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TURKMENISTAN: Political, Economic and Regulatory Issues

M a r c h 3 1 , 2 0 0 8

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TURKMENISTAN: Political, Economic and Regulatory Issues

Summary Of all the countries in Central Asia, Turkmenistan is now being looked upon as a “laboratory of transition.” The sudden death of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006 initiated a new phase for the region -– succeeding a leader born of the Soviet era. The new president, Gurbanguli Berdimukhammedov, was elected in February 2007, garnering 89 percent of the vote and ushering in the possibility of a new era. Still, with political, economic and regulatory issues unresolved, Turkmenistan’s debut on the international stage is an uncertain work in progress. Country Overview Turkmenistan is a desert state slightly smaller than Texas located north of Iran in the heart of Central Asia and bordered to the west by the landlocked Caspian Sea. The former Soviet republic gained its independence in 1991 after the Soviet Union dissolved and, until President Saparmurat Niyazov’s death by cardiac arrest on Dec. 21, 2006, was under the rule of one man. An eccentric rule it was. Niyazov adopted the name “Turkmenbashi” (“Father of the Turkmen”) and crafted a cult of personality around it, applying his appellation to a meteorite and a line of household products while erecting statues of himself in the country’s capital, Ashgabat. Aside from its former leader, Turkmenistan’s biggest claim to fame is that it is believed to be the home of the world’s fifth-largest natural gas supply. Currently, its existing infrastructure is Soviet-era and creaking, and it sends nearly all of its natural gas exports -- about 67 billion cubic meters per year -- north and west to Russia. Without those shipments, Russian state energy firm Gazprom would find it impossible to both satisfy domestic Russian natural gas demand and fulfill its export contracts with Europe and Turkey. Turkmenistan’s natural gas fields -- ones that are currently being exploited and those that have never been touched -- are often pointed to as sources for potential energy infrastructure projects that could send natural gas to Asia via Kazakhstan, to South Asia via Afghanistan or to Europe via a subsea Caspian pipeline. If Gazprom, the world’s largest producer, shipper and exporter of natural gas, believes Turkmenistan is of critical importance, then a presidential death and a shift in direction could have significant economic implications for the region -- and the world. But to understand how Turkmenistan is today, one has to understand its late leader. The dark clouds of Niyazov’s reign still overshadow the country, keeping virtually all international powers from making any economic or geopolitical inroads. However, most observers inside and outside Turkmenistan believe these clouds will dissipate over the next few years, allowing a scramble over the country’s spoils. Large global players are now trying to lay the groundwork for this free-for-all. Turkmenbashi’s Regime Niyazov was among the most bizarre leaders in human history, renaming himself Turkmenbashi only because the Turkish government threatened to cut off relations if he

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went with his first choice: Ataturk (the name of the Republic of Turkey’s founder). In addition to renaming products and erecting statues of himself, Niyazov also renamed the months of the year to more accurately reflect his “central role in human history” and created a spiritual guidebook of his personal wisdom that has largely replaced all other texts in the country’s educational system. He also introduced a brand of Turkmenbashi vodka for consumption in an ostensibly Muslim nation. To rule in this way, Niyazov had to rid his country of anyone willing to oppose him -- or even question him. While his violent tendencies could hardly be compared to those of Josef Stalin, Niyazov instituted purge after purge to remove any semblance of opposition -- or independent thought -- from his domain. His sense of irony often showed in his actions, such as the time a railroad minister was “accidentally” run over by a train. At other times he could simply be creative. Niyazov used a likely fictitious assassination attempt against him as a pretext to banish or arrest the few opposition politicians who remained in the country. The results of his strong-arm tactics were predictable. Eventually, aside from a small cadre of loyalists whose sole duty it was to ensure Niyazov’s physical safety, there was no one left in the country that possessed the mix of competence and charisma needed to step into Turkmenbashi’s shoes.

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The Successor In Central Asia, if a late leader has not groomed a protégé, it is traditional for countries looking for a successor to follow the old rules and pass the torch to a member of the leader’s family. In Niyazov’s case, this was easier said than done. His son had not been seen in public for years (and was rumored to be dead) and his daughter was locked away in an insane asylum. Constitutionally, Niyazov’s rule should have passed to a figurehead leader from the country’s pseudo parliament, in this case National Assembly President Avesgeldy Atayev. However, since Atayev was under investigation at the time for corruption, the National Security Council named Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguli Berdimukhammedov president. He subsequently received overwhelming support in the Feb. 11, 2007, presidential “election.”

Berdimukhammedov had long been rumored to be Niyazov’s illegitimate son, born shortly after Niyazov turned 18. This could explain why Niyazov promoted Berdimukhammedov -- who was trained as a dentist and has little political experience or finesse -- all the way to the highest circle of government positions. The remarkable resemblance between Niyazov and Berdimukhammedov has further fueled this rumor.

Berdimukhammedov was schooled in Russia, considers himself “Russified” and speaks the language fluently. Before becoming president, his foreign dealings were limited to relations with Russia. However, in his new position he has declared that Turkmenistan is willing to establish relationships with other global powers and develop the long-isolated state. No leader of Turkmenistan had ever suggested dealing directly with any powers other than Russia, Central Asian countries and Iran (Turkmenistan is a former Persian province). The possibility of Turkmenistan’s opening up to foreign investment and relations has piqued global interest, although nothing has changed legally or diplomatically to facilitate this opening. Berdimukhammedov is preoccupied with the possible fracturing of his county and needs to address this issue before he can look beyond it. Purges and Clans One of Niyazov’s great achievements was his ability to keep Turkmenistan stable and unified despite the historically volatile clans that make up the country’s population -- much like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is composed of five regions: Ahal, Balkhan, Dasoguz, Lebap and Mary, each having one or two clans (three of the five regions are named after their largest clans). Niyazov set up a system in which his clan, Ahal, ran the government and oversaw everything that had to do with the Caspian Sea. All other clans were either crushed by larger clans or bought off by being allowed to control certain aspects of the country’s economy or government. The largest clan in Turkmenistan, Mary, does not participate in governance but reaps all the financial gains of Turkmenistan’s

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extensive drug trade with Afghanistan. The Lebap clan is in charge of the country’s secret services and the Balkhan clan is in charge of the energy infrastructure. Keeping all these clans content with the status quo is a precarious balance, but it is something that Niyazov was quite good at. Berdimukhammedov has not proved to be so adept. The new president is concerned that clans other than his own Ahal clan have more power in the country (through drug money, petrodollars, intelligence services, etc.) and could overturn the Ahal’s hold on the government. He has made moves to consolidate these powers under him. All the clans answered to Niyazov, but Berdimukhammedov wants not only more control but also to ensure that the clans will not overthrow him. Therefore, he has attempted his own series of purges. First, Berdimukhammedov was determined to break Turkmenistan’s tradition of transporting drugs to Europe and Russia -- though this put him at odds with the Mary clan, which makes up more than 80 percent of the country’s population. Then Berdimukhammedov decided that he wanted to control the secret services, but this pitted him against the head of the Lebap clan, Lt. Gen. Akmurat Redzhepov, who is also the country’s second most powerful man behind the president. Moreover, Redzhepov was heavily tied to both the Soviet KGB and its Russian successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB). Berdimukhammedov has already removed Redzhepov from his position. However, Redzhepov has not truly gone away; his allies are still in control of the country’s police and military hierarchy. The possible instability and need for internal reconsolidation has kept the new president from implementing political and economic reforms, though he vows to sort through the disarray and turn his attention to what he considers more important: bringing in foreign investment to develop his country. Turkmenistan’s Place in the World Under Niyazov, Turkmenistan assumed a “neutral” role geopolitically. This has turned into more of an isolationist policy despite Berdimukhammedov’s expressed desire to attract foreign investment. Preoccupied with internal issues, he has taken no specific action to date in terms of improving the investment climate. Meanwhile, Russia, Iran, the United States and China are jockeying into position not only to get their hands on the country’s vast energy wealth but also to exploit its strategic position among so many regional power brokers. Currently, Russia still holds the most power over Turkmenistan, although Moscow cannot dictate the country’s behavior. Russia must have Turkmen natural gas to maintain its strategy of using energy as a foreign policy hammer; replacing Turkmen supplies would take a decade and tens of billions of dollars in cash that Gazprom simply does not have. Using energy as a hammer is one of Russia’s favorite and most effective foreign policy tools, and there is little Moscow would not do to ensure that it gets its way and maintains control over Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, China is in the process of drawing a knife across Central Asia, slicing off the southern four republics from their traditional overlord, Russia, by running a pipeline to Turkmenistan (more about this below). Turkmenistan makes up the bulk of Central Asia’s natural gas exports, so by securing access to Turkmen natural gas, Beijing could cripple Moscow’s ability to meet Russian and European natural gas needs. Turkmenistan is fully open to China’s moves, especially since China pays up front without any political strings. However, because Turkmenistan has yet to drop or modify its laws on foreign investment, Beijing is still waiting to flood the country with investments and deals.

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For Iran, Turkmenbashi’s death presented a unique opportunity either to strengthen ties or pull Ashgabat into a more Tehran-friendly orbit. Turkmenistan is the borderland between the Persians, the Central Asian tribes and the Russians. For the first time since the early 1990s, however, relations between Ashgabat and Tehran appear to have cooled, especially since Turkmenistan began asserting itself as a natural gas supplier, charging something closer to a market price. This led to a natural gas cut-off from Turkmenistan to Iran in January 2008, at the height of winter. Notably absent from this game has been the West, until recently. Optimistic Americans and Europeans might think Niyazov’s death gave them an opening. In fact, they are refocusing efforts on some provisional deals such as the Trans-Caspian project, a major natural gas pipeline that would run from Turkmenistan across the Caspian to Azerbaijan and then on to Europe. But Berdimukhammedov is coming off of years of a virtually non-existent foreign policy toward the West, and the Trans-Caspian negotiations remain interminable and inconclusive. (Rumor has it that Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has discretely agreed to provide 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually if Turkmenistan commits itself to the project.) Niyazov was a supporter of the 2001 war in Afghanistan that was launched by the United States. The former president’s support stemmed from his fear that Afghanistan’s instability would spill over into his tightly-controlled country. But the 2003 Iraq war deeply affected Niyazov and the rest of the Turkmen government, particularly their view of the United States. The Iraq war was, in Niyazov’s mind, essentially an overthrow by the United States of a very familiar-looking government. After Saddam Hussein was removed from power -- and particularly after Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi reached a rapprochement with the United States -- Niyazov became convinced that he was the next target on Washington’s hit list. In addition, there was a wave of “color” and “velvet” revolutions that began in Serbia in 2000, swept Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and finally reached the Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2005. Not only was Turkmenbashi terrified that the West -- accused of sparking the revolutions -- would attempt one in his country, but he also knew that Turkmenistan would be more vulnerable to such a revolution because it had a far more brittle power structure and weaker security services than the other countries. This all led Niyazov to sign a rather comprehensive defense agreement with Moscow that abandoned Ashgabat’s previous policy of neutrality and placed Turkmenistan back under Moscow’s security umbrella. However, Berdimukhammedov is a more level-headed leader and is making his own decisions. This accounts for why, for the first time in Turkmenistan’s history, its president is planning to attend the NATO summit April 2-4 in Bucharest, Romania. Though Turkmenistan has always been wary of the West, the new president is feeling out his options for security outside of Moscow’s umbrella. An Economic Balancing Act Berdimukhammedov’s behavior may seem a little schizophrenic at times, but Turkmenistan is in a difficult position. It is coming out from under two of the world’s most oppressive regimes -- the Soviet Union and Turkmenbashi -- only to face a slew of powerful suitors wanting to tap its vast wealth. At the same time, Turkmenistan needs to consolidate internally to keep from battling itself. This has led Berdimukhammedov to pull Turkmenistan’s energy and economic policy in all directions without a clear focus. Although Gazprom and the Kremlin do not hold all the cards, they do have long-established relations with Ashgabat and the advantage of being able to deal with the entire Turkmen hierarchy. While Russia still controls export routes for hydrocarbons, it apparently does not

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know the total amount of reserves in the country, and its control over the price of natural gas is clearly eroding, with recent hikes getting closer to European prices. Most of the Western energy supermajors that have their sites on Turkmenistan’s energy sector -- ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron -- have set up shop in Ashgabat, ready to attack when the president begins dropping the restrictions. In addition, investment entities that once had a stake in Turkmenistan -- such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Agency for International Development -- are thinking about investing again. Their decisions will have a significant impact on Turkmenistan’s modernization. While Russia and the United States plan their strategies, China is consolidating its presence in the region’s energy sector. China reaffirmed in January that it planned to invest more than $1 billion to build just the Turkmen section of its Sino-Turkmen natural gas pipeline. Over 1,800 km in length, the pipeline will cross Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and convey up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China per year by the end of 2009, when it’s scheduled for completion. The estimated cost for the whole pipeline will be substantial -- somewhere between $7 billion and $12 billion -- proof that Beijing will not hesitate to outbid its rivals when it comes to energy matters. But that is the only deal that Beijing has made thus far, refusing to invest any more money without knowing what it might be getting into. While Russia and the West are still trying to cultivate relationships with Turkmenistan, China is poised to launch a major project once the regulatory hurdles are removed, and then it will move in and likely outbid other foreign companies on other energy deals. Continued Restrictions Hurdles to foreign investment in Turkmenistan are many. Historically, the most promising areas for investment have been in the oil and gas, agricultural and construction sectors, the strongest segments of the country’s economy. But potential investors are blocked by the state-control mechanisms, a restrictive currency-exchange system, lack of an established rule of law, inconsistent regulatory practices and the government’s unfamiliarity with international business norms. Under Niyazov, government officials acted on the president’s verbal instructions, rather than written orders or governing legislation. Most often, personal relations with government officials have played a decisive role in determining how and when government regulations are applied. Even when they are, bureaucratic procedures are confusing and cumbersome. There is no single body that coordinates registration and activities of domestic and foreign private companies. The government does not generally provide essential information to investors. By keeping them in the dark, officials use the information for personal power and profit. Foreign companies may spend months conducting due diligence in Turkmenistan and end up with very little to show for it. The Turkmen government also has very little respect for private property -- foreign or domestically held. One notable example of this was an effort made by a foreign Presbyterian denomination in 2007 to establish a presence in Ashgabat. After finding and purchasing an appropriate facility, missionaries returned the next day to find that their church building and site had been turned into a park overnight. Turkmenistan has laws against corruption, but bribery is still a way of life in the country, which is not abnormal for most former Soviet states. This non-transparency should not be a surprise to companies going in, since government officials do tend to let companies know up front what is expected in this business environment.

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A New Perspective While Turkmenistan remains an unfriendly environment for foreigners in general, investment is possible in certain sectors, such as agriculture, and it can be lucrative. Although it has often been compared to North Korea, Turkmenistan is not as locked-down or as overtly anti-Western. Nor does it have a history of militant violence or terrorism. Its business rules -- both formal and informal -- may seem confusing and unpredictable, but there is a discernable method to the madness for those who know what to expect going in. Most important, while the country seems just as restrictive as it was under Turkmenbashi, the new president has said he intends to make changes. These changes will take significant time and effort but they are in the works. When Niyazov died there was an expectation that Turkmenistan would be transformed overnight into a country open and eager for foreign investment. Berdimukhammedov simply has too much on his plate for the necessary changes to happen very quickly. This does not mean that this course itself will remain unchanged. With the West, Russia and Asia jockeying over Turkmenistan’s energy reserves and regional domination, the country could revert back to its old ways if the global powers become too overbearing -- or if Turkmenistan feels duped in its attempt to open up to the outside world.