Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature

Eric Maskin; Jean Tirole

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp.139-149.

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Two Remarks on the Property-Rights LiteratureEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp.139-149.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C139%3ATROTPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

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[Footnotes]

1 Caps on Political LobbyingYeon-Koo Che; Ian L. GaleThe American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3. (Jun., 1998), pp. 643-651.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199806%2988%3A3%3C643%3ACOPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

2 Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 83-114.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C83%3AUCAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

8 Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete ContractsIlya SegalThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 57-82.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C57%3ACARAFF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

8 Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 115-138.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C115%3AFOIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

http://www.jstor.org

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8 Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete ContractsIlya SegalThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 57-82.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C57%3ACARAFF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

8 Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 115-138.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C115%3AFOIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

9 Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 83-114.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C83%3AUCAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

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Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion; Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick ReyEconometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar., 1994), pp. 257-282.Stable URL:

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Caps on Political LobbyingYeon-Koo Che; Ian L. GaleThe American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3. (Jun., 1998), pp. 643-651.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199806%2988%3A3%3C643%3ACOPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

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Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingTai-Yeong ChungThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5. (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1042.Stable URL:

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Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout AgreementsJoel S. Demski; David E. M. SappingtonThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 232-240.Stable URL:

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Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal InvestmentAaron S. Edlin; Stefan ReichelsteinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 478-501.Stable URL:

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The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationSanford J. Grossman; Oliver D. HartThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. (Aug., 1986), pp. 691-719.Stable URL:

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Incomplete Contracts and RenegotiationOliver Hart; John MooreEconometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul., 1988), pp. 755-785.Stable URL:

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Property Rights and the Nature of the FirmOliver Hart; John MooreThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6. (Dec., 1990), pp. 1119-1158.Stable URL:

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Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 115-138.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C115%3AFOIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

Implementation and RenegotiationEric Maskin; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 39-56.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C39%3AIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 83-114.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C83%3AUCAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up ProblemGeorg Nöldeke; Klaus M. SchmidtThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Summer, 1995), pp. 163-179.Stable URL:

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Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up ProblemWilliam P. RogersonThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Oct., 1992), pp. 777-793.Stable URL:

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Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete ContractsIlya SegalThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 57-82.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C57%3ACARAFF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

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