprises in public procurement and

resource extraction. However, despite low fiscal

pressure and the low cost of permit and licence

acquisition relative to its neighbours (Grimm et al.

2011), informal enterprises make up a significant

percentage of the local economy, providing 74.3%

of employment in Burkina Faso (Akouwerabou and

Bako 2015).

Tax enforcement is low and unevenly applied, and

corruption in the tax collection service is significant

according to REN-LAC (2017). Coupled with tax

evasion, the business culture in Burkina Faso is

also known to be open to corruption to avoid state

controls. Surveys show that around 56% of

Burkinabé are sympathetic to tax avoidance when it

comes to operating a business. For example, a

REN-LAC survey of customs agency workers,

inspectors and directors found that 22.6% of

respondents had been offered a bribe in the last 12

months, almost a third of which report having been

offered bribes at least once a week (REN-LAC

2015). Unsurprisingly, the 2019 GCB shows that

Burkinabé respondents view business executives as

the most corrupt group in the country

(Transparency International 2019b), while in the

2017 Afrobarometer, 39% of Burkinabé

respondents believe businesspeople to be corrupt.

According to Global Financial Integrity (2019), due

to an estimated trade misinvoicing rate of 26.2%,

Burkina Faso loses an average of US$620 million

annually in the form of illicit financial outflows.

Notably, Hagberg and other academics attribute

the recent rise of violent extremism in the country

to illicit financial flows and the lack of control of

trade in the northern region of the country

(Hagberg et al. 2017; Zeiger et al. 2015). UNODC

(2018a) reports, for instance, that in 2018 potential

foreign fighters were intercepted with US$800,000

in cash, 6.4 kg of heroin and 1 kg of cocaine. The

International Crisis Group (2017) argues that much

of the current violence in the north is not

necessarily linked to religious extremism; in fact,

many of those who have taken up arms were

already involved in crime, while others “may resort

to violence to defend socio-economic and financial

interests or because of local grievances.” Further

complicating matters is the fact that the borders

between Burkina Faso and its neighbours are

highly porous; a bribe of between 1,000 and 3,000

CFA francs to the police allows anyone – even those

without identity papers – to cross into the country,

which observers state “facilitates terrorism”

(Deutsche Welle 2019).

In 2018, a local media investigation found evidence

in the Panama Papers document dump of the use of

offshore, shell companies by various notable

businessmen from Burkina Faso. The KANIS case,

named after the company allegedly participating in

tax evasion, was a major scandal to hit the new

Kamburé presidency as some government officials

were allegedly linked to the company (Keita 2018).

Public financial management

Public financial management has seen gradual

improvements in Burkina Faso since the first laws

reforming national accounting practices were

introduced in the mid-1990s (Wickberg and

Martini 2014). Subsequent gradual changes in the

early 2000s were observed to have had a positive

effect on oversight and control of government

finances, though public financial management

continued to be in a precarious state (Delavallade

2007).

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More recent assessments of budget transparency

and control show that Burkina Faso is still deficient

in all areas. The 2017 Open Budget assessment

gives Burkina Faso a score of 26 out of 100 for

budget, which reveals significant backsliding from

its 2015 score of 43 (International Budget

Partnership 2017). The survey also shows that

information of budget execution is rare and seldom

detailed. A 2016 ASCE report noted that 55% of

government expenditures were listed as

“exceptional procedures” (Bertelsmann Stiftung

2018).

Patronage and bid-fixing are common in public

procurement and when cases of these corrupt acts

are discovered, there is rarely redress or sanctions

(REN-LAC 2011; Akouwerabou and Bako 2015).

For example, Taylor (2012) comments on the case

of a local businessperson who allegedly rigged bids

and provided fraudulent services, was investigated

and later sanctioned and blacklisted by the World

Bank, yet continues to be a public service provider.

Between 2008 and 2012, the ASCE-LC received

more than 1,600 complaints about unfair

adjudication of public contracts of which, between

30% and 50% were considered actionable by the

ASCE-LC (Akouwerabou and Bako 2015).

Corruption by sector

While various sectors suffer from corruption in

Burkina Faso, the available literature on corruption

in Burkina Faso places particular interest on

corruption surrounding extractive industries as

well as on corruption in public service provision in

health, education and the judiciary.

Extractive industries

As stated previously, the Burkinabé economy is

largely powered by ore and mineral extraction and

agriculture. Extractive industries make up 75% of

the country’s exports, and employ roughly 10% of

the nation’s workers (CIA World Factbook 2019).

This dependence on extractive industries as well as

the profits that can be earned through these

enterprises create fertile ground for corruption.

As mining takes place largely in rural communities,

away from large cities, mining operations fall under

the jurisdictions of local governments. Weak

institutional governance in local governance, as

well as reduced transparency oversight by national

authorities has led to numerous instances of

bribery, extortion and rent-seeking by municipal

authorities and mining companies (REN-LAC

2014). The Burkinabé government has been

formally challenged several times in international

courts and chambers of commerce for allegedly

conceding licences in exchange for bribes or kick-

backs. (REN-LAC 2014). Acquiring land, especially

in the mineral rich Dori region, has become

especially problematic due to a broad network of

legal brokers who bribe officials to block land

purchases of competitors and then sell them the

same land (Joslyn 2019).

Tax evasion is also a serious concern in the

extractive industries sector as there is little

uniformity in tax rates due to the opacity of the

public tax system (Kini 2015; Shaxson 2018).

A 2013 survey of mineworkers by REN-LAC found

that 58% of them had experienced a corrupt act

that had occurred on the site they were working

(REN-LAC 2014). The most common occurrences

of corruption reported are “pots-de-vin” (bribes)

and undue commissions to local inspectors to

overlook worker health and safety standards (Kini

2015; REN-LAC 2014).

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Despite all these issues, the last Extractive

Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

evaluation of Burkina Faso conducted in 2017

certified the country as compliant. The

assessment’s key recommendations included

ensuring the full disclosure of mining, oil and gas

licences grants, the publication of application dates

and geographic coordinates of relevant activities,

greater contract transparency in the mining sector

and the full disclosure of official figures for the

volume and value of exports of mining enterprises

(ITIE-BF 2019).

Health service delivery

Burkina Faso’s health provision faces serious

challenges from corruption and mismanagement.

Odaro (2012) notes that public service quality saw a

notable drop in the early 1990s due to a wave of

privatisations undertaken with minimal control or

oversight. A 2003 report by the National Ethics

Committee found that most social public services

were highly corrupt, inefficient and lacked

professionalism (Transparency International and

Damiba 2006). Efforts to improve public services

via decentralisation likewise met with mixed results

as responsibilities were devolved to local

government but devolution of resources to these

governments was uneven (Brockhaus et al. 2012;

Ministère de Santé and WHO 2017).

The quality of the country’s health sector is low

relative to other sub-Saharan African countries,

with low life expectancy (Bertelsmann Stiftung

2018), high mortality rates and infant mortality

rates (Ministère de la Santé and WHO 2017). This

is primarily due to inadequate funding, years of

mismanagement and disregard, and because of

entrenched cultures of rent-seeking (Odaro 2012).

In their analysis of the Burkinabé health services

provided by religious organisations, Gemignani,

Tsimpo and Wodon (2014) note that the public

health sector charges patients for medical supplies

and care (a product of 1990s liberalisation of the

health sector), but due to rent-seeking and alleged

corruption, prices are inflated and become

inaccessible to vulnerable patients.

A 2018 study by REN-LAC found that the health

sector saw the widespread practices of selling free

medicine to patients, the theft of prescription drugs

and clandestine surgical operations (REN-LAC

2019a). The report also registered multiple

complaints of solicitation of bribes by health

professionals, noting that of 172 patients surveyed,

approximately 26% had been asked for a bribe

(REN-LAC 2018). The report also featured reports

by health sector whistleblowers who had come

forward to denounce “ghost positions”, of posts

that were not filled, yet the salaries were charged.

Since 2014, there has been a concerted effort by the

government to improve health services in the

country, raising health budgets and providing

funds for improving health infrastructure, as well

as creating plans to counter corruption in the

health sector. In 2018, the government set up

various committees for citizen monitoring of

service delivery (Comités de Suivi-citoyén des

Prestations de service, CSCPS) to better understand

governance problems in the health sector, plus

committees to investigate and sanction

racketeering in university hospital centres and

regional hospital centres (Open Government

Partnership 2019). Despite these advances, the

Ministry of Health website contains very little

information about these programmes and

publishes minimal or outdated information

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regarding health statistics (Open Government

Partnership 2019).

Corruption of the judiciary and law enforcement

Judicial corruption is considered to be a serious

problem in Burkina Faso in most of the available

literature. Judicial corruption has historically been

linked to lack of judicial independence from the

executive power during the rule of Compaoré.

Corruption also stems from “an overall system that

is inefficient, poorly trained and poorly equipped”

(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). The executive branch

has the power to appoint, promote, transfer and

discipline judges and prosecutors. This influence

was historically abused by the Compaoré regime to

manipulate key court decisions (Transparency

International and Damiba 2006). For example, in

2006, a high-profile case of the murder of a local

journalist, Norberto Zongo, by a presidential guard

was thrown out by judges despite massive protests.

In another, more extreme case, judge Salifou

Nébié, who in early 2014 had ruled against

reforming the 1998 constitution, was killed 30km

west of Ouagadougou in suspicious circumstances,

which media organisations considered retribution

for his ruling (The World Today 2015;

DroitLibreTV 2014)

In 2005, a media exposé about corruption in the

judiciary, including the soliciting of bribes,

embezzlement of court funds and client extortion,

led to the establishment of an ad hoc judicial

commission to investigate the matter. The

commission investigated the two largest court

systems and was able to identify “more than 30

cases of ‘questionable practices’ and ‘suspicious

behaviour’ implicating judges, lawyers, police

officers, intermediaries or ‘touts’, and other users

of the judicial system, including accounting firms

and liquidators” (Transparency International and

Damiba 2006). Despite the report, the judiciary did

not take action to redress the situation, though the

national bar association expelled lawyers who had

solicited bribes and extorted clients and, in 2006,

the judicial branch adopted a code of conduct for

magistrates (Code de déontologie des magistrats)

to improve access to justice, strengthen the

institution’s integrity and fight judicial corruption.

This code is targeted at magistrates, judicial staff

and users, and comprises chapters on judicial

independence, impartiality, integrity, freedom of

expression, judicial competence and

incompatibilities (Wickberg 2014)

Since 2014, initiatives have been taken to improve

accountability and transparency in the public

sector but, crucially, allegedly corrupt judges and

prosecutors from the Compaoré era hold enormous

power (Hilgers and Loada 2013).

The 2019 GCB showed that 31% of respondents

believed the judiciary to be corrupt or extremely

corrupt. Likewise, 29% of the 2017 Afrobarometer

survey respondents believed most or all judges and

magistrates to be corrupt (Afrobarometer 2017).

In terms of law enforcement, the police in the

country is divided between national gendarmes and

municipal police forces. REN-LAC surveys show a

high rate of bribery solicitation by local-level

police. In 2017, the organisation considered local

police the most corrupt institution in the country

(REN-LAC 2017), while the 2019 GCB found that

29% of respondents believed the police to be

corrupt, with 21% of those having reported bribes,

paying them to police (Transparency International

2019b).

While bribe solicitation from gendarmes and army

units reported to REN-LAC is considerably lower,

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there is a notorious lack of transparency and

accountability in the armed forces. In Transparency

International UK’s Defence Governance Index,

Burkina Faso has a low grade of F (on a Scale of A

to F), with major problems related to accountability

of the armed forces to the government and in

relation to procurement and use of resources

(Transparency International UK 2015).

Furthermore, some scholars and organisations

working in Burkina Faso note that the military has

historically been, and continues to be, active in

national politics, putting the current state of

democracy at risk of coups or pressure from

unelected military groups (Hagberg et al 2017,

Bonnecase 2015).

Legal and institutional framework

Overview and background

Burkina Faso’s current legal and institutional

framework for countering corruption cannot be

understood without understanding the impact the

2014 popular uprising and subsequent resignation

of Compaoré. The protests were provoked by

Compaoré’s attempt to reform the 1998

constitution to allow for indefinite re-election

(Asante 2015). Inspired in part by protests in

Senegal following a similar situation in that country

(The World Today 2015), in Burkina Faso, various

civil society and youth movements, trade unions,

opposition political parties and members of the

military took to the streets under the slogan

“enough is enough” and “nothing will be as it was”.

Observers of the protests noted that countering

corruption was a key tenet of the protests and

conditioned future government actions. Youth

activists appropriated the figure of former

president Sankara as a figure for the coming anti-

corruption revolution (Hagberg 2015).

Following Compaoré’s resignation, a transitional

national democratic council took power and

spearheaded new anti-corruption, transparency and

accountability reforms ahead of the 2015 elections,

including a new anti-corruption law which

integrates new corruption crimes and punishments,

establishes a framework to define and disclose

conflicts of interest, and provides new protections

for whistleblowers, as well as a new access to public

information law. These reforms were carried out in a

context of greater public participation in politics as

well as public demonstrations for and against

policies, which became collectively referred to as

“ruecratie” (street-ocracy, in English) (Hagberg

2015).

The context of the 2014 uprising and the subsequent

reforms explain the recent flurry of anti-corruption

activity as well as the transcendent nature of anti-

corruption topics throughout the political spectrum

(Tagnan 2019; Chayes 2018; Freedom House 2019).

More than half (54%) of Burkinabé respondents to

the GCB believe that corruption has decreased in the

past year, and 51% believe the government is doing a

good job countering corruption (Transparency

International 2019b). Similarly, 53% of Burkinabé

respondents of the 2017 Afrobarometer survey

believe corruption to be decreasing (Afrobarometer

2017). A REN-LAC 2017 survey found that 36.6% of

respondents believed corruption to be decreasing

(REN-LAC 2017).

International conventions

Burkina Faso has been party to the United Nations

Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) since

2006 and to the African Union Convention on

Preventing and Combating Corruption since 2005.

In 2010, Burkina Faso also ratified the African

Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

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As a member of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), Burkina Faso has

adopted the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy

and Good Governance (Kabia 2017) as well as the

2001 ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against

Corruption. The country also ratified the OECD

Convention to Combat Bribery in 2006.

Burkina Faso has been a member of EITI since

2013 and the Open Government Partnership since

2017.

Domestic legal framework

Criminalisation of corruption

Corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office, illicit

enrichment, extortion and influence-peddling in

the public sector and facilitation payments are

criminalised under the penal code. In Burkina

Faso, active and passive bribery is punishable with

a fine and up to five years per corruption offence

(OECD/African Development Bank 2012). Public

employees are also mandated to denounce

corruption if they experience or become aware of a

corrupt act (Global Integrity 2018). Any public

servants receiving a payment, gift or donation in

return for performing a service, even if the service

is due, is punished by two to five years

imprisonments and fined twice the value received

(Global Integrity 2018). Law N° 026-2006/AN

prohibits and creates mechanisms to create and

control money laundering. Decree N° 2017-

0049/PRES/PM/MINEFID also established that

companies involved in bid-rigging or bribery of

procurement officials would be barred for up to five

years from participating in public procurement

contracts.

Law N° 04-2015 / CNT, otherwise known as the

anti-corruption law, was an important product of

the transitional government’s bid to appease

popular support for anti-corruption reform. The

law, based on model legislation promoted by the

African Union, created a plethora of new economic

and corruption crimes, established an asset

declaration system, formally incorporated civil

society actors to anti-corruption policy

formulation, established harsher punishments for

existing crimes and established a framework for

international cooperation on corruption

investigations. In its review of the law, the UNODC

considered the legislation to be monumental in

relation to previous corruption legislation in the

country (UNODC 2018b).

Political party and campaign financing

There is currently a national system which finances

electoral campaigns with public funds, specifically

to parties who garnered at least 3% of the vote in a

previous election (Trans-Saharan Elections Project

2012). The National political financing law, Law N°

008-2009/AN, does not obligate political parties to

publish their political or campaign expenditures.

Parties are required to justify expenditures from

publicly ceded funds to the public accounts court

(PAC), yet these reports are not published by the

PAC. Failure to report expenditures to the PAC is

penalised by Law N° 004-2015/CNT.

There is no requirement for political parties to

publish private sources of funding or their

amounts. There are no limits or restrictions to

private sources of funding, nor are there limits to

anonymous or foreign donations (Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2018)

Similarly, there are no spending limits related to

political or campaign spending.

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Vote buying is illegal under the current penal code

(Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

2018).

Access to public information

Law N° 051-2015/CNT establishes the right to

access public information produced by government

agencies at no cost to the person requesting the

information. Nevertheless, observers note that

public information requests are rarely replied to,

and if they are responded to, the information given

is either incomplete or erroneous (Global Integrity

2018). As of 2018, the government recognised that

access to information was still not fully operational,

and committed to a plan to undertake major

reforms as part of its 2017-2019 (Open

Government Partnership 2019).

Burkina Faso has also implemented an open data

portal called the Burkina Faso Open Data Initiative

(BODI), which aims to provide governance data to

civil society, academics and citizens in general.

While the initiative has been well received by

international observers for its use of open formats

and its high degree of accessibility (Bello et al.

2006), critics note that only a limited amount of

government institutions currently provide and

update datasets, and some of those that do only

provide limited not-actionable information

(Stoneman 2015). Due to these critiques posed

through the Open Government Partnership, the

government has partnered with civil society

organisations and private data mining organisations

to develop new datasets (Iglesias 2019).

Conflicts of interest and asset declaration

Article 13 of Law N° 04-2015/CNT establishes the

mandatory submission of asset declarations for

cabinet members though directors within the

executive branch, legislators and members of the

judiciary to be published in the Burkinabé

government official bulletin. These asset

declarations must be presented annually and

within 30 days of assuming and leaving office. The

ASCE-LC is responsible for the reception, control

and publishing of these asset declarations (Global

Integrity 2018). While regional authorities must

also present asset declarations, local authorities

and councillors are left out of the current regime.

(Global Integrity 2018).

Conflicts of interest are addressed in Law N° 039-

2016/AN and in Article 6 and 7 of Law N° 04-2015.

Between them, the laws define conflicts of interest

and specify that public servants cannot participate in

state affairs where they have a direct conflict of

interest, and may suffer sanctions if they should be

discovered. In any case, conflicts should be declared

should the situation arise (UNODC 2018b). Despite

these stipulations, Burkinabé law does not establish

the procedures to declare conflicts of interest, does

not consider indirect conflicts of interest which may

be known to the civil servant, and does not specify

whether conflict of interest declarations should be

made public (UNODC 2018b).

Finally, Burkina Faso does not have any

restrictions on lobbyists or special interest group

representatives from becoming public officials, nor

does it restrict public employees from joining lobby

firms or interest groups following their time in the

public service (Global Integrity 2018).

Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing protection in Burkina Faso is

limited to Law N° 04-2015/CNT, which establishes

basic protections from retaliation or punishment

for experts or public officials who denounce

corruption. The law also establishes fines for public

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officials who undertake retribution against

whistleblowers and establishes a system of

reparations for those whistleblowers who have

suffered such retaliation (Global Integrity 2018).

The Ministry of Public Functions, Employment and

Social Protection has recently launched a channel

for users of public services, as well as government

workers to present complaints to competent

authorities that can investigate the matter (Open

Government Partnership 2019).

A 2004 decree on police conduct entrenched

citizens’ right to denounce police abuse, including

corruption, and established a protocol for such

denunciations (Transparency International and

Damiba 2006). As of 2016, the national human

rights commission assumed the responsibility of

receiving allegations of abuse of human rights from

citizens and members of the police (Global

Integrity 2018).

Institutional framework

Burkina Faso has several institutions responsible for

investigating corruption and providing oversight for

government institutions and processes.

Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat et de Lutte

contre la Corruption (ASCE-LC)

The Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat et de

Lutte contre la Corruption (Higher Authority for

State Control and the Fight Against Corruption,

ASCE-LC) established by law N° 04-2015/CNT as

the national anti-corruption body of the country.

The ASCE-LC is the successor to the Autorité

Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat, and has since

integrated the High Commission for the

Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities, the

State Inspector General, and the National

Commission for the Fight against Fraud.

The ASCE-LC is charged with, “prevention and

fight against corruption and related offences to

promote integrity and probity in the public, private

and civil society sectors; control of public services

to ensure compliance with laws and regulations as

well as the optimisation of the performance of

these services; and the coordination and

supervision of the administrative bodies for the

control and fight against corruption and related

offences” (Ibriga 2018). The ASCE-LC is also

responsible for receiving and controlling

presentations of asset declarations by public

officials (Global Integrity 2018).

The ASCE-LC experienced a significant

strengthening with the passing of Organic Law N°

082-2015 /CNT. The law transferred the ASCE-LC

from the office of the prime minister, and granted it

autonomous constitutional status within the office

of the presidency. An orientation council was

established, comprising of three representatives

from the public sector (from all three branches of

government), the public sector (from chambers of

commerce, the order of chartered accountants and

the bar association) and civil society and media

organisations. This orientation council provides

guidance to the ASCE-LC as well as manages the

process for vetting and selecting the comptroller

general who runs the institution for a five year

mandate after a formal appointment by the

president.

Furthermore, Organic Law 082-2015/CNT also

establishes that the budget cannot be less than

0.1% of the national budget, grants immunity to

controller generals during their mandate, and

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allows the ASCE-LC to hire experts without going

through other state hierarchies.

In 2015, the ASCE-LC opened itself to peer review

by representatives of the UNODC and other West

African anti-corruption agencies to adjudicate its

operations relative to the Jakarta Principles of anti-

corruption agencies (Ibriga 2018). Currently, the

ASCE-LC operates with a permanent staff of 27 and

a budget of US$2.5 million.

The ASCE-LC has seen considerable improvement

in its performance since 2015: in 2014, 10

investigations were brought forward to the

judiciary, while 2017, more than 70 investigations

were presented to the judiciary (Ibriga 2018).

Nevertheless, it takes an average of 10 months from

the time the ASCE-LC receives a complaint to the

moment that complaint is processed (Global

Integrity 2018). In addition, a large number of

corruption cases referred to the prosecutors are

still pending years later, and ASCE-LC

recommendations are often not followed by action

(World Bank 2018b). To ameliorate the situation,

in 2017 the government has launched a process to

install special judicial units to deal with economic

and financial crime, with the objective of speeding

up casework (Jeune Afrique 2017).

The ASCE-LC is also reportedly constrained by the

fact that the government has not yet adopted the

implementing decrees that would allow the body to

operate freely, meaning that in practice it is very

difficult to recruit addition staff to verify asset

declarations or investigate corruption cases

(LibreInfo 2019).

Public accounts court (Cour des comptes)

Established in 2002, the public accounts court is

responsible for auditing the government’s accounts

and complements the functions of the ASCE-LC. It

has historically been a major player in anti-

corruption politics in the country. Despite its

trajectory, recommendations posed by the PAC are

seldom incorporated and PAC reports are often not

released to the public (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018;

Global Integrity 2018).

National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI)

Created in 1998, CENI is composed of 15 members,

including representatives from civil society

organisations and major political parties (Santiso

and Loada 2003). As of 2000, it is monitored and

controlled by the constitutional council, a body of

the supreme court.

Both the CENI and the constitutional council were

criticised in 2015 for failing to intervene after the

transitional government amended the electoral code

to exclude legislators who had supported

Compaoré’s latest constitutional reform from

running for the 2015 elections (Hagberg et al. 2017),

a policy which in part led to the 2015 coup attempt.

Authority for the Regulation of Public Procurement

(Autorité de régulation de la commande publique,

ARCOP)

The ARCOP was created in 2014 by Decree N°

2014-554/PRES/PM, replacing the Authority for

the Regulation of Public Procurement (Autorité de

Regulation des Marchés Publics, ARMP) and the

Inspection General d’État which preceded it. The

ARCOP is a permanent secretariat under the

authority of the prime minister’s office and is

charged with controlling and directing public

procurement and civil service hiring. While

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executive functions of the ARCOP fall under the

jurisdiction of a secretary with a mandate of four

years, it also operates under the directives of two

tripartite councils composed of civil society, public

sector and private sector representatives.

Unlike its predecessors, the ARCOP has

considerable powers to investigate and sanction

corruption, as well as the ability to conduct audits

of all areas of the executive branch. The ARCOP has

a mandate to publish its reports and, importantly,

can conduct surprise audits on all ministries. In

May 2018, the ARCOP undertook a comprehensive

risk analysis of all government bodies’ accounts

and activities, and developed an action plan in

order to address these risks systematically (ARCOP

2019). The results of the action plan, however, will

not known until 2020 when the 2019 report is

published. In its most recent 2018 report, the

ARCOP made several observations regarding the

decreasing amount of contracts awarded via public

bidding and noted the barring of 20 companies

from participating in procurement processes due to

acts of corruption of fraud. (Nabole 2019)

Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic

Promotion (Ministère de la justice, des droits

humains et de la promotion civique, MJDHPC)

The MJDHPC is charged with assisting the judicial

sector with its investigations related to corruption

in the executive branch, as well as supporting

general judicial actions. It has recently established

new specialised judicial centres to deal with

economic and financial crimes. As part of a

partnership with Transparency International,

REN-LAC and the World Bank, as well as with

peer-revision by other West African governments,

the ministry has established two centres for the

judicial branch to properly investigate economic

crimes (Open Government Partnership 2019).

Ombudsperson (Médiateur du Faso)

The national ombudsperson was created in 1994,

basing itself on the model of the French

ombudsperson. Its primary responsibility is

providing legal protection to citizens against all

incorrect use of public power or public sector

inaction (Le Médiateur du Faso 2019). Recently,

based on developments of national anti-corruption

and access to information legislation, the office of

the ombudsperson has incorporated whistleblower

protection and access to public information into the

current agenda, though no notable case has yet to

be brought up by the ombudsperson.

Other stakeholders

One issue that complicates the oversight role that

media, civil society and citizens should exercise is

the lack of reliable public sources of information

about government activity, the performance of

public administration and corruption. Most official

websites are not updated and several ministries

provide no information about their activities.

Media

Article 2 of the constitution and the 1993

information code guarantee freedoms of

expression, information, and the press (Asante

2015). According to Reporters Without Border's

2019 World Press Freedom Index, Burkina Faso is

ranked 36 out of 180 countries, with a score of

24.53, making Burkina Faso the 5th highest ranked

African country and “Africa’s success story”,

according to the organisation. (Reporters Without

Borders 2019). It scores 3 out of a possible 4 ,

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placing it among the highest scoring countries in

sub-Saharan Africa (Repucci 2019).

Burkina Faso’s darkest moment for freedom of the

press came in 1998 when Norberto Zongo, an

investigative journalist focusing on government

corruption was assassinated by a presidential

guard. Zongo’s murder sparked riots and led to

significant changes in the country’s attitude

towards freedom of the press, though harassment

still continues to be an issue for journalists (Asante

2015). In the following years, media organisations

took a more active role in sharing information with

official anti-corruption bodies (Asante 2015).

Burkinabé journalists also spearheaded the

establishment of the Norbert Zongo Cell for

Investigative Journalism in West Africa

(CENOZO), a network aimed to both protect West

African journalists reporting on corruption, as well

as to assist each other in corruption investigations

(UNODC 2015).

The High Council for Communication (CSC) is

responsible for controlling press standards and

applying censorship and uses various mechanisms,

including legal action, to sanction journalists. In

2014, journalist Konaté went to the African Court

on Human and Peoples’ Rights after being harshly

penalised for publishing content that portrayed the

government negatively. The court ruled in favour of

the defendant and set an important precedent for

press freedom in the country (Shelton 2015). The

ruling at African Court on Human and Peoples’

Rights, which came on the heels of the 2014

uprising, resulted in 2018 in defamation of the

government being decriminalised in the country

(Reporters Without Borders 2019).

Civil society

Freedom of assembly and association are protected

by the constitution and, since the 2014 popular

uprising, the legislative and executive branches of

government have initiated various mechanisms to

consult civil society organisations.

Civil society has been at the forefront of the debate

on corruption since the late 90s when several

organisations formed to address the issue, and

likewise played an important role in mobilising

people around the 2014 uprising and the 2015

protests against the attempted coup (Hagberg

2015).

The Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption

(REN-LAC), formed in 1997, associating civil

society groups, press, academics, diplomatic

services as well as representatives of legal bodies

and ministries (Luning 2010). REN-LAC has been

instrumental in shaping public perception of

corruption and providing policy solutions to the

national government. Critics, however, point to the

historic participation of representatives of national

ministries as a hindrance to comprehensive

responses to denounce corruption (Luning 2010).

REN-LAC offers an anti-corruption hotline to

denounce corruption, though there is little

information regarding actions taken from these

complaints or statistics about cases handled (REN-

LAC 2019b)

Since Sankara’s rule, trade unions have maintained

anti-corruption as a core value and have

recurrently joined anti-corruption protests

(Bonnecase 2015). Trade unions have maintained

an active role in national human rights coalitions

and, notably, in 2008, made up a large part of the

Coalition nationale de lutte contre la vie chère, la

corruption, la fraude, l’impunité et pour les libertés

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(Coalition against the High Cost of Living,

Corruption, Fraud, Impunity and for Freedoms), in

the course of intense protests against high food and

fuel prices (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018; Engels

2015).

Many civil society organisations were born from

the 2014 uprising to channel popular anger

towards constructive institutional development.

Balais Citoyén is a relatively new organisation born

out of the 2014 uprising which aims to engage

disaffected Burkinabé youth in national policy

debates (Bonnecase 2015). The group, started by

local musicians and journalists, has been key in

engaging youth in participatory mechanisms

promoted by the government (Frère and Englebert

2015). Other groups Citoyén africain pour la

Renaissance, and Front de Resistance Citoyenne

also formed around disaffected community groups,

such retirees, youth and women (Hagberg 2015).

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REN-LAC. 2011. Les présomptions de corruption dans les marchés publics au Burkina Faso. Les présomptions de corruption dans les marchés publics au Burkina Faso. REN-LAC. http://renlac.com/download/renlac/autres/PRESOMPTIONS-DE-CORRUPTION-DANS-LES-MARCHES-PUBLICS.pdf Reporters Without Borders. 2019. Burkina Faso : Real But Fragile Media Freedom. https://rsf.org/en/burkina-faso

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Keywords

Burkina Faso – extractive industries – health services

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