Two-Party System Zakowski

This article was downloaded by: [Karol Zakowski]On: 31 August 2011, At: 03:57Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Asian Journal of Political SciencePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasi20

Evolution of the Japanese PoliticalScene: Toward a Non-Issue-OrientedTwo-Party System?Karol Zakowski aa Department of East Asian Studies, Faculty of International andPolitical Studies, University of Lodz, Poland

Available online: 30 Aug 2011

To cite this article: Karol Zakowski (2011): Evolution of the Japanese Political Scene: Toward aNon-Issue-Oriented Two-Party System?, Asian Journal of Political Science, 19:2, 186-207

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.600166

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Evolution of the Japanese PoliticalScene: Toward a Non-Issue-OrientedTwo-Party System?Karol Zakowski

This article examines the nature of the two-party system in Japan. The electoral reform

of 1994 has finally led to an alternation of power, but contrary to the predictions of the

reformers, the competition between two major Japanese parties is not based on any

substantial differences in their political programs. The Liberal Democratic Party and the

Democratic Party of Japan are mixtures of various groups rather than coherent parties and

the main axes of struggle on the Japanese political scene run across party divisions. Both

major parties are internally divided with regard to economic as well as defense policy. The

most important factor of Democratic Party of Japans identity has been the goal of

achieving an alternation of power and abolishing the Liberal Democratic Party style of

policymaking. Nevertheless, the discourse on political renewal has been undertaken also by

the Liberal Democratic Party. While the struggle between the partisans and the opponents

of Koizumi reforms continues in the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of

Japan is torn apart between the proponents of big and small government.

Keywords: Liberal Democratic Party; Democratic Party of Japan; Two-Party System;

Koizumi Reforms; Electoral System; Factionalism

Introduction

The Japanese political scene entered into a period of profound changes in 1993, when

the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyu Minshuto) lost power for the first time since

its establishment in 1955. Nevertheless, the system of a dominant party seemed to

have returned in 1994. The LDP managed to keep power for the next 15 years thanks

to the coalitions with smaller parties. The real change occurred in August 2009, when

Karol Zakowski, PhD in political science, is an Assistant Professor at the Department of East Asian Studies,

Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz, Poland. Correspondence to: Karol Zakowski,

Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz, ul. Narutowicza 59a, 90131 Lodz, Poland.E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 0218-5377 (print)/ISSN 1750-7812 (online) # 2011 Asian Journal of Political ScienceDOI: 10.1080/02185377.2011.600166

Asian Journal of Political Science

Vol. 19, No. 2, August 2011, pp. 186207

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

for the first time in history the LDP lost in the elections to the lower house of

parliament. The success of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, Minshuto) seems to

be a sign that the period of transition is over and a new two-party system has been

eventually born.

On the other hand, it is hard to call the competition between the LDP and the DPJ

the final stage of a stable issue-oriented two-party system. According to the survey

conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in June 2009, as many as 64% of respondents saw no

clear differences in the political programs of the LDP and the DPJ, and 59% thought

that the Japanese political scene would not change at all after DPJs victory (Yomiuri

Shimbun Yoron Chosabu, 2009: 90). The main goal of the DPJ was to put an end to

the LDP style of policymaking, but in reality its political program was as vague as

LDPs. As mixtures of different groups, both parties are still searching their new

identities.

This article examines the difficult path of the Japanese political scene toward the

two-party system. It also compares the LDP and the DPJ with respect to their internal

structures and political programs. Finally, by describing discourses that are being

conducted within both parties, the article explains why the current two-party system

is not issue-oriented.

Two-Party System and the Revision of the Japanese Electoral Law

A two-party system is a system in which a regular alternation of power occurs

between two major parties.1 They may completely dominate the political scene, like

in the United States, or coexist with smaller parties, like in Great Britain. Coalition

governments in such systems are rare and usually only one party assumes the

responsibility for governing the country. A so-called Duvergers law links the

formation of two-party systems with a single-majority single-ballot voting system

(Disch, 2002: 74).

Until 1994 Japan had a peculiar electoral system for the House of Representatives.

It was based on middle-sized constituencies (twosix seats from each district) and asingle non-transferable vote (Jou, 2010: 371). This system contributed greatly to the

dominant character of the LDP in the years 19551993. Only the LDP was powerfulenough to field multiple candidates in the majority of electoral districts. Because LDP

politicians running in the same constituency had to compete against each other, they

usually belonged to different factions which struggled for power in the party.

Furthermore, their membership in these intra-party groups was even more important

than their affiliation to the party as a whole. The biggest opposition party, the Japan

Socialist Party (JSP, Nihon Shakaito), did not want to risk the dispersal of the votes of

its electorate and usually confined itself to only one candidate in a single

constituency. It meant that there was no possibility for the JSP to gain the majority

of seats in the lower house (there were about 130 constituencies and about 500

members of the House of Representatives).

Asian Journal of Political Science 187

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

When the so-called 1955 system (55 nen taisei) began (both the LDP and the JSP

were created in 1955), it seemed that it could evolve toward a two-party system, but

an alternation of power did not occur until 1993. Besides the rigidity of the electoral

law there were many other factors which contributed to this situation. The LDP

became an important part of a so-called iron triangle of corporate, bureaucratic,

and political elites. Thanks to pork barrel politics it could rely on the votes of a loyal

countryside electorate. Moreover, the LDP benefited from the support of the United

States as well as from a gradual fragmentation of opposition parties and their

inability to enter into a broader electoral alliance (Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995:

59151; Kabashima and Steel, 2010: 955; Curtis, 1988: 1116).At the end of the 1980s the system of a dominant party entered into a stage of

structural crisis. Due to urbanization, the conservative electorate kept shrinking over

time,2 and the LDP was more and more criticized for corruption scandals and

inability to cope with economic stagnation after the collapse of the Tokyo stock

exchange in the early 1990s. To meet the social demands for political reforms, the

dominant party started preparing a project of revision of the electoral system. The

abolition of middle-sized constituencies was to put an end to factionalism in the LDP,

and thus eliminate the main cause of structural corruption (electoral competition

between factions on the level of constituencies, as well as inter-factional struggle for

power inside the party, consumed great sums of money). Nevertheless, due to

adamant protests of the politicians who feared that the reform would make it harder

for them to be reelected, the administrations of Kaifu Toshiki (19891991) andMiyazawa Kiichi (19911993) had no choice but to postpone the revision ofelectoral system. The reform bill was eventually passed in 1994 thanks to an

agreement between Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and LDP leader Kono Yohei

(Lee, 2006: 85).

Under the new electoral system 300 seats came from single-member constituencies

and 200 (180 at present) were distributed among party lists for 11 regions. The new

law was a fruit of a compromise between the partisans of a plurality voting system

and the members of smaller parties who favored proportional representation. On the

one hand, the creation of single-member constituencies made it easier to build a two-

party system, but on the other, the introduction of party lists also assured that weaker

players remained on the political scene. It meant that there was a strong probability

the winner party would have to form a coalition government.

A key promoter of the revision of electoral system was Ozawa Ichiro. He believed

that the best system for Japan would be a system based exclusively on single-member

constituencies. He thought it would facilitate an alternation of power, and thus

invigorate the political scene. According to Ozawa (2010: 68), the introduction of

single-member constituencies guaranteed that Japanese politics would evolve toward

a two-party system similar to Great Britain or the United States. He was a partisan of

two-party system, because he thought it would make electoral campaigns based more

on concrete political programs than on interpersonal relations between the

parliamentarians and local electorate, as it had been before (Ozawa, 2006a: 6670).

188 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Nevertheless, many LDP politicians, for example Koizumi Junichiro, were

convinced that a single-majority voting system would bring an effect opposite to

the predictions of Ozawa. Koizumi especially opposed the introduction of propor-

tional representation, because he thought it was against the spirit of democracy to

vote for party lists, not for individual candidates, but he also criticized the single-

member constituencies. According to Koizumi, it was the old, not the new, voting

system that allowed candidates from different parties to emphasize the differences in

their political programs. Before the electoral reform a very clear ideological gap had

existed between the LDP and the JSP, but in the 1990s the differences in ideological

leanings of virtually all parties besides the communists became blurred. Koizumi

argued it was caused by the fact that to win in single-member constituencies the

candidates had to appeal to the majority of voters, not only to the electorate which

shared their political vision. Furthermore, under the new system the matter of party

membership of individual politicians depended more on the availability of vacant

districts they could run in than on their political convictions (Koizumi, 1996: 1771).The skepticism of the opponents of the reform was consistent with academic

findings concerning the relationship between electoral systems and ideological

polarization. As pointed out by Gary W. Cox (1990: 903927), a single non-transferable vote and middle-sized constituencies favored centrifugal incentives and

discouraged from appealing to the median voter. On the other hand, single-member

districts produced centripetal incentives which incited centrist policies. In this light it

is not surprising that even though the introduction of single-member constituencies

eventually led to the formation of two-party system, it did not make the competition

between the two major parties be based on clear differences in their political

programs. The alliances Ozawa Ichiro had to make on his long path toward an

alternation of power are the best proof that his initial intentions were not fully

realized.

Alternation of Power as the Highest Value: Difficult Path to Two-Party System

The 1990s were a period of frequent party switching and partisan realignment. One

of the politicians who directed the Japanese political scene on the path which led to

the formation of the current two-party system was Ozawa Ichiro. Ozawa (2010: 3)

himself emphasized: It is my opinion that a two-party system enabling alternation of

power is necessary for Japan to become a healthy democratic country, and since

youth I have believed that the fulfillment of this goal was my mission as a politician.

In 1993 Ozawa left the LDP together with a group of politicians from Takeshita

faction (the biggest group in the LDP at that time). It was the defeat in the struggle

for the post of faction leader that incited Ozawa to this move. Together with Hata

Tsutomu he established the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseito) and appealed for

political reforms (Morita, 1993: 1579). It was Ozawa who put together the eight-party coalition government of Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro which ousted the

LDP from power in 1993 and implemented the electoral reform in 1994.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Ozawa revealed his political credo in the bestseller entitled Blueprint for a New

Japan. According to him, the revision of electoral system would be only the first step

toward a general reform of the Japanese foreign and domestic policy. In diplomacy

Ozawa appealed for the renunciation of a low posture policy. He believed that Japan

should play a more active role in the international scene, for example by participating

in the UN peacekeeping operations. According to him, to prepare for the challenges

of the post-Cold War period Japan should become a normal country (futsu no kuni)

with all the attributes of power, such as real army and revised constitution (Ozawa,

2006a: 102126). In domestic policy, Ozawa (2006a: 188249) was an advocate ofdecentralization, economic liberalism, relaxation of state regulations, and privatiza-

tion of public sector.

Although Ozawas political program was very clear, the same could not be said

about the program of the whole coalition which ousted the LDP from power in 1993.

Ozawa succeeded in creating a new axis of struggle between the reform faction

(kaikakuha) and the faction of hard-line conservatives (shukyuha), but this division

could not last long. The sole common objective of the eight parties which formed

government in 1993 was to achieve an alternation of power. According to Koizumi

(1996: 69), the anti-LDP coalition was a group without its own policy. When the

revision of electoral law was finally enacted, the main basis for the cooperation of

eight parties vanished (Lee, 2006: 34). In 1994 the JSP and the New Party Harbinger

(Shinto Sakigake) abandoned Ozawa and formed a new government together with

the LDP.

At that time no party was strong enough to become the main opponent for the

LDP in a potential two-party system. The JSP, which had been the biggest opposition

party since 1955, lost this status in the mid-1990s. Not only did socialism lose its

charm due to the collapse of the USSR, but also the electorate of the JSP felt

disappointed when their party formed a government together with the LDP in 1994.

Under these circumstances Ozawa Ichiro started his efforts to create a party able to

win in the next parliamentary elections. In 1994 he established the New Frontier

Party (NFP, Shinshinto) which comprised the Japan Renewal Party and Japan New

Party (Nihon Shinto) from the conservative camp, the centrist Buddhist party

Komeito, as well as the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshu Shakaito) and some

members of the Democratic Reform Party (Minshu Kaikaku Rengo) from the left

wing of the Japanese political scene. Ozawa even managed to convince former Prime

Minister Kaifu Toshiki from the LDP to become the leader of the NFP. Eventually this

attempt to create a worthy opponent for the LDP ended in a failure. The NFP

comprised too heterogeneous groups to evolve into something more than a mere

mixture of politicians united by only one goal*to once again oust the LDP frompower. When this aim was not achieved in the elections held in 1996, the NFP entered

into a crisis and split into smaller parties in 1997 (Lee, 2006: 91).

In 1998 Ozawa established a more coherent, but also much smaller, Liberal Party

(LP, Jiyuto). Surprisingly for a politician who appealed for an alternation of power, in

1999 he agreed to enter into coalition with the LDP. A senior LDP politician, Nonaka

190 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Hiromu, claimed that Ozawas real intention was to destroy the LDP from the inside.

According to Nonaka (2005: 101102), by making new demands, such as reductionin the number of ministries, Ozawa hoped to induce inter-factional struggle for

governmental posts, which would incite some groups to split from the LDP. It is true,

however, that Ozawas requests were consistent with his aspiration of building a two-

party system. For example, he demanded a reduction in the number of parliamentary

seats distributed according to proportional representation from 200 to 150

(eventually ended in 180), which favored bigger parties rather than Ozawas LP

(Reed, 2003: 48). Ozawa left the coalition in 2000, when Prime Minister Obuchi

Keizo refused his request to dissolve the LDP and create a new party with the LP

(Nonaka, 2005: 155158). Soon after that Obuchi died of overworking and stressrelated to the cabinet crisis.

In 2003 Ozawas LP merged with the DPJ, which eventually became the second

pillar of the two-party system. In the merger manifesto Ozawa (2006b: 63)

emphasized together with DPJ leader Kan Naoto: The most urgent matter for the

regeneration of Japan is full alternation of power consisting on the change of the

governing party and prime minister, not just the change of prime minister inside

the LDP. The DPJ had been initially established in 1996, uniting part of members of

the former JSP, part of members of the New Party Harbinger, as well as smaller

groups of left and right wing politicians. Similarly to the NFP, the DPJ was meant to

be a party overcoming the Cold War division of the conservative and socialist camps.

In 1998 a new DPJ was created as a consequence of the merger of the old DPJ with

the Good Governance Party (Minseito), the New Fraternity Party (Shinto Yuai)

and the Democratic Reform Party (Bae, 2005: 19). At the moment the DPJ merged

with the LP in 2003, virtually all conservative politicians outside of the LDP, with

addition of former socialists, were united in a single party.

When Ozawa was elected as leader of the DPJ in 2006, it seemed that his efforts to

build a two-party system would eventually prove successful. Under the leadership of

Abe Shinzo (20062007), Fukuda Yasuo (20072008) and Aso Taro (20082009) theLDPs popularity kept decreasing. In 2007 the DPJ won the elections to the House of

Councilors and was expected to repeat this success in the elections to the lower

house, scheduled for 2009. Nevertheless, Ozawa did not get a chance to become

prime minister, because in May 2009 he had to resign from the post of party leader

due to a corruption scandal.3 It was Hatoyama Yukio who became the new DPJ leader

and led the party to a landslide victory in August 2009. The DPJ gained more than

60% of the seats in the House of Representatives and changed places with the LDP.

Ozawa, who soon became secretary-general of the DPJ, finally achieved his main

political goal.

On the other hand, one might ask if the alternation of power which occurred in

2009 means the end of the process of formation of a viable issue-oriented two-party

system. Although in 2003 the DPJ started publishing electoral manifestos, it is hard to

say that the division between the two major parties has been based on stable

differences in their political programs. Even though Ozawas vision of Japan was very


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

concrete in the 1990s, to build a party that could be a match for the LDP he had to

gather politicians representing various ideological camps. As such, the DPJ became

even less coherent in its political goals than the LDP. At the same time the LDP

absorbed into its platform some of reform ideas of the opposition parties. Ozawas

difficult path toward the two-party system attests that interpersonal relations were

often more important in forming political alliances than the political programs of

potential partners.

One of the main incentives for the merger of smaller groups was the new electoral

system which naturally favored bigger parties. Eventually almost all politicians who

opposed the LDP, regardless of their ideological leanings, were absorbed by the DPJ.

According to Gerald L. Curtis (1999: 226): Party affiliation in Japan is determined

more than ever before by pragmatic considerations of prospects for electoral success

rather than by a belief that a particular party represents a community of shared

values and policy goals that distinguish it from other parties. A comparison of the

various groups inside the LDP and DPJ can be an evidence of this trait of the current

two-party system.

Between the Old and the New LDP: Discourse on Koizumi Reforms

When the LDP was established due to a merger of the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) and the

Japanese Democratic Party (Nihon Minshuto) in 1955, it was nothing more than a

loose alliance of factions struggling for power in the party. Although the divisions

between intra-party groups were based on interpersonal relations rather than on

differences in political programs, each faction had its own ideological cue (Fukunaga,

2005: 91). Iyasu Tadashi (1983: 173) emphasized that the LDP comprised partisans of

virtually all ideologies besides communism, from the people who intended to restore

imperial system and revise constitution on the right, to the people who wanted to

realize welfare state on the base of a reformed capitalism on the left. It is true that

until the 1990s the LDP constituted a platform of struggle between various visions of

the Japanese domestic and foreign policy. The camp of hawks appealed for

remilitarization, independent diplomacy, and restoration of traditional values, and

the camp of doves followed Yoshida doctrine4 and tried to stop the revision of the

pacifist constitution. The LDP comprised both partisans of the welfare state and eager

promoters of economic liberalism, both corrupted politicians and advocates of moral

renewal. It is commonly believed that the ideological diversity of intra-party groups

and the political flexibility of the LDP constituted one of the secrets why this party

managed to successfully adapt to the changing needs of the Japanese society and thus

keep power for such a long time (Kitaoka, 2008: 11; Lee, 2006: 123124; Kong, 2003:139; Uchida, 1983: 175; Wang, 2001: 332333).

One of the bonds that kept LDP factions together was the will of conservative

politicians to participate in the distribution of governmental posts while preventing

the socialists from getting power. After the end of Cold War the matter of an alliance

with the United States or constitutional revision, which had been the main source of

192 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

ideological divisions between the LDP and the JSP, lost its significance and it was the

discourse on neoliberal reforms that started emerging as a leading theme for a new

axis of inter-party struggle (Jin, 2009: 131). In the beginning of the 1990s many

parliamentarians left the LDP, but it did not make that party more coherent. The

LDP did not split into the left and right wing, but it was individual politicians from

all ideological groups that decided to appeal for political and economic reforms and

establish their own parties. At first it seemed that the matter of reforms alone could

become a viable basis for a new two-party system. Many politicians in the LDP

opposed economic liberalism or the revision of the electoral system proposed by

Ozawa Ichiro. Nevertheless, eventually it was the reformers led by Koizumi Junichiro

who grasped power in the dominant party.5 The LDP once again adapted to the

current of history, but this time it only accelerated the end of the hegemony of this

party.

During 38 years of one-party rule (19551993) LDP politicians created a system ofpersonal connections with the electorate in their constituencies. The success of the

dominant party was based on a stable support from traditional social groups:

farmers, small businessmen, and public employees. In cooperation with the

bureaucrats, LDP politicians pressed for the increase in public spending on big

infrastructure projects (construction of dams, highways, etc.), especially in less

prosperous regions, or for the introduction of agricultural subsidies (Curtis, 1988:

4961). They could do that thanks to peculiar policymaking mechanisms in the LDP.All bills had to be accepted by the party decision-making bodies, especially by the

Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC, Seimu Chosakai). Each division (bukai) of

PARC was responsible for a different legislative field. The politicians who had much

experience in one field were called members of a parliamentary tribe (zoku giin) and

represented the interests of their ministry (Yuasa, 1986: 1012). For conservativeparliamentarians it was especially profitable to specialize in such legislative fields as

agriculture, construction or commerce and industry, because that way they could

protect the interests of their electorate (Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987: 133).

As long as Japan maintained high economic growth it was not a problem to keep

this protectionism for traditional social groups, but when the gross domestic product

(GDP) growth rate started to decline from the 1970s, extensive public spending

caused an alarming increase in public debt. Nevertheless, drastic budget cuts were

impossible without major changes in the intra-party mechanisms. Because there was

an unofficial rule of consensus in the PARC, even small tribes of influential

politicians could block the decisions which were disadvantageous to the social groups

they represented (Iio, 2008: 8486). Moreover, the party leaders had to maintain afragile balance between the faction bosses who were used to pork barrel politics.

Under these circumstances it was extremely difficult for the prime ministers to

display strong leadership and impose economic reforms on the dominant party. After

the electoral reform of 1994 the influence of factions and parliamentary tribes

weakened, but still continued to play a significant role in policymaking (Curtis, 1999:

8081; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2004: 1423).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

The first signs of the decline of the LDP appeared much earlier than in the 1990s.

Since the 1950s the size of the traditional electorate of the dominant party, such as

farmers, kept decreasing due to urbanization and economic liberalization. The LDP

could mitigate the impact of these changes by allowing overrepresentation of low-

populated constituencies over urban areas, but this situation could not last forever.6

In the 1990s the group of unaffiliated voters (mutohaso) increased remarkably from

23.2% in 1990 to 44.2% in 2000. At the same time the percentage of the Japanese

declaring support for the LDP dropped from 49% to 30.2% (Yomiuri Shimbunsha

Yoron Chosabu, 2002: 93). The inhabitants of big cities were not interested in the

continuation of the LDPs protectionism of ineffective branches of the economy, such

as the rice market or public works. The politicians of the dominant party observed

this trend with anxiety. On the one hand, they wanted to gain the votes of the

inhabitants of urban areas, but on the other, they were unable to just abandon their

loyal electorate from rural districts.

It was Koizumi Junichiro who accelerated the process of changes toward a new

LDP. When he became prime minister in 2001, he declared that he would reform the

dominant party even if he had to destroy it (Nonaka, 2008: 60). By ignoring factional

recommendations for governmental posts he displayed a new style of leadership

(Uchiyama, 2007: 15). Contrary to his predecessors, instead of maintaining balance

between the various groups in the LDP, Koizumi imposed on party members and

bureaucrats his vision of political and economic reforms. He could do that thanks to

his high popularity, especially among the inhabitants of big cities, and thanks to the

weakening of the factions after the reform of the electoral system. The main goal of

Koizumi was to liberalize the inefficient public companies from the construction or

postal sector. One can say that Koizumi stole neoliberal slogans from Ozawa. Both

politicians appealed especially to the unaffiliated voters, both called for strong

leadership, and both wanted to put an end to the pathologies of the Japanese

economy.

For long time Koizumi was an outsider in his own party. Opposite to the majority

of LDP members, instead of protecting the privileges of the conservative electorate,

he appealed for the creation of a small government which would interfere as little as

possible in the activity of the private sector. To convey his vision to the public

Koizumi used simple slogans, such as structural reforms without sanctuaries (seiiki

naki kozo kaikaku) or lets entrust everything that can be done by the private sector

to the private sector (Koizumi, 2001: 119). His main goal was to abolish or privatize

unprofitable public corporations which were only a burden for the budget.

Because structural reforms were a complete contradiction of the policy so far

practiced by the LDP, many politicians of the dominant party opposed Koizumi.

Especially the privatization of the Japanese post became an object of stormy intra-

party debates. Koizumi knew that he would have to face fierce protests of conservative

politicians who protected the privileges of the workers of 25,000 post offices all over

the country. In some constituencies postal trade unions could provide as many as

10,000 votes (Koizumi and Matsuzawa, 1999: 211). When the privatization bill was

194 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

rejected by the House of Councilors in 2005, Koizumi dissolved the House of

Representatives.7 Calling the LDP politicians who voted against the bill a power of

resistance (teiko seiryoku), he managed to gain popular support and achieve a

landslide victory in the parliamentary elections (Uchiyama, 2007: 97102).Koizumi reforms contributed to LDPs victory in 2005,8 but there is also a

hypothesis that in the long run they proved disastrous for the dominant party. By

abolishing the privileges of such social groups as farmers or post offices workers, the

LDP deprived itself of a stable source of votes (Nonaka, 2008: 103106; Honzawa,2008: 103). Koizumi managed to replace it with an even greater electorate from urban

areas, but the electoral behavior of unaffiliated voters was very fluid and changeable.

After 2006 the LDP failed to find a leader with charisma comparable to Koizumi. Abe

Shinzo declared a continuation of structural reforms, but at the same time he allowed

many politicians who opposed privatization of the post to return to the LDP. These

contradictory moves made younger voters and inhabitants of big cities turn away

from the dominant party, which was one of the main reasons why the LDP lost in the

elections to the House of Councilors in 2007 (Sugawara, 2009: 6374).At the same time a growing social stratification made the costs of neoliberal

reforms more visible. Sugawara Taku argues, however, that the majority of

commentators mistakenly judged that the main cause of LDPs defeat in 2007 was

the fact that the inhabitants of the countryside ceased supporting the dominant party

due to the Koizumi reforms. Under these circumstances the opponents of structural

reforms started gradually regaining their influence in the party. The LDP tried to

return to its old policy of big government and extensive public spending. During the

premiership of Fukuda Yasuo it was symbolized by the maintenance of a provisional

gasoline tax, and during the premiership of Aso Taro by the introduction of an anti-

crisis benefit for all Japanese (Sugawara, 2009: 74237).9 Furthermore, in 2009 theAso government suspended the privatization of Kanpo no Yado, one of the

companies belonging to the Japanese post, which meant a retreat from Koizumi

reforms (Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu, 2009: 174175). Nevertheless, this partial returnto the old practices proved ineffective in regaining social support. The contradictory

moves of the LDP only increased popular distrust towards the government and

contributed to the defeat of the dominant party in 2009.

The shock of failure became a good opportunity to start a discourse on new party

identity. There were three candidates in the elections for the post of LDP leader in

September 2009. Tanigaki Sadakazu, perceived as a representative of the old LDP,

received the support of veteran politicians and faction leaders, Kono Taro appealed

for generational change and a continuation of the Koizumi reforms, and Nishimura

Yasutoshi tried to find a balance between both the party traditions and the appeals for

political renewal. Eventually won Tanigaki, but the discourse on the future of the LDP

continues.

Kono Taro emphasizes that the LDP should become a coherent party, not just a

group of individual politicians or an alliance of tribes as before. He admits that in

the past the LDP used to focus on the redistribution of income, but the time has


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

come to redefine these objectives. According to Kono (2010: 23), it is better to try to

make the pie bigger than to think how to divide it. His objective is to build a warm,

small government (atatakai chiisana seifu), which would focus on economic growth,

not on maintaining the privileges of several social groups. According to Kono, the

government should be small with regard to its level of interventionism in the

economy, authority over the regions, number of public employees and the amount of

taxes. It should be big only with regard to the social security system (Kono, 2010:

2022). Just as Ozawa, Kono argues that the best for Japan would be a two-partysystem based on clear ideological differences between the two major parties. To

realize this goal he proposes further reduction in the number of seats in the House of

Representatives distributed according to proportional representation (Kono, 2010:

205). According to Kono, the defeat in the elections of 2009 can be a good occasion to

create a new axis of inter-party struggle. Because the DPJ promised to increase public

spending, it can occupy the left wing of the Japanese political scene, and the LDP

should consolidate on the right flank (Kono, 2010: 2628).Nevertheless, Konos vision is only one of several possible scenarios of the future

development of the LDP. Due to the defeat in 2009, many younger politicians from

this party who supported the Koizumi reforms lost their seats in the parliament.

Especially the so-called Koizumis children, a group of about 80 first-cadency

politicians who managed to win in 2005 mainly thanks to the popularity of the prime

minister and his slogans of privatization of the post, who were almost annihilated in

the elections of 2009. Under these circumstances the influence of older politicians in

the LDP became even stronger than before. The majority of them are used to the

practices of gaining electoral support thanks to the connections with groups of

interest in their constituencies. It is natural that veteran politicians, contrary to Kono

Taro, think that the main reason of the failure in 2009 was not the renunciation of the

Koizumi reforms, but the reforms themselves. As long as this intra-party dispute on

the approach to neoliberal policy remains unresolved, the LDP will not be able to

successfully face the challenge posed by the DPJ.

DPJ: Anti-LDP Patchwork or Unity in Diversity?

The DPJ is a party at least as incoherent as the LDP. Ozawa Ichiro (2006b: 125)

admitted in 2004 that public opinion might have the impression that the DPJ was

nothing more than a mere patchwork of various groups with different programs, but

he was nonetheless convinced these ideological differences could be overcome with

time. The politicians of the DPJ can be divided into three main categories: former

members of the LDP, former socialists, and parliamentarians who started their

political careers as members of new parties created in the 1990s. The DPJ is

composed of several factions, but due to overlapping membership they are less

institutionalized than the similar groups inside the LDP (Kusano, 2008: 167).

According to Patrick Kollner (2004: 101104), inter-factional struggles inside the DPJ

196 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

contributed to the lack of a clear profile of the party and undermined its image as a

credible challenger for the hegemony of the LDP.

As was mentioned earlier, even the groups which derive from the LDP are not

coherent with regard to their political programs. The faction led by Ozawa Ichiro is

the most powerful and used to comprise especially the partisans of nationalism and

neoliberalism. The group of Hatoyama Yukio tended to be more moderate regarding

ideology as well as economic policy. Another faction deriving from the LDP is led by

former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu. There are three main factions which come

from the left wing of the Japanese political scene. Core members of Kan Naotos

group derive from the moderate socialist camp, the faction led by Kawabata Tatsuo

from the Democratic Socialist Party, and the faction of Yokomichi Takahiro from the

JSP. Kawabatas group has been traditionally supported by Domei, and Yokomichis

group by a different labor union, formerly Sohyo (at present both unions are part of

Rengo). In all of these groups there are younger politicians who never belonged to

either the LDP or to the socialist camp, but especially the factions of Noda Yoshihiko

and Maehara Seiji comprise the parliamentarians who started their careers in the

1990s or later. Many of them are graduates of the famous Matsushita Institute of

Government and Management10 and thus partisans of neoliberal economic policy

(Itagaki, 2008: 1627; Kusano, 2008: 162167).It is very difficult to find a common denominator for all these groups. The DPJ is

obviously split in the middle regarding such ideological issues as constitutional

revision or defense policy. For example in 1999, during the voting of the law which

introduced official Japanese flag and anthem,11 45 of DPJ members voted for the bill

and 46 against it (Iokibe et al., 2008: 189). The DPJ became even less coherent

regarding history issues when in 2003 it absorbed the LP, a party more conservative

than the LDP (Kabashima, 1999: 816). It was not easy, especially for the formersocialists, to share their party membership with such ultra-nationalist politicians as

Nishimura Shingo,12 an advocate of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan (Iokibe

et al., 2008: 262263).Also DPJs appeal for the elimination of such pathologies of Japanese politics as

structural corruption or hereditary parliamentarianism13 does not seem too

convincing as a way of distinguishing itself from the LDP. Slogans of political

renewal could be an effective instrument of political competition in the beginning of

the 1990s, but at present also the politicians of the DPJ are engaged in corruption

scandals. Although Ozawa Ichiro (2006b: 135) called for the abolition of the

possibility of institutional donations to politicians, in March 2009 it was found that

his political organization had received bribes from the Nishimatsu Kensetsu

company. Moreover, in 2009 it was revealed that Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukios

political activity had been financed by illegal donations from his mother (Asahi

Shimbun, 2010: 259). Before the elections in 2009 the DPJ tried to make the criticism

of hereditary parliamentarianism one of the main points of public debate and even

promised not to allow the relatives of retiring politicians to become DPJ candidates

in the same constituency (Inaida, 2009: 136). It is true that second-generation


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

parliamentarians are not as numerous in the DPJ as in the LDP, but many of the

leading members of this party, such as Hatoyama Yukio (grandson of Prime Minister

Hatoyama Ichiro), Ozawa Ichiro, Yokomichi Takahiro or Eda Satsuki (son of one of

JSP leaders Eda Saburo), come from political families. Moreover, the discourse on the

prohibition of hereditary parliamentarianism commenced also in the LDP, so it is

difficult to criticize that party of doing nothing in this matter.

By appealing mainly to the unaffiliated voters from big cities, the DPJ adhered to

liberalism, but it meant protection of human rights and individual freedom rather

than pursuance of free market economy. As a party comprising many former

socialists, the DPJ has been supported by the most influential Japanese trade unions,

which naturally did not favor neoliberal ideas. This difference in the social basis of

support for various groups inside the DPJ incited struggle between the partisans of

big and small government (Lee, 2006: 53). Ozawa Ichiro was one of the strongest

promoters of free market economy in the DPJ, at least before having become party

leader in 2006. Just as Koizumi Junichiro or Kono Taro, he emphasized that it was

the policy of an excessive redistribution of wealth that led to the crisis of the Japanese

political scene (Ozawa, 2010: 58). When Koizumi stole his reforms, Ozawa could do

nothing more than criticize the prime minister for the way of implementing

neoliberal ideas, not for the reforms themselves. He called Koizumi reforms a fraud

or mere makeup used only to improve the LDPs image. He also accused the prime

minister that his policy led to the deepening of the gap between the poor and the rich

(Ozawa, 2006b: 3841). It was a sign that Ozawas political stance had moved closerto welfare state policy.

Ozawa resembled Koizumi also regarding his nationalism. One can say that

Koizumis defense policy was in line with Ozawas slogans of building a normal

country. In 2001 Japan sent Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean to support

American intervention in Afghanistan, and in 2004 a Japanese contingent was

dispatched to the occupied Iraq. Ozawa did not oppose the idea of sending troops

abroad, but he kept criticizing Koizumi for excessive concessions to the United States.

According to Ozawa (2010: 145148), Japan had no interest in participating in theoccupation of Iraq. Ozawa did not differ too much from Koizumi also in his attitude

toward history issues. He criticized prime minister not for his visits to Yasukuni,14

but rather for the resignation from paying homage to the controversial shrine on 15

August and for the failure in explaining Japanese stance on this matter to China

(Ozawa, 2010: 150154). On the other hand, perhaps as a reaction to Koizumisnationalism, Ozawa gradually moved closer to the position of the doves.

Nevertheless, it was Hatoyama, not Ozawa, who led the DPJ to victory in the

elections of 2009. Even though before 1993 Hatoyama Yukio and Ozawa Ichiro used

to be members of the same faction in the LDP, their political ideas were quite

different at that time. In 1993 Hatoyama joined the New Party Harbinger which

pursued a much more moderate policy than Ozawas vision of a normal country.

Hatoyamas motto was fraternity (yuai), which meant an attempt to find balance

between the liberty (jiyu) and equality (byodo), that is between the free market

198 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

economy and socialism (Mori, 2009: 179). To gain popular support the DPJ made

many electoral promises which were a clear contradiction of neoliberalism. Even

Ozawa wanted to use the Koizumi reforms to gain the support of social groups

abandoned by the LDP. In 2008 he met with the leader of the postal trade union and

promised him that the DPJ would overhaul the plans of privatization of the post

(Itagaki, 2008: 155156). Also other electoral pledges, such as the introduction of amonthly child allowance or agricultural subsidies, attested that DPJs manifesto

moved closer to big than small government. As Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel

(2010: 141) put it: Instead of projecting itself as a reform-oriented alternative to the

LDP, the DPJ chose to position itself closely to the post-Koizumi LDP, making the

DPJ look like it was trying to out-LDP the LDP.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio was formed in September 2009 in

coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SDP, Shakai Minshuto) and the Peoples

New Party (PNP, Kokumin Shinto).15 The SDP has been traditionally opposed to

neoliberalism and the PNP comprised former members of the LDP who had voted

against the privatization of the Japanese post. The fact that the leader of the PNP

Kamei Shizuka became minister of state for financial and postal services was a clear

signal that the DPJ would revise Koizumi reforms. By adhering to such ideas as the

introduction of a monthly child allowance (13,000 yen for one child), subsidies for

farmers or the removal of fees for using highways, the DPJ pursued a welfare state

policy quite similar to the one of the old LDP. Due to extensive budget spending, the

public debt of Japan rose to about 200% of GDP. On the other hand, Hatoyamas

government announced severe cuts in the funds for public works. Many big

infrastructural projects, such as Yamba Dam in Gunma Prefecture, were suspended.

The cuts in construction projects were even greater than those done by Koizumi in

2002. This policy was coherent with Hatoyamas slogans of moving the funds from

concrete to the people (Asahi Shimbun, 2010: 248269), which meant at least apartial end to the LDPs pork barrel politics. Kan Naoto, who became prime minister

in June 2010, declared that the reduction of public debt would be the priority of his

government. It is clearly visible that the DPJ, just as the LDP, is suspended between

the neoliberal goals and the slogans of welfare state.

Besides putting emphasis on different ways of redistribution of wealth, there is,

however, another issue that distinguishes the DPJ from the LDP. Although Koizumi

managed to weaken the connections between the politicians and bureaucrats, during

the premiership of his successors the LDP started returning to the old parliamentary

tribe (zoku) politics. By abolishing the Policy Research Council (Seisaku Chosakai),16

a DPJ equivalent to the LDP PARC, Hatoyama and Ozawa went much further than

Koizumi in removing the influence of bureaucrats on policymaking (Asahi Shimbun,

2010: 5972). It prevented DPJ parliamentarians from establishing connections withindividual ministries, which would constitute a considerable obstacle in carrying out

economic reforms. Kan Naoto (2009: 213) emphasizes that the DPJ went further than

the LDP also in distributing political posts according to personal skills, not factional

recommendations. Koizumi managed to nominate ministers by his own choice, but


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

lower posts were distributed according to factional key. Prime ministers from the DPJ

not only tried not to continue this custom, but also strengthened the role of vice-

ministers to guarantee their supremacy over the bureaucrats. It does not mean,

however, that these reforms could not have been done under the rule of the LDP, if

only the successors of Koizumi had been consequent in continuing his style of

leadership.

The challenge posed by Ozawa Ichiro to Prime Minister Kan Naoto since the

elections for the post of DPJ leader in September 2010 exposed intra-party frictions.

Kan appealed for an increase in consumption tax to decrease the public debt, and

Ozawa emphasized the necessity of further cuts in wasteful public spending to fulfill

DPJ electoral pledges. Although Kan won by a large margin, especially thanks to the

votes of regional representatives and individual party members, Ozawa gained the

support of nearly half of the DPJ parliamentarians. It only proves that the DPJ is as

prone to factional struggles as the LDP, and time will show whether it can become

something more than a patchwork of different groups.

A Non-Issue-Oriented Two-Party System?

The Japanese two-party system only to a certain degree can be compared to the

examples of the United States or Great Britain. Most of catch-all parties in the stable

Western democracies have a tendency to approach to the center of the political

spectrum and blur the differences in their political programs, but it is at least evident

which party represents the left, and which one the right wing of the political scene.

Both major parties in Japan seem to follow the pattern of a catch-all party, but their

political programs are even less clear. They were established as alliances of various

groups from the left to the right. The LDP and the DPJ are still searching for their

identities and are yet to decide which one of them represents the left, and which one

the right wing of the Japanese political scene.

At present both main axes of struggle run across party divisions. The first axis

concerns economic policy. A discourse on the Koizumi reforms continues between

the partisans of the old and the new LDP. At the same time the partisans of small

government keep competing with the advocates of big government inside the DPJ.

The second axis refers to ideology and defense policy. The camps of hawks and

doves can be found in both parties. During the Cold War the hawks could be

characterized mainly by their appeal for constitutional revision and the doves by

their will of preserving the pacifist constitution. Since the 1990s, however, also many

moderate parliamentarians of younger generation stopped opposing constitutional

revision. Together with the demise or retirement of such veteran politicians as

Miyazawa Kiichi, Kono Yohei or Nonaka Hiromu, the camp of traditional doves

almost disappeared, especially in the LDP. At present it is more suitable to call the

hawks active supporters of remilitarization, the war on global terrorism, and

strengthening of the alliance with the United States, as well as advocates of a tough

stance towards North Korea or China and eager defenders of national values. On the

200 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

contrary, the doves may be characterized by their emphasis on building cooperative

relations, especially with the neighboring countries, by the means of soft rather than

hard power (Tanaka, 2009: 1314). They are also opposed to such nationalistinitiatives as the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, if they are to affect friendly relations

with China or South Korea.

As shown in Figure 1, the representatives of all these groups can be found both in

the LDP and the DPJ. The supporters of neoliberal economic policy are among the

hawks as well as among the doves. The political stance of such nationalists in the

LDP as Koizumi Junichiro (who retired from his parliamentary post in 2009) or his

successor Abe Shinzo resembles very much Ozawas slogans of building a normal

country (although lately Ozawa moved towards the position of welfare state and

doves), and the policy of younger DPJ leaders, like Maehara Seiji (Tanaka, 2009: 1718). Among the supporters of small government there are also more moderate

politicians, such as Kono Taro (who opposes visits of prime ministers to the Yasukuni

Shrine, but is partisan of an assertive foreign policy towards North Korea) in the LDP

and former DPJ leader Okada Katsuya. Furthermore, in the LDP there can still be

found some parliamentarians of the older generation who used to be partisans of the

Yoshida doctrine. Kato Koichi, former leader of Kochikai, a faction which derives

straight from Yoshidas group, emphasizes that during the Cold War his faction was

characterized by economic rationalism (keizai gorishugi) and internationalism

(kokusai kyochoshugi).17 He belongs to a diminishing group of politicians in the

LDP who are not too eager about constitutional revision.

Figure 1. Leading Parliamentarians in the LDP and the DPJ According to their Political

Convictions

Source: Based on various sources, especially Tanaka (2009: 18), and interviews with

Japanese politicians.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Both the hawks and the doves can be found also among the supporters of welfare

state policy. Prime Minister Aso Taro from the LDP was known for his extensive

budget spending as well as for his neoconservative ideas in diplomacy, such as a

value oriented diplomacy.18 It is interesting that in the DPJ the closest stance to

these ideas is represented by a group of former moderate socialists led by Kawabata

Tatsuo. Because they have been supported by the trade unions of the arms industry,

they have traditionally been even more hawkish with regard to defense policy than

the right wing of the LDP (Itagaki, 2008: 21). As for the opponents of neoliberalism

among the doves, in the DPJ they are grouped especially in the factions of former

socialists or social democrats, such as those led by Yokomichi Takahiro or Prime

Minister Kan Naoto. As was already mentioned, Hatoyama Yukio can be called a

supporter of a moderate welfare state. In the LDP the partisans of big government

are represented by such politicians as Nonaka Hiromu (who retired in 2003) or Koga

Makoto. Koga and Nonaka, members of transportation and postal zoku, symbolize

the old LDP which opposed Koizumi reforms.

This mosaic of intra-party groups exposes the non-issue-oriented character of the

Japanese two-party system. Although the opinion polls conducted among the

Japanese parliamentarians indicate that the group of doves and partisans of

neoliberal reforms has been a little more numerous in the DPJ than in the LDP

(Kabashima and Steel, 2010: 140141; Taniguchi et al., 2010: 2023), both majorparties lack a clear common denominator for the factions they are composed of.

Depending on which group prevails in each party, both the LDP and the DPJ can

pursue a policy oriented on small or big government, as well as put more or less

emphasis on hard or soft power in diplomacy.

It does not mean, however, that there were no differences in the electoral

manifestos of the two major parties. In each election there were dominant issues of

contention which determined the course of electoral campaigns. Thanks to the

problem of privatization of postal services the LDP managed to portray itself in 2005

as a reform-oriented party, even though Okada Katsuya, the leader of the DPJ at that

time, was at least as committed to neoliberal ideas as Prime Minister Koizumi. In

2009 the DPJ used the LDPs inability to present a coherent policy and succeeded in

gaining popular support thanks to the promises of abolishing the old style of

policymaking. At the same time both parties moved away from neoliberal slogans.

The discourse on the place each party should occupy on the Japanese political scene

persists, and it remains to be seen if the LDP and the DPJ will become something

more than just a sum of individual politicians and factions.

Conclusion

When the new electoral system was introduced in 1994, the reformers predicted it

would lead to the formation of a system of two major parties whose competition

would be based on clear differences in their political programs. Its opponents, on the

contrary, thought that the reform would cause a decline in policy-oriented discourse

202 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

between the main political players. History proved that the differences between the

two major parties indeed became less clear, which eventually led to the formation of a

non-issue-oriented two-party system. Even the names of both parties show their

hybrid character. The LDP was established in 1955 due to a merger of the Liberal

Party and the Japanese Democratic Party. Maybe the DPJ would have changed its

name to the Democratic Liberal Party when it merged with Ozawas LP in 2003, if it

only did not resemble so much the name of its main opponent.

At the moment Ozawa Ichiro left the LDP in 1993, it seemed that the opposition

between the partisans of reforms and those who wanted to keep the status quo would

be enough to create a policy-oriented two-party system. It quickly became evident,

however, that the slogans of reforms alone did not suffice to shape a stable axis of

political struggle. Also the attempts to characterize the DPJ as a party representing

urban dwellers and the LDP as a protector of the privileges of countryside electorate

turned out to be misleading. Koizumi Junichiro proved that the LDP was able to

become a vanguard of political and economic reforms and acquire the support of the

inhabitants of big cities. The DPJ could do nothing more than wait for the return of

the old LDP to once again appeal for political renewal. It was the mistakes of the

LDP, rather than the attractiveness of the DPJ, that decided the alternation of power

in 2009.

Some of the reforms implemented by the DPJ since 2009, like the weakening of the

influence of the bureaucrats on decision-making process, seem to prove that the DPJ

brought a new quality to the Japanese policymaking. Nevertheless, there are also

many partisans of political renewal inside the LDP. Moreover, after abolishing the old

style of policymaking the DPJ can lose its main reason of existence. Being anti-LDP

alone might not be enough to keep together the various groups which had merged

mainly to oust the dominant party from power. As long as both main axes of struggle

run across party divisions, the Japanese two-party system will not become issue-

oriented. It could change if the left wing of the LDP merged with the moderate camp

inside the DPJ, and the right wing of the LDP created a new party together with the

nationalist camp inside the DPJ. However, such a scenario is very improbable due to

personal animosities between the leading politicians in both parties and problems

with the coordination of candidates in single-member constituencies.

The future of the Japanese two-party system seems to depend mainly on the

posture of the LDP. If the former dominant party decides to continue the Koizumi

reforms, it can once again become attractive to the inhabitants of urban regions. In

that case, the DPJ would have a problem with maintaining its image as a party

oriented on political renewal, and it could instead look for the support of social

groups which appeal for the welfare state policy. If, on the contrary, the partisans of

the old LDP prevail, the former dominant party may return to pork barrel politics.

In that case, the neoliberal wing of the DPJ might gain in influence. If the dispute

between the Koizumi and anti-Koizumi groups inside the LDP remains unresolved,

the lack of policy polarization on the Japanese political scene may persist. In that


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

case, the unaffiliated electorate will have no choice but to vote on the basis of

emotions rather than ideological leaning.

Notes

[1] Japan already had a two-party system in the 1920s and 1930s. Both Rikken Seiyukai and

Rikken Minseito were conservative alliances of factions rather than coherent parties.

[2] The LDP responded to this trend by becoming more sensitive to the demands for welfare

programs and environment protection. See Kabashima and Steel (2010: 2932).[3] In 2010 three of Ozawas former secretaries were indicted for political funds violation, but

Ozawa avoided prosecution due to lack of evidence.

[4] Yoshida Shigeru claimed that Japan should focus on economic recovery, postpone

remilitarization and leave the regions military defense to the US Army. He perceived

Article 9 of Constitution, prohibiting Japan from possessing any military power as the best

guarantee that Japan would not actively participate in the Cold War arms race. Although

Yoshida never wanted his policy to become a permanent doctrine, it was treated as such by

his followers.

[5] Koizumi Junichiro was not the first prime minister who attempted to carry out structural

reforms. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (19961998) announced bold plans of sixreforms: administrative, financial, fiscal, economic, social security, and educational, but was

not able to fully realize them. Nevertheless, the administrative reform reinforced the role

played by the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu), which provided prime ministers with new

instruments of imposing their will on the bureaucrats and politicians of the ruling party. See

Kabashima and Steel (2010: 106109).[6] In 1985 the Supreme Court of Japan held that the disparity in the weight of vote in rural and

urban regions was unconstitutional, which forced the government to redistribute

parliamentary seats from over- to underrepresented districts. Nevertheless, inequality in

the value of one vote in different constituencies remained, although not as big as before.

[7] Japanese prime ministers do not have the right to dissolve the upper house. By dissolving the

lower house Koizumi wanted to gain two-thirds of seats to be able to reject the veto of the

House of Councilors.

[8] Besides Koizumis popularity there were also other factors which contributed to the LDPs

electoral success. One of them was electoral cooperation between the LDP and its coalition

partner, the Clean Government Party (Komeito). In many constituencies LDP candidates

became dependent of the support of the members of Soka Gakkai, a religious organization

which constitutes the main source of votes for the Clean Government Party. See Reed (2003:

5458); Tanaka (2009: 48).[9] In March 2009 the Diet passed a bill introducing a benefit of at least 12,000 yen for all

Japanese. It was meant to stimulate domestic consumption, but was widely criticized as an

unnecessary waste of public money. Koizumi Junichiro opposed the bill and was absent

during the voting.

[10] The Matsushita Institute of Government and Management (Matsushita Seikei Juku) in

Chigasaki, established in 1979 by the founder of Panasonic, Matsushita Konosuke, specializes

in educating future Japanese leaders.

[11] The flag Hi no Maru and anthem Kimi ga Yo were considered the symbols of imperial Japan,

and especially the pacifists opposed recognizing them as official national signs.

[12] In 2005 Nishimura had to leave the DPJ due to criminal charges.

[13] About one third of LDP parliamentarians inherited their constituencies from their relatives.

It is mainly due to the fact that Japanese politicians are usually owners of so-called groups of

support (koenkai), organizations responsible for maintaining personal contacts with local

204 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

electorate. Because koenkai belong to individual politicians, not to a political party, it became

natural that they were inherited from father to son. Since 1991 only one of 10 LDP leaders

(Mori Yoshiro) was not an hereditary parliamentarian.

[14] The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo was built in 1869 as a place glorifying all Japanese who died

for their country and emperor. Because in 1978 also class A war criminals were enshrined,

since 1985 China and South Korea have been protesting against the visits of Japanese prime

ministers to the shrine.

[15] SDP left the coalition in 2010.

[16] Kan Naoto restored the Policy Research Council after he became prime minister in June

2010.

[17] Interview with Kato Koichi, Parliament of Japan, Tokyo, 13 March 2009.

[18] By promoting value oriented diplomacy (kachi no gaiko) Aso wanted Japan to actively

support such values as human rights, democracy and the market economy in the developing

countries (Aso 2008: 2746).

References

Asahi Shimbun Seiken Shuzai Senta (ed.) (2010). Minshuto Seiken 100 nichi no Shinso [Truth about

the 100 Days of DPJ Rule]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan.

Aso, T. (2008). Jiyu to Hanei no Ko [Arc of Freedom and Prosperity]. Tokyo: Gentosha.

Bae, J. (2005). Talnaengjeon Sidae Jeonhwangi-ui Ilbon-ui Kungnae Jeongchi-wa Daeoe Jeollyak

[Japanese Domestic Politics and International Strategy in the Post-Cold War Transition

Period]. Seoul: Tong-il Yeonguwon.

Cox, G. W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems, American Journal of

Political Science, 34(4): 903935.Curtis, G. L. (1988). The Japanese Way of Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Curtis, G. L. (1999). The Logic of Japanese Politics. Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change.

New York: Columbia University Press.

Disch, L. J. (2002). The Tyranny of the Two-Party System. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fukunaga, F. (2005). Habatsu Kozo kara Mita Kochikai*Soshiki, Jinteki Kosei, Rikurutomento[Kochikai from the perspective of factions structure*organization, personal composition,recruitment], Dokkyo Hogaku, 67: 75131.

Honzawa, J. (2008). Habatsu no Shuen to Nihon no Shinro*Koizumi Seiji no Isan [The Demise ofFactions and the Course of Japan*The Legacy of Koizumis Policy]. Tokyo: NagasakiShuppan.

Iio, J. (2008). Nihon no Tochi Kozo [Structure of Japanese Rule]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha.

Inaida, Sh. (2009). Seshu Giin*Kozo to Mondaiten [Hereditary Parliamentarians*Structure andProblematic Points]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Inoguchi, T. and Iwai, T. (1987). Zoku Giin no Kenkyu [Research on Parliamentary Tribes]. Tokyo:

Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.

Iokibe, M., Ito, M. and Yakushiji, K. (eds) (2008). Kan Naoto*Shimin Undo kara Seiji Toso e [KanNaoto*From Civic Movement to Political Struggle]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan.

Itagaki, E. (2008). Minshuto Habatsu Kososhi [History of Factional Struggles in the DPJ]. Tokyo:

Kyoei Shobo.

Iyasu, T. (1983). Seito Habatsu no Shakaigaku. Taishu Minshusei no Nihonteki Tenkai [Sociology of

Party Factions. Japanese Evolution of the System of Mass Democracy]. Kyoto: Sekai Shisosha.

Jin, Ch. (2009). 90 nyeondae ihu-ui Ilbon Jeongchi [Japanese politics since the 1990s], in

Hyeondae Ilbon Hakhoe (ed.), Ilbon Jeongchi Ron. Seoul: Nonhyeong, pp. 130158.Jou, W. (2010). Toward a two-party system or two party systems?: Patterns of competition in

Japans single-member districts, 19962005, Party Politics, 16(3): 370393.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Kabashima, I. (1999). Enquete sur les orientations politiques des parlementaires, Cahiers du Japon,

82 (Winter): 816.Kabashima, I. and Steel, G. (2010). Changing Politics in Japan. Ithaca and London: Cornell

University Press.

Kan, N. (2009). Daijin. Zohohan [Minister. Enlarged Edition]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Kerbo, H. R. and McKinstry, J. A. (1995). Who Rules Japan? The Inner Circles of Economic and

Political Power. Westport, CT: Preager.

Kitaoka, Sh. (2008). Jiminto*Seikento no 38 nen [Liberal Democratic Party*38 years of theGoverning Party]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha.

Koizumi, J. (1996). Kanryo Okoku Kaitairon. Nihon no Kiki o Sukuu Ho [Discourse on the

Destruction of a Bureaucratic Kingdom. The Law that Will Save Japan from Crisis]. Tokyo:

Kobunsha.

Koizumi, J. (2001). Koizumi Junichiro no Boron*Seiron [Koizumi Junichiros Wild Arguments*Proper Arguments]. Tokyo: Shueisha.

Koizumi, J. and Matsuzawa, Sh. (eds) (1999). Yusei Mineika Ron. Nihon Saisei no Daikaikaku

[Discourse on the Privatization of Post. Great Reform of Regeneration of Japan]. Tokyo: PHP

Kenkyujo.

Kollner, P. (2004). Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or how do factions in the LDP

and the DPJ differ? Japan Forum, 16(1): 87109.Kong, Ui. (2003). Ilbon Hyeondae Jeongchi-ui Ihae [Comprehension of the Contemporary Japanese

Politics]. Busan: Sejong Chulpansa.

Kono, T. (2010). Watashi ga Jiminto o Tatenaosu [I Will Reorganize the Liberal Democratic Party].

Tokyo: Yosensha.

Krauss, E. S. and Pekkanen, R. (2004). Explaining party adaptation to electoral reform: the discreet

charm of the LDP? Journal of Japanese Studies, 30(1): 134.Kusano, A. (2008). Seiken Kotai no Hosoku [The Rule of Alternation of Power]. Tokyo: Kadokawa

Shoten.

Lee, K. (2006). Ilbon-ui Jeongdang-gwa Jeongdang Jeongchi [Japanese Parties and Party Politics].

Seoul: Doseo Chulpan Maebong.

Mori, S. (2009). Hatoyama Yukio to Hatoyamake 4 Dai [Hatoyama Yukio and 4 Generations of

Hatoyama Family]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha.

Morita, M. (1993). Seikai Tairan. Jiminto Kaitai Shinto Sosei [Great Revolt in Political World.

Disorganization of the LDP and Creation of New Parties]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.

Nonaka, H. (2005). Rohei wa Shinazu. Nonaka Hiromu Zenkaikoroku [Old Soldier Never Dies. Full

Memoirs of Nonaka Hiromu]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.

Nonaka, N. (2008). Jiminto Seiji no Owari [The End of LDP Politics]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.

Ozawa, I. (2006a). Nihon Kaizo Keikaku [Blueprint for a New Japan]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Ozawa, I. (2006b). Gowan Ishin [Strong Restoration]. Tokyo: Kadokawa Gakugei Shuppan.

Ozawa, I. (2010). Ozawashugi*Kokorozashi o Mote, Nihonjin [Ozawaism*Be Ambitious,Japanese]. Tokyo: Shueisha.

Reed, S. R. (ed.) (2003). Japanese Electoral Politics: Creating a New Party System. New York:

Routledge.

Sugawara, T. (2009). Yoron no Kyokkai*Naze Jiminto wa Taihai Shita no ka [Distortion of PublicOpinion*Why Was the LDP Defeated?]. Tokyo: Kobunsha.

Tanaka, A. (2009). Jiminto Suitai no Kozo: Tokuhyo Kozo to Seisaku Tairitsujiku no Henka [The

structure of LDPs decline: voting structure and the change of axis of political conflict] in

A. Tanaka, M. Kono, A. Hino, T. Iida, and Yomiuri Shimbun Yoron Chosabu (eds), 2009 nen,

Naze Seiken Kotai Datta no ka [2009, Why Did Alternation of Power Occur?]. Tokyo: Keiso

Shobo, pp. 126.Taniguchi, M., Uenohara, H. and Sakaiya, Sh. (2010). Who ended the LDPs reign? Japan Echo,

37(1): 1925.

206 K. Zakowski

Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Uchida, K. (1983). Habatsu [Factions]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Uchiyama, Y. (2007). Koizumi Seiken [The Koizumi Government]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha.

Wang, Zh. (2001). Zhanhou Riben Zhengdang Zhengzhi [Party Politics of Postwar Japan]. Beijing:

Renmin Chubanshe.

Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu (2009). Jimin Hokai no 300 nichi [300 Days of Collapse of the Liberal

Democrats]. Tokyo: Shinchosha.

Yomiuri Shimbun Yoron Chosabu (2009). Kokumin Ishiki no Ugoki [Movement of Peoples

Consciousness] in A. Tanaka, M. Kono, A. Hino, T. Iida and Yomiuri Shimbun Yoron

Chosabu (eds) 2009 nen, Naze Seiken Kotai Datta no ka [2009, Why Did Alternation of Power

Occur?]. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, pp. 81102.Yomiuri Shimbunsha Yoron Chosabu (ed.) (2002). Nihon no Yoron [Japanese Public Opinion].

Tokyo: Kobundo.

Yuasa, H. (1986). Kokkai Giin Zoku*Jiminto Seicho to Kasumigaseki [Parliamentary Tribes*Kasumigaseki and the LDP PARC]. Tokyo: Kyoikusha.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [K

arol Z

akow

ski]

at 03

:57 31

Aug

ust 2

011

Two-Party System Zakowski

Documents

Transcript of Two-Party System Zakowski