u L-L Determination of Fighting Strength USSR 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT

DETERMINATION OF FIGHTING STRENGTH, U.S.S.R

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VOLUME I - TEXT

Prepared under the direction of The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

by the Eastern Europea\ Section, European Branch,

Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service,,

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REGRADED

BY AUTHORITY OF

BY

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Table of Contents Page

A. Survey of Means Available 1 1. General Factors 1

a. National „ 1 (1) Political.. „ „. 1

(a) Introduction 1 (b) Density of Population 2 (c) Ethnic Groups 3

(1) General 3 (Z) Quantitative Ethnic Composition 3 (3) Languages 4 (? Religion 4

Ethnic Distribution of Peoples of the "* U.S.S.R 4

Indo-Europeans 4 Finno-Ugr ians 5 Japhetides ...» 6 Turkic peoples 6 Mongol- Tungus-Manchu 6

(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus 6 """ Languages 7

Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus 7 (d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R...* 8

(_1) From the Beginning to Rurik (4000 B.C.-860 A.D.) 9

(J2) Rurik to Genghis Khan (860-1237) 9 (3) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great (1237~" 1462) 10 (4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great "" (1462-1689) .o 10 (5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War ~ (1689-1853) 11

(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War """ (1853-1904) 12 (7) The Decay of Czarism (1904-1917) 13 (7F) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927), 13 (9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism ~ (1927-1942) 14

(e) Present Political Administration of the U.S.S.R 18 (1) Actual Political Administration of the "" U.S.S.R 18

Table of Contents (Contd.) Page

General Organization 18 Stalin. „ 18 Political Administrations 19 The Franchise and Party Cell 20 Territorial Division 21

(2) Theoretical Political Administration " of the U.S.S.R........... 21

State Organization 22 All Union Commissariats <>... 23 Party Organization 23

($) Administrative Divisions of the U".S*S.R* 23 (2 ) Economic Factors „ 25

(a) Availability of Strategical Materials 25 (b) Strategical and Critical Materials........ 27 (c) Production capacities. 39

Industrial production .' 39 Industrial production by zones..... 39 Zone of combat... 39 Zone of communications 40 •Northern Region 40

Agricultural Production and the Food

Estimate^of the present situation—

Central Industrial Region.... 41 Volga Region. 45 North Caucasus and Transcaucasia 46 Zone of the interior 55 Urals 58 West Siberia. 75 Central Asia 79 Prospects for increased industrial output 86

S ituation 88

general 88 Food and agricultural production by zones 93 Zone of Combat 93 Zone of Communications 93 Zone of the interior 100

(d) Maritime Shipping 103 Tonnage and Disposition. ...» 103 Types of ships 106 General operating conditions............ 106


(3) Psychological Factors 107 (a) Morale 107 (b) Training 108

Training Organization 108 (c) Capacity for United Effort. Ill (d) Inventiveness. Ill (e) Versatility Ill

(4) Information and Counter Information Facilities. 112 2. Factors directly applicable to the armed forces 114

j*. Strength and Characteristics ,. 114 (1) Army. . 114

(a) Strength. 114 (b) Organization 117 (o) Efficiency. 119

(2) Navy 120 (a) Strength.... .......... 120 (b) Organization. 122 (c) Efficiency. 122

(3) Air Forces. 123 (a) Strength 123 (b) Organization 123 (c) Aircraft production. 124 (d) Naval aviation 127 (e) Organization of Naval air forces... 128 (f) Sea plane production... 130

(4) Home Guard Troops 131 b. Characteristics of Personnel 131 """ (1) Basiq doctrines and command psychology of

military and naval leaders 131 (a) Basic doctrines 131 (b) Command psychology of military and naval

leaders 133 (2) Morale 135 (3) Stamina » 135

c. Characteristics of Materiel. 136 ~" (1) General......... 136

(2) The quality of design 136 (3) Armament (Ground Forces)........ 137

(a) Infantry. 137 (b) Cavalry.. 137 (o) Arti l lery 138 (d) Antiaircraft a r t i l l e ry 138

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(e) Coast artillery „ 138 (f) Engineer 138 (g) Chemical materiel 138 (h) Tanks „ 138

(4) Speed and radius of action (Ground Forces) 139 (5) Operating conditions (Ground Forces) 139 (6) Armament (Air Forces)... ..... 144 (7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces) 144 (8) Operating conditions (Air Forces )...„ 144 Facilities for logistical support...... .. 147 (1) Facilities for logistical support - general..,. 147 (2) Logistical and strategic importance of the

Soviet and Persian Gulf ports 149 (a) Vital supply ports 149 (b) Ports for local supply. 151 (c) Naval and operational bases............... 151

(3) Port facilities: Soviet ports.. 152 (4) Port facilities: Pahlevi and the Persian Gulf

ports 152 (5) Airfields......................... 152 (6) Railroads 159

(a) General...... 159 (b) Supply of the western front... 161

(7) Roads 170 (8) Shipping available for support of forces 170 (9) Commercial trucking available 171

(10) Air transport available... .... 171 (11) Local supplies available...; <> 1 7 2

(a) Zone of Combat. * 172 (_l) Kola Peninsula 172 (2) Kandalaksha- Tikhvin. 172 ("3) Tikhvin - Orel 172 (T) Orel - Rostov 172

(b) Zone of Communications 173 (12) Replacement of personnel. 174

(a) Military forces ..«. 174 (1) Numbers 174 (2) Training and mobilization procedures. 175

(b) industrial and agricultural mobilization.. 177 (13) Evacuation facilities. 178 (14) Communications 178

IV


(15) Vulnerable Objectives. .... 179 B. Survey of the Characteristics of the Area 182

1. Hydrography. 182 a. General 182 _b. European Russia 183

Volga River 184 Kama River 184 Don River . „ 186

c. Transcaucasia 187 £. Siberia 187 "e. Soviet Central Asia , ,. 189

2. "Topography. 200 a. General 200 V. European Russia . . 200 c. The Caucasus 203 ji. The Ural Mountains 205 e. Siberia... ... . 205 T. Soviet Central Asia... e......... 206 jg. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia.. 209 h. The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands 211 T. The Altai Mountain System. 214

3. Weather.. 216 a. Temperature , 216 b". Frozen Subsoils. ». 218 ~c. Precipitation 218 £. Winds 221

4. Health factors 222 a. General 222 b". Sanitation 222 "cT. Medical Facilities 223 "d. Medical Problems• 225

5. "Distance Table 227 6. Vital Areas 227 7. Fortifications 229

C. Conclusions as to Fighting Strength 234 1. Strength Factors: To be considered in relation to

Weakness Factors 234 a. Ethnic, historical and political 234 "F. Economic 235 "c". Psychological 235 "d". Intelligence and counter-intelligence 235


e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces 236 7. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.. 236 £. Materiel... 237 h. Logistics 237 T. Geographic 238 Weakness Factors: To be considered in relation to Strength Factors 239 a. Ethnic, historical and political.... 239 b. Economic 240 £. Psychological. 240 d. Intelligence ».... 240 e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces 240 T. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.. 241 j;. Materiel 241 h. Logistics o 241 T. Vulnerable objectives 242 3» Geographic 242

3. Conclus ions 242

VI

BLES

Title Page

A. Survey of Means Available , 1 1. General Factors i e..0. 1

Table I: Population totals 3 II: Chronology of Russian history 15

III: Critical materials 29 IV: Pipelines in the Caucasus , 49 Vt Black Sea ports.. „ 54

VI: Caspian Sea ports 55 VII: Mineral production in the zone of the interior. 56

VIII: Ural-Volga refineries 64 IX: Non-ferrous metals and minerals in the Urals... 66 X: Power stations in the Urals 69

XI: Industries in the Urals 72 XII: Industrial resources of West Siberia.... 76

XIII: Industrial resources of Central Asia 81 XIV: Agriculture - Northern Region .95 XV: Agriculture - Central Region 96

XVI: Agriculture - Middle and Lower Volga Region.... 97 XVII: Agriculture - North Caucasus and Transcaucasus. 98

XVIII; Agriculture - Ural Region 101 XIX: Agrioulture - Siberia (West of Lake Baikal).... 102 XX: Agriculture - Central Asia 104

2. Factors Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces 114 Table I: Order of battle 115

II: Naval forces .... 120 III: Airplane numerical strength according to type:

ju March, 1941.... .....,..., 125 W March, 1942 126

IV: Infantry weapons 140 V: Anti-tank - anti-aircraft weapons 141

VI: Artillery 142 VII: Motorization - mechanization 143

VIII: Characteristics of airplanes 145 IX: Port facilities - Soviet ports. 153 X: Port facilities - Pahlcvi and the Persian

Gulf ports 157 XI: Daily supply requirements (maintenance only)

of large Soviet units.. 165

Vll

LIST OF TABLES (Contd.)

Title Page

XII: Rail shipping weights and spaces, initial equipment, of large Soviet units <, 166

XIII: List of vulnerable objectives, Western Front, U.S.S.R 180

B. Survey of the Characteristics of the Area 182 Table I: Principal irrigated areas 195

II: Rivers and lakes at present exploited for electric power 198

III: U.S.S.R. Coast and Port Defenses 231

1 '*, , i J * ' 'l I i '

List of Maps (Volume II)

1. Density of Population in the U.S.S.R. 2. Ethnic Distribution in the U.S.S.R. 3. Ethnio Distribution in the Caucasus. 4. Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R. 5. Political Divisions of the U.S.S.R. as of April, 1941. 6. Industrial Centers of the U.S.S.R. 7. a. Agricultural Areas of European Russia.

"F. Agricultural Areas of Asiatic Russia. 8. Armed Forces U.S.S.R. 9. a. Northern Routes into Soviet Russia.

"F. Southern Routes into Soviet Russia. 10. a. Air Fields Supporting the Western Front,

"b. Sketch Map of Tenth Kilometer Airdrome. Is. Sketch Map of Kego Island Airdrome. d. Sketch Map of Yagonik Airdrome.

11. "Probable Railroad Supply Network, Western Front, May 1942. 12. Vital Areas and Vulnerable Objectives. 13. Physical Map of the Soviet Union. 14. Natural Regions of the Caucasus. 15. The Kirgiz-Tadzhik Highlands (T'ien Shan Range and Pamirs), 16. The Altai Mountains and Kuznetsk Basin. 17. Defenses of Murman Bay and Kola Inlet. 18. Defenses of Archangel Bay and the Mouth of the North Dvina,

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IV.., if * * -•> m ' «

A. Survey of Means Available.

1. General Factors.

a. National.

(1) Political.

(a) Introduction. The people of the U.S.S.R. in their numbers and distribution, in their ethnic divisions, in their historical development, and in their present political administration, exhibit major strengths and some weaknesses.

The population of the U.S.S.R. in 1939 was exceeded only by India and China; losses have reduced it by 30$. Two-thirds of the remaining population live west of the Volga River.

The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the U.S.S.Rf 16 major nationalities (represented in constituent republics) and innumerable minorities--renders uniform government policy difficult. Separatism is not, howevef, an important problem. Great Russians (58y£) and other Indo-Europeans comprise B0% of the population; Turkic tribes, 14$; and the rest, 6%. The Russians are still largely Greek Orthodox in religion; most of the Turkic peoples are Sunnite Moslems. The Russians live largely in the cultivable areas of European Russia and Western Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere. The Finno-Ugrians live in the forests and tundras of Northern Russia and Siberia west of the Yenisei River- The Turkic groups predominate everywhere in Central Asia except the Ferghana Valley, which is Tadzhik (Indo-European) territory. The Mongol-Tungus-Manchu are found primarily in the Far East; west of Lake Baikal, the principal groups are the Kalmyk along the Volga and near Biisk, the Buriat north of Irkutsk, and the Tungus along the Yenisei River. The Japhetides are indigenous to the Caucasus. In general, one-third of the population of that area is Russian; the rest, including the Japhetides, are quite heterogeneous, the result of the crossroads location of the Caucasus since time immemorial.

Russian history is the record of centralized authority--Czarist or Communist--uniting a confusion of peoples and environments. Russia's strength has been proportional to the firmness of its ruler. The government was strong during the successful repulses of Charles XII and Napoleon; weak, before the Mongol conquest and the defeat by the Central Powers in World War j. Russia's outstanding

^-J^wi'«^uV]iriiH!l

weakness has been its technological backwardness. Nevertheless, its record of territorial expansion has only been equaled by the colonial expansion of the British Empire.

Nine periods may be noted in the historical development of Russia. An obscure early history from about 4000 B.C. was climaxed by the formation of a Slavic state at Novgorod under Rurik, about 860 A.D. However, Kiev was the dominant Russian principality until the Mongol conquest in 1237. The Mongol period, with its strong oriental influences, lasted for more than two centuries. Russia's growing nationalism after the overthrow of the Mongols was influenced by orientation to the west, with Polish, English and Dutch contacts. Siberia was conquered at this time; but internal dissension was great. From Peter the Great to the Crimean War, great territorial expansion and westernization stabilized Russia externally, internally and diplomatically as a European power. Between the Crimean and the Russo-Japanese Wars, Russia was on the defensive in Europe, weakened by internal corruption. Expansion in the Far East and Central Asia continued, however. The decay of Czarism progressed until Russian defeat and revolution in 1917. The Communist Party assumed power and began the formation of the U.S.S.R. After 1927, Stalin emerged as sole leader of the U.S.S.R. Gradually, he orientated Russia toward nationalism. On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked Russia.

Theoretically, the Soviet Union is a socialist state operating with minimal central control for the good of the proletariat, whose will is expressed through a hierarchy of elective Soviets.

The present government of the U.S.S.R. is actually the dictatorship of Stalin, head of the Communist Party which •shapes basic policies. This dictatorship is guaranteed by the police activities of the N.K.V.D. Government leaders are prominent in ratio to their Party status; the most important state offices are invariably occupied by Party leaders. All phases of life in the U.S.S.R. are centrally governed; franchise as such is farcical. All votes are determined by party will; oppositionists are liquidated. Territorial administrative divisions, based on nationality and economic efficiency, are unimportant in themselves.

(b) Density of Population. (See Map 1 and Table I).

The U.S.S.R. in 1939 had a population of 170,000,000, exceeded only by India and China; conquests the next year gained 20,000,000 more. Russia's most densely populated areas, however, containing 30$ of the population, were lost at the outset of tho war. Of the total remaining population, over two-thirds is west of the Volga, including the Caucasus. The Ural

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industrial areas, Western Siberia south of the Vasyuganye (or Great Siberian Marshland) and north of Kazakhstan, and the oases of Central Asia contain most of the remainder. Other Siberian and Central Asian regions are sparsely settled, mostly by nomadic tribes untutored in the needs of modern warfare and industry necessary to support the Soviet army. The high birth and death rates result in an unusually large proportion of children. Fifty-two per cent of the population is female; forty-eight per cent, male. Total manpower between 15 and 49 years is 40,000,000. Most of the U.S.S.R. is rural; Moscow (4,137,000) and Leningrad (3,194,000) are the only cities with a population over one million. Concentration of the population between the front line and the Volga allows massive resistance and construction of dense fortifications Loss of this area, however, would deplete Russia's manpower.

Table I. Population Totals.

Political Division. Population. Density of Population. (2.59 Sq. Kil. = 1 Sq. Mi Sq. Kil (Sq. Mi.)

U.S.S.R. 170,000,000 6.7 ( 2.6) R.S.F.S.R. 108,809,469 6.5 ( 2.5) Ukrainian S.S.R. 31,850,307 66.0 (25.5) Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. 3,209,727 37.2 (14.4) Georgian S.S.R. 3,542,289 50.9 (19.7) Armenian S.S.R. 1,281,599 42.7 (16.5) Turkmen S.S.R. Uzbek S.S.R.

1,253,985 6,282,445

2.8 16.9

( LI) ( 6.5)

Tadzhik S.S.R. 1,485,091 10.3 ( 4.0) Kazakh S.S.R. 6,145,937 2.2 ( .8) Kirghiz S.S.R. 1,459,301 7.4 ( 2.9)

(c) Ethnic Groups.

(1) General. The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. renders any uniform government policy difficult. The Soviet government controls these numerous peoples by exercising strict rule from Moscow administered through policing and espionage—the N.K.V.D. and the Communist Party—and by creating territorial-administrative divisions according to racial differences, thus fostering limited local autonomy. Each of the 16 constituent republics represents a national majority; political subdivisions, national minorities. The long historical intermingling of these peoples has reduced separatism somewhat. The melting-pot tradition illustrates great assimilative powers and facilitates further expansion and absorption.

(2) Quantitative Ethnic Composition. Great

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Russians form 58% of the population, Ukrainians 17$, White Russians 3$, Uzbeks 3$, Tatars 3$, Kazakhs 2$, Jews 2$, Azerbaidzhans 1$, Georgians 1$, and Armenians 1$. No other nationality listed in the 1939 census numbers 1$. Russians and other Indo-Europeans comprise about 80$ of the population, Turkic tribes 14$, and the rest 6$.

(Z) Languages. Each nationality speaks its native tongue, but Russian~is the secondary language in all U.S.S.U. republics. Russian is taught in all schools, and since the Soviets simplified Czarist forms its use has become much more widespread.

The four general language groups in the U.S.S.R. comprise the following percentages of the population*

Indo-Europeans, 80$; Russians 78$, Armenians 1%, Poles and Germans 1$.

Altaic peoples, 16$; Turkic branch 14$, Manchu-Tungus-Mongol branch 1$.

Finno-Ugrians, 1$.

Japhetides, peoples living exclusively in the Caucasus, 3%; Georgians 1%, Abkhaz-Cherkess group, Chechen, and Lesghin tribes, 2$.

Semites, mainly Jews, 1$. (4) Religion. Russians primarily are believers

of the Greek Orthodox faith, the official State religion of Czarist Russia. There are some Roman Catholics and Protestants. Most of the Turkic tribes are Sunnite Moslems. Mongols as a rule are Buddhists. Russian political domination has had little influence on the native religions of nationalities, except for the present younger generation of Russians who have been versed in Communism and may be generally antireligious.

(5) Ethnic Distribution of Peoples in the

U.S.S.R. (See Map 2). Indo-Europeans, mainly Russians, live all over the U.S.S.R., largely in cultivable areas of European Russia and Western Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere. The portage system had great influence on Russian expansion and settlement- Russians are overwhelmingly Slav, but near ethnic boundaries show marked admixture with neighboring nationalities. Great Russians, forming tho bulk of the entire population, live mostly in the R.S.F.S.R. in European Russia around Moscow. They were known as Muscovite Russians, having settled around Moscow after the Mongol invasion forced them from Kiev. They were

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modified somewhat by association with Finno-Ugrians, mainly Finns and Estonians. In Asiatic Russia, Great Russians have spread in a dense belt along the cultivable prairie land lying between the 50th and 60th parallels as far as the Yenisei River, along which a ribbon of Russian penetration has reached the Arctic. Russian settlements are scattered like islands in the Turkic republics. Ukrainians, known also as Little Russians, live mostly in the Ukrainian "373TE. in "the heart of old Russia around Kiev. They have been modified by their association with the Germans, Austrians, Poles, and Jews. Since the war Poles and Germans, formerly concentrated along the Volga in European Russia in R.S.F.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R., have been moved to Central Asia and Siberia. Tadzhik, an Indo-European tribe of Turkestan, occupies the Tadzhik S.S.R. The Tadzhik speak New Persian, but have been influenced greatly by Turkic culture. In the Tadzhik S.S.R. are numerous Iranians, the original inhabitants of southern Turkestan who were either driven out or physically modified by numerous invasions.*

Finno-Ugrians are located in the Kola peninsula and in northern Russia east of "bhe 40th meridian between the 60th and 65th parallels in a belt lying north of Slavic preponderance

* The following peoples of the U.S.S.R. live in territory now under German occupation:

"White Russians are concentrated mostly in the White Russian S.S.R., in the regions occupied after the Mongolian invasion. Though their association primarily with the Poles and Lithuanians has influenced them somewhat, they have probably retained more distinctive characteristics of their race than the Great Russians or Ukrainians.

Baltic peoples—Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians—are a mixture of old Indo-European and Finno-Ugrian groups and live on the Baltic Sea in their respective republics. Racial identity of the Lithuanians is controversial; it is probably more closely related to the Slav than the Finno-Ugrian, although there is some admixture of both. Their language is Balto-Slavic. Latvians are a branch of Lithuanians, though the Latvian S.S.R. is populated partly by Estonians. Livonians, former inhabitants of the present Latvia and now practically extinct, were more closely related linguistically to Estonians than Lithuanians. Estonians are Finno-Ugrians, and havo the strongest ethnic distinctiveness "of the Baltic peoples.

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and extending to the Yenisei, especially along the Ob River. The Finns have intermingled with the incoming Slav population. Their culture is most evident among the forests and marshes south of the tundra zone, and along the central course of the Volga* Karelians inhabit the Karelian-Finnish S.S.R.; Samoyeds, ancient inhabitants of Northern Siberia, live in the tundras north of the 65th parallel to the northeast of the Finns; and Mari (Chuvash) and Komi (Permians), the Ifoscow and Molotov areas respectively. Other Finno-Ugrians, numerically small, are scattered over northern Russia.

Japhetides. (See (6)).

Turkic peoples, members of the Altaic family and second in number to the Russians, live mostly in Turkestan and among Russians in southern Siberia and Tungus in northern Siberia. The Sarts, Iranian Turks, live in the Uzbek and Turkmen republics. The Kazakh, known originally as Kirghiz-Kazakh, live in the Kazakh S.S.R. and in the Bashkir Oblast of the R.S.F.S.R. The Kirghiz, a branch of the Kirghiz known originally as Kara-Kirghiz, inhabit the Kirghiz S.S.R. near the Tyan-Shan Mountains. The Uzbek, a conglomerate of Turkic tribes, with a mixture of Mongolic and Iranian elements, and speaking the Turkic language, occupy the Uzbek S.S.R. Uzbek is related to Kirghiz, and together form the bulk of the population of Turkestan. The Turkmen, a Turkic tribe closely related to the Kirghiz, particularly the Uzbek, influenced more by the Iranians than by any other Turkestan tribe, live in the Turkmen S,S,R. The Yakut live in northern Siberia south of the Khatanga Gulf. The Kara-Kalpak live in the Uzbek S.S.R, Lesser Turkic groups are scattered among the Russians in the Altaic Krai,

Mongol-Tungus-Manchu, members of the Altaic family, are thinly scattered over most of the Eastern Siberian Krai. The principal Mongols are the Kalmyk (Oirot), who live in the Kalmyk A.S.S.R. near the Volga mouth and in the southern part of the Altaic Krai near Biisk, and the Buriat, in the Krasnoyarsk Krai north of Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. The Tungus live in the northern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as over an enormous territory to the east,

(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus. The peoples of the Caucasus are divided into three general groups. Russian conquerors and other Indo-Europeans, including the Iranian Ossetes, comprise about six of the ten millions; aborigines classified as Japhetides, having no recognizable racial or linguistic connection with any people outside the Caucasus, number less than a million; aborigines having racial affilitations outside the Caucasus comprise the rest. The only nationalities including mare than 1% of the population are: Russians 30$; Azerbaidzhans 15$, Armenians 13$, Georgians 11$, the Leaghian tribes 5$, the Chechen 2$, and tho Abkhas-Cherkess group Z%.

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Languages* The languages of the Caucasus, like the physical anthropology, are very mixed. Most of these peoples use their native dialect for ordinary conversation and the ancient language of their nationality for church and literary use. There are five language groups in the Caucasus: Japhetides, 20$ — Georgians 11$, Abkhaz 1$, Cherkess 1$, Chechen 2$, Lesghian tribes 5%; Japhetized Indo-Europeans 3$ — Kurd 1$, Ossete 1$, Tate 1$; Indo-Europeans 46$ ~ Russians 30%, Armenians 13$, Greeks 1$, Germans 1$, others 1$; Semitic peoples, Jews, 1$; Turkic peoples 18$ — Azerbaidzhan 15$, Kumyk ljTJ Nogais 1$, Kirghiz 1$; Manchu-Tungus-Mongol, Kalmyk, 1$.

Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus. (See Map 3). The ethnic groups live mostly in the localities cited; however, since many of them are nomads, small bands of various affiliations may be scattered throughout the Caucasus. Georgians, Japhetides of the southern Caucasus, live in the Georgian (Gruzian) S.S.R. Abkhazians, Japhetides of the west Caucasus, of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group, inhabit the Abkhazian A.S.S.R. Cherkess, also called Adygei, Japhetides of the Abkhaz-Cherkess group consisting of many differently named tribes living in the west Caucasus, occupy the Cherkess Autonomous Oblast and the Adygei Autonomous Oblast. Kabardin, the chief tribe of the Cherkess, live in the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. The Chechen group, Japhetides of the east Caucasus, dwell in the Checheno-Ingushian A.S.S.R. The Lesghian group, also east Caucasian Japhetides, are Dagestan tribes comprising the population of the Dagestan A.S.S.R. and living' in the Agerbaidzhan S<S.R. Kurds, Japhetized Indo-Europeans, are found in the Armenian S.S.R. Ossetes, Japhetized Indo-Europeans, live in central Caucasus in the North and South Osetian Autonomous Oblasts. Tates, Japhetized Indo-Europeans, live in the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. Russians comprise the majority of the population in the north Caucasus, particularly in the Krasnodar Krai. Great Russians live all over the Caucasus, evidently in regions sparsely settled, and Little Russians live in Krasnodar Krai and Ukrainian S.S.R. Armenians, Indo-Europeans, live in the Armenian S.S.R. Greeks, Indo-Europeans, are located mostly in the region of the Sea of Azov. Germans, Indo-Europeans, are located in the region of the Sea of Azov, and in the North Caucasus in the Krasnodar Krai and Ordzhonikidze Krai. Jews, the leading Semitic peoples in the Caucasus, though there are some Aissor and Arabs, live in colonies in the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and on the southern shores of the eastern arm of the Sea of Azov in the Krasnodar Krai. Those dwelling generally in the region of the 42nd parallel are mostly Georgian and Gorsky or Mountain Jews, and differ somewhat from the Armenian Jews. The Jews are ancient dwellers of the country, having mixed with the Caucasian population and adopted the speech and

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customs of those peoples with whom they came .in contact. Azerbaidzhani, belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic peoples occupy the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. and are found in the Dagestan A.S.S.R. They are scattered through the Armenian S.S.R., especially in the Nakhichevan A.S.S.R,, an Azerbaidzhan province in the southern part of the Armenian S.S.R. Kumyk belong to the Turkic Branch of Altaic peoples and live in northeastern part of Dagestan A.S.S.R. Nogais belong to the Turkic Branch of the Altaic peoples and inhabit the Steppes between the Kuma and Terek Rivers, in the Northern Dagestan A.S.S.R. and eastern part of the Ordzhonikidze Krai on the Caspian Sea. The Kirghiz of the Caucasus are a branch of the Kazakh (formerly called Kirghiz-Kaisak) a Turkic tribe inhabiting the Kazakh S.S.R.

(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R. (See Map 4 and Table II). Russian history is the record of a centralized authority—Czarist or Communist—uniting a confusion of peoples and environments. Russia has been strong if controlled by iron-clad rule, weak otherwise. Itsfetory is one of alternating influences from the East and I/Vest thrusting modern progress onto a country characteristically backward, yet constantly expanding and growing in power. Its present outstanding weakness, technological dependence on the West, was lessened by Stalin*s forced industrialization; in the past, Peter's westernization and Genghis Khan's orientalization similarly raised Russia's cultural level#

The people of Russia have been restless pioneers. Peasant families and half-wild Cossacks, fighting and mixing with native tribes, expanded Russia. Their stamina in war and peace has been incredible. Ignorant yet avidly eager for knowledge, stolid yet stubborn and undisciplined, compassionate and callous, submissive and rebellious, the Russians have been an enigmatic people.

Historically, Russia's strength has been proportionate to that of its ruler. With stable government Russia has resisted tremendous onslaughts as those by Charles XII and Napoleon; with internal weakness it fell to the Mongols and collapsed in World War I. Dictators, organizers,, realists desirous of personal aggrandizement and sovereign control have done most for Russia. Her innumerable factions have demanded a firm, even ruthless, rule. Fear and terror have been determining factors; liberty and justice according to western standards have been unknown. Rather, revolutionary tendencies, always latent in Russia, have been used by strong rulers for the co

ordinated development and expansion of the country, Exiles conquered and cultivated Siberia.

Loyal opposition to the government and democratic processes have never been a constructive influence in Russia. Many leaders had liberalistic aspirations, but mild liberalism coexisting with secret terrorism simply resulted in internal corruption and finally disaster.

(1) From the Beginning to Rurik. (4000 B.C. 860 A.D.). Russia's history begins in Central Asia at Anau where domesticated horses and camels were found about 4000 B.C. and in the North Caucasus where a pastoral and metal-working civilization connected with Mesopotamia existed about 3500 B.C. The political unit of Russia, however, did not appear until the tenth century A.D. Slavic culture appeared about 3000 B.C. Eastern Slavs were not in Russia until 400 A.D.; they settled in the Ukraine near the Pripet Marshes, a region which became the melting pot for three groups of peoples; hunters and fishermen from Scandinavia, probably Finno-Ugrians; peasant farmers from the Ukraine and Balkans, probably Indo-Europeans; and nomads from Central Asia and the North Caucasus, probably Altaic peoples, mainly Turks, Huns, and Scyths.

The numerous cultures of these peoples were leavened by influence from the West, primarily by Greek colonists in the Crimea about the fifth century B.C., the Romans and Persians following the Macedonian Wars by the second century B.C., and Teutons and Huns migrating from the north and south respectively between the fourth and sixth centuries A.D. Byzantine culture exerted the greatest influence on Russia. Trade routes between Scandinavia and Constantinople crossed Russia. Merchants, particularly from Byzantium, did not attempt to conquer Russia, but their culture strongly influenced Russian life, religion and art. Scandinavian Vikings called Varangians or Rus penetrated northern Russia, and gradually established political domination over the Slav communities. According to tradition the Scandinavian Rurik ruled in Novgorod, the largest and northernmost of the Russian principalities, in the ninth century. He is recognized as the founder of the Russian dynasty.

(Z) From Rurik to Genghis Khan (860-1237). Several Slavic states ruled by Grand Dukes developed. Having no central ruler encouraged rivalry and internal warfare. Disunity made Russia an easy prey to the invading Golden Horde. Kiev, the heart of old Russia, was the most powerful and centrally located of the 12 Russian principalities of the Middle Ages. Trade with the Byzantine Empire continued; its influence predominated during the reigns of

iUbh

Russia's first rulers of consequence, Vladimir and Yaroslav. Shifting trade routes and internal dissension, together with the Mongol invasion, caused the downfall of Kiev and, with" it, Russia.

(£) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great. (1237 1462. The invasion of the Mongols and allied Turks or Tatars resulted in a great physical movement of Eastern and Western peoples converging on Russia. The Tatars settled particularly around Kazan, their capital; introduced Oriental culture and Islam; and extended their influence to the Arctic. Western influence resulted primarily from emissaries sent from foreign courts to Genghis Khan, the most important being Friar Rubruk, a Franciscan monk, whose medieval travels did much to westernize Russians of that day.

Under the Mongols Russia was centralized and unified. Superior to their conquerors, the Russians were never absorbed by them, although the mingling of Oriental and Occidental cultures was profoundly felt. Traces of Mongol culture are evident in Russia today. Under the Tatars Russian leaders were responsible to a higher authority; they united against the common foe, and built a protective system based on conciliation and submission. Technical advances resulted. The development of horsemanship bore particular relation to the growth of Cossacks, free men who ran away from the crown and colonized on Russian borders. Culturally, the Turks brought in a strong sophisticating influence, particularly through luxuries and literature, from Persia and eventually from India. Oriental governmental methods emphasizing centralized authority weakened the western feudalistic system then extant in Russia; and with the rising absolutism of rulers, Grand Dukes and their Imperial Guards became supreme.

Oriental influence was gradually weakened by the rise of a national center at Moscow and a national leader, Ivan the Great. The political unit of Russia emerged, the Tatars were overthrown, the Hanseatic League was broken, and Russian influence was extended to the Urals. Russia became a Western power.

(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great (14621689. Russia's growing naTionalism was influenced by orientation to the west primarily through contact with the Poles in the Ukraine, and English and Dutch traders in Northern Russia and Siberia. Polish dominance in the Ukraine, responsible for present differences between Great Russia and the Ukraine, Cossack territory at that time, increased until Russia defeated Poland in battle. Trade with England and Holland resulted from the opening of the Archangel route, spurred the development of trading cities in Northern Russia, and stimulated Siberian exploration where fur trade attracted Russians and Europeans. Colonization

wai^J t(%

in Siberia began, especially by Cossack pioneers under Yermak; Cossack power increased. Internal government was strengthened somewhat by the "Zemski sobor", a representative assembly created mainly to oppose the boyars. The church became independent of Constantinople. Printing was introduced.

After the death of Ivan the Terrible no national sovereign until Peter the Great was able to control the conflicts between boyars and lower classes, principally Cossacks. A period of utter confusion resulted, until the rise of the Romanov dynasty gradually restored order.

(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War (1689

1853). Great territorial expansion and westernization stabilized Russia internally and diplomatically as a European power. Fear of her increasing strength finally brought on the Crimean War- The search for technological equality with the West was accompanied by industrialization and revolutionary uprisings.

Russia's contact with the West increased during the reign of Peter the Great; and her position as a European power was established when Peter defeated Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava, thereby gaining an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Peter stimulated scientific exploration in Russia, founded the Russian Academy of Sciences after the model of the London Royal Society, and introduced many other ideas to Russia after his tour of Europe. In addition he founded the city of St. Petersburg as Russia's first industrial and shipping center, the capital and gateway to the west.

Russia under Catherine the Great continued to expand mainly in Poland—annexed after three partitions—the Caucasus, and the Balkans. A Pan-Slavic movement was started. Internally, Catherine was responsible for building up Cossack and German influence. She integrated the Cossacks into the Russian imperial system by giving them a recognized political status and by transplanting their leaders on various estates. She fostered the settlement of the Volga Germans whose later influence became tremendous. Many reforms initiated by Peter matured during her time.

Territorial expansion continued under Alexander I. By 1812 the Russians reached California, after exploring and claiming Alaska. Russia proved her strength against Napoleon, and Alexander became known as the "Savior" of Europe. England and Franco began to fear Russia's increasing strength; finally, they joined Turkey in the Crimean War against Russia.

- 1 1

Russia's defeat was probably due to a weakened internal condition which had been developing since the Congress of Vienna. An intellectual class arose in 1830 which threatened the stability of the crown. Revolutionary ideas, entering Russia first through soldiers who had come in contact with the West as they drove Napoleon to Paris, were fostered by the nobility—intellectuals who were to become the backbone of revolution in Russia. A minor uprising in December 1825, though unimportant in itself, indicated the coming democratic movement. Industrialization entered Russia. Railroads began in 1838, and the increasing influx of Western capital led to various concessions to foreigners, and to the formation of industrial cities, capitalists and proletariat. Labor troubles arose. An intense Russification of Poland followed revolution there.

After the Crimean War, Russia was forced back within her boundaries, and excluded from European power politics. The crown came face to face with internal dissension formerly avertible by external activity.

(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War

(1853-1904). This period, during which Russia was on the defensive in Europe is marked by internal corruption which weakened the state and encouraged the growth of disruptive elements within it. In the central government, the crown, unable to control its subjects, enforced its rule by terror and espionage. Court corruption was heightened by foreign financial entanglements which increased constantly. Within the government two opposition factors, liberals and reactionaries, gained strength. The leading revolutionaries, mainly intellectuals, men like Tolstoy, Prince Kropotkin, and Lenin (Ulianov), were members of the upper class; reactionaries were mostly members of jingoistic groups activating war primarily with Japan, and later with Germany. Corruption existed in the church. Territorial expansion continued, mainly in the North Caucasus and Turkistan, principally under the leadership of Von Kaufmann. Przywalski led military-scientific expeditions into Central Asia which aroused great English anxiety. Muraviev consolidated the Par East and began Russian expansion into Manchuria. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, a major construction project, was startedo

Industrialization continued. The proletariat became a major revolutionary force„ Liberation of the serfs only disturbed an already precarious internal situation. Agricultural conditions grew steadily worse, and resulted in a great famine toward the turn of the century. Growing conflicts between the aristocracy and intelligentsia increased internal dissension. Revolutionary

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societies became powerful forces; the principal ones were the Social Democrats, industrial workers (the Bolsheviks led by Lenin were the extreme left wing of this group); Social Revolutionaries, jingoists and terroists inspired by earlier Populist movements; and Liberal Unionists, intelligentsia, desiring a liberal constitution (the most important group at the time).

{]) The Decay of Czar ism (190.4-1917).

Russia's foreign policy and internal corruption caused the decay and final collapse of Czarism. Her Far Eastern policy provoked the war in which Japan at last defeated Russia overwhelmingly. Internally the crown was wracked by graft and corruption. It sought to quell internal disturbances on the one hand by increasing terrorism--the Black Hundreds were created to augment the Okhrana--and on the other by attempting to reform autocratic methods, but efforts were insufficient. A constitution, granted after strikes by industrial workers in 1905, failed to solve ever increasing problems.

Germany's strengthening position was a constant threat to Russia, and resulted in a series of pacts with England and France prior to Germany's attack on Russia in August 1914. During the war Russian troops suffered devastating defeats. Corruption was revealed within the army as well as in the court. General Sukhomlinov was proved traitorous. The aristocracy's corruption was particularly evident in the Czarina's involvements with Rasputin and other powerful groups of mystics and magic healers. Dissatisfaction increased in other circles; the condition of industrial workers and peasants continually grew worse. Elements of revolution reached the boiling point after continupd defeats on the battle front and at home.

In March 1917 the aristocracy revolted. The Duma refused to obey imperial orders and set up its own Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist and Minister of Justice. This band of intellectuals failed, too, because they refused to be realistic in their dealings with the fundamental revolutionaries-workers and peasants--whose strength was increased by the continual defeats of their enemies at home and abroad, and who finally seized the government by force in November. They were Bolsheviks headed by Lenin and Trotsky, who had been sent from Switzerland via Germany in a sealed car to foment revolt. They made peace with Germany in March 1918. Much territory was lost including Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Baltic provinces, Finland and Transcaucasia. German occupation attempts, however, renewed bitter resistance particularly in the Ukraine.

(8) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927).

This period is marked by the assumption of power by the Communist Party

and subsequent formation of the U.S.S.R.; the intervention and growth' of the Party as the nucleus of Russian nationalism; the foundation of the Third International and spread of Communism abroad; and reconquest of former Russian territory. After Brest-Litovsk, Russia was the scene of allied intervention, under the guise of quelling the revolution. Civil war between the White and Red Armies resulted in even greater turmoil than existed before, and demanded over-all control to restore order. The German occupation of the Ukraine and the famine of 1921 added to need for a change in policy.

The Communist Party of Bolsheviks, victorious in the Civil War, seized control and with the Red Army, the only nationalistic movement in Russia at that time, became the strongest force in the country. It took the name of Council of People's Commissars and drew up a constitution. Lenin became dictator of the party; Trotsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs; and Stalin, Commissar of National Minorities. To protect itself and crush opposition, the Communist Party organized the Cheka, later the N.K.V.D., which served the same purpose as the Czarist Okhrana. The strength of the Party continued to grow, and the Third International (Communist organization founded in 1919 for world revolution) dominated Soviet Russian politics. Through the Party Russian nationalism found expression. Economic failure resulted in formation of the New Economic Policy, a drastic economic revision resulting from economic failure, due primarily to Allied blockade and continual uprisings. The U.S.S.R. sought economic cooperation with other countries, especially Germany. Communism was felt abroad. Revolutions in border countries were fostered, especially in Hungary and Poland until stopped by the French; and in China and Mongolia until stopped by Japanese pressure on China and by Sun Yat Sen's anti-Communistic successor, Chiang-Kai-Shek. Russian territorial expansion revived under Communism or Bolshevik imperialism. The reconquest of Russian territory proceeded, particularly in the Caucasus and Turkistan.

(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism

(1927-1942). Stalin entrenched himself as dictator of the U.S.S.R. He stabilized Russia internally by eliminating all Party irrelevancies and strengthening economic and scientific development; externally, by reestablishing world recognition. He inculcated in the people the spirit of nationalism. In June 1941 Russia was a stronger nation than she had been before.

By 1937 Stalin was the unchallenged leader of the U.S.S.R. Appointed Secretary-General of the Communist Party by Lenin in 1921, he gradually rose to power through Lenin's death and Trotsky's defeat. Trotsky maintained, according to Lenin, that Communism

- 14

in one country was anomalous. Stalin, formulating his policy afterward, accused Trotsky of deviating from the Party line, and had him expelled from the Union. Bukharin and other "Rightists" were also expelled, and from 1936 a series of purges liquidated other oppositionists. Stalin strengthened the economic policy of the country by a series of five-year plans to collectivize and socialize industry and agriculture, and to equalize the U.S.S.R. technologically with other world powers. Scientific development and efforts to raise literacy were promoted; the continual Russian search for knowledge was turned into military and national channels. The University of Tashkent was founded five years after Turkistan was conquered; the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed. The Urals became an industrial center. Stalin established the U.S.S.R. in world politics. Nonaggression pacts with bordering countries, recognition from leading world powers, and membership in the League of Nations followed. A Democratic Constitution incorporated all Soviet possessions into one state. The U.S.S.R. was established as a nationalistic and imperialistic power.

Prior to 1937, Soviet imperialism had been idealistic, accomplished mainly by revolution; after 1937, realistic, accomplished by military growth and territorial exploitation. The U.S.S.R, proved its military ability against Japan in 1938, and further secured its internal position by territorial conquest, always dormant in Russian policy, and protection against foreign attack, particularly against Germany whose power was steadily increasing. In September 1939, the U.S.S.R. occupied part of Poland, attacked Finland two months later, and occupied the Baltic States and Moldavia in June 1940. In April 1941, the U.S.S.R. and Japan signed a nonaggression pact. The increasing strength of Germany and Russia was mutually insurmountable. The nonaggression pact of August 1939 which had witfi&dA actual conflict for two years was abrogated by Germany's attack, on the U.S.S.R., June 22, 1941.

Table II: Chronology of Russian History.

1. From the Beginning to Rurik. (4Q00 B.C.-860 A.D.)

4000 B.C. First signs of ancient Slavic culture. 400-700 A.D. Eastern Slavs settled in Russia.

2. From Rurik to Genghis Khan. (860 A.D.-1237)

860 A.D. First recorded appearance of Russians at Constantinople. Rurik in Novgorod.

978-1015 Vladimir the Saint. Russians converted to Christianity.

:, Hi .

Table II; Chronology of Russian History. (Contd.)

1019-1054 Yaroslav. Greatest Russian ruler of Kievan period,

3. Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great (1237-1462).

1237-1240 Mongol conquest. 1250 Friar Rubruk, Franciscan monk, emissary to Genghis

Khan.

4. Ivan the Great to Peter the Great (1462-1689).

1462-1505 Ivan the Great. First sovereign of Russia. 1533-1584 Ivan IV, the Terrible. Assumed title of Czar. 1555 Trade with England opened. 1589 Russian church independent of Constantinople. 1598-1613 Boris Godunov. Time of Troubles. 1613-1645 Michael Romanov elected Czar.

5. Peter the Great to the Crimean War (1689-1853).

1689-1725 Peter I, the Great. 1709, July 8 Battle of Poltava: Peter against Charles XII. 1728 Bering began Russian exploration of Alaska. 1762-1796 Catherine II (The Great). 1768-1792 Turkish wars. 1772-1795 Partitions of Poland. 1798 Great Britain and Russian alliance, Second Coalition

against France. 1801-25 Alexander I. Defeat of Napoleon- - 1814. 1825, Dec. 26 Decembrist Uprising. 1827 Erivan captured from Persia. 1830-31 Polish Revolution. 1847 Nicholas Muraviev became Governor General of Siberia,

6. Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War (1853-1904).

1853-1856 Crimean War. 1855-1881 Alexander II. 1860 Vladivostok founded. 1861, March 3 Emancipation Edict. 1863-1864 Second Polish Revolution. 1867, March 30 Cession of Alaska to U.S. 1877-78 Turkish War. 1881-94 Alexander III.

Table II: Chronology of Russian History. (Contd.)

1885 Merv taken. 1891 92 Great famine. 1894-1917 Nicholas II.

7. The Decay of Czarism (1904-1917).

1904-05 Russian-Japanese War. 1913 China recognized autonomy of Outer Mongolia. 1914, Aug. 1 Germany declared war on Russia.

8. The Communist Experiment (1917-1927).

1917, Feb. 27 1917, March 1917, Nov. 6

(Oct. 24) 1918 1918, Mar. 3 1918-20 1918, July 10 1918, Dec. 30 1919, March 2 1919 1919, Dec. 11 1920, April 28 1920 1920, Aug. 11 1920, Dec. 2 1921, Feb. 25 1921, March 17 1922, Apr. 16 1922 1922, Dec. 30

1924-26 1924, Jan. 21 1925, May 12

Revolution began. Provisional Government formed. Bolshevik Revolution.

Gregorian calendar introduced. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Peace with Central Powers. Civil War. Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic formed. Ukraine became part of Soviet Russia. Foundation of III International. Hungarian Revolution. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic formed. Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. formed. Polish War. White Russian S.S.R. formed. Armenian S.S.R. formed. Georgian S.S.R. formed. New Economic Policy adopted. Russian-German Treaty of Rapallo. (Economic Agreement) Stalin appointed Secretary General of Communist Party. U.S.S.R. organized. Russia, YiThite Russia, Ukraine, Transcaucasia incorporated into U.S.S.R, Russia supported revolution in China. Lenin's death. Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz S.S.R.!s formed.

9. Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism, (1927-1942).

1928-32 First Five-Year Plan. 1932-33 Famine.

» •••?

; ; , . '

"jr.1 Wi • ' / " ' .7 I!

Table II; Chronology of Russian History. (Contd.)

1933-37 Second Five-Year Plan. 1934 Assassination of Kirov. 1934, Dec. 18 U.S.S.R. joined League of Nations. 1936, Nov. 26 German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. 1936, Dec. 5 Adoption of New "Democratic" Constitution. 1938, July-Aug, Japanese-Russian incidents. 1938-42 Third Five-Year Plan. 1939, Aug. 23 Russo-German nonaggression pact. 1939, Sept. 22 Partition of Poland. 1939, Nov. 30- Russian-Finnish War.

Mar. 31 1940, Mar. 31 Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. formed. 1940, June 27 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. 1940, July 21 Baltic States into Union. 1940, Aug. 2 Moldavian S.S.R. formed. 1940, Aug. 3 Lithuanian S.S.R. formed. 1940, Aug. 5 Latvian S.S.R. formed. 1940, Aug. 6 Estonian. S.S.R. formed. 1941, Apr. 13 Russian-Japanese nonaggression pact. 1941, May 6 Stalin became Premier. 1941, June 20 Stalin became Commissar of Defense. 1941, June 22 Germany attacked Russia.

(e) Present Political Administration of the U.S.S.R.

(1) The Actual Political Administration of the

U.S.S.R. General Organization. Government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a dictatorship of Stalin, the leader of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the only political party in the U.S.S.R., which shapes basic policies. The N.K.V.D. enforces Party policies, checks all attempts at revolt and is the government's most powerful weapon. Government leaders are the most outstanding members of the Communist Party, and their prominence in State affairs is proportionate to their Party status. Communist Party Secretaries are the real rulers of the Soviet Union. Every territorial subdivision in the U.S.S.R. has Party and N.K.V.D. organizations which actually control all activities in that particular political unit.

Stalin. Stalin has been dictator of the Soviet Union since Lenin's death, and a Party and State leader since the Bolsheviks came into power. The only official title Stalin held until shortly before the German invasion was Secretary-General of the Communist

Party; he now has official titles in all key positions. He is Premier of the Soviet Union; Commissar for Defense; Chairman of the two major bureaus of the Party's Central Committee which formulates all government policy. (The Politburo is the smaller and more powerful of the two, the governing board of the Central Committee and composed of the self-perpetuating inner group which rules the Party. The Orgburo is the organizing board composed of candidates to the Politburo.) He is Chairman of both the Party Secretariat and Revision Commission, and a member of both the Supreme Military Council and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Political Administrations. All government administrations, controlled primarily by the Party and secondarily by the State, are centralized under Stalin. In the U.S.S.R., every phase of life is socialized. The central organizations are commissariats, councils, and commissions; they control national economy, politics, society, and culture. Government administration stems from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its state equivalent, the Council of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom). State administrators are responsible to their respective Party superiors. Usually, the top administrator is a Party leader; if he is not, the Party leader is the higher authority.

The government controls all organizations in the U.S.S.R. through Party and State agencies. Two primary ideals inculcated in the mind of every child in the Soviet Union are the spirit of Communism and the need for defending it—major principles of all U.S.S.R. organizations. Functioning primarily for the protection and maintenance of the Soviet Union, these organizations provide a reserve of trained personnel for the military forces. The Party's first protection is military organizations, therefore, not essentially part of the Red Army, are of primary importance. Organizations exist for everyone; their programs cover every conceivable subject supplementing regular school curricula. Participation in some, however, is permissible only to members of the Communist Party and their families. Like all U.S.S.R. systems, these organizations are patterned after the Communist Party, and are highly centralized. Every person in the U.S.S.R., if he expects to receive any individual recognition, belongs to one or more of these organizations; his personal security and well-being are proportionate to his Party affiliation.

The Central government manages all phases of life in the U.S.S.R. Minor authorities have power just so long as they comply with orders from above. Subordinate officers often are not local citizens, but sent from Moscow; when local authorities qualify for leadership, however, they are appointed to office or allowed to be

elected. National administration is the model for political subdivisions.

Principal political administrations aree N.K.V.D. (Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the all-powerful, ubiquitous, and omnipresent police system responsible only to the highest authorities; Osoviakhim, "leisure time" military organization; Komsomols, Pioneers, Ootobrists, youth organizations, primarily for civilian defense training; Trade Unions and the Chief Administration of Labor Reserves, organization,' to supply and control labor; and Gosplan, planning commission for government economy.

The Franchise and the Party Cell. Individuals at the head of Party and government organizations are selected by the district party leaders, through party cells.* Cells carry out party policies and decisions, recruit and educate new members, assist local party committees in propaganda work, and participate actively in the political and economic life of the community. The elections, when they are held, are farcical and their results negligible. Military, naval, and even athletic heroes are frequently delegates. Election procedure as it is managed by the Party is arranged so that the percentage of Communists increases in the higher Soviets. The Supreme Soviet is composed entirely of Party leaders.

Candidates are usually selected from Party leaders prominent in the local organizations. In elections, the proletariat has distinct advantage over other "voters." Suffrage is on on occupational, not territorial, basis. Delegates of workers are proportionate to the number of voters, not population; workers elect five delegates to every one for peasants. Town and factory Soviets are directly represented in Ail-Union Congress, whereas village Soviets have only indirect representation.

All Party oppositionists are disfranchised, entailing deprivation of civil rights, social ostracism, and gradual class extinction. Political prisoners, mostly Poles, at present, constitute the principal disfranchised group; before the war, most disfranchised were former "exploiters"; i.e., bourgeoisie, private traders,

•Party cells are found in all units where there are enough people to be of any importance. They are found in towns, villages, Soviet farms, tractor stations, collective farms, factories, plants, schools, offices, army units, navy units, N.K.V.D. units, and railroad units. Delegates from these cells are appointed to district Party committees in all the city raions, cities, districts, areas, territories, regions, republican Party Congress, and, finally, All-Union Party Congress,

priests, and kulaks. Prisoners (usually kept in concentration camps in Siberia) are classified as either political, criminal, or civil.

Territorial Division. Territorial-administrative divisions in the U.S.S.R. are unimportant. All power comes from the central government; the medium is of small consequence. Continual changing of internal boundaries in compliance with economic demands, necessitates fluidity of state administration. Since the Soviets are continually experimenting with their boundaries, economic statistics are obscure and inexact.

In Czarist Russia, fiscal and military needs determined administrative units. The Soviets, however, re-regionalized the country on the basis of economic geography with the "raion" as the keystone. National boundaries, regional limitations, and new industrial techniques resulted in territorial-administrative divisions based on nationality and economic geography.

The classifications of national units, depending on the individual degree of autonomy, beginning with the highest unit, are: constituent republic (theoretically able to secede from the Union), autonomous soviet socialist republic, the autonomous oblast, and the nationaiT'okrugT As autonomy increases, the political unit is promoted to the next higher level. National boundaries based on population are changed less frequently than non-national.

The classifications based on economic efficiency, also ranging from highest to lowest, are: krais and oblasts, large units roughly corresponding to our states (they are coordinate terms, the krai having a larger area and a more heterogeneous population) and raion, the fundamental economic planning unit, a region within the radius of some industrial or agricultural center with no particular administrative boundaries. Smaller units are rarely divided or changed. The city raion is in some large cities, where subordinate units are wards. In larger krais and oblasts where an intermediate link between them and the raions seems advisable, the okrug is used* It is composed of raions with unimportant racial minorities. (The economic okrug should not be confused with the lowest grade in the national classification.)

(2) The Theoretical Political Administration

of the U.S.S.R. Theoretically, the government of the U.S.S.R. is a dictatorship of the proletariat with minimal state control, existing for the benefit of the individual factory worker and farm laborer. A hierarchy of soviets--councils of workers' elected representatives—

combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers, operates government administration. The soviet with authority vested in the individual worker is the basis of U.S.S.R. administration, all of which is pyramidally organized.

State Organization. Government leaders are elected; any citizen of the U.S.S.R. is eligible. Suffrage is universal and unrestricted for every citizen of the U.S.S»R., 18 years of age and over, engaged either in "productive work useful to society" or enlisted in the Soviet army. The primary electoral unit is the cell, composed of at least three members who are represented in the village, town, and factory Soviets; then in raion Soviets. Delegates to krai and oblast Soviets, elected directly by village, town, and factory Soviets as well as through raion Soviets, elect delegates both to the constituent republic in which they are situated and to the All-Union Congress of Soviets to which delegates also come directly from village, town, and factory Soviets. Subordinate administrative units within the U.S.S.R. usually have theuhicameral system of-representation with supreme local authority vested in the Executive Committees of their Supreme Councils of Peoples1 Commissars or Deputies.

The highest representative council in the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet, composed of five main departments which handle state administrationT~~Of these departments,two--Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities,--comprise the Council of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom). The system of representation is bicameral. The five main departments of the Supreme Soviet are: Soviet of the Union (representation according to population, with one for every 300,000 persons in the U.S.S.R.); Soviet of Nationalities (representation according to subordinate administrative units on the following basis: 25 representatives from each constituent republic, 11 from each autonomous republic, five from each constituent oblast, and one from each national region); Supreme Court (elected by the Supreme Soviet); Prosecutor (elected by the Supreme Soviet); Presidium, of the Supreme Soviet (the governing board of the Supreme Soviet, composed of one President, 16 Vice-Presidents, one from each constituent republic, one Secretary, and 24 members),

The U.S.S.R. is a federation of 16 constituent republics. The Supreme Soviet delegates legislative power to a Central Executive Committee (elected by Supreme Soviet) and executive power to the Council of Peoples' Commissars, whose members arc appointed by the Central Executive Committee. The Sovnarkom is composed of a President, 14 Vice"Presidents, 41 Peoples' Commissars, and many Chairmen of important government commissions. Commissars are directors of the

25 All-Union Commissariats and the 16, Union-Republic Commissariats

Ail-Union Commissariats (primarily national administrations) direct activities such as defense, foreign affairs, foreign trade, industrial projects (Five Year Plans), and communications. Administration in these commissariats is controlled directly from the central government of the U.S.S.R. through intermediate political units. Union-Republican Commissariats (primarily local administrations with national control) direct activities such as internal affairs, internal trade, and local industrial projects. Local authorities direct activities according to the central government's orders.

Party Organization. The only difference between Party and state organizations is that the former is more thorough, larger and stronger in every respect. The supreme organ of the Communist Party, the All-Union Party Congress, is supposed to meet every three years and elect a Revision Commission, Auditing Commission, and Central Committee. The Central Committee forms the Party policies, convenes the Ail-Union Party Conference annually and is organized as follows: Secretariat (four members; Stalin, Secretary-General); Politburo (nine members, most powerful men in the U.S.S.R.) and Qrgburo (alternates and candidates to Politburo); Commission of Party Control; Administrations (Cadres, Propaganda, and Agitation); Departments (Mili'bary, N.K.V.D., Navy, Railroad Commissariat, Agriculture, Schools, Organization, and Instruction).

(3) Administrative Divisions of the U.S.S.R.

(See Map 5). In April 1941 the only consequential political subdivisions in addition to the 16 constituent republics were those within the-R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R. They are listed as follows, with parentheses indicating capitals, and asterisks indicating German-occupied territory within political boundaries (see Map 1 for front line as of May 1942):

R.S.F.S.R. (Moscow)*—Kraist Altai (Barnaul), Krasnoyarsk (Krasnoyarsk), Krasnodar (Krasnodar), Ordzhonikidze (Voroshilovsk), Primorski (Vladivostok), Khabarovsk (Kharbarovsk); Oblasts: Arkhangelsk (Arkhangelsk), Vologda (Vologda), Gorki (Gorki), Ivanovo (Ivanovo), Irkutsk (Irkutsk), Kalinin (Kalinin), Kirov (Kirov), Kuibyshev (Kuibyshev), Kursk (Kursk), Leningrad (Leningrad), Molotov (Molotov), Moscow (Moscow), Murmansk (Murmansk), Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk), Omsk (Omsk), Orel (Orel), Penza (Penza), Rostov (Rostov-on-Don), Voronezh (Voronezh), Ryazan (Ryazan), Saratov (Saratov), Sverdlovsk (Sverdlovsk), Smolensk (Smolensk), Stalingrad (Stalingrad), Tambov (Tambov), Tula

(Tula), Chelyabinsk (Chelyabinsk), Chita (Chita), Chkalov (Chkalov), Yaroslavl (Yaroslavl); A.S.S.R's; Bashkir (Ufa), Buryat-Mongolian (Ulan-Ude), Dagestan (Makhach-KalaJ, Kabardino-Balkar (Nalchik), Kalmyk (Elista), Komi (Syktyvkar), Crimean (Simferopol), Mari (Ioshkar-Ola), Mordvin (Saransk), German Volga (Engels), North-Osetian (Ordzhonikidze), Tatar (Kazan), Udmurt (Izhevsk), Checheno-Ingush (Grozny), Chuvash (Cheboksary), Yakut (Yakutsk).

Ukrainian S.S.R. (Kiev)*—Qblasts; Vinnitsa (Vinnitsa), Voroshilovgrad (Voroshilovgrad), Dnepropetrovsk (Dnepropetrovsk), Zhitomir (Zhitomir), Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamenets-Podolsk), Kiev (Kiev), Nikolayev (Nikolayev), Odessa (Odessa), Poltava (Poltava), Stalino (Stalino), Kharkov (Kharkov), Chernigov (Chernigov), Volynian (Lutsk), Drogobych (Drogobych), Lvov (Lvov), Rovno (Rovno), Stanislav (Stanislav), Tarnopol (Tarnopol), Chernovitsy (Chernovitsy); A.S.S.R.: Moldavian (Tiraspol).

White Russian S.S.R. (Minsk)*--Oblasts: Vitebsk (Vitebsk), Gomel (Gomel), Minsk (Minsk), Mogilev (Mogilev), Polesian (Mozyr), Brest (Brest), Belostok (Belostok), Baranovichi (Baranovichi), Vileika (Vileika), Pinsk (Pinsk).

Other constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow)—Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. (Baku), Georgian S.S.R. (Tiflis), Armenian S..S.R. (Erevan), Turkmen S.S.R. (Askhkabad), Uzbek S.S.R, (Tashkent), Tadzhik S.S.R. (Stalinabad), Kazakh S.S.R. (Alma~Ata), Kirghiz S.S.R. (Frunze), Karelian-Finnish S.S.R. (Petrozavodsk)*, Estonian S.S.R. (Tallinn)*, Latvian S.S.R. (Riga)*, Lithuanian S.S.R. (Kaunas)*, Moldavian S.S.R. (Kishinev)*.

(2) Economic Factors. Ta) Availability of Strategical Materials. The

following "basic materials are strategic for the Soviet Union, i.e., those of which it has sufficient resources within its own "boundaries:

Coal Mica Iron ore As"bestos Crude petroleum Potash Manganese Boron Chromite Phosphates Magnesite Salt' Cotton Sulfur Timber Pyrites Platinum

The following are the most important critical materials, i.e., those which must "be wholly or partially supplied from outside sources:

Aluminum Machine tools; machin-Mercury ery Nickel Wheat Tungsten Sugar Tin Hides and leather Molybdenum Scientific and Antimony professional Copper instruments Lead Fats and oils Zinc Electrodes and Ferroalloys abrasives. Rubber Wool and woolen goods Aviation gas; Chemicals,, medicines

lubricating oil and dr*Ugs

To date the most important shipments from Great Britain, Canada, and the United States have consisted of aircraft and arms. During recent months shipments of food, metals, and chemicals in particular have increased substantially. Food shipments are of vital importance duo to the present severe shortage in the Soviet Union, and even if a good harvest is obtained, food will have to "be included in estimates of aid given to Russia during the coming year.

Although Russian industrial and agricultural losses have "been severe, particularly in the Ukraine, the "bulk of the country's productive capacity is still intact. Approximately 65-75^ of the country's industrial capacity remains in the hands of the

M.-irf"' nl'r ?

fltfl-.JJ.. . "jj.. •'. n "A "J f' 5t" r<

Russians, and potential grain production not counting increased plantings is "between 60-70$ of normal.

Efforts are "being made to increase the output of food and manufactured goods in various ways, and these methods are discussed "below under the appropriate headings. Most important are the increase in the acreage sown to grain and other crops in the unoccupied regions, and the maintenance of the production of strictly military supplies which, if Lend-lease aid is included, may "be estimated at approximately equal to pre-war output. In addition, the country is now producing large quantities of gasoline of a"bout 85 octane at its Caucasian refineries, and small increases have "been made in the output of coal, ferrous metals, electrical equipment and some other goods in the factories of the unoccupied areas.

It is impossible to predict whether the country can continue effective production indefinitely, since a number of factors seriously limit both industrial and agricultural output.* In addition, there are four situations whose aggravation or potential existence would gravely threaten the country's present agricultural and industrial capacities. These situations are discussed below:

Possible loss of the Caucasus. Loss of the Caucasus would mean the loss of 70-80$ of Russia's oil resources and most of its refineries. The North Caucasus also produces a food surplus even taking into account food shipments to Transcaucasia. In addition, the Caucasus contains most of the country's remaining manganese deposits, large power resources, deposits of lead, zinc, copper, and some other metals. Moreover, it manufactures textiles, synthetic rubber, and most of the country's cement, and contains a large number of fish canneries.

Breakdown of the railroad system. Transportation in the Soviet Union is primarily geared to its railroads although some goods are moved over the inland waterways during, the ice-free season, and some overland transportation is possible in spite of the lack of roads. At present the Russian railroads must supply the armed forces and move troops, transport Lend-Lease goods from Murmansk, Archangel, and Iran, and haul raw materials, finished goods, and grain over the country's enormous distances. Railroad transportation is very inefficient at the present time, and a complete breakdown of the rail system would cause the collapse of the country's war effort.

*See pages 88 and 92

Possible drought. The Volga region, the east part of the North Caucasus, the Urals, and Kazakhstan are arid regions subject to drought. In case of severe and widespread drought in these areas on which the Soviet Union depends for much of its grain, famine would result. Up to now, weather conditions have been generally favorable but it is impossible to draw definite conclusions as yet about this year's crops.

Labor shortage. A labor shortage exists at. the present time, especially in the field of skilled labor. This situation will seriously reduce the country's productive capacities particularly in the highly important fields of machinery, and machine tool building, arms, chemicals, etc.

The Russian merchant marine contains at the present time an estimated 3 2 ships of 1,103,6jk gross tons. Of these only 2k are in the Atlantic Convoy Route and 49 in the Siberia-United States West Coast Route, plus about 20 additional ships in other transoceanic routes. The procurement of outside supplies, therefore, depends primarily on the shipping facilities of Great Britain and the United States. Within the Soviet Union communications must, of course, be maintained between Murmansk, Archangel, and Caspian ports and the interior of the country; emphasizing again the vital importance of the railroad system.

(b) Strategical and Critical Materials. For the purposes of this Study, strategic materials are defined as those essential materials of which the Soviet Union has sufficient or nearly sufficient resources. Critical materials are those essential items which are wholly or partially lacking, and which must be supplied from outside sources, mainly the United States, Great Britain and Canada.*

*The above definitions differ from those used by the Commodities Division of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The definitions of the Army and Navy Munitions Board for strategic, critical and essential materials as applying to the United States are as follows:

Strategical materials are those materials essential to the national defense for the supply of which in war dependence muBt be placed in whole, or in part, on sources outside the continental limits of the United States and for which strict conservation and distribution control measures will be necessary.

Critical materials are those materials essential to the national defense, the procurement problems of which in war, while difficult, are

The materials classified as strategic and critical are listed in the introduction.

Strategical materials. Coal -- In spite of the loss of the Don Basin, the Soviet Union still has large coal resources located in the Moscow area, the Urals, the Kuznetsk, Cheremkhovo and Chernogorsk mines in Siberia, and the Karaganda mines in Central Asia.

Iron ore. The chief remaining iron ore deposits are those of the Urals, and the Gornaya Shoriya mines in Siberia, near Stalinsk. Certain ferroalloys and iron and steel manu£p.ctures are, however, critical.

Crude Petroleum. From 70 to of Soviet crude petroleum comes from the Caucasus and most of the remainder from the Emba fields in Central Asia, and -y e Urals - Volga fields. The Soviet Union is the world's third largest producer of crude petroleum, ranking after the United States and Venezuela.

Manganese. The Soviet Union possesses a large deposit of high grade manganese at the Chiatura mines in Georgia, Trans Caucasus. There are also small deposits of manganese in the Urals and Siberia.*

Phosphates. The "bulk of Russian phosphates come from the huge nepheline deposits on the Kola Peninsula. Large stockpiles are also reported to exist at the present time.

*The country's other large manganese deposits at Nikopol in the Ukraine are in possession of the Germans.

(Footnote continued from preceding page:) less serious than those of strategic materials because they can be either domestically produced or obtained in more adequate quantities or have a lesser degree of essentiality, and for which some degree of conservation and distribution control will be necessary.

Essential materials neither strategic nor critical - In this classification are included those materials., essential to the national defense for which no procurement problems in war are anticipated, but whose status is such as to require constant surveillance because future developments may necessitate reclassification as strategic or critical.

TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS MATERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF

NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY REMARKS PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL i

Copper 100,000 tons Possibly Insufficient pro- United States 27,000 tons of] 1936 includ- 150,000 tons. duction for war- South America copper reques-! ing copper time needs* ted from the j extracted Harriman both from ore Mission, and reclaimed metal.

I Lead 58,000 tons Probably about Insufficient pro- United States 84,000 tons ofj in 1936 the same or duction Australia (?) lead requested!

slightly higher United King- from the dom Harriman

Mission, i

Zinc 63,000 tons Probably about Insufficient pro- United States 72,000 tons ofj in 1936 the s ame duction partly due zinc requested

to loss of a zinc from the distillation plant Harriman Misin the Ukraine, sion.

Ferro- ? 9 Insufficient pro- United States ! alloys duction of rare i (Vana- metals i dium, : tungsten, etc.)

•••

TABLE I I I

MATERIAL

Electrodes and Abrasives

Aluminum

(Mercury

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

PRODUCTION REASON FOR NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION

PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL

? ? Insufficient domestic production

55,000 tons 10,000 tons; Conquest of main (1940 est.) possibly production facili

20-30,000 ties. tons depending on functioning of Urals plant and extent Zaporozhe plant was evacuated.

300-500 Nil Conquest of tons Nikitovka mines,

Ukraine

SOURCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPLY

United States

United States Canada

Mexico via United States

REMARKS

U.S. exports (1941)

Electrodes 568,000 lbs.

Abrasives 660,000 lbs.

114,000 tons of aluminum requested from the Harriman Mission.

Reported deposit at Khaidarkan, Kirghiz SSR production, if any, unknown.

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*=- -~

1-; >^Siv " . -<•• '.->

i

TABLE I I I CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

mTERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY


Nickel 2,500-3,000 About the same Insufficient Canada tons resources New Caledonia (1939 est.)

I!

i Tungsten Negligible Negligible Insufficient India resources China

Tin 12,000 tons About the s ame Insuf f ic ient Bolivia via (1937 est.) resources the United

States

Molybdenum Negligible Negligible Insufficient United States resources

REMARKS

9,600 tons of nickel requested from the Harriman Mission; Canada is furnishing 900 tons monthly; yearly requirements estimated at 15-20,000 tons

48,000 tons of tin requested from the Harriman Mission. Imports from China via Sinkiang. »r.^--2& 1941 exports of ore and concentrates (gross weight) 2,312 short tons.

r i

TABLE III CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

MATERIAL

Antimony

Ammunition and

Materiel

1 -'

PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED

PRESENT OUTPUT

Exact data not available: up to 1940 production was only about .01 - .05 of domestic demand.

9,000 guns Reduced by at 6,000 tanks least 35^, i.e.,

present output would equal 5850 guns and 3900 tanks. See "Remarks."

REASON FOR CLASSIFI CATION AS CRITICAL

Insufficient resources

Insufficient production due to loss of factories.


Mexico Bolivia

United States Britain Canada

REMARKS

Includes tanks, Bren carriers guns, ammunition, jeups, trucks, parts and replacements. (About 1,000 British tanks have been shipped.) It is estimated that with Lend-Lease aid pre-war Russian production of purely military supplies has been maintained.

* • , - : .

i

TABLE I I I

CRITICAL T^TERIALS (Cont.) MATERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF REIIARKS

NORL1AL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL

Aircraft 372 planes About 175 per See above5 also United States Pursuit and per month month; 78$ of chronic lack of Britain bomber planes. (first half factories still efficiency. Canada Lend-Lease

1941) in Russian hands shipments but 15% of these (U.S. and are within bomb- Britain) more ing range of the than 2,000. Germans.

Cfll Machine Machine tools 3 Present capacity Insufficient pro- United States From Oct. 1, tools 53j900 units reduced because duction and loss 1941-May 31,

machinery in 1938. of loss of big of at least a 1942, export semi-manu industrial half-dozen arrivals of factures centers in important machine tools of iron, the Ukraine machine tool totaled 1,412 steel such as plants• pieces, valued and other Kharkov. at about metals. 270,000 units $7,400,000.

planned for period 19381942.

TABLE I I I CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

MATERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF REMARKS NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY r


Aviation gas and lubricating oil, tetra ethyl, etc.

Rubber (Natural)

— _~—

_ ! : • • - -

12,000 tons of high octane gas (1940) 1,275,000 tons of lubricating oil (1937)

50,000 tons (approx.) of synthetic rubber annually

Estimated possible capacity of high octane plants; 40-50,000 tons per year. Lubricating oil production probably not greatly increased over 1937.

About the same, as the largest Russian rubber factories have not been captured.

Backward refining industry

Lack of natural rubber and insufficient synthetic production; loss of factories in occupied territory.

United States Dutch West Indies

United States Ceylon

Large amounts of high octane gas and high grade petroleum products shipped since June 22, 1941.

72,000 tons of rubber requested from the Harriman Mission; 1942 requirements estimated by the British at 20,000 tons.

TABLE III CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

MATERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF REMARKS NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY r


Wheat and 1940 barn An estimated* Loss of the United States Size of grain other production 5 million addi- Ukraine and Cen- reserves uncereal of wheat tional acres t r a l Russian agr icul - known. Ex-grains estimated at have been sown tu ra l area. port a r r i

30,000,000^ to grains, but vals Oct. 1, skeo t tons. even with good 1941-May 31,

yields, the har- 1942: vest will prob- wheat ably not be 26,®D0 tons sufficient to feed wheat flour adequately the -33,900 tons. population of unoccupied Russia,

Sugar 2,360,000 70-80$ of the United States Export a r r i - ti short tons of (?) country's output vals Oct. 1, 1 granulated has been l o s t 1941-May 31, 1 sugar in 1938 through con- 1942 amounted!

quest. to about 1 35,000 tons. I

TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)

MATERIAL PRODUCTION REASON FOR NORMAL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION


Fats and Vegetable ? Insufficient pro-oils oil (1938) duction of edible

570,000 fats and lacking metric tons. resources of

tropical oils.

Hides and. Footwear Footwear pro- Insufficient leather 1939 duction re- domestic

US,300,000 duced 35-45$ production* pairs. by war

losses.

''/. ^« > *"""* ' i. r t


West Coast Africa (palm oil) United States (lard and coconut oil)

United States Mongolia South America

REMARKS

U. S. Exports (1941): Coconut oil-12,500 short tons; Shipments of lard and butter Oct. 1, 1941May 31, 1942 equaled 29,000 tons*

Export arrivals Oct. 1, 1941May 31, 1942: Sole leather; 3,766 metric tons; Army boots: 846,000 pairs; British shipments very large.

t> ...^

TABLE III

CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont*)

MATERIAL

Wool and woolen

goods

Scientific and professional instruments.


PRESENT OUTPUT

1938-1939 Wool at approxiwool output mately the 1938-300 million 39 level; all pounds; 1939 textile pro-woolen cloth duction re-110,000,000 duced 35-40$ yards. by losses.

REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL

Insufficient domestic production*

Insufficient domestic production


United States Mongolia South America

United States

REMARKS

Large amounts . of wool and hair requested from the Harriman Mission; U.S. export arrivals of army cloth for Oct., 1, 1941-May 31, 1942 amounted to 993,000 yards.

U.Sw exports (1941)

valued at $1,659,000.

MATERIAL

Chemicals, medicines, and drugs (opium, quinine, serums, etc.)


PRESENT OUTPUT

? ?

TABLE I I I CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )

REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL

Insuf£Lcient domestic production for wartime needs


United States (quinine, serums, etc.) Turkey (opium)

United States Toluol, Phenol, etc.

REMARKS

Export arrivals of medical items, Oct. 1, 1941-May 31, 1942 valued at $1,750,000; large amounts of chemicals, blending agents, explosives , etc•, also shipped during same period.

Cotton. Most of Soviet cotton is grown in Central Asia under irrigation, and in spite of the current reduction of the cotton acreage to provide for food production, Russian cotton output and stocks will "be sufficient for the country's needs.

Timber. The Soviet Union possesses enormous quantities of timber in the northern part of unoccupied European Russia and in Siberia.

• . Chromite, Magnesite, Platinum, Asbestos, Pyrites, Potash, and Salt. All of these metals and minerals come largely from the Urals.

Sulfur. Sulfur is mined in Central Asia and Urals, and also extracted from the pyrites deposits of the Urals.

Boron. Boron comes from Central Asia.

Critical materials. Critical materials are discussed in Table III. Wherever possible, the sources of outside supply are indicated. Under "Remarks," the amounts of material requested from the Harriman Mission are given, and although in some cases such requests may be excessive, they may be regarded as a gauge of the country's needs. Some data on shipments are also given.

(c) Production capacities. Industrial production by zones (see maps 6 and 11). Zone of combat. Industrial production in the zone of combat is inconsequential, except in the case of Leningrad. Normally Leningrad is a center for the production of special steel, electrical and transport machinery, ships, rubber goods, boats, and shoes, textiles, chemicals, food, and ammunition and materiel, accounting for 10-15$ by value of Soviet large-scale industry in 1939The capacity of its factories, however, has now been reduced by at least 6<yfo due to evacuation, bomb destruction and so forth. In addition, power is no longer available from the Svir and Volkhov hydroelectric stations, and rail communications have been cut off. During the winter months some supplies were brought in over a narrow gauge railroad laid on the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga, and in summer, supplies can be shipped by'boat across the same lake. Leningrad, therefore, is chiefly important as a source of local supply, furnishing a portion of the arms and ammunition, boats, uniforms, blankets, packaged food, etc. needed by the troops in the immediate area.

The majority of the remaining cities in the zone of combat, especially Tula and Kalinin, suffered severe damage,

either through fighting or deliberate destruction. In addition, industries, personnel and stocks were evacuated from many of these cities. The Russians now claim to have put some industrial establishments in recaptured towns back into operation. Most of these claims cannot be confirmed, and on the whole seem hardly credible, except perhaps in the case of the Donets Basin where several coal mines are said to have been reopened.

Zone of Communications> The zone of communication is divided into four general regions from north to south.

The Northern Region includes Murmansk and Archangel and extends south to the vicinity of Yaroslavl. The chief importance of this area lies in the fact that it contains the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, through which supplies reach the Soviet Union.-*

The Murmansk and Archangel-Vologda Railroads connect these ports with cities in the interior industrial region. There is an important rail connection between Belomorsk-Obozerskaya-Kotlas, and supplies reaching Kotlas by way of this connection can be transported up the Northern Dvina River to the interior of the country during the ice-free season.

This region is not highly industrialized and parts of it are only very sparsely settled. Its chief natural resources are timber, fisheries, and the apatite deposits of the Kola Peninsula. The locations of the main industries'and power stations are listed below.

Chief industries.

Murmansk Fisheries Sawmills

Kandalaksha Sawmills

Canneries

Kirovsk

Archangel

Archangel-Vologda Railroad

Mezen

Apatite mines

Sawmills Fisheries

Sawmills

Sawmills Fisheries

^Facilities at Murmansk and Archangel are discussed in detail under 2-d.

(Chief industries continued)

Onega Sawmi 1 Is Vicinity of Vologda Sawmills and woodworking

Synthetic rubber - 20,000 tons of divinyl a year

Cherepovets Sawmi 11s (65 mi. west of Vologda)

Main -power stations.

Murmansk Coal-- - 1 - 3,000 KW Tuloma Sta. Hydroelectric 3 - 5,000 KW

(5 mi. south of Murmansk; undergoing enlargement)

Archangel - Mixed fuel 5 - 10,000 KW Niva Sta., at

Kandalaksha Hydroelectric-—25 - 50,000 KW Kadnikov, near

Vologda Mixed fuel 10 - 25,000 KW Vologda Oil - 1 - 3,000 KW Kirov (a) -Wood and mixed--10 - 25,000 KW

fuel (Vyatka) (b)- Peat -10 - 25,000 KW

Total 65 -1^6,000 KW

The Central Industrial Region includes the cities of Kolomna, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo and Gorki. It is one of the most important manufacturing centers of the Soviet Union and the cities of the region are located on a railroad net leading westward, similar to the spokes of a half wheel with Moscow as its hub.

This region contains the Moscow coal "basin which produced 7,500,000 metric tons of coal in 1937, amounting to 7-8$ of the total output of the Soviet Union.

The important industrial establishments are listed under the following headings: steel making, machinery and machine tools, locomotives, car "building and automobiles, chemicals, refineries, textiles, power plants, and ammunition and materiel.

- 41 - ; - • ; *

Steel Makingt The most important steel mills in this region are:

Location Type of steel Production

Moscow-- Sickle and Hammer 285,5^6 m.t. (1938) special steel mill

Liebknecht pipe steel mill 362,097 m.t. (1938)

Vyksum, near Gorki---Pipe steel mill -18^38 m.t. (1938)

Total 832,081 metric tons

These plants account for about one-half the output of the Central Region which produced 1,1+35,000 metric tons of steel in 193?. Steel mills in the central industrial area to the west of Moscow such as those at Tula, have, of course, either "been destroyed or captured, or partially evacuated.

Machinery: Important machinery and machine tool, and electrical equipment factories are located as follows:

Location Type of product Remarks

Moscow Ball "bearings (Kaganovich plant)

Precision instruments Railroad equipment Electro-technical products

Lyut ?rtsy Agricultural machinery Ivanovo Textile machinery Gorki Machine tools, Diesel engines

Radio apparatus Podolsk Sewing machines

Locomotives. car "building, automobiles, ships

Mytishchi Railroad and streetcar (outside Moscow) "building

Moscow Automobiles (Stalin plant)----Produced about of the Soviet Union's automobiles in 1937

Vlfrtu th . •!! , • - I ' / M \ V , s '.'•/. J 1.1 ••-?>

' • • - • •••"- 42

(Locomotives, car "building, automobiles, ships continued)


Kolomna Steam, electric, condenser locomotives.

Gorki Automobile plant (Molotov),-130,000 machines (1937) Ships

Yaros lavl AutomoM le works 2153 trucks and heavy "busses (1937)

One truck factory reported capacity 100,000 trucks

Chemical and related industries:

Moscow Rubber reclamation Bobriki One ammonia plant

(near Stalinogorsk) Yaroslavl Synthetic rubber and asbestos

"combine" Gorki Chemicals, paper Stalinogorsk Chemicals, including

manufacture of hydrocyanic acid and sodium

Vasilkov Synthetic rubber Capacity believed to (near Gorki) be 5,000 tons of

divinyl annually

Refineries:

Moscow Four refineries- -Capacity for boosting aviation gas by use of tetra-ethyl lead.

Sormovo Two refineries (near Gorki)

Yaroslavl Two refineries- -Refining and cracking plant. Nitro-benzol extracting plant

IP m ft .-V3 =I-J «• i gj y

Texfriles;

Location Product Remarks

Moscow— -Textiles including one silk mill

Ivanove- -Textile s •One of the largest textile centers in Soviet Union.

Noginsk- -Textiles

Power stations in the Moscow Central Region:

Location Source of power Capacity

Rybinsk Ifydroeleetrie -300 - 400,000 KV7" under construction

Yaroslavl —Peat 50 - 100,000 KW Moscow Coal 200 - 300,000 KW Kostroma -Peat 25 - 50,000 KSftT Ivanovo- Peat 10 - 25,000 KW Shurukha Peat 50 - 100,000 M

(near Ivanovo; undergoing enlargement in 1938)

Shatura Peat 100 - 200,000 KW Gorki Peat 200 - 300,000 KW

it Oil 25 - 50,000 KW ii Coal 25 - 50,000 KVY

Penza Oil 10 - 25,000 KW

Total 995-1, 600,000 KW

Ammunition and Materiel;


Stalinogorsk Poison gas Probably same as chemical plant above

Moscow 12 munitions plants Some of these have doubtless been evacuated

Podolsk 2 ammunition factories Evacuated? (near Moscow)

- 44

V • - ; / .


Vladimir 1 chemical warfare factory Evacuated ?

KovroY 1 powder factory

2 arms factories Yaroslavl

Gorki

Penza

1 tank factory

1 arms factory, 1 munitions factory 1 tank factory 1 airplane factory 1 airplane factory

Volga Region. The Volga Region is here considered to include the region below the Moscow district as far south as Rostov and as far east as Kuibyshev and the Ural River. The Volga River and the railroad connections with the Caucasus are the important transportation links. The principle industrial establishments may be listed as follows:

Steel: 1,232,000 metric tons (1937). The bulk of this production is accounted for by the Red October special steel plant in Stalingrad which produced 7 .* 652 metric tons of steel in 1938.

Vehicles:

Location Type of products Remarks

Stalingrad Tractor factory U,000 tractors(1933)

Heavy truck factory

Miscellaneous Industries

Saratov 2 oil refineries One Universal refining and cracking plant, one "Polymerization plant producirg 85 octane gas.

Ball bearing plant,

Flour mill

Location Type of products Remarks

Kazan Synthetic rubber Annual capacity of 15,000 tons of divinyl

Power plants:


Ulyanovsk Oil 3 5,000 KW

Saratov Coal 25 50,000 KW

Stalingrad Coal 100 - 200,000 KW

Astrakhan Oil 5 10,000 KW

Total 135 265,000 KW

Ammunition and Materiel:

Ulyanovsk Ammunition factory

Stalingrad Poison gas factory Possibly identical with the chlorine

Tank factory plant listed above

Saratov Part of an airplane factory which was dismantled and shipped from Moscow.

North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Although a portion of the Caucasus is included in the zone of the interior, for convenience the economic capacities.of the entire region are discussed under this section.

The outstanding economic importance of this area lies in its production of 80 - 90$ of the Soviet Union's crude oil and the bulk of its refined products. In addition, the Georgian Republic contains the Chiatura manganese mines, producing the bulk of the country's manganese since the loss of the Nikopol mines in the Ukraine. This region also has' extensive power resources, and accounts for a small production of coal, non-ferrous metals and steel. Its factories produce synthetic rubber, cement, textiles, and process metals.

- 46

^SfFiAl! as follows:

Location

Petroleum. Fields: The principal fields are

Crude Oil and Percentage of Natural Gas Country1s Output

Metric Tons - 1938

Grozny, Ordzhonikidzho Krai 2,763,600 8.5

Maikop, Krasnodar Krai 2,250,600 7.0

Baku, Azerbaijan Republic 231980,000 7k.k

Total 28,99^,200 89.9

Total U.S.S.R. - 1938 32,230,800 100.0

Petroleum. Refineries: At present the percentage of total crude oil processed "by the Caucasian refineries is between 70 and 80$. The Caucasian refineries are listed as follows:

Location Number of Percentage of refineries refined

products

Baku Ik* 63.8 (193*0

Makhach Kala

Grozny 31.1 (193*0

Remarks

Baku leads in output of lubricating oils. Includes ono acetonedewaxing plant.

Receives oil from Grozny by pipe line.

Leads in production of gasoline; hird in production of lubricating oil. k Foster-wheeler 6 Alco 3 Winkler Koch 1 Miller dewaxing plant producing an estimated ^3-53,0 0 tons of high grsde

*Recent reports indicate considerable expansion at Baku.

>tfrm

Percentage of Eemarks refineries refined

products

aviation motor oil annually. 1 Universal polymeri zation plant producing 85 octane gasoline under construction in 19^0, and now evidently completed.

Batumi Capable of handling 2,000,000 tons a year, fed "by two pipe lines from Baku.

Tuapse 1

Krasnodar 2 Receives oil by pipeline from Neftegorsk.

Total 55

Quality of gnsoline. The yield of gasoline at Soviet refineries is low (about 20$) compared to American refineries, but during the past two or three years gasoline fractions have risen due to the addition of cracking plants and improved refining methods

Output of gasoline. In 1958* the Caucasian refineries processed 88$ of the total gasoline produced, with the refineries of the Grozny district leading in output. Although this percentage has now decreased to perhaps 75-80$> "the Caucasian refineries still account for the great bulk of the country's output of gasoline and refined products. According to recent reliable reports, the Caucasian refineries are producing large amounts of 85 octane gas. A large part of this gasoline probably comes from the Universal polymerization plant at Grozny, which is evidently now finished and has an estimated annual capacity of around 55,000 tons of 85 octane gas.

Condition of fields and refineries. In 19^0, an observer reported that the refining plants and storage tanks at Grozny were very close together, and the entire area was easily inflammable since the railroad sidings were soaked with oil. The equipment, although old, appeared serviceable. The fields at Baku were reported

- 48 1'ffin t. Ml i.

in even worse condition at about the same time, and Soviet officials had asked the advice of American experts on avoiding widespread fires in the fields and town in case of bombing.

Petroleum pipelines. The Caucasus in 19^0 contained about 70$ of the total length of pipeline in the country. Generally the pipelines parallel the railroads. The most important ones are listed below:

Table IVt Pipelines in the Caucasus.

From - To Annualtraffic

Diameter Length No. pumping stations

Date ofcompletion

Type of oil carried

Baku Batumi TONS 1,670,000 10"

MILES 51+8 13 1930 Crude oil

885,000 8" 510 16 1906 Kerosene

Grozny -Makhach Kala

600,000 8" 11* 192U Crude oil

Grozny - Tuapse 770,000 10" 38^ 1928 Crude oil

Maikop - 905,000 8" 67 1930 Crude oil Krasnodar

Armavir - 1, 500,000 12". 303 193^ -Trudovaya

Mangane s e : Next in importance to the Caucasian oil fields are the manganese mines at Chiatura in the Georgian Republic. The mines, containing some of the world's finest manganese, are modern and are equipped with concentrating machinery. In 1937, 1,650,000 metric tons of Mi-52$ are were produced by the Chiatura deposits. At present, the location of the mines is a great disadvantage because of the long railroad haul from the deposits in the southwestern Caucasus to the steel mills of the Urals and west Siberia.

Copper: In 1937, the Alaverdi mines in northwest Armenia and the Zangezur mines at Kafan in southeast Armenia produced about &fo of the copper mined in the Soviet Union, with a combined output of around ^,000 tons.

'•i.H.

Coal fields; The Caucasian coal fields produced slightly over ^,000,000 tons of coal in 1938, or about 0.3$ of the country's total output. These fields are located as follows

North Caucasus Khumara - Ordzhonikidze Krai Mikoyan Shakhar - " Akhmara - Georgian Republic

Transcaucasus Akhmara - Georgian Republic Tkvikbuli - " "

Steel: The steel production of the Caucasus is very small. Official figures for 1937 for the "Southern Raiony" which do not separate the North Caucasus and Crimea are 826,200 metric tons, plus 600 metric tons for the Georgian Republic making a total of 826,800 metric tons. There are iron ore deposits at Chiragidzor near Yukhary-Dashkesan, 180 mi. west of Baku, Azerbaidzhan Republic, and 17,900 metric tons of steel were produced in this region in 1937 The grand total, therefore, is something over 8^0,000 tons. A large part of this production, however, was accounted for by the Crimean steel plants. Small ferrous metallurgy plants are located as follows:

Krasnodar, North Caucasus Novorossisk, " " Tuapse, " " Sochi,

There is also a ferro-alloy plant at Zestafoni in Georgia, with a capacity of 60,000 tons annually.

Lead and zinc, mines: The Sadon mines, one of the oldest lead-zinc districts in Russia, are located in the North Caucasus, 25 miles southwest of Ordzhonikidzet Ore from the mines is shipped to the Ordzhonikidze plant for treatment, listed under Industries. These mines produce an estimated 20$ of the Soviet Union's lead and zinc« Exact figures on lead production at the Sadon mines during recent years are not available. The capacity of the Ordzhonikidze zinc plant is 15,000 tons, but it is doubtful if it is working at this level.

Other minerals: The North Caucasus contains •scattered deposits of platinum, molybdenum, chromite, and gold. Production, if any, at ouch deposits is very small and figures on output are not available.

- 50

Power rosources; The Caucasus contains a large number of power stations working either on oil or water power, Caucasian water power rosources have been developed quite extensively during the past few years.

The main power stations of the North Caucasus

and Caucasus District

Location Source of power

Krasnodar Oil

Novorossisk

Tuapse

Sochi

Armavir

Apsheronskaya (75 mi. southwest of Armavir)

Tikhoretsk (75 mi. northwest of Armavir)

Kyzburun, Baksan Hydroelectric Sta. (80 mi. northwest of Ordzhonikidze)

Verkhni Koban, " Gizeldon Sta. (12 mi. southwest of Ordzhonikidze)

Ardon Sta. (kO mi. " southwest of Ordzhonikidze)

Grozny Oil

Ordzhonikidze

Baku (a) (D)

Capacity Remarks

10-25,000 kw

10-25,000 kw

5-10,000 kw

5-10,000 kw

5-10,000 kw

5-10,000 kw

5-10,000 kw

25-50,000 kw

10-25,000 kw

10-25,000 kw Under construet ion in 1938.

50-100,000 kw

3-5,000 lew

200-300,000 kw Under construe50-100,000 kw t ion in 1938.

- I

Location Source of Capacity Remarks power

Art em Island (30 mi, Oil 1-3,000 kw east of Baku)

Sukhum, Georgia Hydroelectric 10-25,000 lew Under construction in 1938.

Batumi, Ge orgi a Oil 1-3,000 kw

Matsunkheti, Atsges* Hydroelectric 22,000 kw (15 mi. east of Batumi)

Vartsikhe, Rionges Hydroelectric (70 mi. northeast of Batumi)

Rosenberg, Khramges Hydroelectric 5-10,000 kw Under construc(kO mi. west-southwest tion in 1938. of Tbilisi)

Tbilisi Oil 1-3,000 kw Undergoing enlargement in 1938.

Zages Hydroelectric 10-20,000 kw (North of Tbilisi)

Kanaker I (on Zanga Hydroelectric 1+2,000 kw River "between Lake Sevan and Yerevan)

Hydroelectric 1+6,000 kw Kanaker II (id.)

Hydroelectric 100-200,000 kw Under construc-Gyumush (id.) tion in 1938.

Kalageran, Dzorages Hydroelectric 10-25,000 kw (kO mi. 3outh of Tbilisi in Armenia)

Kaps, Leninakanges Hydroelectric 5-10,000 kw (8 mi. northwest of Leninakan, Armenia)

Total 531,000-1,10^,000

Industries. The leading industries of the Caucasus, outside of oil refining treated under petroleum, are the manufacture of synthetic rubber, textiles, and cement, as listed below. *The ending "gos" means "hydroelectric station."

- 52

'4 W -'!';' ' ';•*,/ ; i i ,

The fish canneries at Chapayev (Guryev) and Astrakhan as well as those along the Caspian coast of the Caucasus are also included; they process the Caspian fish catch, which represents about one-third to one-half of the Russian total. The principal species are the vobla, a kind of carp, pike, carp, sturgeon, and herring,

Location

Ordzhonikidze

Novorossisk

Krasnodar

Kutaisi Baku

Baku, Vicinity of

Caspian seacoast

Astrakhan

Chapayev (Guryev)

Yerevan

Type of establishment Remarks

Lead smelter Capacity unknown Electrolytic zinc plant 15,000 tons of zinc

Cement

Grain elevators

Synthetic rubber

Lithapone plant* Textiles

Iodine and "bromine extraction.

Helium extraction.

Fish canneries

Fish canneries Cotton textiles

Fish canneries

Synthetic rubber

Novorossisk and vicinity produce nearly 100$ of country's cement. 1937 production of Soviet Union 5,800,000 tons.

Present capacity about 5,000 tons; under construction in ^

Capacity 12,000 tons in 1939.

The Caspian accounts for one-third to one-half of the total Russian fish catch.

Factory with planned capacity of over k million yards annually under construction in 19^0.

Output 10,000 tons (1935)

*An inorganic filler for pigments, linoleum, rubber tires, etc.

- 53

Location Type of establishment Remarks

Sungait (20 mi. north Synthetic rubber Experimental plant for west of Baku) the use of "by-products

of oil, coal, and natural gas.

Kirovakan Chemical works Under construction.

Leninakan Textiles 70,500 spindles in

Kirovabad (Gandzha) Textiles

Nukha (60 mi. north- Silk mill east of Kirovabad)

Tbilisi Machine tools Output about 700 per year.

Ports. Information of the number and tonnage of vessels calling at Black Sea ports, and freight turnover in 1935 is listed below. The most important cargo on both the Caspian and Black Seas is oil, followed by grain and lumber.*

Table V: BLACK SEA PORTS

NUMBER OF VESSELS REGISTERED FREIGHT PORT CALLING IN 1955 TONS TURNOVER, 1935

Batumi 1,371 2,7^8,000 5,062,000** Poti 1,916 1,365,000 1,21*1,000 Sukhumi 2,592 1,11*6,000 Tuapse 2,1^3,000 1,507,000 Novorossisk 3,319 2,2^9,000 2,502,000

*The Black Sea and Caspian merchant fleets are discussed under (2Xd). **Normally the chief freight handled is oil.

Table VI: CASPIAN SEA PORTS

NUMBER OF VESSELS REGISTERED MflELGHT PORT CALLING IN 1955 TONS TURNOVER, 1955

Baku 15,869,000 10,^5,000* 7,91^ Makhach Kala 1,550,000 5,759,000 Krasnovodsk 2,887 958,000 1,658,000 Astrakhan 6,609,000

Zone of the interior. The zone of the interior is an enormous area comprising three regions -- the Urals, including Kazan and Kuibyshev, West Siberia, and Central Asia* All three of these regions contain valuable mineral deposits, many of them capable of expansion, as shown in the attached table. The Urals lead industrially, producing steel, heavy machinery, ammunition and materiel, vehicles, chemicals, and refined petroleum. West Siberia has a ferrous metallurgical center at Stalinsk and also manufactures arms, chemicals, non-ferrous metals and textiles, while Central Asia accounts for a large output of copper, lead and other non-ferrous metals, and produces coal, cotton and silk textiles, nitrates and explosives.

The isolation of the zone of the interior is both an advantage and a disadvantage. While out of the reach of enemy bombers, it must rely on sparse rail networks covering a vast area to haul its raw materials and transport its finished goods to the European portion of the country. The dangers inherent in a breakdown of the rail system have already been pointed out.

^Largest turnover of any port in the Soviet Union; the freight, however, consists mainly of oil; oil also is the most important item in the trad© of Makhach Kala and Astrakhan.

Table VII: Mineral Production in the Zone of the Interior^

The following tat>le gives the percentages of various metals and minerals normally produced in the Urals, West Siberia, and Central Asia.

Metals in which the Soviet Union is seriously deficient are starred.

Metal or Mineral

Approximate $ produced in zone of the interior

Chief sources in order of importance

Capable of expansion yes; no; ?

Remarks -

Iron and Steel

Urals Yes

Petroleum 10-11 Urals, Central Asia Yes From present indications it does not seem likely that the Urals-Volga and Central Asiatic fields can produce sufficient petroleum to make up for the possible loss of the Caucasas,

Copper 95 Urals, Central Asia Yes Large expansion planned for , Central Asiatic mines.

Lead andzinc

95 - 100 Siberia, Central Asia Yes

Bauxite 7 0 - 8 0 (?) Urals Yes Urals bauxite deposits are higher grade than the Tikhvin deposits near Leningrad.

Manganese 10 (1) Urals, Siberia Yes Urals manganese needs elaborate treatment "because of the high phospheroid content.

Metal or Mineral

Chromite

Coal

Magnesite

Platinum

*Nickel

Mercury

*Molybdenum

*Tungsten

*Vanadium

Mica

LIABLE VII Continued,

Approximate fo Chief aources Capable of produced in in order of expansion zone of the importance yes; no; ? interior.

100 Urals Yes

25 - 30 Siberia; Centr Urals

100 Urals Yes

100 Urals, Siberia

90 (7)

1

50 (? Urals; Central Asia ?

Central Asia; Siberia ?

60 ? Urals

60 ? Siberia

Remarks

Russia one of world's greatest producers.

Russia one of world's greatest producers«

Most of the Russian tin production comes from eastern Siberia

Central Asiatic deposits can pro"ba"bly he developed; "bulk of Russian mercury normally comes from the Ukraine.

Soviet molybdenum resources insufficient.

Soviet tungsten resources small.

Soviet vanadium mostly imported.

- 57

TABLE VII Continued,

Metal or Approximate $ Chief Sources Capable of Mineral produced in in order of expansion Remarks

zone of the importance yes; no; ? interior

(Sold 50 ? TJraloJ Siberia ?

Sulphur 100 Central Asia; Urals 1

Pyrites 100 Urals ?

Potaoh 100 Urals Yes Other deposits occur in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Boron 100 Central Asia Yes

Asbestos 100 Urals Yes

Phosphates Kola Peninsula nepheline deposits furnish the "bulk of Russian phosphate production; deposits of phosphate reported in Central Asia.

Salt Urals Yes

URALS, Iron and Steel. The iron and steel industry of the Urals takes second place after that of the Ukraine. In 1937 the Ural steel mills produced about 17$ of the Soviet Union's pig iron and 19$ of its steel.

- 58

Iron Ore.

Iron ore production in 1937 was as follows:

Chelyabinsk Ob last 7,152,200 metric tons (including Magnitogorsk)

Sverdlovsk Oblast 1,2^7,500

Chkalov Oblast 8^,600 Total - Urals ,300

Bashkir Republic 176,UOO Total - Urals and Bashkir 8,661,-700 metric tons

Republic

The most important mines "by far are those at Magnitogorsk ("Magnetic Mountain"), southern Urals, with reserves estimated at hk6 million tons, of which one-fourth is high quality ore. There are also deposits of iron ore at Bakal, in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, at Mounts Vysokaya and Blagodat north of Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and at Khalilovo, northwest of Orsk in the southern Urals.

Pig Iron and Steel Production.

Production of pig iron and steel in the Urals in 1937 was as follows:

io of country's output

Pig iron 2,633,000 metric tons 17 Steel 3,^87,900 19

Although exact data are not available, present steel production in the Urals plants may be estimated at around 5,000,000 6,000,000 tons.

Important iron and steel plants are located as follows:

Location Type of Remarks products

Nizhni Tagil Cast iron Annual planned capacity: (Novo Tagil Plant) Steel Cast iron - 1,700,000 tons

Rolled steel Steel 1,500,000 " Rolled Steel-1,100,000 "

- 59

Location

Magnitogorsk

Chusovoi (near Molotov)

Sverdlovsk

Nadezhdinsk

Zlatoust (Zlatoustovsk plant)

Bakal

Orsk, southern Urals

Belorets, Bashkir Republic

Type of products

Cast iron Rolled iron Steel

Iron Iron alloys

Iron Steel

Special steel

Special steel

Steel

Iron Steel Ferro-alloys

Ferrous metallurgy

Remarks

Ultimate planned capacity: Cast iron - ,000,000 tons Blooming mill steel

3,000,000 tons

Actual production: Pig iron 1,253,000 tons

(1935) Rolled iron 608,000 tons

(1935) Cast iron 2,500,000 tons

(19M) Steel 816,000 tons

(1935) Open hearth 1,^90,05^ tons steel (1938)

New charcoal iron smelter; production unknown.

This is reported to "be a "gigantic" plant; details of production unknown.

1938 production 290,051 tons.

1938 production - l88,U88 tons,

Details of production unknown.

Large plant under construction in 19^0; works on the KhaliA lovo deposits of iron ore with nickel, chromium and other metals usually added to steel.

Details of production unknownf

IMP? AWSH- 60

' Coal, The Ural coal mines produced 8,081,000 metric tone of coal in 1937. The most important fields are listed as follows:

Location Type of Coal Production

South of Lignite 3,600,000 metric Solikamsk tons (1936)

Chelyabinsk fields Short distance Lignite east of the city of Chelyabinsk

Rezh River deposits On the Rezh River Planned pro(Egorshino) a short distance duction

northeast of Sverdlovsk 1,000,000 metric tons

Vorkuta River fields On a tributary of the Bituminous About 300,000 Usa River in the northern metric tons extremity of the Urals (1939)

At present, the Kizel and Chelyabinsk mines are the leading producers in the Urals, with a planned combined production of 9,500,000 metric tons by I9U2, Coal from these mines is used by the Ural metallurgical plants, by the power stations and industries, and for local use in general. Expanded production of the Ural coal mines has relieved the railways of some of the burden of transporting coal from Kuznetsk and Karaganda.

Urals and Volga Petroleum Fields Output. The oilfields of the Ural and Volga region, referred to as the "Second Baku,u

produced 6.5$ of the country's total oil output in 1939 > amounting to 1,986,000 metric tons. This percentage was scheduled to grow to 21.&f> by 19 -2, with a planned production for that year of 11,772,000 tons.

These fields have not come up to expectations, however, and output for the first nine months of 19^0 fell short of the plan, 19^0 production, therefore may be estimated at about 2,000,000 tons. Later figures on production are not available.

> $

- 61

The fields are located as follows:

Syzran On the great tend of the Volga, Stavropol near Kuibyshev, and "between Sergievsk the Volga and Belaya Rivers. Buguruslan

Ishimbayevo Tuimazy and On the Belaya River, near adjacent fields Sterlitamak, a short distance

south of Ufa.

Krasnokainek and On the Kama River, near adjacent fields Molotov (Perm).

Refineries. Information on the Ural-Volga refineries, which mostly dates from 19A0, is very incomplete as to actual output. It is evident, however, that the Soviets have planned to develop the" Ural-Volga refineries as the center of their high octane gas production. Two-thirds of the 85 octane gas to "be boosted to 95 octane "by the Universal Hydrogenation plant at Ufa was to come from the Saratov and Ufa polymerization plants, and the other one-third from Grozny.

The total output of gasoline at the refineries listed on Tafcle VHI ia unknown. An estimate of gasoline production at the Alco, Lummus, and Universal plants at Ufa is given "below:

Plant Octane Metric tons

Alco ) Lummus) 65 360,000

Alco ) Lummus) 75 238,000

Universal Varying 70,000 of which Hydrogenati on 3O/o 90-95 about 21,000 is

90-95 Total 668,000

In 19^0, however, actual production of 85-90 gas at the Universal Hydrogenation plant at Ufa was estimated at only 12,000 tons. This plant's theoretical production is U0-50,000 tons of 90-95 octane gas; an output of this size depends on whether the Ufa, Saratov, and Grozny polymerization plants are furnishing their quota of 85 octane, and whether the hydrogenation plant is working at capacity.

• t'i"';'

American engineers who installed these plants reported in 1938-IJ-O that their operation, due mainly to the failings of the personnel, was most unsatisfactory. In addition, early in 19^0, salt and sulphur were appearing in the oil at one of the Ufa refineries, doing great damage to the equipment. Mud also appeared in oil from one of the fields near Ufa, possibly indicating the exhaustion of the well in question,

Information on the output of other fractions at the Urals-Volga refineries is not available, "but presumably an equal amount of planning has gone into the production of lubricating oils.

Pipelines. Orsk is the terminus of the pipeline from the Emba fields on the Caspian. There is also a 102-mile pipeline between Ishimbai and Ufa, and another of approximately equal length, between these two cities was reported to be half completed in 19^0. In addition, a 12-inch pipeline about 93 miles long runs from Tuimazy to Ufa.

Non-ferrous Metals and Minerals. The Urals account for a large part of the Soviet Union's production of non-ferrous metals.

Aluminum. This region contains the country's best deposits of bauxite, utilized by the Kamensk Uralski aluminum plant. The Kamensk plant produced an estimated 10,000 tons of metallic aluminum in 19^0, with a theoretical capacity of 25,000 tons, to be raised later to 80,000 tons by the addition of new units. According to Soviet reports, a portion of the Zaparozhe aluminum plant was evacuated to Kamensk. In this case, if sufficient building space and power are available, the Kamensk plant may be producing at the rate of 30-i(-0,000 tons of metallic aluminum a year.

Copper. From 70 to oQfp of the Soviet Union's copper comes from the Urals. The Kirovgrad and Pyshma smelters together produced about 70,000 tons of the nearly 100,000 metric tons of copper turned out by the Soviet Union in 1937. Other copper smelters of unknown capacity are located at Krasnouralsk, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk, Revda, and Blyava.

Other Metals and Minerals. The Soviet Union is one of the world's leading producers of chromite and magnesite, and the country's deposits of these minerals are found in the Urals. Unlimited quantities of metallic magnesium, extremely valuable for light alloys, can be obtained from magnesite. A portion of the Zaparozhe magnesium plant was reportedly evacuated and presumably the transported units are functioning at the Solikamsk plant.

Location

Bashkirskoe(near Kuibyshev)

Syzran

I Orsk

>terlitamak

Ishimbayevo

Chusovoi

tolotov

Puimazy

Type

Refinery

Refinery

Cracking plant

Refinery

Refinery

Refinery

Refinery

Refinery

TABLE VIII URAL - VOLGA REFINERIES

Annual Capacity Productionof crude

Metric- Tons 500,000

Source of crude

Volga fields

Volga fields

Emba fields (by pipe

lines )

Ishimbayevo fie Ids

Ishimbayevo fields

Krasnokamsk •fields

Krasnokamsk fields

Tuimazy fields

Remarks

To be completed in 1940; present status unknown.

First section r e ported in operation in the early part of 194-0.

Reported under construction in 1940. 1

TABLE VIII URAL VOLGA REFINERIES (Cont.)

Location Typo Annual Capacity of crude

Production Source of crude

Remarks

Ufa (1)

Alco plant 400,000 (crude)

20$ yield of 75 oc- Ishimbayevo tane = 80,000 tons. f ie lds 30$ y ie ld of 65 octane fta 120,000 tons.

(2) Universal plant (a) Catalytic polymerization

Unknown Unknown Ishimbayevo fields

Produces 85 octane gas

CD

- " * * ) * •[

(b) Hydrogenation Unknown Possible: annual capacity in 7O,5SO tons of gas per y.^ar of which 30$ is 90-95 octane 21,000 tons.

Actual; 12,000 tons of 85-90 in 1940 (See also remarks)

Gas to be furnished by 1. Ufa polymerization plant. 2. Saratov polymerization. 3. Grozny polymerization.

Theoretically when the Grozny Saratov, and Ufa polymer ization plants furnish the planned amounts of 85 octane, this hydrogenation plant can furnish 40-50,000 tons of 90-95 octane a year.

(3) Lummus plant 1,000,000(crude)

Estimated: a 158,000 tons of 75

octane gas annually. Ishimbayevo

fields Scheduled to open in 1940.

b_ 240,000 tons of 65 octane gas annually.

Small amounts of lead, zinc and nickel come from the Urals. Recent Soviet writings claim that improved methods of treating Urals manganese have "been devised, allowing for the use of these low-grade ores in the local steel plants. The Urals also produce part of the country's gold, and most of its platinum. There is a large deposit of pyrites used for making sulphur and sulphuric acid. In addition, about 2,000,000 tons of potash are produced yearly in the Urals.

Table IX: NON-FERROUS METALS AND MINERALS IN THE UBALS.

Non-ferrous metals and various minerals products come from the following places in the Urals.

Metal or Mineral Location Remarks

Aluminum See Bauxite

86,000 tons produced in Asbestos Ashest and vicinity 1938 mostly coming from these deposits.

Bauxite Krasnaya Bauxite used by the Shapochka, U5 mi. Kamensk Uralski plant, north-northwest opened Sept '39, with of Serov; other theoretical capacity of deposits in Urals. 25,000 tons of aluminum.

Chromite Biser; Sverdlovsk 219,000 tons of ore and vicinity; south- mined in 193&, about 20$ e m Urals. of the world's production.

Copper 5 deposits in About 87$ of USSR copper various parts of production comes from the Urals. Smelt- the Urals. ers at Blyava, Kirovgrad, Krasnouralsk, (30 mi. north of Nizhni Tagil) Nizhni Tagil, Pyshma, (7 mi. north of Sverdlovsk) Revda (28 mi. west of Sverdlovsk), and Sverdlovsk.

- 66

Metal or Mineral

Cryolite (artificial)

Gold

Lead and Zinc

Magnesite

Manganese

Mercury

Mica

Molybdenum

TABlft IX Continued»

Location

Plants at Polevskoi, (30 mi. southwest of Sverdlovsk); Revda (under construction) (28 mi. west of Sverdlovsk) .

Principal deposits in following districts : Ugolny, Nizhni Tagil, Nevyansk (7 mi, northeast of Kirovgrad),' Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk.

Remarks

Fluorspar for artificial cryolite comes from Amderma; capacity 4,500 tons.

Soviet gold production is very large; statist t-ics on individual fields not available.

Deposits south of Chelyabinsk and between Sverdlovsk and Krasnouralsk.

Satka (30 mi. SW of Zlatoust).

Chief deposits: Qrsk-Kalilovo, (30 mi. W of Qrsk), and Marsyata (35 mi. N of Serov.)

Deposit reported in Upper Rezh River Valley ( 5 mi. N of Sverdlovsk).

Deposits on the Kama River

Serov

There is a zinc concentrating plant at Chelyabinsk.

1936 production roughly 500,000 metric tons chiefly from Satka; U.S.S.R. is worlds largest producer.

Production very small; Ural manganese unsatisfactory.

Not being worked as far as known.

Production, if any, very small.

Production very small

- 67

Metal or Mineral

Nickel

Phosphorites

Platinum

Potash

Pyrites

Silver

Sulphur

Tin

Tungsten

Vanadium

TABLE IX Continued.

Location

Verkhne-Ufalei, Rezh, Khalilovo, Orsk (under construction.

Deposits reported northwest of Rezh and in the Emba River Valley.

Five platinum bearing areas

Solikamsk

Belt running fromNizhni Tagil south

Remarks

Production very small.

Production, if any, unknown.

Production figures secret; "but the USSR is one of the world's leading producers .

Production about 2 million tons a year; Soviet Union one of world's greatest producers.

6l8,000 metric tons pro duced in 1935, most of

to Karabash, (55 mi. which came from the Urals. W-NW of Sverdlovsk), Pyrites used to make coinciding with a sulphur and sulphuric acid, large part of the copper zone.

None reported.

No important deposits of free sulphur but some of the copper mines extract as a byproduct.

None reported.

Burannoye, Chkalov Oblast

Khalilovo iron ores (west of Orsk)

No figures available. Soviet tungsten production insufficient.

Very small; Soviet vanadium production insufficient.

- 68

TABLE X POWER STATIONS IN-THE URALS

The most important electric power stations in the Urals (including Kazan, and Kuibyshev) are as follows:

City Source of power Capacity Remarks

Kuibyshev Coal 10 - 25,000 M (1938)

Kazan Coal 25 - 50,000 KW (1938)

Berezniki Coal 50 -100,000 KW (1938)

Krasnokamsk (25 mi. west of Molotov) Coal 50 -100,000 KW (1938)

G-ubakha (50 mi. southeast of Berezniki) Coal 50 -100,000 KW (1938) iKushva (25 mi. north of Nizhni Tagil) Coal 10 - 25,000 KW" (1938)

Serov (Nadezhdinsk) Coal 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

Novaya Lyalya (75 mi. south of Serov) Mixed fuel 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

Nizhni Tagil (a) Coal 49,000 KW (1938) Undergoing enlargement

in 1939,

(b) Unknown Unknown Station attached to Novo«-Tagil iron and steel plant.

JJLIJi—

Kirovgrad (Kalata) Coal 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

TABLE X (Continued) POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS


Solikamsk Coal 3 5,000 KW (1938) Attached to the potash plant.

Molotov Coal 5,- 10,000 KW (1938)

Sredneuralsk(15 mi. north of Sverdlovsk, "Surges," Central Urals Electric Station)

Coal 100,000 KW (1939) Largest station in Urals and one of the largest in Soviet Union.

Sverdlovsk Peat 25 - 50,000 KW (1938)

Berezovski (8 mi. northeast'of Sverdlovsk) Peat 3 5,000 KW (1938)

Pervouralsk (25 mi. west of Sverdlovsk) Coal 5 - 10,000 KW (1938)

Rezh (45 mi. northeast of Sverdlovsk) Coal 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

Kamensk Uralski Lignite 125,000 KW (1938) Attached to the aluminum plant. Undergoing enlargement.

Chelyabinsk Lignite 100 -200,000 KW (1938)

Zlatoust Coal 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

Satka (25 mi. southwest of Zlatoust) Coal 5 - 10,000 KW (1938) Probably attached to

the magnesite plant.

TABLE X (Continued) POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS


Asha Coal 5 - 10,000 KW (1938 )

Magnitogorsk Coal 100-200,000 KW (1938)

Orsk Coal 25,000 KW (1938)

Chkalov (Orenburg) Mixed fuels 3 5,000 KW (1938)

Ufa Petroleum 10 - 25,000 KW (1938)

Ishimbai Petroleum 5 - 10,000 KW (1938)

Belorotsk Coal 5 - 10,000 m (1938) i

-a TOTAL: 818,000 - 1,374,000 KW

"t"?

Industries. Under the second and third Five-Year Plans, the Soviet authorities have concentrated on the industrial development of the Urals. This region is now a center of heavy industry; it also refines oil, and manufactures machinery, chemicals and munitions. Industrially, it ranks third in the Soviet Union after the Ukraine and the Moscow area.

The list "below gives the location of important factories known to exist in the Urals. Data are not complete since detailed figures on production are not published, and many of the factories have only gone into operation during the past two or three years.

Table XI: INDUSTRIES IN THE URALS.

Machinery, machines and machine tools.

Location Type of Production or Remarks product capacity

Nizhni Tagil Electrical machinery Unknown Machine tools

Sverdlovsk Electrical machinery " Excavators, (Ural Machine Heavy Machinery " large presses, Plant or "Ural mash") Machine tools etc.

Ufa Internal combustion motors

Chelyabinsk Machine tools

Railroad equipment, trucks, etc-

Chelyabinsk Tractors

Nizhni Tagil Car-"building 5^,000 freight, tank and refrigerator car's of 50-ton capacity each

Orsk Steam and diesel locomotives

Eefineries — See Table VIII, p. 6U< •

Miscellaneous industries -

Krasnovishersk Paper and pulp 23,600 tons (60 mi. N of of paper Solikamsk)

- 72

TABLE XI Continued. Location

Krasnokamsk (30 mi W of Molotov)

Ufa

Lysva (50 mi E of Molotov)

Orsk

Chemical plants Location

Kazan

Solikamsk

Berezniki

Nizhni Tagil

Sverdlovsk

Magnitogorsk

Type of product

Paper mill

Woodworking mills

Tinplate plant

Meat packing

Type of product

Powder Sulphuric acid Nitric acid Synthetic rubber (divinyl)

Potash Metallic magnesium

Fertilizers (incl. ammonia) War chemicals Nitrogen fixation Sulphuric acid Soda

Coke-chemical plant

Hydrocyanic acid Sodium

Coke-chemical plant

Production or Remarks capacity

U2,900 tons (Planned capacity)

Production or Remarks capacity

2,000,000 metric tons

Raw materials; coal, salt,

30,000 metric tons potash, 57,toO " " limestone,

phosphorites.

Attached to Novo-Tagil Iron and Steel Plant.

50,000 metric tons (nonmilitary)

Attached to Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Plant.

« 73 ~

Location Remarks Type of Production or product capacity

Chapayevsk Sulphuric acid (near Kuibyshev) Nitric acid

Poison gas

Vavilovo Acetic acid (50 mi. east-north- Methyl alcohol east of Ufa.) Charcoal

Ammunition and Materiel(Mainly data of 1937)

Kuibyshev 1 ammunition factory 2 powder factories 2 chemical warfare factories

(possibly identical with the chemical plant at Chapayevsk)

Kazan 1 ammunition factory 1 powder factory 1 chemical warfare factory

Berezniki 1 arms factory 1 chemical warfare factory (probably identical with plant listed under chemical plants)

Izhevsk 2 arms factories

Serov 1 ammunition factory (Nadezhdinsk)

Molotov 1 arms factory (Perm)

Chusovskoye - 1 ammunition factory (E of Molotov)

Chkalov 1 plane factory

Nazhni Tagil - 1 ammunition factory

Sverdlovsk - 1 arms factory

- 74

TABLE XI Continued.

Zlatoust Z arms factories

Chelyabinsk 1 tank factory; greatly expanded with machinery evacuated from Kharkov.

1 tractor factory now converted to tanks annual capacity of 40,000 tractors.

Ufa 1 airplane factory

This list does not include factories which have been evacuated since the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.

West Siberia. The industrial center of West Siberia is the city of Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Basin. The steel plant at Stalinsk, working on coal from the Kuznetsk Basin and the iron ore of the Gornaya Shoriya mines, produced 1,600,000 tons of steel in 1937, and 530,700 tons of special steel in 1938.

The Kuznetsk Basin contains coal of varied types. Its production in 1937 amounted to 17,800,000 tons, dropping to about 16,800,000 tons in 1938. In 1940, about 2,000,000 tons of Kuznetsk coal were still shipped annually to the Urals. These shipments are declining, due to the increasing amounts of coal now mined in the Urals or sent from Karaganda.

The enormous deposit of anthracite at Cheremkhovo, on the Trans-Siberian northwest of Irkutsk, supplies the railroad. It produced more than 3,000,000 metric tons of coal in 1936, There is also a coal field at Chernogorsk which is the chief source of coal for the Abakan-Minusinsk region. Its production vras over half a million metric tons in 1939.

Locomotive repair shops to serve the Trans-Siberian Railroad are located in Omsk and Irkutsk.

• A recent industrial development is the building of textile mills to work on Central Asian cotton.

This region also contains large resources of timber, mostly-coniferous, along the Yenisei and Angara Rivers.

- 75

Table XII: INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF WEST SIBERIA.

1. Metals and minerals. Metals and minerals are mined at the following places in West Siberia.

Location Metal orMineral

Production or capacity

Stalinsk (Kuznetsk) Iron and steel 1,600,0.00 tons of steel in 1937; 530,700 tons of special steel in 1938.

Gornaya Iron ore Shoriya (150 miles south of Stalinsk)

Novosibirsk Metal working Unknown

Prokopyevsk (25 mi. Iron and steel west of Stalinsk)

or processed

Remarks

Comprises: (a)

(b)

(0)

(d) (e)

(f)

several blast furnaces. 10 open hearth furnaces• rolling mill zinc smelter coke-chemical plant steam electric power plant.

Kemerovo Lead Exact capacity unknown; Electrolytic zinc reportedly "largest

in the world"

Stalinsk Zinc smelter Capacity unknown

Belovo (75 mi. north of Stalinsk) Zinc plant

Salair mines (west Kuznetsk Basin) Lead

Kuznetsk Basin Coal ("Kuzbas," with center at Stalinsk)

17,800,000 tons Furnishes coal for the Stalinsk and (1937) Urals iron and steel works; Kuznetsk coal is of superior quality and reserves large.

76

TABLE XII Continued. Location Metal or Production or Remarks

Mineral capacity

Cheremkhovo

Chernogorsk

Coal

Coal

5,000,000 tons (1956) 500,000 tons

Supplies the rail road and local industry.

Mazul Manganese 150,000 tons Planned exploita(near Achinsk) 19^0 (?) tion to serve

Kuznetsk steel plants; actual production unknown,

2. Electric Power Stations. The present combined capacity of the main West Siberian power stations may "be set at around 500,000 KW. These stations are listed "below:


Novosibirsk (a) Coal 50-100,000 KW Coal Unknown

Kemerovo Coal 50-100,000 KW Stalinsk Coal 100-200,000 KW Omsk Coal 10-25,000 KW Irkutsk Coal 10-25,000 KW

Combined capacity: 220-550,000 KW

5. Chemicals. Stalinsk - Coke-chemical plant attached to the metallurgical plant, capacity unknown.

Kemerovo - Chemical combinat comprising:

(1) sulphuric acid plant (2) fertilizer plant, including nitrogen fixation. (5) coal liquefaction plant (k) coking plant producing "benzol and hydrogen

as ly-products.

- 77

TABLE XII Continued. Railroad eauiTament, repair, etc.

Location

Omsk

Stalinsk

Irkutsk

5. Textile plants.Asian republics.

Novosibirsk

Barnaul

Belovo

Stalinsk

Prokopyevsk

Kemerovo

Krasnoyarsk

Type of installation

Shop for repairing locomotives, tractors, "boats

Locomotive worksto go into operation in1939-^0.

Locomotive repair shopand locomotive works.

Capacity or production

Planned capacity of 5*1-0 locomotives.

Planned capacity of 10,000 four-axle

Car works to be finished freight cars, in

These mills obtain their cotton from the Central

6. Ammunition and materiel.

Novosibirsk

Irkutsk

Omsk Tomsk

Cotton textiles (planned in

Cotton Textiles

Dress goods

Textiles - (cotton?)

Cotton prints and satins

Spinning and weaving mill

About 28 million yards yearly.

Capacity unknown

Planned in 19^0

Planned in 19^0

1 arms factory 1 tank factory 1 airplane factory 1 arms factory 1 tank factory 1 airplane factory

1 airplane repair shop

™fi!

Central Asia. Central Asia comprises a huge region including the Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik Republics. A railroad crosses Kazakhstan from Tashkent to Chkalov, and the "Turk-Sib" runs from Arys,' a short distance north of Tashkent by way of Alma Ata to Semipalatinsk in Eastern Kazakhstan. A line also runs from the Fergana Valley across the Turkmen Republic to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian, and another, a single-track road, connects the Karaganda fields with Sverdlovsk.

Natural Resources. This portion of the Soviet Union contains deposits of coal, copper, lead and zinc, petroleum and sulphur.

Coal. The coal resources of this region include the Karaganda •bituminous mines in Kazakhstan which produced nearly k million tons in 1937. In recent years the Karaganda mines have been developed as a leading source of coal for the metallurgical plants of the Urals. In southern Kazakhstan, near Chimkent, the Lenger lignite mine has "been in the process of development since 1932, and is capable of supplying local needs. Other mines are "being developed in western Kazakhstan, in the Fergana Valley, and on the Mangyshlyak Peninsula. (See Table XIII), They are chiefly valuable as a source of supply for:

local industries.

Petroleum. The Fergana Valley, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan account for a small oil production. (See Table XIII and Map 6).

The most important arc the Emba River fields producing 652,000 metric tons of crude oil and natural gas in 1938, and a reported 1,150,000 tons in 1939. Planned production for 19*1-2 was 2,020,000 tons.

These fields have an unfavorable location in the Kirgiz salt steppe, and the lack of water, labor and decent living quarters has hindered their efficient operation and development. Thoy are connected with Orsk by a U7^-mile pipeline, and a 322-mile railroad goes from Guryev to Kandagach, on the Chkalov-Aktyubinsk-Tashkent line (tho Turk-Sib).

Non-ferrous Metals. • Lead; The greater part of Russian lead production comes from Central Asia. Most of the Soviet production of 78,300 metric tons of lead in 1938 was furnished by the plant at Chimkent, Lead has also been produced for many years at the Ridder mines, in the eastern corner of Kazakhstan and mines of unknown extent are also being worked in the Kirgiz Republic.

- 79

Copper* The copper deposits of Central Asia are very large, "but are still in the stage of development. Production in 1937 was nearly 8,000 tons; although exact data are lacking, present output is probably about double, or in the neighborhood of 15-16,000 tons, since the first metal was produced at the BalkhaBh smelter in 1939. A "Kombinat" was under construction at Dzhezhazgan in 19^1; data on the progress of the work are not available. Potentially the Central Asiatic deposits can produce the bulk of the Soviet Union's copper, but it is highly doubtful if the plan, which originally called for production of 70$ of all Soviet copper in Kazakhstan in 19^2, is anywhere near fulfillment.

Other non-ferrous metals and minerals. Centra}. Asia accounts for a small production of bismuth and antimony, as well as a large proportion of the country's output of sulphur.

Central Asia. Power Stations; In 1937* the power stations of Central Asia contributed only approximately 2$ of the power generated in the Soviet Union, and their average efficiency was lower than that for the country as a whole. Most of the stations are small ones, except for the Ulba plant near Ridder, and the big hydroelectric project at Chirchik, Uzbekistan, which is about half finished at present. Table XIIE gives only stations of 5,000 KW capacity and over,

Industrial establishments. The big synthetic nitrogen and nitrate fertilizer plant at Chirchik was reported ready for operation at the beginning of 19^1. This plant is of great importance since it is doubtless manufacturing explosives from the cotton crop of Central Asia.

There are at least two small oil refineries in Central Asia: one near Krasnovodsk and the other in the Fergana"Valley. The crude refining capacity of these installations is approximately 700,000 tons, with a cracking capacity of about 300,000 tons.

Another leading industry in this region is the manufacture of cotton textiles. Some silk is woven in factories in Tadzhikistan, working on the small silk output of that region.

0

Table XIII; INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF CENTRAL ASIA.

Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, and Turkmenistan.)

1. Metals and minerals:

Capacity or Location Type of installation production Remarks

Turgai, 2 antimony smelters Unknown; Antimony trisulfide Kazakhstan operating on local probably and antimony

ores small pentoxide.

Andrasman, Bismuth from local Unknovn; Put into operation Tadzhikistan deposits probably June (70 mi. south- small east of Tashkent)

Balkhash, Copper; ore comes Theoretical Under construction eastern from Kounrad de- capacity for more than 10 Kazakhstan posit (15 mi* north 175;000 years; exact oper(on Lake of Balkhash) metric tons ating status unknown; Balkhash) of raw first metal produced

copper in 1939.

Dzhezkazgan, Central

Copper (a) Small works

Deposits at Karsakpai said to be the best

Kazakhstan (b) Kombinat in the Soviet Union* (also designated as

still under cons, in

Kar*sal£pai plant)

Almalyk (50 mi. south of

Copper Unknown Uses ore from the old and rich Ridder

Tashkent), mines Uzbekistan Ridder, Lead and zinc northeastern Kazakhstan

TABIE XIII Continued.

Location Type of installation

Chimkent, Lead and zinc Kazakhstan

Karaganda, Coal east-central (Bituminous) Kazakhstan

Lenger mine, Coal southern (Lignite) Kazakhstan

Fergana Coal Valley several deposits

Ber-Chogur, Coal Western Kazakhstan

Mangyshlyak Coal Peninsula, Caspian Sea

Ridder lead Gold (contained in mines, lead ores.) Kazakhstan

(a) Emba Petroleum River fields, Kazakhstan Dos-sor, Makat, Baichunas, Iskine, Koshchagyl


Unknovn; furnishes large part of Soviet Union's lead

5,9^0,000 metric tons (1937)

11*3,000 metric tons (1937)

Unknovn

Unknovn

100,000 metric tons (plan) 19^0

Unknovn

652,000 m.t. (1938)

Remarks

Works on ores from the Takeli, Achi-Sai and Kan-Sai mines.

Large resources of good quality coking coal shipped to Magnitogorsk and other Ural metallurgical centers.

Capable of supplying local needs.

Capable of supplying local needs; some mines not yet developed.

Supplies Aktyubinsk 0blast

Newly developed mine.

A pipeline, kfh miles long, connects the Emba fields with Orsk Emba oil reported very rich with about 30$ of benzine.

TABLE XII Continued.

Location Type of installation

(b) Central Petroleum Asiatic fields including Cheleken Island, Caspian Sea, and adjoining mainland around Nebit-Dag and Nefte-Dag, Turkmenistan

(c) Fergana Petroleum Valley Uzbekistan: Chimion^ Shor-Su, Kim, and Khaudak fields

Khaudag, Petroleum Surkhany and Uch~Kyzyl, southern Uzbekistan (about 30 rai« north of Termez)

Kim, Fergana Petroleum Valley, Tadzhikistan

Changyrtash, Petroleum Kirghizia (east extremity of Fergana Valley)

Kara-Bogaz- Sodium and other Gol Bay, salts Caspian Sea

Ridder mines, Silver Kazakhstan


662,000 m.t. (1938)- 1939 output approximately the same

Capacity of individual fields unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Remarks

- 83

XIII Continued^

Location Type of installatiqn

Kara-Kum Sulphur desert, 155 mi. north of Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan

Gaurdak Sulphur plant, Uzbekistan

Shor-Su plant, Sulphur Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan

2. Electric Power - Data of 1938:

Location Source of pover

Bidder Petroleum

Kazakhstan

Ulba, near Ridder Hydroelectric (Ulba River)

Chirchik, (20 mi northeast of Tashkent) Uzbekistan Komsomol Coal

Komsomol Hydroelectric

Tabak 11

Troitski

Andrasman, Petroleum Tadzhikistan

- 84


1,000 metric tons

1,500 metric tons

1,500 metric tons

Capacity

10-25,000 KW

50-100,000 KW

3-5,000 KW

168,000 KW total capacity of the project

100-300 KW

Remarks

Remarks

Undergoing enlarge^ ment in 1939 2 turbo generators installed at Komsomol in 19*U' other 2 stations yet to be constructed.

Supplies power to the bismuth concentrating plant.

w Jfl1

TABLE XIII Continued,

Location Source of power

Verkhne-Varzobsk, Hydroelectric Tadzhikistan (north of Stalinabad)

Semipalat insk, Kazakhstan

Karaganda, Kazakhstan

Kounrad, Kazakhstan

Alma Ata, Kazakhstan

Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Kadyrya, Uzbekistan (10 mi. northeast of Tashkent)

Kuva - Sai,Uzbekistan (Fergana Valley)

Total

3. Chemicals

Location

Chirchik, Uzbekistan

Aktyubinsk

Coal

Coal

Coal

Coal

Hydroelectricand steam

Hydroelectric

Coal

Type of Product

Synthetic

Capacity

5-10,000 KW

10-25,000 KW

10-25,000 KW

10-25,000 KW

10-25.000 KW

10-25,000 KW

10-25,000 KW

10-25,000 KW

138-315,000 KW

Capacity or Production

Unknown Nitrogen and nitrate fertilizer

Chemicals Unknown

Remarks

Undergoing enlargement - 1939.

Undergoing enlargement - 1939.

Remarks

Ready for operation at beginning of

- 85

\ ^ V'-F^

TABLE XIII Continued. Refineries:

Location Capacity Remarks

Net) it-Dag and Unknown; Receive crude from Cheleken Shaumyan, probably small Island and Nefte-Dag. Kazakhstan (95 and 150 mi. southeast of Krasnovodsk)

Kanibadam Unknown; Operate on crude from neighboring Vannovskaya, probably small fields Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan

5. Miscellaneous Industries:

Location Type of Installation Capacity or Production

Semipalatinsk, Meat-packing "kombinat" 25 million cans Kazakhstan

Tashkent, Uzbekistan Cotton textiles Unknown

Bukhara, Uzbekistan Cotton textiles Unknown

(Unlocated) Silk mills Unknown Tadzhikistan

Fergana, Eastern Cotton textiles Unknown Uzbekistan

Ashkhabad, Cotton textiles Unknown Turkmenistan

Prospects for increased industrial output. The evacuation of industry has increased the industrial capacity of the unoccupied region generally by as much as 10$. Efforts to increase output in some fields, notably iron and steel, coal, gasoline, military supplies, and electrical equipment^have been successful. Output of certain of the Soviet Union's natural resources, notably iron ore, coal, petroleum and aluminum, can be further increased to a small extent. Substitutes can be developed for some lacking materials. On the whole, however, an increase in industrial output is limited seriously by the

- 86

labor shortage, the time element, bad living conditions, and a possible breakdown of the transport system.

Increased output due to evacuation. It is estimated that in spite of the heavy losses due to exposure and breakage suffered by machinery in the process of removal, industries evacuated to the east by the Soviets have raised production in the unoccupied regions generally as much as 10$. Some stocks were also removed, as well as highly skilled personnel and their families. The general policy was to preserve machine-building equipment, complicated dies and laborsaving devices and other specialized equipment. Aircraft and munitions plants were also evacuated, as well as portions of some steel plants and the Zaparozhe aluminum and magnesium combine. Factories making electrical equipment were sent to the Urals, and some aircraft ammunition and gasoline motor parts, sent to the Volga regions were producing by the fall of ^

Soviet claims of increased production during recent months. Soviet claims of increased production during recent months tend to exaggeration and should be regarded with considerable reserve. However, increases have been achieved in some fields during the past winter and spring.

It is estimated that if Lend-Lease aid is included, Eussian pre-war production of purely military supplies has been maintained. The Caucasian refineries are now producing large quantities of 85 octane gasoline, which with the addition of tetraethyl lead and other agents imported from the United States, can be boosted to higher octane for military use. In addition, efforts are being made to open new oil and gas wells, and during 19^1 the United States shipped $5,650,000 worth of petroleum and gas-well drilling apparatus and parts to Russia. The Zlatoust and Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works are reported to be making special steels almost exclusively, and if any substantial increase in special steel output can be made, it.will

serve to cut down imports of this critical material. Coal output has been stepped up to a small extent in the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia. Allegedly, production of electrical equipment has been stepped up kO<f> in the Urals, due to evacuation and expansion of old factories. Efforts have been made to increase the production of textiles and chemicals, but information on results is not available.

The reasons for these increases are the pressure exerted on the workers, longer hours, and perhaps improved organization leading to greater efficiency. There have also been reports that personnel in some important factories get better food, receiving hot meals at the plant. Some of the increases claimed for the

mines and metallurgical plants during the late spring were probably-seasonal, since in winter the extreme cold interferes with their operation.

Expansion of output of natural resources. A moderate increase in the present output of the following minerals is considered feasible during the next six months:

Iron and steel Coal Copper Petroleum Lead and zinc Aluminum

Output of the following can be increased only to a slight degree, if at all, during the next six months:

Nickel Molybdenum Tin Manganese Tungsten Mercury Antimony

Substitutes for lacking materials. In some cases, there are effective substitutes for materials which are lacking or which must be conserved. Some success has been attained in saving coal and oil by the use of by-products gas, or generating gas from peat or wood. Some alloying materials can be substituted, such as chromium - manganese - silicon steel for molybdenum steel. At the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities the Soviet Union already had a well-developed synthetic rubber industry, and in some cases synthetic rubber can be further employed in place of the natural product.

Limiting factors. The time element is one of the most serious limiting factors confronting Soviet industry, since it takes a considerable period to develop new mineral resources and industrial plants. In addition, many factories, metallurgical plants, power plants, refineries, etc. in unoccupied areas, particularly the Urals and Siberia, have only recently been opened. There is al3o the time-lag, already mentioned, involved in setting up and rehabilitating evacuated industries. Other limiting factors are the labor shortage, the general inefficiency of Soviet industry, and the possibilities of famine and epidemics. The situation which would result from a breakdown of the transport system has already'been discussed.

Agricultural production and the food situation. General estimate of the present situation. All reports indicate that the present food situation in the Soviet Union, especially the large cities of European Russia such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kuibyshev, is

- 88

very grave. Refugees and evacuees, estimated at over 10 million, add to the difficulties of the present situation. It is estimated that the additional sown acreage will produce sufficient grain to feed about 6 million of these refugees> provided certain limiting factors-labor shortage, climatic conditions, etc.--do not interfere* The food situation in general will probably remain serious, and the United States will have to continue food shipments.

Crops. Food- grains constitute the single most important item in the country's ;food producing capacities, since the caloric content of the average Rttssian diet is predominantly derived from grains, mostly wheat and rye. The grain producing capacities of unoccupied Russia represent "between 60 and 70$ of the country's normal productive potentialities. The extent of Russian grain reserves at the present time is unknown, "but the grain deficit in this year's crop is estimated at "between 3 and 8 million tons.

Next in importance come potatoes, with an estimated 50$ of the total acreage still intact. The most serious loss is in regard to sugar since the Ukraine and the central region of European Russia grew 60-70$ of th© country's sugar beet crop, and milled 80-90$ of its sugar. In regard to cabbage, it is estimated that about kcrfo of the acreage is intact, and likewise 60$ of the acreage planted to other vegetables. Both potatoes and cabbage supplies on hand during the winter of 19^1-^2 are reported to have suffered from late harvest and early frost. Most of the Soviet Union's sunflower seed acreage (yielding oil) found in the lower Volga and North Caucasus regions, is intact. In addition, Central ABia produces cottonseed oil. About 50$ of the acreage devoted to flax lies in unoccupied regions. Most of this is fiber flax, although some oil flax is grown in the Volga region. The cotton growing area lost to the Germans is negligible.

Livestock. About 80$ of the sheep and 70$ of the cattle are in unoccupied regions, with the greatest livestock raising areas in the lower Volga, North Caucasus, and Kazakhstan. However, the number of cattle will be further reduced due to slaughter because of lack of fodder and other causes. According to 1938 statistics,the latest available, there were approximately 9,500,000 horsea, or 55-60$ of the total in the region included in this study. The number of horses taken over by the army may be estimated at 2,300,000 leaving a maximum of 7,200,000 horses available for agricultural use. About 70$ of the fodder-producing acreage is in unoccupied Russia.

- 89

Dietary level and rationing. In general, the diet of the average Russian is a low-level one, depending on tread grains and potatoes for calories, and often lacking sufficient fats and important minerals, vitamins, and proteins. Hence a drastic lowering of the present food level will have serious consequences in weakening resistance to disease among the civilian population. On the other hand, Russians are accustomed to deprivation and can adjust themselves to food shortages better than people in countries accustomed to a more abundant and adequate diet.

Available information indicates that present rations are adequate for a country where the population is used to living mainly on broad. Heavy workers receive the largest amounts of food, non-manual workers about two-thirds as much, and dependents and children somewhat less. The army, N.K.V.D, and Communist Party members, of course, are much better fed than the average citizen. Food is also better in the more important war industry factories, where the workers are given bread and hot food twice daily.

Evacuation of machinery, livestock, crops and skilled labor. The extent to which machinery and livestock were removed from occupied territory by the Russians cannot be determined exactly. Reports of the evacuation of stock and machinery are borne out by German accounts. There are also indications that the managers of collective and state farms, tractor operators and mechanics were either mobilized or evacuated. It is probable that a portion of the grain crop, particularly in the territory west of the Dnepr, was saved; it is likely that all but a small proportion of the sugar beet crop was lost.

Measures to increase production. Measures taken to increase production include the evacuation of tractors and livestock, already mentioned, labor mobilization, the extension of the sown areas, and the substitution of food for "technical" crops such as cotton, in the Central Astatic republics.

Labor mobilization. An estimated 17,600,000 persons in the Soviet Union are agricultural workers, plus a possible 5-6,000,000 auxiliary workers.

Recent decrees for agricultural production apply to all males from 1^ to 55 and females 1^ to 50 of urban and rural communities not employed in industry or transport. Children and students are also required to work on the farms. 150 days of labor are required of agricultural laborers in the unoccupied area

- 90

around and north of Moscow, and in cotton growing districts, principally in Uzbekistan, and 120 days in other regions. Drastic penalties are provided in case of failure to comply with these decrees.*

Extension of sown area. According to recent reports, the sown area has "been increased "by some 6,500,000 acres of which about 5 million were sown to winter crops. This acreage was distributed as follows:

Urals and Volga region - 1,500,000 acres Kazakhstan - 1,000,000 " Siberia - 1+, 000,000 "

Total 6,500,000

In addition, Central Asiatic cotton acreage is to be decreased by as much as 60$ to allow for food crops. This area has amounted on an average to about 3 million acres: hence a reduction by 6Cff> would mean about 1,800,000 acres released for sowing to food crops. Thus, according to present information, the additional acreage sown this year amounts to over 8 million acres.

Grain, On the basis of the above figures, an estimate may be made of the size of the grain crop obtained from the additional sown acreage for this year. It may be assumed that 75$ of the 8 million acres mentioned will be sown to grains, giving 6 million acres. A Department of Agriculture expert estimates that "each additional million acres sown should, on a conservative estimate and barring very adverse weather conditions, bring roughly between 200,000 and 300,000 tons of grain, exclusive of seed or enough, especially with rationing, to take care of a million or more people." The yield from these 6 million acres sown to grain therefore should theoretically bo able to feed about 6 million people, or between 50 and 60$ of the number of refugees mentioned** Whether this program can succeed depends very largely on the extent certain limiting factor©, discussed below, can be overcome.

Other crops. Potatoes and vegetables;- The area under potatoes and vegetables in the eastern parts of the Soviet Union has increased substantially in recent years, Fotatoes and certain cold climate vegetables, such as cabtn^es, are also grown in the northern grain deficit regions, and increased plantings can help

*See p. 177 **See p. 89

- 91

in relieving local food shortages. One feature of the government's program is the emphasis on the planting of vegetable gardens "by city-workers. Evidently efforts are also "being made to plant vegetables in reoccupied areas, as it has "been announced that the Russians have requested a supply of 200 tons of carrot seed and 30 tons of onion seed for this purpose.

Sugar. The concentration of Russian sugar "beet production in the Ukraine has "been due mainly to soil and climatic conditions. Some sugar beets are grown in Kirghiziaand Kazakhstan, where acreages sown to this crop have been increased. The Russians claim that they are developing a sugar beet which can grow in a colder climate and poorer soil. Even if they are successful in these experiments, however, mills must be built to take care of the crop, and on the whole it is doubtful if much can be done in the immediate future to alleviate the sugar shortage. Moreover, it is not probable that there are reserves of any size, so that the country's needs will have to be met by imports.

Limiting Factors* Three factors may seriously limit the country's capacity for increased food production, and for supplying its deficit areas. They may be listed as technical, transport, and climatic. The presonce of one of the factors in aggravated form, or a combination of all three may result in a widespread and severe famine.

Technical. Even in peace time, Soviet agriculture suffers from a number of defects, here referred to as "technical" including frequent breakdowns and stoppages of tractors and combines, shortage of spare parts and waste of fuel. Wartime conditions have added to these dofoctm a shortage of labor, as well as horses, tractors and fuel for sowing and harvesting operations. Russian agriculture normally uses the bulk of the country's output of distillate and kerosene, and if the Caucasus is conquered, the fuel situation will be very serious. Recent reports from Russia indicate that many tractors have not been repaired through a shortage of mechanics and a lack of spare parts. In spite of the organization of mobile repair units, a press campaign, and special rewards for putting machines back into operation, it is problematical whether it will be possible to harvest the full amount of land planted. The labor mobilization and shortage of seed have already been mentioned.

Transport. Since the grain production of the Soviet Union is not evenly distributed over the country, food must be shipped from one region to another. The disastrous results of a breakdown of the railroad system have already been discussed.

Climate, The climate of the eastern parts of European Russia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan is continental, "becoming more severe as one goes eastward. Rainfall is scanty and devastating droughts sometimes occur. In Siberia, on the other hand, rainfall late in the season often interferes with harvesting. Agriculture in Central Asia can for the most part "be carried on only with irrigation.

Although information on weather conditions is incomplete, so far conditions appear to have been favorable. In spite of the late spring, damage to winter crops seems to have "been negligible. May and June are the critical months for the spring crops of the arid regions listed above, and so far no drought has "been reported. Information is as yet too incomplete to draw definite conclusions about this year's crops, and the situation will be potentially dangerous until the crops are actually harvested.

Food and agricultural production by zones. (See Maps 7a, 7b and 11. ) Zone of combat. The northern part of the zone of combat, roughly the area north of Moscow is, under normal conditions, a grain deficit zone. Information on sown areas, principal crops, and livestock numbers is contained in Table XIV since Murmansk and Karelia are divided between the zone of combat and the zone of communications.

Most of the area in the zone of combat south of Moscow belongs normally to the black soil food surplus region, growing grains, flax, sugar, potatoes and vegetables. Wartime conditions, however, make this area a food deficit zone to which food must be transported for the supply of the army.

Zone of communications. The zone of communications is divided roughly into four regions from north to south: (l) the northern region, (2) the Moscow region, (5) the Middle and Lower Volga region, and (k) the North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus and Kalmyk ASSR. These regions as shown in the tables on sown areas and livestock do not always correspond exactly to the zone of communications marked on Map 11, because available statistics are based on administrative divisions. The tables are intended to show the extent of the planted area and the most important crops rather than give complete data on all crops.

Northern region. For purposes of convenience this area includes practically all of north European Russia, east of Leningrad. Although not producing sufficient grain to feed all its inhabitants, it grows some wheat, rye, barley and oats, as

- 93

well as potatoes, vegetables, legumes, fiber flax, and forage crops. A local treed of cattle furnishes dairy products. In addition, the Archangel and Murmansk fisheries supplement the food supply of the local population. Codfish ia perhaps the most important variety in this region.

Table XIV gives the acreages sown to important crops and livestock numbers in 1938.

Moscow region. As will "be seen from Table XV, this area has large acreages planted to grains, including both spring and winter wheat, large amounts of potatoes and sunflower seeds. However, due to the dense population, the region is deficient in grain. The largest acreages planted to sunflower seeds lie in Voronezh Ob last, a portion of which is in the zone of combat. About 150,000 acres are also planted to sugar beets in this oblast, but as it is impossible to judge what portion lies east of the line of combat this acreage is not included in Table XV . Penza, Ryazan, and Tambov oblasts also produce small amounts of sugar beets. About 25,000 acres are also devoted to seed flax in Voronezh, Penza, Ryazan, Tambov oblasts and the Mordovian ASSR. Table XV also shows livestock numbers as of 1938.

The Middle and Lower Volga region (See Table XVI) • This is one of the most important food-producing regions in the Soviet Union, with an estimated grain surplus of around 1.3 million tons in 1937 • In addition, it contains a large proportion of the country's sunflower seed acreage. This area however is subject to drought so that harvests are unpredictable.

The North Caucasus, TransCaucasus and Kalmyk ASSR (Table XVII). The North Caucasus is another important grain producing area with an estimated surplus of 1.5 million tons of grain in 1937. The Transcaucasus (mainly Georgia) also produces considerable amounts of grain and other crops, and the loss of the Caucasus would constitute a serious blow to the agricultural potential of Soviet Russia.

In the North Caucasus, the area east and northeast of the Don River towards the Caspian Sea is semi-arid and grows spring wheat. In the Kuban region around Krasnodar the precipitation is very favorable and large amounts of winter wheat are grown. This fact is of considerable importance since winter wheat gives higher yields than spring wheat and favorable climatic conditions make for stable crop production. A small amount of rice is grown in both the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus.

TABLE XIV AGRICULTURE - NORTHERN REGION

A. Sawn Areas, 1938 **

REGION WINTER SPRING WINTER SPRING OATS POTA- VEGE- LE- FLAX FORAGE WHEAT WHEAT RYE BARLEY TOES TABLES GUMES FOR CROPS

FIBER

Murmansk* 74-0 4-90 5,930 Karelian

ASSR 1,980 7,170 31,880 15,320 39,040 21,250 2,220 4,940 490 22,490 Vologda 34,350 267,370 610,090 269,340 649,380 178,500 18,290 85,500 216,210 310,600 Arkhan

to gelsk 9,880 89,450 233,020 194,960 228,810 77,100 7,170 36,820 62,780 76,110 Komi ASSR 490 9,390 45,470 52,880 30,390 26,190 3,710 3,950 12,600

TOTAL 46,700 373,380 920,460 532,500 947,620 303,780 31,880 131,210 292,080 415,130

*• In thousands of acres. Political divisions of 1939.

B. Live Stock, 1938 *##

REGION HORSES CATTLE HOGS SHEEP AND GOATS

Murmansk 5,100 6,900 5,700 13,600 Karelian ASSR 38,900 87,900 25,500 68,300 Vologda 222,200 629,200 112,000 390,200 Arkhangelsk Komi ASSR

139,500 54,400

375,400 122,000

57,300 19,800

274,600 99,900

TOTAL 460,100 1,221,400 220,300 846,600

In thousands., of-head•

TABLE XV

AGRICULTURE CENTRAL REGION * A. Sown Areas, 1938 *#

WIN H N SPRING SPRING OATS BUCK- M I L - POTA VEGETER TER V/HEAT BARLEY WHEAT LET TOES TABLES RYE WHEAT

12,216 2,817 7,6U 1,143 1,793 674 1,693 4,014 494

#*- In thousands

HORSES

2,063

*- In thousands

Includes:

of a c r e s .

B.

CATTLE

5,323

of head.

Moscow Oblast Yaroslavl Ivanovo Ryazan Penza Gorki

Live Stocky 1938

HOGS

2,867

Kirov Oblast Tambov " Voronezh " Mari ASSR Mordovian " Udmurt "

L E - SUN- FLAX FORAGE GUMES FLOWER FIBER CROPS

SEED

1,559 1 ,083 1 ,078 5,608

SHEEP AND GOATS'

7,158

TABLE XVI AGRICULTURE - MIDDLE AND LOWER VOLGA REGION

A. Sown Areas, 1938 *

REGION WINTER RYE

SPRINGWHEAT

OATS SPRING BARLEY

SUNFLOWER

SEED

POTATOES

VEGETABLES

Kuibyshev

TatarSaratovStalin

grad GermanVolga

2,195

2,494 1,732 2,052

664

3,242

1,3753,0543,807

1,566

1,047

1,454 725 385

101

171

71 319 669

209

465

64 517 345

122

357

449 152 121

45

46

36 39 50

U

1 TOTAL 9,137

* I n thousands

13,044 3,712

of acres.

1,439

(1) I n c l u d i n g 378,000 acres under mustard

1,513

s e e d .

1,124 •

185

B. Live Stock, 1938 **

REGION HORSES CATTLE HOGS

Kuibyshev Tatar Saratov-Stalingrad German Volga

233 329 116 180

34

760 657 556

1,035 220

273 310 246 310 119

TOTAL 892 3,228 258

In thousands of head.

LEGUMES

300

623 229 14

16

1 , 1 8 2

OTHER CROPS

1,381

1,402

(1) 2,404

792

7,432

SHEEP AND

1,361 1,338

986 1,401

291

5,377

TOTAL

9,204

7,968 8,270 9,847

3,529

38,818

GOATS

TABLE XVII

AGRICULTURE - NORTH CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASUS

A. Sown Areas, 1938 ##

REGION WINTER WHEAT

SPRING WHEAT

OATS WINTER RYE

WINTER BARLEY

SPRING CORN BARLEY

RICE POTATOES

VEGETABLES

MELONS LE* GUMES

Nor t h Caucasus Tran s c auca su s

8,727 2,012

2 ,98 8520

ls 489 1,410 52 34

714 477

3,898530

2,485 995

26 64

526 121

36278

354 46

100 97

TOTAL 10,739 3,508 1, 541 1,444 1 , 1 9 1 4,428 3,480 90 647 440 400 197

CO

1 I REGION

Nor t h Caucasus TransCaucasus

CASTOR BEAN

391

SUNFLOWER

SEED

1 ,81 9 54

TOBACCO

67 72

COTTON

524 530

FORAGE AND HAY

4,592 300

1

OTHER CROPS

,321 225

TOTAL

31,785 6,213

TOTAL 391 1 ,873 139 1 ,05 4 4,872 1 ,546 37,998

* The North Caucasus here embraces the Rostov Oblast, the Kalmyk ASSR, the Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze Krais, the Kabardino-Balkar, North -Osetian,'Checheno-Ingush and Dagestan ASSR and the Karachai Autonomous Oblast, The Transcaucasus embraces the Georgian, Azerbaidzhan and Armenian S.S. Republics.

-x-x- In thousands of acres.

(Cont inued)

REGION

North Caucasus Transcaucasus

TOTAL

HORSES

1,041 421

1,462

In thousands of head.

TABLE XVII

CATTLE

4,531 4,001

8,532

HOGS

2,007 886

2,893

SHEEP AND GOATS

8,149 5,590

13,739

In addition, the North Caucasus is one of the important oil seed growing areas in the Soviet Union. The Transcaucasus, especially Goergia, grows tropical and semi tropical plants such as tea, citrus fruits, tung oil and essential oils. There are also extensive vineyards in the Transcaucasus. Both the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus grow tobacco. In Table XVII, the entire Transcaucasus and the Kaljnyk ASSR are included.

There are important fisheries in "both the Caspain and Black Seas, and a number of canneries are in operation.-*

Zone of the interior. Food and agricultural production. The zone of the interior is roughly divided into 3 regions ,&) the Urals, (b) Siberia, and (c) Central Asia (including Kazakhstan and the Central Asiatic republics). Tables XVIII,, XIX, and XX give the acreages sown to important crops and livestock numbers in 1938.

The predominating food grain of these areas is spring wheat, as the severity of the climate prevents the sowing of winter wheat. Although eastern Russian spring wheat is of excellent quality, yields are lower than those obtained from winter wheat. Like the middle and lower Volga region, the Ural and Kazakhstan agricultural regions are arid, and devastating droughts have occurred in the past. These facts - dependence on a single crop and uncertain weather •- constitute perhaps the single greatest danger to the country's food potential at present.

The Urals, Vest Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan are the leading dairy regions of the Soviet Union, accounting in 193*+ for over a third of Russian commercial butter production.

The Urals (Table XVIII). On the basis of interregional grain shipments, the Urals had a small grain deficit in 1937- These shipments were doubtless needed to supply the Molotov (Perm) and Sverdlovsk industrial regions, in view of the large acreages devoted to spring wheat and other grains in the Bashkir ASSR, Chkalov and Chelyabinsk oblasts.

Siberia (Table XIX). The Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts and Altai Krai, often referred to as "western" Siberia, together constitute a grain surplus area (about 1.2 million tons in 1937), while Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast in 1937 produced approximately enough grain for their needs. Grain yields in western Siberia are fairly stable, although late rainfall often interferes with harvesting.

*See p. 53

- 100

REGION WINTER RYE

Perm 999 Sverdlovsk 461 Bashkir 2,047 Chkalov 1,397

Chelyabinsk 911

TOTAL 5,815

o

REGION

Molotov (Perm) Sverdlovsk Bashkir Chkalov Chelyabinsk

TOTAL

-x- I n thousands

Ht In thousands

TABLE XVIII AGRICULTURE - URAL REGION

A. Sown Areas, 1938 -x

SPRING SUN POTA VEGE LEGUMES BARLEY FLOWER TOES TABLES

SEED

246 187 25 108 131 174 26 119 79 186 368 43 255

268 142 24 29 246 81 236 a 251

970 695 1,107 159 762

B. Live S tock , 1938 **

CATTLE HOGS

503 288 600 2 6 1

1,136 342 858 191

1,120 274 4,217 1,356

OTHER CROPS

628 298

1,356 1,163

676

4,121

SHEEP

TOTAL

3,868 2,637 8,578 8,721 8,271

32,075 |

AND GOATS

535 470

1,765 1,253 1,358 5,381

SIRING WHEAT

576 7a

2,609 4,345 4,160

12,431

HORSES

198 187 459 190 262

1,296

of acres ,

of head.

OATS

1,099 687

1,635 925

1,669

6,015

TABLE XIX AGRICULTURE - SIBERIA (West of Lake Baikal)

A, Sown Areas, 1938

REGION WINTER RYE

SHIING WHEAT

OATS SHIING BARLEY

SUNFL01ER SEED

POTATOES

VEGETABLES

LEGUMES OTHERCROPS

TOTAL

Omsk Novos ib i rsk Altai Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk

768 1,086

235 522 392

3,468 3,104 6,094 1,931

485

1,594 2,148 1,794 1,398

456

273 190 112 217 105

81 13

243 3

281 368 223 139 91

31 53 33 25 13

173 39 20 17 22

1,082973983379254

7,751 7,974 9,737 4,631 1,818

o CO TOTAL 3,003 15,082 7,390 897

B.

340 1 , 1 0 2

Live Stock, 193 8

155

##

271 3,671 31,911

I REGION HORSES CATTLE HOGS SHEEP AND GOATS

Omsk Novosibirsk Altai Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk

351 505 433 328 163

1,396 1,708 1,466

767 436

427 704 408 383 181

1,463 1,580 2,139 1,265

294

TOTAL 1,780 5,773 2,103 6,741

-x- In thousands of acres . * * * •**•<*%

•JHf- In thousands of head.

Central Asia (Table XX). (Kazakhstan, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik and Kirghiz Republics) - The agricultural belt of Kazakhstan is confined to its upper part, roughly the area above 50 north latitude. The outstanding crop is spring wheat with over 8 million acres sown to it in 1938. Kazakhstan is also one of the leading cattle, sheep and goat raising areas in the Soviet Union.

The Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz Republics together had over k million acres devoted to spring and winter wheat, divided about equally between the two, in 1938. Cotton, however, is the staple crop in these regions, with over kcfjo of Russian acreage in Uzbekistan. As previously mentioned, about 6of> of this cotton acreage will be diverted to food crops. Cotton seed oil furnishes the leading vegetable fat of eastern Russia, and oil cake furnishes cattle feed. The use of cotton for making explosives has been discussed under "Industrial production."* Most of the Soviet silk crop, which is very small, is raised in Uzbekistan. The figure for sheep and goats in Central Asia includes the caracul sheep raised as fur-bearing animals, marketed as "caracul" and "Persian lamb,"

(d) Maritime Shipping. Tonnage and disposition. Tonnage: Reliable figures show that on December 31, 19^1 the Soviet merchant marine consisted of 3^6 ships, with a total gross tonnage of 1,120,138. (This figure excludes coastal vessels of less than 2,000 gross tons). This tonnage was divided as follows:

Number of ships Types, Remarks, etc. Gross tonnage

Over 2,000 gross tons, including 7 ships of more than 7*000 gross tons 932,k9k each

22 Coastal vessels over 2,000 gross tons each 67,506

80 Oceangoing ships of less than 2,000 120,138 gross tons each

Total 1,120,138

Known losses since January 1, 19^2 have brought these figures down to 3^2 ships of 1,103,67^ gross tons.

* See p.

- 103 -r

TABLE XX

AGRICULTURE CENTRAL ASIA A. Sown A r e a s , 1938 *

REGION WINTERRYE

SPRING WHEAT

OATS SPRING SUNBARLEY YLCMER

SEED

POTATOES

VEGETABLES

LE GU5.ES

OTHER CROPS

TOTAL

o I Kazakhstan Uzbek Turkmen Tadzhik Kirghiz

TOTAL

1 In addition 2 In addition 3 In addition

,,,

495 8,039x 1, 1,403

120 — 658

1 701

496 1 0 , 9 2 1 2 1 ,

383,000 ac res were

427 2

—— 2

207

638

892 608

48 245 459

2,252

under winter 2 ,045,000 ac re s were under 277,000 a c r e s were

369 1

___ 1 7

3 378

wheat. w i n t e r wheat .

under winter barley.

252 49 4

20 31

356

50 51 9

11 9

130

13 26

8 47

6 100

3,552 4,859

824 992

11 ,330

15, 6, 1, I t 2 ,

27,

089 999 013 976 524, 6011

1 B. Live Stock, 1938 **

sitrr^ REGION HORSES CATTLE HOGS SHEEP AND GOATS

Kazakhstan Uzbek Turkmen Tadzhik Kirghiz

639 381 64

102 362

3,095 1,411

233 500 486

368 76 23 21 91

5, 3, 1 , 1 , 1 ,

288 980 831 635 886

TOTAL 1,548 5,725 579 14, 620

In thousands of acres. In thousands of head.

Disposition. The known disposition of 96 Russian merchantmen, including 8 tankers, in April 19 -1 was as follows

Route Number of ships Tonnage

Atlantic Convoy Route

Siberia-U.S. West Coast Route

Other routes 23

96 357,81*9

This figure does not take into account ships sunk since April 28.

The remaining 225-250 ships of about 750,000 gross tons are in the Black, Caspian and Baltic Seas, or immobilized in Turkish waters. In addition to the known losses already mentioned it is estimated that 80/0 of the Baltic Fleet which totaled Qh ships of 208,000 gross tons in 1939 has "been sunk or immobilized leaving 17 ships of IJ-5,000 tons. About korfo of the Azov-Black Sea fleet, which was reported to consist of 160 ships totaling U65,OOO tons has been lost leaving 96 ships of approximately 186,000 tons. About 106 ships totalling 173,257 tons, of which h% are oil tankers, are in the Caspian fleet which is intact. Available shipping including tankers in the Baltic, Black and Caspian SeaB therefore may be estimated as follows:

Location Tonnage

Baltic Sea

Black Sea 186,000

Caspian Sea 173,257

Total with tankers 219 1^,257

Minus tankers

(Estimating 25$ of remaining Black Sea fleet are tankers)

In addition, an unspecified number of small vessels from 600 to 2,000 tons are operating in the Caspian.

- 105

These figures, therefore, account for approximately 315 ships of 762,106 tons in trans-oceanic routes, and the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas. The disposition of the remaining 27 ships of 3^0,000 tons is unknown; doubtless these vessels represent unannounced losses.

Types of ship3. Information on types of ships in the Soviet merchant marine is incomplete. The different types of ships vere represented "by the following percentages, however, on December 31* ^

Type Percentage

Tankers (over 2,000 g.t.) 8

Coal burners 66

Motor ships 5

Oil burners 11

Total 100

General operating conditions. Age; Approximately one-half of the Soviet merchant marine is obsolescent, consisting of ships built before 1921. A little less than 2% of the total number of ships was built between 1928 and 1932.

Condition. In general, the condition of Soviet ships is poor. In 1938, only 21$ of Soviet ships met the country's requirements for the safety of ship and cargo. Ships wear out rapidly and often suffer from serious technical defects. Repairs are haphazard and often take an inordinate amount of time. In addition, ships go long periods without proper overhauling and drydocking, thereby greatly lowering their speed and efficiency.

Operation. Operation of Soviet ships is very inefficient. The average speed is slow, and standing time in both the tanker and dry cargo fleets is excessive. Frequent shipwrecks are mostly the result of a lack of discipline and complete disregard of navigation rules. Passenger and cargo service are both poor. In addition, it is the regular practice to overload ships.

- 106

(3) Psychological Factors. (a) Morale. The present Soviet-German war has im

posed additional hardships upon a people who, even in peace,, lead dra"b and weary lives. The strain carried by the population has been such as to force observers to speculate on whether the Red regime would survive. The civil population in the U.S.S.R. has "been so oppressed that outside observers expect the civil morale to break. Civil morale in this semi-Asiatic, semi-western country, however, does not require the attention that the morale of western people does. The response of the civil population is due to complete control by the government which is quick to administer the severest punishment for the slightest act of omission. Any act of commission, which in any way might oppose government efforts, is rewarded by the death penalty. The counter-espionage and counter-sabotage organizations are large and effective, and there is no hesitation to prosecute even a factory worker who fails to produce as much as the government thinks he should. One important reason, therefore, for the continuance of the support by the civil population is fear.

Simultaneously, the Russians are intensely nationalistic. Since the rise of Stalin to power continuous propaganda has built up patriotic fervor. All groups were mentally set for war, having been taught for years to hate and fear German Fascism; propaganda, actual German brutality and total lack of German conciliatory measures have fanned this hatred to great heights.

Due to evacuations the housing problem in the unoccupied areas, never too spacious anyway, has become serious; the food shortage is becoming more apparent and the queues arc getting longer; all prices are soaring and taxes are being added; and there is a scarcity of fuel. Clothing for the average person is simply unobtainable; working hours have been lengthened and intensified. The majority of the population, never well cared for, is suffering more than ever. They are not bearing it because of their good morale--it is doubtful if they understand the meaning of the- word. The people of Russia have-known none other than a stern, harsh rule, and they accept philosophical', whatever conditions are imposed.

With the exception of the besieged cities, there has been only one known instance of break in civil morale. This exception took place in Moscow the day after foreign diplomats were evacuated. This evacuation could not be concealed, and the population of MOB cow knew that the greater part of the Moscow militia was also evacuated. Looting broke out all over the city and several days elapsed before order was restored. Execution was the only punishment meted out and much publicity was given to these cases.

- 107

So long as there is a Stalin or his successor and so long as there is the Communist Party organization with its complete control over the secret police and troops of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the morale of the people of the U.S.S.R. will never be seriously considered by the heads of the government. Decrees will be issued and enforced without regard to effect on the population.

Civil morale of the U.S.S.R. is not an important factor in the present war--what is more important is a keen knowledge of the national psychology and national capacity to withstand oppression. The present leaders of the Soviet Union have this knowledge.

(b) Training. Training for all persons in the U.S.S.R. has national defense as its objective, and the purposes of every organization are invariably to further Party dictatorship and to increase every individual's political and military knowledge and physical fitness. Education is on a somewhat higher status than under the Czars, and more widespread.

Military training is the most important phase of Soviet education, and all or most of the present Soviet leaders have military educations. The objective of pre- and enlisted military train*ing is to develop in the soldier physical superiority, elementary schooling, and above all a good political foundation. Every Soviet youth's training begins with political conditioning in Party organizations, whicfy control every phase of life in the U.S.S.R.

Civilian training, outside the normal compulsory schooling in elementary grades, is largely devoted to industry, agriculture, and military reserve instruction whose main purpose is to increase national defense. Special middle schools (military), either attached to or separated from the normal ten-year school, have been established for seamen, and naval, artillery, and flying cadets.

Training Organization. The Soviet child between the ages of two and four receives his first introduction to the Communist Party and gets his first taste of military instruction. The lessons in regimentation are, of course, only rudimentary, but as an Octobrist he mixes with others of his own age and learns to march in a

The estimated number of Octobriats column of twos. is approximately three million.

A Pioneer is a boy between the ages of five and fourteen. He may be compared to a junior boy scout. He is taught discipline, marching, and some sport. As he grows older he is imbued with idea that he is being prepared for the honor of membership

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UNCLAS in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), Estimated number of pioneers is about six million.

The Komsomol is a youth organization of about ten million members "between the ages of fifteen and twenty-six. Its organization is similar to that of the Communist Party and is subordinated to it. Its purpose is to provide a training ground for future communists even to the hardening process of Party inspired hoodlum raids on churches in session. The Komsomols are financed by dues and have their own newspapers and periodicals. Although the organization does not conduct schools, it does provide moral and financial support to organizations which do, such as the People's Commissariats for Education and Physical Culture and the Society for Air and Chemical Defense (Osoaviakhim). It holds competitions in all types of sport beneficial to the military service. The power of the Komsomol has somewhat diminished. In the past it took too active, and many times too controlling a part in all phases of national economy. However, as its influence was not always beneficial to the government and as some of the young leaders were rash and frequently abused their power, the Party curtailed its activities and issued a series of public reprimands in the press.

Osoaviakhim is a Party controlled "voluntary" society composed of some thirteen million members of both sexes and various ages who devote some spare time to its activities. Its general mission is to create a reserve of partially trained personnel for all military forces. Its specific missions are: (a) to train pre-conscripts for the ranks of the Army^ Navy, and N.K.V.D.; (b) to disseminate military technical knowledge of all branches; (c) to train the populace (particularly urban) in defense measures against air and gas attacks. The society raises about three hundred twenty-five million rubles annually from dues, national lottery, donations, and benefit performances. This sum is expended to purchase its own equipment and supplies to fulfill its programs, the most expensive being airplanes. The objectives of the society parallel those of the armed forces. It intensifies its activities according to the needs of the national defense program. The chairman of the committee is a Major General of Aviation. The Party initiates instructions to the Central Committee of the Society, the Commissariat for Defense furnishes the instructors and supervises the program. The importance of the society lies in the following: (a) a tremendous saving in time for the military forces when the personnel enters the service; (b) provides an excellent proving ground for the selection of the best material for the various branches of national defense; (c) is self-supporting and is not a drain on the national treasury, (hence its figures do not appear in the budget); (d) presents its activities to the people in the light of the recreational, sporting, and Belf-preservation aspects.

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Trade Unions. Members of these Party inspired and Party controlled organizations may "be of all adult ages. They are organized according to factories, plants and shops (company union in type) "but as is the cage of other clubs or societies, they have no place in the Soviet Union unless they: (a) further the Party dictatorship; (b) increase the productivity and regimentation of labor; (c) increase the political and military knowledge and fitness of the individual. Strikes are unknown. Drastic la"bor laws are often "suggested" "by union organizations. One of the primary objects of the Trade Unions is the propagation of military knowledge "by means of rifle clubs, military circles, lectures, exhibitions, visits to army training camps, etc. Dues are used to "endow" rest homes, nurseries, clinics, etc. The membership is about twenty-three million.

State Labor Reserves. The Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) has a Chief Administration for the purpose of directing, training, and distributing state labor reserves. Industrial trade schools are divided into three classes; (a) trade schools; (b) railroad schools; (c) factory and plant apprentice schools. The trade schools, taking boys of fourteen and fifteen, with a two-year course, are preparing skilled workers as metallurgists, petroleum workers, chemical workers, and maritime transport and communications personnel. The railroad schools also taking boys of fourteen and fifteen and giving a two-year course, are training engineers, machinists, boilermakers, and repairmen of all types necessary to railroad maintenance. The factory and plant apprentice schools, taking boys sixteen and seventeen, start out with a six-months course in preparation for their final entry into the mass occupations such as coal and ore mining and construction jobs. The lesser skilled workmen train for metallurgical and petroleum industries. The bulk of the conscripts come from farm areas, and chairmen of collective farms assign yearly four young men for every hundred collective members, counting men and women from fourteen to fifty-five years of age. Students completing the prescribed course are considered mobilized and obliged to work the next four successive years in some state enterprise at the order of the Administration. Military service is deferred until the expiration of their obligatory work period. The first classes started December 1, 19^0, with a total enrollment of 601,378, of which trade schools received 307,962; the railroad schools, 36,589; and the factory schools, 255,827.

There is complete regimentation of labor, both' industrial and agricultural. By ukas'e, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in November 19^0, gave the various Commissariats the right to transfer skilled workers, technicians, foremen, bookkeepers, engineers, etc., from their place of employment to any enterprise that

- 110

needs skilled labor. Wives wishing to join their husbands were to be released from their jobs. Refusal to accept such transfers subjects the employee to trial and imprisonment. Agricultural mobilization was ordered in April 19^2 when all able-bodied men and women of rural and urban communities not employed in industrial and transport enterprises were mobilized for work on collective and state farms and tractor stations. This order brought all categories of citizens in the U.S.S.R. within all inclusive mobilization.

(c) Capacity for United Effort. The capacity for united effort in the Soviet Union is limited only by the abilities of its people. One word from the Party or the State can unite the efforts of the entire economy of the country. Never in history has one man had such complete control over the lives of so many human beings as at the present time in Russia. Every village large and small has alread3>- been collectivized, forcefully if necessary. Eefusal to comply means not only loss of job, living space> and buying privileges, but can mean prison camp or death as the authorities desire.

(d) Inventiveness. The strong inventiveness of the Russian people dates back to the beginning of the eighteenth century when it was stimulated by the foundation of the Akademiia Nank by Peter the Great. It has been limited by (l) insufficient technical moans unadapted to radical changes in mass production, especially in making large motors, (2) grandiose planning and haphazard execution, and (3) political interference, such as the execution of the Vavilov brothers, geneticists, and Tupolev, aircraft designer.

The Soviets, in their efforts to make a modern industrial country out of a backward agricultural one, have made great strides toward the goal but shown little originality. Most of the articles produced today are copies of foreign models or built under foreign license. Notable exceptions are the Tupolev, Polikarpov, and Putilov airplanes and the aircraft armament by Shpitalny and Komaritski whose machine guns and cannon are considered not only original but among the most efficient in the world.

The Russians are responsible for the following inventions of military importance: the plane-carrying submarine, radio-operated mine, rocket bomb, Molotov breadbasket, (bomb distributor), and gyroscopically stabilized tank sight. They originated the use of parachute troops. In the field of medicine they contribute the blood bank and the use of plasma for transfusion. Electroencephalography is also a Soviet invention. Modern plant genetics and soil science owe their foundation to pre- and post-revolutionarjr Russian scientists.

(e) Versatility. The main mass of the people have had little education and practically no experience outside of the daily

mm( Mai - Ill

necessary routine of life. They have little adaptability for mechanical or technical work. They do not cling tenaciously to old methods from choice, but "because they have had no alternative. They eagerly receive new methods and thingss immediately taking them apart with a childlike interest; and like the child they seldom get the object "back together again. A small minority that has withstood the political upheavals and acquired superior educations has proved to "be entirely modern and practical. The outstanding feature is the vast gulf "between the few and the many. A national characteristic is the Russian's desire to cut instruction dangerously short and to make only a superficial investigation of new techniques, methods, and materials. For this reason all changes are accomplished with unnecessary loss of time and material. Great achievements have "been attained in the field of technique and economy "by audacity and carelessness of consequences.

Stalin in his May 1, 19^2 speech states: "The magnificent technique (of British and American pianos and tanks) available to the Soviet nation is not used to the fullest extent. Therefore, Red Army airmen, tank crews, machine gunners and others must all learn zeal and industry and know everything of their particular aim to "become specialists." This warning follows reports from Scandanivia that Soviet airmen are not handling foreign fighter pianos in a scientific manner and that they are easy targets for German and Finnish pilots.

( ) Information and Counter Information Facilities. The Intelligence Section of the General Staff of tho Red Army and all lower staffs arc responsible for the organization of military intelligence work.

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) through its State Security Administration is held responsible for espionage and counter-espionage work. The personnel of this organization is hand-picked from special schools and other commissariats. They combine the duties, at home and abroad, of the U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Marshal; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation; and State Police., County Sheriffs Office; and City criminal investigation departments, less all traffic enforcement.

This super police force (old G.P.U.), has under surveillance, secretly and otherwise, every government and Party activity within and without the Soviet Union. The personnel of S.S. may bo found in all government offices, institutions, enterprises, the army, tho navy, and all foreign embassies within the U.S.S.R. Abroad, all Soviet Embassies and Legations are under the constant surveillance of its personnel in the consular sections.

The power of this secret police organization, at home and abroad, with its own courts and the power of life, death; or prison camp held over all its citizens, makes available nearly all information from any of its people at any time. The member of this organization who turns against it or the Party of Stalin can expect death from their hands at any time, in any country on earth.

Secret police units are organized in all countries to spy on Party members abroad and to see that Party edicts are carried out by local communist organizations.

There is no Intelligence Corps in the Red Army; the Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the N.K.O. and all lower staffs being responsible for the organization of military intelligence work.

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff is subdivided into the following sub-sections:

(a) General sub-section. (b) Military Intelligence sub-section which is

responsible for the organization and instruction of military personnel and for counter-espionage measures in formations and units of the Red Army.

(c) Information and statistics sub-section which is responsible for the collection of information regarding foreign armies.

(d) Cipher sub-section„ The duties of intelligence sections of the General Staffs of Military Districts in peace and war are:

(1) To observe the morale of the Red Army. (2) Counter-espionage. Q ) To collect information on armies

likely to oppose the Red Army and on possible areas of operations.

The General Staffs at headquarters of Corps and Divisions have similar responsibilities. The duties of the political personnel also include limited intelligence and counter-espionage work, while the Chief Administration of State Security is the chief agency for obtaining non-military intelligence and for counter-espionage and security measures.

- 1X3

2. Factors directly applicable to the Armed Forces.

a. Strength and Characteristics. IT) Army.

Xa) Strength: The Soviet Army as of June 22, , was estimated as follows:

100 Infantry divisions (17,700) 85 Infantry divisions (12-15,000) U0 Cavalry divisions 70 Tank brigades (some grouped into divisions)

Reserve materiel for 105 Infantry divisions.

Grand total: 35>000 guns 16,250 tanks 12,000 planes ( 500 of these obsolescent)

The losses in the war up to May, 19^2, have been extremely great. The bulk of these were suffered in June-November, by which time the Soviets had lost 3,500,000 casualties; li+,500 guns (h&f>); 13,000 tanks (80$) and 9,000 planes (75$). From November to May their losses, except in casualties (750,000) and planes (1500) were very low. However, with the renewal of fighting in the Kerch Peninsula and near Kharkov, losses have risen by some 155,000 casualties, 1200 guns, 700 tanks, and 600 planes in May.

The present (May 31, 19^2) Russian strength on the Western Front is estimated to be:*

* See Map 8.

- uk

Table I Order of

Sector Units

1. Northern: Murmans k-• R ims koye

Infantry** Cavalry-Tank (Brig Air Overhead

Total

Pudozh-Kalinin Infantry Cavalry Tank (Brig Motorized Air Overhead

Total

2. Central; Klin-Stalinogorsk

Infantry Cavalry Tank (Brig Motorized Air Overhead

Total

Battle

Div.*

62

5 1

.)*#* i 2

8.5

in k

.) 5 2 k

55.5

127

Qk 10

.) 12 12 15

127

Men

662,000

50;000 6,600 3, 500 8,000 13,000

81,100

Ul0,000 25,600 17.500 1^,000 16,000 98,200

581,300

1,370,000

8^0,000 66,000 i)-2,000 8^,000 60,000

278,000

1,370,000

Tanks Planes

950 . 950

150 320

150 320

800

6k0

800 6k0

1950 21+00

1950 2^00

1950 21+00

Note: Totals of men, planes, and tanks in the various sectors and Western Front are given in round numbers.

For purposes of computation, tank brigades are figured at two to a tank division. Infantry Divisions are largely of reserve 10,000 man strength. The allocations of tank units are flexible, as tank units of infantry divisions, as tank brigades, or as temporary tank divisions, depending'on the situation.

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Table I(continued)

Order of Battle

Sector Units Div.* Men Tanks Planes

3• Southern: Yelets-Chertkovo

Infantry

113

20

1,100,000**

200,000

3100*** 1760**

Cavalry Tank (Brig.) Motorized Air

8 1210 5

52,800 ^2,000 1900 70,000 20,000 800

Overhead

Total 9 76,000

1+60,800 1900 800

Millerovo-Rostov Infantry 21 210,000 •Cavalry Tank (Brig.)

86

52,800 21,000 900

Motorized 6 1+2,000 Air 5 20;000 800 Overhead 38,000

Total

Caucasus

O* 383,800 900 800

Infantry 16 160,000 Cavalry 3 19,800 Tank (Brig.) Air Overhead

Total

2 1

21

7,000 l+,000 38,000

228;800

300

300

160

160

h. Grand Total:Western Front

Ground Air

270 32

3,000,000 128,000

6000 5000

* For purposes of computation, to a tank division.

tank "brigades are figured at two

** Less 155,000 losses in Kerch and Kharkov. *** Less 700 lost in Kerch and Kharkov. **** Less 600 lost in Kerch and

•W"1

116

Table I Order of Battle (continued)

Sector Units(Divs.) No, Men Tanks Planes 5- In training,

Communications Zone 55 550,000 Infantry, Tank, etc.

6. Far East Infantry- 50 500,000 Tank, etc.

1*, 150,000

7. Various supply, Home Guard and other second-line units 6,000,000

(b) Organization. The operation of the high command and the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. is characterized by three factors: authority through personal prestige as well as law; extreme duplication of personnel in key positions, and fluid, temporary organizations for specific purposes. The available data indicate confused, overlapping channels of command and communication.

Since July 20, 19^1, Stalin has held all the key civil and military positions. Simultaneously, he is the chairman of the following party agencies: the Revision Commission, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Organization Bureau, the Supreme Military Council (Red Army), the Supreme Naval Council, and the Control Bureau (N.K.V.D.). He is also a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Prime Minister and Commissar for Defense.

Below Stalin is a maze of superior councils of national defense: the Political Bureau, the Supreme Military and Naval Councils, the Soviet of People1s Commissars, the Committee for Defenses, the Supreme Economic Council, etc. The great overlapping of personnel and of functions, and the rivalry for power create indecision, confusion and unwillingness to take responsibility.

Theoretically, the Commissariat for Defense (War Department) is only one of several equivalent administrations Navy, Aviation Industry, Armament, Mortars, Shipbuilding, etc. Normally, however, although policies are formulated by the thirteen members of the Supreme Council for the Army, the Commissariat for Defense executes all military affairs. It consists of the Commissar, 1^ Assistant Commissars, one of whom is Political Commissar and 9 are generals; the General Staff and 20 Administrations. The General Staff includes the Chief of Staff (Marshal Shapoahnikov), a Deputy (Political)

- 117

Commissar and 9 divisions: Operations, Organization and Training, Communications, Intelligence, Air Defense and Rear Areas, Mobilization, Fuels, Administration and Supplies, and Topographic and Mapping. The functions of the General Staff are theoretically advisory, "but in many instances they actually operate as GHQ, exercising control over the tactical air and ground units by authority of the Defense Commissar. The 20 Administrations (Arms and Services) are not all of equal importance, since they range from Air Forces to Armament, to Political Propaganda, and even to Sports.

The operational units of the Soviet Army are grouped into five Fronts (Army Groups): Northern Front (General K. A. Meretskov); Central Front (General G. K. Zhukov); Southwestern Front (Marshal S. K. Timoshenko); Trans Caucasian Front (Lt. Gen. D. T. Kozlov); and Far Eastern Front (General I. R. Apanesenko). In the zone of the interior, the Military Districts are still operating, largely as administrative agencies. Below the fronts, and also assigned to a definite defensive sector, are about 55 Armies, of varying compositions, with from 3 to 16 divisions.

Information concerning the Corps is uncertain. Infantry Corps appear to be essentially administrative units which handle supply and provide artillery and other reinforcements to the divisions. The Cavalry Corps is a definite organization, normally of 3 divisions, with the following additional troops: 1 howitzer regiment (114 mm. howitzer and 107 m . guns), 1 tank brigade, 1 engineer battalion, 1 signal battalion, corps train. One experimental Tank Corps is known to have been formed at Leningrad.

The regular Infantry Division of June, 1941 was a large (17,700), powerful and slow-moving organization composed of 3 infantry and 2 artillery regiments. Its artillery component was large: 69 AT guns (45mm); 4-6 AA guns (76mm); 32-36 guns, 76 mm; 22 howitzers, 76 mm; 28 howitzers, 122 mm; 12 howitzers, 152 mm. In addition it had 12 large mortars (107 or 150 mm.). Its small arms included a large number (420) of submachine guns. Motorization was very incomplete, with only 645 trucks and 110 tractors against 6000 horses. In addition, the division normally had 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 tank battalion, 1 signal battalion, 1 sapper battalion, 1 division engineer park, etc.

Losses in the present war have necessitated the introduction of a reserve Infantry Division only 10,000 men strong, armed lightly with obsolescent materiel. The numbers of its special troops (e.g.#l reconnaissance company) and its transport are greatly

1 f ? ^ ,

- 118

reduced. This type of organization, which now predominates, is unquestionably only an expedient.

The Motorized Division is small (7,360 men) but hard-hitting. It consists normally of 3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and special units; 1600 vehicles. The Cavalry Division is likewise small (66kO), although recent information states that an increase to 11,000 is being attempted. It has k horse, 1 tank and 1 horse artillery regiments. In addition, it is normally supported by one observation squadron and one or two squadrons of dive bombers.

(c) Efficiency. TTJ Production capacity. The actual produc

tion of the U.S.S.R. in 1939-^1 amounted to equipment for fully 90 divisions, with 9,000 guns, 6,000 tanks and 5,000 planes. The losses in production capacity since June, 19^1 have amounted to at least 35$>; these have been somewhat offset by complete industrial and labor mobilization. At present, Soviet production of ammunition appears adequate for any eventuality, the production of arms adequate to maintain a winning army, but the production and maintenance of trucks, tanks and planes inadequate even under the best war conditions. Lend-Lease aid is thus essential to keep the Soviet armies in the field. Up to May 30, 19^2 the finished military products alone were equivalent-except for artillery and small arms--to equipment for h-5 infantry, 15 motorized, 10 tank and Ik air divisions. In addition, large quantities of raw and semi-finished materials, such as aluminum plate, copper wire, armor plate, etc., have poured in.

(2) Transportation is the weakest element in the Soviet military picture. Its inadequacies have limited the forces at the front, and stifled their mobility (see also Railroads and Roads).

(3) The operational efficiency of the Soviet Army is not certain. The vast majority of the regular troops were killed or captured in the first months of the war. The reserves are mentally and physically inferior to them. On the other hand, large numbers of able men, both in lower and higher commands, have forced themselves forward in the field of combat. Politicians such as Voroshilov and Budyenny have been eliminated.

The defensive power of the Russians has been shown on numerous occasions: their field fortifications, their camouflage, their use of cover, all are excellent. In contrast, they have shown little offensive skill. Only at Kaluga and Mozhaisk were they able to take consolidated German positions. In general, a ratio of 2:5 in relation to German efficiency seems justified. It is probable that the forty-odd Guards Divisions are considerably better; it is certain that many of the reserve divisions are far worse.

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(2) Navy. (a) The estimated personnel strength of the Soviet

Navy as of June 1, 19^1, was 8,000 officers, 67,000 men and from 45,000 to 50,000 trained reserves.

The estimated materiel strength as of June 1, 194l, was as follows: 3 battleships, 23,000 ton, 12-12", 10-4.7", 6-4.1" E.A., 3-4" A.A., 4-3" H.A., 2-1.5" A.A.; 9 cruisers, 8,000 ton and 7,200 ton, 9-7-1", 6-3.9", 4-1.46" A.A. or 11-5.1", 5-4.1", 7-3.1" H.A., 2 Vickers A.A., 6m A.A.; 6 destroyer leaders, 2,900 ton, 6-5.1", 6-1.81" A.A., 6-0.5m A.A., or 5-5.1" H.A.; 2-3", 2-1.1+6" A.A.; 38 destroyers, 1300-1700 ton, some I*-5.1", 2-3", 2-1.46" A.A., some 5-4" H.S., 2-3" H.A., others 4-4", 2-3" H.A.; 49 old destroyers, 800 ton, 2-4", 3-3" H.A.; 257 8ubmarines, 200-1200 ton, from 2-3.9", 2 smaller, to 1-1.46" or 1-1.81".

The following chart shows (a) the fleet organization and distribution as of June 1, 1941, with (b) losses, badly damaged or sunk as of March 1, 1942, and (c) remaining ships:

Table II Naval Forces

Baltic Northern Black Sea Pacific remain-Fleet Fleet Fleet Fleet der

a b a b a b a b c

Battleships 2 2 1 1

Cruisers 4 3 5 3

Leaders 4 1 2 1 2-3 6-7

Destroyers 18 5 7 10 3 3-6 30rO3

Destroyers, old 3 2 4 7 3

Destroyers, small 7 2 8 9 8 30

Mine layers 5 5

Mine sweepers 60 4 14 18 96

Mine trawlers 10 12 7 29

Gunboats 7 5 12

1' A x.'Y^ - 120

Table II (continued)

Torpedo cutters

Icebreakers

Depot-oilers

In all

Submarines - (Tonnage)

K (1120)

L (1000)

P (1000)

D (1000)

S (700)

H

Shch (550)

B

A

M (188)

Estonian (600)

Class unknovn

Total Submarines

Naval Forces

Baltic Northern Fleet Fleet

a

80

10.

6

b

15

a

5

20

1

b

1-2

2

h

3

1

12

7

2

1

2

28 . 6

36

2

88

6

2

26

Black Sea Fleet

a b

50

3 "

3

7

5

k

3

15

13

40

Pacific Fleet

a b

100

12

3

14

35

50

103

remainder

c

23$

u3*"Uu

13

9

25

7

6

17

Qk

105

2

257

CVJ

p v^ii.'"'" 1 1 8 « ? •

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(b) Organization of the Commissariat for Navy-indicates not only emphasis on naval defense, "but external ambitions regarding European territories. Handicaps of landlocked or ice-bound coast line, lack of maritime tradition, training and experience, absence of shipyards and facilities for big ship construction, as well as the geographical difficulty of assembling the fleets, militate against the emergence of Russia as a first-class naval power.

The People's Commissariat for Navy was created in January, 1938, and the Commissar (Admiral N. G. Kunetzov) is the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Supreme Naval Council, a Party organ, determines naval policy; and naval councils control all fleet, naval aviation, and coast defense activities within each naval district,

Naval districts, with headquarters in cities named, and commanders according to latest identification, are as follows;

District Headquarters Commander

Northern Fleet Murmansk Rear-Admiral A. G. Golovko Baltic Fleet Leningrad Vice-Admiral V. F. Tributs Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol Rear-Admiral F. S. Oktiabrsky Pacific Fleet Murmansk Vice-Admiral I . S. Yumashev Amur River Flotilla Khabarovsk Rear-Admiral Abankin Caspian Sea Flotilla Baku Rear-Admiral F. S. Sedelnikov

Sea-based and land-based aircraft and their respective units of the Air Force Administration are under the People's Commissariat for Navy. Although details are not known, there is some evidence to show that land-based units are under the command of the Naval District Commander, while sea-based units are directly under the control of the Fleet Commanders; e.g., Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific. Air Forces are commanded by a senior air force officer who is subordinate to his respective naval commander to whom he acts as an adviser.

(c) The efficiency of the Red Navy is fair. In the Black Sea there has been aggressive coordination in landing operations at Feodosia and other Crimean ports. The Navy maintained sea channels to Odessa, and then evacuated the city; it has been the sole supply line for Sevastopol. Only the naval aviation has shown itself as notably bad -- the bombing of the Ploesti oil fields has been negligible.

In the Baltic, there were large mining operations. Navigation has been poor with many losses from shipwreck. The attempted evacuation of Tallinn failed. Yet the gunnery of the

?• R.

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half-sunken battleships at Leningrad has been an important aid in saving the city.

In the White Sea, Soviet submarine and destroyer activity has been effective. Some landing operations have been attempted with poor success.

As a whole, the Soviet Navy seems to be good on small operations. Materiel and training are lacking for real control of the sea lanes except in the Black Sea.

(3) Air Forces. (a) Strength: The estimated strength of the

Soviet Air Force on June 1, 1941 was 6700 Army and 950 Navy craft, with about two pursuit and attack planes to three bombardment planes. In addition, at least 4500 obsolescent and obsolete planes were available for auxiliary operations.

Losses during the war to May, 19^2, have amounted to over 10,000 planes. In addition, at least k<yf> reduction in Soviet aircraft production has resulted from the capture or destruction of factories. Finally, Lend-Lease shipments have compensated for such losses to an increasing extent (2000 planes by May 1, 1942). Thus the best available data indicate a total Soviet strength of 67OO planes. (1700 in the Far East, including 400 naval craft.) This distribution by locality is given in Table I. Approximate data on plane distributions according to type may be found in Table III.

Most of Russia's defensive air strength lies in its fighters. Soviet bombers are obsolete for modern bombing operations except the DB2 of which there are very few.

(b) Organization. Little is known of the composition of a Russian Air division. The latest reliable information received prior to the war (June 22, 194l) was as follows:

3 airplanes - 1 flight .3 flights - 1 squadron (squadrons contain

from 1 - 6 planes in reserve) 4-6 squadrons - 1 regiment 4 regiments - 1 division

In the Air Forces, the Soviets make up "divisions" to fit any given situation. Some special fighter divisions are known to be made up of six fighter regiments. The typical regiment appears to be made up of three bomber squadrons and one fighter squadron although many are said to be in the ratio of four to one.

The Russian Air Force is closely coupled with the ground forces. In fact, the commanding officers of different air units are under the command of the ground unit to which they are attached and all air operations are carried out in close collaboration with troops and tank units.

Russian Long Range bombers are under a separate command known as a "Special Missions" Corps. This corps acts independent of the other armed forces.

In August, 19^1 it was estimated that the Soviet Air Force consisted of 5 air divisions. Four fighter divisions were reported to be in the West, including one division for Leningrad and one division for Moscow.

(c) Aircraft Production. Control of all aircraft production is centralized in the Commissariat for Aviation Industry.' This commissariat is grouped with the commissariats for Armaments, Munitions and Shipbuilding Industry all placed under the control of the Council for Defense Industries which in turn is directly under the Sovnarkom.

Factories. The best available information placed the number of factories making aircraft in the Soviet Union at 32. In October 19^1, seven (7) at least were in the hands of the Germans, leaving a total of twenty-five (25) available to the Soviets. Nineteen of the factories still available are within a 300-mile radius of the German Front lines. Of the nineteen (19), approximately 16 are within a 200-mile radius including 13 of the most important, all concentrated in the Moscow area. Only six factories out of a total of 32 are located in the east with a reasonable guarantee of security from the Germans. Of the six factories secure from German bombers, at least two are within range of Japanese bombers should the Soviet be attacked in the Far East.

Prior to the German invasion Russian aircraft production had been greatly accelerated. The factories were modeled after those of foreign nations and were modern in relation to equipment. However, aircraft production in the Soviet suffered, and continues to suffer, from numerous, serious handicaps Some of the most critical shortcomings adversely affecting the efficient functioning of the aircraft industry are as follows: lack of trained and competent personnel in all branches of the industry; shortage of well equipped laboratories engaged in necessary research; failure to create standardization of machinery; e.g., mass Pr

ed from United States models while la§o

- IZk

Airplane Numerical Strength According to Type

Table III. a. (March, 194l)

Pursuit I 15,155 I 16 MIG 5

Total

Attack E 5,6,10 R 2, SSS G-V-25 (?)

Total

Bombardment, Light

PE 5 SB 2,5

Total

Bombardment, Medium

DB 5

Total

Bombardment, Heavy

TB 5,5,6

Total

Seaplanes (F.B.) »

Total

Miscellaneous DC 5, etc.

Total

Grand Total

Army

Planes Squad.

800 66 1400 116 480 40

2680 222

40 1500 110 48 5

1548 155

48 5 1560 150

1608 155

600 60

600 60

500 50

500 50

162

162

6756 780

Navy

Planes Squad.

150 12 500 24

450 56

160 14

160 14

360 21

560 21

950 71

N.K.V.D.

Planes 8quad.

300 50

300 ' 50

300 50

Table III. b. (March, 19*+2)

Source "A" Source "B" Source "C" Type

Army Navy Army Navy

Pursuit (fighters) 201+5 612 108 1200-1500 Attack 312 1+8 800 Observation 1558 95^ 1500 Light Bombardment 516 1+00 Medium Bombardment 300 21+ 300 Heavy Bombardment 876 1506 78 Training 51+0 60 500 200 ' Patrol 10 266 120 Miscellaneous 800

Totals 53^3 326 578 1+200-1+500 Grand Totals

(Army and Navy) 5669 5562 Experimental 350 200 Second Line 1800-1800

Total 6OOO-63OO

is adopted from the Germans; and failure to bring in foreign specialists due to distrust and suspicion.

Generally, the industry is ridden with excessive centralization and is characterized by its mediocrity. Its mediocre position has been induced largely through excessive political interference (A. N. Tupolev, the famous aircraft designer, and other high officials in the industry have been purged), paucity of engineering skill, low productivity of labor and inefficiency in planning.

Estimated production. The estimated monthly production of service type aircraft in series appeared to have reached an all time high during the first six months of 19I+I. This was about 372 planes per month. The most reliable source at the time reported the bulk of production carried by seven factories:

- 126

Location Type Model Monthly Production

Moscow* Pursuit MIG-3 78 Gorki Pursuit 1-153,1-16 77 Irkutsk Pursuit 1-153,1-16 77 Fill Moscow* Light "bombers SB-3 78 Voronezh* Light and

long range " SB-3 DB-3 21 Moscow* Long range bombers DB-3 20 Komsomolsk Light bombers SB-3 21

372

It has been reliably reported that the average time between major overhauls for Soviet military aircraft is 150 flying hours.

Engine Factories and Production. The production of military and civil airplane engines was carried on in 1*+ or more factories. As was the case of airplane factories, four out of ill-carried the bulk of the production. The first six months in 19^1 the principal factories are reported to have produced as follows:

Plant Monthly No. Name Location Type Production

19 Stalin Motovilikhi Wright Cyclones 300 2k Frunze Moscow* Soviet "Liberty" 500 26 (?) Rybinsk* Eispano-Suiza 700 29 Baranov Gnome-Rhone 300

Bolshevik Zaporz* 1,800

Accessory Factories. Most of the accessory factories and all of the principal ones are located near Moscow.

(d) Naval Aviation. The Naval Air Forces are partly based on shore using army land-type planes, some fitted with pontoons. Certain warships and auxiliary vessels are fitted for carrying aircraft. In most cases aircraft are hoisted in and out of ships by derrick, but some of the heavier ships are fitted with catapults. There are no aircraft carriers with landing decks.

Repeatedly bombed and believed not in production. (February

The Navy is said to have about 360 seaplanes The planes are said to "be organized as follows:

3 seaplanes - 1 flight 2 flights - 1 squadron 3 squadrons - 1 group 6 groups - 1 brigade

Distribution of Naval Forces as of March

Naval Air Forces. The Baltic Fleet (land based).

6lst Division•*# - Haapsalu* 65th Division - Tallinn* 70th Division - Leningrad

The Black Sea Fleet (sea based). 2nd Brigade Sevastopol l+th Brigade Sevastopol

(Balaklava) 29th Group Akkerman* 32nd Group Poti N Group (reserve) - Yeisk N Group (reserve) - Nikolayev* N Squadron Anopa N Squadron Novorossisk N Squadron Poti

The Pacific Fleet (land based). 71st Division - Vladivostok N Squadron - Petropavlovsk N Regiment - (Nikolayevsk)

(Soviet Harbor?) The Pacific Fleet (sea based).

N Brigade - Vladivostok N Group - Petropavlovsk N Squadron - Soviet Harbor

(e) Organization of Naval Air Forces. Sea-based naval aircraft units are directly under the control of the Fleet Commanders; i.e. Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific. Air Forces are commanded by a senior air force officer who is subordinate to his respective naval commander to whom he acts as an adviser. Land-based Naval Air Forces are organized into units up to and including the division.

* Units destroyed in combat. •5Bf Since 1Q1|1 a reinforced brigade has been termed a division.

Sea-based air forces are said to be organized into units up to und including the brigade.

The organization of a flying-boat squadron is said to consist of three flights of six aircraft plus one for commanding officer, 19 in all. "Where an independent flying boat squadron has been located, the establishment has been reported as consisting of 12 initial aircraft.

Tactical Policies: The Red Navy has no aircraft carriers with landing decks. Naval air operations are contemplated close to the shore line only. Independent naval air operations are discouraged. Naval District Commanders will use aviation to support their fleet aims. Seaplanes and flying-boat units are said to be under their fleet operational commands. The Naval District Commander is responsible for coastal and port defenses, including A.A. defense.

Types and distribution of seaplanes and flying boats; There are the following imported types of aircraft in use by the Naval Air Forces:

Savoia Flying Boat (S 62) Consolidated P.B.Y. Flying Boat (S 55) Sever sky Convoy Fighter and Amphibian Fjghter

(S itf) Martin Flying Boat

Distribution:

District Types Unknown Total MBR 2,5 S 55 S 62

Baltic-Arctic 2k 16 32 72 Black Sea 92 92 Far East kS 100 196

Total 116 kQ 6k 132 360

Aircraft normally carried on warships: (June 1, 19M.)

Fleet Type Warship Seaplane Each

Arctic Ocean 1 destroyer 1 depot ship

- 129

Fleet Type Warship Seaplane Each

Arctic Ocean (continued) 7 icebreakers 1 each

1 icebreaker 2 ~nr Baltic Sea

1 heavy cruiser 1 h destroyers 1 each 2 training ships 1 each 1 depot ship k

11

Black Sea 1 battleship 2 3 heavy cruisers 1 each 1 light cruiser 2 1 depot ship 12 1 depot ship 15 ~w

Pacific Ocean 2 destroyers 1 each 1 guard ship 1 1 depot ship k 2 icebreakers 1 each 1 icebreaker 3

12

Lake Onega

1 depot ship 6

Grand Total 77

War losses have not been included in the above list.

(f) Seaplane Production. It is extremely doubtful if any seaplanes are now (March, 19 +2) being produced. Soviet land planes are easily adaptable to wheels, skis, or pontoons. Seaplane production and factories have been reported as follows:

- 130

Odessa (flying boats) - 12 monthly* Taganrog (MBR 5, PBY 1) - kO monthly* Komsomolsk (seaplanes) - unknown

Home Guard Troops.** The defense training societies organized "by the Communist Party have proved their worth. As a result of such training, city people and peasants were able to offer stubborn resistance to the Germans, both before occupation and as guerrillas. All the men and women in the U.S.S.R. not actually mobilized in the armed services have been conscripted in time of emergency, becoming a trememdous force in policing, cleaning up, constructing defensive works, and even fighting.

The nuclei of most Home Guard units have been the factories and the collective farms (Kolhoz). Usually, a military committee is set up, headed by a military commander, assisted by a political commissar and the local leaders.

These organizations have built most of the vast system of fortifications that now guards the front up to the Volga. Indicative of their efficiency in occupied territories is a report by an anti-communist near Pskov:

"In the villages there are very few people of the type of the followers of Quisling. Everyone knows that coexistent with the official German authorities are occult representatives of Soviet power, forming reprisal groups composed of guerrillas, forest troops called "Zilyonye" (Greens) and parachutists, all of whom grant no pardon. To the same extent as the German troops advance deeper into the country the radius of the measures of reprisal increases."

b. Characteristics of Personnel. (1) Basic Doctrines and Command Psychology of Military

and Naval Leaders. (a) Basic Doctrines. Soviet military tradition

has passed through five periods, each of which profoundly affected its basic doctrines.'

(_1) The Red Army was formed by Trotsky from the demobilized soldiers of the World War during the October Revolution and the Civil Wars. Its political purpose was primary: the political

Captured by Germans. ** See also Replacement of Personnel.

- 131

reliability of leaders and the free support of the masses were the foundations. Personal leadership and even personal magnetism were essential, with control decentralized, masses small, supply minimal. Infiltration, sabotage, subversion and propaganda played equal roles with formal tactics. The fronts were fluid, and wide raids and attacks from all directions constantly took place. The principal objectives were railroad communications and cities. Improvisation of tactics, weapons and transport was normal.

(2) Immediately after the Civil War, the Soviets began an intensive policy of military education, even for their former high commanders. The artillerist Frunze dominated Russian teachings. The doctrine of a People's1 Army was established, with emphasis upon territorial rather than regular troops.

(3) With the rise of Stalin, the leadership of Tukhachevsky and the close collaboration with the Reichswehr, a professional army spirit developed. An enormous, highly formal, and very competitive school system was evolved. The gap between officers and men widened and the political commissar was relegated to a secondary role. The composition of the army changed from three-quarters territorial to three-quarters regular. Major changes in materiel were introduced, with great increases in artillery, tanks and planes. There were many experiments with new weapons, such as paratroops. The Blitzkrieg doctrine was developed, jointly with the Germans.

This period had its culmination in the Russian successes in Manchuria in 1937-38, when mechanization crushed the Japanese. Major weaknesses, however, were uncovered in the Finnish War of 1939-^0: the training of junior officers was imperfect, and small units were badly handled; the high command was demoralized by the purges begun in 1935> and supply difficulties arose. Mechanization functioned poorly in winter weather.

(k) Timoshenko began to rectify the errors of the Finnish War in 19^0. Emphasis was placed upon initiative and upon small group training. The construction of defensive positions was stressed. Additions were made to artillery, particularly antitank guns.

(!>) The German War caught the Red Army in process of reorganization, with a mixture of traditions. The theories of the Blitzkrieg failed quickly; at no time could the Russians succeed in envelopments. Commitments of tanks in-mass simply led to rapid annihilation. Consequently, smaller mixed teams took their place, with artillery support for tanks, and close coordination between air and ground. Flexibility and adaptability to new tactics replace standard offensive theories. German encirclements forced decentralization; German occupation revived guerrilla tactics, which were closely coordinated with the operation of organized troops. Static, localized

- 132

defenses in enormous depth, with limited maneuver were necessitated by-logistic difficulties.

In the winter campaign, deep infiltrations "by small bodies of lightly equipped troops struck constantly at communications but were unable to assault major positions. To date, this spring, mechanized units, with infantry riding on the tanks have borne the brunt of the fighting. The newest tactical doctrines are not yet fully clear.

(b) Command Psychology of Military and Naval Leaders. Command psychology is determined by two principal factors, the personalities of the leaders and the disciplinary methods.

(l) The high command of the Soviet Army has, almost without exception, served since the Civil War. The origins of these men have been various—former enlisted men, Tsarist officers, a sprinkling of Old Bolsheviks, etc. Most of them took their advanced military training only after having had important commands. Thus Budyenny, who led the First Cavalry Army in the Civil War, graduated from Frunze Military Academy at the age of fifty. At the same time, these officers have dabbled in politics, holding positions such as Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. But the most ambitious of these men have long since been executed.

In general, the higher officers show a wide range of ability, for which the Soviet Union paid dearly during the first part of the German war. Gradually, however, the incompetents have been eliminated. Most of the present high command—Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov, Cherevichenko, etc.--are genuinely able men, soldiers and not politicians. Their patriotism is unquestioned, but they are certainly aware of the deficiencies of the Stalin regime.

The younger officers, trained purely under the Soviets, are professionally more competent, although often too specialized. They are fanatically nationalistic and accept their government without question. They are well-disciplined and very hard-boiled.

The political commissars serve as the liaison men between the military and civil populations. They have some military training, particularly in minor operations. They have received special training in agitation, and in counter-espionage. Ostensibly safeguarding morale, they are really even more ruthless than the younger line officers.

Among individual leaders, the following are most important: Stalin, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, and Shaposhnikov.

Stalin is the greatest living genius at organization, one who deals in people and is always accessible to them. He possesses consummate patience and "builds slowly. He is not rigid in his ideas, borrowing ideas even from his enemies, always experimenting and pursuing another course if he fails. He is a big man, and his ambition to prove himself the greatest living dictator spurs him on even to greater heights of success--but also to dishonesty, ruthlessness and cruelty.

He never forgets anyone who has defied or crossed him. His enemies are pursued to the ends of the earth.

Stalin is petty in encouraging fawning exaltation of him as infallible, indispensable, omnipotent and all-high. He never delegates too much authority or popularity to anyone. To enhance his own power he destroyed the Communist Party as a true communist or socialist organ. He did not liquidate unemployment in the Soviet Union, but the unemployed. He may destroy the Soviet Union in his attempt to retain absolute control.

Timoshenko has always been a professional soldier. Trained both in the Tsarist Army and subsequently, with a long tour of various European forces to his credit, he is thoroughly competent. His tactical ideas are simple, clear and sound. He emphasizes small-unit training, individual initiative and extreme attention to detail: "Nothing is unimportant in combat." He stresses the offensive and the counter attack, which he employed with considerable skill at Smolensk, Gomel, Bryansk-Vyazma, Rostov and Kharkov during the present war. Unassuming, unambitious, loyal, he is a soldier's soldier. The best generals in the Soviet Union today have been his students or his colleagues.

Voroshilov is a political soldier, more used to intrigues than to combat. Stalin's support alone has raised him to a high position. His failures in war have been serious; his Jealousies have led to the downfall of abler men. He epitomizes the typical political commissar.

Shaposhnikov is a typical relic of the Tsarist Army. Precise and dry, he has taught the theory of tactics to the newer generation of officers. He hides his political feelings most carefully, forwarding himself only as a technician in the science of war. He is a valuable staff officer

(2) The disciplinary methods of the Soviet Army are rigorous. Obedience and secrecy are absolutely demanded; an officer may even kill a man in line of duty. Beyond this, the

- 13U

political commissar is always the final arbiter of an officer's or a man's loyalty. He acts ruthlessly and in secret.

On the other hand, rewards for good service are many: the Army gets the "best of everything.*

(2) Morale. In June, 19 1> the Soviet Army was cocksure. Years of propaganda in regard to the ability of its crack forces led to the belief that the Germans could not only "be held, "but that Germany itself could "be invaded. A series of great defeats, the easy penetration of the Stalin line, and the catastrophic loss of the Ukraine staggered the high command. Many removals and some executions took place, with abler men, particularly Timoshenko and his colleagues, assuming command. But this did not help at first! by October 15 the bottom had been reached, with Moscow on the verge of capture. Morale was low.

The repulse of the Germans and the initial success of the winter campaign raised morale to a high level. But as Stalin said in his May Day, 19^2, speech: "The complacency and heedlessness in the attitude toward the enemy, observed among Red Army men in the first months of the patriotic war, have disappeared." Determination now is great, but far more caution and battle experience are in evidence. The morale of the Red Army at present is fair to good.

A number of specific means have been established to maintain morale„ Political commissars emphasize the ideological basis of the present war. Outstanding units are honored by designation as "Guards," with corresponding privileges, pay, etc. Individual heroes are greatly honored, and tho families of those killed get sizable pensions In short, every advantage possible is provided tho army.

(3) Stamina. Dogged resistance under hopeless odds during the first part of the war, the last-ditch defense of Moscow, the strong repulse and constant harassment of the Germans during the winter months testify to the amazing stamina of the Russian soldier.

The average Red soldier is capable of enduring great hardships, of acting courageously, and of making surprising efforts, but moody and fatalistic. He is physically hardy, accustomed to privations, and used to the idea of sacrificing himself for his country. Properly equipped and led the Red soldier is a good fighter, and Red troops in defense of their country are a formidable fighting machine.

* See also Morale

- 135

Characteristica of Materiel. IT] General: Soviet designers attempt to achieve the

following ends: (a) Operational dependability under continued

adverse conditions rather than maximum peak performance. (b) Ease of mass production with an emphasis on

a few basic types, simplicity of design, interchangeability of parts, minimal finish of accessories and parts of secondary importance.

(c) Minimal use of rare materials, especially inflammable ones and those subject to damage by frost, etc. Thus rubber, felt, copper, and similar products are used sparingly, and only at essential points.

(d) Simplicity of operation and ease of repair. Positive mechanical actions are stressed against more efficient but more delicate hydraulic boosters, etc.

(e) The weight of the fire power rather than the volume is most important. High muzzle velocity is stressed for all AA and AT guns; muzzle brakes are widely used.

(f) The maximum possible thickness of armor must be used at all essential points.

(g) All vehicles and tanks must have a maximal horse power/weight ratio; fuel capacities must suffice for at least 90 miles.

(2) The quality of design: {aj Soviet experimental design has been good,

although occasionally daring and impractical. The radio-operated mine and the rocket bomb are recent inventions. The Stormovik is a powerful attack plane. The self-propelled armored sleigh was used during the Finnish War of 1939-^0.

(b) In actual practice, the Russians have tended to make intensive studies of advanced foreign models, to buy the best of these, and to produce them in mass. Minor improvements are constantly being attempted. Thus the tracks, turret and other parts of the British Valentine tank have been remodeled. On the other hand, the inadequacy of the Soviet machine-tool industry and the lack of large-scale experimental facilities make radical changes extremely difficult: basically, all Russian tanks are only developments of British (Bren carrier, Carden-Lloyd, Carden-Lloyd Amphibian and Vickers) and American (Christie) prototypes.

(c) Lend-Lease aid from the Americans and the British has introduced a large number of new types of materiel: notable are Hurricane and P^O fighters, and B25 and Boston bombers; Matilda, Valentine, M3 Light and M3 Medium tanks, Bren carriers, bantams (peeps); Boys AT rifles; 2J- ton Studebaker trucks; 1^ ton Ford, Dodge and Chevrolet trucks.

- 136

(d) Finally, war losses have forced the Soviets to bring into use much obsolescent or even obsolete equipment. For example, T37 (Amphibians) and T28, and even MS (Renault) tanks have been noted in action. Fifty-eight mm. howitzers, 37 mm. AT guns have also been brought back in the reserve divisions.

(3) Armament (Ground Forcefl). (a) Infantry. (See Chart IV•) The Infantry has

the following equipment: rifle, model 1891-1930, and carbine model 1891-1930 (the latter is being again modernized), caliber 7.62-mm.; bayonets; blade, 6-7 inches long and French type, triangular 18 inches long; hand grenades: model 191^> Mills, Novitski, 1933, Dyakonov, and model 1917 chemical; rifle grenades: Dyakonov, model 1930 and model 1915 chemical grenade; 7.62-mm. Nagan revolvers, which are being gradually superseded by 7.62-mm. Tokarev automatic pistols, model 19301933; 7.62-mm. automatic rifles: Degtyarev and Lewis (called by the British, light machine guns); 7.62-mm. heavy machine guns: Maxim Colt and Tokarev; 9-mm. sub-machine gun, Bergman; 50, 81, 107 and 150-mm., trench mortars, Stokes-Brandt models (the latest models medium and heavy mortars being mounted on a fixed base and two-wheeled rubber-tired carriage); gas masks; telescopic rifle sights; camouflage netting. The Boys AT rifle is now being furnished by the British in quantity as a platoon weapon. Infantry AA, AT and other cannon are shown in Chart II.

(b) Cavalry. (See Chart V.)

Revolvers and automatic pistols. Same as Infantry.

Carbine: 7.62-mm. model 1920. Range, 1700 meters, (ivanov.)

Lance: Used only for ceremonies.

Saber: Type 27, without guard on handle; weight, 3«7 lbs.; a bayonet is attached to the wooden saber sheath,

Light machine gun: Degtyarev, as in the Infantry; or Lewis. Transported on pack animals.

Heavy machine gun: Maxim equipped for A.A. defense; transported in a ^-horse cart. An effort is being made to increase the number of MG's and artillery pieces with Cavalry units. The Cavalry had no AT guns in 1937 > using its regular artillery for this purpose. The 19^1 allowances include 10 k^-ma.. AT guns per division.

Separate Cavalry brigades usually have 76-mm. mountain guns; Cavalry divisions have 76-mm. guns, model 1902-30, 122-mm. and ll^-mm. howitzers; Cavalry corps have 11^-mm. howitzers and 107-mm. guns. The 19^1 organization includes ^5~mm. AT guns, 76-mm. guns and 122-mm. howitzers.

(c) Artillery. (See Chart VI.) The GHQ (ARGK) Artillery has about 20 calibers ranging from 20-mm. to ^06-mm. (including many obsolete models). It has both Schneider and Vickers 152-mm. howitzers; French 155-BHH. guns; 76-nmu guns3 107-mm. guns; French 2U0-nm. mortars; ii-0-mm. automatic guns; 76-mm. AA guns; etc.

(d) Antiaircraft Artillery. (See Chart V.) The Red Army has both 76-mm. and 85-mm. AA guns, some of which are permanently mounted in trucks, some truck-drawn and some tractor-drawn.

The standard AA defense weapon for troops is the 1909-10, 7-62-mm. Maxim MG mounted coaxially in groups of three or four. These MGfs are attached to a fixed base and permanently mounted, one group per 2-ton truck.

(e) Coast artillery: guns, 3-inch, model 1900; 120-mm. (Vickers); 120-mm. (Obukhov); 130-mm. (?); 152-mm. (Canet); 200-mm. (?); 9-inch, model 1877; 10-inch, model 1900; 25^-mm. railway; 11-inch, model 1877; 305-mm. immobile (52 calibers) and 12-inch {k5 or 52 calibers). Mortars: 9-inch and 11-inch, both model 1877. Most of the above guns and mortars are of obsolescent types. Searchlights: 90 cm., 110 cm., 150 cm., 220 cm., and 320 cm.

(f) Engineer. Arms and equipment. Pioneers are armed with 7.62-mm. infantry rifle, model 1691-1930, of the 7.62-mm. carbine, model 1910 (mounted units only); intrenching tools; camouflage equipment; explosives; hydrotechnical materiel (pumps, filters, etc.); motor saws; bridge equipage; and road building machines (trench dredgers, rollers, pile drivers, etc.). Each type of pioneer regiment has its particular type of equipment.

(g) Chemical materiel. During the Finnish War it was at first reported that the Reds employed asphyxiating gas shells, sprayed chlorpicrin gas from planes, and presumably occasionally released gas from cylinders in tanks of armored cars. Later information denied this report. Prior to this war, it was planned to spread asphyxiating gas from projectors, to employ gas and smoke candles, and to use gas shells in 107-mm. Stokes-Brandt mortars. Gas was to have been disseminated from airplanes either by using 22-220 lb. gas bombs (usually containing mustard, but sometimes asphyxiating or irritating gas) or by spraying persistent gas (mustard or chlorpicrin) from 21-gallon containers.

(h) Tanks (see C&art VII) are limited to four basic groups, i.e.

mm - 138

(1) Two-ton tanks (T-27) and armored cars for reconnaissance and liaison; nine to twelve-ton tanks (T-26 and BT) for infantry support and mobile tank operations; twenty-eight to thirty-nine ton tanks (T-28, T-32 and T-35) for attack and penetration; fifty-two to seventy-two ton self-propelled armored guns, (experimental) for close, heavy fire support;

(2) Armor is thick, up to 70 mm.; (3) Accurate moving and stationary fire are

emphasized, with long bases and stable firing platforms, low silhouettes and dual periscopes;

(k) Dependable performance under bad conditions and extremely low temperatures is ensured by wide shoes, heaters, manually operated turrets, etc.;

{3) Long range is more important than speed because of the size of the country and paucity of good roads.

Flame projectors have been installed on some of the T-26, Vickers 6-ton tanks. The length of the flame projected is about 20 meters and the height about 5 meters.

A confusing feature in the study of Soviet tanks is the fact that one type of tank may contain any one of three or four standard gasoline motors or a Diesel. This is offset somewhat by the fact that one type of motor, the Soviet M-3U V-twelve for instance, may be found in an airplane, a torpedo boat or a tank.

( ) Speed and radius of action (Ground Forces). (a) Infantry divisions operate at 2g- miles per

hour (20 miles per day); higher speeds are impractical since three-fourths of the transport is horse-drawn. The normal radius of action is 16 to 18 miles from the zone of communications with horse-drawn transport; 25-31 miles with motorized transport.

(b) Cavalry operates at k^ milea per hour (kO miles per day); its transport is entirely horse-drawn. The radius of action is up to 100 miles.

(c) Tank units operate at 7i to 12| miles per hour (100 miles per day); the transport is entirely motorized. The radius of action is up to 100 miles.

(d) Motorized units operate at 12§- to 20 miles per hour (125 miles per day); their radius is up to 200 miles.

(5) Operating conditions (Ground Forces). In general, Soviet materiel is designed to operate under all climatic and soil conditions. Actually, however, snow over 18 inches in depth restricts motor vehicles, artillery and light tanks entirely to roads, and markedly affects the performance of medium and heavy tanks. All vehicles are adapted for ready perfomance in extreme cold; nevertheless gasoline and oil consumption are 2% to 3 times the normal rate at such times.

- 139

Table Infantry Weapons

i

Il - 1

o i

Article

Rifle,

Rifle, auto

Rifle, auto (LMG)-x-

Carbine

MG, heavy

Wtf sub.

Mortars, trench

Mortars, trench

Mortars, trench

•* British designation

Make-Type

Mossin-Nagant

AVS

Degtyarev

Maxim

Bergman

Stokes-Brandt

Stokes-Brandt

Year

1891/30

1936

1938

1910

1909/10

1940

Caliber MM.

7.62

7*62

7*62

7,62

7.62

9

50

81

81

Weight lbs.

9.35

8.69

20.7

7,26

39,6

10.1

25.3

Max. Rn. yds.

2,200

3,025

2,200

5,500

1,650

880

1,100

3,300

M.V f.p.s.

2,820

2,770

2,025

2,640

2,840

924

990

Feed Rds.

Clip 5

Drum 47

Mag 5

Belt 250 I Drum 70

flntijtank — Antiaircraft Weapons

Caliber Weight Maximum Range (yards) M/V Article Make-Type Year MM* lbs. Horizontal Vertical

Rifle - AT Boys 1940 13*77 34*75 500* 2,540

[MG-AA 3 or 4 Maxims 1909/10 7^62 200 4- 5,500 3,025 2,840

MG-AT or AA DK 12*7 73*7 7,590 2,805

MG-AT or AA Hotchkiss 13-2 7,150 3,300 2,840 !

Cannon,-AT or AA Oerlikon Auto 20 572 5,500 4,070 2,740

Cannon, AT Rheinmetall 1930 37 737 7,700 2*640 i kCannon, AT Zik-5 1932/? 45 990 7,150 8,000 2,500

Gun, AA Degtyarev 1933/36 76.2 15,950 9,570 2,560

Gun, AA 1938 85 19,300 13,000 3,070

Gun, AA "Leningrad" 1934 105 23,000 19,800- 14,300- 3,100

22,500 16,000 3,300

Infantry and Cavalry Artillery

Howitzer, Inf, PA-27, Soviet 1927/36 76.2 1,390 6,550 Trail 1,180 1,600 7,650 Split

Howitzer, Cav, Vickers 114.3 3,000 8,200 Box 1,020

Howitzer, Pack< "Mountain" 1909 76*2 1,200 7,660 Box 1,250 1,375

-x- Effective ft

,\\ MV.I \\\>r\ \

Table VI Artillery

Article Make-Type Year Caliber MM.

F.P. Weight lbs.

Yds. Range

M/V f.p.s. Trail

IV)

I Gun (a)

Howitzer

Soviet

Schneider

1902/30

1910/30

76.2

122

1,840

2,790

9,30014,000

10,500

1,930

1,100

Box

Box

Howitzer Schneider 1910/30 152 6,270 12,600 1,250 Split

Long rifle Soviet 1909/30 152 11,500 13,200 2,180

(a) Until recently this gun has been the standard.

• ' > 1

...LtSWP MOTORIZATION - MECHANIZATION

Table VII

,0' • - ra

ok

•s i or

M.G

.

a

\ A v \ ' v V . i - . i . . t .

MC, motoroyole IE, with s ide oar SC, armored oar SC, " " SC, Amphibian armored oar S l e ighs , armored S l e i g h s , armored M-l, oar M-U15, piok-up M-75, piok-up ZIS-101, oar GA2-A, truok AMD-3 ZIS-5, 6 truok TAG-5, 6, 10 truok Tanks

T^27, "Tankette" ArmstrmpeUdetoy T-26, Tank Ford V-8, Meadow VI T-37, amphibian Soviet M-3U BT, Tank T-28, Tank - Annstrong-Siddeley T-32, 35 Tank T-50, armored gun

Lend-Lease

Valentine, Brit ish (Inf . Mk. I l l ) Matilda, Brit ish (Inf . Mk. I I ) Amerioan Light U-3 Amerioan ifed. U-3

Churcnill , Brit ish - A-22 ( Inf . Mk. IV)

Ford

lab

ill-

Tro

ops

Car

r:

C

1 Ton Miles Axles Inohes Inohes

12-18 1 2

2-3 3.2 U7 50 2 15.7 •35 U 7 U3 85 3 (£ tr.) 23.6 U 9 Uo 85 3 Bouy. J*3-*55

- • 10-20 2 30 100 6 1 1.U3 Uo 50 2 2 Uo 50 2 u6 2 U5 60 2 6 1 2.6 55 100 2 6 2 Uo Uo 2| 3(i T») 16 2 6.1 Uo 60 2-3 20 2 9.75 30 75 2-3 30

2 2 15 Uo U* 18 .16-.39 3.000 MB 3 6-9.5 12 90 8» 36 .19-.55 6,000 MGj 50-Gun 2 3 29 56 Bouy. .25—39 3,000 MB U*3 10-12 20-UO 350-500 5-6 39 .79 2,700 IKj 92-Gun

5-7 25-33 20 U5O-75O 10-12* U2 1.37 U.OOO M3j 85-Gun 7-10 33-39 7 500-750 8* U7 1.37-2.3U T

T 52-72 800 6* 2.73 T

_

U 25.2 15 95 36 - 2 J47 6,000 UG| 93-Gun U Light 37 265 1.5 8,270 MG|103-Oun 6 Med. 25 Uoo Uo 2.25 7.I4DO U5 |1200gub|fQ

Ul-75 mm.jl37-37iDji 5 35-UO 1 350 2.26 U.725 M5jl5O-Gunj

25 Smoke ^jOsab UO

3 16.0 15 135 36 .78-2.92 6,000 MG) 60-Gun

itio

n8. g *

Lgh

t

i '1§ 6 s. „Ore

w

* I1 CO O

«i r- 0 ro <

1 AR 1 AR 1 -2 1 - 2 2 1 AR 1 AB

1 1 -2 1 - 2 1 - 2

3-U 3-5

1 (.33) l (7.92)

3 (1 Sub IE) U (2 Sub MG)

1-2 (7.92)( 1 Sub MG)

1

1

-

F.T.»«)r 1 -1

2

1 1 1 1

1-76^ 1-76.2

1-105 or 1-152

1-75 ma.

1-3" how. or l-2"pounder;

(58 now) 1 amis proj.2"

_ S

Typ

eM

otor

jPa

y 1 o

ad (

1

Harley Davidson n •

Kord Ford r'ord

-T

Tord Ford ( i ton) Chevrolet ( j ton) Buiok ?ord ( l £ ton) Eeroules (3-5 ton) leroules (5-10 ton)

Bedford Ford-12 oyl.

JB Pro. of Bogies In SODS oases has been oonverted to a flame-thrower.

(6) Armament (Air Forces). (See Table VIII.) According to the information available on individual planes it is evident that all fighters are armed with four MGs (usually 7. 62 nm.cal.). New types of fighters usually have two 7-62 mm. MGs and one 12.7 mm. MG.

The "Stormovik", a recent fighter model, carries two wing MGs and 2-20 mm. wing cannon. The latest model of the "Stormovik" is supposed to be armed with two MGs and two cannon of either 37 mm. or ho mm. caliber. Its power plant is an in-line 2000 h.p. motor. It is supposed to carry one pilot and one observer. This new "Stormovik" is reported to be heavily armored as far as protection of the crew and is ruggedly built. Its normal operating height is 500 ft. - 1000 ft. It is quite fast as compared to modern-day planes of similar design and power but is slightly handicapped because of its heavy construction and armor plate. This plane was designed solely as an attack-bomber to be used in direct support of ground troops. The armament is located in the wings and is fixed.

The light and medium bombers have about the same armament as the fighters except the guns are not fixed. On some new models the 20 mm. cannon replaces the heavy MG.

The long-range bombers are armed, with three MGs. Bombers large enough to carry a crew of six to eight men are equipped with six MGs (7.62 mm.).

(7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces). These figures are estimated from the information available on the performance of individual planes.

Speed Type Top : Cruising Radius of Action

Old-type fighters New-type fighters (191+1) Old-type medium bombers New-type medium bombers (19^1) Old-type L.R. bombers New-type L.R. bombers (19^1)

2 5 355

225 330 165 230 160 210

180 mi. 200 mi. 575 mi. 1500 mi. 1000 mi. 2000 mi.

The manufacture of a great number of these plane models has been discontinued. The new models now under construction on a mass-production basis undoubtedly possess better performance figures than those listed above.

(8) Operating conditions (Air Forces). One feature that is evident in the Soviet Air Force and its associated departments

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIRFLABBS

Table Till

Obaolesoent-Attaoki

R-5

R-ZET

R-SSS

R-1O

DI-6

FE-2

SB-2

SB-3

liodium Bombers i

DB-3

Heavy Bombers i

IB-3

TB-5

TB-6

Miscellaneousi

MBR-5

U-2

UT-1,2

Obsolescent

Obsolesoent

Standard

Standard

Standard

Obsolesoant

Obsolesoent

Obsolesoent

Obsolesoent

Obsolesoent

Standard

Obsolesoent

Standard

Obsolescent

Obsolesoent

Standard

Standard

Standard

]f-22j

M-62-Aj 1-800

M-62-Bj 1-850

M-62-Bi 1-650

H-35-FJ 1-1200

M-17; 1-700

M-3UJ 1-850

K-17J 1-700

M-62-Aj 1-800

U-25J 1-750

If-105-Ai 2-1200

M-103» 2-860

U-105i 2-960

M-87-B) 2-950

M-3U» 2-850

M-3Ul lt-850

M-35»

U..100

15,700

16,200

16,500

6,800

172

166-235

215-250

2l»6-260

390

H+5

170-180

220

22U

300

2f|8

260

270

150

169

250

93

120

19,700

26,000

32,600

31,500

38,000

19,000

27,860

16,000

25,000

31,800

11,600

28,000

30,250

28,000

21,300

16,000

14,760

372

14O8

1.1 hrs .

1.5 hrs .

1.5 hrs .

620

500

600

500

600 - 750

500 - 1.00C

1,750 - 2,000

1,250

875 - 1,875

6-10 hrs .

250

2-7-62

U-7-62

U-7.62

2-7.62

2-7.62J 1-12.7

2-7.62

3-7.62

U-7.62

U-7.62

3-7.62

' • — * * • " w

lW-62

U-7.62

W-62

5-7.62

110

110

330

560

660

1,300 - 1,100

2,200 - 1,320

2,200

8,800

6,600

is the fact that all technical and research experts are entirely separated from the flying personnel and conduct few, if any, flights under the authority of the Army or Navy. Consequently these technical experts are not in a position to advise flying personnel and influence them to further develop the technical knowledge of the Air Forces. This is true of manipulating bomb sights and even true of navigation.

Compared to the other world powers the educational standard in Russia is very low. This is true of officers as well as enlisted men. Elementary arithmetical tables have been found in Russian planes shot down over Finland and there are numerous reports of Russian pilots being lost and failing to find their objectives due to their lack of navigational knowledge. Russian pilots make great use of railroads, rivers, etc as guides when flying cross-country.

Soviet pilots have undergone intensive training under their customary winter conditions and they were able to keep a much greater percentage of their equipment operating when temperatures were very low than were their enemies.

The Russians have made considerable experiments in keeping flying fields in condition for operation when the fields are covered with snow. They have special tractor-drawn scrapers and rollers and manage to keep their landing areas in fairly good condition despite severe winter weather. The Russians have made wide use of a motorized oil-heating unit that, during cold weather, keeps the lubricating oil at a certain temperature and is equipped vith a pump to quickly replace this oil in the planes when they are needed.

The Russians were successful in destroying numerous German planes on the ground during winter surprise raids as the Germans had insufficient time to fill their planes with hot oil and get them into the air.

Generally speaking,Russian Air Force maintenance is not excellent. Although it is reported that Soviet mechanics are very clever at making replacement parts> etc. for planes, it is said their combat planes are not kept in first-class operating condition.

d. Facilities for logistical support.

(1) Facilities for logistical support - general„

Facilities for the logistical support of the Vv'estcrn Front are weak. Although the initial disposition and organization of ports, railroads, airfields, roads and communications viere strategically souna, the enormous extent and the poverty of the country prevented adequate development. Improvements have been rushed during the war, particularly in the Arctic and Persian Gulf supply routes, but the present effort still is greatly handicapped by logistical difficulties. The meager shipping, rolling stock, commercial trucking and air transports have been markedly reduced by war losses. Even manpower has been seriously affected. Only the most universal and stringent mobilization of man, woman and child power has allowed maintenance of the needed armed forces without a collapse in the labor supply.

The northern route of supplies into the U.S.S.R. is severely hampered by ice, German air and naval operations, lack of bottoms and limited interior transportation. During the winter of 1941-42, the port of Murmansk maintained a trickle of 80-90,000 tons per month. With the opening of Archangel at the end of May, this flow should be at least tripled.

The Caspian Sea is the center of Soviet waterborne commerce, carrying fully half of the present total. Three of its ports—Baku, Astrakhan and Makhach Kala—are the greatest in the U.S.S.R. The flow of supplies on its waters—oil, ores, materiel, grain--is crucial for the Russian war effort.

The southern route of supplies has steadily grown in importance. Carrying only 30,000 tons in the fall of 1941, it has doubled its load. By the winter of 1942 it will carry far more than Murmansk, providing major relief from the freezing of Archangel.

Airdromes and landing fields arc concentrated in the Murmansk—Kandalaksha, Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov, Tbilisi and Baku areas; they also parallel all the principal railroads. Many airdromes are large and quite good. However, although large scale airdrome construction is in progress, airdromes and even landing fields are very sparse. The problem of adequate air support of the front is critical.

The Soviet railroads haul an enormous load of freight, 238 billion ton-miles in 1938, or four times the average ton-mile haul of the United States. But war losses of trackage and rolling stock have been severe. This has been aggravated by poor maintenance caused by a lack of

"'tis

- 147

trained men and materials. Consequently, the railroads are incapable of supplying much more than the present concentration of troops in the combat zone. Full simultaneous use of Russia's military manpower is impossibleo Transportation likewise limits major Soviet operations to the front from Tikhvin to Tula with its center at Moscow, and to the Rostov sector- Improved roads exist on the front only in the sectors between Novgorod and Orel, which intensifies the limitations imposed by the deficiencies of the rail net.

Sea-borne transport and maintenance of troops are important in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland, less important in the Barents Sea. The amount of commercial trucking or of air transports is negligible.

Local supplies of natural forage, grain, and livestock in the combat zone are most abundant between Tikhvin and Orel, almost exclusively between May and September. Manufactures, particularly materiel, are produced in significant quantities at Leningrad and Moscow.

In June, 1941, the regular and first-line reserve forces of the U.S.S.R. numbered 11.5 million; war losses reduced this to 7 million. About 5 million men and possibly 500,000 women have been trained as replacements. Pre-military training of 110 hours over five months is compulsory for all men between 16 and 50. Induction into the active army is apparently on the age-class system, although in some cases pre-military training units have fought as separate organizations in the front lines.

Industrial and agricultural mobilization is complete All able-bodied men and women not employed in industrial and transport enterprises are mobilized for work on farms. School children and old people (from 12 to 55) are being utilized whenever possible. In spite of these measures a serious labor shortage exists $ losses and military mobilization have reduced the labor pool to 28 million plus 10 million auxiliary workers--but two-thirds of the maximal labor pool of the United States.

Planned evacuation of territory threatened by the Germans has yielded an increment of about 10% to the military-industrial potential of unoccupied Russia.

The- telegraph, telephone and radio systems are strategically disposed in relation to the transportation system. The networks, however, are far too thin. The efficiency of communications is low.

- 148

(2) Logistical and strategic importance of the Soviet and Persian Gulf ports . Soviet ports may be divided into"'throe categories: those vital for the supply of the country (Murmansk and Archangel, the Caspian Sea ports and the non-Russian Persian Gulf ports), those needed for local supply (the secondary Arctic ports and the Caucasian Black Sea ports), and naval or combined operational bs.ses (Leningrad, Novorossisk, Sevastopol, Rostov and Yeisk).

(a) Vital supply ports. (1) The significance of the Arctic ports (See

Map 9a) is definitely limited by four factors. All the ports, other than Murmansk, are closed by ice for at least five months of the year. Secondly, the active air and sea operations of the Germans from Northern Norway have forced the reduction of the number of ships in each convoy to about 25. Moreover, despite strong escorts, losses are high. Thirdly, operational needs in other theaters make procurement of the needed bottoms difficult. Fourthly, the interior transportation facilities, railroads and rivers, are restricted. The secondary ports on the Kola Peninsula and along the -western shore of the uhite Sea cannot be used for oth^r than local traffic because the capacity of the one railway is barely sufficient to carry the traffic from Murmansk alone, especially during the spring and summer thaw. The ports on the Ob, Yenisei and Lena Rivers are not only difficult of access both from the west and the east, but they also have negligible internal communications. Consequently, only Murmansk and Archangel (including Molotovsk, Ekonomia and Bakaritsa) are of vital importance to the supply of the U.S.S.R.

In all, the intake capacity of Murmansk is limited by the railroad to 80,000 tons a month. Improvements on the railroad may not only increase this considerably but allow use of the subsidiary ports from June to November. However, the regular bombardment to which the line is subjected makes this improbable.

The capacity of Archangel and its ports— open from June to December--is at least 220,000 tons per month, probably considerably more. The railroad to Vologda has ample capacity for this traffio--330,000 tons per month. This will be doubled once the double tracking, which extends now probably to Plesetsk, is completed. In addition, the newly finished line from Obozerskaya to Kotlas can take some 90,000 tons a month. Finally, the Northern Dvina river can carry nearly 100,000 tons per month. It is clear therefore that Archangel and its system of interior supply are adequate for any traffic that can reach it from June to December

a 'It,/ r f,

- 149

(£) The Caspian Sea ports play four vital roles. Baku, Astrakhan, and Makhachkala are the three busiest ports in the U.S.S.R. They carry two-thirds (12,000,000 tons) of the oil from the Caucasus, manganese, fish and other products to the north and Central Asia. They carry munitions and finished industrial goods from the Central Industrial region to the Caucasus and Central Asia. They carry cotton, copper, and other raw materials from Central Asia to the north and to the Caucasus. Finally, Baku takes in a flow of Lend-Lease supplies from the Iranian ports of Bandar Shah and Pahlevi. In all, the Caspian, with 27 million tons turnover in 1935, accounts for at least half the total present shipping traffic of the U.S.S.R. It is essential for the Russian war effort.

The capacity of the Caspian Sea ports is reduced by serious siltage which has accompanied the steady drop of the sea level. As a result, even the main ports of Baku, Makhach Kala, Astrakhan, Guryev, Krasnovodsk and Pahlevi can be maintained only through constant dredging. Numerous other ports, such as Bandar Shah* have become almost unusable, with lighterage needed 5 to 10 miles out. In addition, the connecting railroads, especially on the northern and eastern shores, have low capacities. The railroad from Astrakhan to Urbakh can carry no more than 4000 tons per day each way, or barely 21$ of the traffic at that port. The traffic at Krasnovodsk is kept down by the railroad to a maximum turnover of 420,000 tons a month. The port facilities at Guryev are unknown; the rail limit is 220,000 tons each way, or a turnover of 440,000 tons monthly.

(3) The Iranian and Iraqi ports on the Persian

Gulf, Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, Basra, and Bushire, have a total capacity of about 230,000 - 250,000 tons per month, with a massive increase under way. Khorramshahr alone is scheduled to attain a capacity of 300,000 tons in November, 1942. The principal limitations have been threefold. Until recently, shipping on an important scale was not available for this route. Secondly, the entire capacity of Basra is devoted at present to the needs of the British Tenth Army and the Turks. In case of dire necessity, however, the rail facilities from Basra to Baghdad to Khanaquin, and the excellent military highway from Khanaquin to Kermanshah to Hamadan to Kazvin would allow major diversion of this traffic to Russian needs. The extent of this diversion depends on the possible increases in traffic capacity between Kazvin and Dzhulfa. Thirdly, the railroad from Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr to Andimeshk can take over 60,000 tons per month, the total present capacity of these

* Extensive dredging, clearing a 13' channel, has just been reported.

- 150

ports. Between Andimeshk and Kazvin, however, the railroad is limited to 39,000 tons a month, with trucks hauling 21,000 tons. In Northern Iran, the routes break up: a part of the traffic goes by a combination of rail and truck from Tehran, Kazvin and Zinjan to Tabriz and probably ; Wwa2fa; a part, by truck from Kazvin to Pahlevi; by rail to Bandar. Shah; minor quantities by truck to Meshed and Ashkhabad. Additions to rolling stock and trucks, and intensive work on railroads and roads will double the capacity of these routes by November, 1942. The combined transit capacities of Dzhulfa (126,000 tons by rail, 15,000 by truck) and Pahlevi (15,000 tons) - 156,000 tons per month - are more than adequate.

In general, the southern routes carry somewhat less than Murmansk; by the winter of 1942, however, they will carry far more, providing major relief from the freezing of Archangel. Diversion of supplies from the Turks and the British 10th Army in case of extreme necessity can probably double this capacity.

(b) Ports for local supply.

(1) The subsidiary ports of the Kola Peninsula and the western shore of the White Sea, Kandalaksha, Kem and Belomorsk (Soroka), give important support to the Murmansk sector of the front from June to November. The ports, and the spurs loading from them to the front,* have a total capacity of some 1500 tons a day, or at least 250,000 tons for the year. This is an addition of 21$ to the logistical support of that area,** which may be exploited either by the building up of reserve depots for winter use or by increases in troop strength of up to 3 divisions for active summer or fall operations.

(2) Loss of the foreign, Ukrainian and Crimean, markets and a 40^1oss in shipping have greatly diminished the importance of the Caucasian Black Sea ports. At present their principal task is to augment the Trans-Caucasian railroad by the movement of troops and local supplies especially between Batumi and Novorossisk. The capacities of Novorossisk, Tuapse, Poti and Batumi far surpass those needed for this task.

(c) Naval and operational bases.*** Soviet

base facilities are not large; however, the navy is so small and scattered and merchant shipping so badly decimated, that facilities are more than sufficient in all theaters. The greatest Soviet base is Leningrad with its island fortress of Kronstadt. The second most important base, Sevastopol, has been abandoned by the fleet for six months, and many of the installations have probably been

* See Map 9a. ** See p. 162. *** See also pp. 329~f33; p. 120

- 151

removed to the present headquarters at Novorossisk. Rostov and Yeisk, deprived of all commercial traffic, are free to serve as bases for the landing operations which have taken place in the Sea of Azov. Murmansk and Llolotovsk, and Baku are bases for small squadrons in Arctic and Caspian waters, respectively.

(3) Por"fc facilities; Soviet ports. (Table IX). The analysis of Soviet ports embraces the following points: number and/or length of berths (wharfage), depth alongside berths in feet, railroad facilities, storage capacity and fuel stores, lifting equipment, conveying equipment, monthly capacity of port in tons, electric power available in kilowatts, shipbuilding and repair facilities, principal exports, and miscellaneous facilities.

Information is fullest and most accurate on the ports of Archangel and Murmansk; poorest, on the Black and Caspian Sea ports. No details at all are available concerning the Caspian port of Guryev.

The port of Archangel is treated in detail according to its three component ports: Molotovsk, Ekonomia, and Bakaritsa. However, in regard to lifting equipment only a statement for the port as a whole is available. This information (1940), although not reliable, is submitted as an indication of available equipment: (l) floating cranes: 1-150 tons, 1-100 tons, 6-30 to 50 tons, 5-6 to 10 tons; stationary cranes: 4-8 to 20 tons, 8-3 tons; portable cranes: 10-8 to 15 tons; movable cranes: 10-3 to 8 tons.

(4) Port facilities: Pahlevi and the Persian Gulf Ports (Table X ) . The analysis of Pahlevi and the""Tranian and Iraqi ports on the Persian Gulf follows that for the Soviet ports. It must be emphasized that these ports are undergoing rapid and large-scale expansion with which reports have not been able to keep up. As a result, the data tabulated, some of which are as early as November, 1941, are obsolescent, and useful merely to give a general orientation. Available data on Bandar Shah are obsolete; latest reports indicate a major development by the Russians. A 13' channel has been dredged, 2 cranes installed and other improvements are in progress to effect a monthly capacity of 30,000 tons.

(5) Airfields. (See Map 10a). Available information indicates that pre-war European Russia had about 1,000 airfields, about half of which were emergency landing fields. The great bulk of these fields, however, supported the western fortifications which were quickly overrun. The following

V

- 152

M5? In TABLE DC! pr>7T FACIIll

:l

1 . Namo of Fort KmnDer and/or 3. Depth along- Railroad 5. Storage oapeol fa. Lilt ing 7. Convoking Vonthly ca- 9. Lleotrio '"hipbuiiding 11. 1-rinoipal . lcce.ltu.eoualength of side Berths faoilitie ty and fuel equipment. equipment. pacity'of power avail- and repair exports• ieoilities; berths (wharf- (feet) stores . port in tons a Die in kll< faci l i t ies . remarks.age). watts •

ABCTIC WATERS i

1. Murmansk IS ino l . 1 fuel 3-17' Sails on all piers 20,000 sq. I t . 3u ton l i t . crane 1 coal conveyor, 5-lo,uuu plus Floating dock Tinier, a pat it t uergency aiiBrves o i l tanker berth at Yurntnsk covered storage (sunk); otherwioe opt. JOO ton/)-; clear only 5u,ooo from (built in Eng- fart i l i i er . now used for pur(Notei Soviet for dry cargo. aerious s ho rtage. Sli transporter; ' 0,000. Tuloma station land), cpt. 250 poses other than unclaim of 11+ Unknown amount of 6 ton traveling 10 other con- tons, in two loading convoys ioerths not con- fuel o i l , gaso- veyors. orane; 9 non- seotions of 155 £ Derths (!.os. lt> firmed oy : : , i . , line and cool plurcbing r.r. and 950 tons ; and 17) at the Fish-Murmansk.) storage for orth- cranesi 1-U5 ton; length 2UO'. ing Port; 19' depth em Fleet use. B-7 ton. "hipouiloing an alongside. 2 Derths

repairing yard at Yaenga Bay. 1 with traverser oertn at the Timber s l i p taking up Lock, 1 berth at the to I'd trawlers Coastal Fatrol Dock. 160' long. Ship. Tumarouna for con-repairing yard, voy of 12 ships is with 1600 ton 10-12 days from Ice-floating dock. land waters. Taval port with An expansion of port HlOO ton f loat- faci l i t ies ia in ing dock, 262' progress . long. 2 modern drydooks, 656' ana en 328' long, max. draft 29.51 . 6 s l ips haul

ing" up 700 ton ships.

2 . Kandalaksha 2 berths where 2 loi at Shore ^O mi. spur con- 150,000 fron IceDound i.ov.-U ships can unload retro 1 dook. nects port with liiva III static ino l . s imiltaneous ly • ' urman rr.; rail

to end of pier.

3 . Ken 3 berths whioh >-20'; 1-16' 2 mi. spur con- 18,000-30,000. 500-1,000. Icebound ;.ov. 3^can acoonsr.odate nects port with :.ay 15. Sawoills, U. 3 ships simul- Kern on Vurman rri mi. below town, have taneously. own wharves and shops

for small repairs.

Belomorsk Accommodations fa All berths 20 ' . l.uuo-j, 000. Icebound Dec. 1-IJay (Soroka) 3 ships i 2 gener- 15. Port recently

al cargo, 1 tank- developed 10r timber. Feasible 6UEaarine oase.

5 . Onega 3 berths. All berths 16' . On or near spur of 1Electrified; 3elon<orsk-0bozer- extent unknovrr.. Fort for assembly skaya rr. and loading of sown

limber, fecause of shal low bar 5 nii. from Onega, usual to unload ships partial ly ay Darges to reduce dralt to lU1 . barges unloaded at nega. Dredging

operations planned, sunmer of 19U2,

y

XABLE H i PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET FORTS

Name o f For t Rai lroa d fao i l i t i e s .

5. Storage oapaoity and fuel

6. Lifting equipment.

7. Conveying equipment.

8. Monthly oapaoity of

9. Eleotrio power avail

10. Shipbuilding and repair

stores . port In tons. able In kilo- fac i l i t i e s . watts.

6 . Arohangel a. Uolotovsk 5 ships ( i . e . , 1

tanker, U general oargo ships) oaa unload simultaneously. (Notei Joining 2 now separate wharves wil l enable 6 to 7 ships to unload simultaneously by Sept., 19H2).

Low water (allberths?) 25.5'Sships drawing26.5' oan useaoeeas oanal at flood. Ships dra ing 26' at low water oan be aooommodated by Sept. 1, 19142.

30 ml. single traok rr. line

to Arohangel Vologda rr.

3 steel storage fuel tanks—2,000 ton opt.} 1 tank hulk of 4,000 ton opt.; 1 other nearly oomplete. U oonorete fuel o i l tanks (2 underground and 2 hulks )—30,000 ton total opt. Soviets olaim 100,000 tons ooal in Arohangel area, mostly at Uolo

50,000 tons without improvements listed in columns #2 and $12.

Eleotrioity probably laid on wharves.

Im. V. Molotova Shipbuilding Yard (No. 402). Large naval base under oonstruotion 1 machine shops, foundries, oovered building ways com-pleted. 2 destitp era nearly finished. Fall, 19U1. Large yard and building slip under oonstruotion.

Naval port. Pipe lines laid to •11 fliel storage teaks. Pipe lines to 2 wterTM paralleled by sttan heat pipes. Fuel pumps 18 tana opt./hr. Into 12 tank oars similtaneous ly at wharves.

tovsk.

5 berths. All berths 1 23-2V Only trammy to Current dredging nainland. Solomoperations expeot- balakaya Islanded to allow 2o' Arohangel Town draft ships to rr. bridge under

Many sawmills oloae by; covered storage spaoe probably available.

!>0,000 (est.). (Soviets nay use port for bunkering only.)

Electricity in Ekononla Town; probably on wharves.

See general statement in ret Archangel.

Sown lumber logs. Amount of looal ooal reserves not known.

berth here by Nov oonstruotion 1942. (Notei when ioe

oonditions on the N. Dvina H. permit, a rr. ii laid in winter from Arohangel to Solombalskaya Is . )

o. Bakaritsa 12-15 Berths. (Hotel quay 1800 yards long aeoommodates 13-1; ships simultaneous ly} •

All bertha: 22' 24' over bar.

1 line on quay; 5 traok sorting yard between quay and Bakaritsa Station.

Bulk of total Arohangel storage opt.; no figures available.

1-10 to 12 ton traveling orane. (Notet Soviets plan to add transporter oranes up to 15 tons; 2 tractor oranes up to 3 tons; 7«5 ton rr oranes by Fall,

Some eleotrioally driven portable conveyors, reaching only 14' above water level. Goodi removed by ships' derrioks oan be off-loaded from truoks to barges at several shallow loading wharves near rr. station.

120,000 (est.) Eleotrioity laid on all wharves.

None reported. Timber. Quay 2230 yards long; about 1800 yard* suitable for discharging oargo. 3 parts 1 1. Ho. seotion BOO yards long; 19* deep at so. end, 22' 6" at no. end. One 10-12 ton traveling orane with' 150 yard range, 20' max. reach above water level at no. end. 2 . Central seotion, 430 yards long; for timber only. 3* So. section, 1000 yards long; 16' deep at so end, 23' at no. erd. Not a l l suitable for unloading.

7. Fort Dikson Coal wharf under going extension to 650'. 1 pile wharf, 380 x 65'

Depth off7-10'.

port lew warehouses reported, 1937.

.Tiarfside "mechanized" .

Fixed conveyor, 210" long, for bunkering.

Station of unknown opt.

Bunkering and subsidiary port. Powerful W/T for oommunioation with al l polar stations .

6. Igarka 6 berths for simultaneous unloading of 6 ships.

Trans-Siberian rr. at Krasnoyarsk 400 mi.upstream.

100,000 for navigation season;

000_per month.

500-1000 Ioefree only 90 days per year.

TABiE H i PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET PORTS

Has* of Port Number and/or length of bertha (wharf

3* Depth alongside berths (

U. Bailroad faoll it ies .

5. Storage oapaoi ty and fuel stores.



8. Monthly oapaoity of port in tons.

Elaotrlo powar available in kilowatts.

10. Shipbuilding and repair faollitiea.

Prinoipal aiporti .

12. Misoallanaoui faoilitiosj ranarka.

. BALTIC SEA I

1 . Leningrad 10 wharves totalling 8 mi., about 125 bertha for vessels inol. 70 oeean-going

10-M1

wharves. 183,000 tons. 7 floating

oranea— 35, 40, 50, 70, 100, 150, and 200 tons.

I'oohanioal loadings

WX), 000-1(50,000 depending on ice conditions.

206,000 plus 96,000 from Svir s t a . , 56,000 from Volkhov Sta.

7 shipbuilding works for 2 oapital ships, U destroyers, submarines, e te . largest in U.S.".

Timber, grain, ores, ooal, e te .

Ioebreakera 1 3-9,000 ton) 4-2,000 ton; 3-600 ton. Port loebound Feb.-Apr. e' witt> ioebreakers.

I I I . BUCK SEA I

1. Sevastopol (Facilities now largely evacuated or destroyed

BztenaiTe naval wharfage.

Rails on wharves.

6 large o i l and gas tanks.

Floating oranes 2-100 ton; 1-50 ton; 1-tiO ton; 1-25 ton; '2-20 ton; 1-5 ton.

25,500 (3 stations ) .

U relnf. oonoiete building s l ips , max. 328'; 6 wooden s l ips , nax 230'. 3 drydooks: 500', 680', T. 3 floating dooksi 1-300'.

No oonmeroei naval only.

Second largest naval port in U.S.S.H.

cn

2. Hostov-on-Don

2.5 mi. Average 1 IV Rails on wharves.

120,000 tons, ovei 100 warehouses.

2 floating oranes 15 and 50 ton.

3 srato loaders, 5u t / i j 2 floating grain loacBrs 50 t/h; 1 floating elevator, 125 t/ii .

120,000 tons; large oapaoity of river transport

lu-25,000. 2 marine railways, l ifting 700 and 350 tons .

Grain, timber, o i l . Ioebreaker; port severely handioappe by ioe oonditioni, Nov.-Apr.

3 . Yeiak 920 yards. 1O-1U1 Hails on -aharves.

33,500 tons, 26 warehouses .

Several grain and salt loaders.

30,000 subjeot to ioe oonditions

3,000-5,000. Repair yards. Closed by ioe Deo. 15-aar. 31 .

U« Kovorossis' 36 berths. 17-30* Sails on all wnarves.

i2,800 cons, 20 warehouses; 50,OOU ton o i l depot; 50,000 ton grain elevator.

2 floating oranesj kO-50 ton; 6 portable cranes, ?-15 tons; 2 portable oranes, 2 ton.

Conveyors 1 1 floating ooal, 100 t/h; 2 grain, 100 t/h; 1 oeEPTit barrels; pipeliie to o i l pier.

2^0,000 10,000-25,000. "mil repair yard with U small s l ips .

Grain, o i l , oemant. Sinoe siege of Sevastopol," main naval base of Blaok

•y. Tuapse 2,300 yards; 11* wharves.

16-30* !p.ils on wharvei except oil berths.

2,000 tons; I4I tanks, 1600-i|200 tons eaoh, for crude o i l , kerosene, gasoline; 21 tanks, U,000-6,000 tons.

nil pipeline; 2 grain conveyors, 50 t/h; various other conveyors.

U5,OOO-6o,00O without oi l •erths; oi l oertha, 100,000 to 150,000.

5,000-10.000. Yard and workshops for repairing oi l tankers; employs up to 1,000 men.

Handles QQ.0 pass angers/ye Terminus of pipeline from Groiny

6. Poti 2,255 berths

15 20-23' .ails on all wharves .

20,000 sq. yds. cold storage plant.

3 steam shovels for orej 2-l60 t/h; 1-80 t /h . 2 electric ore cranes 12.5 tan, with 66' radius. 2 electric portable cranes—3 ton, with 50' radius. Floating oranes, 40 and 25 tons.

Transporters, eleetrio trucks, eto.

120,000-150,000. Bion Sta., 1&0U0; Abasha Sta., 13,000.

Fort repair work;hops with s l ip

l ifting 500 tons.

Manganese from Chiatura.

10,000 ton vessels can berth alongside wharves; 22,000volt ourrent from Rion stepped down in port by 2EO/38O volt transformers.

TABLE DC i PORT FACILITIES - SOVIET PORT1?

1 . Nina of Fort . 2 . Number and/or length of berths (wharfa g e ) .

3 . Depth alongs ide berths (feet).

4* Railroad faoil i t ies .

5. storage oapaoi ty and fuel stores.



Monthly oapaoity of port in tons

9. Eleotrio powor available in kilo' watts.

10. Shipbuildin and repair faoilltiea.

11. >rinolpal exports.

Miscellaneous faoilities) remarks.

7 . Batumi 2.253 berths.

13 23-32' . Rails on al l wharves.

20,000 sq. yds. 40 ton floating orane; f-8 ton traveling oranes with 50' radius

Pumps and pipelines at all berths; several traveling oonvoyors for grain

100,000 without oi l; oil berths, 100,000; small vessels and barges, 2^0,000

Adzharis-Tskali Sta., 22,000.

Ship-repairing shop with small s l ip .

Oil, manganese. 8 and 10 in. pipelines from Baku; seoondary submarine base; 9OJ4 of turnover la o i l .

17. CASPIAN SEA I

1 . Astrakhan Pipeline. 800,000 tons during navigatio season; mostly tankers and barges .

5,000-10,000» being enlarged.

Shipbuilding yan with sl ip of 565'i floating dock 1,700 ton opt.

Transit of o i l , grain, mnufaetura between Caspian Sea and Volga R

Volga froien Deo. Apr.

2 . Makhaoh-Kala

Several liiarves; over 1100 yaras.

3 large o i l reservoirs, 14 smaller, total opt. 2.5-3 mi 13 ion tons•

Fixed conveyors i 2-410' long; 2328' long, for loading cotton.

450,000-500,000 tons; mostly tanke rs and barges.

3,000-4,1X50. Ship-repairing shop with floating dook for ships of medium tonnage.

Transit of o i l . New oi l harbor opened in 1938; 2 pipelines to Grozny refineries. Ioe nay stop navigation for short period In Jai

t

3 . Baku 80 piers, mostly for o i l , along c mi. of water front} 3,720 yds for o i l j 2,too yds . f o r dry goods.

. aria, ble i oonstant dredging.

Rails on dry goods pier.

Numerous o l l -storage tanks and reservoirs up to 10,000 ton opt.

50-ton floating orane; 2-ton oranes on dry goods pier, etc.

8" and 10" pipelines to Batum; annual cpt. l,U60,000 tons, l,6l42,OOO tons res p.

1,000,000 200,000-300,000. Navy yard and ship-repairing yards, one having 1 single and 1 double dook, both taking largest Caspian ships. Steamers up to 5,000 tans can be constructed.

By far the largest port In the U.S.s.R Base of the Caspian Sea f l o t i l l a .

4 . Kr&snovodsk 15 piers on pile (of whioh 5 deoayed) in ..estem Harborj 21 wooden piers (of whioh 15 at oayed in VI"ra Harbor).

iioatern Harbor 5-a'i ufra Hartcri 10-12'j 16' along 2 bertas of o i l piers.

Hwny good warehouses; oil tanls, total opt. 12,000 tons.

2-3 ton oranes.

Grabs and conveyors with opt of 50 t/hj floating grain trans-shipper, 50 t /n .

140,000 500-1,000. Cotton, grain, alabaster.

Oil from Cheleken Island, stored in tanks at s ta . , used by rr.; mny oil reservoirs at landing plaoe 5.25 mi east of Krasnovodak

9

\i ! \ i \ I II i I V i ! '; >L i ! i1 n

i! I il !L TAl'Lii X - PAi LEVI AND THE FEUS IAN GULF PORTS.(O .V» i ii

1k- Railroad 5. Storage capaci- 7. Conveying c. !:onthly oafacilities. ty and fuel equipment. equipment. paoity of t . Lifting

stores • port in tons•

None; port V.'arehouse cpt.i 1-30 ton float- •lono ; discharging 15,000-14,000. oleared oy Closed sheds - ing orane, steam by ships' derricks truoks. toad to 6H56 sq. f t . engine; 2 cater- or hand. Kaiuin takes 500 Open sheds - pillar oranos. tons daily in 7iil6 sq. f t . diesel, opt. 10 dry weather; 250 Closed sheds - tons at lo.5* in wet. (damaged but free space; 5

largely useable )- tons, at 26' free VldU sq. I t . spaoe. Closed sheds - 1 ;ant ry-type

(under oonstruo- crane at "aval tioo) - 1312 sq. Yard; cpt. 7 tons

I t . 'heda for inllamm-Roles - (under construction) 157U sq. f t . Fuel stores 1 no ooal stooks. 3 large oi l tanks beh ind i avy Ya rd .

a_. 3 rr. spurs ii30,000 sq. f t . 1-55 ton, 1-25 129,000 (l.'Ay 'Ji2); on wharl'. of transit sheds; ton floating 170,000 (July 'Ufd);

150,000 sq. f t . oranes; i-» ton with limited in-warehouses; eleotrio; 1 > oreasss thereafter limited adjaoent ton steam; U-3

ing. !!o coal or- 2-3 ton steam; dinarily. Fuel 5-1 ton eleotrio. o i l at Aoadan» probably 5-2 ton plpel^-ie to he (liotei shortage built. Vater laid of trained crane on wharves; avail orews). aftle from 600-ton self-propelled barge.

Rr. to Anwar Customs sheds - 2-10 ton oater- 90,000 tons, June to oe completed 5,000 tons opt. pillar oranes 'U2; 300,000 tons. July '1|2. Fuel at Abadan. for plumbing

lighters.

j \ U 1 \ r ~ \ "if if J r

' 1 j 1 ' i'!\\ V-. \ \ r !! i •

1 iLD nirO)rO)|i,

j

. N'ame of Port .

I . PAHLKVI

I I . PEHSIAU (-• GULF PORTSt

en 1 . Basra S I

t

2 . Khorramshahr

I • Number and/or

length of berths (wharfa g e ) .

U berths I customs quay, 669' long, min. widtn 0 2 ' , aooommodates 3-500 ton sh ips ; sl ipway quay i n Naval Yard, 160' Long, a d j . terrain 197' wide. 1 mole-16001 long; 1 mole-1000' long —insufficient depth or unloading faci l i t ies .

a. 1-J0001 wharf ~ with 6 berths. _b. 1-600' wharf. £ . U deep-water ~ berths finlshe

or nearly finished.

_d. 9 lighterage ~

a.~b.~

o.~

berths.

Concrete whar: 11+00' . 2 deep water

Berths and 2 "I" shaped lighterage berths to be completed by Aug. 1, 'Ij2; other work ir progress.

5-liEhter jetties on so

bank of Karun at Persian yaval Base.

V i l [yrv 1. Depth along

side berths ( feet ) .

Customs and s l i p -way quays; LI'5".

a. 26' . b. 20'. o. Deep water. d. "shallow water.

lighterage.

Karun Hiver bar 19-21' et low water in October.

a. 20' . T>. Deep water. o". Shallow water ~ for lighters

only.

n!

^ ^ ^ • ^ • ^ • ^ • ^ • ^ • ^ • W ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

V. Eleotrio 10. Shipbuilding 11. Prinoipal power avail- and repair exports• able in kilo faol l i t iee . watts .

Several small Maval Yard. Transiti power plants for U.S. ' .E. -Iran. lifhting purposes .

12. Miscellaneous facilities 1 remarks.

Water level variations up to 3^5' • Sufficient labor available for present operation! • Deepening of channel and eocstruotion of wooden jett ies planne d .

Ample eleotricitj Port Directorate for a l l purposes. and Gray,

Mackentie marina vnrkshops. No dry dook or large slipway. Lighters, diving equipment. 1 salvage steamer.

Main supply base of British 10th Army; port of entry. Land Lease to Turkey. Longest vessel swinging safely in river650'. Good anchorage for 22 vessels between outer bar and "'jargit wharves.

Ueager repair shops. barraoki and jetties of Persian Navy. Tremendous port expansion underway.

^ • ^ ^

p TABLE • - PAKLEVI ANU THE PERSIAN GULF PORT':.

ifl 1 . Name of Fort 2. Number and/or 3. Depth along . Railroad 5 . Storage oapaai- 6 . Lifting 7. Conveying Monthly ca- Eleotrio

length of side bertha faoilitis t y and fliel equipment. equipment. pacity of power a' berths (whtrf- (feet). stores . port in ton able in ki lo

watts.

Aba dan

U« Bandar Snahpur

CD

i

5 . Bus hire

General oargo wharf 150' long. 10 deep water steel and oonorete Jet t ies} 9 of then for o i l .

Jetty - 800' long 300' wide. Causeway 9001 long oonneota with solid f i l l . (3 deep water and lighterage Berths to be oompleted by NOT. 'l£.)

One quay} oargo disoharged by lighters.

30'} heavy s i l t ing nay ohoke berths.

30' 1 bar at Khor Eusa, 21+'} deep ohezinel.

Inner an oho rag 9 fo r T»SS el 3 up to 20'.

Concrete deok with narrow

iuge rr. ana road alongside at wha rves.

letty - 3 rr. ;r»okai siding

all warelOuses.

lone; road to Isfahan.

Tank farm for refined petroleum produots, 3 million barrels opt] same for orude, 10 million barrels opt.

9 open-sided ware, houses 1 some open-storage.

Several warehouses} open storage.

b-3 ton eleotrio nes} 1 dumb

200-210 ton floating orane, unaDie to slew, requiring } tugs to maneuver.

No oranes on jetty; 12 ton Diesel rr. wreoklng orane (radius U5') in

yard.

2-10 ton cranes trawler

truoks; 5-ton hand crane.

10" pipeline. Oil only1 90,000 tons ?

30,000 (to oe expanded).

5,000-10,000. Eleotric lignt plant.

2 small slipways} floating dook 730 too opt.} maohine shop. Ssell craft maintenance and construction.

3,000 ton floating dock} l ift ing apt. 6,000 tons) length U7T I internal breadth 65.6'.

No repair or fueling facilit ies.

Crude and refined oil including 100 octane gasoline. Fueling ships.

iiat a supply port of the CS.' .S.; fuels ships in Persian Culf traffio

All supplies including water sent by rail.

Auxiliary port for truck route to Isfahan and Teheran.

concentration areas for airdromes have remained: Iv;urmansk--Kandalaksha (5 airdromes, 3 seaplane bases, at least 24 landing fields); Leningrad (20 airdromes, 3 seaplane bases); Moscow (28 airdromes); Rostov (5 airdromes, 3 landing fields); Tbilisi (5 airdromes); and Baku (6 airdromes, 1 seaplane base, 2 landing fields). Beyona this, airdromes or landing fielas parallel all the principal railroads, even in the deep zono of the interior. Those noted by a reliable observer along the Trans-Siberian Railroad were numerous and much larger than American fields. They appeared to be in excellent condition, and difficult to sight from the air since the runways were unmarked. In addition, recent reports indicate large scale airdrome construction in the Archangel area, in the North Caucasus and along the Lower Volga from Stalingrad to Astrakhan. In relation to the enormous extent of the front, however, airdromes and even landing fields are very sparse. The problem of adequate air support, particularly by heavy bombers or fighters with fast landing speeds, is therefore serious

Some ©f the principal airdromes of European Russia have the following characteristics. There are three airports near Archangel (Sec Maps 10b, 10c, lOd). One of these, Tenth Kilometer airdrome, has two runways at right angles in an L-shape. The north-south runway is gravel, 5280' x 350'; the -oast-west runway is wooden, made of logs, laid crosswise eight feet deep, and is also 5280' x 360'- It has been reliably reported that the wooden runway will take heavy bombers of any size. Only the runways are usablo. This airdrome is of great importance since British and U.S. Lcnd-Lease aircraft are assembled there preliminary to service on the front.

Khodinka airport, nt>e.r koscow, consists of two large crossed hard-surface runways, 3800• txnd 34001 (450' wide). Shohelkovo airport, fifteen miles north of Moscow, has two 3000' concrete runways constructed in a V-shape. Airports at Engels, Borisoglcbsk, Stclingrad,

flala., and Baku have runways 3000' in length, surfaced with fine sand and clay.

The Russians have two methools of dealing with their frequent winter snows, scraping and rolling. Scraping is less effectual than rolling. If the temperature is not very low fields must be scraped, otherwise rollers s.re used. Snow sticks to metal rollers and wooden rollers are used exclusively. The Soviet rollers used arc six feet wide and four feet in diameter and filled with sand. Fields packed by heavy rollers (4 tons) ere smooth, hard enough to support heavy bombers, and ecsily camouflaged.

(6) Railroads.

7a) General. In 1938, the U.S.S.R.- had 70,500

- 159

miles of railroads, as well as 26,200 miles of station, yard and siding trackage. Territorial losses in the war up to May, 1942 reduced this trackage by 35%. On the other hand, verified information has recorded about 1100 miles of new track, principally in Northern Russia. Virtually all the trackage is 5-foot gauge. The Caucasus and the Kola Peninsula have the great bulk of the electrified sections.

By 1941, possibly 23,000 locomotives were available for use (annual production, less than 1600); more than two-thirds of these, however, are obsolescent types. Furthermore, lack of ballast prevents use of the newer, heavier, more powerful FD and IS locomotives on over 60% of all trackage. About 700,000 freight and passenger cars are serviceable; 19,000 are tank cars. Automatic block signals protect barely 5^ of the track (principally near Moscow). The total railroad personnel is large, 1,500,000, but the shortage of skilled workers has been so acute that since 1940 large numbers of 14 to 17 year-old boys have been drafted as compulsory railroad apprentices.

The geographical distribution of railroads is very uneven; 61% of the mileage being west of the Volga. Examination of the system from the viewpoint of economics and strategy, however, lessens its apparent vulnerability and disbalance. Six functional divisions exist.

(1) The basic industrial and agricultural network enclosed by the great crescent of Baku-Rostov-Krivoi Rog-Kharkov-Mo scow-Leningrad-Vologda-Mo lo to v-Novosibirsk-Achinsk-Minus insk-Semipalatinsk-Chkalov-Astrakhan. Most of the war losses in this net were balanced by loss of the areas being served, such as the Kharkov-Stalino-Krivoi Rog industrial center. The most serious loss affecting unoccupied Russia was destruction of the bridge at Rostov which forced the diversion of vital oil traffic to the Stalingrad railroad, with its much lower capacity (8000 tons a day against 18,000 tons).

(2) The West Russian strategic and Black Sea grain export network: virtually all in German hands but little of it essential for Russian internal economy.

(3) The Transcaucasian economic end Turkish and Persian strategic network. The economic importance of this line will be greatly increased with the completion of the link to the Trans-Iranian, between Tabriz and Kazvin, not earlier than the winter of 1942.

(4) The Central Asiatic strategic network, which has assumed increasing economic importance with the agricultural and industrial development of that area.

(5) The Trans-Siberian line: purely strategic since its agricultural anofcommercial significance virtually vanished with Japanese seizure of Manchuria.

- 160

(6) The Vologda-Archangel-Murmansk lumber and fertilizer export, and emergency supply line: This has been strengthened by the new Obozerskoya-Kotlas link which completes a net of 14,000 tons daily capacity, or more.

Moscow is the principal railroad center. Its radiating lines, aided by two concentric belt railroads, have a capacity of over 200,000 tons daily.

In 1938, the Soviet railroads carried a total of 515 million tons of freight, for a total performance of 238 billion ton-miles; thus the average haul was 6.8 million tons per mile, or over four times as much as in the United States. Yet seasonal variation is marked: January to April have only 61% of their proportional share in the yearly turnover. The extreme load of these railroads is achieved through the use of large trains (1200 tons average gross weight; 730 tons net) and minimal spacing. The long distance practical capacity is 29 trains daily each way on double track main lines; 13-16 pairs, on single track main lines. But speeds are slow-12 m.p.h., loading is slow16 hours; and the turn-around is long-7 days for each freight car.

War has imposed a serious strain on Soviet railroads. Despite the great paucity of locomotives, many are lying idle through the lack of minor repairs for which men and materials are not available. All equipment is in very bad shape; thus 50% of all brake shoes are out of order; in freight trains only every other car has any brakes at all. Twenty-five miles per hour was the maximum speed in early pring ?42, At that time it took 7-g- days to travel from Kuibyshev to

Moscow. (b) Supply of the western front. During the course

of the war, Soviet railro'ads have had two essential tasks: the transportation of heavy freight for the maintenance of war industries in the zone of the interior, and the transportation of troops and supplies through the communications zone to army and corps railheads.

(1) Supply in the zone of the interior has simply magnified the peacetime job. Normally even, railroad traffic consisted of coal and coke, 25%; timber, 14% (largely for export and now eliminated); petroleum, 10% (halved with the loss of the Ukraine); grain, 8%; iron and steel, 7%; ores, 5%; all other goods and passengers, 31%.

(2) The supply of the railheads is shown by Map 11, which charts the p7obable network as of May, 1942. This map is basecfon actual Russian experience, with modifications for improvements and alterations of railways.

(a) The daily capacity (each way) of the lines from the principal supply""depots in the zone of communications to

- 161

3L.

the railheads is as follows:

Sector Daily tonnage

1. Northern 29 ,200 Mur man sk-R imsko ye 2,600 Pudozh-Kalinin 26,600

2. Central (Klin-Stalinogorsk) 51 ,000 3. Southern 46 ,700

Yelets-Chertkovo 20,300 Mi llerovo-Rostov 26,400

126,900 tons/day (b) The daily supply requirements of

various types of major Russian units are analyzed in Table XI. To summarize:

'Unit Daily supply

1. Infantry Division (Regular Strength)* 379 tons 2. Cavalry Division 165 tons 3. Tank Brigade 194 tons 4. Motorized Division 246 tons 5. Tank Division 327 tons

(c) In general, an allotment of 300 tons daily for the average division Ts adequate. On that basis, the various sectors of the front can maintain--without allowance for necessary troop movements—the following maximal numbers of divisions:

Sector Max. No. Divisions Maintained (No Allowance for Troop Movement).

1. Northern 85 Murmansk-Rimskoye 8** Pudozh-Kalinin 77***

2. Central (Klin-Stalinogorsk) 170 3. Southern 155

Ye 1e ts- Cher tko vo 67 Millerovo-Rostov 88

410 divisions

*The 10,000 man Reserve Division would require about 250 tons. **Use of the auxiliary Arctic ports and the spurs to the Finnish frontier

can increase this capacity by 2\%. ***Deductions have been made for the minimal support of the Leningrad

factory workers.

f ^

- 162

(d) Troop movements require extremely large tonnages. The rail shipping weights and spaces of the initial equipment of various types of large Russian units are studied in detail in Table XII. Briefly.

Unit Wt. (Equivalent)* of Initial Equipment

Infantry Division (Reg. strength) 27,600 tons** Cavalry Division 14,100 tons** Tank Brigade 23,900 tons** Motorized Division 23,000 tons** Tank Division 40,200 tons**

(_e) Thus a figure of 25,000 tons for the movement of an average Soviet division is tenable. On that basis, the maximal troop movement per day—without allowance for the maintenance of other troops—is as follows for each sector of the front:

Sector Maximal Troop Movement per Day (No. of Divisions)

1. Northern 1.0 Murmansk-Rimskoye 0.1 Pudozh-Kalinin 0.9

2. Central (Klin - Stalinogorsk) 2.0 3. Southern 1.9

Yelets - Chertkovo 0.9 Millerovo - Rostov 1.0

4.9 divisions per day. (f) Increase of troop mobility by rail

depends on the type of organization and the capacity of the line. For Russian organizations and railroads, rail capacities of more than 10,000 tons daily give infantry and cavalry mobility equal to that of tank and motorized units. It is in conjunction with such rail facilities, therefore, that infantry and cavalry operate best against mechanization. The factors are summarized below.

*Space-weight equation for men and horses at 40 men or 8 horses per car of 29.3 sq. m. floor space.

**In all figures, 5 days' initial supplies are included.

a r •: 'I i;U 'dr*.".^Jr~fit'''-1' '•

- 163

flnit Day of march Daily movement by railroad of (miles) capacities listed below in tons;*

2500 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 1 . Infantry Div.

(regular strength)20 22 45** 90 135 180 225 2 . Cavalry Div. 40 44 W ITS "2~BU "25ft •2*5*0* 3 . Tank Brigade 100 25 36" TUo" TSo" "2150" 250 4 . Motorized Div. 125 25 50 100 150* "200 "250 5 . Tank Div. 100 15 31 62 93 T"?4

(jO The general significance of these factors in terms of Soviet miliTary operations seems to be the following:

The present concentration of approximately 270 divisions in the combat zone absorbs two-thirds of the absolute capacity of the front, even without allowance for the present critical state of railroad equipment. Major increases in personnel or materiel say, over 300 full divisions - could be achieved only by virtual immobilization of units in their sectors of the combat zone. Consequently, full simultaneous use of Russia's large edge in manpower cannot be achieved. Transportation difficulties impose a localized, static defensive organization in great depth on the USSR, depriving it of the possibility of more than localized offensive operations.

Troop concentrations or shifts by rail at a significant rate arc possible only on the front from Tikhvin to Tula with its center at Moscow, and in the Rostov sector. These, therefore, must be the foci of all major Russian attacks or counter attacks.

The relative mobility of infantry and cavalry in the Moscow and Rostov sectors makes probable their maximal concentration there. On the other hand, the practical limitations of infantry movement to 40 miles per day. on the southwestern front from Yelets to Chertkovo impose the necessity of a high motorized and mechanized concentration in that sector.

The distribution of improved roads on the front, supplying only the sector from Novgorod to Orel and centered at Moscow, intensifies the peculiarities of the rail network. The strength of the Moscow sector and the weakness of the Yelets - Chertkovo sector are fundamental.

•Assuming a daily run of 250 miles including loading and unloading. ••Underscored figures denote a significant increase over the day of march

of the unit with its organic transport. Thus, a railroad of 5,000 tons capacity can move 2 battalions 250 miles per day, or a whole division in 5 days. This is over twice as fast as a division could march.

rrt

Table XI. Daily Supply Requirements (Maintenance only) of large Soviet units.

a. Regular Infantry Division. ~ 1. Food: 4 lbs. x 17,750 = 70,000 lbs.

2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 17,750 = 8,750 lbs. 3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 17,750 = 4,800 lbs. 4. Ordnance materiel (less

ammunition): 0.3 lbs. x 17,750 = 5,300 lbs. 5. Ammunition = 143,300 lbs. (Day of Supply). 6. Horse fodder: 8 lbs. x 6,000 = 48,000 lbs. 7. Gas and oil: 880 tanks and vehicles x 13 gallons =

11,440 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) = 39 tons (1.4 tank cars) 8. Fuel - negligible. 9.- Construction materials: 200 tons. 10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 758,400, or 379 tons.

b. Motorized_Infantry Division. """ " 1. Food? 4 lbs. x 7,360 = 29,440.

2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 7,360 - 3,680. 3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 7,360 = 1,990. 4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x

7,360 = 4,400. 5. Ammunition = 57,300 lbs. (Day of Supply). 6. Horse fodder: none. 7. Gas and oil: 1574 tanks and vehicles x 18 gallons =

(per 6.84 lbs.) = 97 tons (3.5 tank cars). 8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 1330 lbs. 9. Construction materials: 100 tons. 10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 491,740, or 246 tons.

c. Tank Brigade. ~" 1. Food: 4 lbs. x 3500 = 14,000 lbs.

2. Clothing: 0.5 lbs. x 3500 = 1,750 lbs. 3. Medical: .27 lbs. x 3500 = 945 lbs. 4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x

3500 = 2100 lbs. 5. Ammunition: 50,000 lbs. (Day of Supply). 6. Horse fodder: none. 7o Gas and oil: 33 medium heavy tanks, plus 1450 tanks

and vehicles x 20 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) - 99 tons (3,7 tank cars).

8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 630 lbs. 9. Construction materials: 60 tons. 10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 388,000, or 194 tons.

- 165

Table XI. (Contdo) £. Tank Division.

1. Food: 4 lbs. x 7000 = 28,000 lbs. 2. Clothing: 0.5 x 7000 = 3,500 lbs. 3. Medical: .27 x 7000 = 1,890 lbs. 4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.6 lbs. x

7000 = 4200 lbs. 5. Ammunition: 100,000 lbs. (Day of Supply). 6. Horse fodder: none. 7. Gas and oil: 66 medium heavy tanks plus 2500 tanks

and vehicles x 20 gallons (per 6.84 lbs.) = 158 tons or 6 tank cars.

8. Fuel: 35 lbs. per 200 men = 1,225 lbs. 9. Construction materials: 100 tons. 10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 654,800, or 327 tons.

je. Cavalry Division. 1. Food: 4 lbs. x 6600 = 26,400 lbs. 2. Clothing: .5 lbs. x 6600 = 3,300 lbs; 3. Medicine: .4 lbs. (includes veterinary) x 6600 =

2,640 lbs. 4. Ordnance materiel (less ammunition): 0.3 lbs. x

6600 = 1,980 lbs. 5. Ammunition: 71,600 lbs. (Day of Supply). 6. Horse fodder: 8 lbs. x 6640 = 53,120 lbs. 7. Gas and oil: 120 tanks and vehicles x 15 gallons (per

6.84 lbs.) = 6.1 tons or 0.8 small tank cars. 8. Fuel: negligible. 9. Construction materials: 80 tons. 10. Total supply in lbs. per day: 331,300, or 165 tons..

Table XII. Rail shipping weights and space, initial equipment, of large Soviet units.

a. Regular Infantry Division.

Item No. Wt./ltem Total Wt. Shipping No. of " (lbs.) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars.

1. Men, packs individual; rifles

2. Horses, packs

17750

6000

250

900

2217

2700

444

750

1194

or 21 trains.*

(14,700 ton-equivalents)

^Observed troop trains in the Kuibyshev uree, had 70 cars with 40 men each.

ll 1,/H - 166

Table XII. (Contd.)

Wt./ltem Total Wt. Shipping No. of ( lbs . ) (Tons). Wt. (Tons.) oars .

18,000 990 1485 12,200 3660 5490 19,500 438 657

2860 36 54 14,000 175 262 19,000 209 313 6,000 54 81 550 412 618

2,790 39 59 6,270 37 56 1,840 39 49

1,390 15 19 990 35 44

9187 Plus 20% for overhead: 1837 Plus 5 days' supplies: 1895

12,919 tons

Plus ton-equivalents: 14,700

27,619 Division.

Wt./ltem Total Tvt. Shipping No. of ( l b s . ) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars...

250 920 184 or 3 trains

(2100 ton-equivalents) 19,000 332 518 14,000 63 94 12,200 4600 7200

19,500 3900 5850 16,000 1600 2400 2860 185 277 2790 25 37

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

IX. 12. 13.

14. 15.

1.

Item No..

Tractors 110 Trucks, plain, 2-|T 600 Trucks,' special 45 3 axle Autos, (Fords) 25 Armored Cars (Fords)25 Tanks T26 22 Tanks T37 18 Wagons 1500 Howitzer, 122 mm. 28 Howitzer," 152 mm. 12 Guns, 76.2 mm 42 (AA & FA) Howitzer," 76.2 mm. 22 Guns, 37 or 45 im» 69 AT

b . Motorized ^Infantry

Item No.""

Men; packs, 7360 individual; rifles

Tanks T26 35 Armored Cars (Ford) 9 Trucks, plain, (800) 2JL.T Trucks, heavy (400) trucks, special (200) Autos (130) Howitzer, 122 mm. 18

- 167 -'

y" "J

Table XII. (Contd.)

Item No. Wt./ltem Total Wt (lbs.) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars.

9. Guns, 76 .2 mm. 22 1840 20 25 10. Howitzer , 76.2 mm. 18 1390 25 31 11. Guns, 45 mm. AT 21 990 11 15

16,447 Plus 20$ for overhead: 3,289

19,736 Plus 5 days' supplies 1,230

20,966 tons Plus ton-equivalents: 2,100

23,066 tons c. Tank Brigade.

Item , No Wt./ltem Total Wt, , Shipping No. of (lbs.) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars.

1. Men; packs, 3500 250 438 88 individual; or 1-g- trains rifles (1050 ton-equivalents)

2. Tanks, T35 33 78,000 1287 1930 3. Tanks, BT 100 24,000 1200 1800 4. Tanks, T26 50 19,000 475 712 5. Trucks, plain, 2-|T(600) 12,200 3660 5490 6. Trucks, heavy (300) 19,500 2975 4462 7. Trucks, special (300) 16,000 2400 3600 8. Autos (100) 2,860 146 219 9. Guns, 76.2 mm. (12) 1,840 11 15 10. Guns, 45 mm. AT (6) 990 3 4


21,888 Plus 5 days' supplies: 970

22,858 tons Plus ton-equivalents: 1,050

23,908 tons

- 168 y

,

Table XII (Contd.) jd. .Tank Division.

Item No. Wt./ltem Total Wt. Shipping No. of ( lbs . ) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars .

1. Men, packs, 7000 250 438 175 individual; or 3 trains rifles (2100 ton-equivalents)

2. Tanks, T35 66 78,000 2574 3860 3. Tanks, BT 200 24,000 2400 3600 4. Tanks, T26 100 19,000 950 5. Trucks, plain (1000) 12,200 6100 9150

6. Trucks, heavy (500) 19,500 4875 7312 7. Trucks, special (500) 16,000 4000 6000 8. Autos (200) 2,860 286 429 9. Guns, 76.2 mm. (24) 1,840 22 30 10. Guns, 45 mm. AT (12) 990 6 8


36,463 Plus 5 days' supplies; 1,655

38,098 tons Plus ton-equivalent; 2,100

40,198 tons e. Cavalry Division.

Item No. Fb./ltem Total Wt. Shipping No. of (lbs.) (Tons) Wt. (Tons) cars.

Men; packs, 6600 250 825 160 individual; rifles Horses, packs 6640 900 2988 830

990 or 17 trains

(11,900 ton-equivalents)

Tanks, T37 16 6,000 48 72 Tanks, T26 32 19,000 304 456 Armored cars, Ford 1100 18,000 90 135

12 12,200 73 1106. Trucks, 2^1 7. Wagons 680 550 187 281

mim ( l1 .! ' ' /. i ' In- T^

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Table XII. (Contd.) e. Cavalry Division. (Contd.)

Item 0 . Wt./ltem ( lbs . )

Total Wt. (Tons)

Shipping Wt. (Tons)

No. of cars .

8. Howitzer, 122 mm. 9. Guns, 76 mm. 10. Guns, 45 mm. AT 11. Guns, 37 mm.

12 24 10 64

2,790 1,840

990 737

17 22

5 24

25 28

6 30

1,143 Plus 20$ for overhead: 229

1,372 Plus 5 days1 supplies: 825

2,197 tons Plus ton-equivalents:11,900

14,097 tons. (7) Roads. The thinness of the Soviet rail net and the

damage caused by scorched-earth policies and the fighting of last fall have necessitated dependence upon truck and wagon transport in the combat zone. Although about 150,000 trucks (mostly 2^ ton) and over 400,000 wagons (mostly |r ton) are available, the paucity of decent roads renders front-line supply extremely difficult. As may be seen from Map 12, improved roads to the front exist only in the sectors between Novgorod and Orel, less than one-third of the line. On other sectors, supply is greatly dependent on the weather, and must usually be carried on by heavy duty trucks (extremely scarce) or slow tractors and wagons.

In the zone of communications, two important nets are found. A number of roads radiate as feeders or laterals for the front from Moscow, while others connect Moscow with Yaroslavl, Gorki and Ryazan in the rear. Another net exists in the Caucasus, one road leading from Maikop, to the coast at Tuapse thence along to the coast to Sukhumi, and then gradually inland to Tbilisi. Connecting with this road is the famous Georgian military highway to Ordzhonikidze in the north. Finally, a number of feeders run south to Yerevan and other strategic points in the south.

(8) Shipping Available for support of forces. Sea-borne transport and maintenance of troops are important in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland, less important in the Barents Sea.

(a) Black, Sea. In 1939, the Soviet Union had about 150 ships, totaling 420,0*0*0 gross tons in the Black Sea. A considerable proportion of these—probably 25$—are tankers; many vessels are of less than 2000 tons displacement. Accurate data on shipping losses are not

- 170

available. In view of the rapid German seizure of the ports of Nikolayev and Kherson, and the severe continuous landing, maintenance, and evacuation operations at Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch and other ports, total losses of 4:0% are a conservative estimate. Thus it is improbable that over 180,000 tons of shipping (other than tankers) arc available for troop support.

Before the recent German conquest of Kerch, two isolated garrisons had to be maintained in the Crimea. Included in the garrison at Sevastopol is c civil population of about 70,000 persons (reduced from 112,000). In view of the stringency of shipping and the normal supply requirements particularly for air, anti-aircraft and coast artillery units, it is improbable that more than 8 divisions could have been supplied on the whole peninsula. Of these, probably half have been lost at Kerch. Limited reinforcement of Sevastopol is thus possible.

(b) Gulf of Finland. In 1959, the Soviet Union had over 84 ships, totaling 208,000 gross tons, in the Baltic Sea. Extreme losses were suffered by this shipping particularly in the fall of Tallinn. It is unlikely that more than 20%, or 45,000 tons are operational at present.

Russian supply requirements in the Baltic are now limited to three small but important groups of islands in the Gulf of Finland: Kronstadt, Seiskari and Lavonsaari. The maximum total garrison that con be maintained in these islands is not over 3 divisions. Landing operations are virtually barred by lack of shipping.

(c) Barents Sea. In the Barents Sea, the Soviet Union has available to it not only its own craft but those of other United Nations. The main operational problem is the maintenance of the isolated garrison on Fisherman's Peninsula. Some landing operations have been attempted near Pets-jono and Kirkenes. On the whole, however, this sector has been very inactive in relation to its strategic importance and logistical opportunities for aggressive landing operations.

(9) Commercial trucking available. The amount of commercial trucking now available is almost negligibTe. (See Roads). The relatively very small quantity of trucks which operated on the extremely few good roads in peacetime have long since been impressed into military service, and a good part of those must be considered as lost.

(10) Air transports available* It may be assumed that all types of commercial aircraft have been converted to purposes of attack or defense. Neither passenger nor freight airplane service had attained important proportions before the war, except in the remote region of Northeastern Russia and Northern Siberia, which could be ruached by

no other moans. Planes for the transportation of wounded and medical personnel can be spared only in extraordinary cases. Not a single report

-171. ii'^ijj iu%%p}'-^-

has been received regarding any large-scale transportation of troops or military supplies by air-

It was planned to haul 33,000,000 ton-kilometers, including 7,700,000 of air mail, ana 250,000 passengers in 1939. The state of Soviet commercial aviation is well illustrated by the fact that irregular lines, operating chiefly in the most remote and sparsely populated regions according to need, accounted for about three-fourths of the total air transportation in 1938, and only about one-fourth was performed by the most important regular air lines.

(11) Local supplies available. (IT) Zone of Combat* With respect to supplies avail

able locally, the zone of combat may be divided into the following sectors (1) Kola Peninsula. Only important sources of

food are the fisheries and the large reindeer herds (53,000 head in 1935), which may have beon considerably reduced in view of the length of military operations in this region

(2) Kandalaksha-Tikhvin. A vast expanse of forest, swamp and tundra aTfording practically no manufactured goods and little food except game and fish from the numerous large lakes. The Shlisselburg salient cuts it off from its only important source of manufactures , Leningrad.

(3) Tikhvin-Orel. Devoted mainly to the growing of flax and hemp. ""The rye crop increases in size from north to south. Relatively small amounts of potatoes and wheat are raised on scattered dairy farms. Their limited live stock, insofar as not driven out of the zone, has doubtless been largely, if not entirely, consumed by the armed forces. Natural forage is more plentiful during the summer months (May-September) than in other sectors, owing to the smaller extent of the forests than in the north, and to the more abundant rainfall than farther south. Neither here nor in the other sectors of the combat zone can the farmers be presumed to have been able to plant much in the way of grain, vegetables or forage during the last fall and spring, especial!, since large parts of the present combat zone wore hold by the Germans until the late fall. With Moscow still on the rear edge of the combat zone, this sector is more favorably situated than others with respect to locally available manufactures.

(4) Orel-Rostov. Wheat, sugar boots and sunflower seed (for oil) are "all very important crops in this sector, but at best only a small part of the normal crops can be expected this year, since military operations may be expected to have prevented plantings in a large portion of the sector. Natural forage becomes less and less abundant from north to south. Crop-raising is linked to a large extent with dairying and live-stock raising, but it is not likely that much of {he live stock still remains.

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Normally, nearly all the spring wheat is sown by May 1. In 1935, 9% of the grain crop throughout the Soviet Union had been harvested by July 10, 58% by August 10, and nearly 100^ by September 25.

Important Food Crops Raised by Qblasts Located in the Combat Zone

(Figures for 1935 in round numbers)

Oblast (largest subdivision of a constituent republic).

Wheat Rye Sugar Beets Name Percentage

of oblast not 1935 % from 1935 % from un- 1935 % from unoccupied by crop unoccu- crop occupied crop occupied Germans in May, pied part. part. 1942. part.

1bons tons tons tons tons tons of MNMW

Leningrad ,'° 70 100 0 18,000 13,000 ___ ___

Kalinin 70 144,,000 100,000 395,000 276,000 Moscow 100 415,,000 415,000 1,016 ,000 1,015,000 124,000 724,oor Kursk 50 536,,000 268,000 1,089 ,000 544,000 2,216,000 1,108,0 Kharkov 30 1,287,,000 386,000 842,000 253,000 3,264,000 979,00L Donets (now 50 697,,000 348,000 300,000 15,000 16,000 8,000 Stalino and Voroshilovgrad).

Totals 3,079,100 1,517,000 3,660,000 2,116,000 5,620,000 2,819,00C

(b) Zone of Communications. The central and southern parts of the zone of communications and the adjoining section of the zone of the interior are among the most productive regions in the unoccupied portion of the Soviet Union, both agriculturally and industrially. The amount and variety of supplies available to the fighting forces is greater than it would be in most other localities of the Soviet Union. Even in this area, practically nothing is now available in anything like adequate quantities, but whatever is available is likely to be nearer at hand and consequently to require less hauling than would be the case with military operations almost anywhere else in ythe .country advantage however,^he,.country.. ThiThiss .advantage,,

*"*- \ , \ •

- 173

is more or less offset by the fact that the military and civil population is much denser than it is in almost all regions which afford a more limited amount and variety of supplies. For figures on agricultural production in this aone see under "Production Capacities".

(12) Replacement of personnel. (a) Military Forces.

{!) Numbers, ""in June, 1941, the military forces of the U.S.S.R. totaled the following:

Active Forces Red Army 4,060,000 Air Force 150,000 N.K.V.D. 200,000 Red Navy 75,000

4,485,000

In addition, the first line reserves (with conscript training) of the first (up to 35 years) and second classes (up to 45 years), as well as reserve N.K.V.D. units, were immediately mobilized!

Reserve Forces 1st Line Reserves — — — — — — — —

(trained) 1st Class (18-35) 3,900,000 2nd Class (36-45) 2,600,000

N.K.V.D. Reserves 485,000

6,985,000 Plus regular forces 4,485,000

11,470,000

Losses in combat up to May 1942, reduced this force by 4,500,000, or to approximately 7,000,000. Thus a need for massive replacement arose. The forces available for this purpose in January, 1941, were the following:

1st Line Reserves (trained) 3rd Class (46-50) 1,300,000

2nd Line Reserves (partially trained or untrained)

1st Class (18-35) 5,200,000 2nd Class (36-45) 2,600,000 3rd Class (46-50) 1,300,000

10,400,000

i ij. rJ(.•;;• wt,..

' " • • f c - 174

This number was reduced by population loss (30-35%), physical disabilities, and the maintenance of a minimal number of workers in essential industry, to about 5,000,000. In all, 12,000,000 men are under arms or in training at the present time; major increases will probably be impossible.

At the same time, however, women have been used in military service, especially as doctors and nurses, radio operators, telegraph operators, chauffeurs, and members of anti-aircraft units. Inasmuch as these combat duties are open only to females between the ages of 14 and 25, and on a voluntary basis, it is improbable that such auxiliary forces number over 500,000.

(2) Training and mobilization procedures. On ' October 1, 1941, a law was proclaimed for the training of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 16 and 50. The law provides for the training of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 16 and 50. The training course requires one hundred and ten (110) hours and not more than five months. Approximately six hours of training or study are completed each week and the law requires that the classes meet at least twice a week. In order not to interfere with war production, all universal military training must be carried on outside working hours.

The training methods and subjects taught are taken directly from the Osoaviakhim.* Under the new law, however, the specialists trained appear to include only riflemen, machine gunners, trench mortarists, snipers, ski troops and tank destroyers.

The subjects covered by all trainees include tactics, marksmanship, drill, physical training, engineering (pioneering) chemical warfare, sanitation and Red Army regulations. If a unit or group is being trained in one of the other specialties time for this specialist training is taken from the other1 subjects.

The machine gunner, in addition to the basic subjects, is taught the nomenclature and operation of the machine gun. He is taught the duties of a machine gunner and the tactical use of machine guns against personnel, light tanks and armored cars.

The trench mortarists receive special instruction in their weapon, similar to that of machine gunners. Snipers are given special instructions in the use of optical instruments and camouflage. Tank destroyers are given practice in throwing grenades and bottles of inflammable liquid from various positions.

*See pp. 20, 106-109.

'1 [ •*[''.•,]• ! v l ! ' l

- 175

Most of the equipment for training is obtained from the Osoaviakhim.

All trade unions, societies and sports olubs are required to lend whatever aid is necessary in the way of equipment and instruction. Ski equipment and ski instruction are included when available.

The instruction is given on Osoaviakhim premises, sports fields, squares, skiing stations, physical culture and sports clubs, institutes and schools.

The organization of the units is exactly the same as in the Red Army, i.e., squads, companies, battalions, etc., depending on the number of men available. Units are organized on a production or what might be called an occupational basis. For instance, the men in a kolkhoz will be organized into a rifle company, or if the number of eligible males in one kolkhoz is not sufficient, two adjacent kolkhozs will furnish the men. Similarly, workers in a large factory would be organized as a battalion or larger unit. Territorial organization is very seldom used.

Instructors for the pre-military training groups are selected from among army and political reservists and from among older men who have seen active servioe. Instructors also receive short refresher courses before beginning the course. The final selection and designation of instructors is made and approved by the Regional Military Councils and the Regional or District Military Commissars.

So far in the war, the pre-military training is reported by the Soviets as being immensely valuable. In many cases, before being inducted into the army, pre-military training units have fought as separate organizations in the front lines, particularly in defending cities. The Soviets appear to be satisfied with the system and its results. The peace-time method, based on the geographical principle, is less advantageous than that based on the occupational principle, duo to the fact that the latter more readily solved the problem of control, training and use of equipment.

The first five months period has just been completed. Although it is not definitely known, it is believed that men not yet conscripted will continue this training until such time as they are called into actual service.

- 176

It is uncertain to what extent newly-trained groups of men are used as filler or unit replacements. However, in many cases, new tank brigades and infantry divisions have been organized, although existing units were at 50$ strength. On the other hand, several mauled organizations, e.g. the Ninth Army, have been reconstituted. Men are called into service by age classes, at least to some extent. On May 15, 1942, the 18-year-olds registered for military duty.

(b) Industrial and Agricultural Mobilization, Private enterprise as known in'the West does not exist in the Soviet Union. All industry and agriculture are owned and operated by the government in both war and peace, therefore conscription of industry is unnecessary. The yearly turnover of one-third to one-half of the factory workers was finally stopped in 1940 by the most drastic and severe labor laws believed to be in existence today. The new laws prescribed trial and imprisonment for persons who voluntarily change jobs or are late to work. The eight-hour day and seven-day week replaced the six-hour day and six-day week. Youths from 14 to 17 were conscripted as apprentices in industries and on the railroads for 4 years. In February 1942, man and woman power for war industries was mobilized, and the agricultural labor laws passed in April 1942 completed the all-inclusive mobilization of labor in the Soviet Union. All able-bodied men and women of urban and rural communities not employed in industrial and transport enterprises were mobilized for work on collective and state farms and tractor stations. The only exceptions are for persons working elsewhere, women with young children, and persons physically unfit. School children, and old people (from 12 to 55) are being utilized wherever possible. Forced labor is the penalty for refusal to comply with these laws. The necessity for such drastic measures is evident from the following figures.

The total U.S.S.R. labor pool, as of January 1941, between the ages of 15 and 59 was 110,600,000. Geographic losses reduced this figure about 30$, to 77,400,000. Out of this number 48$ or 37,152,000 are males, of whom 80$ or 29,721,600 are employable, and 52$ or 40,248,000 are females of whom 3 7 ^ or 15,093,000 are employable. Out of the 44,814,600 employables in the labor pool, 16,500,000 have been mobilized and 4,500,000 of these have been killed, or wounded, or are prisoners of war. The total labor available at present is about 21$ or 28,314,600 of the total population. Of these 40$ or 11,600,000 are industrial workers, and 60$ or 17,600,000 are agricultural. There are possibly 10,000,000 auxiliary workers including children, pregnant women, and the "halt, lame and blind." This total, when compared to the maximal labor pool of 55 million in the United States, clearly records the severe labor shortage of the U.S.S.R.

- 177

(13) Evacuation Facilities. The evacuation of personnel and machinery from threatened or occupied areas has been an important factor in the resistance of the U.S.S.R.

In contrast to the refugee movements in France, Russian evacuation was, for the most part, a planned and orderly process. Men of military age were marched to the rear. Administrators, and technical and scientific personnel were the first civilians to be moved. Machinery was unbolted, maintained in operation until the last moment, and then sent off on flat cars. The workmen operating these machines rode in boxcars on the very same trains. Only in a few instances— Leningrad, Odessa, Kharkov, etc.--was the ordinary civilian population evacuated. In most cases, movement was forbidden, to keep the railroads and roads clear for military traffic.

The effectiveness of this program differed in variou; sectors of the front. It was greatest in the Donets Basin, the Leningrad area and at Odessa. It was negligible in the Baltic States and the western Ukraine, notably at Kiev. In all, not over 5,000,000 people were evacuated from the occupied area, with an equal number leaving the present combat zone. Possibly one-third of the machinery for light and mediun industries in the occupied areas was evacuated. Of this, not over half has been rehabilitated r.nd put in operation in factories in the east. As a whole, planned evacuation has yielded an increment of about 10^ to the military - industrial potential of unoccupied Russia.

(14) Communi cations. The entire telegraph and telephone system is under military control. Its lines arc built with strategic orientation, and it is subject to immediate mobilization. In 1940, there were one million miles of interurban telegraph and telephone lines, with 25,000 telegraph offices. Eight million messages were sent. The lines parallel all the railroads, and also run from Krasnoyarsk to Dudinka, and from Irkutsk to Okhotsk. Before German occupation foreign lines ran from Leningrad to Libau, Latvia and other European points; from Alma Ata to Hand to Shanghai; from Ulan Udo to Peiping; and from Vladivostok to Nagasaki.

The radio network is built up on a strategic division of the U.S.S.R. and is almost entirely for official use. Moscow has one 500 kw. and eight 100 lew. stations, and Leningrad, one 100 lew. station. Stations of more than 1 kw. capacity are located at all important railroad points, within 200-250 miles of each other; intervening at regular distances are stations of 0.1 - 0.9 kw. capacity. The smallest stations serve isolated hinterlands.

- 178

In 1938, there were 85 main broadcasting stations, largely with propaganda programs. Weather information is broadcast irregularly, in secret code.

(15) Vulnerable Objectives4 (See Map 12). In order to determine the vulnerability of the different industrial areas in Russia the first consideration is the range of the enemy's heavy: bombardment units. The following table can b© used to determine the range of German bombers under normal load and flying conditions.

Model Radius of action

Focke-Wulf 200 (4 engine) 1030 miles Heinkel 117 (4 engine) 1080 miles Ju. 89 (4 engine) 800 miles Do. 217 (4 engine) 400 miles Ju. 88 (2 engine) 220-800 mi.

Considering the Russo-German front as a base, Axis bombers could operate approximately one thousand miles eastward into Russian territory. This, of course, would make the Moscow area even vulnerable to the attack of short-range bombers plus the fact that large bombers could attack this region with a heavier-than-normal bomb load.

If Germany is able to advance southeast from the Crimea towards the Caucasus, she will rapidly bring the oil region around Baku well within bombing range. Bombers could fly to Baku and back from1

the Kerch Peninsula but the distance (1100 mi.) is quite far and bomb loads would have to be curtailed. Astrakhan, the important port on the Caspian Sea, has been bombed by German aircraft. Batum, an important port on the Black Sea, is within range of enemy bombers.

On the broad front from Rostov to Leningrad the western sector of the Russian belt of communications, as shown on Map 11, is vulnerable to German light, medium and heavy bombardment. Leningrad continues to resist German air attacks, although the majority of demolition is caused by heavy artillery.

The Murmansk railroad, for its entire length, is vulnerable to air-raids from Axis aircraft based in Finland. It has been attacked several times. The port of Murmansk has been recently attacked by bombers.

Archangel has not been reported bombed to date, but

it is certainly an enemy capability and probably an imminent one now that

this port is ice-free.

- 179

The Ural Mountain region is beyond present Axis range and the industrial plants there are widely dispersed.

Table XIII List of Vulnerable Objectives, Western Front, USSR.

1. Zone of Combat.

Leningrad -- Port facilities; railroad communications; ships; special steel; electrical and transport machinery; rubber goods; boots and shoes; chemicals; textiles, ammunition and materiel.

2. Zone of Communications.

a. Northern Region. Murmansk—Port facilities; railroad connections. Archangel—Port facilities; Dvina River shipping; railroad

connections; lumber yards (?). Vologda—Rail connections; synthetic rubber factory.

b. Central Industrial Region. (Electric power stations not .' listed but power facilities

may be assumed for all cities.]. Yaroslavl--Refineries; synthetic rubber; automobile works

and trucks; tank factory. Ivanovo—Textile machinery, textiles. Moscow—Special steel and pipe steel mills; ball bearings; and and Moscow defense area precision instruments; Moscow railroad equipment; electro-technical products; defense Stalin automobile plant; refineries (including gas area. boosting by tetra-ethyl lead); chemicals; munition,

(a portion of these plants, particularly munitions, have probably been evacuated); power stations; railroad network leading to Moscow; Moscow Defense Area: Podolsk, sewing machines; Mytishchi, railroad and street car building; Lyubertsy, agricultural machinery; Kolomna, locomotives; Podolsk, ammunition factories (probably evacuated).

Noginsk--Textiles. Stalinogorsk—Chemicals (including poison gas).

Chemicals (at Bobriki). Gorki—Pipe steel mill; machine tools; Diesel engines;

radio apparatus; Molotov automobile plant, shipbuilding; chemicals, paper, arms, tank, and airplane factories; two refineries (at Sormovo).

j.;fcj?;\ |- ••

- 180

Table XIII. (Contd.)

Vladimir—Powder and chemical warfare factories—possiblyevacuated.

Kovrov—Arms factories. Penza—Airplanes. Volga District. Saratov—Ball bearings, refineries (including a poly

merization plant producing 85 octane gas), part of airplane factory shipped from Moscow, flour mill.

Stalingrad—Special steel, tractors, heavy trucks, ch.enfi.cals, tanks.

Ulyanovsk—Ammunition. North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Maikop—Oil wells. Grozny—Oil wells; 15 refineries (fields reported in

bad condition). Baku—Oil wells; 14 pipeline refineries (reportedly in

very bad condition in 1940, with the danger of widespread fires if the fields are bombed.)* port facilities; helium; power plants; iodine and bromide,

Batumi--Refinery, port facilities. Tuapse--Refinery, pipeline terminus. Krasnodar--2 refineries; pipeline terminus. Makhach Kala—Refinery; pipeline terminus. Armavir—Pipeline from Maikop. Novorossisk—Port facilities. Tuapse- " " ; pipeline terminus. Sukhumi— " " ; hydroelectric power. Poti— " " Astrakhan—Port facilities; river shipping; canneries;

fishing fleet. Ordzhonikidzhe--Lead smelter; electrolytic zinc plant. Yereven—Synthetic rubber; electric power. Sumgait—Synthetic rubber. (Northwest of Baku). Tbilisi—Machine tools; hydroelectric power. Kirovakan—Chemicals. Leninakan--Textiles; electric power; railroad connections

with Turkey. Chiatura—Manganese mine and concentrating plant; Rion

River hydroelectric plant (vicinity).

3. Zone of the Interior.

Kazan—Synthetic rubber; electric power; chemicals; powder; river shipping.

Kuibyshev—Munitions; river shipping; electric power; chemicals (Chapayevsk); refineries (Syzran and Bashkirskol).

Stalingrad—Tractors; trucks; tanks; chemicals.

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B. SURVEY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AEEA.

1. HYDROGRAPHY.*

a. General. The principal rivers of European Russia lie mainly athwart the path of an invader from the west. But they present a formidable military obstacle only during the few weeks of the spring floods, and the spring and fall ice passages. The fall ice passage is due to the circumstance that in the larger rivers the ice usually forms and breaks up several times before becoming consolidated. At other times, large parts of the rivers are so sluggish and shallow that their width is of relatively little strategic importance. The swamps and lakes in which the northern half of European Russia abounds are considerably more serious impediments. The southern half, more attractive in every respect for an invader, becomes increasingly dry from north to south.

A large part of the West Siberian Lowland is a malaria-infested swamp area of such vast dimensions as to appear practically impenetrable for a large army, regardless of equipment. The Trans-Siberian Railroad zone, though keeping south of the worst part of the swamp area, passes amid thousands of fresh or salt-water lakes, and even here the swamps hinder traffic in many places and make it difficult to obtain good water. East-west motor travel on a large scale is practicable only along the highway running parallel to the railroad. The solid grain-growing section of Vest Siberia lies almost entirely south of the railroad, in the salt-lake steppe zone extending from the southern Urals to the Altai Mountains. This is the only part suited for military operations. North of the railroad, great expanses of forest alternate with equally great expanses of swamp or tundra. Throughout the West Siberian Lowland, the spring floods necessarily inundate proportionately much greater areas than the rivers of European Russia owing to the extreme lowness of the country, and, for the same reason, a much larger part of the waters is unable to drain off after the recession of the floods.

The hydrography of Soviet Central Asia as a whole presents a forbidding aspect to an invader at nearly all seasons of the year. In the summer, large parts of the lowland are practically waterless. The late winter rains fill the depressions between the sand ridges, thus covering immense areas with a gigantic network of small lakes. The most practicable approach to the interior is along the Kuibyshev--Chkalov (South Urals)--Aralsk-Tashkent railroad, which, beyond the north tip of the Aral Sea, follows the Syr-Darya River valley, largely planted to rice.

* See Map 13.

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The Turkistan-Siberian ("Turksib") Railroad from Novosibirsk via Barnaul, Semipalatinsk, and Alma-Ata to Tashkent traverses a 175-mile stretch of desert (the Sary-Ishik-Otrau Sands) east of Lake Balkhash, but nearly everywhere else it skirts or crosses fairly high foothills.

All the larger rivers of European Russia and West Siberia are navigable to various degrees, but their generally north-south direction renders nearly all of them useless to both sides for transportation to a north-south front, though either side could make very considerable use of them for parallel communication behind the lines. The Amu-Darya is navigable from the Afghan Border to the Aral Sea. Otherwise, the rivers of Soviet Central Asia are negligible as waterways. For three to seven months of the year, the solidly frozen rivers of North and Central European Russia and of Siberia (not including Central Asia) constitute a network of motor highways far superior to most of the man-made roads.

b. European Russia. In European Russia there are two major watersheds. The one lies roughly along the parallel of Leningrad (6cP N) and forms a tenuous line of demarcation between the rivers of north Russia and those of central and south Russia:

(1) the Northern Dvina and Pechora Rivers, flowing into the Arctic Ocean; and

(2) (a) the Dnepr and Don Rivers, which empty into the Black Sea, and

(b) the Volga and Ural Rivers, which empty into the Caspian Sea.

The other watershed, formed by the Volga Hills, occupying the area between the kk° meridian (Gorki--Stalingrad line) and the Volga River, separates the Black Sea and Caspian Sea drainage basins.

The Central Russian Hills, extending from the vicinity of Leningrad to the Sea of Azov, form a secondary watershed between the Dnepr and the Don. Their northern part, known as the Valdai Hills and the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, separates the Volga system from the Western Dvina and other comparatively short streams which drain into the Baltic Sea.

The headwaters of the Volga, the Dnepr, the Don, the Western Dvina and the Northern Dvina all lie within a radius of 200 miles from Moscow, which largely owes its origin and importance to this fact.

The Western Dvina, Northern Dvina and Pechora basins are dotted with countless lakes and swamps, few of which can be shown on any but very small-scale maps. In the northern parts of the Dnepr,

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Don and Volga basins there is also a considerable number of lakes and swamps.

The Northern Dvina and Pechora basins are subject to yearly spring and summer floods of normally devastating proportions. Extensive floods are also common in the other basins, but they are usually much less destructive. The spring thaw for a few weeks causes high water and dangerously swift current in otherwise sluggish streams like the Don and the Volga, Ice blocks traveling at high velocity render the rivers impassable for weeks after the ice breaks up.

The Volga is 2,590 miles long and is navigable to within 65 miles of its source, in the Valdai Hills near Kalinin, only 750 feet above sea level. At a distance of 1,500 miles from its mouth, the Volga is only 190 feet above sea level and 280 feet above the surface of the Caspian Sea. The average fall of the Volga is only 1:600,000, or one-tenth of an inch per mile, as compared with 1:17,000, or 3,7 inches per mile for the Amu-Darya River of Soviet Central Asia. At the latitude of Stalingrad (49° N), where the Volga-Don canal has been projected, the two rivers are only 48 miles apart. The Volga starts to thaw around March 18 at Astrakhan, April 5 at Stalingrad, and April 9 at Kalinin on its upper course, but only around April 14 at Gorki in its middle course. The freeze, however, commences at the head and proceeds gradually downstream. The average navigation period is 205 days at Kalinin, 195 at Gorki, 196 at Kuibyshev (formerly Samara), 210 at Stalingrad and 260 at Astrakhan, The ice passage, during which navigation is practically impossible, lasts 3-8 days at Kalinin, 4-18 days at Gorki, 6-30 at Saratov, 3-17 at Stalingrad and 2-5 at Astrakhan. In the lower Volga, constantly shifting sand bars and alluvial islands make it necessary to rechart the fairway each year after the spring floods. The spring rains raise the level of the rivur at many points as much as 40 or 50 feet. They are followed by a period of dry weather, during which the shallowness of the Volga and most of its tributaries, except the Kama (main eastern tributary from the Urals), causes extraordinary difficulties to navigation.

The Kama River rises at an altitude of 910 feet, about 100 miles west of Molotov (Perm), in a marshy area of the Ural foothills, and describes a loop about 170 miles long, reaching northward between 52° and 54° E and southward between 56° and 57° E along the western side of the Ural Mountains to Molotov. Thence it pursues a winding course south-southwostward to 56° N (mouthof the Belaya River) and then in a west-southwesterly direction to the Volga, which it joins about 50 miles south of Kazan. It is 1,170 miles long, and is navigable throughout up to the mouth of the Vishera, 185 miles above Molotov, beyond which it is used only for log floating. The Kama is considered the most navigable river in European Russia. The width of the channel and the depth of the fairway are almost everywhere sufficient for free

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navigation, and the shallows and bars appearing at mean water level are far from "being so obstructive as those of the Volga. The mean fall of the Kama is nearly k inches between the mouths of the Vishera and Chusovaya (at Molotov), 3.6 inches between the mouths of the Vishera and the Belaya (at the big southeastern bend) and nearly 3.5 inches between the latter and the Volga. The Vishera, Chusovaya and Belaya, with a dense network of short tributaries, drain the west slope of the Ural Mountains. Along the whole section from the Vishera to the Chusovaya, a distance of iQk miles, the right (weBt) bank of the Kama is flat and the left is high, witji cliffs of hard limestone. Above Berezniki (midway point), the mean channel is 700 to 1, 00 feet wide; below that point, it widens suddenly and in places reaches 2,800 feet or more, but the width of the fairway in some places, especially where the channel is divided by islands, is inconsiderable and causes many difficulties to navigation. The section from the Chusovaya to the Belaya, a distance of 33^ miles, is flanked on both sides by a chain of sandy hills, the left bank remaining, in general, higher than the right (west). The width of the channel varies from 1,125 to 3>5OO feet, while the whole river bed may reach a breadth of 2 miles or more, especially where there are numerous islands. The minimum depth, even over the sand bars, is 6 to 7 feet. In the section from the Belaya to the Volga, a distance of 237 miles, the right (north) bank is the higher, but the hills, which reach a maximum elevation of 200 feet, recede some distance from the channel in places. Most of the left (south) bank is low, quite flat and at many places marshy. The channel in stretches free from islands is 1,1(00 to 3>5OO feet wide, and in places as much as 3 miles. The depth in the straight and free stretches reaches 60 feet or more and the fairway is wide. Before the Revolution, the steamers of the Kama basin comprised about one-fourth of the entire Volga fleet, 75$ being tugs. The navigation season lasts from 170 days at Berezniki to 192 days near the mouth. In some years the Kama freezes after the first break-up, and a second ice passage and flood period follow. Where the banks are low, wide areas are flooded and the rise of the water level is small. In the lower section, where the south bank is flat, the floods extend 7 or 10 miles, and at the mouth 13 miles or more. The high-water level is generally in the second half of May and lasts for two or three days; thereafter the water falls until the middle of June, when the Kama reaches its mean level.

In view of the fact that the Kama runs from tho industrialized section of the Ural Mountains toward the present theater of war and is crossed by two main railroad lines coming across the Urals from Siberia, this river acquires considerable strategic importance. In addition to the two points of direct railroad contact, namely at Molotov (Perm), where the lines from Nizhni Tagil and Sverdlovsk converge, and at Sarapul, about 300 miles farther downstream, where the main Trans-Siberian line crosses, the Kama has indirect contact with the line from

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Chelyabinsk, which crosses the navigable Belaya at Ufa. As on many other Russian rivers, much of the transportation is effected by means of towed rafts, built of lumber from the extensive forests in the vdcinity of the point of departure and used as fuel or construction material at or beyond their destination.

The Don River_ rises in Lake Ivan-Ozero at 580 feet above sea level, north of the town of Donskoi, east of Stalinogorsk and about 120 miles south of Moscow. It is 1,325 miles long and drains an area of some 166,000 square miles. Its upper course, above the mouth of the Voronezh (about 35 miles below the town of Voronezh), passes mostly through a low-lying, fertile region, though the section traversing the southwest corner of the Ryazan Oblast has steep, rocky banks, at some places even precipitous. From the mouth of the Voronezh to its nearest approach to the Volga, west of Stalingrad, it cuts its way for the most part through limestone rock, which in many places rises on either side in steep, high banks, and at intervals encroaches on the river bed. Above the mouth of the Voronezh it is 500 to 700 feet broad, at a few-places 1,000 feet, and from 4 to 20 feet deep. Toward its easternmost point, its ordinary breadth increases to 700-1,000 feet, with an occasional maximum of 1,400 feet, and its depth to 8-50 feet. As in the Volga, the right bank is, as a rule, high and the left bank flat and low. The average fall is about 5^ inches per mile. Shallow stretches are not uncommon, and there are at least seven considerable shoals in the southwest part of its course. Partly for this reason, the Don is little used for navigation above Kalach, terminus of a branch railroad 115 miles southeast of Voronezh in a straight line, although it is navigable as far up as the mouth of the Voronezh. The Don begins to subside with great rapidity about the beginning of June. In August, the water is very low and navigation almost ceases, but traffic with small craft occasionally becomes practicable after the September rains. The river is usually frozen from November or December to March or April; at rare intervals it freezes in October- Even Rostov, only 27 miles from the mouth, is severely handicapped by ice conditions in the winter, and by the silting up of the mouth, which confine it primarily to the status of a river port.

(4) Most of the streams from the north slope of the Crimean mountains are intermittent, especially in their lowland courses. The larger part of the Crimean Peninsula suffers from chronic drought, particularly the regions around Kerch, in the east, and Yevpatoriya, in the west. There are several large salt lakes near the coast in the Kerch Peninsula, on the Perekop Isthmus and southeast and northwest of Yevpatoriya.

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£. Transcaucasia.* In hydrographically isolated Transcaucasia, the Surami Ridge (north-south transverse spur uniting the Major and Minor Caucasus) separates the Rioni River, flowing westward to the Black Sea, from the Kura River, flowing eastward through the Azerbaidzhan Lowland to the Caspian Sea. The Araks River, separating mountainous Soviet Armenia from the Ararat Range in Turkey, joins the Kura in the center of Azerbaidzhan Lowland.

In the midst of the Armenian Highland and connected with the Araks .by the Zanga River is Lake Sevan (in Armenian) or Gokcha (in Turkish), situated 6,230 feet above sea level and framed in by high, rocky mountain walls. Its maximum length is h-5 miles, its maximum width, 23 miles. Only k percent of the water entering the lake flows out; the remainder evaporates. ,

As the Surami watershed is situated only about one-fifth of the distance from the Black Sea to the Caspian, the Black Sea tributaries are much shorter and swifter. The number of torrential brooks and rivers of all sizes rushing toward the Black Sea is enormous, and they are fed by heavy rains during most of the year, especially in Adzharistan, which is traversed by the independent Adzhar is-Tskali River, called Chorokh in its lower course. Since the Armenian mountains, with the exception of a few peaks, do not reach the snowline, the rivers become very shallow in summer, necessitating artificial irrigation, particularly on the south slope of the Minor Caucasus and the adjoining Plain of Ararat (Armenian Plateau).

§:• Siberia. East of the Urals, conventional boundary between European and Asiatic Russia, the vast and largely swampy West Siberian Lowland stretches one thousand miles eastward to the Yenisei River and the Central Siberian Tableland, not far beyond the Yenisei, and 1,300-1,500 miles southward from the Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas to the Altai Mountains, the Tarbagatai Range, the Kazakh Fold-Land, the Turgai Gates and the South Ural Steppe, which together form the watershed line between Western Siberia on the .one hand and Soviet Central Asia and China on the other.

The greater part of the West Siberian Lowland is drained northward by the Ob River, with its major tributary, the Irtysh, both of which rise in the Altai Mountains. Only its eastern edge is drained northward by the Yenisei, rising south of the Western Sayan Mountains in the Tuva People's Republic. The watershed between the Ob and the Yenisei is not much over 200 feet high, and the west bank of the Yenisei

See Map

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is only 1*0-50 feet above the river. The slope of the entire West Siberian Lowland is extraordinarily gentle. At the railroad crossing over the Ob near Novosibirsk, 1,700 miles from its mouth (Ob Bay), the mean water level is only about 300 feet above sea level. The low-water level in the Irtysh at Omsk is about 230 feet above sea level.

(1) The area known as the Vasyuganye, enclosed between the Ob and the Irtysh as far south as Novosibirsk and Omsk (both on 55°N, on the Trans-Siberian Railroad), is one vast expanse of almost solid moss swampland, save for scattered areas which have been reclaimed in recent decades. Only the narrow river zones between the swamps are covered with trees, principally conifers and birch. Around 59°, latitude of the Vasyugan River, east tributary of the Ob, the maximum elevation of the Vasyuganye Swamp above sea level is from 325 to 1*50 feet. In the summer the hunters' trails along the rivers are the only means of passage. In the winter the whole area can be crossed by sled. In 1925, the population was little over 1,000 or 0.02 person per square kilometer, and preponderantly aboriginal.

Lakes of all sizes abound throughout the West Siberian Lowland. By far the largest is the shallow Lake Chany, 335 feet above sea level and 60 by 35 miles in width, situated 25 miles south of the railroad between 77° and 78°E. Like many other large and small lakes in the belt between 56° and 50° N, Lake Chany has various short tributaries but no outflow. Its water contains about one-sixth ounce of cooking salt and sulfuric acid salts per quart. The salt content of these lakes increases toward the mouth, but even to the north of Lake Chany there are dead lakes containing considerable quantities of various kinds of salts and acids.

A peculiar phenomenon, found nowhere else in the world on such a maesive scale as in the middle and lower courses of the Ob-Irtysh and tributaries is the starvation of fish caused by the presence of iron salts, the immense acidity of the water due to the decay of organic substances; and the reduction of the quantity of free oxygen through evaporation and fermentation of•the organic substances, in summer and through isolation from the atmosphere by ice during the winter. Even in the 0b itself, the saturation of the water with free oxygen is 25 percent below normal.

(2) The larger western part of the Central Siberian Tableland is drained by the eastern tributaries of the Yenisei, of which the most important are, from south to north, the Angara or Upper (Verkhnyaya) Tunguska, the Podkamennaya or Middle (Srednaya) Tunguska and the Monastyrskaya or Lower (Nizhnyaya) Tunguska. Since the watershed between the 0b and the Yenisei lies comparatively very close to the Yenisei, all the western tributaries of the latter are short and small.

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The Yenisei is about 2,520 miles long, but the Angara, together with its true upper course, the navigable Selenga, emptying into the east side of Lake Baikal, is over 30 percent longer and their sources lie considerably higher. The configuration .of the confluence of the Yenisei and Angara and other hydrographic facts show that the Yenisei is in reality a tributary of the Angara. The upper course of the Yenisei, above Abakan, is suited only for timber floating because of its swift current and the series of rapids along the stretch where it breaks through the Yie stern Sayan Range. The mean fall between Abakan-Minusinsk and Krasnoyarsk is about 16 inches per mile; between Krasnoyarsk and Yeniseisk, below the mouth of the Angara, about 10 inches per mile. The volume fluctuates from a few hundred cubic yards per second to tens of thousands of cubic yards, during the June high-water season. The Yenisei at Yeniseisk is frozen over for an average of 173 days.

The Angara is navigable from the outlet of Lake Baikal except for a middle stretch of 180 miles below Bratoskoye (102° E, 56° N), on which only small sailboats and rowboats can be used because of the large number of rapids. It is so swift that it freezes over completely only 2-g- months after the beginning of frost. Ice blocks float down the river for a long time without forming a solid cover.

North of 71° N the West Siberian Lowland extends about 1,000 miles beyond the Yenisei between the Central Siberian Tableland and the Byrranga Mountains to the delta of the Yena. This expanse of low Arctic tundra, measuring 200-300 milts from north to south, is drained into the Arctic by four great rivers, the Pyasina, the Khatanga or Lyama, the Anabar and the Olenek (from west to east), which attain a width of many miles in their lowland section. The first three are well over 500 miles in length; the Olenek about 1,000 miles. All four reach deep into the northern part of the Central Siberian Tableland.

e. Soviet Central Asia (formerly called "Russian Turkiston") "" JT) This vast area of over 1,500,000 square miles (about

one-half that of the United States, exclusive of Alaska) is without any drainage outlet to the ocean except for that part of the Kazakh Republic which extends north of the natural northern boundary of Soviet Central Asia. This boundary, the watershed between the Irtysh system of the West Siberian Lowland and the Central Asia systems, runs from the southern end of the Ural Mountains along 15° 30' N, across the Turgai Gates, then south«-southeastward to the Kazakh Fold-Land, and through the middle of the latter, approximately along 49° N, to the Chingiz-Tau and Tarbagatai Mountain Ranges, which divide the head tributaries of the Irtysh from the basins of Lakes Balkhash and Ala-Kul.

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(2) The streams of the Central Asia systems empty into a number of lakes or seas, or dry up in the sands of the desert. The principal drainage systems are as follows:*

(a) (Lake) Ala-Kul, 1,000 feet above s.l., kO by 25 miles, and (Lake) Sassyk-Kul, about one-third as large; situated between the Tarbagatai Range on the north, the Dzhungar-Ala-Tau Range on the south, and the Barlyk Range of Chinese Turkistan and the Dzhungar Gates (low pass to (Lake) Ebi-Nur in China) on the east. Both are salt lakes, and the region round about is partly swampy, partly covered with desert sand.

(b) Lake Balkhash, 1,120 feet above s.l., 300 by 6-^5 miles, maximum depth in west 35 feet, in east 65 feet. It is the lowest point in a drainage basin enclosed on the north by the Kazakh Fold-Land, on the west by the Golodnaya Step (Hunger Steppe) and on the south by the high ridges of the T'ien Shan Range marking the border between the Kazakh and Kirgiz Republics. On the east it is bounded by the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range. Between the latter and the T'ien Shan Range lies the valley of the H i , the only large tributary of Lake Balkhash, which comes westward from the Chinese part of the T'ien Shan Range and enters the lake on its southeastern side. North of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range only a low rise in the sandy wastes, traversed by the Turkistan-Siberian ("Turksib") Railroad, separates Lake Balkhash from Lakes Ala-Kul and Sassyk-Kul. The greater part of Lake Balkhash is fresh water, but its southern tip and the long eastern arm contain a considerable amount of salt. The northern banks of the lake are rocky, at places high and precipitous, culminating in the Targyz quartzite mountain, rising 1,000 feet above the level of the lake. The western shore, of porphyry, quartzite and limestone, rises on an average to not more than 50-U00 feet above the lake, though the Burun-Baikal quartzite chain along the west side of the southern tip reaches 700 feet. The eastern shore is much lower, and large parts of the southern shore are swampy and covered with an impenetrable growth of reeds.

(c) The Aral Sea, l6k feet above ocean level, 2^9 feet above the level of the Caspian in 1901,* maximum length 250 miles; width 150 miles; maximum depth 220 feet; average depth 52 feet. It receives the very scant drainage of the Turanian Lowland and the Kyzyl-Kum Desert to the east, the eastern part of the Ust-Urt Plateau on the west and the Kara-Kum Desert on the south, as well as the two largest rivers of Soviet Central Asia:

(l) The Syr-Darya, which crosses the Kyzyl-Kum Desert from the Fergana Valley (outlined approximately by the

* See Map 15.

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boundary of the eastern panhandle of the Uzbek Republic), the only large recess in the otherwise solid mass of mountains covering the Kirgiz Republic. The Naryn River, the only large tributary of the Syr-Darya, rises near 78° E at an altitude of over 10,000 feet and flows westward through the heart of the Kirgiz Republic, draining a zone of the T'ien Shan Mountains included roughly between kl° and ^2° N, After describing a bend around the northwest end of the Fergana Range, it enters the northeast side of the Fergana Valley and joins the Kara-Darya, coming westward from the head of the Fergana Valley, to form the Syr-Darya. The aggregate length of the Naryn and Syr-Darya is about 1,800 miles.

(£) The Amu-Darya (the ancient Oxus, still so called on some maps), which marks the border between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan from the confluence of the Pyandzh and Vakhah Rivers to 65° U0f E, where it turns northwestward and passes between the Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum Deserts to the south end of the Aral Sea. Some 250 miles before reaching the sea, the Amu-Darya begins to break up into a number of arms, which are constantly changing. The Kank-Uzyak, one of the three main channels, is navigable.

The Pamir River marks the border between Afghanistan and the Tadzhik Republic from (Lake) Zor-Kul (73° U01 E, elevation 13,390 feet, also called Sary-Kul or Viktoria), its source, to the point (72° kO' E) where it joins the Vakhan-Darya, flowing between the Vakhan Range and the Hindukush (both in Afghanistan), to form the Pyandzh, which continues to mark the border to its junction with the Vakhsh (68° 20!E), where it becomes the Amu-Darya. The aggregate length of the Pamir, Pyandzh and Amu-Darya is around 1, U00 miles. The Pamir and the Pyandzh drain all the Pamir Highland covering the eastern half of the Tadzhik Republic, except those areas in the northeast that drain into lakes without outlets.

The Vakhsh, whose valley is now undergoing intensive development as an irrigated cotton-growing area, drains the greater part of the western half of the Tadzhik Republic. It is formed by the junction of the Obi-Khingoi, flowing between the Darvaz Range on the south and the Peter the Great Range on the north, with the Surkhob, flowing along the north side of the Peter the Great Range, westward through the neck between eastern and western Tadzhikistan. The Surkhob, in turn, is formed by the confluence of the Muk-Su, flowing westward along the south side, and the Kyzyl-Su, flowing along the north side, of the Trans-Alai Range, which marks the boundary between the Kirgiz Republic and eastern Takzhikistan. The valley of the Kyzyl-Su, known as the Alai Valley, is 70 miles long and as much as 12 miles broad, and is famous for its pastures. Its upper part is 11,000 feet high, its lower part 7>8OO feet high (at Daraut-Kurgan).

'V

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The east shore of the Aral Sea is low and sandy; the west shore, which is the eastern edge of the Ust-Urt Plateau, is precipitous, reaching 625 feet above the Aral Sea at places; the north shore (Turgai Tableland) reaches k^O feet above the Aral Sea. The 50-mile long Malyye Barsuki Sands reach the sea at its northwest corner.

(d) Chelkar-Tengiz, a salt lake of about the same size as Ala-Kul and situated north-northeast of the Aral Sea, midway "between the latter and the Turgai Gates. It receives the Turgai River from the north and the Irgiz River from the northwest. It is approximately level with the Aral Sea and separated from it by a low sand waste.

(e) The Caspian Sea, 8^ feet "below ocean level, which receives the extremely small amount of drainage from the west slopes of the Kara-Kum Desert and Ust-tJrt Plateau and from the southern slopes of the Southern Urals.

(f) (Lake) Issyk-Kul, 5, 1 5 feet a"bove sea level at normal water level, 100 "by 37 miles, maximum depth over 2,200 feet. It is a highland collecting "basin for a large number of short glacier streams of the Kungei Ala-Tau Range (to the north) and the Terskei Ala-Tau Eange (to the south) in the northeast part of the Kirgiz Republic eastward from 760 E and northward from 1+2° N. Although without an outlet, Lake Issyk-Kul contains fresh water and several varieties of fresh-water fish.

(g) The Chu River, rising around the west end of the Terskei Ala-Tau Range southwest of Lake Issyk-Kul. It runs in a generally northward direction for a"bout 100 miles, passes through the Buam Gorge between the Kungei Ala-Tau Range (on the east) and the Kirgiz Range (on the west), runs thence in a generally northwest direction for about -00 miles through the Muyun-Kum Sand Desert, then an equal distance westward between the latter and the Hunger Steppe, and finally loses itself in the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum Desert somewhat beyond 68° E. The Chu River passes within four miles of the west end of Lake Issyk-Kul, and a part of its spring flood water overflows into the lake through the Kutemaldy Channel. Through the Chu Valley runs the only highway connecting the interior of northern Kirgizia (north of k2° N) with the capital of the Republic, Frunze, and the plains of Kazakhstan.

(h) Lake Chatyr-Kul, on 75° 20' E, ^0° 20' N, 11,300 feet above s.l., 13 by 7 miles, depth insignificant. It receives 20 small streams from the inner slopes of an amphitheater of mountains formed by the convergence of several high ranges near the border between Kirgizia and China: the Fergana Range to the west, the At-Bashi Range to the north, and the main border ranges, the KokShaal-Tau, to the east, and the Kashgar Range, to the south. This fresh-water lake is also without an outlet.

(i) The Tarim River, which loses itself in the desert of Chinese Turkistan when it does not reach Lake Shor-Kul or Lob-Nor. It is formed "by the junction of the Yarkend and the Ak-Su, which latter is in turn formed "by the junction of the Kum-Aryk and the Taushkan-Darya, "both intermittent streams situated on the Chinese side. The Kok-Shaal, running along the Chinese side of the "border range of the same name, joins the Bedel (south of the east end of Lake Issyk-Kul), to form the Taushkan-Darya. The Ak-Sai, rising only 10 miles east of Lake Chatyr-Kul, runs eastward and joins the Myudyuryum, coming southward along the Kirgiz side of the Kok-Shaal range, to form the Kok-Shaal River, which breaks through the range just below kl° N. The Sary-Dzhaz River describes an arc around the west side of the great glacier region in the eastern extremity of the Kirgiz Republic and breaks through the border range at kl° 1+5f N to join the Kum-Aryk on the Chinese side. It is separated from Lako Issyk-K&l, to the west, by the northeastward curve of the Terskei Ala-Tau Range.

(j) (Lake) Kara-Kul, 12,970 feet above s.l., 15 miles long, up to 790 feet deep in its western part. This collecting basin, situated in the High Pamirs of the northeastern corner of the Tadzhik Republic, is enclosed on the north by the Trans-Alai Range, on the east by the Sary-Kol border range, on the south by the Muz-Kol Range, and on the west by the vast glacier region in which the Peter the Great Range terminates at its eastern end. Several tributaries of the Muk-Su (see under No. 2) rise not more than 25-*+O miles west of (Lake) Kara-Kul around the northeast side of this glacier area. Lake Kara-Kul, one of the highest lakes in the world, has no outlet but its water is only slightly brackish.

(3) The upper courses of the rivers of Central Asia are swift mountain torrents carrying enormous quantities of alluvium and entirely unsuited for any kind of navigation. They retain their swiftness long after leaving the mountains, and only in their lowest stretches are they comparable with the rivers of European Russia. Even in the lowlands, they are little suited for navigation, since the mud and sand carried down from the mountains make them shallow and constantly change their channels. The only river on which any navigation worth mentioning has been conducted is the Amu-Darya between Termez, on the Afghan border, and the Aral Sea. Here, both the Tsarist and the Soviet Governments have operated a fleet of steamers over very poorly remunerated routes with Turtkul (formerly Petroaleksandrovsk), in the Khorezm Oasic ubcut 250 miles from the Aral Sea, and Urgench, 30 miles farther* downstream* as ports of call.

(k) The rivers of Central Asia have from time immemorial been PTPIsited for irrigation, and both the Tsarist and Soviet Govern- • ments have devoted considerable attention to its development, especially for cotton growing. Their swiftness and high silt content render them

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« &

especially favorable for this purpose. Furthermore, the summer thaws in the high T'ien Shan and Pamir Ranges generally svell their volume precisely at the time when the rainless irrigated areas are most in need of water, and the highland precipitation is stored up in the form of ice and snow during the period of maximum lowland precipitation, whereas the rivers of southern European Russia swell from floods in the spring, when the rains alone are excessive, hut dwindle precisely in the driest, summer months, when irrigation could in many placeB he otherwise applied to great advantage.

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TABLE I

Principal Irrigated Areas

Ukraine

1. Dnestr Valley northwest of Odessa.

North Caucasus

2. Malokabardinski Irrigation System, enclosed by the great loop of the North Caucasian railroad between Prokhladny and Grozny.

3» Irrigation District of the Terek and Kuma Rivers (Tersko-Kumski), which flow into the Caspian Sea north of the Caucasus.

Transcaucasia

4. Mugan Steppe, southwest of Baku, between the Araks River on the northwest and the Kura River on the northeast, with the large Lake Akh-Chala in its eastern part.

5. Milskaya Steppe, west of the Mugan Steppe (see No. 4) and the confluence of the Araks and the Kura. More than half the cultivated land of the Azerbaidzhan Republic is irrigated, and the greater part of the cultivated land lies in the central part of the republic. Irrigation on an extensive scale has been practiced in Azerbaidzhan from very ancient times, and remains of large canals and reservoirs are found in areas which are now entirely waterless and uninhabited,

6. Maly Sardarabad Canal, irrigating more than 60,000 acres west of Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia, with water from the Araks River. The Araks and some of its tributaries are also used to irrigate various other areas of different sizes in the southern half of Armenia. The Zanga, passing through Yerivan, irrigates more than k^>, 000 acres south of Yerivan along the Yerivan-Dzhulfa railroad. The Garni-Chai and Debeda-Chai irrigate an equal area adjoining the former on the southeast, likewise along the railroad. The Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai, a parent stream of the Araks, irrigates 30>000 acres around Leninakan, on the railroad northwest of Yerivan. Some of the canals and other works date from ancient times, but many of them have been reconstructed, enlarged and mechanized since the Revolution.

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TABLE I Principal Irrigated Areas

(Continued)

Western Siberia

7. Alei Steppe, along the Alei River and the railroad "between Barnaul and Semipalatinsk, with its center at Aleisk, 180 miles due south of Novosibirsk, 226 miles by rail.1

8. Irrigation system of the Uibat River, west of Abakan, branch •• railroad terminus on the Yenisei River 170 miles south-southwest of Krasnoyarsk.

Soviet Central Asia

9. Irrigation system of the Chu River, between Lake Balkhash and the Kirgiz Highland, in southeast Kazakhstan; begun before World War I and expanded since the Revolution.

10. Irrigation District of the Chirchik, Keles and Angren Rivers, east tributaries of the Syr-Darya; the Keles passes northwest of Tashkent, the Chirchik southeast of it, and the Angren farther south. Modern irrigation was instituted here before the First World War.

11. Hunger (Golodnaya) Steppe--not to be confused with the much larger Hunger Steppe west of Lake Balkhash--, 50 miles southwest of Tashkent, between the southwest bank of the Syr-Darya, the Tashkent-Bukhara railroad and the Kyzyl-Kum Desert. The beginning of this project dates back before the First World War.

12. Dalverzinskaya Steppe, along the Syr-Darya south-southwest of Tashkent; an eastward extension of the old Hunger Steppe development (No. 11 above) east of the railroad toward the mouth of the Fergana Valley.

13. Irrigation systems of the Fergana Valley, using water from the Syr-Darya, and both its parent streams, the Naryn and the Kara-Darya, in the eastern panhandle of the Uzbek Republic and the northern panhandle of the Tadzhik Republic. Most of the canals date back before the Revolution and some are of remote antiquity, but it is reported that the whole system has boon undergoing a thorough overhauling and important expansion during the last 15 years.

Ik. Surkhan-Shirabad Irrigation District, along the Shirabad River from Shirabad south to Termez (on the Tashkent-Stalinabad railroad) in the southern extremity of the Uzbek Republic.

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TABLE I Principal irrigated Areas

(Continued)

15. Valley of the Vakhsh (east of 68°), a parent stream of the Amu-Darya, in the southwest corner of the Tadzhik Republic.

16. The Oasis of Mary (formerly Merv) and Bairam-Ali (site of the ancient Merv) in which terminates the Murgab River, coming northward from Afghanistan; on the Tashkent-Krasnovodsk railroad west of 620 E. Important modern irrigation works in this ancient irrigation area were completed "before the Revolution,

Other areas of Russian Central Asia in which irrigation works of considerable extent were in operation "before the First World War are:

17. The H i River Valley around Dzharkent and Alma-Ata (formerly Verny).

18. Kopal and Abakumovskoye, on the north side of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range, exploiting the upper courses of some of the seven tributaries of Lake Balkhash from which the district east of Lake Balkhash was formerly called the Seven-River (Semirechenskaya) Cblast, now named Alma-Ata Oblast.

19. The Arys River around Chimkent; works reaching southward toward the irrigated area around Tashkent.

20. The Zeravshan River, around Samarkand; works extended westward since the Revolution. The Zeravshan, rising at the east end of the Turkestan Range and flowing along its south side to Samarkand, does not reach the Amu-Darya, pro"ba"bly "because all of its water is consumed in irrigation.

21. The Amu-Darya Valley from the Afghan Border to Chardzhou, on the latitude of Bukhara, with an irrigated zone reaching eastward along the railroad to Bukhara (considerably expanded since the Revolution); also a large part of the Amu-Darya Delta, east and north of Khiva.

22. The Tedzhen River, in the Tedzhen Oasis, west of the Mary Oasis (see Wo. 16), on the Bukhara-Ashkhabad railroad,

23. A zone along the Bukhara-Ashkhabad-Krasnovodsk railroad to a distance of 170 miles north from Ashkhabad and 125 miles south from Ashkhabad; exploiting short streams from the northeast slope of the Kopet-Dag.

TABLE II

Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power

European Russia

1. Tuloma, at Kola, on the railroad 7 miles south of Murmansk.

2. Niva, north of Kandalaksha (Kola Peninsula), on the railroad l66 miles south of Murmansk.

3. Lake Sandal, above Kondopoga, on Lake Onega and the railroad 623 miles south of Murmansk.

k. Svir, at Svirstroi, on Murmansk Railroad 190 miles northeast of Leningrad.*

5. Volkhov, at Volkhovstroi, on Murmansk Railroad 77 miles east of Leningrad.

6. Dnepr, at Dnepropetrovsk.*

7. Baksan, at Kyzburun, in North Caucasus (U30 25' E, ^3° 35' N), i»-0 miles south-southeast of Mineralnyye Vody and 80 miles northwest of Ordzhonikidze.

8. Gizeldon, at Verkhni Koban, in the North Caucasus 12 miles south-vest of Ordzhonikidze.

Transcaucasia

9. Rioni, at Vartsikhe below Kutaisi near the TransCaucasian Railroad, about 85 miles from Batum and 55 miles from the Black Sea.

10. Aragva, north of Tiflis.

11. Khrami, at Rosenberg, ^0 miles southwest of Tiflis.

12. Alazan, near Kardanakhi, 55 miles east of Tiflis, on a branch railroad.

13. Adzharis-Tskali, at Makhuntseti, 20 miles east-southeast of Batum.

Now in German hands.

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TABLE II Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power

(Continued)

1^. Dzoraget, near Kalageran on Tiflis--Yerivan railroad, about kO miles "by rail south of Tiflis, in Soviet Armenia.

15. Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai, at Kaps, 8 miles northwest of Leninakan, which is 137 miles by rail southwest of Tiflis, in Soviet Armenia.

16. Zanga, "between Lake Sevan and Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia; project provides eventually for 9 stations aggregating 570,000 kw., or 12,000 more than the Dnepr Dam. According to latest available information (19^2) two units are in operation: Kanaker I with ^2,000 kw. and Kanaker II with ij-6,000 kw. The Gyumyush station, with 1^,000 kw., is under construction,

17. Okhchi-Sai, at Kafan, the terminus of a railroad running southwest from Baku along the Araks River into the southeastern extremity of Soviet Armenia.

Central Asia

18. urba, at Ulba, on the railroad spur of the Turksi"b Railroad from Semipalatinsk to Ridder, about 10 miles southwest of the latter, in the northeast extremity of the Kazakh Republic.

19. Chirchik, at Chirchik, 20 mileB northeast of Tashkent, on a railroad spur from Tashkent. There are four other hydroelectric stations in the vicinity of Tashkent on tributaries of the Chirchik. The largest one (10,000-25,000 kw.) known to be completed is at Kadyrya, 10 miles northeast of Tashkent.

20. Varzob, 8 miles north of Stalinabad, capital of the Tadzhik Republic.

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2. TOPOGRAPHY,*

a. General. From the western "border of the Soviet Union to the Yenisei River, 27° to 90° E, or more than one-sixth of the distance around the globe "between the Arctic Circle and latitude 55° N, there is no elevation sufficiently great, steep or rugged to present a really serious military obstacle from any direction. Even the Ural Mountains, though twice as high as the Central Russian and Volga Hills, resemble these two hill chains in that the forests which cover them with increasing density northward from 55° N represent more considerable impediments to military movements than do their topographic features. South of 55° (1 degree south of Moscow) the forest land shades off gradually into treeless steppe.

Irom north to south there is an open sweep varying from 1,500 miles, between the Barents Sea and the Caspian, to 2,TOO miles, between the Kara Sea and the Afghan border, across the Turgeti Gates and the Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum Deserts.

If the Soviet Union west of the Yenisei has little internal protection through natural features, all its borders except the western are exceptionally well protected by seas and high mountains. To the south of European Russia are the Black Sea, the Major and Minor Caucasus (backed by the high mountains of eastern Turkey), and the Caspian Sea, bordered on the south by the high ranges of Iran. The mountain ranges marking the southern border of Asiatic Russia, together with the principal passages across them, are described in detail below. Some of these passages are broad enough to facilitate a large-scale invasion, but all of them lead in from areas which are themselves very difficult of access. As the parts of the border ranges which overlap upon the territory of the Soviet Union mostly occupy large recesses in the border, they cannot greatly interfere with military movements within the Soviet Union. Lake Baikal and the Central Siberial Tableland, backed by the Yablonovy, Stanovoi and other high ranges, afford an excellent natural defense on the east side of the West Siberian Lowland.

b. European Russia. (1) The Central Russian Hills extend from a point 90

miles southeast of Leningrad in a south-southeast direction 500 miles to the Northern Donets River, and are resumed beyond the 55-^ilo broad valley of the latter by the Donets Ridge, which slopes off gently toward the Gulf of Taganrog. The broadest part of this chain, known

See Map

- £00

as the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, is about 225 miles wide, reaching from Smolensk to Moscow. It tapers off gradually "both northward and southward. North of the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, the chain is indented only lightly "by the headwaters of the Volga, Dnepr and Western Dvina, and is here called the Valdai Hills. South of the Smolensk-Moscow Ridge, "between Bryansk and Kaluga (southwest of Moscow), the chain is almost cut in two by a depression extending from the head of the Desna, a tributary of the Dnepr, to the head of the Oka, a tributary of the Volga. South of this gap the chain attains its greatest altitude, 1,007 feet. Its average elevation is not over 500 or 600 feet. It is undulating throughout and heavily forested north of the Bryansk-Kaluga gap. Southward from this line, the forest gradually gives way to treeless steppe and the chain becomes more and more disrupted by the many tributaries of the Dnepr on the west and the Don on the east.

(2) The Volga Hills extend 1*50 miles southward from the Gorki-Kazan section of the Volga along the west side of this river to Stalingrad, whence they are continued southward to the Kumo-Manych Sink (between the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea) by the lower Yergeni Range. Their northern half is over 200 miles broad, while their southern half (south of Saratov) rapidly breaks up into a narrow chain of more or less scattered heights. The highest point, l,2lj-8 feet, is in the Khvalynsk Mountains, near the town of Khvalynsk on the Volga, just below 53° N. The average altitude of the northern half is between 700 and 900 feet. In general, the elevation decreases toward the south, but altitudes of 6OO-7OO feet are found even at the southern end of the Yergeni chain. Large stretches of the Volga Hills fall off in precipitous cliffs toward the Volga, whereas the east shore is almost everywhere low, level and marshy and is covered "by the spring floods almost to the limit of the valley, which is from 1 to 13 miles wide. South of the Kumo-Manych Sink, the Yergeni chain is resumed by the Stavropol Hills, between kl° and k5° E, which incline southward into the foothills of the Caucasus.

(3) The Kalach Hills, included between the Don on the west and its main tributary, the Khoper, on the east, form an imperfect transverse connection between the southern ends of the Central Russian and Volga Hills, to which it is similar in altitude and general character•

(k) The three hill chains described above, together with the Oka (Volga tributary) on the north, enclose the Oka-Don Lowland (southeast of Moscow), the very heart of European Russia and one of its most fertile and populous areas. They are almost the only elevations rising above the general level of the great East European Plain, which otherwise occupies the whole of European Russia from its western border to the foothills of the Urals and from the Arctic Sea to the

T 201

foothills of the Caucasus. They divide this plain into the following distinct lowland areas.

(a) The Dnepr Lowland, with large swamp areas north of Kiev and dry, treeless steppe land south of that city.

(b) The Black Sea Lowland ("between the Dnepr and the Crimean Peninsula), into which intrude the Volhynian-Podolsk Hills, which extend eastward from Poland as far as 32° E and have a considerably greater general elevation than the Central Russian Hills.

(c) The Oka-Don Lowland, continued north of the Oka "by the swampy Moshchorskaya Lowland.

(d) The Kumo-Manych Sink, already mentioned. (e) The arid and partly sandy Caspian Lowland,

extending in the form of a crescent with a maximum width of 2^0 miles from the east end of the Caucasus around the northern third of the Caspian Sea to the Ust-Urt Plateau west of the Aral Sea and south of the Urals.

(5) A "branch of the Scandinavian mountain system stretches over most of the Kola Peninsula except its south shore. Average heights in different parts range from 500 to 2,000 feet. The highest points are situated amid the group of extensive and highly ramified lakes in the southwestern part of the peninsula, where Mount Lyavachorr, "between Lakes Imandra and Umbozero, attains an elevation of 3,893 feet.

(6) The foothills of the Urals protrude at many points as much as 200 miles or more into the East European Plain, "but they are much "broken up, and at a number of places more or less completely severed from the Ural Ridge, by the numerous tributaries of the Volga (especially the Kama) and of the Pechora. Their general height and character are similar to those of the Volga Hills.

(7) The Crimean Mountains, geologically a spur of the Caucasus cut off "by the Kerch Strait, extend along the southeast coast of the peninsula from Sevastopol to the region of Feodosiya and reach inland as much as 25 miles, the distance of Simferopol, capital of the Crimea, from the coast. The main ridge (so-called "Yaila", meaning "pasture" in Crimean Tatar) extends from Balaklava, southeast of Sevastopol, to Stary Krym, west of Feodosiya, rising from both extremities to its highest point, Mt. Roman-Kosh, 5>O15 feet. It has a flat surface with isolated summits. It slopes gently into the northern valley, but drops off in rocky cliffs toward the south shore, a narrow zone of health resorts and most highly developed agriculture.

The remaining three-fourths of the peninsula is more or less arid lowland. Some elevations under 600 feet occur in the

V hwm MHMHMHHUJL

Kerch Peninsula, the east projection of the Crimea, and northwest of Yevpatoriya, in its west projection.

c. The Caucasus.* (1) The main ridge of the Major Caucasus is about

1,000 miles long, and has a large number of northward and southward spurs. The highest peak is the Elbrus ( 2° 30' E, U30 20' N), l8,VfO feet high. The Kazbek (kk° 30' E, h2° kV N), the sixth peak in the Caucasus, is 16,390 feet high and is situated about 10 miles west of the 191-mile long Georgian Military Highway between Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladikavkaz, meaning "Control-Caucasus") and Tiflis, the only motor road leading across the main ridge of the Major Caucasus. The section between the Elbrus and the Kazbek is the highest part of the range, and has a very heavy covering of eternal snow and glaciers. The average altitude of the eastern part of the range, between Dagestan on the north and the Azerbaidzhan Republic on the south, is between 5>8OO and 9,700 feet. The two highest peaks are the Bazar-Dyuzi, 1^,590 feet, and the Shakh-Dag, 13,8l6 feet (U8° E, northeast of the Bazar-Dyuzi), both covered with eternal snow.

The only easily accessible pass in the entire range is the Gudaur Pass (formerly called Krestovy or Cross Pass), 7,700 feet high, on the Georgian Military Highway. The only known pass between Dagestan and Azerbaidzhan is the Salavat Pass, 9>19*»- feet high, just east of hQ° E.

The slope of the Major Caucasus, as a rule, is much steeper toward the south than toward the north. Toward the Kura Valley, the mountains fall away very abruptly, as much as 2,000 feet in a single drop. The eastern end of the range inclines more gradually toward the east and southeast to the Apsheron Peninsula, a hilly plateau with heights up to 160 feet above ocean level, or 2Mi- feet above the level of the Caspian. Along the Caspian, the Caucasus everywhere leaves a low coastal strip, ranging in width from one mile, around Ul° N, to 20 miles. Along the Black Sea, between Sochi and Sukhum, it drops sharply to the coast line at many points and leaves only a narrow margin at many others.

The whole area of the east and southeast slope of the Major Caucasus from the Apsheron Peninsula to Larich ( 8° 25' E, k0° 50' N), 85 miles west-northwest of Baku, abounds in mud volcanoes, active from time to time. They are also found farther to the south in the steppe zone, and on the coastal islands of the Caspian Sea.

iih\ !<[:>! * Map Ik.

/'•: -<\ '! 'vv.' • i.v^j^j '' ;.»i •' '

- 203

(2) The Major and Minor Caucasus are connected by the north-south transverse Surami Range, which the Transcaucasian railroad and highway cross by means of the 3,08^-foot high Surami Pass (U30 20»E), situated about one-fourth as far from the Black Sea as from the Caspian.

(3) The Minor Caucasus occupies most of the area between the Rioni-Kura river line and the Turkish and Iranian borders, as far east as h'J0 E. The Georgian part of the system, consisting of two east-west ranges, the Telereti and the Adzharo-Imareti (the latter touching the coast at Batum), merges with the mountains of northeastern Turkey. The highest points are over 10,000 feet. The eastern half of the Minor Caucasus, separated from Turkey and Iran by the Araks River and the Armenian Plateau (about il-,000 feet high), occupies the greater part of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and reaches over into Azerbaidzhan in the Karabakh Highland, embraced by the Nagorno-Karabakh (Highland Karabakh) Autonomous 0blast of the Azerbaidzhan Republic. The highest peak in the Minor Caucasus is Alagoz (in Azerbaidzhani) or Aragats (in Armenian), 13,310 feet, 35 miles west of Lake Sevan, on kk° 12» E, *K)O'32! N, rising like an isolated volcano cone from the Armenian Plateau, or Plain of Ararat. Various ranges encircle Lake Sevan, 6,230 feet above sea level. Along its northeast side runs the Shakh-Dag Range, continued eastward to the Azerbaidzhan (Kura) Lowland by the Murov-Dag or Gyandzha Range, 5,800 to 9,700 feet high.

The principal highway pass over the Armenian Highland is the Semyonovski Pass, 7>O6o feet high, across the Pambak Range, a few miles beyond the northwest end of Lake Sevan, on the route from Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia, to Delidzhan and Kirovakan (formerly Karaklis) in northern Armenia.

(h) The Talysh Range, along the southeast part of the Azerbaidzhan border and without direct connection with the Soviet part of the Minor Caucasus, is the northwest extremity of the Elborus Mountains of Iran skirting the south shore of the Caspian Sea. It declines toward the sea and ends 3 "to 12 miles from the shore in low hills and spurs. The coastal zone is very humid lowland, separated from the sea by a small ridge of sand and pebbles, formed by the surf, and is dotted with shallow lakes and estuaries.

(5) In general, the western part of Transcaucasia is thickly wooded, owing to the heavy rainfall. The forest covering dwindles eastward from the Suram Ridge, is scant in the western part of Azerbaidzhan and entirely lacking in the lowland parts of eastern Azerbaidzhan, Over 50 percent of Abkhazia, in northwestern Georgia, and of Adzharistan, in southwestern Georgia, is covered with forest. The northern slopes and foothills of the Major Caucasus are semiarid and nearly treeless. The northern slopes of the Minor Caucasus northwest of Lake Sevan are covered with fine

- 204'

remainder of the range ig more or less "barren and devoid of trees and other large-size natural vegetation. The frequency of earthquakes in Armenia indicates the recent geologic origin of the Minor Caucasus.

d. The Ural Mountains. (1) The Urals are a very old mountain fold chain which

has "been much worn down "by long cycles of erosion, but still represents a fairly sharp dividing line "between the drainage systems of European Bussia and Western Siberia from near the Arctic Sea as far south as the Ural River, at 51° N. Beyond the Ural River it is continued toward the Ust-Urt Plateau and the Aral Sea by the less distinct Mugodzhary Range, also the remnant of a fold formation, having a maximum altitude of 2,. 100 feet. Konstantinov Kamen, at the northern extremity of the Urals, is 1,466 feet high, and is still covered with snow in July, being only about 25 miles from the Kara Sea. The highest point in the entire chain is Telpos-Iz, 5,505 feet high, on 630 55« N. North of this point there are a number of peaks between 3,000 and 5,000 feet high. South of it, they become lower: Mount Isherim (6l° U» N), considered as dividing the North from the Central Urals, is 4,325 feet high. In the populated and industrialized part, from Nizhni Tagil southward to the Ural River, the altitudes range between 1,500 and 3,500 feet. On the west side of the Urals, the foothills are well developed, but on their east slope they are almost totally absent. The slope to the pass leading over to Sverdlovsk is so gradual that the summit is imperceptible to a traveler on the Trans-Siberian line, which crosses at this point.

The northern and central parts of the Urals are covered with a rich growth of many varieties of trees. Southward from Sverdlovsk the forest covering thins out more and more though far more rapidly on the east slope. The region around Magnitogorsk, (on the east slope), the new metallurgical center created in the midst of a wilderness, is almost treeless. The Central and Southern Urals are extremely rich in a majority of the most important minerals, many of which have been exploited for more than a century.

<e. Siberia. JT) The West Siberian Lowland has been more fully

described under "Hydrography", since water occupies an exceptionally large part of it. However, in the salt-lake zone along its southern side there are extensive areas of more or less dry steppe land. The largest of these are:

(a) the Ishim Steppe, situated between the upper Tobol (southwest Irtysh tributary) and the Upper Irtysh, and traversed by the Ishim River (also a southwest Irtysh tributary);

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(b) the Baraba Steppe, enclosed "between the Irtysh and the upper Ob, and surrounding Lake Chany. In its northern part, expanses of steppe land alternate with scattered patches of "birch, the number of which decreases toward the south. Extensive drainage work has "been done here since "before the Revolution, and has even reached northward into the Vasyuganye Swamp.

These steppes contain long, gently sloping elevations alternating with sinks. The elevations run mainly northeast, rise 10-1+0 feet, rarely 65 feet, above the general level of the steppe, and are hundreds of yards "broad and sometimes several miles long. The Ural Steppe, which continues these steppes westward, is 700 feet high at Chelyabinsk, but the average relative height of its elevations is less than in the steppes to the east.

Even in these steppes, the vales between the elevations are not infrequently the beds of swamps, salt marshes, small lakes and streams. The Baraba Steppe adjoins the swampy Vasyuganye on the north and the dry Kulunda Steppe on the south. The latter (west of Barnaul) contains many salt lakes, of which the largest is Lake Kulunda, 20 miles long by 15 miles wide.

(2) The Central Siberian Tableland occupies most of the area between the Yenisei, the Lena and Lake Baikal as far north as the 200-300 mile broad northeastern arm of the West Siberian Lowland. This tableland, measuring 1,000-1,300 miles from north to south and some 1,000 miles from east to west, is a region of very old horizontal strata largely characterized by mesa formations, produced by the erosive action of countless rivers of all sizes. It is consequently one of the most rugged areas in the Soviet Union. The average elevation varies in different sections from 1,000 to 5*000 feet, the greater part being nearer the lower limit.

f_. Soviet Central Asia. JT) The Kazakh (or Kirgiz) Fold-Land (Skladchataya

Strana) forms the larger part of the natural boundary between Siberia and Soviet Central Asia, though it is overlapped some 100-200 miles by the Kazakh Republic in its present boundaries. From the Chingiz-Tau Mountains (780 E), northeast of Lake Balkhash, it extends some 600 miles westward and northwestward to the Turgai River and Turgai Gates (650 E), north-northeast of the Aral Sea. It widens from about 100 miles at its east end to over 350 miles at its west end. Nowhere does it reach an altitude of 5,000 feet. The highest points are in the eastern part, to the north and south of Karkaralinsk, a road center north of Lake Balkhash. The geologic folds, from which the chain receives its scientific name, run partly northeast, partly northwest.

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Low, short ranges, unconnected with each other, alternate rapidly with areas of small, low, isolated hillocks having rounded contours. Entirely level sections are rare, though the Kazakh Fold-Land resembles a steppe in the character of its vegetation and the lack of forest.

(2) The Turgai Gates (Turgaiskiye Vorota), 20-100 miles wide and over 250 miles long, are a gap "between the Kazakh Fold-Land and the Southern Ural Steppe. They connect the head of the Ubagan River, a tributary of the Tobol, and the salt lake of the same name (50 by 5-10 miles) with the head of the Turgai, a tributary of the salt lake Chelkar-Tengiz• The Turgai Gates themselves contain a large number of small salt lakes, and a few large ones. The highest part of the gap is "barely U00 feet above sea level, while the plateau to the west, forming the watershed between the Turgai and the Ishim (irtysh tributary), attains 1,000 feet above sea level. The tableland on both sides of the gap is also known as the Turgai Mesa Land, as it consists of low, isolated plateaus or mesas, between and around which lie steppe plains, sandy areas or lakes.

(3) The Tarbagatai Range, marking in its eastern half an east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along hj° N, extends along the south side of the basin of Lake Zaisan, official source of the Irtysh, toward the Turkistan-Siberian Eailroad ("Turksib"). Its average elevation is 5*000-7,000 feet, its maximum point (Tas-Tau), 9,600 feet. Its most used pass, Khabar-Asu, 8,200 feet high, leads over to the Chinese-Turkic town of Chuguchak, an important point on an ancient trade route. West of the railroad, the Tarbagatai Range is continued northwestward by the lower and more sprawling Chingiz-Tau Mountains, which merge with the Kazakh Fold-Land around 780 E, thus completing the physical dividing line between Siberia and Soviet Central Asia.

{k) The Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range, marking in its eastern half another east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along ^5° N, curves southwestward to the railroad and the valley of the H i , tributary to Lake Balkhash. On the Chinese side it reaches through the area between Lake Ebi-Nur and the H i to join the northeast extremity of the T'ien Shan Range around the headwaters of this river. It reaches elevations of 15*000-16,500 feet and is covered with small glaciers, 1-3 miles long.

(5) With the exception of the Fergana Valley, and a few smaller irrigated areas, oases and very restricted river valleys, the lowland interior of Soviet Central Asia is one vast area of more or less sandy wasteland, measuring about 1,^00 miles from the Tarbagatai and Dzhungar Ala-Tau Ranges in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west, 200 to 300 miles from north to south in its eastern half, between the Kazakh Fold-Land and th© Kirgiz Highland (T'ien Shan Range), and 700 to 1,000 miles in its western half, between the Southern Urals and the

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"border with Afghanistan and Iran. The following are its most important divisions, from east to west:

(a) The Sary-Ishik-Otrau Sands, "between Lakes Ala-Kul and Balkhash.

(b) The Hunger Steppe (Golodnaya Step, or Betpak-Dala), extending west from Lake Balkhash to the Sary-Su Eiver (6j°-6Q° E) and south to the Chu Eiver (roughly along V?° W); a desert plateau, 800-950 feet above s.l., dropping from a 12-20 foot ledge toward the Sary-Su and sloping rather gently toward the Chu.

(c) The Muyun-Kum Sands, south of the Hunger Steppe and enclosed "between the Chu River, the Talas Ala-Tau Range and its northwest spur, the Kara-Tau Range; average elevation 350 feet.

(d) The Kyzyl-Kum ("Red Sand") Desert, enclosed by the Hunger Steppe, Muyun-Kum Sands and Kara-Tau Range on the east, the highlands of Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan on the southeast, the Amu-Darya River on the southwest, and the Aral Sea on the west; covered almost entirely with stationary eand and sandhills. Throughout the Kyzyl-Kum, areas of sandhills alternate with takyrs, smooth, hard, clayey areas like a par^uetted floor, in the depressions "between the sandhill ridges. In the early spring these fill with water, forming lakes, sometimes a dozen or more miles long, which dry out "by the end of April or May. In other seasons, the Kyzyl-Kum is almost inaccessible "because of the nearly total lack of water, though it contains ancient irrigation systems and fortifications of "burnt "brick. The southeast corner of this desert, southwest of Tashkent and the Syr-Darya River and west of the mouth of the Fergana Valley, is also known as the Hunger Steppe, --to "be distinguished from the much larger Hunger Steppe described above under No. 2. In this arid forest plain, extensive irrigation works had "been completed and were partly under construction even "before the First World War; under the Soviet regime they have "been considerably expanded. The Kyzyl-Kum as a whole declines toward the •Turanian Lowland, which extends from the Aral Sea to a distance of 50-100 miles and is included in the desert.

(e) The Kara-Kum ("Black Sand") Desert, covering most of the area "between the Amu-Darya on the northeast, the Afghan border, the Caspian Sea and the Ust-Urt Plateau on the northwest, and extending some 600 miles from southeast to northwest and 200-300 miles from northeast to southwest. Most of it is lower than the Kyzyl-Kum Desert. The sands alternate between dunes and sand steppe. The hills vary from a few feet to 25-35 feet, the usual height being 20-25 feet. They are irregular in shape, but all their slopes are gentle and reinforced with vegetation. Parallel sand ridges, with slightly undulating crests usually 50-70 feet high, are scattered throughout the northwest part of the desert as far east as 59° E (east of Ashkhabad). The

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distance "between them is usually 200-280 feet, "but ranges from 150 to 700 feet. The depressions are characterized by the formation of takyrs, as in the Kyzyl-Kum Desert.

(f) The Ust-Urt Plateau, occupying most of the area "between the Aral Sea, the Amu-Darya Delta, the Kara-Kum Desert (on the south), the Mangyshlak Peninsula of the Caspian Sea and the North Caspian Lowland; a monotonous plain of horizontal strata of clay and stone, covered with sand or salt lakes, and surrounded on all four sides "by precipices, which are 88 feet a"bove the level of the Aral Sea, up to 1,000 feet above the level of the Caspian Sea, and are almost everywhere clearly defined.

(g) The Bolshiye Barsuki ("Big Badger") Sands, 6-27 miles wide and about 125 miles long, extending northward from the northwest side of the Aral Sea, and the 50-mile long Malyye Barsuki ("Little Badger") Sands, to the east of the former.

£. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia. The border between Asiatic Russia on the one hand and Iran, Afghanistan, China and Mongolia on the other is for the most part marked by high mountain ridges. The only important gaps in these border chains are:

(l) Border Passages. (a) The 60-mile broad Southeast Caspian Lowland,

which extends 1+0-50 miles over into Iran. A strip of lowland shore at least one mile broad reaches westward along the south shore of the Caspian and is followed by the railroad from the Caspian port of Bender-Shah, in the southwestern extremity of the Southeast Caspian Lowland, to Teheran.

(b) The 100-mile broad sand-desert valley of the Amu-Darya, nearly all of which lies in Afghanistan, since a number of north-south spurs of the Tadzhik Highland abut on the north side of the river. But to the south and east of the valley lies the mighty barrier of the Hindukush, watershed between the Amu-Darya and the basins of the Indus and the Tarim (in Chinese Turkestan), reaching altitudes of more than 25,000 feet.

(c) The gap of the Kok-Shaal River through the Kok-Shaal-Tau Range at ^0° 55' N, 76° k^ E, connecting southeast Kirgizia with the Kashgar basin.

(d; The 111 Valley, leading over to Kuldzha (in Chinese Turkestan), beyond which it is shut in by the convergence of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau and T'ien Shan Ranges, which extend along the north and south of the valley from Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, respectively. From Sary-Ozek, on the railroad 10^ miles north of Alma-Ata, a highway runs along the north side of the 111 Valley into the Chinese province of Sinkiang, where it turns northeastward across the 5899

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feet high Talki Pass in the Dzhungar Range to Lake Ebi-Nur, whence it rims eastward to Hami, and on to Lanchow and Chungking.

(e) The Dzhungar Gates (Dzhungarskiye Vorota), a waterless gap 5 to 10 miles wide, extending south-southeastward from Lake Ala-Kul across the Kazakh-Chinese border to the region of Lake Ebi-Nur and separating the east end of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range from the Barlyk Range in China.

(f) The 30-mile "broad valley of the Chyorny (Black) Irtysh, which rises in the Mongolian Desert southwest of the Mongolian part of the Altai Mountains, crosses the "border at kQ° N and empties into Lake Zaisan, considered the source of the Irtysh.

(2) Border Ranges, Between the Southeast Caspian Lowland and the Kara-Kum Desert the Iranian border range of Kopet-Dag protrudes some 75 miles into Soviet territory. The western edge of this spur lies approximately on 55° E. Its northeastern edge is delimited by the Ashkhabad railroad. It reaches a maximum elevation of 9*685 feet on Soviet territory, in Mt. Vazarash, southwest of Ashkhabad. It has only a few small streams and scant forest.

From this spur to the Amu-Darya Valley the boundary skirts the foothills of the great mountain systems of Iran and Afghanistan. Thence eastward to Lake Zor-Kul (source of the Pamir), it is marked by the Amu-Darya, Pyandzh and Pamir Rivers. The remainder of the Soviet border, from Lake Zor-Kul to Transbaikalia, follows in general the crests of some of the highest ridges in the Pamirs of Tadzhikistan, the T'ien Shan Ranges of Kirgizia, and the Altai and Sayan Ranges of south central Siberia. The following are the principal ridges forming this boundary line:

(a) The Vakhan Range, between Lake Zor-Kul and the southwest extremity of the Tadzhik Republic. The Bender Pass, 25 miles east of Lake Zor-Kul, is around 15,000 feet high.

(b) The Sary-Kol Range, forming the eastern boundary of Tadzhikistan and the watershed between the Ak-Su, indirect tributary of the Pyandzh, and the Yarkend-Darya basin in Chinese Turkistan. The few passes over it exceed 1^,000 feet. The important Beik Pass, near its southern end, where it merges with the Vakhan Range and the Hindukush, is 15*3^0 feet high.

(c) The Kok-Shaal-Tau Range, marking the eastern boundary of the Kirgiz Republic with the Kashgar Basin. The Kugart Pass (7U0 30' E. kO6 20' N) is about 12,000 feet high; the Bedel Pass, in the middle of the range southeast of Lake Issyk-Kul, over 13,000 feet high. There are many glaciers throughout the range, and an especially heavy concentration in a 15-mile section on either side of Dankov Peak, 17,700 feet high, about 70 miles south of Bedel Pass,

>: r^i

The eastern extremity of the Kirgiz Republic, embracing a roughly circular area 55-65 miles in diameter, is occupied "by a solid nucleus of glacier-covered mountains, the Khan-Tengri, with Khan-Tengri Peak, 22,735 feet high, and others over 20,000 feet.

(d) The Sailyugem-Shapshal Range of the Altai Mountains (see "below), "between the Chyorny Irtysh Valley and 89° E.

(e) The Western Sayan Range, winding from 89° to 96° E in a generally northeast or east-northeast direction along the Mongolian Border, from the Altai Mountains to the east "boundary of the Krasnoyarsk Krai. The altitudes of the main ridge are from 5,000 to 9,200 feet, those of the passes from 6,000 to 7,000 feet. It rises "beyond the timber line (5,700-6,200 feet) throughout, and the crest is mostly jagged with sharp peaks, and has numerous small lakes and tarns on "both slopes. The Shabin-Daban Pass (91° 35' E), leading from the Abakan "basin into Mongolia, is 6,700 feet high. A main thoroughfare from Abakan -Minusinsk crosses the main ridge from the Us Valley (parallel to the main ridge) to Kyzyl on the Mongolian part of the Yenisei in the Tuva People's Republic, over an unnamed pass 5,655 feet high. North of the main ridge there are a number of secondary ranges.

(f) The Eastern Sayan Range, very sparcely populated and one of the least known areas in Siberia, runs southeastward from a point not far southwest of Krasnoyarsk, unites with the northeast end of the Western Sayan Range and continues southeast along the Mongolian "border to the Dzhida and Selenga Rivers, south of the southwest end of Lake Baikal. Its highest point, Mount Munku-Sardyk, on the "border north of the Mongolian Lake Kosogol or Khubsugul-Dalai, has an elevation of 11,210 feet, and is the source of several of the large glaciers of the range. The few passes are 6,000 to 8,000 feet high. The Eastern Sayan as a rule slopes gently toward the north and east (toward the Irkutsk amphitheater) and steeply toward the upper Yenisei and Lake Kosogol (101° 30f E, in Mongolia). The prevalent forms are massive and rounded, with "broad, level or slightly undulating crests, over which sometimes rise level summits. On the upper parts there are small glaciers and snowfields, "but scattered rocks predominate. The snowline is at 9,^00 feet on the north slope, at 10,000 on the south slope; the timber line, at 6,500-7,100 feet. The Eastern Sayan Range sends out a large number of spurs, 5,000 to 9,500 feet high, northwestward or northward toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

h. The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands.* (l) The general direction of the ridges within this

highland area is from east to west. Those of the Kirgiz Republic abut on the border range (Kok-Shaal-Tau), as the principal rivers here cut

* Map 15.

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across the "border. Those of the Tadzhik Republic are largely separated from the "border range (Saryk-Kol) by rivers (Ak-Su, Ak-Baital, Muz-Kol, Kara-Dzhilga) running parallel to the "border range, and "by Lake Kara-Kol. in the northeast corner of the Republic. However, the valleys themselves lie at elevations of 10,000 to 1^,000 feet, so that the entire territory of the MountainouB Badakhshan (Gorno-Badakhshanskaya) Autonomous Ob last, occupying the eastern half of the Tadzhik Republic, is a single, unbroken mass of highland, the Pamir Highland, measuring some 180-200 miles east to west and 90-110 miles from north to south. A zone with a maximum width of 30 miles on either side of the "border between the Oblast and the western half of Tadzhikistan J.s a vast glacier area, culminating in Stalin Peak (72° E, 59° N), 2^,359 feet high, at the eastern end of the Peter the Great Range (maximum altitude over 20,000, passes 11,000-12,000 feet). It is separated from the Trans-Alai Range by the Muk-Su, indirect tributary of the Amu-Darya. The Darvaz Range, paralleling the Peter the Great Range on the south, is equally high and contains many glaciers.

(2) The eastern half of Tadzhikistan is separated from the Kirgiz Republic by the Trans-Alai (Zaalaiski) Range; the western half by the Alai and Turkestan Ranges. All three have large glacier areas. Lenin (formerly Kaufman) Peak (73° E), 23,162 feet high, is one of the highest points in the Soviet Union. To the west of Lenin Peak is the Ters-Agar Pass, 12,^92 feet high; to the east of it, the Kyzyl-Art Pass, 13>9l6 feet high. The Alai Range, extending along the north side of the Alai Valley (valley of the Kyzyl-Su, Amu-Darya tributary) into Kirgizia as far as the southeast end of the Fergana Range, is the main watershed between the basins of the Syr-Darya and the Amu-Darya. Its principal pass is the Taldyk Pass, 11,860 feet high, which is crossed by an old cart road, now converted into a motor road, leading from Osh, at the head of the Fergana Valley, to the Alai Valley. From the Alai Valley this road continues southward across the Trans-Alai Range by the 13,920-foot high Kyzyl-Art Pass, then along the east side of Lake Kara-Kol, across the 15,315-foot high Ak-Baital Pass, down the Ak-Baital River to the Murgab and across the Naiza-Tash Pass, then westward through the southern part of the High Pamirs through the Alichur Valley, across the 13,600-foot high Tagarkaty Pass and the 1^, 100-foot high Koi-Tezek Pass and finally down the valleys of the Tokuz-Bulak and Gunt Rivers to Khorog (37° 30f W), on the Pyandzh River and the Afghan border. From Murgab, on the Murgab River, a cart road runs up the Ak-Su River valley into the southeast corner of Tadzhikistan.

(3) The Fergana Range, 120 miles long, extends northwestward from the junction of the Alai and Kok-Shaal-Tau Ranges along the northeast side of the Fergana Valley to the Naryn River. It has an average elevation of 1^,000 to 15,000 feet and contains a number of

glaciers. Its northeastern slope is steep, while its southwestern slope descends to the Fergana Valley in broad foothills. The main pass, the 10,800-foot high Kugart Pass, leads from the Kugart Valley above Dzhalalabad, at the head of the Fergana Valley, to the inner Kirgizia course of the Naryn Eiver. Beyond the Naryn River, the Fergana Range is continued northwestward by the 40-mile long Uzun-Akhmat-Tau to the converging point of two other ranges situated in the northwest corner of the Kirgiz Republic: (l) the Chatkal Range (maximum altitude over 15,000 feet), coming from the southwest along the northwest side of the Fergana Valley; (2) the Talas Ala-Tau Range (maximum altitude over 15,000 feet, with many small glaciers), winding in a general east and west direction from the converging point between 71° to 7^° E. This cluster of mountains and the Fergana Range represent the only important exception to the general east-west direction of the principal ridges of Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia. The Kara-Mazar Mountains, a southwestern spur of the Chatkal Range, reach to within a few miles of the Turkestan Ran^e (western continuation of the Alai Range), leaving only a comparatively narrow outlet from the Fergana Valley to the desert plain of Kazakhstan. This fertile and agriculturally developed valley has the form of a roughly oval amphitheater, about 220 miles from east to west and 1^0 miles from north to south, enclosed by the ranges mentioned in this paragraph.

{k) Beyond the railroad, the northwestward direction of the Fergana chain is resumed by the Kara-Tau ("Black Mountain") Range, which protrudes some 250 miles into the sandy desert lowland of Kazakhstan between the Syr-Darya and Chu Rivers, attaining an elevation of 7,000 feet.

(5) The northern boundary of the Kirgiz Republic is . roughly marked by the Kirgiz or Aleksandrovski Range to the west of the Buam Gorge of the Chu River, and by the Kungei Ala-Tau Range to the east of that gorge. The average height of the Kungei Ala-Tau is 9>000 feet, the maximum over 1^,000 feet. East of Lake Issyk-Kul it sends a spur (the Ketmen Range) northeastward along the south side of the H i River into Chinese Turkestan, while the main ridge curves southeastward along the Kirgiz-Kazakh border to the glacier area in the northeast corner of Kirgizia. Lake Issyk-Kul is enclosed on the south by the Terskei Ala-Tau, in which the highest peak is 18,000 feet. Several passes 12,000-15,000 feet high lead over into the Issyk-Kul basin from the north, across the Kungei Ala-Tau, and from the south, across the Terskei Ala-Tau.

(6) The Trans-Ili (Zailiiski) Ala-Tau Range, together with its northwestward extension, the Chu-Ili Mountains, describes a flat curve along the south of the lowland region of Alma-Ata (capital of the Kazakh Republic, formerly Verny), with its center touching the Kungei Ala-Tau in the vicinity of 77° E. It culminates in the 15,900foot high Talgar Peak, southeast of Alma-Ata. An area 20-30 miles

broad around the tangent between these two ranges is covered with numerous glaciers, up to 6 miles in length.

(7) Both the Kirgiz Range and the Trans-Ili Ala-Tau drop steeply to the northern plain and their upper parts are traversed "by a "broad "belt of fir forest, usually wreathed in rain or snow clouds.

i.. The Altai Mountain SyBtem.* The Altai Mountains extend from the northeastern extremity of the Kazakh Republic through the Altai Krai (District) to the western end of the Western Sayan Range (890 E). Their snow covering is heavy and they have numerous glaciers. The snow line is between 10,000 and 7,800 feet.** The Altai ranges become gradually lower toward the north and west where they merge into the steppe land.

(1) The so-called Inner Altai occupies the southern part of the Altai Krai, along and north of the Kazakh border. Its southernmost range, the Kholzun Belki, is 90 miles long, 6,000-9,000 feet high, only a little above the snow line, with small snow fields and hanging glaciers. The summits and watersheds are flat and often swampy. The Kazakh border is continued southeastward by the Listvyaga Range, having a maximum elevation of 8,320 feet and rising little above the timberline.

(2) North of the Listvyaga Range and almost completely encircled by the Katun, Argut and Kok-Su Rivers lie the Katun Belki, the highest mountains in the Russian part of the Altai (as distinguished from the Mongolian part). The average altitude is about 10,000 feet and they are covered with eternal snow throughout their entire length, down to 8,500-7,800 feet on the north slope and to 10,000-8,700 feet on the south slope. In the central and eastern parts there are solid ice caps up to 25 miles in breadth. The Belukha, about 1^,800 feet high on its east summit, 1^,700 feet on its west summit and 13,300 ° n

its saddle, is the tallest peak in the entire Altai. It is located approximately in the middle of the Katun Belki, at the tip of a northward loop in the Kazakh border. The total area of its glaciers is about 23 square miles.

(3) East of the Argut River, the Southern Chuya Belki reach eastward to the Sailyugem border range. They attain their highest point in Mount Dzhan-Iiktu, around 13,000 feet high, and have 5 large

See Map l6.

Because of their more or less extensive covering of perpetual snow, the main ranges are known as "Belki" or "Whites", plural of belok, "the white of an egg or the eye", sometimes also rendered by

U T!

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glaciers. The Northern Chuya Belki, parallel to the Southern Chuya Belki and south of the Chuya River, reach a maximum elevation of 8,000 feet.

(k) The Sailyugem Range, marking the •border between the Altai Krai and Mongolia, extends from the junction of the Kazakh and Mongolian "borders to the Shapshal-Daba Pass, 9,770 feet high, north of Lake Khindiktig (9-0° E, 50° 25' N). Its maximum altitude is 11,800 feet in its east-west section, and 13>800 feet in its north-south section, also called the Chikhachev Range. The post road from the Chuya Valley to the Khobdo "basin runs across the 8,260-foot high Tashentu Pass. On both slopes there are valley glaciers over a mile long and a square mile in area. The main Sailyugem Range is 150 miles long, 9 to 12 miles wide and 10,000 feet high on the average.

(5) North of the Shapshal-Daba Pass, the Sailyugem Range is continued northward by the Shapshal Range, 100 miles long and up to 10,500 feet in height, as far as the northern border of the Altai Krai, where it meets the Western Sayan and Abakan Ranges. It is covered with snow fields. Between the Shapshal Range and the Chulyshman River is the State Altai Preserve or protected area, occupying some 3,800 miles. The Chulyshman River flows through the wild Chulyshman Plateau, J,800-7*90° feet high, covered with erratic blocks, numerous banks and moraine ridges, which have formed many lakes.

(6) From a westward protrusion of the Soviet-Tuva border west of Lake Khindiktig the Sailyugem Range sends westward two arms:

(a) The Kurai Range, 90 miles long and up to 10,700 feet high, continued over 100 miles westward by other ranges having summits above 8,000, with flat tops covered with abundant snow fields;

(b) The Chulyshman Range, (south of the Chulyshman River), 75 miles long, with a maximum elevation of 8,610 feet, reaching to the head of long, narrow Lake Teletskoye (west of 88° E, south of 52° N). This lake is 1,535 feet above sea level, 1*8 by 2-2.5 miles, has a maximum depth of over 1,000 feet, and is surrounded by precipitous mountains, which reach 5,500 feet on the southeastern shore (the Teletski Range).

(7) South of the Kurai Range, in the Chuya Valley, lie arid highland steppes (called Chuya Steppe in the upper part, Kurai Steppe in the lower part, separated by a small spur of the Kurai Range), 35-1*5 miles long, up to 10 miles wide, with dry, sandy and stony soil covered with moraines and river and glacier deposits.

(8) The Abakan Range, over 120 miles long and reaching over 8,000 feet in its southern part, but little over 5,000 feet in the

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north, curves northward "between the east side of Lake Teletskoye and the left shore of the Bolshoi ("Big") Abakan River and forms the watershed between the headwaters of the Yenisei and the Biya, a tributary of the Ob.

(9) The west and east boundaries of the southeastern panhandle of the Novosibirsk Oblast mark the crests of the two northward continuations of the Abakan Range which enclose the Kuznetsk Valley, containing the "Kuzbas" (Kuznetsk Basin) mining and industrial area;

(a) on the west, the gold-bearing Salair Ridge, beginning northeast of Lake Teletskoye. It is 150 miles long, but not high: Mount Kopna, in the north, is less than 2,000 feet high;

(b) on the east, the Kuznetski Ala-Tau (scientific name), known to the natives only under various other names. It reaches elevations of 7^000 feet in its southern part, east of Stalinsfc , but does not exceed 5>000 in its middle, east of Leninsk-Kuznetski, and toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad it gradually passes over into undulating plains. The peaks of the southern part of the Kuznetski Ala-Tau are covered with snow nearly all summer.

3. WEATHER o

a. Temperature. Heat and cold in the entire Soviet Union, except the Black Sea region, are extreme by comparison with most other areas of the world in the same latitudes. This extremeness becomes more pronounced with increasing distance from the tempering influence of the Baltic, North, White and Barents Seas, the Black and Mediterranean Seas, and, to a lesser extent, the Caspian Sea. The Arctic Ocean exercises no such influence because in the winter it is largely insulated from the atmosphere by ice, which further chills the air. In the spring and summer, on the other hand, the melting of the ice covering and ice flows absorbs a considerable amount of the heat generated by the sun in the area above the Arctic Circle or brought into it by the winds. Nevertheless, the winter temperature along the Siberian north coast, even in the mountains, is somewhat warmer than inland, despite cold winds from the continent.

The zones of equal summer temperatures run relatively straight in an easterly direction from the western border of the Soviet Union to the Yenisei, with only one sharp southward dip enclosing the main ridge of the Urals. Only in the Caucasian and Kirgiz-Tadzhik highlands (T'ien Shan and Pamir ranges) do they lose all semblance of symmetry. The zones of equal winter temperatures, on the contrary, describe a distinct curve from the Baltic, White and Barents Seas southeastward toward the Chinese and Mongolian borders, so that

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Leningrad, Moscow and Voronezh lie roughly in the same belt as the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash, with a mean daily temperature "below freezing for 120-150 days, and Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk lie in the same "belt as Karaganda and northeast Kazakhstan, with a mean daily temperature "below freezing for 150-180 days. The region of Lake Peipus, only some 125 miles southwest of Leningrad, has as few days of mean daily temperature below freezing as the north shore of the Caspian Sea and Alma-Ata, namely 110 to 120. These phenomena are due mainly to the fact that the ice-free North and Barents Seas exert an absolutely greater tempering influence in winter than in summer, when their moderating efficiency is reduced by the great masses of icebergs passing into them from the Arctic.

In the larger part of Siberia, average January temperatures are below -k° F, while July temperatures, even in the northern half, sometimes considerably exceed the mean temperatures of the hottest parts of Soviet Central Asia. At Verkhoyansk (in the upper Yana Valley, east of the Lena, only 1° within the Artie Circle), where the lowest temperatures (-9U0 F) in the world, not excluding the polar regions, have been recorded, temperatures as high as 9 ° F have been recorded in June-August; and the mean temperature during the same period is 560

(60.3 in July), though the thermometer has been known to sink to 18° F during that period. At Tomsk the mean June-August temperature is 62°, the maximum 960, the minimum 28°; at Krasnoyarsk, 63.1°, 103° and 2k°, respectively; at Yeniseisk, 62.9°j» 96° and 30°, respectively; at Ashkhabad, in the Kara-Kum Desert, 83.7°> 113° and 53°> respectively; and at Termez, on the Afghan border, 87.3° average and 118° maximum; at Astrakhan, 7^-6°, 110° and U30, respectively. The remarkably hot though short summers throughout Siberia make agriculture possible even beyond the Arctic Circle.

No part of the Soviet Union is absolutely free from frost. Even in Tashkent and the Fergana Valley freezing weather is frequent enough to exclude the profitable raising of citrus fruits, though they are much better protected from the north winds than are the cotton-growing Amu-Darya lowlands. Even the middle course of the Syr-Darya River freezes. In the whole northern hemisphere, the only other rivers that freeze farther south are those of Northern China. On the Caspian shore, the winters are warmer than in the plains and valleys of Soviet Central Asia, since the middle and southern parts of this great inland sea do not freeze, and warm winds are not v&re. Krasnovodsk has a mean January temperature of yj ,h°, as compared with 32.9° at Ashkhabad, and its December-February minimum is 1°, as compared with -lh° at Ashkhabad. The mean summer temperature in the Transcaspian area is above 86° F, considerably higher than at the equator.

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The daily range of temperature in all seasons also "becomes more pronounced in the direction from the tempering seas of the west, and is most extreme in the interior of Siberia and Central Asia. In Western Siberia the influence of the ice in Ob Bay and the Kara Sea on the north and the hot steppes on the south produces rapid fluctuations in temperature over level expanses, and the great areas of swamp increase the danger of night frosts at the 'beginning and end of summer.

b. Frozen Subsoils. West of the Yenisei the line of totally and eternally frozen subsoil runs well above the Arctic Circle (66° 30' N), and there is no area of perpetually frozen subsoil south of 62° N. The southern limit of the zone containing areas of perpetually frozen subsoil curves sharply northwestward from the west side of the Urals and meets the Arctic Circle over 200 miles northeast of Arkhangelsk. But almost immediately east of the Yenisei it drops to the southern border of Siberia, so that no part of the remainder of Siberia, except the Maritime Province, Sakhalin and southern Kamchatka, is without more or less extensive patches of perpetually frozen subsoil, and the line of totally frozen subsoil dips far south of the Arctic Circle to 60° N north of the Okhot Sea. The permanently frozen condition of the subsoil at many places favors agriculture by preventing the draining away of the scant rainfall, but presents the disadvantage that the surface soil is often marshy and acid when not frozen.*

c. Precipitation. A line drawn through Arkhangelsk, Kandalaksha (south side of the Kola Peninsula), Leningrad, the western border of the Soviet Union, Kharkov, Kazan, Molotov (Perm), thence northward to the latitude of Arkhangelsk (650 N) and westward along it, roughly encloses an area in which the yearly precipitation amounts to 5OO-65O millimeters (about 20-25 inches), the greater part of which occurs in the spring and early summer, especially in the central part, containing Leningrad, Moscow, Minsk and Kiev. An approximately equal area, with a yearly precipitation of 400-500 millimeters (15.7-20 inches), extends eastward from the first area to a short distance beyond the Yenisei, northward more or less to the Arctic Circle and southward to the railroad line between Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk, and, in addition, embraces the foothills of the Altai and the Sayan Mountains as far as Lake Baikal. The Altai Mountains themselves and parts of the Sayan Mountains receive 700-800 mm. (27.5-31-5 inches), and some parts of the Western Sayans receive as much as 1,000 mm. (39-4 inches). The ^00-500 mm. zone also extends westward in belts varying in width from

For details of freezes and thaws in the Volga, Yenisei, etc., see under "Hydrography."

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kO to 2^0 miles along the north and south side of the 5OO-56O mm. zone, and reaches down along the east side of the Sea of Azov, the south shore of the Crimea (see belov) and around the foothills of the Northern and Southeastern Major Caucasus.

On the Crimean Peninsula, an anomaly with respect to rainfall, the precipitation increases from less than 300 mm. (11.8 inches) in the north to ^00-500 mm. (15.7-19-9 inches) in the south part of the steppe and in the foothills, and even more in their forested parts. The maximum, about 1,000 mm. (39. *4- inches) falls on the southern mountain ridge (Yaila). In the main, the Crimea is poor in rainfall. Many places suffer from water shortage, sometimes water must be carried from one village to another. The regions of Kerch and Yevpatoriya are particularly dry, but in the latter there is a vast supply of ground water at a depth of 15-30 feet, which is pumped up by large plants. Elsewhere great reservoirs have been built or were under construction before the present war.

The main ridges of the Major Caucasus, save for its eastern extremity, lie in the 500-1*000 m . zone, together with western Transcaucasia (west of the Surami Range). Sukhum has an annual precipitation of 1,000 mm., and the region of Batum (Adzharistan) has 2,^00 mm. (9^-5 inches), the rainfall here being by far the heaviest in the Soviet Union throughout the year and very favorable for the growing of tea. The region of Lenkoran, on the southwest side of the Caspian Sea, receives 1,000 mm., also distributed more or less equally throughout the year. The Armenian plateau, eastern Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan (eastern end of the Caucasus), on the other hand, receive only 250-300 mm. (about 10-12 inches) a year, and require irrigation. The south slope of the Minor Caucasus belongs mostly to this zone, the north slope to the ^00-500 mm. zone.

The Kirgiz, Eungei Ala-Tau and Trans-Ili Eanges of northern Kirgizia, together with the basin of Lake Issyk-Kul and the region around Alma-Ata, are covered by an isolated 500 mm. zone, where 300 mm. of rain fall during the summer half of the year.

Outside the main 1+00-500 mm. zone described above, the amount of precipitation in general diminishes progressively toward the Arctic, Black, Caspian and Aral Seas, and the Lena River valley. Odessa, the northern part of the Crimea, Saratov, Chkalov (Orenburg) and Omsk are in the 300-i<-00 mm. (about 12-16 in.) belt, likewise the Kola Peninsula, Igarka on the lower Yenisei and the greater part of the basins of the Yenisei tributaries, the Upper (Angara), Middle and Lower Tunguska Rivers. The rainfall in Siberia is usually sufficient

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f«r grain and fodder, but there have been occasional catastrophic droughts in the so-called "Siberian Granary", around Tobolsk and Tomsk.

The driest area in the Soviet Union is a 100-mile wide strip extending over 400 miles along the southeast side of the Aral Sea and at a distance of 20-25 miles from it, through the Kyzyl-Kum Desert and across the Amu-Darya River into the Kara-Kum Desert. Here the yearly rainfall amounts to less than 4 inches. In the irrigated Fergana Valley the yearly rainfall is scarcely double that amount, but Tashkent and Stalinabod lie in the 200-300 mm. (about 8-12 in.) belt.

The proportion of precipitation occurring in the summer half of the year increases in general toward the east both in European Russia and in Siberia, though the relative humidity and cloudiness are smaller in Siberia during the summer than in other seasons. In contrast to this general rule, the summer is the dry season in most of Soviet Central Asia. The heaviest.rains in the valleys and foothills of the Central Asian mountains occur in March, April and December. In the mountains themselves it rains above 10,000 feet in summer, and snows heavily throughout the winter. The zone of transition between Siberia and Central Asia is the very dry salt-lake steppe land south of 53° N, embracing the Kazakh Fold-Land and the: Turgai Gates.

Snow Cover. In general, the amount of snowfall decreases from north to south. The north coast of the Kola Peninsula, (with Murmansk), the greater eastern part of Karelia, Leningrad, Moscow, Gorki, Chkalov, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Barnaul, the Altai Mountains, Krasnoyarsk and the Lena, Indigirka and Kolyma basins lie in a zone covered by snow to a maximum depth of 40-60 centimeters (15.7-23.6 inches). Pskov (with Lake Peipus), Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Voronezh, Saratov, Karaganda, the northern (east-west) part of Lake Balkhash, Lake Zaisan (source of the Irtysh), and the Eastern and Western Sayan Mountains have a maximum cover of 20-40 cm. (7.9-15.7 in.), as do also Irkutsk, Lake Baikal, the Stanovoi range in northern Transbaikalia, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

The Kirgiz highland, together with Alma-Ata, and the Major and Minor Caucasus are isolated areas receiving a maximum cover of 20-30 cm. (7.S-11.3 in.), while the remaining southern region receives less than 20 cm. In western Karelia, and in the area enclosed by the roughly semicircular northern limit of the 40-60 cm. zone, the maximum snow cover ranges from 60 to at least 80 cm. (51.5 in.); in the Central Urals and in most of the area between the lower 0b and the Khatanga River (east of the Yenisei) north of 60° N, it reaches 90 cm. (35.4 inches), and even more in the greater part of the interior of this latter area, being the deepest snow cover recorded in the Soviet

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Union outside of Kamchatka, which receives up to 120 cm. (47.2 in.). The Yana River "basin, with Verkhoyansk, is an isolated 30-^0 cm. area.

In large sections of the populated railroad zone of Siberia, the snowfall is unexpectedly scant, "being sometimes insufficient to cover the ground. In the steppe parts of Central Siberia wagons must sometimes "be used all winter instead of sleds. Except for the part of Kazakhstan which extends over the Kazakh Fold-Land into the West Siberian Lowland, Soviet Central Asia has little or no snow cover except in the mountains.

0±' Winds. In general, the winds in the western part of European Russia "blow in from the White and Black Seas and the Atlantic Ocean during the summer months. In early fall they reverse their direction, except in the center. Thus, in the north the prevailing winds are northerly or northeasterly during the summer, southwesterly during the fall. In the center, westerlies prevail both in summer and fall. In the south, westerly or southerly winds are dominant during the summer, while northerly or northeasterly winds prevail in the fall. In the main, the winds are fairly brisk, averaging 8 to 10 miles per hour.

The extreme seasonal (and even daily) fluctuations of temperature resulting from the remoteness of most of Asia from the tempering influence of great bodies of water contribute considerably to a wide seasonal difference in air pressure. In winter, pressure is high over the interior of Asia, averaging highest south of Lake Baikal over Mongolia, from which center the winds tend outward in a clockwise direction* In summer, pressure is generally low over the continent and winds are mostly variable but tend inland.

Most of the cyclones passing from the west along the north of Siberia cannot overcome the resistance of the dense masses of air of the Siberian anticyclone, and upon reaching the area of the lower Yenisei, they turn northeastward along the borders of the anticyclone. Those storms which enter Asiatic Russia from a more southerly quarter either move toward the northeast track or disintegrate. Summer cyclonic storms are relatively infrequent in Western Siberia. The cyclones move usually hO to ^5 miles per hour, and in late winter and spring maintain their identity eastward to the Pacific Coast. The snowfall which accompanies them in winter seldom exceeds four hours, but the strong winds, which sometimes reach hurricane force, churn up clouds of stinging sand and sand-like particles of snow for much longer periods, often continuing for days and involving real dangers for any who venture out in them. These storms, locally called buran or purga, have been compared with the blizzards of the United States prairies, but one experienced American eyewitness declares them to be much worse.

Most of the storms that reach Soviet Central Asia are either offshoots of storms centered much farther north, or else come from the Mediterranean across the Black Sea. Thunderstorms occur in summer, "being most frequent in the mountains. The prevailing high-altitude winds from the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Seas "bring heavy snowfalls to the Alai, Trans-Alai and other ranges along the Kirgiz-Tadzhik "border.

k. HEALTH FACTOKS.

^- General. The enormous number of wounded and the severe losses of medical personnel in action have strained every military medical facility to the utmost. The public health organization in the zone of the interior has "been disrupted "by the drafting of essential personnel into the armed forces and by the migration of refugees. Even under normal conditions, the facilities for the preservation and restoration of health have "been far from adequate to the needs of the civilian population, and every civilian need was treated as strictly secondary to the requirements of the Army. Under present conditions, practically all of the existing facilities have "been diverted to the use of the armed forces, and little, if any, attention can be given to those parts of the population which are not directly engaged in combating the enemy. Deliberately depriving the laboring population of desperately needed food and medical attention has become a bitter military necessity. Not onlj old people and young children, but also industrial workers must be largely left to shift for themselves. However appalling may be the losses to industry through disease and malnutrition, they cannot be so serious as such losses would be to the fighting forces. Although no comprehensive information is available regarding present health conditions among the civilian population, isolated details from first-hand and thoroughly reliable sources are of such an alarming nature as to suggest that the death rate among noncombatants may well be at least as high as it has been among the men in the front lines.

t). Sanitation. Although there are water purification plants in the larger cities, the high rate of enteric diseases indicates either that the facilities are inadequate or that they are poorly operated and supervised. In the combat area, due to the breakdown or demolition of treatment facilities, or to the contamination of streams, lakes and ground-water by human and animal wastes, drinking water is not easily obtainable.

Modern sewage carrying and treatment facilities are lacking in all but a few of the larger cities. In the combat zone contamination of the soil by human excrement is common. Disposal of human

excrement during the winter often proves difficult, and conditions this spring have been unusually bad. The spring thaws disseminate sewage over large areas and contaminate supplies of drinking water.

Eussian troops are required to "bathe at least three times a month, except during the winter months, when they bathe only as the opportunity occurs. Shower trucks, disinfecting stations, etc., are said to be at their disposal, but it is extremely doubtful that they are sufficiently numerous or well organized to serve the entire army adequately.

It is the established policy of the Red Army to billet troops in private houses wherever possible, but its regulations prescribe that they bivouac outside a community if contagious diseases are found in it or if it is within easy reach of enemy fire. When the community is small, first choice of quarters is given to the hospital unit, cavalry needing shed cover, and the staff.

Special attention is paid in the Red Army to the care of the feet and the trimming of toenails. The regulations prescribe that the hair should be cut short, but not shaven (as is done by many Russians in the summer). During the march, soldiers are advised to put white handkerchiefs under their hats, but never to remove their hats. In cold weather, they are advised to wrap paper over their socks and, if possible, to cover their faces with vaseline or grease. They are warned not to sit or lie on the snow during halts. Before a march, especially on a hot day, the troops are directed to drink their fill of water, eat bread well sprinkled with 8 grams of salt ( a little less than a teaspoonful), then drink more water until their thirst is fully quenched. On the march and during the first two short halts no water at all is drunk. On the third short halt, after resting for 5 minutes, 1 to 2 glasses of water are drunk in small swallows, the water being kept in the mouth a long time. During the long halt and also after a rest of 15 to 20 minutes, not more than 2 glasses of water are drunk. The meal during the long halt includes not less than 10 grams (l teaspoon) of salt with bread. After eating and before starting after the long halt, the men drink their fill of water.

£• Medical Facilities. (1) Personnel"! Red Army doctors working at the front

must have military knowledge as well as medical training, and must understand complex military operations. Seven percent of the wounded officers are doctors. More than 50 percent of the Red Army doctors, 75 percent of the dentists and 50 percent of the nurses are women. Almost all the auxiliaries are women. The women who go to the actual

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front are volunteers who are put in special medical brigades. They are expected to endure the same hardships as the men at the front. Every group of 200 men has k men-nurses for first aid. One man in charge of 25 soldiers always remains near them, bandages wounds and also tries to assure protection against a second wound by temporarily sheltering the wounded man in a less exposed place, such as a small trench, until he can be removed to the rear. He must also take immediate measures to protect the wounded against the cold with blankets, sheepskins and chemical warmers.

In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total number of physicians in the Soviet Union as around 110,000, compared with 19,785 in 1913.

(2) Hospitals and Beds. Russian authorities assert that there are between 600 and 1,000 large sanitary bases distributed in the rear of the divisions. They regard the following disposition of beds as a necessary minimum, though it is not known to what extent it is being filled: 15 beds per 100 men in action, 30 percent being in the rear of each army, U5 percent further back from the front and the rest in the hinterland. They claim to have thousands of hospitals averaging 500 beds, and often with as many as 2,000. All treatment is guided by the one aim of sending the men back to the front as soon as possible. Six or eight hospitals are attached to each Army, one or two specializing in radiology, orthopedics, etc. Only those casualties who may be made fit for further service are given special treatment. There is a vast radiological organization, with mobile posts at the front and large centers in the rear. The wounded, after first aid, are picked up on the battlefield as soon as possible and taken to the battalion first aid post, about 500 yards behind, then further back to the regimental post, where they get tea, food, and alcohol. Ambulances for transportation to the rear are heated with coal and contain padded sleeping bags, furs, etc.

In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total number of hospital beds in the Soviet Union as 672,000, compared with 175,500 in 1913. But hospital service has doubtless been preempted by the Army to such an extent that little or none is available to the civilian population.

(3) Medical Supplies. Before the war, medical supplies and equipment were on hand in limited quantities only. It is known that there have been acute shortages in certain medicines and essential laboratory supplies in recent months. Among the supplies most urgently requested from the United States are sulfidine, antitetanic serum, antitoxin serum, novocaine, chlorethyl for narcotic use, and surgical instruments of small dimensions, which have to be renewed very often, such as scalpels, Kocher pincers, etc. ;

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(h) Blood Transfusion. Blood transfusion is very extensively practised. The "blood is collected from "both volunteer and paid donors (60 kopeks per cubic centimeter) in the towns and transported either "by plane or by train in isothermic cases. Ten percent of the wounded need "blood transfusions, "but, owing to transportation difficulties> only 6 or 7 percent receive them. There are "blood donors among the doctors and nurses themselves, who move near the "battlefields with the armies. Blood plasma is often used for transfusions, especially for the purpose of hemostasia. Red Army men are not classified "by type before going to the combat area.

d. Medical Problems. (1) Military Sick and Wounded. The number of sick and

wounded among the Soviet military forces to date is estimated at between 1.5 and 2 million.

(2) Prevalent Diseases. Soviet medical authorities assert that epidemic louse-borne typhus is practically nonexistent on the Russian side, though they state that there are typhus and dysentery in the German Army. Nevertheless, there are reports that epidemics of typhus are occurring in scattered localities in various parts of the Soviet Union. Specifically, it has been observed at Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Moscow (1,000 cases around the beginning of April, 19^2), in the area between Kuibyshev and Chkalov (Orenburg) and at Bukhara (30 deaths a day in April, 19^2). The prevalence of scabies and louse infestation in practically all parts of the Soviet Union and the presence of louse-borne relapsing fever throughout the country indicate that the vector of typhus fever has a universal distribution in Russia and, if the disease has not at present reached epidemic proportions, there is always danger of its doing so.

With few exceptions, the most important disease problems are common to the entire country. Malaria is more or less prevalent in many large areas throughout the Soviet Union, but it is the principal disease problem along the Black Sea coast, parts of the Caspian Sea coast and in the vast and swampy West Siberian Lowland. When serving in highly malarial areas, Soviet troops are given prophylactic anti-malarial drugs. It is not known to what extent these are now available.

In the fall of 193** an experienced American eyewitness found typhus raging in the Altai Mountains of northeastern Kazakhstan and hundreds of people were suffering from malaria. The authorities had not provided quinine, either there or in other parts of Russia at the time, and chronic malaria was setting in.

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The Soviet authorities affirm that venereal diseases have been practically eliminated, though they admit that it is still necessary to maintain numerous venereal disease clinics and hospitals. Gonorrhea and Syphilis have been listed in Soviet statistical tables as the principal venereal diseases, along with some cases of chancroid, lymphogranuloma inguinale and granuloma venereum.

Of the enteric diseases, typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever and bacillary dysentery occur throughout the country, "but amebic dysentery, except for occasional scattered cases, is confined essentially to the south of European Russia and to Soviet Central Asia.

The acute infectious and respiratory diseases, mainly pneumonia, influenza, measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough, diphtheria, epidemic encephalitis and cerebrospinal meningitis, are more prevalent than in the United States.

There are no recent reports of cholera from Russia, though there have been many violent epidemics in the past.

A tick-borne encephalitis is found in the swamps of Central Siberia. Dengue fever, oriental sore and kala-azar occur in the southern part of West Siberia; undulant fever, anthrax, intestinal parasitism, trachoma and echinococous, in the central and southern parts.

Of common occurrence in Soviet Central Asia are kala-azar, oriental sore, dengue fever, sandfly fever, undulant fever, anthrax and echinococcus. A large focus of rodent plague is found along the Afghan border, but no human cases have been reported from this area in recent years.

(3) Climatic Influences. (a) Frostbite, The extreme coldness of the winter

in Northern and Central European Russia and throughout Siberia makes freezing and frostbite an ever present danger for at least four months of the year and adds greatly to the difficulties of caring for the wounded and providing for the water supply, waste disposal and other sanitary measures among large bodies of troops. Among the Polish troops now in training in the southwestern foothills of the Urals, there was an average of 100 cases of second and third degree frostbite in each regiment (3,000 men) per week during the past winter.

(b) Heat Prostration. The summers in Soviet Central Asia are very hot, and troops are subject to heat prostration unless well acclimated.

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5. DISTANCE TABLE.

Air Line Distances from Moscow to

Miles Miles

Alma-Ata 1,925 London 1,550 Ankara 1,200 Magnitogorsk 870 Armavir 510 Molotov (formerely Baku 1,210 Perm) 720 Basra 1,950 Nizhni Tagil 81J-5 Berlin 1,010 Novosibirsk 1,750 Cairo 1,925 Omsk 1,590 Chelyabinsk 950 Reykjavik 1,900 Dnepropetrovsk 565 Rome 1,1*90 Gorki 250 Rostov 600 Irkutsk 2,600 Sevastopol 810 Kabul 2,1^-0 Stalingrad 570 Karaganda 1,520 Stalino 550 Kharkov Kiev

lj-15 1*80

Stalinsk-Kuznetski Sverdlovsk

1,955 890

Krasnoyarsk 2,090 Tula 120 Krivoi Rog 585 Ufa 750 Leningrad 580 Yaroslavl 180

6. VITAL AREAS. (See Map 12.)

a. The vital centers of the U.S.S.R., in their approximate order of importance, are the following:

(1) Moscow - Yaroslavl - Ivanovo - Gorki - Tula. The political, population, industrial, commercial, transportation and communications center of the country.

(2) Leningrad. A great population, industrial and commercial center.

(5) Kharkov - Voroshilovgrad - Rostov - Tanganrog Stalino - Mariupol - Zaporozhye - Krivoi Rog - Dnepropetrovsk. Heavy industry, coal, iron, aluminum, electric power, dense population.

(k) Sverdlovsk - Chelyabinsk - Magnitogorsk - Beloretsk Ishimbai - Ufa - Molotov (Perm) - Solikamsk - Serov - Nizhni Tagil,

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Heavy industry, supplied with coal from Karaganda in northeastern Kazakhstan and from the Kuznetsk Basin; ferrous and nonferrous metals,

(5) Armavir - Krasnodar - Novorossisk - Tuapse Maikop. Oil, agriculture, transportation.

(6) Baku - Makhach - Kala - Grozny. (7) Batumi - Poti - Chiatura - Kutaisi. (8) Tbilisi - Erevan - Leninakan - Kirovakan. (9) Kazan - Kuibyshev -- Syzran, transportation,

agriculture, industry. (10) Stalingrad. (11) Novosibirsk - Kemerovo - Stalinsk.* Heavy industry,

agriculture, iron. (12) Tashkent. Textiles, nonferrous metals, agriculture.

Not shown on map.

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Fortifications.

a. The large system of forts constructed by the Soviets in Western Russia, the so-called Stalin Line, was overrun by the Germans by early July, 19lil, None of these fortifications are in Russian hands at the present time. However, since September, 19hl, literally millions of people have been put to work building field fortifications and trenches along the entire front, as far back as the Volga River, After reaching the Volga this line extends in a general southerly direction along the line of that river. The line has been extended clear into the North Caucasus, Log and earth bunkers, portable concrete pillboxes, barbed wire and mines have been extensively used. Inhabited points—villages, towns and cities—form the centers of resistance. The local population provides the necessary garrison. Thus a defensive zone 500 miles deep has been created.

b. In Northwest Russia the ports of Archangel and Murmansk (and the coast and land areas in their vicinities) are protected by extensive land and sea fortifications (the kinds and extent of these fortifications are indicated by Maps 17 and 18). It may be concluded that the coastal fortifications protecting both ports are too extensive to permit a successful attack from the sea. However, from recent evidence, it may be concluded that the defenses from air attack are inadequate, at least in the case of Murmansk. The vulnerability to air attack arises from the generally poor quality of Soviet antiaircraft defenses, an apparent paucity of interceptor aircraft and lack of heavy bombers for operations against nearby hostile airdromes and installations. Because of the latter deficiencies German land based bombers and long range fighter planes have bombed constantly, heavily and successfully British and United States convoys during the approach to Murmansk and after arrival at the port.

£. The Caucasus Mountain range, arising from the foothills of the North Caucasus and running in a southeast direction about 700 miles from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, forms a tremendous natural barrier against an invasion of Transcaucasia from the north. There are only three passes over the Caucasus, all of which could easily be made inaccessible to an enemy force. The only land routes for bypassing the Caucasus Mountains are the Black Sea coast road or the narrow strip of passable but difficult terrain between the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea coast. Both of these routes, especially the former, are hard for any type of force to traverse and are easily defensible because of their narrowness and the high ground which overlooks them from the land side.

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There is little or no danger that the Caucasus vri.ll be attacked from the Caspian Sea side, while an invasion from the direction of the Black Sea would be met by the extensive fortifications of the Black Sea coast. The Black Sea coast from Batumi to Novorossiisk is fortified with field and coast artillery guns in concealed emplacements. These coastal defenses are concentrated in the vicinities of the principal Black Sea ports and are generally situated at short distances in back of, and parallel to the railroad which runs along most of the Caucasian Blac> 3ea coast. The guns cover the sea approach to the ports as well as landing beaches.

d. The Turkestan frontier, especially near Termez, is protected by a series of forts, mostly two-story concrete block houses. In addition, as is the case with the rest of the USSR, all vulnerable points, such as bridges, are provided with local protection in the form of barbed wire and concrete fortifications, and are constantly guarded. Along the frontier with Turkey there is a wide "no-man's land," backed by extensive land defense installations heavily garrisoned by Soviet troops.

e. Generally speaking, the land fortifications of the USSR are extensive enough to seriously hold up enemy operations and to allow a heavy toll to be taken of the attacking forces. The USSR coast defense installations and fortifications appear to be strong enough to resist any invasion from the sea.

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Table III- USSR Coast and Port Defenses

Name of Place Number of Pieces Caliber of Kind of Range Armament Armament Yards (inches)

NORTHERN WATERS

1. Murmansk (See Map 17) 2. Polyarnoye k

kk

6 >cuns (uncertain) 3 gun*. 3 guns

Kandalaksha 3. Kern U.

6 batteries ? A.A. guns Belomorsk 5.

6. Solovets kk

3 guns 3 guns

7. Archangel: (See Map 18) a.Modyngski Island

b.Yagri Island

hhh

7.1? guns S.I? guns 6 guns

c.2j mi. VJ. of Nikolski Monastery 2 6 guns

d.Modyngski Island, A .A. guns Nikolski Island, Hanni Island, Kego Island, Yagri Island, Molotovsk.

BALTIC SEA

Leningrad: a.Kronstadt 2 3 guns

ii hk

12 32,000 (figures do not include

ii 2U,000 10 u 16,000 21 6practically II 16,000 8 U.7 useless 6, 9

field guns 9,300 3U 3and 11 in. guns, model 58 3 A .A. guns 9,800-12,000

1877) b.Gulf of Finland "~ northeast of

Kronstadt: (1) on islands h 10 guns 2U,00C

l6,00C 10 6 it

15,OQC 1* U.7

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Name of Place Number of Pieces Caliber o Armament (inches)

27-31 3 22 3

(2) on main- U 8 land 12 6

6 U h.l 1U 3

38 32U

BIACK SEA

9. Sevastopol:

md of Armament

field guns A.A. guns guns

it

it

it

tt

field guns A.A. guns

Range Yards

9,300-10,900 9,800-10,900

27,000 16,000 16,UOO 15,000 9,800 9,300 9,800

a.Cape Ulukul (10 miles

hh

12 guns A.A. guns 3

north of Sevastopol)

b.Sevastopol 2 lU guns (from Kacha 8 12 it

River to Cape U 8-12 u Khersonesski) 8 10 it

8 8 ii

8 6 it

8 5.1 II

CVI

8 nU.7

8 II

8 3 ti

12 howitzers 6 ti

hh

h A.A. guns i;8 37 3 it

32 1.5 it

A.A. guns 3 8 guns

hh

c.Cape Feolent d.Balaklava

A.A. guns (15 miles south- 8 kit3east of Sevastopol) h

10 Rostov-on-Don no coast defense batteries

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Name J of Place Number of Pieces Caliber of Kind of Range Armaments Armament Yards (inches)

11. Novorossisk hhh

12 8

guns it

5.1 it (Hqrs. Uth Black Sea Defense Zone)

12. Tuapse

13. Poti liu Batumi

(Hqrs. 6th Black Sea Defense Zone)

CASPIAN SEA

15. Baku

2 (?) 8 (?)

unknown h (?)

2 (8?) 8 (12?) 2

(12?)

9 batteries

6 3

unknown 12

10 6 5.1 U.7

ti

A.A. guns on railway mountings

guns

it

ti

it

ti

8 (1 bat ti

rest unknown

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C Coneluaions as to Fighting Strength.

1- Strength Factors: To be considered in relation to Weakness Factors.

a. Ethnic, historical and political. The distribution of the bulk of the Soviet Union's population west of the Volga allows the development of a solid band of resistance along the entire front. The character of the population, with its extreme linguistic and cultural diversity, is not completely a weakness. Long contacts and intimate admixture, tolerance of regional traditions, limited local autonomy and absence of economic stratification have eliminated significant minority problems. On the contrary, Russian success in ethnic assimilation has been an important aid in the advance of the Soviet Union in Sinkiang, Mongolia and Northwest China.

Emphasis on historical tradition has been a major weapon for the unification of the U.S.S.R. under the Stalin regime. For the past decade, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great have been stressed as national heroes almost to the degree of Lenin and Stalin. The great historical role of Russia, with its constant expansion and grandiose achievements of planning and development, is brought out. The vital importance of powerful personal leadership, national unity and strong--even ruthless--centralized authority in the history of Russia is clear. With them, Russia has been victorious; without them, Russia has crumpled.

The recent history of the U.S.S.R. is especially important. Since Stalin1 s rise to power in 1927 the country has been unified; all dissident elements have been eliminated. All efforts have been directed toward maximum national strength. Propaganda constantly has pounded in the minds of the people the danger of foreign attack. Military conscription has been supplemented by volunteer training which embraced the whole population. The Five-Year Plans--two completed and one in progress at the beginning of the war-attempted to create maximum economic backing for military effort. Although failing to achieve the desired performances and costing enormously in lives and effort, these Plans did succeed in raising the country's war potential to a major extent.

The present government of the U.S.S.R., ostensibly democratic and constitutional, is controlled completely by Stalin. His main instruments of control are the Communist Party and the N.K.V.D.; elected office indicates public approval--as for military heroes--but has little to do with actual administration. The Communist Party, through propaganda, and the N.K.V.D., through fear, execute

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Stalin's will efficiently. Local government in the U.S.S.R. is fluid; units and techniques vary according to current economic and strategic needs.

b. Economic. Despite its losses, the U.S.S.R. is still largely self-sufficient from an economic standpoint. Production of the following essential materials is adequate for minimal military needs: coal, iron ore, crude petroleum, manganese, chromite, magnesite, cotton, timber, platinum, mica, asbestos, potash, boron, phosphates, salt, sulphur and pyrites. Within the next six months, moderate increases in the production of the following materials are possible and probable: iron and steel, copper, lead and zinc, coal, petroleum and aluminum. Potato, cabbage, and oil-producing seed acreages may also be enlarged. Lend-Lease help has diminished shortages especially in nickel, aluminum, ferro-alloys, copper, cloth, and machine tools. Shipping on the Caspian Sea-Volga River route which accounts for at least half the present water traffic of the U.S.S.R., carries over two-thirds of the oil and is thus absolutely vital, has up to now been free from German attacks.

£. Psychological. Two factors maintain the morale of the civilian population of the U.S.S.R. On the one hand, the people are intensely nationalistic and imbued with hatred for the German invaders. On the other, they are used to deprivation and accept extreme hardships with philosophical resignation.

Education and training in the U.S.S.R. have been almost exclusively along lines of practical and military value. In addition to conscription and the compulsory training of the labor reserves, strenuous efforts were being made some time before the war to encourage volunteer participation in defense activities. Popular subscription supported the Osoaviakhim, a society which enabled everyone to learn shooting, flying, skiing, etc., at nominal cost. The technical training of a very small part of the military and civilian population is of a high order. This minority has been responsible for virtually all the technological advancements of the U.S.S.R. Soviet inventions-the Molotov breadbasket (bomb distributor), the rocket bomb, etc.-have been fairly numerous and of decided military significance.

d. Intelligence and counter-intelligence. Soviet counterintelligence work has been outstanding. All incipient fifth-column activity has been vigorously suppressed. The obtaining of information of military importance even by allied and friendly powers is exceedingly difficult.

£• Strength and characteristics of armed forces. Mobilization of reserves and induction of newly trained men have raised the Army in the western front to 270 divisions, with 55 more in training. About 12 million men are in action or in training in various echelons. Production of strictly military supplies plus Lend-Lease aid are sufficient to provide minimal equipment, although inadequate to replace additional heavy losses or to sustain major offensive operations. The efficiency of the small units is good, particularly in defense, although vast differences exist between crack Guard units and mediocre reserves. The engineers and artillery have been excellent; infantry and cavalry, good; tanks, good in close support missions.

The Navy maintains significant combat units only in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Its performance in combined operations--landing, artillery support of coastal defenses, supply and evacuations--has been outstanding.

The Air Forces on the western front number about 5000 airplanes, about 60$ of which are attack planes or light or medium bombers. They are organized into some 30 Air divisions, with total personnel strength of about 120,000. Their missions, which have been performed fairly well, are the close support of ground troops with the destruction of personnel and materiel in the field and the interception of enemy bombers. The purely defensive role of the Air Forces, however, must be stressed.

The home guards have performed essential and heroic services. Men, women and children have rapidly dug and erected large systems of fortification. They have trained in spare hours to serve as army replacements. They have fought tenaciously by the sides of regular troops. After German occupation, they have carried on an active and exhausting guerrilla war.

f. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina. The greatest strength of Soviet tactical doctrines has been their fluidity and openness to experimentation. New ideas--parachutists, tank-riding infantry men, etc.--are always being attempted. At present the following principles appear to be stressed: thorough training of small units, extensive infiltration and careful reconnaissance, coordination of all arms in small combat teams, preparation of deep perpendicular defenses with strong points at inhabited centers.

Stalin's leadership is genuine. His mastery of practical psychology, his intense nationalism, his knowledge of Russia's problems, and his harsh and relentless will place him in the tradition of previous great Russian rulers. Among military men,

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Timoshenko is excellent. A thoroughly trained, capable and unassuming soldier, he was given a leading role in the reorganization of the Army after the Finnish War. He has "been Russia's best commander in the present war. His colleagues and students--Zhukov, Cherevichenko, etc.,--hold other major commands.

The commanders of small units are generally well trained, stern disciplinarians and good leaders. The political commissars are fanatically determined to maintain the resistance of their units. The private soldier is stolid, able to endure extreme hardships, and willing to fight to the finish.

g. Materiel. The major advantageous trends in Soviet materiel design have been the following: ability to operate under adverse conditions; ease of mass production; simplicity of design; ease of operation, maintenance and repair; and minimal use of critical materials. The caliber of guns is as large as possible; mortars, howitzers and guns are sharply distinguished. Within each category, however, each should be multi-purpose, e.g., AA and AT. In vehicles and planes, long operating range and maximum armor are stressed. Maintenance is noteworthy for its improvisation and field repair of major assemblies; fine tooling and delicate work, on the other hand, must always be sent back to the factories. Cold weather maintenance is ingenious and relatively efficient.

h. Logistics. The system of ports, railroads, air fields, roads and communications, although far too thin, was developed (even in Tsarist times) in accordance with strategic and basic economic needs. The Arctic supply route, limited to 80 - 90,000 tons per month during the winter, can handle all the traffic reaching it during the summer. The capacity of the Southern route has been considerably expanded this year, and by the coming winter it should be able to offset the freezing of Archangel. Soviet railroads, despite extreme deficiencies in rolling stock, shortage of trained personnel and severe climatic conditions, carry four times as many tons of goods per mile annually as do the railroads of the United States. Relatively good railroad and supporting road nets exist in the Moscow and--to a lesser degree-Worth Caucasian sectors.

Local supplies of fodder and grain are available to some extent on the front from Tikhvin to Orel from May to September. Manufactures within the combat zone are provided by Leningrad and Moacow. Shipping for the support of forces is available in the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea.

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All able-bodied men from 16 to 50 are required to undergo 110 hours of basic military training over a five months' period. The period of training in troops is thus definitely shortened. On occasion pre-military training units have even engaged in combat. At least five million men, compensating for the war losses to date, have been added to the Soviet Army in this way.

Men, women and children (12 to 55) not in the armed forces, nor engaged in essential industry or agriculture, have been impressed into duty on state or collective farms or tractor stations. The mobilization of human power in the U.S.S.R. is absolutely complete,

Systematic evacuation of personnel and equipment in the face of German advances has raised the potential of unoccupied Russia by about

jl. Geographic. The waters of the U.S.S.R., particularly the Caspian Sea and the Volga and Kama Rivers, are of primary economic importance during the summer months. They relieve the railroads of the transport of much bulk cargo, particularly in lateral transportation. Their importance as barriers, however, is limited to short flood periods; at other times they are very sluggish and often easy to ford. In winter, they may even serve as excellent ice roads. A railroad laid on the ice of Lake Ladoga maintained Leningrad during the winter of 19^1-^2.

The Caucasus Mountains are an important barrier protecting the oil, manganese and other resources of the Trans-Caucasian area. Except for narrow strips along the Black and Caspian Sea coasts, they are proof against major troop movement for most of the year. The Georgian Military Highway, even when free from snow, is easily defended.

No other portion of Russia or Siberia has comparable protection. Nevertheless, the combination of bogs, forests and rolling hills that stretches from Kharkov to the Arctic Sea is an excellent foundation for defensive positions. The Kalinin and Murmansk sectors are particularly difficult for operations.

The principal advantage of Russian weather is tactical. From December to May, mechanized forces are virtually unusable; all heavy traffic must move by roads. Operations off the roads are possible only by ski troops, or specially trained infantry or cavalry. New barriers are created, but many normal barriers--rivers, swamps, etc.-are obliterated. Winter fighting is thus a special art, which the Russians have mastered since the Finnish War. During the thaw, fighting is impossible: troops observed on the Mozhaisk aeotor even at the end of June were up to their waists in mud.

liffil --238—

Over a third of the basic rWf&SFce'a and vital areas of the Soviet Union are east of the Volga and vest of the Yenisei, impenetrable either to German or to Japanese attack. Consequently, so long as the government and the people retain their will to fight, Soviet resistance on a significant scale is possible. The Russians are masters at fortifications: Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Sevastopol bear witness to this fact. The new system of fortifications stretching along the entire front for a depth of 300 miles and more insures the protection of the core of Soviet resistance.

2. Weakness Factors: To be considered in relation to Strength Factors.

a. Ethnic, historical and political. The sparseness of population in the areas of Siberia and Central Asia away from the railroads prevents the full exploitation of the agricultural and mineral resources in those areas. Linguistic diversity in the U.S.S.R. has imposed major educational and administrative problems, since millions of people have only sketchy knowledge of the Russian language.

The extreme centralization of government in Russian history has been a weakness as well as a strength. Grandiose plans have been begun without due consideration. Grave mistakes have been continued because criticism might cause displeasure. Able men have been replaced by sycophants. Power without responsibility has encouraged harsh control or even brutal terrorism. As a result, disruptive influences have always been potentially present in Russian history. When leadership has been capable these influences have been harnessed to national aims--Yermak, an exile, conquered Siberia and presented it to Ivan the Terrible. But when the government is weak and undivided, and alternates from liberalism to terror--as in the days of Nicholas II--then revolution and anarchy arise. No peaceful mechanism for major changes in policy or personnel exists.

The present regime is strong, although even it wavered at the worst of the siege of Moscow. Its mistakes have been costly; the Finnish War is an example. The purges of 1935-37 removed many able officers; the incompetency of such court favorites as Voroshilov and Budyenny before their removal nearly caused Russia's collapse. The executions and famines connected with the forced movements of population for the Five Year and other strategic plans of the U.S.S.R. killed millions of innocent Kulaks, Poles, etc., as well as creating untold misery. Stalin has seen to it that no other man in the U.S.S.R. can replace him.

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b. Economic. Losses in the present war have amounted to about 35$ of the total productive capacity of the U.S. S.R. The food situation especially is critical: even with maximal expansion of acreage and favorable weather a grain shortage of 2,000,000 tons is probable. Lend-Lease shipments of food have lagged. Marked shortages of the following materials are found: mercury, nickel, tungsten, tin, molybdenum, antimony, lead, zinc, rubber, aviation gasoline, lubricating oil, machine tools, machinery, trucks, tractors, wheat, sugar, hides end leather, electrodes and abrasives; chemicals and medicines. The number of horses is considerably below army, agricultural and transport needs. Increases in the production of tin, tungsten, antimony, molyb-. denum, manganese and mercury are highly improbable. Russian shipping for the Arctic and Southern supply routes is trifling; almost all supplies must be brought in foreign bottoms.

£. Psychological. The morale of the Soviet civil population has endured severe shocks: disillusionment in the initial perform ance of the Red Army; dismay at the loss of prize Soviet achievements— Dnieprstroi, the Kharkov industrial works—and cherished historical centers—Kiev, Novgorod; extreme suffering in the course of evacuation— exposure, disease, starvation. The grim determination of the Russians despite these shocks is astounding; how many more can be withstood is unknown.

The general level of education in the U.S.S.R. is still very low; barely 20$ are more than semi-literate. While strenuous efforts have been made to increase the number of technicians, particularly on the railroads and in industry, the shortage remains critical. Beyond this, the national habit of ambitious planning and haphazard execution makes real grasp of new techniques or inventions difficult. Invention generally has been held back by the lack of experimental means and a real machine tool industry, and by political interference.

d. Intelligence. While Soviet intelligence abroad, both through military channels and the Communist Party, has been able to gain an enormous amount of detailed information, e.g., concerning U.S. materiel, the conclusions drawn have often been erroneous. The strength of the Communist Party in Germany and in Finland was over-estimated, and the unity of the two countries was badly misjudged. The German attack on June 22, 1941, caught the Soviet Air Force particularly unprepared, so that many planes were destroyed on the ground.

1 e. Strength and characteristics of armed forces. On June 23, 1942, the Soviet Information Bureau admitted 4,500,000 casualties and 22,000 guns, 15,000 tanks and 9,000 (too low) planes lost

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since the beginning of the war- This loss was equivalent to the entire first-line strength of the U.S.S.R. a year ago.

In operations, staff work, liaison and communications have been poor. Bombardment aviation, both land and naval, has been negligible.

L' Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina. The blitzkrieg doctrine popular in the U.S.S.R, before the war nearly proved its undoing. The Russian units massed on the western front for offensive operations, unprepared for defense, were readily encircled. Hasty commitment of tank and air reserves--as at Sianlai-resulted in enormous losses. The blitzkrieg doctrine had to be discarded.

Far too many politicians dominated the Red Army in June, 19^1. Budyenny's reliance upon river barriers, his rudimentary ideas of flank security, and his lack of appreciation of the capabilities of tanks and combat engineers led to disaster in the Ukraine. Voroshilov was considerably more competent; lack of aggressiveness was his principal defect. Fortunately, these and other politicians have been replaced by abler leaders.

g. Materiel. The development of Soviet materiel has been seriously retarded by dependence upon foreign prototypes, and the lack of taps and dies. As a result, most models are obsolescent; changes in motors and frames have been particularly slow. As a whole the peak performances of Soviet materiel are below those of other nations.

Losses and Lend-Lease aid have thoroughly complicated materiel. By October, 19^1, even Renault tanks were being pressed into service. The United States and Britain have added five new types of tanks alone. A crowning touch has been the use of German vehicles captured during the winter campaign. Consequently, the problems of organization, supply, maintenance and replacement are virtually inseparable.

Soviet mechanics are interested only in keeping their materiel in action; the quality of performance is incidental.

h. Logistics. The capacity of railroads and roads to the front strains to maintain the present forces; full simultaneous use of Russia's manpower is logistically impossible. In fact, only in the Moscow and Rostov sectors can rapid troop movements on a major scale take place. Elsewhere a static defense in great depth is forced on the Russians. This condition is aggravated for tanks, artillery

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and other heavy materiel in the winter when railroad traffic is reduced by

The number of commercial trucks or of air transports available is negligible. Communications are poor.

The present armed strength in the army approaches the maximum available. Labor shortage is already acute: the total labor pool--28 million plus 10 million auxiliary works--is only two-thirds of the United States maximum.

A* Vulnerable objectives, A number of vital objectives are open to heavy German air attacks, The Arctic supply route passes close to the northern coast of Norway, Murmansk and the Murman railroad are subject to constant raids.

Air and artillery bombardment did important damage to aircraft and armaments factories in Moscow and Leningrad. While damage at Stalingrad and in the Worth Caucasus has been scattered to date, even small German advances would place this area, and the connecting Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk railroad within deadly operational range.

A' Geographic. The climate of the U.S.S.R. is a serious economic handicap. The severe winters cut off river transport except over the ice, reduce railroad traffic by hO^o, and choke hydroelectric power. The spring thaws and floods cause immense damage to transportation above all; serious health hazards also arise. Both insufficient and excessive precipitation are dangers; the granary of West Siberia is subject both to devastating droughts and to rot in the fields.

Health conditions in the U.S.S.R. are incredibly bad. It is probable that civilian deaths in this war have equaled the number lost in action. Nutrition has been barely over the starvation level, quantitatively and qualitatively. The severe housing shortage has been aggravated by large scale movements of population. Typhus on a large scale has been reported from Moscow to Tashkent, Cholera epidemics are expected this summer.

5. Conclusions. Potentially, the U.S.S.R. is the strongest military power in the world. At the present time, despite grave losses, Soviet manpower, materiel and productive resources are still considerable. Even more: ,the military strength of Russia has been historically determined by the leadership, strength and stability of the government. Today, under Stalin, these are at a high level of forcefulness. Consequently, while the Soviet Union may well be forced to yield additional territory to Germany before the end of

the year, and while a Japanese attack would be a major blow, Russian resistance should "be adequate to maintain a vigorous fight and to protect its vital centers. On the other hand, the U,S.S.R., without great amounts of material and considerable numbers of first-rate troops from the U.S. and Britain, does not have the power either to expel the Germans from its territory or to open up effectively a Pacific theater

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u L-L Determination of Fighting Strength USSR 1942

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