TUUKKA KAIDESOJA -- Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

37:10021–8308

© 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007. Published by BlackwellPublishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKJTSBJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour0021-8308© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007XXXOriginal ArticleExploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist TraditionTuukka Kaidesoja

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a

Critical Realist Tradition

TUUKKA KAIDESOJA

ABSTRACTThis article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar’s account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued thatthe concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar’stranscendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power.

INTRODUCTION

The historical origins of the philosophical concept of causal power are traceableto everyday language concepts such as ability, capacity, and readiness. In theWestern philosophical tradition, one of the earliest systematic treatments of thisconcept can be found in Aristotle’s philosophy; his concept of efficient cause canbe seen as an ancestor of the modern concept of causal power. “Efficient cause”is, however, only one of the four types of causes (or causal explanations) inAristotle’s classification of them. The others are formal, material, and teleologicalcause. From this perspective, it is rather surprising that many current advocatesof the concept of causal power tend to see the variable causal powers of things asthe only kind of causes there is. This assumption is also largely accepted in thecritical realist tradition based on Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of science. As is wellknown, Bhaskar espoused the concept of causal power along with some otherideas from Rom Harré, who was his teacher in philosophy. Therefore, the rootsof this concept in the critical realist tradition can be found in the early works ofHarré and his associates (e.g. E.H. Madden, P.F. Secord).

For the sake of clarity, it is useful to distinguish the ontological problem ofcausality from the epistemological problem. The former problem concerns thequestion: what is causation? A solution of this problem should specify, amongother things, the differentiating characteristics of causal relations from other kindof relations. I agree with critical realists that the concept of causality cannot beeliminated from any viable ontology and that the ontological problem of causalityis therefore a genuine one. The latter problem, by contrast, deals with the question:how is it possible to acquire knowledge concerning causal relations? Here, we areinterested in the empirical identification of causal relations and empirical testingof hypotheses and explanatory theories that putatively refer to causal relations andcausal mechanisms. Nevertheless, the ontological and the epistemological problems

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© 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007

of causality are not entirely independent, as our solution to one of them con-strains the domain of possible solutions to the other.

The concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition is designed to addressthe ontological problem of causality. Critical realists commonly believe that, in orderto develop adequate epistemological and methodological views, ontological ques-tions must be answered first. Following this order of exposition, I herein analyseand evaluate the uses of the concept of causal power in this tradition mainly fromthe ontological point of view, although I also have occasionally something to sayabout the epistemological and methodological implications of these uses as well.

I begin by investigating Harré and E.H. Madden’s

Causal Powers

(CP), in whichthey present a detailed analysis of the concept of causal power. Then I examinethe doctrine of human powers that Harré and P.F. Secord put forward in theirbook,

The Explanation of Social Behaviour

(ESB). There is, however, somewhat acontroversial issue as to whether these two books be classified as belonging to thetradition of critical realism or not. Be this as it may, these books have certainlybeen influential in the formation of Bhaskar’s early philosophy of science and thecritical realist concept of causal power. Indeed, I also attempt to show that someof the problems that vitiate the applications of the concept of causal power inBhaskar and other critical realists’ works already appear in CP and ESB. Further-more, I point out that there are also some interesting contrasts between theconcept of causal power found in Harré and his associates’ early works and theconcept of causal power that is developed in the works of Bhaskar and othercritical realists (e.g. lack of the concept of emergence in CP and ESB). Next, Iturn my attention to Bhaskar’s first book,

A Realist Theory of Science

(RTS). I arguethat his transcendental account of the concept of causal power is both ontologicallyand methodologically problematic. I also show that his version of the concept ofemergent causal power is ambiguous. Finally, I examine how the concept ofcausal power is used in the critical realist social ontology that was first articulatedin Bhaskar’s book,

The Possibility of Naturalism

(PN). In this context, I also brieflyaddress the criticism that Harré and Charles C. Varela (e.g. 1996) raise againstapplying the concept of causal power to social structures in the critical realistsocial ontology. Although I largely accept their criticism, I nevertheless argue thatthe concept of emergent causal power might be applied in a certain way to thesystem-level properties of certain kind of concrete social systems. I also try to showthat the relations between the structure of the concrete social system and itscomponent agents may be considered as causal on the condition that we give up theidea that there is only one adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality.

HARRÉ AND MADDEN ON THE CONCEPT CAUSAL POWER

In recent discussions dealing with critical realism, it is sometimes forgotten thatHarré (e.g. 1970) already uses the concept of causal power in the late sixties and

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

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early seventies. However, the most detailed analysis of this concept in Harré’sworks can be found in CP, which he wrote jointly with E.H. Madden. I think thatthe analysis presented in CP is compatible with Harré’s earlier accounts of thisconcept and for this reason I focus, in this section, on the analysis of the conceptof causal power that was put forward in CP.

According to Harré and Madden, the concept of causal power adequatelyrepresents the metaphysics presupposed by modern natural sciences. They con-tend that the world studied by natural sciences should not be understood asmerely consisting of passive matter in motion, or regularly conjoined atomisticevents, but rather of causally interacting powerful particulars. They argue thatthese powerful particulars generate the observable patterns of events and thenomic regularities. Furthermore, Harré and Madden argue that powerfulparticulars possess essential natures in virtue of which they each necessarilypossess a certain ensemble of powers. They also maintain that, in certainconditions, the powers of a certain powerful particular manifest themselves inobservable effects necessarily. Examples of such powerful particulars include fieldsof potentials, chemical substances, ordinary material objects, and biologicalorganisms.

Harré and Madden (1975, 86) analyse the ascription of causal power to a thingas follows: “ ‘X has the power to A’ means ‘X (will)/(can) do A, in the appropriateconditions,

in virtue of its intrinsic nature

’.” In other words, causal powers areproperties of concrete powerful particulars, which they possess in virtue of theirnatures. One consequence of this analysis is that abstract entities such as numbers,moral values, meanings, and social classes cannot possess causal powers. However,the term “can” incorporated into the previous analysis is meant to secure theextension of this analysis to the ascription of causal powers to people (ibid. 87).I will come back to this extension later. By the concept of intrinsic nature, Harréand Madden (e.g. ibid. 101–102) refer to the real essences of powerful particulars.These real essences are constitutions or structures of particular things in virtue ofwhich they each posses a certain ensemble of causal powers. They also believethat it is, in principle, possible to divide objects of natural scientific research intonatural kinds according to their real essences (ibid. 16–18, 102).

An important feature of Harré and Madden’s account of causality is that theyconceive the relationship between the occasion for the exercise of the certainpower and the manifestations of that power in observable effects as naturallynecessary (ibid. 5). They state that; “[t]he ineliminable but non-mysterious powersand abilities of particular things [ . . . ] are the ontological ‘ties that bind’ causesand effects together” (ibid. 11). The natural necessity that connects causes to theireffects in causal relations is, according to this view, a real feature of the worldand not a feature that the mind has somehow projected onto reality. Harré andMadden also argue that the relationship between the ensemble of causal powersof a powerful particular and that its essential nature is naturally necessary and,therefore, they also contend that it is physically impossible for a powerful particular

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to act or react incompatibly with its own nature (ibid. 13–14). Furthermore,Harré and Madden (ibid. 19–21) distinguish the concept of natural necessityfrom the concepts of logical, transcendental, and conceptual necessity. Theynevertheless maintain that the conceptual necessity embedded in our historicallydeveloped conceptual systems may reflect a natural necessity grounded in theessential natures of things when empirical knowledge, acquired via scientificresearch into these natures, is used in real definitions of natural kinds (ibid. 6–7,12–14, 16–18). It follows from this that the propositions describing natural neces-sities are different from the logically necessary propositions, because the formerare necessarily

a posteriori

and the latter

a priori

.Harré and Madden’s notion of natural necessity is compatible with our com-

mon sense intuitions concerning causal relations. We do believe, for example, thatit is somehow necessary that a sample of water boils in normal air pressure whenheated to 100

°

C by virtue of its chemical structure (i.e. H

2

O molecules interactingin certain ways). Harré and Madden use these kinds of intuitions heavily whenthey try to establish the superiority of their position to that of Human regularitytheory, which, according to their interpretation, reduces causal relations to theconstant conjunctions of observable events and denies the existence of the naturalnecessities. It is not, however, entirely clear whether Harré and Madden’s theoryis in fact an adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality. For example,Raymond Woller (1982) argues that this theory is problematic since Harré andMadden’s treatment of the concept of natural necessity is multifarious eventhough they use it as it were unified. I propose that there is indeed some waveringin their use of this concept, but I also contend (contra Woller) that its differentuses are quite tightly related to the two main uses previously mentioned. Be thisas it may, I also suggest that their analysis of the concept of causal power isproblematic or is at least insufficient in other ways.

To picture this more clearly, we need to think of some complex material thing,say a eukaryote cell, which can be decomposed into parts (e.g. organelles), whichare also complex things that can be further broken down into parts (e.g. organicmolecules) and so forth. Now, it may be asked: what is the intrinsic nature (orstructure) of the eukaryotic cell in virtue of which it necessarily possesses a certainensemble of causal powers? If the causal powers of this cell are ontologicallydependent on the non-relational powers of its component organelles, in the sensethat the powers of the cell do not exist unless the powers of its organelles exists,as it is reasonable to assume, then it may be asked: are the powers possessed bythe cell

nothing but the ontological resultants (or mereological sums) of the non-relational powersof its component organelles

? If this is the case, then the powers of the cell are notontologically grounded in the nature of the cell, but rather in the natures of itscomponent organelles due to the fact that the powers of the cell can be ontolog-ically reduced to the powers of its component organelles (i.e. in the last analysisthey are nothing but the resultants of the powers of the organelles). If we assumefor a moment that this view is correct, then it implies, methodologically, that it is,


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in principle possible, to explain the properties of the cell solely by investigatingthe non-relational causal powers of its component organelles without consideringtheir specific and complex organisation (e.g. their non-linear, complex, andrelatively permanent dynamic relationships). If the causal powers of the organellesare also nothing but the resultants of the powers of their components, then thisontological reduction can be repeated by reducing their causal powers in a similarway to the powers of their component organic molecules. The same applies tothe powers of the organic molecules, which can be again reduced ontologically tothe powers of the atoms that constitute them. If the causal powers of the eukaryotecell and its component organelles, and the component molecules of these com-ponent organelles and so forth, are all merely the ontological resultants of thecasual powers of their components, then this regression may go on

ad infinitum

orit may stop to such ultimate entities that are plain powers which lack intrinsicnatures or structures. In either case, complex things such as an eukaryote cell arenot able perform any real causal work because, according to this interpretation,their alleged causal powers are always ontologically reducible to the causal powersof entities that are ontologically more fundamental.

1

It seems to me that Harré and Madden are not ready to accept this ontologicallyreductionist analysis of the concept of causal power, which I find problematic.There are, for example, many passages in CP where they suggest that the specificorganisation of the parts (or structure) of a certain complex thing such as a watermolecule, a biological organism, or a car is somehow relevant regarding theexistence of the causal powers of this thing, although they admit that the powersof these kinds of complex things are ontologically dependent on the powers oftheir parts (e.g. ibid. 5–6, 104–105). They also maintain that the explanation ofa certain power of a certain thing, in terms of its nature, does not explain thispower away nor eliminate the description of it from our description of this thing(ibid. 11; see also Harré 1986, 285–286). As such, it seems to me that Harré andMadden at least implicitly commit to such a non-reductionist ontological view,according to which the causal powers of complex things are not ontologicallyreducible to the powers of their components. They fail, however, to provide anysufficient clarification of this position or arguments for it and, consequently, donot succeed in justifying this position. I think that one possible way to clarify anddefend this position is to introduce the notion of an emergent causal power thatspecifies the conditions in which complex material things possess emergent causalpowers that are ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components, andto provide empirical evidence for the existence of such emergent powers. Amongothers, Bhaskar (1978) has developed a concept of emergent causal power, but,as I will later argue, it is ambiguous and does not meet the previously statedrequirement. Nevertheless, I believe that an adequate concept of emergent causalpower might be incorporated to Harré and Madden’s analysis of the concept ofcausal power quite easily, although this is not the right place develop such aconcept.

2

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Harré and Madden (ibid. 86–87) emphasise that the powers of a certainpowerful particular do not cease to exist outside the conditions where they areexercised as long as the nature of the particular does not change. Therefore,according to their view, causal powers should be conceived as causal potencies ofthings, which determine what the thing will, or can, do in the appropriateconditions, rather than the empirical consequences of the exercise of thesepowers. This marks the distinction between Harré and Madden’s concept of causalpower and reductive analyses of dispositional concepts by using the hypotheticalor conditional statements presented by Gilbert Ryle and others. In other words,Harré and Madden maintain that the causal powers of things cannot be onto-logically reduced to their non-dispositional categorical properties. It is worth notingthat this position is different from the position considered in the previous section,according to which, the causal powers of a complex thing cannot be reducedontologically to the powers of its components.

Harré and Madden (ibid. 87–88) distinguish enabling conditions from stimulusconditions for the exercise of a certain causal power of a powerful particular.Satisfaction of the enabling conditions ensures that the powerful particular “is ofthe right nature and in the right state for the exercise of a certain power” (ibid.88). Therefore, the descriptions of enabling conditions refer to the intrinsic struc-ture or constitution of the powerful particular. Harré and Madden also separatethe intrinsic structure of a particular thing from its internal structure, conceivedin a spatial sense, because the former may include some of the particulars rela-tions to its external environment. Satisfaction of the stimulus conditions means,by contrast, that a certain causal power of the powerful particular (that is alreadyin the state of readiness) is exercised. In other words, satisfaction of the stimulusconditions will necessarily lead to the empirical manifestation of the power inquestion, if no interfering influences are present.

Furthermore, Harré and Madden (ibid.) distinguish many kinds of causalpowers. These include active powers, passive powers or liabilities, constant powers,variable powers, ultimate powers, tendencies, abilities, and capacities. Although itis not necessary to consider these conceptual distinctions in detail here, thequestion should be asked: do these various causal powers share a common core?It seems to me that the answer is negative due to the fact that Harré and Maddenexplicitly use at least two rather different conceptions of causal power (see Woller1982, 627–631). They apply the previously presented concept of causal powerto complex things with intrinsic natures. The other concept of causal powerappears in the context of a discussion on the nature of ultimate entities (see ibid.161–185). They state, for example, that; “since the natures of ultimate entities aretheir powers, no further characterisation of such particulars is possible, becausethere is no independent question as to their natures” (ibid. 162). Unlike the former,this latter concept conflates the powers and natures of powerful particulars.Therefore, the previous analysis of the concept of causal power does not apply tothe powers of ultimate entities. In fact, it follows that the concept of causal power


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developed in CP is not as unified as Harré and Madden sometimes seem tosuggest.

Harré and Madden’s account of the concept of causal power is also explicitlyessentialist, although their essentialism is rather sophisticated in the followingrespects. Firstly, they do not claim that all entities possess essences but, instead,restrict their essentialism to the domain of powerful particulars. They also thinkthat the essences of complex powerful particulars may change, although theybelieve that ultimate entities are unchanging powers (ibid. 150–57, 161–163).Following John Locke, they move on to distinguish the nominal essences of things(i.e. observable properties that are normally used in the classification of things)from their real essences (i.e. usually unobservable intrinsic natures that generatetheir manifest properties) and restrict their concept of the essential nature to the realessences of things (ibid. 16–18, 101–102). Subsequently, according to their view,the only changes in the real essence of a powerful particular are those changes inits essential nature (e.g. ibid. 150). In a similar manner, Harré and Maddendifferentiate essential changes from the inessential changes of powerful particulars.

Leaving aside deeply metaphysical questions concerning identity and change,I think that the concept of essential nature might have some legitimate uses incertain scientific contexts (e.g. elementary particle physics, chemistry), but it isinappropriate in many others. For example, biological species do not form suchnatural kinds as those that can be separated from each other by referring to thecommon essential natures of the individuals belonging to a certain species (see e.g.Sober 1980). Furthermore, there is controversy surrounding the existence or notof psychological and social kinds that might be identified by referring to theiressential natures (see e.g. Sayer 1997). Even though these and other examplessuggest that global essentialism is clearly problematic, there might still be somelocal candidates (e.g. elementary charges, atoms, and molecules) that possesssomething akin to real essences in the sense that Harré and Madden’s describe.Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the question of whether a certainthing possesses an essential nature or not is an empirical one. It follows from thisthat the uses of the concept of causal power developed in CP should be eitherrestricted to such fields where it can be plausibly applied or, alternatively, that thisconcept should be redefined without reference to the essential natures of powerfulparticulars. I prefer the latter option as, otherwise, the uses of the concept ofcausal power in different sciences would be restricted remarkably. Andrew Sayer(1997) defends a similar position, which he labels as “moderate essentialism,” butI think that “moderate anti-essentialism” is an equally good name for this view.

HARRÉ AND SECORD ON HUMAN POWERS AND HUMAN NATURES

In ESB, Harré and Secord argue that, within the social sciences, human beingsshould be understood as active and knowledgeable agents who are capable of

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initiating action. ESB also contains a thorough critique of the behaviouristicexperimental social psychology and a sketch of an alternative ethogenic method-ology for social psychology. The basic principle of the ethogenic methodologystates that; “[f ]or scientific purposes, treat people as if they were human beings”(Harré & Secord 1972, 84). In accordance with this principle, Harré and Secord’sethogenic methodology emphasises the relevance of an agent’s own accounts oftheir actions, negotiations with agents, the episodic nature of social action, andthe importance of rules for the explanation of social action. They base this newmethodology on their anthropomorphic model of man, which conceives humanbeings as possessors of certain general powers that are exercised in meaningfuland rule-governed social action. These powers include the power to initiate change,the power to use language, the power to monitor action, the power to monitorthe monitoring of action, and, finally, the power to provide self-commentaries onactions (see ibid. 84–100).

Moving on, in ESB, Harré and Secord (ibid. 82) write that; “identification ofpowers and natures must form essential parts of the methodology of the socialsciences just as they do in the natural sciences.” They also contend that theconcept of power and concepts like it, “can provide a system capable of beingused to bring a unity of an acceptable sort into the whole field of disparate kindsof knowledge of human beings” (ibid. 245). These disparate kinds of knowledgeof human beings include the so-called folk psychology embedded in our ordinarylanguage concepts, psychological explanations of human behaviours, and actionsand neurophysiological knowledge concerning the human nervous system. Harréand Secord (e.g. ibid. 253) maintain that different kinds of behaviours and actions,in which human powers are exercised, should be classified by using the conceptsused in everyday language. In accordance with these views, they suggest, quiteoptimistically, that the concepts of ordinary language, elaborated by using theconceptual system of powers, are capable of providing a secure basis for conceptualintegration in the human sciences (e.g. ibid. 240). This position is closely relatedto their previously described anthropomorphic model of man.

Harré and Secord (see e.g. ibid. 248–251) assert that the logical structure ofthe ascription of human powers fits the general logical structure of the ascriptionof powers presented above. Familiar distinctions between enabling and stimulusconditions (or internal and external stimuli), and between intrinsic and extrinsicconditions, also appear in ESB. These distinctions are, however, elaborated in away that, in certain respects, differs from their use in CP and Harré’s earlierworks. In addition, subtle but rather underdeveloped classifications of humanpowers (e.g. a distinction between general capacities and specific states ofreadiness, permanent and transitional powers, powers and liabilities, long- andshort-term powers, generic and specific powers, powers to act and powers toacquire powers) are presented in ESB. Consequently, it is not always entirelyclear whether the possessors of certain kinds of powers are biological individuals,persons, social selves, or social episodes. It is also notable that Harré and


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Secord avoid using the concept of causality in their account of the concept ofhuman power and, remarkably, restrict its legitimate use in their ethogenicmethodology. For this reason, it is not entirely clear whether human powersshould be conceived as genuine causal powers or, rather, as being analogous withthem only in some respects. Nevertheless, I will proceed as if they were genuinecausal powers.

In what follows, I argue that Harré and Secord’s account of human powers andhuman natures contains two intersecting tensions: (1) between an individualisticand a collectivist ontology, and (2) between an anti-naturalistic Kantian idea ofautonomous person and a naturalistic conception of human beings as biologicalindividuals. Similar tensions, as I will later argue, are also visible in the criticalrealist social ontology. In addition, my critical remarks concerning the analysis ofthe concept of causal power in CP are also, in a large part, applicable to theconcept of human power and human nature developed in ESB. For example, thelack of the notion of emergent power is problematic in ESB because humanbeings are obviously such complex organisms, composed of complex parts andpossessing powers ontologically irreducible to their parts. The essentialist analysisof the concept of causal power presented in CP is also problematic in the contextof the social sciences. Instead of repeating these remarks here, I will focus on thepreviously mentioned tensions that can found in the concepts of human powerand human nature used in ESB.

Harré and Secord’s account of human powers oscillates between an indivi-dualist ontology and a collectivist ontology. In some passages in ESB, human powersare conceived in plainly individualistic terms. Harré and Secord (ibid. 277–278)note, for example, that from a metaphysical point of view: “the whole enterpriseof this book can be seen as the attempt to replace a conceptual system, inheritedfrom the seventeenth century and based upon the substance and quality, with asystem based upon of an individual with powers.” Of course, the term “individual”refers here not only to individual human beings but also to powerful particularsstudied in the natural sciences. Harré and Secord do not, however, explicitly treatsocial groups or collectives as if they were individuals or analogous with them.They write, for example, that “[t]he processes that are productive of social behaviouroccur in individual people, and it is individual people that they [social psychologists]must study” (ibid. 133). In addition, an individualistic interpretation of humanpowers is presupposed in Harré and Secord’s (see e.g. ibid. 89, 246–247, 270–271) view that human powers are tied to the currently unknown internal natureof human beings, which consist of both psychic and physical (or physiological)aspects. Furthermore, the metaphysical doctrine of dual-aspect materialism thatthey espouse seems to require that human powers are tightly connected to thephysiological structures and processes of individual human beings (see ibid, 24).As far as I can see, this individualistic interpretation of the concept of humanpower does not violate Harré and Madden’s (1975) account of the concept ofcausal power, although it may contain other problems.

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Nevertheless, there are other places in ESB that differ from the purely individ-ualistic account of human powers. To begin with, Harré and Secord (e.g. ibid.275–271) distinguish permanent human powers, such as the power to speakEnglish, from transitory human powers such as moods, attitudes and characters,and maintain that transitory powers are not tied to “the permanent features ofhuman nature” but, rather, to the “transitory aspects of human nature” (ibid.281). They also suggest that these transitory human powers are highly dependenton the social episodes (e.g. a dinner party, quarrel, or lecture) in which they occur(ibid. 153). Secondly, they separate the concept of human nature from the conceptof biological individual and claim that a certain biological individual may possessmany natures, which, they believe, may be understood as her different socialselves (e.g. ibid. 92–95, 127, 143–145, 276–288). Again, these social selves seemto be highly dependent on different kinds of social episodes. Thirdly, Harré andSecord maintain that certain kinds of human actions should be explained by usingconcepts such as “rule”, “role”, and “meaning”. It seems to me that they, at leastimplicitly, conceive these concepts — especially the concept of rule—as referringto certain kinds of collective entities that enable and guide the actions of individ-uals, although they admit that the effects of these entities are always mediated bythe actions of self-monitoring individuals (see e.g. ibid. 147–204). Furthermore,they write that; “[the institutional] environment is operative both in its effectsupon the

natures

of people, and in providing opportunities and background for thedisplay of those natures” (ibid. 258). It seems to me that it is presupposed in theseviews that rules and institutions possess causal powers that are ontologicallyirreducible to those of individuals. Now, it may be concluded from the previouspoints that Harré and Secord at least implicitly presuppose that some humanpowers are properties of collective entities, although they maintain that thesepowers manifest themselves only through the actions of individuals. This collectivistinterpretation of human powers is incompatible with the individualistic interpre-tation of the concept of human power and I will return to this issue in the contextof critical realist social ontology.

Another tension in Harré and Secord’s analysis of human powers and naturescan be found between their application of the Kantian conception of person andthe concept of biological individual. One of the central motives behind their bookseems to be the rehabilitation of an anti-naturalist Kantian idea, according towhich, human being are autonomous agents that possess power to initiate actionindependently of any antecedent causes. This idea was abandoned by behaviour-ist social psychologists who advocate a mechanistic conception of human beings.Harré and Secord argue, for example, that human beings should not be con-ceived as passive organisms who automatically react to environmental stimuli,but, rather, as persons capable of initiating action, directing their action, monitor-ing their action, and monitoring their monitoring of this action (ibid. 29–43; 84–100). Moreover, they contend, in a Kantian spirit, that these general humanpowers are some kind of transcendental presuppositions that are the “necessary


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conditions for something to be a language user” (ibid. 84) and derive descriptionsof these powers from

a priori

philosophical analysis of the concept of person (ibid.37–42; 91–92). It seems to me that this also explains why a naturalistic perspec-tive on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of these human powersis missing in ESB. Furthermore, in their discussion of the nature of intentionalaction, Harré and Secord distinguish the concept of reason from the concept ofcause and are rather critical regarding a causal explanation of intentional action(ibid. 11–12, 159–162). Despite their conceptual distinction between reasons andcauses, they admit that there are intermediate cases of human action, which theycall “enigmatic episodes,” where both a reason/rule-following explanation andcausal explanation might be applicable (e.g. ibid. 162, 171, 179–181). Neverthe-less, they seem to be willing to remove reasons for action from the causal orderof nature. This kind of talk, which conceives human beings as autonomous agents,also includes an irreducible moral component since, in the Western philosophicaltradition, and in our everyday discourse, the concept of autonomous agent istied inseparably to the concept of moral responsibility.

3

Although this anti-naturalist position is, in a certain sense, individualistic, it assumes that some kindof transcendental powers separate human beings from the causal order of nature.Therefore, it seems to be incompatible with the previously discussed more natu-ralistic interpretation of human powers, in which human powers are ontologicallytied to the nature of individual biological organisms.

In his later works on social ontology, Harré (1990; 1993; see also Harré &Gillett 1994) has gradually abandoned the concepts of human power and humannature in favour of concepts such as conversation, discourse, grammar, narrative,and moral order (see also Shotter 1990). He writes, for example, that; “there areonly two human realities: physiology and discourse (conversation)—the former anindividual phenomenon, the latter collective” (Harré 1990, 345) and that “primaryhuman reality is conversation” (ibid. 341). Furthermore, he also complains aboutthe confusion of causal necessity for moral obligation and suggests that theconcept of causality does not have any applications in the social constructionistontology and methodology of the social sciences (ibid. 350–352; see also Harré1993). Harré (1990, 352) also contends that in ESB he and Secord were “stillthinking in terms of traditional metaphysics, in which the ontology of humanstudies is grounded in human beings,” whereas now he concedes that thisapproach was misplaced. I will come back to Harré’s more recent position onsocial ontology when I deal with Harré and Varela’s critique concerning criticalrealist social ontology. Next, I will turn my attention to Bhaskar’s RTS.

BHASKAR ON CAUSAL POWERS IN “A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE”

Bhaskar adopted the concept of causal power in his RTS from the philosophicalworks of his teacher Rom Harré. For this reason, it is not surprising that there are

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many similarities between Harré and Madden’s (1975) analysis of this conceptand Bhaskar’s own characterisations. Bhaskar (1978) writes, for example, that:

Most things are complex objects in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies,liabilities, and powers. (p. 51)

To ascribe a power is to say that thing will do (or suffer) something, under the appropriateconditions, in virtue of its nature. (p. 175)

The real essences of things are their intrinsic structures, atomic constitutions and so on whichconstitute the real basis of their natural tendencies and causal powers. (p. 174)

These statements are almost identical to Harré and Madden’s analysis of theconcept of causal power. In RTS, Bhaskar also uses the related concepts of naturalnecessity, natural kind, and generative mechanism in a similar way as Harré andMadden. Furthermore, he presents a sketch of the development of science byusing the concept of causal power in very much the same way as Harré andMadden (see ibid. 168–178). When compared to CP, there are, however, a fewinteresting differences in Bhaskar’s account of this concept in RTS. I focus onthese differences here.

In general, in RTS and his other works, Bhaskar advocates a more openlyontological (or metaphysical) realism than Harré and Madden in CP and Harré(see e.g. 1986) in his other works on philosophy of science. Unlike Harré andMadden, Bhaskar also uses a transcendental method of argumentation in thejustification of his “transcendental realist” ontological position. He argues in RTS,for example, that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of scientific experi-mentation that causal laws/mechanisms, which are ontologically grounded in thecausal powers of things, are categorically distinct from the patterns of events thatthey generate (Bhaskar 1978, 33–36, 45–55). Furthermore, when compared toHarré and Madden’s book-length exposition of the concept of causal power,Bhaskar’s account of this concept in RTS is more superficial as it lacks, for example,clear criteria that would enable powerful particulars to be identified (Varela &Harré 1996, 318). Bhaskar’s distinctions between the different kinds of causalpowers are also more modest than those presented in CP. In addition to thesedifferences concerning their general approach, there are also two specific pointsin which Bhaskar’s account of causal powers differs from Harré and Madden’s.

Firstly, as I have previously stated, Bhaskar argues that mechanisms ontologi-cally grounded in the causal powers of things are categorically distinct from theactual events that they produce. He also states that causal laws conceived as waysof acting of powerful things must be analysed as tendencies due to the fact thatthere are situations in which the exercised causal powers of things fail to generatemanifest effects at the level of actual events (Bhaskar 1978, 14; 50). For thisreason, Bhaskar (ibid. 14) writes that; “tendencies may be regarded as powers orliabilities of a thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular


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outcome.” Therefore, causal powers are understood in RTS as non-actual and,consequently, non-empirical features of reality, which, in principle, lie beyond ourunaided perceptual capacities and scientific observations, made by using senseextending instruments (see e.g. ibid. 49–50). It is worth noting that Bhaskar is notonly stating that causal powers exist in the form of the potentialities of thingsoutside the conditions of their exercise, rather he also suggests that exercisedcausal powers are categorically distinct from the actual effects that they produce.Therefore, according to this view, exercised causal powers also seem to lie beyondobservable phenomena, although their actual effects may be observable in certainconditions.

I refer to the aforementioned view as

a transcendental account of the concept of causalpower

because, according to this, (1) the existence of the causal powers of thingsbelong to the necessary conditions of the possibility of successful scientificpractices and, (2) the causal powers of things exist in a special ontological realmbeyond the realm of the actual events and processes that constitute the possibleobjects of our experiences (see also Varela & Harré 1996, 318). It is notable that,by contrast, Harré and Madden (1975, 49–62) argue that, in certain conditions,it is not just the effects of the exercise of causal powers that are observable, butalso certain causal powers at work can be directly perceived. Therefore, accordingto their view, causal powers are not transcendental features of reality by definition,although they admit that the causal powers of things exists as potentialities outsidethe circumstances in which they are exercised, and that, in many cases, theexercised causal powers that produce observable effects are

currently

unobservablefeatures of reality.

4

Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power is problem-atic, because it locates the causal powers of things in an ontological realm, which,in principle, lies beyond the realm of actual entities (see also Gibson 1982, 305).From this perspective, it becomes problematic to answer to the question: how arecausal powers of things related to actual entities (e.g. observable events, processes,things and states of affairs)? It is not enough to assert that the exercised causalpowers somehow produce the actual objects of observations, because the precisenature of this relation of production remains inevitably obscure since it is hard tosee how something that is categorically distinct from actual entities could produceany actual spatio-temporal effects. Consequently, the relationship between thecausal powers of things and actual causation remains obscure in Bhaskar’saccount (see e.g. Elder-Vass, 331–337). This problem seems to be analogous tothe problem of the relationship between things-in-themselves and objects of ourexperience (appearances) in the so-called two-worlds interpretation of Kant’stranscendental idealism. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bhaskar does not explicitlyadvocate this Kantian doctrine because he believes that the causal powers ofthings, unlike Kant’s things-in-themselves, may be possible objects of our knowledge.

Furthermore, at least three problematic methodological implications seem tofollow from Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power.

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Firstly, it seems to be possible to attribute indefinitely many hypothetical transcen-dental causal powers to a certain thing. Secondly, it seems to be possible to inventindefinitely many hypothesis that refer to different kinds of transcendental causalpowers that allegedly explain any actual phenomenon in which we are interested.Thirdly, it follows from the previous two methodological implications that it isdifficult to empirically evaluate the competing hypotheses regarding the causalpowers that putatively participate in the production of a certain actual phenomenondue to the fact that it is

always

possible to invent indefinitely many hypotheses thatallegedly refer to transcendental causal powers of things that explain the pheno-menon in question (see also Kourikoski & Ylikoski 2006). The first two problematicimplications concern the lack of empirical or methodological restrictions interms of the possible uses of the concept of transcendental causal power. Thethird is a variation of the Duhem-Quine underdetermination (of theories by data)thesis.

Laboratory experiments in physics and chemistry provide, according toBhaskar (see e.g. 1978, 163–170, 191–194), an efficient way of evaluating hypoth-eses concerning the causal powers of things because they enable scientists to studya certain generative mechanism in isolation from interfering influences. This viewis, however, problematic because if we accept the notion that causal powers are,in principle, non-actual properties of things, then laboratory experiments alsoseem to be vulnerable to the previous methodological problems. Moreover,outside laboratory conditions, the situation seems to be even worse due to the factthat there seems to be few methodological tools available for testing empiricallyexplanatory theories that allegedly refer to such transcendental causal powers ofthings, those that operate in these “open-systemic” conditions. Nevertheless, it isnot entirely clear whether the rather sketchy epistemological and methodologicalviews that Bhaskar presents in RTS are consistent with his transcendental accountof the concept of causal power.

The second feature that differentiates Bhaskar’s view from Harré and Madden’s,is that he uses a concept of emergent causal power. As I have argued above, thenotion of emergent causal power is needed in order to avoid ontologicalreductionism regarding the causal powers of complex things. In this respect,Bhaskar’s concept of emergent causal power is promising; although he is by nomeans the first one to use this concept since its historical roots go back to at leastthe nineteenth century (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992). Furthermore, this conceptis left remarkably underanalysed in RTS and Bhaskar’s (e.g. 1979, 1982, 1986,1989, 1994) subsequent books do not offer much help in this matter (see alsoElder-Vass 2005; Sawyer 2005, 80–82). In RTS, Bhaskar uses this concept (1) todescribe the properties of the whole of a particular complex thing, which iscomposed of parts related to each other (or organised) in specific ways; and (2) todescribe relations between levels of reality without specifying clearly how thesetwo uses are related (see e.g. 1978, 113; see also 1979, 124–125; 1982, 277, 281–284). In his later works, this concept is also applied in several other contexts


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without, so far as I can see, providing any clear analysis of it, nor the relationsbetween its different uses (see e.g. Bhaskar 1994, 67–88). Moreover, Bhaskar doesnot specify in RTS, nor in his subsequent works, whether all of the emergentproperties of complex things are causal powers or only some subset of them. Italso remains unclear whether non-physical (e.g. mental or social) emergent causalpowers of complex things supervene

5

on the physical properties of these things (cf.Sawyer 2005, 81). I think that Bhaskar’s transcendental interpretation of theconcept of causal power also vitiates his account of the concept of emergentpower because it becomes rather difficult to characterise the relationshipsbetween the emergent powers of a given complex thing and the causal powers ofits constituent parts if both of these kinds of powers are conceived of as lying, inprinciple, beyond our observations.

For these reasons, and following Elder-Vass (2005), I think that further devel-opment of the concept of emergent causal power requires that Bhaskar’s categor-ical distinction between the causal powers of things and the actual events isloosened, and that the concept of emergent power is explicitly defined as charac-terising the ‘parts-whole’ relation of the composition of complex things. I alsobelieve that the concept of the ontological level of reality should be explicitlydefined by referring to the emergent causal powers of complex things in orderavoid postulating ontologically mysterious entities.

CONCEPT OF CAUSAL POWER IN A CRITICAL REALIST SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

In his book,

The Possibility of Naturalism

(PN), Bhaskar develops a realist socialontology in which he largely employs his version of the transcendental realistontology first presented in RTS. The concept of causal power is, therefore, acentral feature of the critical realist social ontology that is largely built onBhaskar’s philosophical ideas. Generally speaking, critical realists maintain thatsocial life does not form its own reality, totally distinct from the natural worldgoverned by the causal laws of nature, but, instead, that it forms a part of the totalcausal structure of reality. Nevertheless, they commonly admit that there arecertain specific ontological features that differentiate social entities from naturalentities and, consequently, hold that the specific methods of natural sciences arenot directly applicable to the social sciences. According to Bhaskar (e.g. 1979, 48–49), activity-dependence, concept-dependence, and time-space-dependence aresuch properties that differentiate social structures from natural structures.

Furthermore, critical realists commonly advocate a relationist conception ofsociety in which social structures are understood as internal relations betweensocial positions and positioned-practices (see e.g. Bhaskar 1979, 51–54; see alsoArcher 1995; Sayer 1992; Lawson 1997). Examples used by critical realists ofinternally related positions are, typically, those such as; “capitalist and worker, MPand constituent, student and teacher, husband and wife” (Bhaskar 1979, 36). The

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idea is that a certain social position, which individual agents occupy, is constitutedby its internal relations to other social positions. Critical realists also emphasisethe point that social reality is stratified in the sense that agents (or persons) andsocial structures are ontologically distinct entities in virtue of their

sui generis

emer-gent causal powers. Despite this ontological distinction, they nevertheless believethat structures are continuously reproduced and transformed via the intendedand unintended consequences of agents’ intentional actions. Furthermore, theyhold that structures are ontologically dependent on the activities of agents in thesense that structures cease to exist when they are no longer reproduced via theactivities of individual agents. Critical realists also admit that social structureshave historically emerged from the social interaction of such agents, which mayhave already passed away, and believe that some pre-existing social structuresalways enable and constrain current intentional human actions.

6

In addition tothese two “basic levels” of social reality, namely agents and structures, some criticalrealists also distinguish several other levels (see e.g. Archer 1988; 1995; 2000).

For the sake of clarity, it is useful to differentiate three contexts in which criticalrealists have used the concept of causal power in their social ontology: (1) thecontext of general mental capacities, (2) the context of reasons, and (3) the contextof social structures. In what follows, I briefly evaluate the uses of this concept byfocusing on one context at the time. I argue that all of these uses are beset bycertain problems. I believe that these problems are at least partly due to criticalrealists’ transcendental interpretation of the concept of causal power and theirambiguous notion of emergent causal power.

In PN, Bhaskar (1979, 103) writes that; “I intend to show that the capacitiesthat constitute mind [ . . . ] are properly regarded as causal, and that mind is a

suigeneris

real emergent power of matter, whose autonomy, though real, is neverthe-less circumscribed.” Following Harré and Secord (1972), Bhaskar (ibid. 44, 104)maintains that these consciously mediated capacities of people (or agents) includethe power to self-monitor ones own activity, power to monitor the monitoring ofaction, and the power to manipulate symbols. He also maintains, much like Harréand Secord (ibid.), that we can derive descriptions of these powers from

a priori

conceptual analysis, and that possession of these powers is constitutive of bothhuman mind and intentional agency (see Bhaskar 1979, 44, 103–106). The mostcritical realists follow Bhaskar in believing that the existence of these rather anti-naturalistically and individualistically interpreted general mental powers to be oneof the ontological presuppositions of such social studies that take agency seriously.

It is not

prima facie

implausible to state that the mind is constituted of anensemble of emergent causal powers. Nevertheless, this view notably remainsunderdeveloped in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works. They have not pro-vided sufficient answers to the following questions: what exactly are these generalemergent powers that constitute mind? What is the exact relationship betweenmental powers and neurophysiological structures and processes? How does socialcontext shape the development and the exercise of mental powers? How do


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mental powers develop ontologenetically, and how have they evolved phylogenet-ically? Unfortunately, Bhaskar’s (see e.g. 1979, 124–125) rather sketchy doctrineof synchronic emergent powers materialism does not provide the requiredanswers because it is, as I have previously argued, open to many differentinterpretations and conceptually ambiguous. Furthermore, Bhaskar’s reliance onan

a priori

philosophical argumentation, as well as his transcendental account ofthe concept of causal power, seem to prevent him for providing satisfactoryanswers to these questions. Even though I think that the previous questions arenot only extremely difficult but also largely empirical, in the sense that it is notpossible to answer them solely by using

a priori

philosophical analysis, I neverthelessbelieve that they are relevant in regards to the justification of the application ofthe concept of causal power to mind.

Critical realists also defend the view that an agent’s reasons should be con-ceived of as causes of her/his intentional action. This is where their views differfrom those of Harré and Secord (1972). Bhaskar (1979, 106, 115–123), for example,argues that reasons can be interpreted as generative mechanisms that producebehaviour in a way analogous to the ways in which the generative mechanismsstudied in the natural sciences produce observable effects. Although he contendsthat reasons are possessed in virtue of the exercise of certain general mentalpowers, he nevertheless maintains that reasons are

sui generis

causes of intentionalaction (see e.g. ibid. 106). Bhaskar also states that, “agents are defined in terms oftheir tendencies and powers, among which in the case of human agents, are theirreasons for acting” (ibid. 118, see also 106). As such, he conceives the notion ofintentional causality in terms of a theory of causal powers. Now, it seems to belegitimate to ask here; what is the intrinsic nature of reasons in virtue of whichthey possess causal powers? In PN, Bhaskar (1979, 120–123) provides quite atraditional analysis of the concept of reason by using the concepts of desire and belief,yet it remains unclear how the nature of desires and beliefs, in virtue of which theyallegedly possess causal powers, should be understood. He also states that, “Reasons. . . are beliefs rooted in the practical interests of life” (ibid. 123), but does notdevelop this idea very far.

Even though Bhaskar does not directly address the previous question, the onlyplausible answer available to him seems to be the one in which reason is under-stood as a certain kind of mental property that supervenes from the neurophysi-ological properties of the brain. If this is not the case, it becomes impossible toexplain how reasons could produce material effects, which is, according to Bhaskar(ibid. 117), a necessary condition for their existence, as well as that of causal efficacy.Although Bhaskar does not use the term ‘supervenience’ in PN, he explicitly criticisesall kinds of materialistic views that conceive mental states as material propertiesof our neurophysiological systems. He argues, among other things, that this doctrine,which he refers to with the term “central state materialism,” is necessarilyindividualist and reductionist (ibid. 124–137). He also states that, “I want to argue[ . . . ] that people possess properties irreducible to those of matter” (ibid. 124).

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I think, however, that a non-reductionist materialist view, which sees mentalproperties as the non-physical properties of the neurophysological systems thatsupervene from the physical properties of such systems, is compatible with theemergent materialist doctrine, according to which, mental properties, understoodas states of neurophysiological systems, possess system-level emergent powers thatare ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components (e.g. neurons andglias). In following this view, mental states could be conceived as a specific kindof non-physical, and yet material (in the broadest sense of the term), properties ofthe neurophysiological system (see e.g. Searle 1992). I also believe that this viewcan be developed in such a way that would be compatible with the view thatposits the physical and social environments, in which human beings live (and havelived), as shaping (and having shaped) their plastic neurophysiological systems,both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. In other words, it is possible to con-ceive human neurophysiological systems as “open systems” that are in continuousand complex interaction with their environments. This does not amount, how-ever, to a denial of the role that genetic factors play in the development of theneurophysiological system, but, rather, it requires a rebuttal of genetic determinismin regards to the properties of such a system.

To conclude: I hope to have shown that Bhaskar’s criticism of the doctrine of“central state materialism” is misplaced and that some kind of biologicallyinformed non-reductionist materialist perspective on the mind is more plausiblethan that which is advocated by Bhaskar. I concede, however, that the pointsmade above require further conceptual elaboration, and that their validitydepends, among other things, on the results of neuroscientific research. Nonethe-less, Bhaskar and other critical realists’ views of mental powers often seem to bemuch closer to the problematic Cartesian mind-body dualism than they areprepared to admit.

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, critical realists have applied the con-cept of causal power to social structures. For critical realists, the problem of thecausal efficacy of social structures seems to be the pressing question: how do theinternal relations between social positions affect the actions of the agents thatoccupy these positions? Critical realists, for example, commonly write about theenabling, constraining, and motivating effects of social structures in relation to theactions of the agents that occupy the structural positions. Accordingly, Bhaskarand other critical realists contend that internal relations between social positionsand positioned practices posses some kind of transcendental and emergent causalpowers (e.g. ibid. 51–52; 68–69; see also Archer 1995, 165–194; Lawson 1997,163–170; Sayer 1992, chapter 3). According to this view, society, understood as atotality of social structures, is some kind of transcendental entity that is, “notgiven, but presupposed by, experience” (Bhaskar 1979, 68). Examples of suchpowerful social structures include the structure of a capitalistic economy (Bhaskar1979, 65–67; Sayer 1992), the demographic structure (Archer 1995), and thestructure of an educational system (ibid.). Bhaskar (ibid. 51) also suggests that the


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concept of social position may be further analysed by using concepts such as“place”, “function”, “rule”, “task”, “duty”, and “right”, but does not present aprecise analysis of the meaning these concepts .

Bhaskar (e.g. ibid. 43–44; see also 2001, 30), however, suggests, using theAristotelian distinction between efficient and material cause, that social structuresshould be understood as material causes of social activity, whereas people are theonly efficient causes of social activity. This statement seems to be incompatiblewith the view that social structures possess causal powers since, as I suggested inthe beginning of this article, the concept of causal power should be interpreted asan elaborated version of the Aristotelian concept of efficient cause (see also Harré& Madden 1975, 57; Lewis 2000, 257–258; cf. Manicas 2006, 72). AlthoughBhaskar’s position is, in this respect, ambiguous, I assume that the differentiatingfeature of the critical realist social ontology is that it sees the powers of individualagents and the powers of social structures as ontologically distinct because Ibelieve that this is the most common view among critical realists. This statementis, however, not intended as a denial of the fact that there are some advocates ofthis tradition who do not accept this view (e.g. Manicas 2006).

Harré and Charles C. Varela (1996 see also Harré 2001, 2002a; 2002b; Varela2001, 2002) have criticised critical realists for their application of the concept ofcausal power to social structures. They argue that the attribution of causal powersto social structures violates the general logic of the concept of causal power as itis presented, for example, in CP because it requires among other things thatcausal powers are illegitimately separated from powerful particulars. They alsoargue that if the concept of causal power is adequately understood, then it is clearthat social structures are not such things that may possess causal powers. It isnotable that the arguments presented by Harré and Varela presuppose that thegeneral logic of the concept of causal power has been already presented in anadequate way in Harré’s earlier works. I have earlier challenged this presupposition.

Nonetheless, I think that Harré and Varela are right to criticise the criticalrealist view that social structures possess relatively autonomous causal powers inrelation to the agents that occupy the positions in these structures. To be con-vinced of this, it should be emphasised that it is certainly a

minimum

requirementfor the legitimate application of any adequate concept of causal power to a certainentity that this entity be a concrete and organised material system that is capableof producing observable effect(s) in certain conditions and in a relatively auto-nomous way. Social structures, conceived as sets of abstract internal relationsbetween social positions and positioned-practices, do not seem to meet thisrequirement. Therefore, Harré and Varela (1996, 314; see also Harré 2001,2002b; Varela 2001) are right to insist that, in some cases, critical realists committo the reification of the abstract macro-social concepts (e.g. working class) in theirapplication of causal powers to social structures. However, I am not entirelyconvinced that it follows from this, as Harré and Varela (1996, 316, 322; see alsoHarré 2001, 2000a, 2002b) seem to suggest, that all kinds of social structures are

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nothing but taxonomic categories, which do not refer to any extra-conversationalentities (see also Manicas 2006, 73). It is also an exaggeration to claim that, intheir social ontology, critical realists have tacitly committed to some kind ofstructural determinism that totally undermines human agency (see Harré &Varela 1996, 316; Harré 2001, 26; 2002b).

In addition, it is important to notice, here, that it does not follow from Harréand Varela’s arguments against critical realist social ontology that Harré’s socialconstructionist ontology is the only viable social ontology compatible with the causalpowers theory. First of all, it is not clear whether Harré’s social constructionismis in fact compatible with the analysis of the concept of causal power presentedin CP. Harré (see e.g. 1993, 98; see also Harré 2002b; Harré & Gillet 1994), forexample, maintains, in his later social ontology, that people are the only causallyefficacious entities in social reality while simultaneously claiming that people areconversational constructs. Now, it is not at all clear to me how conversationalconstructs could satisfy the minimum requirement for the application of the conceptof causal power. It is surely one thing to say that the conversations, in which biolog-ical individuals engage in their lives, in many ways shape and modify their powers,and another to claim that people are nothing but conversational constructs (seee.g. Archer 2000; Manicas 2006, 43–52). I find the first claim perfectly acceptableand compatible with causal powers theory and the other problematic.

Moreover, even if we deny that social structures, understood as some kind ofabstract internal relations between social positions and positioned-practices,possess relatively autonomous powers in relation to the agents that occupy thestructural positions, there may still be some other way to apply the concept ofcausal power to concrete social systems. By the term ‘concrete social system’, Irefer to the organised groups or collectives of individual agents who communica-tively interact with each other in relatively stable ways by using symbols, materialresources, and material artefacts.

7

If we think of any given concrete social systemin this way (e.g. factories, families, business firms, hospitals, schools, or politicalparties), then it may be said that the system as a whole possesses system-levelemergent causal powers in relation to its environment because it fulfils the minimumrequirement for the legitimate use of the concept of causal power. In other words,these kinds of concrete social systems can be conceived as organised materialsystems, although they are not merely physical systems, because they also possessnon-physical emergent causal powers. The environment of the system may, inturn, consist of individual agents that do not participate in this system, othersocial systems, or ecosystems; although in some cases, it may be difficult to decidewhere the boundaries of the system lie. Furthermore, these kinds of concretesocial systems might be modelled by using the theory of complex dynamic systemsthat radically differ from the traditional functionalism (e.g. Talcott Parsons) insociology (see e.g. Sawyer 2005).

It does not follow from the position outlined above that concrete social systemspossess autonomous causal powers in relation to the agents that form their


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components because the emergent causal powers of the previously characterisedsocial systems are always ontologically and causally dependent on the causalpowers of the acting agents.

8

This is not, however, meant to deny the notion thatthese kinds of social systems may have been historically formed through theactivities of different agents to those who currently act as their constituent com-ponents: nor does not follow from this that the system-level emergent powers ofthe social systems can be ontologically reduced to the powers of individualagents, because these system-level powers are not only ontologically dependenton the non-relational powers of the agents but also on the relatively stabledynamic relations between communicatively interacting agents (and therelations between them and material resources and artefacts). Furthermore, it ispossible to say that the relational structure of the social system (i.e. the set ofrelations between its components) also enables, constrains, and motivates theactions of the agents. In this sense the positions that agents occupy in this kindof social systems remain important, although it is not possible to ontologicallyseparate them from the ongoing interaction between agents. Moreover therelation between the structure and agents in such systems cannot be, due to theaforementioned reasons, adequately analysed by using the concept of causalpower. Nevertheless, enabling, constraining, and motivating structural relationsmay still be interpreted as causal by using some other analysis of the concept of“cause” than the causal powers theory. I shall leave it open here as to whetherthe previous analysis can be extended to also cover macro-systems such aswelfare states, capitalist economies, and educational systems. Indeed, I also admitthat the concepts of “concrete social system”, “communicative interaction”, and“emergent causal power” require further analysis than that which must be omittedhere.

The previously stated argument demands that we give up the presuppositionthat there only exists a single adequate ontological analysis of the concept ofcausality. Although this move makes things conceptually messier, I neverthelessbelieve that it leads to a more fruitful interaction between philosophicalanalysis and empirical research. Therefore, instead of searching for a singleontological analysis of the concept of causality, it seem to be more fruitful totry to specify different kinds of causal relations that are referred to by differ-ent kinds of causal concepts applied in different contexts (see Hitchcock2003). Some critical realists have already proceeded in this direction bypresenting tentative analyses of structural social causation that employ a differentkind of analysis of the concept of cause to that of the causal powers theory (seeGroff 2004; Lewis 2000; see also Patomäki 1991). Bhaskar (see e.g. 1986, 132;1994, 82) has also recently abandoned the presupposition that the causal pow-ers theory provides an adequate analysis of all kinds of causal relations, althoughhis discussion of the causal powers of social structures is still quite problem-atic. However, any evaluation of these suggestions forms the topic of anotherarticle.

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CONCLUSION

Finally, I want to list briefly the major points that I presented in the previousdiscussion regarding the critical realist concept of causal power:

• The concept of emergence, which refers to the relationship between thesystem-level properties of a complex system and the properties of its parts,is necessarily part of any notion of causal power that is employed outsideelementary particle physics.

• The concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way.The question of whether a certain entity possesses an essential nature or notis empirical in nature.

• Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power advocatedby most critical realists is problematic, in both the natural and social sciences.

• In the context of social ontology, the uses of the concept of causal powershould be restricted to (1) human beings or people conceived as dynamicbiological organisms that are naturally predisposed to, and whose powersare modified by, social interaction; and, (2) to such concretely structuredgroups and collectives (and perhaps combinations of these) that function asrelatively enduring dynamic social systems.

• It is not possible to analyse the structural social causality by using the con-cept of causal power, but might succeed by using another kind of ontologicalanalysis of the concept of causality. Therefore, it might be fruitful to give upthe presupposition that there only exists one adequate way of analysing theconcept of causality.

9

Tuukka KaidesojaDepartment of the social sciences and philosophyPL 35 (MaB)40014 University of Jyväskylä, Finlande-mail: [email protected]

NOTES

1

It should be noted that it is not necessarily problematic to assume that ultimate powers(or other kind of ultimate entities) do not exist. For example, Schaffer (2001) has quiteconvincingly argued that there is no positive or negative empirical evidence available forthe existence of the fundamental level of reality. He also argues that the idea of the infinitereduction of the properties of complex things to the properties of their constituents isinternally coherent and cannot be rebutted by

a priori

arguments alone. Schaffer (ibid.)himself defends an agnostic position regarding the existence of a fundamental level (seealso Bhaskar 1978, 170–171, 182). By contrast, Harré and Madden (1975, 161–185)suggest that physical fields of potentials are the ultimate powers that do not possess any


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intrinsic natures or structures. Nevertheless, the problem concerning the existence ofultimate powers or a fundamental level should be distinguished from the problem of theontological reduction of the causal powers of complex things to their constituents. Possiblesolutions to these problems are not, however, totally independent since ontologicalreductionism (or reductive physicalism), for instance, seems to require the existence of somekind of fundamental entities (see e.g. Schaffer 2001).

2

Harré (2002b, 144) has recently questioned the notion of emergent causal power byclaiming that, “in this universe, there are people performing discursive acts and there arematerial poles and charges. That is all. [ . . . ] Elementary charges are [causally] efficacious.All other material efficacy is product.” It seems to me that he has committed here to arather dubious ontology that is both ontologically reductionist regarding, for example, thecausal powers of biological organisms, and dualistic in the sense that it separates discursivereality from physical reality. It should be also noted that the concept of emergent causalpower has been the subject of vigorous debate, especially in the field of the philosophy ofmind and the philosophy of science (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992; Elder-Vass 1999; Kim1999; Sawyer 2005).

3

This aspect of moral responsibility, which is only implicitly present in ESB, becomesmore central in Harré’s (see e.g. 1990, 1993) later works on social ontology (see also Shotter1990; Secord 1990).

4

In his

Varieties of Realism, Harré’s (1986, 281–316) position concerning theinterpretation of the causal powers that belong to the ontological “Realm 3” resemblesBhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power. Nevertheless, Harré doesnot claim that all causal powers belong to “Realm 3”.

5 In this context, the concept of supervenience usually includes the following theses: (i)No two things can differ in their non-physical properties without differing in their physicalproperties; (ii) a single thing cannot change its non-physical properties without changingits physical properties; (iii) if, at a given time (t), a single thing has two different subsets ofnon-physical properties, it must have two different subsets of physical properties.

6 Archer (e.g. 1995, 169) has argued that the emergent causal powers of social structuresare not usually ontologically dependent on the activities of the current agents, but, rather,on “the activities of previous ‘generations’.” As, for example, Sawyer (2005, 91–92) hasargued, this view is problematic since it denies that the causal powers of social structuresare supervenient on the properties of the current agents and their activities.

7 Mario Bunge (e.g. 1996; 1998) has defended a similar notion of a concrete socialsystem from the point of view of the emergent materialist system-ontology, although he doesnot use the concept of emergent causal power. According to his CESM view of a system,“a social system is analysable into its composition or membership, environment or context, structureor relationships and mechanism or the processes that makes it tick” (e.g. Bunge 1998, 61).Bunge maintains that these kinds of social systems are always concrete material entities.

8 This problem is a specific instance of the more general problem concerning theconceptualisation of downward causation in complex systems that possess system-levelemergent causal powers (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992; Elder-Vass 2005; Kim 1996;Sawyer 2005). Note also that my position differs from that defended by Manicas (2006,57–74) in the sense that his interpretation of the concept of social structure, inspired byGiddens’ structuration theory, differs from mine and, unlike him, I am not ready to entirelygive up the notion of structural social causality, although I do admit that this notion cannotbe analysed by using the concept of causal power.

9 I would like to thank Kaj Ilmonen and Petri Ylikoski for their helpful comments onthe earlier version of this article. Some of my interpretations and critical remarks have alsobeen formed in numerous discussions with Mika Salo. All responsibility for possible errorsis, of course, mine.

86 Tuukka Kaidesoja


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TUUKKA KAIDESOJA -- Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

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