FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 113388. September 5, 1997]ANGELITA MANZANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and MELECIA MADOLARIA, as Assignor to NEW UNITED FOUNDRY MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents

FACTS:The petitioner filed an action for the cancellation of Letters of Patent covering a gas burner registered in the name of responded Melecia Madolaria who subsequently assigned the letter of patent to United Foundry. Petitioner alleged that the private respondent was not the original, true and actual inventor nor did she derive her rights from the original, true and actual inventor of the utility model covered by the letter of patent; further alleged that the utility model covered by the subject letter of patent had been known or used by others in the Philippines for than one (1) year before she filed her application for letter of patent on Dec1979. For failure to present substantive proof of her allegations, the lower court and Court of Appeals denied the action for cancellation. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the respondent court wrongfully denied the cancellation of letter of patent registered under the private respondent.

HELD: No. The issuance of such patent creates a presumption which yields only to clear and cogent evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor. The burden of proving want of novelty is on him who avers it and the burden is a heavy one which is met only by clear and satisfactory proof which overcomes every reasonable doubt. Clearly enough, the petitioner failed to present clear and satisfactory proof to overcome every reasonable doubt to afford the cancellation of the patent to the private respondent.

The primary purpose of the patent system is not the reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts and sciences. The function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge and one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions. This is a matter which is properly within the competence of the Patent Office the official action of which has the presumption of correctness and may not be interfered with in the absence of new evidence carrying thorough conviction that the Office has erred. Since the Patent Office is an expert body preeminently qualified to determine questions of patentability, its findings must be accepted if they are consistent with the evidence, with doubts as to patentability resolved in favor of the Patent Office.[1]Petitioner Angelita Manzano filed with the Philippine Patent Office on 19 February 1982 an action for the cancellation of Letters Patent No. UM-4609 for a gas burner registered in the name of respondent Melecia Madolaria who subsequently assigned the letters patent to New United Foundry and Manufacturing Corporation (UNITED FOUNDRY, for brevity). Petitioner alleged that (a) the utility model covered by the letters patent, in this case, an LPG gas burner, was not inventive, new or useful; (b) the specification of the letters patent did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended; (c) respondent Melecia Madolaria was not the original, true and actual inventor nor did she derive her rights from the original, true and actual inventor of the utility model covered by the letters patent; and, (d) the letters patent was secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation. In support of her petition for cancellation petitioner further alleged that (a) the utility model covered by the letters patent of respondent had been known or used by others in the Philippines for more than one (1) year before she filed her application for letters patent on 9 December 1979; (b) the products which were produced in accordance with the utility model covered by the letters patent had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one (1) year before the application for patent therefor was filed.Petitioner presented the following documents which she correspondingly marked as exhibits: (a) affidavit of petitioner alleging the existence of prior art, marked Exh. A; (b) a brochure distributed by Manila Gas Corporation disclosing a pictorial representation of Ransome Burner made by Ransome Torch and Burner Company, USA, marked Exh. D; and, (c) a brochure distributed by Esso Gasul or Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., of the Philippines showing a picture of another similar burner with top elevation view and another perspective view of the same burner, marked Exh. E.Testifying for herself petitioner narrated that her husband Ong Bun Tua worked as a helper in the UNITED FOUNDRY where respondent Melecia Madolaria used to be affiliated with from 1965 to 1970; that Ong helped in the casting of an LPG burner which was the same utility model of a burner for which Letters Patent No. UM-4609 was issued, and that after her husbands separation from the shop she organized Besco Metal Manufacturing (BESCO METAL, for brevity) for the casting of LPG burners one of which had the configuration, form and component parts similar to those being manufactured by UNITED FOUNDRY. Petitioner presented in evidence an alleged model of an LPG burner marked Exh. K and covered by the Letters Patent of respondent, and testified that it was given to her in January 1982 by one of her customers who allegedly acquired it from UNITED FOUNDRY. Petitioner also presented in evidence her own model of an LPG burner called Ransome burner marked Exh. L, which was allegedly manufactured in 1974 or 1975 and sold by her in the course of her business operation in the name of BESCO METAL. Petitioner claimed that this Ransome burner (Exh. L) had the same configuration and mechanism as that of the model which was patented in favor of private respondent Melecia Madolaria. Also presented by petitioner was a burner cup of an imported Ransome burner marked Exh M which was allegedly existing even before the patent application of private respondent.Petitioner presented two (2) other witnesses, namely, her husband Ong Bun Tua and Fidel Francisco. Ong testified that he worked as a helper in the UNITED FOUNDRY from 1965 to 1970 where he helped in the casting of LPG burners with the same form, configuration and mechanism as that of the model covered by the Letters Patent issued to private respondent. Francisco testified that he had been employed with the Manila Gas Corporation from 1930 to 1941 and from 1952 up to 1969 where he retired as supervisor and that Manila Gas Corporation imported Ransome burners way back in 1965 which were advertised through brochures to promote their sale.Private respondent, on the other hand, presented only one witness, Rolando Madolaria, who testified, among others, that he was the General Supervisor of the UNITED FOUNDRY in the foundry, machine and buffing section; that in his early years with the company, UNITED FOUNDRY was engaged in the manufacture of different kinds of gas stoves as well as burners based on sketches and specifications furnished by customers; that the company manufactured early models of single-piece types of burners where the mouth and throat were not detachable; that in the latter part of 1978 respondent Melecia Madolaria confided in him that complaints were being brought to her attention concerning the early models being manufactured; that he was then instructed by private respondent to cast several experimental models based on revised sketches and specifications; that private respondent again made some innovations; that after a few months, private respondent discovered the solution to all the defects of the earlier models and, based on her latest sketches and specifications, he was able to cast several models incorporating the additions to the innovations introduced in the models. Various tests were conducted on the latest model in the presence and under the supervision of Melecia Madolaria and they obtained perfect results. Rolando Madolaria testified that private respondent decided to file her application for utility model patent in December 1979.On 7 July 1986 the Director of Patents Cesar C. Sandiego issued Decision No. 86-56 denying the petition for cancellation and holding that the evidence of petitioner was not able to establish convincingly that the patented utility model of private respondent was anticipated. Not one of the various pictorial representations of business clearly and convincingly showed that the devices presented by petitioner was identical or substantially identical with the utility model of the respondent. The decision also stated that even assuming that the brochures depicted clearly each and every element of the patented gas burner device so that the prior art and patented device became identical although in truth they were not, they could not serve as anticipatory bars for the reason that they were undated. The dates when they were distributed to the public were not indicated and, therefore, were useless prior art references. The records and evidence also do not support the petitioners contention that Letters Patent No. UM-4609 was obtained by means of fraud and/or misrepresentation. No evidence whatsoever was presented by petitioner to show that the then applicant Melecia Madolaria withheld with intent to deceive material facts which, if disclosed, would have resulted in the refusal by the Philippine Patent Office to issue the Letters Patent under inquiry.Petitioner elevated the decision of the Director of Patents to the Court of Appeals which on 15 October 1993 affirmed the decision of the Director of Patents. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in relying on imaginary differences which in actuality did not exist between the model of private respondent covered by Letters Patent No. UM-4609 and the previously known model of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and Manila Gas Corporation, making such imaginary differences grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (b) in rendering judgment based on misapprehension of facts; (c) in relying mainly on the testimony of private respondents sole witness Rolando Madolaria; and, (d) in not canceling Letters Patent No. UM-4609 in the name of private respondent.Petitioner submits that the differences cited by the Court of Appeals between the utility model of private respondent and the models of Manila Gas Corporation and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., are more imaginary than real. She alleges that based on Exhs. E, E-1, F and F-1 or the brochures of Manila Gas Corporation and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., presented by petitioner, the cup-shaped burner mouth and threaded hole on the side are shown to be similar to the utility model of private respondent. The exhibits also show a detachable burner mouth having a plurality of upwardly existing undulations adopted to act as gas passage when the cover is attached to the top of said cup-shaped mouth all of which are the same as those in the patented model. Petitioner also denies as substantial difference the short cylindrical tube of the burner mouth appearing in the brochures of the burners being sold by Manila Gas Corporation and the long cylindered tube of private respondents model of the gas burner.Petitioner argues that the actual demonstration made during the hearing disclosed the similarities in form, operation and mechanism and parts between the utility model of private respondent and those depicted in the brochures. The findings of the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals that the brochures of Manila Gas Corporation and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., are undated cannot overcome the fact of their circulation before private respondent filed her application for utility model patent. Petitioner thus asks this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., disappeared before 1979 and reappeared only during the Martial Law years as Petrophil Corporation. Petitioner also emphasizes that the brochures indicated the telephone number of Manila Gas Corporation as 5-79-81 which is a five (5) numbered telephone number existing before 1975 because telephones in Metro Manila started to have six (6) numbers only after that year.Petitioner further contends that the utility model of private respondent is absolutely similar to the LPG burner being sold by petitioner in 1975 and 1976, and also to the Ransome burner depicted in the old brochures of Manila Gas Corporation and Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., fabricated by Ransome Torch and Burner Company of Oakland, California, USA, especially when considered through actual physical examination, assembly and disassembly of the models of petitioner and private respondent. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for disregarding the testimonies of Ong Bun Tua and Fidel Francisco for their failure to produce documents on the alleged importation by Manila Gas Corporation of Ransome burners in 1965 which had the same configuration, form and mechanism as that of the private respondents patented model.Finally, it is argued that the testimony of private respondents lone witness Rolando Madolaria should not have been given weight by the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals because it contained mere after-thoughts and pretensions.We cannot sustain petitioner. Section 7 of RA No. 165, as amended, which is the law on patents, expressly provides -Sec. 7. Inventions patentable. Any invention of a new and useful machine, manufactured product or substance, process or an improvement of any of the foregoing, shall be patentable.Further, Sec. 55 of the same law provides -Sec. 55. Design patents and patents for utility models. - (a) Any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture and (b) any new model of implements or tools or of any industrial product or of part of the same, which does not possess the quality of invention, but which is of practical utility by reason of its form, configuration, construction or composition, may be protected by the author thereof, the former by a patent for a design and the latter by a patent for a utility model, in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and requirements as relate to patents for inventions insofar as they are applicable except as otherwise herein provided.The element of novelty is an essential requisite of the patentability of an invention or discovery. If a device or process has been known or used by others prior to its invention or discovery by the applicant, an application for a patent therefor should be denied; and if the application has been granted, the court, in a judicial proceeding in which the validity of the patent is drawn in question, will hold it void and ineffective.[2] It has been repeatedly held that an invention must possess the essential elements of novelty, originality and precedence, and for the patentee to be entitled to the protection the invention must be new to the world.[3]In issuing Letters Patent No. UM-4609 to Melecia Madolaria for an LPG Burner on 22 July 1981, the Philippine Patent Office found her invention novel and patentable. The issuance of such patent creates a presumption which yields only to clear and cogent evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor. The burden of proving want of novelty is on him who avers it and the burden is a heavy one which is met only by clear and satisfactory proof which overcomes every reasonable doubt.[4] Hence, a utility model shall not be considered new if before the application for a patent it has been publicly known or publicly used in this country or has been described in a printed publication or publications circulated within the country, or if it is substantially similar to any other utility model so known, used or described within the country.[5]As found by the Director of Patents, the standard of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of legality of the issuance of UM-4609 to respondent Madolaria was not legally met by petitioner in her action for the cancellation of the patent. Thus the Director of Patents explained his reasons for the denial of the petition to cancel private respondents patent -Scrutiny of Exhs. D and E readily reveals that the utility model (LPG Burner) is not anticipated. Not one of the various pictorial representations of burners clearly and convincingly show that the device presented therein is identical or substantially identical in construction with the aforesaid utility model. It is relevant and material to state that in determining whether novelty or newness is negatived by any prior art, only one item of the prior art may be used at a time. For anticipation to occur, the prior art must show that each element is found either expressly or described or under principles of inherency in a single prior art reference or that the claimed invention was probably known in a single prior art device or practice. (Kalman v. Kimberly Clark, 218 USPQ 781, 789)Even assuming gratia arguendi that the aforesaid brochures do depict clearly on all fours each and every element of the patented gas burner device so that the prior art and the said patented device become identical, although in truth they are not, they cannot serve as anticipatory bars for the reason that they are undated. The dates when they were distributed to the public were not indicated and, therefore, they are useless prior art references.Furthermore, and more significantly, the model marked Exh. K does not show whether or not it was manufactured and/or cast before the application for the issuance of patent for the LPG burner was filed by Melecia Madolaria.With respect to Exh. L, petitioner claimed it to be her own model of LPG burner allegedly manufactured sometime in 1974 or 1975 and sold by her in the course of her business operation in the name of Besco Metal Manufacturing, which burner was denominated as Ransome burner But a careful examination of Exh. L would show that it does not bear the word Ransome which is the burner referred to as the product being sold by the Petitioner. This is not the way to prove that Exh. L anticipates Letters Patent No. UM-4609 through Exhs. C and D. Another factor working against the Petitioners claims is that an examination of Exh. L would disclose that there is no indication of the time or date it was manufactured. This Office, thus has no way of determining whether Exh. L was really manufactured before the filing of the aforesaid application which matured into Letters Patent No. UM-4609, subject matter of the cancellation proceeding.At this juncture, it is worthwhile to point out that petitioner also presented Exh. M which is the alleged burner cup of an imported Ransome burner. Again, this Office finds the same as unreliable evidence to show anticipation. It observed that there is no date indicated therein as to when it was manufactured and/or imported before the filing of the application for issuance of patent of the subject utility model. What is more, some component parts of Exh. M are missing, as only the cup was presented so that the same could not be compared to the utility model (subject matter of this case) which consists of several other detachable parts in combination to form the complete LPG burner.It must likewise be pointed out that Ong Bun Tua testified on the brochures allegedly of Manila Gas and of Esso Gasul marked Exhs. E and F and on the alleged fact that Manila Gas Corporation was importing from the United States Ransome burners. But the same could not be given credence since he himself admitted during cross- examination that he has never been connected with Manila Gas Corporation. He could not even present any importation papers relating to the alleged imported ransome burners. Neither did his wife.The above findings and conclusions of the Director of Patent were reiterated and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[7]The validity of the patent issued by the Philippine Patent Office in favor of private respondent and the question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulness of the improved model of the LPG burner are matters which are better determined by the Patent Office. The technical staff of the Philippine Patent Office composed of experts in their field has by the issuance of the patent in question accepted private respondents model of gas burner as a discovery. There is a presumption that the Office has correctly determined the patentability of the model[8] and such action must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary.The rule is settled that the findings of fact of the Director of Patents, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has failed to show compelling grounds for a reversal of the findings and conclusions of the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals.The alleged failure of the Director of Patents and the Court of Appeals to accord evidentiary weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioner showing anticipation is not a justification to grant the petition. Pursuant to the requirement of clear and convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption of validity of a patent, it has been held that oral testimony to show anticipation is open to suspicion and if uncorroborated by cogent evidence, as what occurred in this case, it may be held insufficient. Finally, petitioner would want this Court to review all over again the evidence she presented before the Patent Office. She argues that contrary to the decision of the Patent Office and the Court of Appeals, the evidence she presented clearly proves that the patented model of private respondent is no longer new and, therefore, fraud attended the acquisition of patent by private respondent.It has been held that the question on priority of invention is one of fact. Novelty and utility are likewise questions of fact. The validity of patent is decided on the basis of factual inquiries. Whether evidence presented comes within the scope of prior art is a factual issue to be resolved by the Patent Office.[10] There is question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation.[11]Time and again we have held that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and credibility of witnesses presented before the lower tribunal or office. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, its findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Philippine Patent Office is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitionerG.R. No. L-32160 January 30, 1982AGUAS v. DE LEON 1982FACTS:Conrado G. de Leon filed a complaint for infringement of patent against Domiciano A. Aguas and F. H. Aquino and Sons alleging that being the original first and sole inventor of certain new and useful improvements in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles. He claims that Aguas infringed his patent by making, using and selling tiles embodying said patent invention and that Aquino & Sons is guilty of infringement by making and furnishing to the defendant Aguas the engravings, castings and devices designed and intended of tiles embodying De Leon s patented invention; that he has given direct and personal notice to the defendants of their said acts of infringement and requested them to desist, but nevertheless, defendants have refused and neglected to desist and have disregarded such request, and continue to so infringe causing great and irreparable damage to plaintiff; Aguas on the other hand contended that plaintiffs patent for the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles is invalid because said alleged process is not an invention or discovery as the same has already been used by tile manufacturers both abroadand in this country. Trial court favored De Leon, an appeal was brought to CA which affirmed the same. Hence this petition was filed by Aguas.ISSUE: WON a process pertaining to an improvement of the old process of tile making is patentable; and if such, was there an infringement?HELD: De Leon never claimed to have invented the process of tile-making. Although some of the steps or parts of the old process of tile making were described therein, there were novel and inventive features mentioned in the process. The records disclose that de Leon's process is an improvement of the old process of tile making. The tiles produced from de Leon's process are suitable for construction and ornamentation, which previously had not been achieved by tiles made out of the old process of tile making. De Leon's invention has therefore brought about a new and useful kind of tile. De Leons improvement is indeed inventive and goes beyond the exercise of mechanical skill. He has introduced a new kind of tile for a new purpose. He has improved the old method of making tiles and pre-cast articles which were not satisfactory because of an intolerable number of breakages, especially if deep engravings are made on the tile. He has overcome the problem of producing decorative tiles with deep engraving, but with sufficient durability.

Durability in spite of the thinness and lightness of the tile, is assured, provided that a certain critical depth is maintained in relation to the dimensions of the tile. What is in issue here is the process involved in tile making and not the design, the processand/or improvement is indeed patentable. As shown by the facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the petitioner Domiciano A. Aguas did infringe de Leon' spatent by making, using and selling tiles embodying said patent invention

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. NO. 37824-R entitled "Conrado G. de Leon, plaintiff-appelle vs. Dominciano Aguas and F.H. Aquino and Sons, defendants-appellants," the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, with the modification that plintiff-applee's award of moral damages is hereby redured to P3,000.00, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, in all othe respects, with costs against appellants. 1

On April 14, 1962, Conrado G. de Leon filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City a complaint for infringement of patent against Domiciano A. Aguas and F. H. Aquino and Sons alleging that being the original first and sole inventor of certain new and useful improvements in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles, he lawfully filed and prosecuted an application for Philippine patent, and having complied in all respects with the statute and the rules of the Philippine Patent Office, Patent No. 658 was lawfully granted and issued to him; that said invention was new, useful, not known or used by others in this country before his invention thereof, not patented or described in any printed publication anywhere before his invention thereof, or more than one year prior to his application for patent thereof, not patented in any foreign country by him or his legal representatives on application filed more than one year prior to his application in this country; that plaintiff has the exclusive license to make, use and sell throughout the Philippines the improvements set forth in said Patent No. 658; that the invention patented by said Patent No. 658 is of great utility and of great value to plaintiff and of great benefit to the public who has demanded and purchased tiles embodying the said invention in very large quantities and in very rapidly increasing quant ies; that he has complied with the Philippine statues relating to marking patented tiles sold by him; that the public has in general acknowledged the validity of said Patent No. 658, and has respected plaintiff's right therein and thereunder; that the defendant Domiciano A. Aguas infringed Letters of Patent No. 658 by making, using and selling tiles embodying said patent invention and that defendant F. H. Aquino & Sons is guilty of infringement by making and furnishing to the defendant Domiciano A. Aguas the engravings, castings and devices designed and intended of tiles embodying plaintiff;s patented invention; that he has given direct and personal notice to the defendants of their said acts of infringement and requested them to desist, but nevertheless, defendants have refused and neglected to desist and have disregarded such request, and continue to so infringe causing great and irreparable damage to plaintiff; that if the aforesaid infringement is permitted to continue, further losses and damages and irreparable injury will be sustained by the plaintiff; that there is an urgent need for the immediate issuance of a preliminary injunction; that as a result of the defendants' wrongful conduct, plaintiff has suffered and the defendants are liable to pay him, in addition to actual damages and loss of profits which would be determined upon proper accounting, moral and exemplary or corrective damages in the sum of P90,000.00; that plaintiff has been compelled to go to court for the protection and enforcement of his and to engage the service of counsel, thereby incurring attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the sum of P5,000.00. 2

On April 14, 1962, an order granting the plaintiff's petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. 3

On May 23, 1962, the defendant Domiciano A. Aguas filed his answer denying the allegations of the plaintiff and alleging that: the plaintiff is neither the original first nor sole inventor of the improvements in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles, the same having been used by several tile-making factories in the Philippines and abroad years before the alleged invention by de Leon; that Letters Patent No. 658 was unlawfully acquired by making it appear in the application in relation thereto that the process is new and that the plaintiff is the owner of the process when in truth and in fact the process incorporated in the patent application has been known and used in the Philippines by almost all tile makers long before the alleged use and registration of patent by plaintiff Conrado G. de Leon; that the registration of the alleged invention did not confer any right on the plaintiff because the registration was unlawfully secured and was a result of the gross misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff that his alleged invention is a new and inventive process; that the allegation of the plaintiff that Patent No. 658 is of great value to plaintiff and of great benefit to the public is a mere conclusion of the plaintiff, the truth being that a) the invention of plaintiff is neither inventive nor new, hence, it is not patentable, b) defendant has been granted valid patents (Patents No. 108, 109, 110 issued on December 21, 1961) on designs for concrete decorative wall tiles; and c) that he can not be guilty of infringement because his products are different from those of the plaintiff. 4

The trial court rendered a decision dated December 29, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants:

1.Declaring plaintiff's patent valid and infringed:

2.Granting a perpetual injunction restraining defendants, their officers, agents, employees, associates, confederates, and any and all persons acting under their authority from making and/or using and/or vending tiles embodying said patented invention or adapted to be used in combination embodying the same, and from making, manufacturing, using or selling, engravings, castings and devises designed and intended for use in apparatus for the making of tiles embodying plaintiff's patented invention, and from offering or advertising so to do, and from aiding and abetting or in any way contributing to the infringement of said patent;

3.Ordering that each and all of the infringing tiles, engravings, castings and devices, which are in the possession or under the control of defendants be delivered to plaintiff;

4.Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff the following sums of money, to wit:

(a)P10,020.99 by way of actual damages;(b)P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;(c)P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;(d)P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and(e)costs of suit. 5

The defendant Domiciano Aguas appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors. 6

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S PATENT FOR THE 'PROCESS OF MAKING MOSAIC PRE-CAST TILE' IS INVALID BECAUSE SAID ALLEGED PROCESS IS NOT AN INVENTION OR DISCOVERY AS THE SAME HAS ALREADY LONG BEEN USED BY TILE MANUFACTURERS BOTH ABROAD AND IN THIS COUNTRY.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PATENT OF PLAINTIFF IS VALID BECAUSE IT IS AN IMPROVEMENT OR THE AGE-OLD TILE MAKING SYSTEM.

IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S LETTERS PATENT NO. 658, EXHIBIT L, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE PATENT LAW, REPUBLIC ACT 165.

IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT DOMICIANO A. AGUAS IS GUILTY OF INFRINGEMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF'S PATENT IS NOT A VALID ONE.

V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NEVER BE GUILTY OF INFRINGEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PATENT BECAUSE EVEN IN MATTERS NOT PATENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF - LIKE THE COMPOSITION AND PROPORTION OF INGREDIENTS USED AND THE STRUCTURAL DESIGNS OF THE MOULD AND THE TILE PRODUCED - THAT OF THE DEFENDANT ARE DIFFERENT.

VI THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANT, INSTEAD OF THE PLAINTIFF, LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

On August 5, 1969, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee's award of moral damages was reduced to P3,000.00. The petitioner assigns the following errors supposedly committed by the Court of Appeals:

It is now respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors involving questions of law, to wit:

First error. When it did not conclude that the letters patent of the respondent although entitled on the cover page as a patent for improvements, was in truth and in fact, on the basis of the body of the same, a patent for the old and non-patentable process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles;

Second error. When it did not conclude from the admitted facts of the case, particularly the contents of the letters patent, Exh. L and the pieces of physical evidence introduced consisting of samples of the tiles and catalouges, that the alleged improvements introduced by the respondent in the manufacture of mosaic pre-cast tiles are not patentable, the same being not new, useful and inventive.

Third error. As a corollary, when it sentenced the herein petitioner to pay the damages enumerated in the decision of the lower court (Record on Appeal, pp. 74-75), as confirmed by it (the Court of Appeals), but with the modification that the amount of P50,000.00 moral damages was reduced to P3,000.00. 8

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:

The basic facts borne out by the record are to the effect that on December 1, 1959 plaintiff-appellee filed a patent application with the Philippine Patent Office, and on May 5, 1960, said office issued in his favor Letters Patent No. 658 for a "new and useful improvement in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles" (Exh, "L"); that defendant F.H. Aquino & Sons engraved the moulds embodying plaintiff's patented improvement for the manufacture of pre-cast tiles, plaintiff furnishing said defendant the actual model of the tiles in escayola and explained to said engraver the plans, specifications and the details of the engravings as he wanted them to be made, including an explanation of the lip width, artistic slope of easement and critical depth of the engraving that plaintiff wanted for his moulds; that engraver Enrique Aquino knew that the moulds he was engraving for plaintiff were the latter's very own, which possession the new features and characteristics covered by plaintiff's parent; that defendant Aguas personally, as a building contractor, purchased from plaintiff, tiles shaped out of these moulds at the back of which was imprinted plaintiff's patent number (Exhs., "A" to "E"); that subsequently, through a representative, Mr. Leonardo, defendant Aguas requested Aquino to make engravings of the same type and bearing the characteristics of plaintiff's moulds; that Mr. Aquino knew that the moulds he was asked to engrave for defendant Aguas would be used to produce cement tiles similar to plaintiff's; that the moulds which F.H. Aquino & Sons eventually engraved for Aguas and for which it charged Aguas double the rate it charged plaintiff De Leon, contain the very same characteristic features of plaintiff's mould and that Aguas used these moulds in the manufacture of his tiles which he actually put out for sale to the public (Exhs. "1" to "3" and Exhs. "A" to "E"); that both plaintiff's and defendant Aguas' tiles are sculptured pre-cast wall tiles intended as a new feature of construction and wag ornamentation substantially Identical to each other in size, easement, lip width and critical depth of the deepest depression; and that the only significant difference between plaintiff's mould and that engraved by Aquino for Aguas is that, whereas plaintiff's mould turns out tiles 4 x 4 inches in size, defendant Aguas' mould is made to fit a 4-1/4 x 4-1/4 inch tile. 9

The patent right of the private respondent expired on May 5, 1977. 10 The errors will be discuss only to determine the right of said private respondent to damages.

The petitioner questioned the validity of the patent of the private respondent, Conrado G. de Leon, on the ground that the process, subject of said patent, is not an invention or discovery, or an improvement of the old system of making tiles. It should be noted that the private respondent does not claim to be the discoverer or inventor of the old process of tile-making. He only claims to have introduced an improvement of said process. In fact, Letters Patent No. 658 was issued by the Philippine Patent Office to the private respondent, Conrado G. de Leon, to protect his rights as the inventor of "an alleged new and useful improvement in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles." 11 Indeed, Section 7, Republic Act No. 165, as amended provides: "Any invention of a new and useful machine, manufactured product or substance, process, or an improvement of the foregoing, shall be patentable.

The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent has introduced an improvement in the process of tile-making because:

... we find that plaintiff-appellee has introduced an improvement in the process of tile-making, which proceeds not merely from mechanical skill, said improvement consisting among other things, in the new critical depth, lip width, easement and field of designs of the new tiles. The improved lip width of appellee's tiles ensures the durability of the finished product preventing the flaking off of the edges. The easement caused by the inclination of the protrusions of the patented moulds is for the purpose of facilitating the removal of the newly processed tile from the female die. Evidently, appellee's improvement consists in the solution to the old critical problem by making the protrusions on his moulds attain an optimum height, so that the engraving thereon would be deep enough to produce tiles for sculptured and decorative purposes, strong optimum thickness of appellee's new tiles of only 1/8 of an inch at the deepest easement (Exhs. "D" and "D-1") is a most critical feature, suggestive of discovery and inventiveness, especially considering that, despite said thinness, the freshly formed tile remains strong enough for its intended purpose.

While it is true that the matter of easement, lip width, depth, protrusions and depressions are known to some sculptors, still, to be able to produce a new and useful wall tile, by using them all together, amounts to an invention. More so, if the totality of all these features are viewed in combination with the Ideal composition of cement, sodium silicate and screened fine sand.

By using his improved process, plaintiff has succeeded in producing a new product - a concrete sculptured tile which could be utilized for walling and decorative purposes. No proof was adduced to show that any tile of the same kind had been produced by others before appellee. Moreover, it appears that appellee has been deriving considerable profit from his manufacture and sale of such tiles. This commercial success is evidence of patentability (Walker on Patents, Dellers Edition, Vol. I, p. 237). 12

The validily of the patent issued by the Philippines Patent Office in favor of the private respondent and the question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulness of the improved process therein specified and described are matters which are better determined by the Philippines Patent Office. The technical staff of the Philippines Patent Office, composed of experts in their field, have, by the issuance of the patent in question, accepted the thinness of the private respondent's new tiles as a discovery. There is a presumption that the Philippines Patent Office has correctly determined the patentability of the improvement by the private respondent of the process in question.

Anent this matter, the Court of Appeals said:

Appellant has not adduced evidence sufficient to overcome the above established legal presumption of validity or to warrant reversal of the findings of the lower court relative to the validity of the patent in question. In fact, as we have already pointed out, the clear preponderance of evidence bolsters said presumption of validity of appellee's patent. There is no indication in the records of this case and this Court is unaware of any fact, which would tend to show that concrete wall tiles similar to those produced by appellee had ever been made by others before he started manufacturing the same. In fact, during the trial, appellant was challenged by appellee to present a tile of the same kind as those produced by the latter, from any earlier source but, despite the fact that appellant had every chance to do so, he could not present any. There is, therefore, no concrete proof that the improved process of tile-making described in appellee's patent was used by, or known to, others previous to his discovery thereof. 13

The contention of the petitioner Aguas that the letters patent of de Leon was actually a patent for the old and non-patentable process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles is devoid of merit. De Leon never claimed to have invented the process of tile-making. The Claims and Specifications of Patent No. 658 show that although some of the steps or parts of the old process of tile making were described therein, there were novel and inventive features mentioned in the process. Some of the novel features of the private respondent's improvements are the following: critical depth, with corresponding easement and lip width to such degree as leaves the tile as thin as 1/8 of an inch at its thinnest portion, Ideal composition of cement and fine river sand, among other ingredients that makes possible the production of tough and durable wall tiles, though thin and light; the engraving of deep designs in such a way as to make the tiles decorative, artistic and suitable for wall ornamentation, and the fact that the tiles can be mass produced in commercial quantities and can be conveniently stock-piled, handled and packed without any intolerable incidence of breakages. 14

The petitioner also contends that the improvement of respondent is not patentable because it is not new, useful and inventive. This contention is without merit.

The records disclose that de Leon's process is an improvement of the old process of tile making. The tiles produced from de Leon's process are suitable for construction and ornamentation, which previously had not been achieved by tiles made out of the old process of tile making. De Leon's invention has therefore brought about a new and useful kind of tile. The old type of tiles were usually intended for floors although there is nothing to prevent one from using them for walling purposes. These tiles are neither artistic nor ornamental. They are heavy and massive.

The respondent's improvement is indeed inventive and goes beyond the exercise of mechanical skill. He has introduced a new kind of tile for a new purpose. He has improved the old method of making tiles and pre-cast articles which were not satisfactory because of an intolerable number of breakages, especially if deep engravings are made on the tile. He has overcome the problem of producing decorative tiles with deep engraving, but with sufficient durability. 15 Durability inspite of the thinness and lightness of the tile, is assured, provided that a certain critical depth is maintained in relation to the dimensions of the tile. 16

The petitioner also claims that changing the design from embossed to engraved tiles is neither new nor inventive because the Machuca Tile Factory and the Pomona Tile Manufacturing Company have been manufacturing decorative wall tiles that are embossed as well as engraved; 17 that these tiles have also depth, lip width, easement and field of designs; 18 and that the private respondent had copied some designs of Pomona. 19

The Machuca tiles are different from that of the private respondent. The designs are embossed and not engraved as claimed by the petitioner. There may be depressions but these depressions are too shallow to be considered engraved. Besides, the Machuca tiles are heavy and massive.

There is no similarity between the Pomona Tiles and de Leon's tiles. The Pomona tiles are made of ceramics. 20 The process involved in making cement tiles is different from ceramic tiles. Cement tiles are made with the use of water, while in ceramics fire is used. As regards the allegation of the petitioner that the private respondent copied some designs of Pomona, suffice it to say that what is in issue here is the process involved in tile making and not the design.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that Patent No. 658 was legally issued, the process and/or improvement being patentable.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the petitioner Domiciano A. Aguas did infringe de Leon's patent. There is no showing that this case falls under one of the exceptions when this Court may overrule the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. The only issue then to be resolved is the amount of damages that should be paid by Aguas.

In its decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the amount of damages awarded by the lower court with the modification that the respondent is only entitled to P3,000.00 moral damages. 21

The lower court awarded the following damages: 22

a)P10,020.99 by way of actual damages;

b)P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;

c)P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

d)P5,000.00 by way of attomey's fees and

e)Costs of suit

because:An examination of the books of defendant Aguas made before a Commissioner reveals that during the period that Aguas was manufacturing and selling tiles similar to plaintiff's, he made a gross income of P3,340.33, which can be safely be considered the amount by which he enriched himself when he infringed plaintiff's patent. Under Sec. 42 of the Patent Law any patentee whose rights have been infringed is entitled to damages which, according to the circumstances of the case may be in a sum above the amount found as actual damages sustained provided the award does not exceed three times the amount of such actual damages. Considering the wantonness of the infringement committed by the defendants who knew all the time about the existence of plaintiff's patent, the Court feels there is reason to grant plaintiff maximum damages in the sum of P10,020.99. And in order to discourage patent infringements and to give more teeth to the provisions of the patent law thus promoting a stronger public policy committed to afford greater incentives and protection to inventors, the Court hereby awards plaintiff exemplary damages in the sum of P5,000.00 to be paid jointly and severally by defendants. Considering the status of plaintiff as a reputable businessman, and owner of the likewise reputed House of Pre-Cast, he is entitled to an award of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00. 23

In reducing the amount of moral damages the Court of Appeals said:

As regards the question of moral damages it has been shown that as a result of the unlawful acts of infringment committed by defendants, plaintiff was unstandably very sad; he worried and became nervous and lost concentration on his work in connection with his tile business (pp. 28, 30, t.s.n., Feb. 28, 1964). In addition, plaintiff's character and reputation have been unnecessarily put in question because defendants, by their acts of infringement have created a doubt or suspicion in the public mind concerning the truth and honesty of plaintiff's advertisements and public announcements of his valid patent. Necessarily, said acts of defendants have caused plaintiff considerable mental suffering, considering especially, the fact that he staked everything on his pre-cast tile business (p. 36, t.s.n., Id.) The wantonness and evident bad faith characterizing defendants' prejudicial acts against plaintiff justify the assessment of moral damages in plaintiff's favor, though we do not believe the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower court is warranted by the circumstances. We feel that said amount should be reduced to P3,000.00 by way of compensating appellee for his moral suffering. "Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances such damages are justly due" (Art. 2219 NCC).

There is no reason to reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees awarded by the trial court as modified by the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 37824-R appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.SEC 5 RA9502SEC. 5. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 22. Non-Patentable Inventions. - The following shall be excluded from patent protection:

"22.1. Discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, and in the case of drugs and medicines, the mere discovery of a new form or new property of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance, or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance, or the mere use of a known process unless such known process results in a new product that employs at least one new reactant.

"For the purpose of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of a known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy;

RA 9168Section 4. The Certificate of Plant Variety Protection shall be granted for varieties that are:a) New;b) Distinct;c) Uniform; andd) Stable.

Section 5. Newness. - A variety shall be deemed new if the propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold, offered for sale or otherwise disposed of to others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety;

a) In the Philippines for more than one (1) year before the date of filing of an application for plant variety protection; orb) In other countries or territories in which the application has been filed, for more than four (4) years or, in the case of vines or tress, more than six (6) years before the date of filing of an application for Plant Variety Protection.However, the requirement of novelty provided for in this Act shall not apply to varieties sold, offered for sale or disposed of to others for a period of five (5) years before the approval of this Act. Provided, That application for PVP shall be filed within one (1) year from the approval of this act.

Section 6. Distinctness. - A variety shall be deemed distinct if it is clearly distinguishable from any commonly known variety. The filing of an application for the granting of a plant variety protection or for the entering of a new variety in an official register of variety in the Philippines or in any country, shall render the said variety a matter of public knowledge from the date of the said application: Provided, That the application leads to the granting of a Certificate of Plant Variety Protection or the entering of the said other variety in the official register of variety as the case may be.

Section 7. Uniformity. - The variety shall be deemed uniform if, subject to the variation that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics.

Section 8. Stability. - The variety shall be deemed stable if its relevant characteristics remain unchanged after repeated propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle.

VARGAS v CHUA57 PHIL 784FACTS: Angel Vargas, the plaintiff herein, brought this action to restrain the appellants and the other defendant entity, Cham Samco & Sons, their agents and mandatories ,from continuing the manufacture and sale of plows similar to his plow described in his patent No. 1,507,530 issued by the United States Patent Office on September 2, 1924; and to compel all of said defendants, after rendering an accounting of the profits obtained by them from the sale of said plows from September 2, 1924, to pay him damages equivalent to double the amount of such profits. The trial court rendered a judgement in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant. It appears from the bill of exceptions that Cham Samco & Sons did not appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the plow, Exhibit F, constitutes a real invention or an improvement for which a patent may be obtained, or if, on the contrary, it is substantially the same plow represented by Exhibit 3-Chua the patent for which was declared null and void in the aforementioned case of Vargas vs. F. M. Yaptico & Co., supra.HELD: The appellee is not entitled to the protection he seeks for the simple reason that his plow, Exhibit F, does not constitute an invention in the legal sense, and because ,according to the evidence, the same type of plows had been manufactured in this country and had been in use in many parts of the Philippine Archipelago, especially in the Province of Iloilo, long before he obtained his last patent. In the above mentioned case of Vargas vs. F. M.Yaptico & Co.,we said :When a patent is sought to be enforced, "the questions of invention, novelty, or prior use, and each of them, are open to judicial examination." The burden of proof to substantiate a charge of infringement is with the plaintiff. Where, however, the plaintiff introduces the patent in evidence, if it is the due form, it affords a prima facie presumption of its correctness and validity. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents in granting the patent is always presumed to be correct. The burden then shifts to the defendant to overcome by competent evidence this legal presumption. With all due respects, therefore, for the critical and expert examination of the invention by the United States Patent Office, the question of the validity of the patent is one for judicial determination, and since a patent has been submitted, the exact question is whether the defendant has assumed the burden of proof as to anyone of his defenses. We repeat that in view of the evidence presented, and particularly of the examination we have made of the plows, we cannot escape the conclusion that the plow upon which the appellee's contention is based, does not constitute an invention and, consequently, the privilege invoked by him is untenable and the patent acquired by him should be declared ineffective. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellants are absolved from the complaint, with costs of this instance against the appellee. So ordered

G.R. No. L-36650 January 27, 1933ANGEL VARGAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PETRONILA CHUA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.Jose F. Orozco for appellants.Jose Yulo for appellee.

IMPERIAL, J.:

The defendants Petronila Chua, Coo Pao and Coo Teng Hee, appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

Wherefore judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering each and every one of them, their agents, mandatories and attorneys, to henceforth abstain from making, manufacturing, selling or offering for a sale plows of the type of those manufactured by the plaintiff, and particularly plows of the model of Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, and to render to the plaintiff a detailed accounting of the profits obtained by them from the manufacture and sale of said type of plows within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt by them of notice of this decision, with costs against all of the defendants.

Angel Vargas, the plaintiff herein, brought this action to restrain the appellants and the other defendant entity, Cham Samco & Sons, their agents and mandatories, from continuing the manufacture and sale of plows similar to his plow described in his patent No. 1,507,530 issued by the United States Patent Office on September 2, 1924; and to compel all of said defendants, after rendering an accounting of the profits obtained by them from the sale of said plows from September 2, 1924, to pay him damages equivalent to double the amount of such profits.

It appears from the bill of exceptions that Cham Samco & Sons did not appeal.

In addition to the evidence presented, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

The parties agree on the following facts:

1. That the plaintiff, Angel Vargas, is of age and a resident of the municipality of Iloilo, Iloilo, Philippine Islands.

2. That the defendant, Petronila Chua, is also of age, and is married to Coo Pao alias Coo Paoco, and resides in Iloilo.

3. That the defendant, Coo Teng Hee, is also of age and a resident of Iloilo, and is the sole owner of the business known as Coo Kun & Sons Hardware Co. established in Iloilo.

4. That the defendant, Cham Samco & Sons, is a commercial partnership duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with their principal office in the City of Manila, and that the defendants Cham Samco, Cham Siong E, Cham Ai Chia and Lee Cham Say, all of age and residents of the City of Manila, are the partners of the firm Cham Samco & Sons.

5. The parties take for granted that the complaint in this case is amended in the sense that it includes Coo Paoco as party defendant in his capacity as husband of the defendant, Petronila Chua, with Attorney Jose F. Orozco also representing him, and that he renounces his rights to receive summons in this case by reproducing the answer of his codefendant, Petronila Chua.

6. That the plaintiff is the registered owner and possessor of United States Patent No. 1,507,530 on certain plow improvements, issued by the United States Patent Office on September 2, 1924, a certified copy of which was registered in the Bureau of Commerce and industry of the Government of the Philippine Islands on October 17, 1924. A certified copy of said patent is attached to this stipulation of facts as Exhibit A.

7. That the plaintiff is now and has been engaged, since the issuance of his patent, in the manufacture and sale of plows of the kind, type and design covered by the aforementioned patent, said plows being of different sizes and numbered in accordance therewith from 1 to 5.

8. That, since the filing of the complaint to date, the defendant, Petronila Chua, has been manufacturing and selling plows of the kind, type and design represented by Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, of different sizes, designated by Nos. 2, 4 and 5.

9. That, since the filing of the complaint to date, the defendant, Coo Teng Hee, doing business in Iloilo under the name of Coo Kun & Sons Hardware Co., has been obtaining his plows, of the form and size of Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, from the defendant Petronila Chua.

10. Without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to ask the defendants to render an accounting in case the court deem it proper, the parties agree that the defendant Coo Teng Hee, doing business under the name of Coo Kun & Sons Hardware Co., has been selling to his customers in his store on J. Ma. Basa Street in Iloilo, plows of the kind, type and design represented by Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, having bought said plows from his codefendant, Petronila Chua, who manufactures them in her factory on Iznart Street, Iloilo.

11. That, according to the invoices marked Exhibits C and C-2 dated March 13, 1928, and June 19, 1928, respectively, the defendant Cham Samco & Sons, on the dates mentioned, had, in the ordinary course of business, bought of its codefendant Coo Kun & Sons Hardware Co., 90 plows of the form, type and design of Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2 which it has been selling in its store on Sto. Cristo Street, Manila.

12. That the same defendant Cham Samco & Sons, in the ordinary course of business, bought on March 17, 1928, of the store "El Progreso" owned by Yao Ki & Co., of Iloilo, a lot of 50 plows, of the form, type and design of Exhibit B-1, as shown by Invoice C-1, and that it has been selling them in its store on Sto. Cristo St., Manila.

13. That, on September 19, 1928, the defendant Cham Samco & Sons, sold in its store on Sto. Cristo St., Manila, the plow Exhibit B-1, for the sale of which invoice Exhibit D was issued.

14. That, on December 20, 1927, the plaintiff herein, through his attorneys Paredes, Buencamino & Yulo, sent by registered mail to the herein defendant, Coo Kun & Sons Hardware Co., at Iloilo, the original of the letter Exhibit E, which was received by it on September 28, 1927, according to the receipt marked Exhibit E-1 attached hereto.

15. That the plows manufactured by the plaintiff in accordance with his patent, Exhibit A, are commonly known to the trade in Iloilo, as well as in other parts of the Philippines, as "Arados Vargas", and that the plaintiff is the sole manufacturer of said plows. A sample of these plows is presented as Exhibit F.

16. That the document, Exhibit 1-Chua, is a certified copy of the amended complaint, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and that of the Supreme Court (R. G. No. 14101) in civil case No. 3044 of Iloilo, entitled "Angel Vargas", plaintiff, vs. F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., defendant", and that Exhibit 2-Chua et al. is a certified copy of Patent No. 1,020,232, to which the aforementioned complaint and decision refer, issued in favor of Angel Vargas by the United States Patent Office on March 12, 1912, and that Exhibit 3-Chua et al., represents the plow manufactured by Angel Vargas in accordance with his Patent marked Exhibit 2-Chua et al.

The appellants assign the following errors:

FIRST ERROR

The trial court erred in declaring that the Vargas plow, Exhibit F (covered by Patent No. 1,507,530) is distinct from the old model Vargas plow, Exhibit 2-Chua, covered by the former Patent No. 1,020,232, which had been declared null and void by this court.

SECOND ERROR The trial court erred in mistaking the improvement on the plow for the plow itself.THIRD ERROR The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.FOURTH ERROR The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.

The evidence shows that Exhibit F is the kind of plows the plaintiff, Angel Vargas, manufactures, for which Patent No. 1,507,530, Exhibit A, was issued in his favor. Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2 are samples of the plows which the herein appellants, Coo Pao and Petronila Chua, have been manufacturing since 1918, and Exhibit 3-Chua represents the plow for which, on March 12, 1912, the appellee obtained a patent from the United States Patent Office, which was declared null and void by the Supreme Court in the case of Vargas vs. F. M. Yap Tico & Co. (40 Phil., 195).

With these facts in view, the principal and perhaps the only question we are called upon to decide is whether the plow, Exhibit F, constitutes a real invention or an improvement for which a patent may be obtained, or if, on the contrary, it is substantially the same plow represented by Exhibit 3-Chua the patent for which was declared null and void in the aforementioned case of Vargas vs. F. M. Yaptico & Co., supra.

We have carefully examined all the plows presented as exhibits as well as the designs of those covered by the patent, and we are convinced that no substantial difference exists between the plow, Exhibit F, and the plow, Exhibit 3-Chua which was originally patented by the appellee, Vargas. The only difference noted by us is the suppression of the bolt and the three holes on the metal strap attached to the handle bar. These holes and bolt with its nut were suppressed in Exhibit F in which the beam is movable as in the original plow. The members of this court, with the plows in view, arrived at the conclusion that not only is there no fundamental difference between the two plows but no improvement whatever has been made on the latest model, for the same working and movement of the beam existed in the original model with the advantage, perhaps, that its graduation could be carried through with more certainty by the use of the bolt which as has already been stated, was adjustable and movable.

As to the fact, upon which much emphasis was laid, that deeper furrows can be made with the new model, we have seen that the same results can be had with the old implement.

In view of the foregoing, we are firmly convinced that the appellee is not entitled to the protection he seeks for the simple reason that his plow, Exhibit F, does not constitute an invention in the legal sense, and because, according to the evidence, the same type of plows had been manufactured in this country and had been in use in many parts of the Philippine Archipelago, especially in the Province of Iloilo, long before he obtained his last patent.

In the above mentioned case of Vargas vs. F. M. Yaptico & Co., we said:

When a patent is sought to be enforced, "the questions of invention, novelty, or prior use, and each of them, are open to judicial examination." The burden of proof to substantiate a charge of infringement is with the plaintiff. Where, however, the plaintiff introduces the patent in evidence, if it is the due form, it affords a prima facie presumption of its correctness and validity. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents in granting the patent is always presumed to be correct. The burden then shifts to the defendant to overcome by competent evidence this legal presumption. With all due respects, therefore, for the critical and expert examination of the invention by the United States Patent Office, the question of the validity of the patent is one for judicial determination, and since a patent has been submitted, the exact question is whether the defendant has assumed the burden of proof as to anyone of his defenses. (See Agawan Co. vs. Jordan [1869], 7 Wall., 583; Blanchard vs. Putnam [1869], 8 Wall., 420; Seymour vs. Osborne [1871], 11 Wall., 516; Reckendorfer vs. Faber [1876], 92 U. S., 347; 20 R. C. L., 1112, 1168, 1169.)

Although we spent some time in arriving at this point, yet, having reached it, the question in the case is single and can be brought to a narrow compass. Under the English Statute of Monopolies (21 Jac. Ch., 3), and under the United States Patent Act of February 21, 1793, later amended to be as herein quoted, it was always the rule, as stated by Lord Coke, Justice Story and other authorities, that to entitle a man to a patent, the invention must be new to the world. (Pennock and Sellers vs. Dialogue [1829], 2 Pet., 1.) As said by the United States Supreme Court, "it has been repeatedly held by this court that a single instance of public use of the invention by a patentee of more than two years before the date of his application for his patent will be fatal to the validity of the patent when issued." (Worley vs. Lower Tobacco Co. [1882], 104 U. S., 340; McClurg vs. Kingsland [1843], 1 How., 202; Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. vs. Wright [1877], 94 U. S., 92; Egbert vs. Lippmann [1881], 104 U. S., 333; Coffin vs. Ogden [1874], 18 Wall., 120; Manning vs. Cape Ann Isinglass and Glue Co. [1883], 108 U. S., 462; Andrews vs. Hovey [1887], 123 U. S., 267; Campbell vs. City of New York [1888], 1 L. R. A., 48.)

We repeat that in view of the evidence presented, and particularly of the examination we have made of the plows, we cannot escape the conclusion that the plow upon which the appellee's contention is based, does not constitute an invention and, consequently, the privilege invoked by him is untenable and the patent acquired by him should be declared ineffective.The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellants are absolved from the complaint, with costs of this instance against the appellee. So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur. PLOW NOT AN INVENTION ACCORDING TO THE COURT

CRESCENT PRECISION SYSTEMS INC v. COURT OF APPEALSFacts:

Respondent was granted by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Letter of patent for its aerial fuze on January 23, 1990. Sometime in 1993, respondent discovered that the petitioner submitted samples of its patented aerial fuze to the AFP for testing claiming to be his own. To protect its right, respondent sent letter of warning to petitioner on a possible court action should it proceed its testing by the AFP. In response the petitioner filed a complaint for injunction and damages arising from alleged infringement before the RTC asserting that it is the true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze which it developed on 1981 under the Self Reliance Defense Posture Program of the AFP.

It has been supplying the military of the aerial fuze since then and that the fuze of the respondent is similar as that of the petitioner. Petitioner prayed for restraining order and injunction from marketing, manufacturing and profiting from the said invention by the respondent. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner citing the fact that it was the first to develop the aerial fuze since 1981 thsu it concludes that it is the petitioners aerial fuze that was copied by the respondent. Moreover, the claim of respondent is solely based on its letter of patent which validity is being questioned. On appeal, respondent argued that the petitioner has no cause of action since he has no right to assert there being no patent issued to his aerial fuze.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It was the contention of the petitioner that it can file under Section 42 of the Patent Law an action for infringement not as a patentee but as an entity in possession of a right, title or interest to the patented invention. It theorizes that while the absence of a patent prevents one from lawfully suing another for infringement of said patent, such absence does not bar the true and actual inventor of the patented invention from suing another in the same nature as a civil action for infringement.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has the right to assail the validity of the patented work of the respondent?

Ruling:

The court finds the argument of the petitioner untenable. Section 42 of the Law on Patent (RA 165) provides that only the patentee or his successors-in-interest may file an action against infringement. What the law contemplates in the phrase anyone possessing any right, title or interest in and to the patented invention refers only to the patentees successors-in-interest, assignees or grantees since the action on patent infringement may be brought only in the name of the person granted with the patent. There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been issued since the right one has over the invention covered by the patent arises from the grant of the patent alone. Therefore, a person who has not been granted letter of patent over an invention has not acquired right or title over the invention and thus has no cause of action for infringement. Petitioner admitted to have no patent over his invention. Respondents aerial fuze is covered by letter of patent issued by the Bureau of Patents thus it has in his favor not only the presumption of validity of its patent but that of a legal and factual first and true inventor of the invention.