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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

AMNESTY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS

PIETERMARITZBURG - 4 ( 9 - 11 Feb 1998)

KILLINGS IN KWAZULU-NATAL

Judith Dlamini (AM0350/96) 6 pages (8 Kb)

Bongani Malevu(AM0293/96) and Walter Tanda

(AM0578/97)- part 1 97 pages (143 Kb)

Bongani Malevu and Walter Tanda - part 2 32 pages

(47 Kb)

Bongani Malevu and Walter Tanda - part 3 51 pages

(75 Kb)



AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 09-02-1998

HELD AT: PIETERMARITZBURG

NAME: JUDITH DLAMINI

CASE NO: AM0350/96

DAY 1

______________________________________________________

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, the matter of Mthembui, which is a part-heard matter

before this Committee, my information this morning was that Mr Mthembui was

arrested in Eshowe District on Thursday last by members of the Murder and

Robbery Squad.

We have been unable in this short space of time to find out exactly where he is, it

is unlikely that he would be here today. In the circumstances of the matter, I would

ask that the matter simply be adjourned in absentia for a date to be arranged with

his representative. Mr Wills unfortunately was here, he left to go back to his office

and won't be able to get back to the hearing within the next 15 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: He is aware of this act that is going to be adjourned?

MR PRIOR: We've sent a message to him, to his office, that it will be adjourned.

CHAIRPERSON: The next matter? This matter will be adjourned in absentia to a

date to be arranged.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. The next matter is the part-heard matter of

Gumbi and Zuma. All the parties are present and Ms Judith Dlamini is present to

be cross-examined.

JUDITH DLAMINI: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Klerk, at the last hearing you requested an adjournment

for you to look at certain documents and to decide whether you wanted to ask any

more questions.

I am told you have a few questions to ask.


FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DE KLERK: That is correct Mr

Chairman. Ma'am, I just want to get clarity. Is it correct that you also testified

during the criminal trial which the applicants were convicted?

MS DLAMINI: Will you please repeat your question.

MR DE KLERK: Can you just tell me, is it correct that you testified during the

criminal trial where the applicants were originally convicted?

INTERPRETER: The witness doesn't seem to hear anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you hear that question?

MS DLAMINI: I would like the question to be repeated.

MR DE KLERK: I will repeat the question. Is it correct that you testified during

the criminal trial where the applicants were convicted?

MS DLAMINI: That is correct.

MR DE KLERK: The reason why I am asking, it seems according to the record

that I received from the High Court register, that the person that testified during

that trial's names are the following: Excuse me Your Worship, Zokhile Judith

Dlamini. Is that you?


MR DE KLERK: You testified previously in this matter that you saw a van, it

seems that you saw a police van and that there were camouflage clad occupants, is

that correct, in that van?


MR DE KLERK: Why did you mention that during this application for amnesty?

MS DLAMINI: I mentioned that because I saw the van which used to come by

taking people.

MR DE KLERK: Do you agree with me that is an important event that happened

that night?


MR DE KLERK: Just to clarity before I ask my next question. What did this van

do, what did the people do?


MS DLAMINI: I used to see the van passing by and some people will get into the

van and that is all that I know.

MR DE KLERK: Who climbed into the van? I am going to ask this straight

forward, did this van assist the attackers in any way?

MS DLAMINI: I didn't see people getting into the van.

MR DE KLERK: You did see people getting into the van?

MS DLAMINI: I didn't say it that way, I didn't say I saw people climbing into the

van. After my mother was injured, a van used to come by to carry people. My

mother asked me to stop the van so that they could help her, but I said I can't stop

the van because it is used by police.

Nobody climbed into the car, I didn't see anybody climbing into the car.

MR DE KLERK: Was this after the attack or before the attack?

MS DLAMINI: It happened after the attack, after my mother was injured. And this

car passed and she asked me to stop the car so that she could be helped, to take her

to hospital.

I said to her I can't stop the car, because I know this van, it is a police van. Those

were the camouflage police.

MR DE KLERK: The reason why I am asking you, if this is such an important

event that you deem it necessary to explain to this Commission, why didn't you

explain to the criminal court, the High Court, these facts?

Because out of the record, there is no mention in your evidence during that trial?

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it more important for a victim to explain what happened to

her mother who was killed in the attack, what was done than it is for a witness in a

criminal trial?

MR DE KLERK: Maybe the witness can explain that to me, Mr Commissioner. Is

it possible that you can just say why didn't you mention this at the criminal trial?

MS DLAMINI: Isn't it now you want the truth? At this present moment I am

telling you the truth.

MR DE KLERK: Yes, and during the criminal trial, did you tell the truth?

MS DLAMINI: Will you please repeat your question.


MR DE KLERK: Yes, all I want to know is just explain why didn't you say it at the

criminal trial, that is all? If it wasn't asked from you or you didn't deem it

necessary, you can just explain it.

CHAIRPERSON: If it wasn't asked from her, she wouldn't have said it. She is

being led at a criminal trial isn't she Mr De Klerk?

MR DE KLERK: I will not take that point further Mr Commissioner. I've got no

further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DE KLERK.

MR RETHMAN: I have no questions Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR RETHMAN.

MR PRIOR: No questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that conclude the evidence in this matter?

MR RETHMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I am afraid I can stay no longer, I should have been in hospital

20 minutes ago. I will ask parties to submit written argument.

That concludes today's hearing, we will now adjourn until ten o'clock tomorrow?

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, the position is that the new matter was scheduled for

Wednesday. I have communicated with Mr Arendse who will be consulting with

the applicants tomorrow morning.

It is prepared, as soon as he had concluded that consultation, to then proceed with

the matter, so we hope to try and get it on by tea.

CHAIRPERSON: I was thinking to indicate to spectators who may wish to have

come.

MR PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It will not be before ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS.



AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 10-02-1998

NAME: BONGANI MALEVU

CASE NO: AM0293/96

NAME: WALTER F. TANDA

CASE NO: AM0578/97


DAY 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we proceed this morning

with the amnesty applications of Andile Shiceka, Walter Falibonga Tanda and

Bongani Malevu, on the 10th of February 1998.

Mr Chairman, sorry, just for the record, Adv P.C. Prior representing amnesty and

in this matter, Mrs Swarts, one of the victims in the application.

CHAIRPERSON: For the record you will say they are applications 5939/97, the

next one 5784/97 and the third one 293/96.

MR PRIOR: Yes, I confirm that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And the panel consists of myself, Ngoepe J, Adv Potgieter SC,

and adv Sandi. And the other people please place themselves on record.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, members of the panel. My name is

Norman Arendse, I am from the Cape Bar, I am appearing together with my

learned friend Vuyani Ngalwana. We appear on behalf of all three applicants.

From left to right Bongani Malevu, in the middle Walter Tanda and on the right

Andile Shiceka.

And I would like, with your leave Mr Chairman, deal with them in that order,

thank you.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, before we continue, we have agreed the status of the

bundle of documents which have been already handed up to the panel, as Exhibit

A. That Exhibit A is a bundle of documents which sets out the amnesty


applications, the indictment and medical legal post-mortem examination report, a

court judgement, three witness statements and certain press and newspaper articles.

Without further proof thereof, the bundle is what it purports to be. Obviously the

veracity of each and every allegation in those documents is not cast in stone, it is

open to be challenged by any party and or the Committee.

So the agreement is basically that proof thereof is dispensed of. The status is

accepted.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, which is the bundle that you are referring to?

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, the prepared bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, you mean the whole thing?

MR PRIOR: Yes, that is the bound bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR PRIOR: May that be marked Exhibit A with leave of the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, very well. Thank you.

MR PRIOR: May I also place on record Mr Chairman, that notices were sent out to

all the victims. Mrs Swarts, I have indicated is present. Mr Wolfaardt and Mr

Maloney who were the other two victims in the incident, were notified. They

indicated that they were unable to attend.

Both victims, Maloney and Wolfaardt expressed the following, that they had no

objection to the application for amnesty and obviously would leave the decision in

the hands of the Committee.

Certain implicated persons have been notified, those are the persons whose names

appear at item 5 of Exhibit A, that is the bundle. I understand, I have only been

handed the fax report or the return of service, is that the notices, the Section 19(4)

notices, were delivered to their last known addresses and their inmates of those

addressed brought it to the attention of those persons.

I understand that Mr Dube was the only one who contacted Mr Arendse in so far as

representation was concerned. So from amnesty's side Mr Chairman, all the notices

were handed to all the interested parties. I do have the returns if it should be

necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, Mr Arendse, the formalities have been dispensed

with now. I am sure we can proceed now.


ADV ARENDSE: As you please Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, members of the

Committee, I just have a short prepared opening statement to make and thereafter I

would like to call on each of the applicants to give evidence in support of their

applications.

I believe that copies of prepared statements on behalf of the applicants, have been

made available to you. They are unsigned. They will stay substantially as they are,

there will be some deviations here and there because, and the reason for that is, for

the first time only today, this morning, I had an opportunity of meeting all three

applicants together in the same room.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Arendse, you say they are prepared statements from the

applicants?

ADV ARENDSE: That is correct Adv Potgieter.

CHAIRPERSON: The statements cover incidents other than the one we (indistinct)

with?

ADV ARENDSE: That is correct Mr Chairman, because there was a request from

the Amnesty Committee Secretariat for the applicants to provide details to the

other incidents, but yes, you are right, we only intend to deal with the Newcastle

Crazy Beat disco matter and unless you specifically or Mr Prior wants to refer to

the others, I don't intend to deal with them.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I suppose ordinarily we would confine ourselves to what

is before us.

ADV ARENDSE: As you please Mr Chairman. If I may continue Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman the applicants were arrested in connection with what is referred to as

the Crazy Beat disco incident in Newcastle on the 15th of February. The incident

itself took place on the 14th of February of 1994.

The applicants were then charged with murder, attempted murder, unlawful

possession of arms and ammunition and grenades. These charges arose from the

shooting which took place at the Crazy Beat disco on the 14th of February. As a

result of the attack on the disco, a 31 year old white female I hope the

pronunciation is correct, Guibrecht Solomina van Wyk was killed.

Applicant malevu was convicted. They appeared in court, he was convicted or

murder, attempted murder and the unlawful possession of machine guns. Applicant

Tanda was convicted of murder, attempted murder and unlawful possession of

machine guns, grenades and three rounds of ammunition and a pistol. Applicant

Shiceka was convicted of murder, attempted murder, unlawful possession of

machine guns and grenades.


Malevu was sentenced to an effective 10 years imprisonment, the trial court having

found that he was an accomplice to the murder and the attempted murder as well as

being an accessory after the fact.

Tanda and Shiceka were found to have perpetrated the attack on the Crazy Beat

disco. They were sentenced to effective terms of imprisonment of 25 years. The

applicants, Mr Chairman, accept that they were properly convicted and sentenced

by Judge Hugo, sitting with two assessors on the 24th and 26th of May 1994.

We submit that the summary of substantial facts in the criminal trial which I see is

not part of the record before you Mr Chairman, read together with the facts found

by the trial court, and those facts are before you, are substantially correct.

The trial court also found correctly that the applicants were members, in the case of

Mr Malevu, the members of the Pan African Congress and in the case of Messrs

Shiceka and Tanda, members of APLA.

The trial court also found that the attack was politically motivated. That they acted

on orders from the APLA high command and that the applicants gained nothing

personally from the attack.

Mr Chairman and learned members of the Committee, we submit that on these

facts as found by the trial court, albeit with respect, that it is an opinion from

another tribunal, we submit that this Committee after hearing evidence will make

the same if not similar, the same findings and accordingly we submit that having

regard to the Act, and in particular the requirements for amnesty, that the

applicants should be entitled to be granted amnesty.

Mr Chairman, if I may proceed to call the first applicant to give evidence, Bongani

Golden Malevu.

BONGANI GOLDEN MALEVU: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Arendse, in the criminal trial, who was accused 1?

ADV ARENDSE: Accused 1 was Malevu. Accused 2 was Tanda and accused 3

was Shiceka. And accused 4 was also a Malevu, the brother of Bongani Malevu.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, yes you may proceed.

EXAMINATION BY ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Malevu,

you have made an application, a formal application for amnesty to this Committee,

is that correct?

INTERPRETER: The speaker is not audible.


MR MALEVU: Yes, that is true.

ADV ARENDSE: And the application relates to your role in the attack on the

Crazy Beat disco in Newcastle on the 14th of February 1994, is that correct?

MR MALEVU: Yes, that is correct.

ADV ARENDSE: Is it also correct that the criminal court where you were, in

which you appeared as accused 1, found that you did not play a direct role in the

attack?

MR MALEVU: That is correct.

ADV ARENDSE: Is it correct that your role was confined to driving your co-

applicants, Tanda and Shiceka in your motor vehicle to the scene of the attack

before the attack happened and then again subsequently after the attack, you also

transported the accused in your motor vehicle?


ADV ARENDSE: And for that role that you played in the whole operation, you

were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment?


ADV ARENDSE: And you are currently serving that sentence at the Waterval

prison in Newcastle?


ADV ARENDSE: Mr Malevu, just some personal details. Are you married?

MR MALEVU: Yes.

ADV ARENDSE: Do you have children?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I have children.

ADV ARENDSE: How many and how old are they?

MR MALEVU: There are two.

ADV ARENDSE: What are their ages?

MR MALEVU: One is five and the older one is nine.

ADV ARENDSE: Do you get to see them from time to time?


MR MALEVU: Yes, I do see them. However, not that often.

ADV ARENDSE: How do you feel about what happened, you know what

happened in the attack, a lady was killed and two people were injured. How do you

feel about what happened.

MR MALEVU: I feel sorry for the family and I will like to ask for forgiveness, and

I will also ask for forgiveness before the Commission because whatever I did, I

didn't gain anything, I did it in the name of the organisation.

ADV ARENDSE: The organisation that you are referring to, is that the PAC?


ADV ARENDSE: Were you a member of APLA at the time?

MR MALEVU: No, I wasn't.

ADV ARENDSE: Mr Malevu, just give us some background as to your education.

Did you go to school and if so, up to what standard?

MR MALEVU: I passed standard 10.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you have the privilege of any tertiary education?

MR MALEVU: I didn't get the chance.

ADV ARENDSE: When did you first join the PAC?

MR MALEVU: It was at the time when it opened its mouth.

ADV ARENDSE: When would that have been?

MR MALEVU: It was during 1990.

ADV ARENDSE: I believe you also were an official of NATO, the Trade Union

federation aligned to the PAC, is that correct?


ADV ARENDSE: Were you politically active, did you play an active role in the

politics of the movement?

MR MALEVU: Yes, at some times I occupied some positions.

ADV ARENDSE: Are you in a position to explain to us the relationship between

the PAC as a political organisation and APLA as a military organisation?


MR MALEVU: APLA is the armed wing of the PAC. PAC concentrate on the

political side, while APLA concentrates on the armed struggle.

ADV ARENDSE: Before the 14th of February 1994, that is before the Crazy Beat

disco attack, did you know that the attack was going to take place?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I did know.

ADV ARENDSE: When did you first get to know and who told you and so on, just

explain that to us?

MR MALEVU: I got it from Andile Shiceka and Walter Tanda. The two people

sitting right here with me.

ADV ARENDSE: When did you get that from them?

MR MALEVU: It was during the weekend before the attack, I met them, there was

a meeting where they explained to me the operations, telling me that they have

come to Newcastle and all the things they were coming to do in Newcastle. That is

where I got the message.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, is it correct that during the course of 1993 already, you

had been informed by a member of the APLA high command that an operation

would take place in Newcastle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I did get that.

ADV ARENDSE: When in 1993 did you get that?

MR MALEVU: It was between May and June in 1993, I don't remember well the

exact month.

ADV ARENDSE: Can you name the person in the APLA high command who told

you this?

MR MALEVU: I don't know his exact name, but we use code names, and he was

referred to as Jones.

ADV ARENDSE: Would this Jones be Mandla Power, would he be one and the

same person or don't you know?

MR MALEVU: I can't say it is the two, however, you find that people had many

code names, so I will make a mistake if I say he was one of the two.

ADV ARENDSE: At the time, and I am referring to mid-1993, you said May,

June, you are not exactly sure, were you at that stage given any task to do? Were

you told what role to play?


MR MALEVU: Yes.

ADV ARENDSE: What was that task?

MR MALEVU: I was told that APLA will send its members in Natal to check the

place, or to do reconnaissance in the area so that when I go back to my place, I will

also be armed.

ADV ARENDSE: Is it correct that you were given arms and ammunition to take

from Umtata and to hide it in Newcastle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, that is correct. I took them with me.

ADV ARENDSE: How did you transport these arms?

MR MALEVU: I was travelling in a bakkie, we disconnected it and we put them

inside the body of the car and then we seal it off again. I took them back home and

when I am at home, I dismantled it and took the firearms out.

ADV ARENDSE: So these arms were transported in your bakkie and they were

concealed inside the bodywork of the bakkie?

MR MALEVU: Yes, they were hidden in that way.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you use these arms at all before the Crazy Beat disco

attack?

MR MALEVU: No, we didn't use them. We only used them at the operation at

Crazy Beat disco operation.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay, now in January 1994 and part of February 1994, you had

been away to Sweden, is that right?


ADV ARENDSE: Can you briefly tell us how did it come about that you went to

Sweden?

MR MALEVU: The Civic Organisation by the name of SANCO, (indistinct)

elected me as a delegate to go to Sweden. That is how I was elected.

ADV ARENDSE: And when you returned in February, is that correct, on the 11th

of February?



ADV ARENDSE: Before the 11th of February, did you know your co-applicants

Walter Tanda and Andile Shiceka? Did you meet them before the Crazy Beat

incident?

MR MALEVU: I didn't know Tanda but I knew Shiceka.

ADV ARENDSE: How did you know Shiceka?

MR MALEVU: During 1993, when it was said they will come up to do

reconnaissances, he was part of the group which came to do reconnaissance in

Newcastle.

ADV ARENDSE: Are you in a position to explain to us what did this

reconnaissance entail, what did that mean?

MR MALEVU: What I was trying to explain was that as members of APLA who

came to the area, they couldn't just start attacking, they first have to come and

investigate the situation to see how the layout is in Newcastle and to find out how

many people they will need to do the attack or operations.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you know what the reason was why these APLA operatives

were doing these reconnaissance?

MR MALEVU: As I have mentioned, that we talked to Jones in 1993, he also

mentioned that they will come to do the recognosce and it was clear that the PAC,

especially the armed wing, APLA, haven't done anything in KwaZulu Natal, so

there was a need to send people to come and do the reconnaissance so that the

operation could be carried out. I think that is the picture.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, it is well known that the PAC had a conference in

December of 1993. Did you attend that conference?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I was present.

ADV ARENDSE: Did any resolutions come out of that conference dealing with

the armed struggle or the status of the armed struggle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, there were such things.

ADV ARENDSE: What more or less was the resolution that was taken there at the

conference?

MR MALEVU: There was a debate about the armed struggle and it was agreed

that the armed struggle should continue.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you personally hear anything about the armed struggle or

the status of the armed struggle after that resolution was taken in 1993?


MR MALEVU: I found out after I was arrested, that the PAC will suspend the

armed struggle.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, if you could just deal with the evening of the attack on the

14th.

Can you explain to the Committee what role you played?

MR MALEVU: My part in the operation after having conversed with Tanda, I was

told that I would have to help with driving and also to help them in the hijacking of

the car.

I was also the driver when we went to look for this car. I was driving Tanda to look

around at the place and see if there were road blocks or not. That is what I did and

after the operation, I also tried to take the arms to go and hide them in the farms in

Babana and my brother, I think that is what I did.

ADV ARENDSE: You mentioned in your application, Mr Chairman, which is on

pages 15 to 19 of the record and Exhibit A, on page 16 Mr Chairman, under sub

heading Nature and Particulars (iv), you mention in your application, I have been

part of planning the attack that took place in Newcastle disco on 14 February 1994,

which was conducted by APLA cadres where one person was killed and the other

was injured.

Can you just explain what you mean that you were part of the planning of the

attack on the disco?

MR MALEVU: I was trying to say that after I came back from overseas, we had a

meeting where everything was explained to me. I was told I have to get a driver

and that is the reason why I am saying I was involved, but that is what I was trying

to say.

ADV ARENDSE: Still on page 16 Mr Chairman, under the sub heading State the

political objective sought to be achieved, you wrote Mr Malevu, to dismantle the

apartheid regime. We were pressurising the whites so that they can tell the

apartheid regime to concede to our political demands, do you recall writing that in

your application?

MR MALEVU: I do remember even if I don't remember which of the applications,

because I made a few applications. I don't know which one is that one.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, the attack took place on the 14th of February 1994, just

about two and a half months or so, approximately two months before the first

democratic elections in this country which took place I think on the 27th of April

1994.


The question is, here we were going to have our first, and we did have our first

democratic elections which returned a majority black government. Why did you

still participate in this attack?

MR MALEVU: What I knew was that the PAC was continuing with the armed

struggle so I have to follow the resolution of the armed struggle.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you participate because you were ordered to do so?

MR MALEVU: Can you repeat the question for me?

ADV ARENDSE: Did you participate in the attack, as you put it the planning of

the attack and the role that you played in the attack, both before and after the

attack, did you do that because you were ordered to do so?

MR MALEVU: Doing what, what did?

ADV ARENDSE: Were you ordered to play a role in the attack or did you do so

voluntarily, did you just feel like doing it or were you told to do it?

CHAIRPERSON: I think we should disallow that question in the way that it is

coming.

ADV ARENDSE: As you please Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you take part in this thing?

MR MALEVU: I was a PAC member and I follow its rules and if part of the PAC

decided to follow the armed struggle, I was supposed to help. I couldn't oppose or

refuse to help, because that will mean I am contradicting the rules and procedures

of the PAC.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You had brought arms back from

Umtata and you hid it at your home, but then you left in January to go to Sweden

and you returned in February. Did you make these arms available to Tanda and

Shiceka on your return from Sweden or were those arms made available before

your return from Sweden?

MR MALEVU: When I left, after realising that it is possible that they might come

to look for the arms when I am not available, I made sure that I put them in a place

where they would be able to reach them when they want to use them.

ADV ARENDSE: You did not convey your co-applicants to the Crazy Beat disco

to carry out the attack, is that correct?

MR MALEVU: Please repeat your question?


ADV ARENDSE: You did not convey Tanda and Shiceka to the Crazy Beat disco

to carry out the attack?


ADV ARENDSE: That was done by Dube?


ADV ARENDSE: And he drove in a Cressida vehicle which was hijacked on the

same night of the attack?


ADV ARENDSE: Did you play any role in hijacking this Cressida motor vehicle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I was there.

ADV ARENDSE: What role did you play?

MR MALEVU: I was the one who was driving the car for the people who were

going to do the hijacking.

ADV ARENDSE: You had mentioned that some reconnaissance work was done by

APLA operatives in the Newcastle area. Do you know whether any targets were

identified by these operatives?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I remember.

ADV ARENDSE: Can you mention which targets were identified in the Newcastle

area?

MR MALEVU: If I remember well, at the end it was a restaurant, the Crazy Beat

disco.

ADV ARENDSE: Were those the only two?

MR MALEVU: Those are the only two I can remember.

ADV ARENDSE: Do you know why the restaurant was not attacked instead of the

Crazy Beat disco?

MR MALEVU: I only discovered later as to why it wasn't attacked.

ADV ARENDSE: What were you told, why was it not attacked?


MR MALEVU: I was told that when they arrived, there were many people outside

the building and there were many African people around there, and it was clear that

if they carried out the operation, some of the African people, two or three could be

injured.

ADV ARENDSE: Do you know why the Crazy Beat disco was identified as a

target?

MR MALEVU: It was because it was mostly frequented by white people.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you at any stage see for yourself that the Crazy Beat disco

is mostly frequented by white people?

MR MALEVU: Yes, as a person who was staying in Newcastle, I used to pass the

Crazy Beat so I knew, I saw that it was mostly white people who were frequenting

the place.

ADV ARENDSE: When did you see the, your co-applicants Tanda and Shiceka,

when did you see them again after the attack took place, was it that same night or

was it the next day?

MR MALEVU: I saw Tanda the very same night of the attack.

ADV ARENDSE: Where did you see him?

MR MALEVU: At home.

ADV ARENDSE: At your home?

MR MALEVU: Yes.

ADV ARENDSE: And what did he tell you?

MR MALEVU: He came to request a car telling me that they have carried out the

operation.

ADV ARENDSE: Did he mention to you what took place and where the operation

took place and what happened, did he give any details to you?

MR MALEVU: If I remember well, he told me that they carried out the attack. I

don't remember as to which target they mentioned to me, and they told me they

didn't meet any problem on the way, they were not stopped by police, or they didn't

fight with other people there.

So, however, they didn't identify as to which target.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay, did Tanda stay at your home that night?


MR MALEVU: He came that night to take a car, and left.

ADV ARENDSE: Did he take your car?


ADV ARENDSE: Now, we know that the next day, the 15th of February, you were

arrested together with your co-applicants, is that correct?


ADV ARENDSE: And was it in your car that you were all sitting?

MR MALEVU: No, we were using my friend's car.

ADV ARENDSE: Is there any reason why you didn't use your car?

MR MALEVU: It is because it worked throughout the night and it was dirty. It was

a time where we had to go to work, I couldn't use it to go to work, because it was

dirty. I left it with my friend to wash it, and took his car.

ADV ARENDSE: Mr Chairman, that will be all at the moment, thank you. Thank

you Mr Malevu.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV ARENDSE.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Malevu,

I am going to ask you questions on behalf also of one of the victims, Mrs Swarts,

whose daughter died in this attack, and also in my capacity as evidence leader for

the Amnesty Committee.

Do you understand?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I do.

MR PRIOR: Thank you. What was your position with in the PAC in the Newcastle

area, did you have an office, were you an office bearer within the organisation for

that region?

MR MALEVU: I was a member of the local committee.

MR PRIOR: Who was the Chairman of the local committee, do you recall?

MR MALEVU: It was Victor Twala.


MR PRIOR: And if I understand your evidence, you were approached in 1993 and

given information that an attack was eminent in the Newcastle area and that you

were to give assistance to the APLA members who were to approach you, is that

so?


MR PRIOR: Now, during the conference in December of 1993, that was in

Umtata, was it not?


MR PRIOR: You say the armed struggle, or the idea of the armed struggle was to

continue, that was the resolution that was taken at that conference?


MR PRIOR: Was that a clear signal that went out from the leadership that the

armed struggle was to continue during 1994?

MR MALEVU: In the conference it wasn't only the leaders who were speaking, it

was the whole conference that resolved that the struggle should continue.

MR PRIOR: Was there any disagreement that the struggle should continue in the

run up to the elections in April of 1994?

MR MALEVU: There were two views. The other view was that it should be

suspended, the other one was that it should continue, however, those who were in

favour of the continuation of the armed struggle, won the vote.

MR PRIOR: Yes, that is what I am trying to demonstrate, that there didn't seem to

be unanimity among PAC members, or the leadership of the PAC and APLA,

whether the armed struggle should be discontinued in the run up to the elections or

not. I just wanted you to assist us there, is that correct, there was no unanimity,

there was a rift.

There were two parties, two views of thought as to whether the armed struggle

should be discontinued or not?

MR MALEVU: At the conference, it is clear that people come into a conference

will not come with one view, they will have to debate all the views, but it didn't

mean there was a rift within the organisation.

It was PAC as one political organisation.

MR PRIOR: I don't want to burden the record with referring to all the news

clippings and paper clippings, but it seems to me, it seems to be common cause


that at the stage, prior to the election and particular at the time of the various

attacks, for example St James church in Cape Town, the Heidelberg Tavern in

Cape Town, King Williams Town golf club, the Crazy Beat disco in Newcastle,

those attacks, there seems to be lack of uniformity of decision amongst the PAC.

We have had views saying that it wasn't their type of operation, they hadn't

sanctioned that operation and we were also hearing that in fact the PAC had not

suspended the armed struggle. We were getting two types of signals in the press.

Are you able to comment on that?

MR MALEVU: I would like to understand when you are referring to suspension of

armed struggle and what do you mean by that?

MR PRIOR: All right, if I can refer to page 80 of Exhibit A. Unfortunately Mr

Chairman, those preparing the bundle have not indicated the date of this press

release, but I want to refer to it in general terms.

There is an article headed PAC (indistinct) and it seems to report that the PAC

expresses disappointment, yes, there were statements made by veteran Raymond

Laba at the weekend, when he criticised the PAC for being committed to the armed

struggle.

It referred to Mr Timothy Jantjies of the Eastern Cape who said last night that the

PAC was not opposed to the election in terms of the congress resolution taken in

Umtata in December.

And he is going on to report. Sorry, if I may stop there. Do you know Mr Jantjies,

Timothy Jantjies from the Eastern Cape?

MR MALEVU: I don't know him, I don't know anything about him.

MR PRIOR: Well, he is reported to have said we have never threatened civil war

or the use of force to disrupt the election. Are you able to comment on that?

MR MALEVU: I don't know where he got that, however, what I knew is that the

PAC said that we had to continue with the armed struggle.

MR PRIOR: He is reported to have said that the PAC were committed to peace,

was committed to the peace process? Was that the type of thing that was being

discussed at the conference in Umtata in December of 1993?

MR MALEVU: What peace when we were oppressed?

MR PRIOR: Sorry, it is a very simple question. Were those the type of things that

were being discussed, that the PAC was committed to peace, a peaceful resolution


of the problems of the country, that they were committed to the peace process and

the election that was forthcoming or were those things not discussed?

MR MALEVU: We all wish peace, however the situation wasn't right for peace.

MR PRIOR: Right, at page 82 of the bundle, there is a report of Sevello Parmer in

the Argus African News Service, who is reported to have said and once again I

apologise, but as to the time frame of this article, obviously it must have occurred

before Mr Parmer passed away and that was I understand in 1993.

He had indicated that orders had gone out to members of the PAC armed wing to

seize all military operations and the reports of attacks from APLA were being

made not by APLA people, but by other people, are you able to comment on that?

MR MALEVU: I won't deal with Sevello Parmer's stories or his reports. He was

reporting, I wasn't trained in that field, I don't know what he was saying.

MR PRIOR: Mr Malevu, what I want to just hear from you as a member of

committee of the PAC, were there clear signals coming from the leaders of the

PAC, were they being filtered down clearly to people like you on the ground, that

the armed struggle was to continue, or did there seem to you to be confusion as to

whether the armed struggle should continue or not?

MR MALEVU: The suspension of the armed struggle frightened me as I have said

it was resolved that it should continue and that people had different views as to

whether they should continue or not.

However, at the end we are bound by the resolution which said that it has to

continue and also the leaders from the regions also sent the very same message that

it should continue. So we had to obey them as members.

MR PRIOR: You went to Sweden, that was shortly before the attack in February, it

was the 14th of February is that right?


MR PRIOR: Was that in your capacity as a member of the PAC or as a member of

the Trade Union?

MR MALEVU: As a Civic Organisation member.

MR PRIOR: Were you aware at the time, or had you heard about the St James

church attack in Cape Town, as well as the Heidelberg attack in December of

1993?

MR MALEVU: You mean at the conference?


MR PRIOR: Well during your stay, when you went to Sweden, that was in the

early part of 1994, were you aware, had you heard that those attacks had taken

place?

MR MALEVU: I wasn't told but I had seen it on the newspapers. There wasn't a

structure that gave the information to me.

MR PRIOR: Were you aware that APLA had claimed responsibility for those

attacks?

MR MALEVU: At the time when I got the information?

MR PRIOR: Yes, that is when you were in Sweden or shortly thereafter, that is

before the Newcastle attack?

MR MALEVU: I don't remember well as to how the information was which I

found in the papers. Whether the PAC claimed to have been responsible, I don't

remember well.

MR PRIOR: All right. Are you able to recall whether there was any international

condemnation on that type of operation? I am asking you particularly whilst you

were in Sweden?

MR MALEVU: The complain regarding white people?

MR PRIOR: That the international community was opposed to that type of

operation where innocent civilians were being killed in restaurants and in

churches? Were you aware of that voice that was in Europe at the time?

MR MALEVU: Yes, it used to happen.

MR PRIOR: Now, when you came back to the Republic you then told the

Committee that you then actively participated in the preparation for the attack on

the Newcastle discotheque?


MR PRIOR: Were you able to give any information to your colleagues, Mr Tanda

and Mr Shiceka and the others regarding the identification or the identity of the

target?

MR MALEVU: If I remember well, we arrived on Friday, the operation was

carried out on Monday. I think they had already done most of the preparation when

I arrived.

MR PRIOR: You became aware that the Crazy Beat discotheque was to be

attacked at some stage before the attack, is that correct?



MR PRIOR: Did you know that from your, I mean you lived in that area, did you

know that it was a discotheque, it was a place where people went to enjoy

themselves, to dance and to drink, is that correct?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I knew.

MR PRIOR: Did you also know that those people were unarmed civilians?

MR MALEVU: It is clear that they are usually armed, you see them when they go

around, carrying their firearms.

MR PRIOR: Are you saying that the patrons of the Newcastle discotheque were

normally armed, they carried firearms?

MR MALEVU: Not all of them, but it is clear that as a man you normally carry

firearms.

MR PRIOR: Is that just something that you accept from what you have heard or

what you have read, or do you know that from your own knowledge?

MR MALEVU: That is from my own knowledge.

MR PRIOR: What I am driving at, is that can you possibly explain to the

Committee, how was the attack on a discotheque where civilians were in

attendance going to assist the struggle that the PAC and APLA were embarked on,

can you assist us on that?

MR MALEVU: According to the information that I had with regard to the

operation, it was that there will be many white people at the place where they will

be enjoying themselves.

MR PRIOR: Yes?

MR MALEVU: I will say that is the crux of the matter.

MR PRIOR: An attack in those circumstances, against white people,

predominantly white people, how was that going to assist in overthrowing the

regime, or how was it going to assist in achieving democracy?

MR MALEVU: The PAC's principles are clear. It also stated in one of principles

that one of their aims is to topple the oppressive government and if they do attack

the white people, the ruling people, the government will take it seriously and they

will go about trying to change.


MR PRIOR: But it was common knowledge at that time, February 1994, that the

elections were scheduled for April, as your counsel put it, two months away? Is

that not so?


MR PRIOR: And by all accounts the indications were overwhelmingly that there

will be a black majority government? Maybe not a PAC led government, but

certainly an ANC led government?

MR MALEVU: It wasn't very clear since the ANC insisted that we should continue

attacks, we didn't believe or wholly believe in the elections.

MR PRIOR: Sorry, I don't follow that. You say the ANC indicated that the attacks

should continue, I didn't quite follow?

MR MALEVU: I am saying even if we were about to go through the elections, the

organisation at the conference took a resolution that we should continue with the

armed struggle, knowing that there will be elections.

They were using the strategy that they will go to the elections while also attacking

at the same time.

MR PRIOR: All right, let's put it in a different way. Correct me if I am mistaken,

was the attack on a purely white target, in other words involving white civilians,

was that to put pressure on the white section of the electorate, in other words to

pressurise them into voting the right way, in other words away from the Nationalist

Party led government at the time?

MR MALEVU: No, we didn't attack them so that they should love us.

MR PRIOR: Why did you attack them, can you maybe explain that?

MR MALEVU: It was clear that when you attack them, the people have the

channel to go to government and tell them that there should be change in the

country.

MR PRIOR: Did you do anything to advise your colleagues from APLA, that is

your two co-applicants or any of the others, to desway them from attacking the

discotheque?

MR MALEVU: I never discouraged it.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I noticed it is one o'clock, are we going to carry on? I

will probably be another ten minutes at the most.

CHAIRPERSON: Then maybe, let's carry on.


MR PRIOR: As the Committee pleases. As far as you were concerned, and I am

referring to what was in your mind, can you tell us, who ordered, who was the

person that gave the order to attack the discotheque, in other words to attack, and I

can put it in this context, a white target?

MR MALEVU: In regards to the issuing of orders to go and attack, I shall think

that that will come from the armed wing, and I wasn't involved with that.

MR PRIOR: During a submission made by the APLA high command during the

week 7 to 10 or 11th of October, of last year, before the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission in Cape Town, it was stated quite clearly there that the PAC was a

party not based on racial lines.

Do you agree with that?

MR MALEVU: It seems that you've added to the fact that you say PAC was not

against apartheid.

MR PRIOR: No, its policies weren't based along racial lines, in other words it also

embraced the white population and welcomed membership from the white section

of the population of the country?

MR MALEVU: I think that is correct.

MR PRIOR: I need to put this to you, it also appeared from those submissions that

the strategy of APLA seemed to change round about that time, it was from mid-

1993 when the St James attack occurred until the Newcastle attack occurred, a

range of about eight months.

That APLA moved away from striking purely military or police targets and shifted

its emphasis to civilian targets or soft targets as they were referred to. Were you

aware of that shift or were you aware of that development?

MR MALEVU: I wasn't told about the shift. I only used to know that we had to

attack white people.

MR PRIOR: And if I understand your evidence thus far, you simply agreed with

that policy and you gave every assistance that you could, as you have explained, to

the members of APLA who came to Newcastle to carry out the attack, is that

correct?


MR PRIOR: And you did that without question?

MR MALEVU: Asking who, from whom?


MR PRIOR: No, you did that without questioning whether it was correct to do so

or not, you simply carried out those requests and instructions as you had received

from your superiors?


CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Prior, when you say your superiors, who are you

referring to? Are you referring to the PAC people or APLA?

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Maybe he can answer that. The instructions

that you carried out or the requests that you undertook, did they come from your

leaders of PAC or did they come from the high command of APLA?

MR MALEVU: I think it was from APLA. I can't say the high command, because I

don't know the rank structure of APLA.

INTERPRETER: The witness is complaining that his earphones are not working

well, it goes on and off. Can somebody help me?

MR PRIOR: Maybe he can just change his headset. Please try the other headset

that has been handed to you.

May we just try that question again.

MR MALEVU: This is an English channel, could somebody just get it on channel

3?

MR PRIOR: Can you just assist and put channel 3 on your headset.

Can you hear now?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I can hear you.

MR PRIOR: Right the question briefly is where did you get the instructions to

assist in the attack in Newcastle, was that from the leadership of the PAC or from

APLA, did that request come from APLA?

MR MALEVU: With regard to the attack, I am getting confused, the instruction

that I got was to help those people who are coming to attack, organise a place for

them to stay.

We never discuss as to which target for example Crazy Beat, I think it might have

been organised or dealt with while they were in Umtata.

MR PRIOR: Just finally, one of - you indicated also that there were two targets to

be attacked in Newcastle, one was a restaurant. And you indicated that that wasn't


attacked because there were black people in the vicinity and they may have been

injured.

MR MALEVU: I didn't say inside, I said just surrounded area, there were black

people.

MR PRIOR: In the vicinity of the restaurant and that is why that target wasn't

attacked, is that correct, is that your information?


MR PRIOR: Just finally, you also indicated that a vehicle was hijacked and used

presumably in the attack. Are you aware of that?

MR MALEVU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: Were you present when that vehicle was hijacked?

MR MALEVU: I parked around the area where they hijacked the car, they alighted

from my car and went to hijack the car.

MR PRIOR: So were you able to see what happened with that incident?

MR MALEVU: It was at night, I couldn't see.

MR PRIOR: Sorry, was it Mr Tanda and Mr Shiceka that approached that vehicle,

that is the vehicle that was hijacked?

MR MALEVU: Shiceka wasn't there, it was Tanda and other two men.

MR PRIOR: Do you know whether they were armed at that stage when they

proceeded to that vehicle or moved towards that vehicle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, they were armed.

MR PRIOR: Do you know what happened to the driver of that vehicle?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I know.

MR PRIOR: Was he injured, was he tied up, was he assaulted? Are you able to tell

us?

MR MALEVU: What I found is that they had a discussion with them, which was

not an amicable one. They explained to him who they were and they said they are

not going to attack African people.


They asked him that they will not cause any problems to him, they will bring back

his car and he should just obey the request and fortunately he had his girlfriend.

They agreed to hand the car, they even drove the girlfriend and this man back to

their place. They were tied from behind, the hands behind and they were guarded

by two people.

Their car was taken to do the operation and after that, it was brought back to them.

Tanda after the operation, also gave him R10-00 to put petrol in the car. They even

shared a cigarette after that.

MR PRIOR: Why was it necessary to tie these people up, the girlfriend and the

owner of the vehicle?

MR MALEVU: They were tied because it was a common cause that if there is an

accident they might get injured, so for their safety we have to tie them.

When the car went to do the operation, found the young boys who had to guard

these people. They said to them, untie them, because you are armed and they are

also cooperating, there is no need to tie them.

Therefore after the operation, when they come back, they found they were tied.

They were only tied when they were caught and put into the car, but most of the

time, they were untied.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR:

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we should adjourn until two o'clock.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: One aspect if I may be

permitted, to put to this witness. Mr Malevu, there is just one aspect I wish you to

comment on.

It is an aspect that seems to have arisen in most of the APLA applications. It

certainly came to the fore in the Heidelberg Tavern attack and it concerns your

arrest the next day, that is the day after the attack, on the 15th of February 1994.

You indicated that you were arrested together with Mr Tanda and Mr Shiceka, is

that correct?



MR PRIOR: And you were driving in someone else's motor vehicle?


MR PRIOR: Did that ever bother you that you were arrested so soon after the

attack?

MR MALEVU: It did bother me.

MR PRIOR: Are you able to say now, at any stage, whether any information had

been passed to the Security Forces regarding your involvement and the

involvement of your co-applicants in this attack? In other words there was an

informer in your midst?

MR MALEVU: Excuse me, what came to my mind was that the person from

whom they hijacked the car was told that we were APLA people, so I suppose that

people might have been surveilling or operations.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR.

ADV SANDI: Mr Malevu, you mentioned that there was a conference in Umtata.

At that conference a resolution was taken to continue with the armed struggle. I

just want to know from you what exactly was decided upon, how were you going

to go about continuing with that armed struggle? Who were going to be the targets,

how long was this armed struggle envisaged to continue?

MR MALEVU: My understanding was that the armed struggle should continue as

we were fighting against the apartheid government. I didn't have the correct picture

as to how long it should continue. All I knew is that it should continue.

ADV SANDI: Was it discussed who the targets were going to be?

MR MALEVU: I don't remember if it was specified in the conference. What was

clear was that we had to fight against the apartheid government.

ADV SANDI: In other words, you are saying that this was just a general resolution

that the armed struggle should continue?

MR MALEVU: I do not remember the specifics as to which should be done,

however as we were debating it, which was suspended, it was supposed to be

suspended during CODESA but it continued.

ADV SANDI: You also mentioned that there were two opposing view points at

this conference. One of them was in favour of intensifying the armed struggle, and

the other was against. Do you recall that evidence this morning?


MR MALEVU: Yes.

ADV SANDI: Are you perhaps able to remember the reasons that were being

advanced in motivation of intensifying the armed struggle, are you able to

remember what those who were saying the armed struggle should continue, what

reasons they were giving for that view point?

MR MALEVU: It came out that we shouldn't wait for the negotiations, we should

continue with the armed struggle and we will see from the results of the

negotiations as to whether to continue or not.

However, it was exercised that we can't rely on negotiations, we have to continue

with the struggle.

ADV SANDI: Is this at December 1993, this conference?

MR MALEVU: It was on December if I remember very well.

ADV SANDI: December 1993, I thought that was your evidence this morning?

MR MALEVU: Yes, it was at December 1993.

ADV SANDI: Was the PAC at that stage not part of those negotiations at the

World Trade Centre?

MR MALEVU: It was involved, however, I don't know whether it was during

CODESA or the World Trade Centre one, but it took part in one.

ADV SANDI: At the end of the day the resolution was taken that that the armed

struggle should continue?

MR MALEVU: Yes.

ADV SANDI: Are you able to remember the reasons or arguments that were being

advanced by those who had won this debate?

MR MALEVU: I can't have the whole picture as to what the debate was going

about. However, it was clear that it should continue despite the elections coming

on, the negotiations.

ADV SANDI: Did you personally play any role in selecting the Crazy Beat disco

as a target?

MR MALEVU: No, I didn't.

ADV SANDI: When Mr Tanda came to you that evening, to say that they had

carried out the operation, what did you understand him to be talking about?


MR MALEVU: As I knew that they were going to attack, I only asked him as to

what happened. Whether they were injured or whether they were arrested or

something like that.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Malevu.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Perhaps Mr Prior, in all fairness to the applicant, we should

refer to an article which is parallel to the one that you read to him.

There is, on the same page, I am sure you don't have that, but there is an article

next to the one which was read to you, page 80, there is an article which says that

the PAC in the Transkei or rather members of the PAC in Transkei were very

much in favour of the continuation of the armed struggle, and they were almost

about to revolt against any suggestion that the armed struggle should stop.

Would that be in line with the view of some of the people who were at the meeting

in December 1993?

If you do not understand my question, you must please tell me?

MR MALEVU: May you please repeat?

CHAIRPERSON: According to this newspaper report, there were people in the

Eastern Cape or in particular in Transkei, members of the PAC who did not want

to give up the armed struggle.

Would that be in line with the views of some of the people who attended the

meeting where the resolution was taken in 1993?

MR MALEVU: At the conference, when the issue of armed struggle was

discussed, there were debates before the resolution. I was not referring to debates

which was going on outside of the conference.

I don't know whether you are referring to what was discussed at the conference or

something that happened outside the conference.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not clear whether it was in or outside the conference, but in

all probability it was not at the same conference.

It is not referring to the conference, but the general situation in Transkei at the

time? Thank you Mr Arendse, do you have questions in re-examination?

MR MALEVU: Yes, I understand.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, just again for the sake of

completeness really, can I also just refer to, my learned friend Mr Prior had

referred to page 82 where APLA was told to seize operations, then we find on page


83, that 1994 had been declared the year of the bullet and the ballot. That was in

the New Years message received from APLA Commander Sevello Parmer and

then on page 87 just to link that to the point that you raised Mr Chairman, PAC

government in talks, but rebellion is brewing.

That article actually highlight some of the different factions within the party that

appear to be rebelling against the decision to suspend the armed struggle.

I seem to think that there was an announcement, it may even have been in January

of 1994 about the leadership suspending the armed struggle.

But other wise Mr Chairman, I don't have any further questions of Mr Malevu.

CHAIRPERSON: I think let's tie that up. So is it correct then that inside the PAC

and or APLA as well, there were some people who thought that the armed struggle

should be suspended and on the other hand, there were others who felt that it

should continue?


CHAIRPERSON: And where did you fall?

MR MALEVU: During the conference?

CHAIRPERSON: Or even thereafter, what was your view? We've got two groups,

one group says the armed struggle should stop, the other group says, no, it should

continue.

Where did you fall?

MR MALEVU: I was of the view that it should continue.

ADV SANDI: At that stage Mr Malevu, a number of attacks had been conducted,

maybe I should say allegedly by APLA, were these attacks discussed at the

conference at Umtata?

MR MALEVU: I don't remember attacks being discussed at the conference.

CHAIRPERSON: You would all have been arrested there and then at the

conference, if you discussed those attacks, I am sure?


CHAIRPERSON: The idea that you should, well, you shouldn't launch an attack at

the restaurant because there were a lot of black people in front or outside, rather go

and attack the disco because it is frequented by white people. To me it sounds

rather racist?


It sounds that the attack is inspired by pure racism? What do you say about that?

MR MALEVU: It wasn't because of racism.

CHAIRPERSON: Explain that please.

MR MALEVU: It is clear as I have already mentioned, that the white people were

the only people who were in government, people who have the right to vote.

We were fighting against this government and in order to pass the message to this

government, we had to attack this white people since the white people were trained

to protect the government. We wanted to send a message straight to the

government.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Did anyone else have questions to put to the

witness?

MR PRIOR: My questions will be directed to the other applicants, I think we have

canvassed this, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Arendse?

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, can I call on Walter Falibonga Tanda

to be sworn in Mr Chairman.

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: You may sit down, and please try to speak loud so that the

interpreters can hear you. We don't want you to be misinterpreted, it may cause

problems later. Do you understand?

MR TANDA: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, yes, Mr Arendse?

EXAMINATION BY ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Tanda, how

old are you now?

MR TANDA: I am 37 years old.

ADV ARENDSE: Are you married?

MR TANDA: Yes, I am married.

ADV ARENDSE: Do you have any children?

MR TANDA: Yes, three.


ADV ARENDSE: How old are they?

MR TANDA: One is 12 years old, the other is 8 and the last one is 3.

ADV ARENDSE: You are currently serving a 25 year sentence at Pollsmoor is that

correct?

MR TANDA: That is correct.

ADV ARENDSE: And that follows your conviction in the Pietermaritz High Court

in connection with the Crazy Beat disco murder?


ADV ARENDSE: Mr Tanda, did you go to school?

MR TANDA: I didn't. Can you repeat the question please?

ADV ARENDSE: Did you go to school?

MR TANDA: Yes, I did go to school.

ADV ARENDSE: Up to what standard?

MR TANDA: Up to standard 2.

ADV ARENDSE: Standard 2, and how old were you when you left school?

MR TANDA: I left school in 1974.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay. And after leaving school, did you go and work or what

did you do, can you just tell us briefly?

MR TANDA: I worked at Brand number 1, which is a mine.

ADV ARENDSE: Yes?

MR TANDA: 1979.

ADV ARENDSE: Until?

MR TANDA: 1984.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay. Now, the court found, the court that found you guilty and

sentenced you, the court found that you were a member of APLA and that you

were directly involved in the attack on the Crazy Beat disco? Do you agree with

those findings?


MR TANDA: Yes, I agree with them.

ADV ARENDSE: You agree with the court's finding that you were one of the

gunmen that shot inside the disco on the night of the 14th of February 1994?


ADV ARENDSE: You also agree with the finding that you were the Commander

of the Unit that perpetrated the attack that evening?


ADV ARENDSE: Okay, now let's just deal with why you launched the attack on

the disco.

Did you decide for yourself that you should attack the disco?

MR TANDA: It was an instruction. I got an instruction from APLA member who

was my Commander.

ADV ARENDSE: What is his name, what was his name?

MR TANDA: We were using code names. He uses Mandla, Mzala, Power.

However, the name that we used to use at that name in Newcastle when trying to

contact him, we used Jones which is also a code name.

ADV ARENDSE: So Mzala, Power, Jones is one and the same person, is that what

you are saying?


ADV ARENDSE: And he is the person who gave you the order? Is that right?


ADV ARENDSE: When did he give you the order?

MR TANDA: He came to fetch me in Port St Johns to meet Andile, that is where

we sat and he told us that we have to go to Newcastle. And that would be the

following morning.

ADV ARENDSE: When was that?

MR TANDA: It was in January, but I can't remember the exact date, 1994,

January.


ADV ARENDSE: Okay, so just to recap, in January 1994, he Power, Mzala, Mr

Jones or Jones fetched you in Port St Johns, he took you to was it Umtata you said?


ADV ARENDSE: And that is where you met Shiceka?

MR TANDA: Yes, that is correct.

ADV ARENDSE: Had you met Shiceka before that?

MR TANDA: At the time I was in Transkei, I had never met Shiceka. I only met

him on that particular day.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, just tell us a bit more about what order you were given by

Jones or Mzala or Power, what exactly did he tell you? what were your

instructions?

MR TANDA: The instructions I get from Jones were that myself and Andile who

will be my assistant in that Unit, as an assistant Commander, he also led me to two

gentlemen and also gave us instructions that we should go to Newcastle and

firearms are already in Newcastle and when we arrive in Newcastle we will attack

places where we will see, places which are usually frequented by white people.

ADV ARENDSE: So, you must correct me if I am wrong, I am just going to

summarise what you said.

You were told that you were a Commander of a Unit, it is you and Shiceka and two

other gentlemen. You will come too and that you were to go to Newcastle, arms

and ammunition is already in Newcastle and in Newcastle you must attack places

where there are white people?


CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, places frequented by white people.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The difference maybe ...

ADV ARENDSE: Places frequented by white people.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV ARENDSE: I put it wrongly, it is places frequented by white people? You

were told to attack places frequented by white people?


MR TANDA: Yes.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you. Did Power or Mzala or Jones identify these places?

Did he tell you exactly where these places are?

MR TANDA: No, he didn't identify them as to whether we should attack the

restaurant or the disco. It was us who selected the target.

The instruction was to attack those places where white people normally meet. So,

we investigated those kind of places.

ADV ARENDSE: So you identified these places?


ADV ARENDSE: And when was that, when did you first identify these places?

MR TANDA: As soon as we arrived in Newcastle, we went around town, looking

as to how we could get in and out of the town so that on the day on which we are

supposed to attack, we have to be sure that our members are safe.

The reason why we went in, we were also going to look at the place, how we can

manoeuvre around it, we were not specifically looking as to which places were

frequented by white people or not, but in that process we managed to see them.

ADV ARENDSE: How many places did you identify as a target or a potential

target?

MR TANDA: It was a restaurant, the disco, the two.

ADV ARENDSE: The restaurant and the disco?


ADV ARENDSE: Now, how much time did you spend observing or doing

reconnaissance before you decided that the restaurant or the disco is going to be

the target, or a target?

MR TANDA: As I have already mentioned, that we arrived during January. The

operation was carried out on the 14th of February, therefore I would say during all

the time between this two time period, we were busy trying to identify targets.

We were also trying to find ways as to how we would find cars which we would

use as a get away car. So it did take time before the attack, I can't remember the

exact dates.

ADV ARENDSE: Why did you only identify places frequented by white people?


MR TANDA: It is because when you are given an instruction as an army officer,

you have to follow the instruction given by the Commander, therefore we were

following the instructions.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you not at any stage question that instruction?

MR TANDA: Any army member will tell you that you don't question an order.

You are supposed to go and do or carry out these instructions, and after carrying

out the instruction, you have to report back. It is then that you get a chance to ask

questions if you have questions with regard to the order as to what was the purpose

behind it and we never got that chance, even up to now, because we were arrested

before.

We didn't get a chance to ask.

ADV ARENDSE: Did you not, why didn't you ask those questions of Power or

Mzala or Jones, why didn't you ask him those questions in January when he picked

you up at Port St Johns or when he brought you to Umtata to meet Andile?

MR TANDA: Within the APLA organisation, each member of APLA is told that if

you are under a Commander and when given instructions to carry out an operation,

you don't have to ask but you can only ask after the operation.

Therefore there was no reason as a member of APLA to ask, so I could carry any

instruction given to me by the Commanders of APLA.

ADV ARENDSE: When did you become a member of APLA?

MR TANDA: I got training in 1990.

ADV ARENDSE: Where did you get that training, was it inside the country or

outside the country?

MR TANDA: Inside the country.

ADV ARENDSE: And when did you do your first operation, when did you carry

out your first operation?

MR TANDA: It was during 1991 where I was instructed to go to Cape Town,

when I arrived in Cape Town, I stayed there.

I used to work as a person who received APLA members who were employed to

the Cape Town region. And also to identify targets. After that I was involved in

police operation in Cape Town.

ADV ARENDSE: Let's just come back to the Newcastle operation.


We have heard from your comrade Bongani Malevu, that earlier before you

actually launched the attack on the disco, he drove a vehicle which took you to a

place where you hijacked a Cressida motor vehicle, is that correct?


ADV ARENDSE: Who was with you when you hijacked the vehicle?

MR TANDA: It was Funani and Situlele and myself.

ADV ARENDSE: Funani and Situlele, are those the two gentlemen you referred to

earlier, the members of the Unit, the other two members of the Unit?

MR TANDA: Yes, those are the ones we were together in Transkei.

ADV ARENDSE: And after you hijacked the vehicle, who drove the hijacked

vehicle, the Cressida?

MR TANDA: It was myself.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay, and where did you go with the vehicle?

MR TANDA: We took it from the scene where it stopped. When we were

hijacking it, I went to them, I approached them asking them to get out of the car.

It was a militant approach because I pointed a firearm at them. After that, after they

got out, we took them and tied them and we took them to an area where you can't

switch on the car. I went back to get R20-00 petrol into the car.

After that I went to the house which we used, I packed the car and Andile knew

that there was supposed to be a driver. They were on standby with a driver, Funani,

then I gave them instructions that they should get into the car to go to Newcastle.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, we know from the criminal trial that Dumisane Dube, he

was the driver of the vehicle, or he became the driver of the vehicle that took you

back to the disco, is that right?


ADV ARENDSE: Now, so in the vehicle it was Dube, you, Shiceka, Funani and

the other chap, Sitembele?


ADV ARENDSE: Did you, did Dube drive you straight to the disco or did you go

anywhere else?


MR TANDA: After taking the car he drove it to the restaurant. I told him to stop

the car. Shiceka alighted from the car and looked around as to whether people were

inside or not and he came back to the car.

After seeing the situation, if we tried to attack this restaurant, there were many

people outside, it is possible that there might be some African people, passerby's

who might be injured, to avoid that, we tried to move to another target.

We tried to move to another target, because we had two targets.

ADV ARENDSE: So, would it be correct to say that the restaurant was in fact the

main target for that night? You targeted the restaurant?

MR TANDA: Yes. It was one of the selected targets, however, it wasn't a target

because of a very simple problem I have just explained.

ADV ARENDSE: How far is the disco from the restaurant?

MR TANDA: It is not far, although I can't estimate the metres. After the restaurant,

behind it, there is an open parking and at the corner of the park in the other street,

that is where the disco was situated, it is not that far.

ADV ARENDSE: So did you drive from the restaurant to the disco or did you

walk there?

MR TANDA: We drove by car.

ADV ARENDSE: You drove and who got out of the car first? Did you get out of

the car?

MR TANDA: When we arrived at the disco, I went out. I looked around in the

disco, I went back to the car. I instructed Shiceka to get out. I also instructed

Funani to give us a firing cover behind so that while we are attacking the place, he

can ...

ADV ARENDSE: Yes.

MR TANDA: Dube was to sit in the car just to protect the driver.

ADV ARENDSE: And you then entered the, did you go through the back or the

front of the disco?

MR TANDA: I will say we didn't enter into the disco, because there were iron bars

on the door, we shot through the door which was facing the main road.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay.


MR TANDA: It was myself and Shiceka who were shooting.

ADV ARENDSE: And can you recall how many people were inside the disco

when you shot?

MR TANDA: I cannot specifically say the number and I won't be able to know that

because I didn't count them. I only looked at the place and I see that there were

people inside and there were many. I don't know how many they were.

ADV ARENDSE: And you were armed with a, what was it, an R4 rifle?


ADV ARENDSE: And you also had a hand grenade?


ADV ARENDSE: Did you throw the hand grenade?

MR TANDA: I didn't throw it.

ADV ARENDSE: Why didn't you throw it?

MR TANDA: As there were bars on the door, it is possible that if you throw it, it

can hit and come back to near to you and it might injure us instead of the targets.

ADV ARENDSE: Would it be correct to say that you, when you shot and when

you fired the shot from your rifle, you and Shiceka, that you aimed to kill and

injure as many people inside the disco as possible?

MR TANDA: Our aim was to kill as many people as possible.

ADV ARENDSE: How did you react when you learnt or heard that one person was

killed and two people were injured? Did you expect that number to be killed and

injured or did you expect more people to be killed and injured?

MR TANDA: The killing of a human being is not similar to killing a chicken or

any other animal. We felt it, but we are killing people.

If it was possible that I can get out of prison and ask the PAC as the mother body

of APLA to talk to the government and arrange a meeting between myself and my

family and the families of the victims in order to reconcile.

ADV ARENDSE: Now, when you - how long did this attack last?

MR TANDA: I will not be exactly sure as to the time period, however, we knew

that we don't have to take a long time.


ADV ARENDSE: Are we talking about seconds or minutes?

MR TANDA: I don't know how many minutes it was.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry the other question actually was, when you heard the

following day that only one person was killed, what did you think? Did you think

that, or did you expect that more people would have been killed or what?

MR TANDA: I personally as a person who was given directions to command the

people, I saw it as an unsuccessful operation.

CHAIRPERSON: So you know yourself how many shots you fired, you know how

long you kept the fire on. Did you think, when you left the discotheque, did you

think that more people would probably be killed or did you think only one would

be killed?

MR TANDA: When the firing started, the lights went off and it was dark. I

wouldn't be able to see the target inside.

Therefore, I wouldn't be able to know how many people might have died, however,

we used lots of ammunition rounds.

CHAIRPERSON: So the following day when you heard that only one person was

killed, you were not surprised?

MR TANDA: The truth is I didn't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR TANDA: Meaning that he was surprised.


ADV ARENDSE: When you returned to the motor vehicle with Shiceka and where

did you go to after that?

MR TANDA: You mean after leaving the restaurant?

ADV ARENDSE: After leaving the discotheque, yes. After you shot?

MR TANDA: We went back to the place where we were staying.

ADV ARENDSE: Yes, and what did you do there?

MR TANDA: I arrived, I got the members who were with us out. I said to comrade

Shiceka that he should get into the car so that we can go. We went away on the

way to the place where Bongani stayed and we requested a car.


I gave the car to Shiceka who drove it to the owner of the car. After that I took out

R10-00 and gave it to him to put petrol into the car, because we didn't know where

he stayed. Even if I used the petrol, I put R20-00 petrol into the car, I had to give

him an extra R10-00 because I didn't know where he stayed in that area.

We gave him his car and came back and stayed in the house of Buthelesi.

ADV ARENDSE: You were arrested the very next day, is that right?


ADV ARENDSE: How did you react to the arrest? The fact that you were arrested

so soon, so quickly, after what happened the night before?

MR TANDA: I couldn't react at the time when I was getting arrested, the reason

being that I was in possession of a shotgun which has ammunition, seven bullets.

The rifles we had already left them behind at Malevu's brother so the (indistinct)

arrested us, we couldn't counteract through the use of a pistol.

ADV SANDI: Mr Arendse, are you not really asking the witness how did he feel

about his sudden arrest?

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you. Mr Tanda, I asked you how did you feel about being

arrested so soon after the incident took place just the night before, and now you are

faced with this contingent of police stopping you and arresting you?

MR TANDA: I was not suspecting any person who could have sold us out, or even

think there is that possibility.

ADV ARENDSE: Is it then your view that it was a pure coincidence that the police

stopped you that day, the next day?

MR TANDA: When we were going to Malevu's brother, there was a bakkie which

we came across on the way. It was driving towards the township, as we were

getting out of the township, when going back, we also met it again.

I suspected that, we didn't suspect much because had already dropped the guns and

went back to Matadeni.

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he not applying for amnesty in respect of the illegal firearms,

ammunition and the like?

ADV ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Tanda, you were also found guilty

of possessing arms and ammunition and hand grenades and you heard me say in


my opening statement, that you were correctly convicted for committing those

offences, do you agree with that?


ADV ARENDSE: And would it be correct that you are also applying for amnesty

in respect of those offences?




CHAIRPERSON: What did the police find in your possession, what weapons did

they find?

MR TANDA: When I arrived at the police station, we were searched. They found a

phone which links me to Jones.

They also found the shotgun I referred to, the 9mm shotgun.

CHAIRPERSON: And some ammunition?


CHAIRPERSON: Where did you get this shotgun with its ammunition and the

hand grenade?

MR TANDA: The hand grenade and the arms were from Umtata.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you want to use them for? For what purpose did you

want to use all those weapons and ammunition that were found with you?

MR TANDA: The truth is that the gun, the arms were to be used for the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr Prior?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Tanda,

in a statement which is unsigned, you indicated that you arrived in Cape Town in

1992 where you started a Task Force and trained members of APLA in order that

they were able to carry out operations, is that so?


MR PRIOR: Are you able to tell us where in Cape Town this training took place?


MR TANDA: I would like to ask a question. The hearing in which I was supposed

to appear in Cape Town, does the operations which took place in Cape Town affect

the operation or are they linked to the operation that we took out in Newcastle?

Because I think I was supposed to talk about the operation which is specifically

mentioned, about this, because I have already talked about these operations before.

Unless, if that is not going to affect me, because I didn't have much consultation

with my Advocate with regards to the operations in Cape Town.

CHAIRPERSON: It is your Advocate who took us to Cape Town. I assure you

though that I am sure the questions are not going to ask you what you did in Cape

Town, what did you do and the like. I am sure the questions will not get into that.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, may I assure the witness?

MR TANDA: I think the question he asked me is referring directly to what

happened in Cape Town and not about the ...

CHAIRPERSON: I don't remember what the question is, can you repeat the

question.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I certainly won't go into the detail of those separate

incidents. But for way of background and his training in the use of arms in

particular, I think the question is a general question and relates to the training that

he did in Cape Town.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe I should explain to you this way that when your

Advocate talked about Cape Town, I didn't understand either as trying to go deep

into what you did in Cape Town. I thought that he was trying to show to us that

you were in fact a genuine trained member of APLA, in other words, they didn't

just pick you up that evening in Newcastle and just used you there and there.

He was trying to show that you have got a history as a soldier of APLA, to

complete the picture because sometimes you find somebody who becomes a

member of a liberation movement, five minutes before he kills people and then he

comes and he says, well I am a member of APLA. For how long, for five minutes,

but in order to show that you were a genuine member of APLA he wanted to show

some history, that you had been working for APLA for many years or for some

time before that.

But they are not going to ask you did you kill somebody in Cape Town, did you

throw a hand grenade in Cape Town, they are not going to ask you that. We will

guard against that immediately. Do you understand?

MR TANDA: To cut it short, I had a programme to train the defence unit for the

PAC. I also had a programme to oversee the PAC in Cape Town so that the units


doesn't get infiltrated and also receiving members of the Force and I also had to

train the members of the Task Force.

Those which were supposed to meet the APLA members, I used to unite them, get

them together.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that answer your question Mr Prior?

MR PRIOR: In some way, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Prior, what is the status of those other incidents? Are they

pending?

MR PRIOR: Yes, I understand, I give the Committee the assurance that in so far as

the applicant has applied for amnesty for these matters and they do not serve

before us today, I will not question on them in any detail whatsoever.

The question is simply a background question. I don't know why the applicant is so

defensive. I simply want to go into his background insofar his military background

and his training is concerned, which will then lead me to Newcastle.

ADV POTGIETER: Yes, but is the fact that those things are pending before the

Amnesty Committee, are they ...?

MR PRIOR: Maybe Mr Arendse can answer. I know there are several applications

for amnesty from various APLA members regarding Guguletu and Khayelitsha and

the other matters.

ADV POTGIETER: That seems to apply to both the first and second applicants,

they seem to be the operatives and they seem to have been involved in some other

incidents now. We are not sure, be obviously are only dealing with the disco at this

stage.

MR PRIOR: May I give the Committee the assurance, we are only dealing with the

disco. I understand that the statements were prepared in response to questions

which were directed by the analysts some time ago, regarding the application

which indicated some other incidents and in order to identify them, those questions

were asked.

Somewhat belatedly the replies came to those questions and unfortunately they

were included in the statement which is now before this Committee. We are only

dealing with Newcastle and to that end I shall not deal in any depth at all, or in any

respect, of those other incidents which have no bearing on the Newcastle attack.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.


MR PRIOR: If I understand you correctly, obviously part of the training dealt with

the use of firearms, is that correct?


MR PRIOR: Were you proficient with the use of particularly the R4 rifle?


MR PRIOR: And on the evening in question, that is the 14th of February in

Newcastle, did you have a fully loaded magazine before you fired into the

discotheque?


MR PRIOR: And how many rounds did the magazine contain?

MR TANDA: There was 30.

MR PRIOR: You discharged all 30 rounds into the discotheque?

MR TANDA: I won't be able to say exactly that I used 30. I think I used less than

30. When coming back to the car, I didn't look to see as to how many bullets were

still inside, I just loaded full again.

MR PRIOR: Did you change magazines at any stage during the attack at the

discotheque?

MR TANDA: We didn't change magazines.

MR PRIOR: Mr Shiceka, did he also have an R4 semi-automatic rifle?

MR TANDA: He had an R5.

MR PRIOR: Does that magazine also contain 30 rounds?

MR TANDA: When looking at the operation, each and every member had to carry

his own firearm, to load it, to see whether it is working properly. I won't be able to

answer that question. I can't answer for you.

MR PRIOR: As the Commander in charge of that operation, were you aware that

he had a fully loaded magazine with him, or can't you say?

MR TANDA: Yes, it is usual that it is supposed to be full when you are going to

do an operation.


MR PRIOR: Do you know if he changed magazines after shooting initially at the,

in other words what I want to know did he change magazines and continued

shooting into the discotheque or are you unable to say?

MR TANDA: I won't be able to say that because if a soldier is holding his own

firearm, he has to take care of his arm and I was taking care of my arm.

MR PRIOR: Thank you. How many hand grenades were in your possession on that

evening?

MR TANDA: I had a hand grenade which was one.

MR PRIOR: You mentioned a launch grenade, is that a rifle grenade?

MR TANDA: Yes.

MR PRIOR: Just tell us the hand grenade is that an M26 hand grenade? Described

as an M26?

MR TANDA: Yes.

MR PRIOR: Did you have wire nails taped onto the outside of the hand grenade?

MR TANDA: It wasn't reinforced, it was an M16 which was not reinforced.

MR PRIOR: Are you familiar with that addition to the grenade by taping wire nails

onto the outside of it to cause maximum carnage when it explodes, or are you not

familiar with that method?

MR TANDA: We use those type of hand grenades as APLA members, that is

correct.

MR PRIOR: All right. You have explained why you never threw a grenade into the

premises. What about the rifle grenade, were you supposed to shoot that into the

premises?

MR TANDA: The launch grenade too was prepared for reinforcement if ever we

meet a roadblock when coming back. We didn't intend to use it at the disco. The

hand grenade we didn't launch or throw it because there were bars, iron bars, it

could bounce back near us and also injure us.

MR PRIOR: Tell me before you started shooting, did you find out whether there

was a back entrance to the discotheque? A rear entrance?

MR TANDA: The back door was not used by us. Our aim was to, we shouldn't

take longer time to enter into the disco, however, we were operating from the

outside through the front door.


MR PRIOR: What I am driving at very simply is, were you able to gain access

from the rear entrance or was that door locked which prevented you gaining access

to the premises?

MR TANDA: I didn't investigate as to whether the back door was locked and since

the targets were selected, when leaving the restaurant, we went straight, we aimed

to go and attack the disco.

MR PRIOR: All right. You had previously identified the discotheque as a target

together with this restaurant in Newcastle, is that so?


MR PRIOR: And did they qualify as targets because they were frequented or they

were places frequented by white people only?

INTERPRETER: The microphone was off, can you repeat the question please?

MR PRIOR: Were the targets identified solely on the basis that they were places

frequented by white people?

MR TANDA: As we were given instruction to attack places where white people

meet, that is the criteria we used to identify the target.

MR PRIOR: And that decision or the specific target for example, the discotheque

was your choice? It was a choice made by yourself as the local Commander?

MR TANDA: It was our choice. When we were given instructions, they never

selected targets for us, Mandla. He said we will identify targets and we will attack

these places that are frequented by white people and we identified the target

ourselves.

MR PRIOR: I understand that. He gave you an instruction in principle what was to

be done, and you selected the specific target to be attacked, is that correct?

MR TANDA: I don't really understand what you are trying to ask me. I don't

understand the questions.

MR PRIOR: I have no difficulty now, I am just trying to clarify what you are

saying, in other words Mandla, Jones, Power, whoever he may be, said the policy

now is to attack white people wherever they may gather. He never said go and

attack the discotheque at Newcastle? That was your choice, you selected that target

as the Commander in Newcastle at that time?



MR PRIOR: For example you could have attacked the primary school or a

hospital, is that correct if you so wished?

MR TANDA: I don't think it was based on revenge, maybe to revenge a June 16. I

knew what was supposed to be a target if I have to choose a target.

I knew that we had to choose a target where there are white people, I don't think I

would have gone into a school and shot young children where they are studying.

MR PRIOR: If they were white people, what was stopping you, it was part of the

instruction to attack whites where they were gathered?

Or are you saying there were some guideline that you were following?

MR TANDA: I am not going to answer for another person, however, I personally I

wasn't going to select children as targets because we all knew that it will happen

that we will have to meet the white people again in future, therefore attacking

children I don't see any reason why I should have involved myself in such a way I

had to get into a school and shoot children.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior, can I just come in here for a moment and maybe put

the question in a slightly different way.

Did you choose the Crazy Beat disco as a target because in your understanding it

was one of the places frequented by whites?


MR PRIOR: Would you agree also from your observations or your surveillance on

a previous occasion before the attack, that many of the white people attending the

discotheque were very young people, in fact teenagers?

MR TANDA: On that specific date when we were surveiling, I didn't see young

youth entering the place, I only saw white people there.

MR PRIOR: You see, what I am trying to just understand from you, were there any

guidelines, were there any points beyond which you would not go in selecting your

targets?

MR TANDA: I will say that the instruction is where there are white people,

although it doesn't specifically refer to ages, I personally as a Commander, I wasn't

going to attack children.

MR PRIOR: Maybe I can ask you a different way. Why did you feel, or why did

you believe that the patrons at the Crazy Beat disco on the 14th of February 1994,

were legitimate targets in your view?


MR TANDA: It is because before the attack, I took Bongani, he drove me to do

surveillance over the target and also the restaurant. Sorry, I am referring to the

disco. I knew the place before going there to attack it, and I knew the targets.

MR PRIOR: ... assume that you did not believe that members of the Security

Force, either policemen or military personnel, white personnel, were attending that

place because you chose the target purely because it was attended by white males

and females, presumably who were not children?

MR TANDA: That is correct. To add, it is clear that the operation wasn't

specifically directed to police or soldiers. Power made it clear that we should

attack white people, whether they will be soldiers or police. I wouldn't know

whether it is an issue because if you dress like that and Andile dressed in the way

he looks, I won't be able to identify who is a police between you and who is a

police and who is not.

Soldiers are identified by uniform. You cannot just look at a person in the face and

recognise a person as a particular person like a police or whatever.

MR PRIOR: I want to put to you the same question or a similar question as put by

the Chairman to Mr Malevu.

It appears, or it would appear from the fact that at the restaurant which you never

attacked because there was a chance that black people may have been injured, that

the attack on the discotheque was purely along racial lines or for racist reasons.

The people there were to be killed purely because they were white people and for

no other reason, is that correct?

MR TANDA: I wouldn't like to agree with you because apartheid, if it were to

continue, it was clear that the people who were going to be in charge or in control,

was going to be white people.

If we don't look at apartheid and look at the reason as to why liberation movement

fight only against the white people, we will find the reason. From there as we are

talking here today, we talk about the 20th of March 1966, that was the incident

caused by white people, based on racial lines and when we talk about June 16, it is

an incident which was caused by white people which was based on racial lines.

And other many cases where things were done on racial lines, together with things

like the train shootings, therefore we can't stress the racial issue, because we were

fighting for the land which was in the hands of the white people, who were not

prepared to hand back what belonged to the African people.

Therefore we see that as an oppressive situation, therefore we can't talk of

apartheid if we don't see white people. People who were oppressing the African


people in a country where we were born. You are saying that the white people

were doing the right thing by oppressing us, which was wrong, and we were

fighting because we were oppressed and only people that were voting for the

government of the day, were the white people, who also enjoyed the vote and

(indistinct).

Therefore all the people who were prominent in apartheid, were white people.

Even the professional people, you will find that the Judges of South Africa are

mostly dominated by white people and they chose that even the communists under

their hands, referring to myself personally, I ended up in standard 2, I never

benefitted anything through apartheid.

Most white people enjoyed the situation under the white apartheid government.

Most of us black people ended up in jails, however the same people who were

supposed to enjoy the privileges of the freedom that we fight for. For example

P.W. Botha (indistinct), he should come and work with the TRC, therefore he can

get (indistinct).

He is saying that because it is a status issue which plays a role in this situation. If I

was wrong for fighting for freedom, it should be made clear.

MR PRIOR: I have understanding to what you say, but my question is simply, I am

trying to understand why you selected a discotheque where people were ostensibly

having a party. Why you chose to murder or kill, if I may use that word kill, in

your own evidence, as many people as you wanted or could have killed. I just want

to understand that?

CHAIRPERSON: That is a different question from what you have been asking.

The previous question, you were asking him why he would have chosen the white

people as targets. In response to which you got quite a mouthful. Now what you

are asking is something different now.

You are asking him why if he wanted to kill white people, he chose to kill white

people who were at a party enjoying themselves.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I accept that it adds to it, but in essence the target that

he chose were white people at a discotheque/party.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and not for example white people who were at a different

place. That is the input of your question?

MR PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it should come otherwise.

MR PRIOR: All right, can I put it that way as you have clarified it.


CHAIRPERSON: That is right.

MR PRIOR: I am just trying to understand why you chose the discotheque as a

target on that evening? Are you saying it was as a result of a command or an order

that you got or was it something that you decided on personally or was it an order

to avenge or revenge the deaths that were occurring on the trains as you referred

to?

Can you explain what the reason was why that specific target was selected by

yourself?

MR TANDA: To put it clear, I was given instructions as orders by Jones, I would

refer to him as Power or Mzala to go and carry out operations in Newcastle.

He didn't mention to me that I should go and attack a disco or a restaurant.

However, I shall attack places where white people are meeting.

I tried to explain that that it wasn't a decision from me. I left Umtata to Newcastle

through orders. I didn't leave Umtata on my own.

I went there through instructions. And also when I attacked, it wasn't my own

personal vendetta, it was following instructions from my Commander.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Tanda, perhaps just to try and clarify this thing, your

instruction was to find a place, a target which is frequented by whites, that was the

order from Jones that was given to you, is that correct?


ADV POTGIETER: You had spent quite a bit of time in Newcastle between

January and the 14th of February when this thing happened and you were looking

around for targets that qualify in terms of that instruction that you got from Jones?

Did I understand it correctly?

MR TANDA: That is correct. We also had problems we came across, because

when you are ready to carry out an operation, you have to look at the area, the way

in and the way out of the area because you have to make sure that the operation

succeeds and also to make sure that the people involved in the leadership of such

operations, doesn't get arrested.

ADV POTGIETER: So what you are saying is that taking into account the

logistical situation, all those issues that you have spoken about, the access and the

exit from the place and that sort of thing, taking the logistics into account, taking

into account the order that you were given, taking those things into account, you

concluded that these two places, the restaurant and the disco, would qualify as

targets?



ADV POTGIETER: Now, your Commander the person that you took instructions

from, was Jones, is that correct?

MR TANDA: That is correct. As I said he was also known as Power, Mandla. The

name that we used while we were in Newcastle was Jones.

ADV POTGIETER: You said that when you were arrested, the police found a

telephone in your possession which you had used to communicate with Jones?


ADV POTGIETER: ... in Newcastle, up to the incident, were you reporting to

Jones?

MR TANDA: Yes, report the situation at that time to him.

ADV POTGIETER: ... your observations, and were you reporting the fact that you

had identified these two targets?

MR TANDA: Yes, those were the things which I had to report and also explain

that the operations haven't yet been carried out because of this and this reason for

example, transport. Because if you look at Newcastle, the town and the place

where we were staying is far apart.

Therefore that led us to a situation where we had to hijack a car and get to

Newcastle, because it is not easy to get access to the town. Those were the things

that we were looking at.

ADV POTGIETER: Did you have to get clearance to put it that way, from Jones

for the specific operation, did he have to clear the targets? Did he have to confirm

that those targets are in order, you can proceed?

MR TANDA: What happened is that when he wants me, I shall report back to him

as to the progress of the operations.

I will tell him all the problems, for example that we had problems with the

transport. I also told him that we identified a target, the disco and the restaurant.

We said it was the restaurant and the second option would be the disco.

Therefore it wasn't a full report, I just informed him about the operation and after

the operation, we were supposed to give a full report.

ADV POTGIETER: When you conveyed the targets to him that you had identified,

what was his attitude?


MR TANDA: He said we have to make sure that the work continued as planned.

ADV SANDI: Did you engage Mr Tanda, in any further and perhaps a detailed

conversation with Mr Jones about the two targets or did you just say to him we

have identified two targets, the restaurant and the disco?

MR TANDA: There was nothing to discuss because according to instructions

given to us by him, they didn't give a specific target. He said we have to attack

places which normally you will find white people, he didn't say a hotel, a disco or

any other place.

We have to, ourselves, identify a target. He said, he stressed that we had to attack

places that were frequented by white people.

ADV SANDI: In other words you were not contacting Mr Jones in order to get the

go ahead from him?

MR TANDA: Truly I will say that give an example, when a person is in Cape

Town, talking for example about a famous person for example Archbishop Tutu,

you as a person who is sitting here, sitting in this hall in Pietermaritzburg, will be

able to know better here, you wouldn't be able to know because he is not here.

He said to me and Andile go and attack white people. I won't be able to say

whether he came to Newcastle or not. It is difficult for me to say he said that we

should go and attack the disco. He said we will identify the targets ourselves and

all that he said was that we should go and attack white people.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Did you question the instruction or the

orders given by Jones as to the nature of your targets? Did you ever ...?

MR TANDA: I have already explained clearly that when you are briefed about our

operations, you are told that when given instructions, you have no right to

question. You have to carry out that particular instruction and after carrying out the

instruction, you have to come back and give the report as to what you have done.

If you have done the operation, the report will be accepted by the Commander and

thereafter you have a chance to ask as to why you were given such a particular

instruction, for example to go and attack in Newcastle, but I as a person never got

that chance to ask because we were arrested.

MR PRIOR: If you had any problems with the nature of the attack, you would have

cleared that up before the attack and not after, don't you agree?

MR TANDA: As I said, I used to contact him to tell him about the progress.


MR PRIOR: Right, I want to put to you that it would seem, I am not going into any

detail in these other events, but the Newcastle attack seems to be a substantial

departure from your normal target that you had experienced from 1992. Would you

agree with that?

MR TANDA: Can you please explain to me about departure, can you clarify the

question for me?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, ... of the nature and extent of, or do we know the nature

and extent of his other activities in Cape Town to the extent that we could with

some justification put that question to him?

MR PRIOR: Well, I am Mr Chairman, simply referring to his statement where he

lists seriatim at least three incidents where, in the Zola Budd operation, Guguletu

operation and Crossroads operation where the object of the attacks were all police

vehicles or police personnel.

And on that basis only I am suggesting that the Newcastle disco attack appears to

be a departure from the type of targets that he attacked in the past. I simply want to

confirm whether he agrees with that distinction or whether there is a distinction.

ADV POTGIETER: But you are not responding to the Chairperson's question.

What do we have in front of us at this stage?

MR PRIOR: We have a statement.

ADV POTGIETER: What is the value of that? And that is why I asked you

whether this is part of pending proceedings before the Committee and which might

prejudice the applicant if you were to canvass that which is pending.

MR PRIOR: I take the Chairman's point. If I may then be permitted to simply put it

in general terms. Maybe if I can rephrase the question in the following way and

please, if the question is still unfair, or ... (tape ends) ... departure from the normal

operations carried out by APLA and yourself up until that stage?

In other words from 1992 till the time of the attack in Newcastle in 1994?

MR TANDA: Sir my answer to you is that when a person who is above you in

rank, give you an instruction, you have to carry out the instruction. However, I

don't know whether Power who gave me the instructions to go and attack in

Newcastle will exactly know the reason why we had to shift from the previous

target to the new targets.

However, what I knew personally is that in South Africa, we were oppressed and I

don't think anybody have a right to oppress us. I knew about the attacks on police

and it was changed later, we have to go to Newcastle, but I don't know about


whether the official shift, what happened. I was just given a target to go and carry

out instructions.

ADV SANDI: Was it correct though, I didn't want to interrupt you because you

said to him there was a departure all along until this Newcastle thing.

Hadn't the St James incident occurred before Newcastle?

MR PRIOR: Sorry, I was referring specifically to ...

ADV SANDI: To him as an individual?

MR PRIOR: I seemed to qualify my question, the departure from APLA but

specifically his participation within APLA, this attack was different.

ADV SANDI: Okay.

MR PRIOR: That is the only distinction I wished to make and I think he answered

the question.

ADV SANDI: Yes, he answered the question.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Tanda, you agree with the evidence we

heard, it is also common cause that the elections occurred or took place in April of

1994, about two months or so after the attack in Newcastle.

MR TANDA: The truth will be yes, however, it doesn't affect following the order

which was given to me by the Commander.

MR PRIOR: The question that I want to ask you is, looking at the situation now,

can you think of how the attack on the discotheque in any way, assisted the move

to democracy in South Africa?

MR TANDA: I would say the PAC was formed in 1959 and it formed its armed

wing APLA in 1961, therefore it started as a political party before becoming a

liberation movement. The formation of APLA was after there were incidents like

the Sharpville massacre and other incidents which were not mentioned.

What happened is I don't understand how your question fit into all this. However,

the aim of all this attack was to fight to get back our land.

If you look all over, if there were people who were oppressed internationally, the

fight for their liberation because you the white people do not accept that you were

wrong by oppressing us and you expected us to fold our hands and to obey under

the oppression.


Therefore as I am saying, it was nothing racial, it was just an order that I had to

carry out.

MR PRIOR: Are you saying that you did not have much confidence in the

negotiation process at that time, February of 1994?

MR TANDA: I won't like you to think for me. I will like you to ask me I think the

reason why the reason you ask me referring to an order, it was, it was referring to

the order that was given.

It is not a question as to whether I was (indistinct) of the success of the

negotiations, I couldn't run away from an instruction of APLA because the PAC

will negotiate.

However, I had to follow the instruction. If you are a soldier you have to take

instructions, therefore I took instructions. I don't think that that means that I was

against negotiations by carrying out the instruction that I was given.

I don't think it is relevant in asking me about the negotiations and the part that I

took, because I was turning out an order.

MR PRIOR: What would have occurred, what do you think would have happened

if you disobeyed the order as you put it from Jones? If you had said to him for

example, I am not going to go and kill civilian people, white people, what do you

think would have happened to you, if anything?

MR TANDA: Firstly I would say the reason why what motivated me to become an

APLA member was the conditions under which we are living.

Nobody dragged me to join APLA. I saw how our brothers were killed by white

people together with the police and the soldiers, defending the apartheid system.

So therefore nobody pushed me behind to go and join APLA, I personally joined

APLA.

I joined not to cause chaos within it, however only to follow instructions and its

principles and aims.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I think the question is a fair question. I am going to ask

the Chair to ask the witness to answer that question please.

The basis therefore, if I may just briefly explain if there was a strict adherence to

carrying out an order in a military sense, then obviously there must have been

some apprehension for a reprisal of some sort or sanction if that order is not carried

out, and it is a very simple question.


Did he entertain any fear in his mind of what may have happened to him if he had

disobeyed the order?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, perhaps we can because he has already given an answer

which may be part of the answer. He has already said he didn't go in there to cause

chaos within APLA, he went there with a purpose to go and listen to, to go along

with whatever orders.

But maybe we can go on and ask him. You have already said that when you were

asked as to whether you thought anything could have happened to you, if you did

not follow the orders, you said that you joined freely, you were not forced by

anybody.

And that you didn't go there to go and cause any chaos. Is there any other reason

why you did not want to disobey the order?

MR TANDA: Firstly I went to the army and I was finding out where it is possible

that a soldier who is given an instruction by the Commander, by the seniors, a

person who would disobey such an instruction is not fit to be a soldier, so I can't

answer about the punishment because it depends on a situation.

I don't know if I managed to answer that question.

MR PRIOR: Do I understand that you were unaware that there would be any

punishment, specific punishment, or that didn't enter your mind at all?

MR TANDA: At the time when I was a member of APLA, I once, sometimes I got

punishment if I did something that was wrong, so I knew that if you do something

wrong, you get punished.

So to defy an order from your Commander, I knew that you would be punished. In

other words to defy means I would be doing counteract to the revolution.

MR PRIOR: My ultimate question refers to paragraph 29 of the statement, the

unsigned statement. You describe how you arrived at the discotheque, you say I

got out and found many white people inside.

I returned and ordered Situlele to stay with the driver and protect him. Funani was

to give us firing cover from behind. Can I just ask you on that aspect. You seem to

set out what in my mind appears to be a military style operation, you have got the

driver being protected and you've got someone in a position to give you firing

cover, or covering fire. Who were you afraid of in that situation?

The discotheque was closed, there were bars, people were inside the discotheque

obviously they couldn't get out in a hurry, who did you fear a counter attack from,

if I can put it in that way?


MR TANDA: In South Africa, it is clear that not a single person will claim not to

know that white people stay in areas and they are usually armed.

The areas in which they stay, you always find police around, soldiers around

because the white people in South Africa were the people in charge of security of

the whole country.

Therefore you were not protecting the area like that.

MR PRIOR: Would I be correct in assessing from this paragraph that when you

started shooting, the people inside the discotheque had no warning, no idea that an

attack or shooting was going to occur?

MR TANDA: When you attack, I don't think that your main aim is to make the

people aware in order for them to be safe, because we were told that we could die

at any time if you ever inform them, therefore that would be counteract to the

operation.

MR PRIOR: Can you explain why when you drove away from the scene of the

attack, that you shot at a police van driving in the opposite direction?

MR TANDA: The reason why we shot at the police van was it met us when we

were approaching a T-junction, they were going to patrol Madadini area and the

speed at which it was travelling, it was clear that it was alert, therefore we couldn't

wait for the enemy to attack us and act as responders.

You have to attack first before you get attacked, therefore we had to attack it

because we thought we were not safe having met the car at our road.

MR PRIOR: You also encountered a police hippo vehicle. You say you ordered

that it should not be shot at because the gunfire noise would give an indication to

other pursuers of which direction in which you had retreated? Is that correct?

MR TANDA: That is correct. When you look at a hippo, shooting at a hippo is a

waste of ammunition, you cannot affect or get rid of the enemy inside the hippo.

At the same time, you will be giving direction as to where we were as we were

travelling to different directions in the crossroads.

When you carry out an operation, the most important thing is that you succeed and

also to make sure that the people in your company are safe. It is not one of the aims

to challenge the enemy because we know the reinforcements in South Africa, that

one of the reasons why we operate in small groups so that as soon as we finish

operating, we can disappear as soon as possible, without having been cornered by

the reinforcement.


Because the reinforcement of the apartheid government was powerful at that time.

The police could have followed us, the police were in the police stations.

CHAIRPERSON: ... came to you and say to you that you have substantially

answered the question.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Finally, your counsel asked you when you

learnt the next day at some later stage, that only one person had died, you said you

regarded the operation as a failure.

Were you disappointed that so few people had died in that attack that had been so

carefully planned and executed?

MR TANDA: When following an order to go and attack a place where white

people are meeting, if we go and attack and only one person got killed, while our

aim was not to kill only one person, it was clear that you will see yourself as a

person not having carried out a successful operation.

MR PRIOR: Yes, I was just a bit puzzled at your reply when you said it is not like

killing a chicken, a human being, you felt something and I wanted maybe just to

explore that.

What was that something that you felt? Was it disappointment, was it anger, was it

joy, was it happiness or was it sadness? Are you able to explain to the Committee

what you felt when you learnt that at least one person had died?

MR TANDA: I have clearly stated that I know that because I have before involved

in operations. Killing a person is not a nice thing.

I end up saying that I would ask from the leadership of the PAC to contact the

government, the government to arrange a meeting between the PAC with my

family and the victims' family to show humanity and also reconciliation. That is

why I answered your question.

I don't know whether there is anything that shows that I didn't have any pity with

regard to the killing of people.

MR PRIOR: Do I understand you correctly, are you saying that it was necessary to

kill as part of the instructions that you had, even though it was not pleasant for you

to do so?

MR TANDA: It is painful, or it is not a good thing to kill. Even if you know that

that is the case, it doesn't mean that you will be able to defy a Commander's

instruction.

MR PRIOR: I don't have any further questions, thank you.



ADV POTGIETER: Mr Tanda, just one issue. How many hand grenades were

issued for this operation?

MR TANDA: We had two hand grenades on that particular day. It was a launch

grenade which was one.

ADV POTGIETER: The hand grenades, you seem to have been charged with

possession of four M26 hand grenades. Were those the hand grenades that were

meant for the operation or what?

MR TANDA: Those which we took to the operation, it was a hand grenade and a

launch grenade.

ADV POTGIETER: ... afterwards when it was pointed out?


ADV POTGIETER: This M26, what kind of hand grenade is that? Is that a

defensive or offensive hand grenade?

MR TANDA: It is offensive.


MR TANDA: I would like to ask if I can get a chance to pass water and come back

if possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put in re-examination?

ADV ARENDSE: Just one aspect Mr Chairman, it shouldn't take more than a

minute or so.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you carry one question?

MR TANDA: Okay.

RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV ARENDSE: I am in the same desperate situation,

don't worry. Just to try Mr Tanda to help the Committee understand a particular

question or a proposition that was put to you by Mr Prior namely that targeting

white people, like for example St James, the King William's Town golf club and

the disco, just trying to help to understand that, you were an operative in other

words you operated as an APLA soldier on the ground, is that correct?



ADV ARENDSE: Were you anywhere involved or in any way involved in making

policy decisions within APLA, in other words did you decide what direction the

military wing of the PAC, namely APLA in which way it was going in a particular

period of time in a particular year?

MR TANDA: I wasn't involved, I only got instructions. It was the High

Commander and the PAC leadership which had powers to do that.

To add, the reason is that the army is not similar, the PAC or any other

organisation where there is democracy. There is limited democracy in an army

situation.

ADV ARENDSE: ... for example, we see on and I am referring Mr Chairman, to

page 83 of the record, where Sevello Parmer proclaims 1994 to be the year of the

bullet and the ballot.

That would be a policy direction or a particular course of action that APLA is

going to take say in 1994. How would that be communicated to you, how would

you know that this is the direction the organisation is taking?

MR TANDA: I was going to be given an instruction. But the instructor was going

to say what I had to do. Sometimes there is a need for them to address us as a Unit,

so they will come to our Unit and address us on any changes that might have

occurred.

I wasn't part of that unit, however comrade Sevello Parmer was the one as a

General in APLA.

ADV ARENDSE: So for example, if the APLA High Command Sevello Parmer

and other would have decided that during 1993 and 1994 we are going to

paraphrase, to take the attacks to the whites in the urban areas, if they had made

that their goal for 1993 and 1994, would you have had anything to do with that?

MR TANDA: What was going to happen was that I as a soldier, I was supposed to

accept such outcome or instructions and to do as I was instructed. I couldn't refuse

or not agree.

ADV ARENDSE: So in other words if you get an order like in this case, you got

an order from Power, Mzala, Jones which would give effect to that policy

direction, you carry out that order?


ADV ARENDSE: Would you agree with me that this is also part of military

strategy for example in the 1960's and 1970's, the former government,they would

have decided to suppress political opposition within the country, but then later on,


in the late 1970's and in the 1980's they would decide also to move across the

border and actually pursue people involved in the liberation struggle.

Would it be akin, would it be something like that where the military command, the

High Command changed strategy and changed policy direction?

MR TANDA: Yes. But a soldier doesn't have an influence as to the policy

direction.

ADV ARENDSE: Okay, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We are trying to think aloud as to whether it would be

convenient for everybody if we had to start at nine o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, yes most certainly. From our side there is only one

witness to be called, that is Mrs Swarts who doesn't really canvass the merits of the

application, so she will be very short and I see it only remains for the third

applicant to give evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I assume that maybe you will argue thereafter?

MR PRIOR: Yes, I am sure we will be in a position to simply argue the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Then we will adjourn until tomorrow nine o'clock. Thank you.

HEARING ADJOURNS



AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 10-02-1998


CASE NO: AM0293/96


CASE NO: AM0578/97


DAY 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------















Andile Shiceka.


thank you.











accepted.





CHAIRPERSON: Okay.


















necessary.







applications.







applicants?



with?







is before us.








































Golden Malevu.








is that correct?









attack?














MR MALEVU: Yes.















explain that to us?














exact month.


you this?











MR MALEVU: Yes.




also be armed.












attack?







Sweden?




of February?





incident?





Newcastle.





















conference?







armed struggle.


14th.




the car.










was injured.






to say.





your application?






1994.
















coming.






of the PAC.































area?


disco.




Crazy Beat disco?







injured.


target?






the place.






MR MALEVU: At home.


MR MALEVU: Yes.



operation.























you Mr Malevu.







Do you understand?




that region?








so?



Umtata, was it not?


















there was a rift.


























struggle.



Umtata in December.










































the Trade Union?




1993?





place?




attacks?






remember well.



were in Sweden?












target?



I arrived.















firearms.











MR PRIOR: Yes?












that not so?













at the same time.










country.



discotheque?


















against apartheid.

















correct?






















3?


Can you hear now?







them to stay.







injured.


people.






MR MALEVU: Yes.















us?









by two people.

















COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:



comment on.





that correct?






attack?































MR MALEVU: Yes.









with the struggle.






World Trade Centre?





MR MALEVU: Yes.







as a target?

















in December 1993?


































should continue?






continue.

Where did you fall?












rather racist?










government.


witness?










MR TANDA: Okay.



old are you now?










correct?
















ADV ARENDSE: Yes?

MR TANDA: 1979.

ADV ARENDSE: Until?

MR TANDA: 1984.




those findings?










the disco.



was my Commander.






you are saying?







following morning.



January.












instructions?

















CHAIRPERSON: Yes.




MR TANDA: Yes.

















target?












exact dates.












before.





















































anywhere else?


















walk there?



the car?




can ...

ADV ARENDSE: Yes.



front of the disco?



ADV ARENDSE: Okay.




when you shot?







































be killed?






























they find?







hand grenade?



























question.
















time before that.










them together.




pending?











the other matters.




stage.





were asked.














discotheque?









discotheque?











do an operation.








evening?



MR TANDA: Yes.


as an M26?

MR TANDA: Yes.







correct.



premises?













to the premises?



















ourselves.






































targets?












(indistinct).










get (indistinct).







to understand that?











MR PRIOR: Yes.









to?


yourself?



























targets?











Jones?































any other place.




go ahead from him?


























agree with that?


question for me?
































out instructions.








ADV SANDI: Okay.


the question.



















the oppression.



carry out.








will negotiate.















APLA.



















anybody.































the whole country.








operation.





















the reinforcement.

















explore that.














to do so?



instruction.












launch grenade.








if possible.



minute or so.


MR TANDA: Okay.

















situation.










occurred.


General in APLA.







or not agree.














direction.











HEARING ADJOURNS



AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 10-02-1998


CASE NO: AM0293/96


CASE NO: AM0578/97


DAY 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------















Andile Shiceka.


thank you.











accepted.





CHAIRPERSON: Okay.


















necessary.







applications.







applicants?



with?







is before us.








































Golden Malevu.








is that correct?









attack?














MR MALEVU: Yes.















explain that to us?














exact month.


you this?











MR MALEVU: Yes.




also be armed.












attack?







Sweden?




of February?





incident?





Newcastle.





















conference?







armed struggle.


14th.




the car.










was injured.






to say.





your application?






1994.
















coming.






of the PAC.































area?


disco.




Crazy Beat disco?







injured.


target?






the place.






MR MALEVU: At home.


MR MALEVU: Yes.



operation.























you Mr Malevu.







Do you understand?




that region?








so?



Umtata, was it not?


















there was a rift.


























struggle.



Umtata in December.










































the Trade Union?




1993?





place?




attacks?






remember well.



were in Sweden?












target?



I arrived.















firearms.











MR PRIOR: Yes?












that not so?













at the same time.










country.



discotheque?


















against apartheid.

















correct?






















3?


Can you hear now?







them to stay.







injured.


people.






MR MALEVU: Yes.















us?









by two people.

















COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:



comment on.





that correct?






attack?































MR MALEVU: Yes.









with the struggle.






World Trade Centre?





MR MALEVU: Yes.







as a target?

















in December 1993?


































should continue?






continue.

Where did you fall?












rather racist?










government.


witness?










MR TANDA: Okay.



old are you now?










correct?
















ADV ARENDSE: Yes?

MR TANDA: 1979.

ADV ARENDSE: Until?

MR TANDA: 1984.




those findings?










the disco.



was my Commander.






you are saying?







following morning.



January.












instructions?

















CHAIRPERSON: Yes.




MR TANDA: Yes.

















target?












exact dates.












before.





















































anywhere else?


















walk there?



the car?




can ...

ADV ARENDSE: Yes.



front of the disco?



ADV ARENDSE: Okay.




when you shot?







































be killed?






























they find?







hand grenade?



























question.
















time before that.










them together.




pending?











the other matters.




stage.





were asked.














discotheque?









discotheque?











do an operation.








evening?



MR TANDA: Yes.


as an M26?

MR TANDA: Yes.







correct.



premises?













to the premises?



















ourselves.






































targets?












(indistinct).










get (indistinct).







to understand that?











MR PRIOR: Yes.









to?


yourself?



























targets?











Jones?































any other place.




go ahead from him?


























agree with that?


question for me?
































out instructions.








ADV SANDI: Okay.


the question.



















the oppression.



carry out.








will negotiate.















APLA.



















anybody.































the whole country.








operation.





















the reinforcement.

















explore that.














to do so?



instruction.












launch grenade.








if possible.



minute or so.


MR TANDA: Okay.

















situation.










occurred.


General in APLA.







or not agree.














direction.











HEARING ADJOURNS


ON RESUMPTION - 11TH FEBRUARY 1998


ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Are we ready to proceed?

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, it is the 11th of February 1998, we

continue with the matter for amnesty on Mr Malevu, Tanda and Shiceka. Thank

you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we proceed with the next applicant, can we go back to

Mr Tanda?

You are still under oath Mr Tanda.

F W TANDA: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Where did you live then, at the time of the incident?

MR TANDA: It was at Maskopase, New Castle.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I’ve forgot to put on my earphone, I didn’t hear the

answer as a result. Will you repeat it please?

MR TANDA: I was staying at Maskopase, a township in Newcastle.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that your home?

MR TANDA: It wasn’t my home, it was a home for one of the PAC members.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I wanted to know where you ordinarily lived? I know for

you to carry out an attack in Newcastle you had to be in Newcastle, I wanted to

know where you ordinarily otherwise lived.

MR TANDA: My home is at Moleteno in the Eastern Cape.

CHAIRPERSON: The purpose of coming to Newcastle was specifically to come

and carry out that kind of operation?

MR TANDA: That’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Anybody with questions flowing from that? Mr Prior?


ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I have no questions flowing from that but if I may be

permitted to ask one question concerning the aspect of infiltration and I tell the

Committee why. It’s because ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, you don’t have to tell us.

ADV PRIOR: As the Committee pleases.

Mr Tanda, I omitted to ask you yesterday on this aspect. During other hearings, St

James and particularly the Heidelberg Tavern attack which occurred in December

of ‘93, there was a strong suggestion made by various victims and other witnesses

that APLA in planning these attacks, had been infiltrated by the security forces,

whether that was the security branch of the police or military intelligence of the

army. Were you aware or did you hear anything like that especially in respect of

your own operation in Newcastle?

MR TANDA: I haven’t.

ADV PRIOR: You indicated to the Committee yesterday that you were responsible

for the security of the operation, code names were used, vehicles that couldn’t be

traced back to you were used and so forth, yet you were arrested the very next day

after the operation and it seems that within a few hours the police had recovered

the weapons, the ammunition, where you had stayed was pointed out, the people

that you had contact with were all arrested within a few hours of the actual

operation. Did that cause you to believe that you had been infiltrated and that

information had been passed to the police prior to your arrest?

MR TANDA: I would not bind myself to say that police had information before we

were arrested or after we had been arrested. But however, what I know is that

during the interrogation one of our brothers by the name of Buthalezi went out to

point out firearms and other things. I don’t want to accuse anybody at the present

moment, for example saying so and so is working for the white people. I didn’t

have time to look for such information.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR

UNKNOWN: I’ve got no questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Tanda.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Arendse?


MR ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, learned members of the Committee.

Can I call on Andele Shiceka to be sworn in to give evidence Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, how do you pronounce yourself, Mr Shiceka?

MR SHICEKA: Sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: You are Mr Shiceka?

MR SHICEKA: Yes.

ANDELE SHICEKA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

Mr Arendse?

MR ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Shiceka, you were convicted by the Criminal Court in May of last year, of

1994. Mr Shiceka, you were convicted in May of 1994 of murder, attempted

murder, unlawful possession of machine guns and unlawful possession of grenades

and you were sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment of 25 years, is that

correct?

MR SHICEKA: That’s correct.

MR ARENDSE: Is it also correct that you are applying for amnesty in respect of

all these offences which you were convicted of?


MR ARENDSE: These offences flow from the incident at the Crazy Beat Disco on

the 14th of February 1994.


MR ARENDSE: When you and your co-applicant, Walter Tanda entered the Crazy

Beat Disco and fired ammunition into the disco from your automatic rifles, is that

correct?


MR ARENDSE: Now, Mr Chairman, if I could refer to pages 41, in fact Mr

Chairman, 38, 39 and 41 of the record.

Mr Shiceka, you gave evidence at the criminal trial, is that right?



MR ARENDSE: Now I’m referring to page 38 of the Judgement. The Court says

that you denied that you were involved in the events at the disco. The Court went

on to say that you alone of the accused admitted that you were a member of APLA

and that you were in fact in Newcastle about the business of APLA at the time that

this incident took place. Do you remember that?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, I do remember.

MR ARENDSE: Now today in your amnesty application before the Committee

you are now admitting, confessing to your involvement in the Crazy Beat Disco

killing, is that right?


MR ARENDSE: So at Court you weren’t being truthful when you denied being

involved in the incident?


MR ARENDSE: Is it correct however that you are a member of APLA?


MR ARENDSE: When did you become a member of APLA?

MR SHICEKA: It was 1989.

MR ARENDSE: 1989? Did you receive any training and if so, where did you

receive that training? Was it inside the country, outside the country?

MR SHICEKA: Outside the country.

MR ARENDSE: Were you involved in any APLA incidents before the Newcastle

incident, before the 14th of February 1994?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, there were other operations in which I was involved. Yes, I

was involved in some operations.

MR ARENDSE: Have you applied for amnesty in respect of those operations?


MR ARENDSE: Now just before we get to the incident, just some personal details.

How old are you now?


MR SHICEKA: I’m 28 years old.

MR ARENDSE: Are you married?

MR SHICEKA: No married.

MR SHICEKA: I have no children.

MR ARENDSE: Where you ordinarily reside? Where do you hail from?

MR SHICEKA: In Cape Town, Guguletu, 72 number 11.

MR ARENDSE: Were you born in Cape Town?

MR SHICEKA: Yes.

MR ARENDSE: Did you go to school?

MR SHICEKA: Yes.

MR ARENDSE: Did you finish school or did you leave school before you could

finish school?

MR SHICEKA: I did finish school.

MR ARENDSE: Where did you go to school?

INTERPRETER: I’m sorry, excuse me, the mike was off.

CHAIRPERSON: When does one finish school? Shouldn’t you ask him up to what

standard he attended school?

MR ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman. I didn’t get the translation though.

MR SHICEKA: I went up to standard 10.

MR ARENDSE: Thank you.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Shiceka, you heard your co-applicant Mr Tanda testify that he was introduced

to you at Umtata, is that correct?


MR ARENDSE: And he was introduced to you by Umzala Power Jones, one and

the same person, is that right?



MR ARENDSE: Is it at that meeting - and that would have been in January of

1994, is that right?

MR SHICEKA: That’s right.

MR ARENDSE: Would it be at that meeting where you were introduced to each

other, that you were told about the Newcastle operation?


MR ARENDSE: Were you told specifically what you were to do in Newcastle and

how you were to go about doing it? Were you given any detailed plan by Umzala?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, he did give us details, that’s correct.

MR ARENDSE: Can you tell us about those details?

MR SHICEKA: In the meeting that we had with him together with Tanda, he told

us that we should go to Newcastle. When we arrived in Newcastle we have attack

places where we can find white people.

MR ARENDSE: Were you given any other details?

MR SHICEKA: No.

MR ARENDSE: You were also - you then travelled from Umtata to Newcastle and

there were four of you, you and Tanda, Sitenbele and Funani, is that right?


MR ARENDSE: And according to Tanda he was appointed commander of that

unit?


MR ARENDSE: And on the night of the attack it was the four of you together with

the driver Dube, who carried out the attack on the crazy beat disco, is that correct?

MR SHICEKA: That’s correct, however we were five together with Dube.

MR ARENDSE: Yes, that’s right. Now, who decided on attacking the Crazy Beat

Disco?

MR SHICEKA: The decision was taken by Tanda.


MR ARENDSE: Yes?

MR SHICEKA: The reason was because two targets were selected, a restaurant

and the Crazy Beat Disco, if we failed to attack one we had the option to attack the

other one, either the restaurant or the Crazy Beat. The person who selected the

Crazy Beat Disco it Tanda because he’s the one who did the recognises.

MR ARENDSE: Can you tell us why the restaurant and the disco were identified

as targets to be attacked?

MR SHICEKA: It is because it’s a place where you normally find white people in

numbers.

MR ARENDSE: Did you see that for yourself, that there were - as you put it, white

people in numbers and the restaurant and at the disco?

MR SHICEKA: The times I will go to the place in Tanda’s company and I’ve seen

when going to town that it was frequented by white people. As his deputy I had to

know what kind of place we are going to carry out the operation.

MR ARENDSE: Why did you not attack the restaurant?

MR SHICEKA: The reason why we didn’t attack the restaurant was because there

were many african people on the streets and we realised that if we start attacking

the restaurant some african people might be injured, therefore Tanda decided that

since - if we start attacking this place people may get injured and therefore we

should avoid it and then we went straight to the Crazy Beat.

MR ARENDSE: Can you provide us with reasons why the decision was taken that

the target should be where you find whites: "in large numbers", as you put it?

MR SHICEKA: I won’t be able to know because we were given an order, an order

which was coming from the Transkei which said that we should go and attack

white people. I think that’s the main reason why we ended up attacking the Crazy

Beat Disco, because it’s a place where white people normally frequent.

MR ARENDSE: I ask the question because it would appear from your various

amnesty applications that you have applied for amnesty in respect of attacks on for

example, police stations, army bases and so on and they would appear to be what

you can call: "hard targets" and what’s also been referred to as: "legitimate

targets".

Now there seems to be a shift from attacking those: "hard targets" to what is

referred to as: "soft or civilian targets" where there are people involved, ordinary

civilians presumably innocent civilians. Can you explain whether there was in fact

that shift? Were you aware that there was that shift in strategy?


MR SHICEKA: I personally, I’m a soldier, I had to carry some orders from my

seniors. As to the question of whether we were shifting from one target to another

target, I’m not part of the decision making in such APLA operations. I’m only

given instructions to attack. Whether APLA was shifting from defence force and

South African Police, I won’t be able to answer that. I think our seniors are the

people, the relevant people who can answer that questions. I personally had to

carry the orders as it was given.

MR ARENDSE: Did you not question the order?

MR SHICEKA: During my training I was taught that you don’t question an order

or instruction. If you are a disciplinary member of the army you have to carry out

the instruction as it’s given. After carrying out the operation you can ask questions.

Therefore it means that if I defy an order I’m causing a mutiny within the ranks

army and a mutiny in something that’s not wanted in any army situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, causing what? Mutiny or meeting?

MR SHICEKA: Mutiny.

UNKNOWN: I think he said mutiny.

MR ARENDSE: Have you ever defied an order given to you by your commander

or someone in the APLA high command?

MR SHICEKA: I never defied any orders since from the time I joined the army.

MR ARENDSE: Do you know of any of your comrades in the APLA army who

defied an order and if so, what happened to that person?

MR SHICEKA: What I know is, for example if you had a small dagga it’s not

allowed and if you’re seeing doing so you’re out of the principle of the army

therefore the commander has to punish you. Those were the petty things that I saw

people getting punished for them. For example they will take off your clothes and

let you crawl and put you in the mud and water to bring you back to your senses.

Those are the petty things that I’ve seen as I’ve said. For example, when you’re

drinking a lot or smoking dagga. Those are the things that I saw.

MR ARENDSE: And these forms of discipline which you describe to us, did you

see that here in this country or did it happen outside of the borders?

MR SHICEKA: It was outside the borders. I haven’t seen that with in the country.

MR ARENDSE: Is that while you were staying in camps?



MR ARENDSE: Now the arms and ammunition which was used during the attack,

where did that come from?

MR SHICEKA: I don’t have an understanding to that regard. I think comrade

Malevu said they were in Transkei but I don’t know how they came to be in

Newcastle. I was that ammunition is already available in Newcastle, I don’t know

how it was carried to Newcastle. I wasn’t told that answer with Bongani. They told

me that I’ll find arms in Newcastle.

MR ARENDSE: And did you find the arms in Newcastle, you obviously did.

Where did you find the arms and ammunitions and the grenades?

MR SHICEKA: At Miki.

MR ARENDSE: At Miki’s house?

MR SHICEKA: That’s Miki’s house, yes.

MR ARENDSE: Did you take all the arms and ammunition with you in the car that

evening?


MR ARENDSE: The car that you used during the attack was a Cressida, we know

that and that Cressida was high-jacked. Were you part of the group that high-

jacked the car?

MR SHICEKA: I wasn’t.

MR ARENDSE: Were you waiting at that time at Miki’s house for ...[intervention]

MR SHICEKA: I wasn’t in Miki’s house. We’re not staying at Miki’s house, we

were staying in Skumbuza Shomba’s house. It was an ...[indistinct] as Maskopazin.

MR ARENDSE: Now, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Who is Miki?

MR SHICEKA: Miki was one of our contacts. As comrade Malevu was in Sweden

we had to arrive at Miki’s place.

MR ARENDSE: Thank you. Now, when you were in the Cressida and you went

towards the target, you went first to the restaurant, is that correct?

MR SHICEKA: We started at the restaurant.


MR ARENDSE: And you got out of the car and you actually went to the

restaurant, is that right?


MR ARENDSE: And I take it at the time you went to the restaurant you were not

armed?


MR ARENDSE: Were you the one that came back and reported to Tanda that you

don’t think you should attack that target?

MR SHICEKA: That’s correct. However, the car was not far from the scene of the

restaurant. Even the people in the car could see the situation outside. However, I

personally went into the restaurant to see what was happening and I realised there

were many people around here and I told them that the situation is bad.

MR ARENDSE: Now we know that the disco was not far from the restaurant, is

that right?


MR ARENDSE: So from the restaurant you moved to the disco?


MR ARENDSE: And did you go into the disco first or did Tanda go first?

MR SHICEKA: Tanda went first. He got out of the car to go and look around in

the disco, he came back.

MR ARENDSE: And what did he - did he speak to you, did he tell you anything,

did he give you any orders?

MR SHICEKA: He gave us orders. He said there were white people inside. Tulele

and Funani, we ended up being four. I myself and Tanda went to look around at the

disco. Tulele and Funani were giving us firing cover. The reason why they had to

give us a firing, it was because if ever police come or we are shot from behind,

they will be able to cover us while we’re concentrating shooting and the disco. The

people who went to shoot at the disco it was my myself and Tanda.

MR ARENDSE: Now you were also armed or you also had in your possession a

grenade, is that right?

MR SHICEKA: That’s correct, I was armed together with a hand grenade.


MR ARENDSE: You didn’t use the grenade?

MR SHICEKA: I didn’t use it.

MR ARENDSE: Is there any reason why you didn’t use it?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, there was a reason why I haven’t used the hand grenade

because the front door had burglar proofs and we realised that if we throw a hand

grenade through the door it can re-bounce, it can hit the burglar proofs and explode

next to our vicinity and we might be injured and we never wanted to be injured.

That’s the reason why we never used it.

MR ARENDSE: Can you recall how many times you fired or how many bullets

you fired? How much ammunition you used during the attack?

MR SHICEKA: No, I can’t remember.

MR ARENDSE: Was it one magazine, two magazines? Did you change

magazines, can you recall?

MR SHICEKA: No. I don’t know whether Tanda did change his, I never changed

my magazine.

MR ARENDSE: How many rounds in one magazine, the rifle that you were using?

MR SHICEKA: It’s 35. I don’t know how many he loaded into his rifle. I loaded

mine full.

CHAIRPERSON: I would not be surprised if you were not able to remember how

many shots you fired but it would surprise me if you were to say to us that you

don’t remember whether you changed the magazines, whether you loaded another

magazine. I would expect you to can remember that.

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairman, I understand what you’re saying. I’m saying at the

time of the attack, my magazine carries 35. Each and every person has to load his

firearm. I loaded mine to the full, it had 35 rounds. At the time when I was

shooting, I don’t know how many rounds I shot. After the shooting I then reloaded

my magazine. When we were leaving the house before the attack, going to attack

we were responsible for loading our own firearms. Mine was fully loaded.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Arendse, I think you must clear that up.

MR ARENDSE: You should be in a position, because you’re the person that fired

the shots, you should be in a position to tell us whether you dispensed with the

whole magazine or whether you changed it. If you fired one magazine then it gives

us a pretty good idea of how many shots were fired, at least we know it’s not more


that 35. And we also know from the ballistic evidence that was given in the trial

court which was not challenged, that quite a number of rounds were fired from -

that could be seen from the cartridges that was picked up from the scene. Can you

assist us there?

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairman, I never changed my magazine, I shot, I fired while

Tanda was also firing and I never changed my magazine. I didn’t see him changing

a magazine. He might answer for himself. I only can say I never changed my

magazine.

MR ARENDSE: Thank you. Now you shot through - how wide was this grill, this

door that you were firing through?

CHAIRPERSON: Is it the width of an ordinary normal door?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, a normal door.


MR ARENDSE: Thank you. So you fired through there and you fired quite a

number of shots. It resulted in one person being killed and two people being

injured. Now, you only learnt that afterwards obviously, that one person was

killed, two people were injured. Did you expect more people to be killed or

injured?

MR SHICEKA: We expected many people to die, that’s what we expected.

However we heard that only one person was killed and we were surprised.

MR ARENDSE: Was the disco full?

MR SHICEKA: I didn’t have that opportunity to look inside into the disco because

the person who went to see inside was Tanda and when I went towards the disco I

didn’t look around, I just started firing.

MR ARENDSE: So, given that you expected more people to be killed or injured,

did you not regard the operation as a success?

MR SHICEKA: We didn’t.

MR ARENDSE: Now you killed Ms Gerbrecht Selomina van Wyk and I

understand that at the time she was the mother of four young children. They were

been at the time, 14, 10, 13 and 6 at the time. You were obviously not aware of that

but now that you know that, how do you feel about what happened that evening

and particularly that you killed Ms van Wyk?


MR SHICEKA: It’s very painful because killing a human being is a very painful

experience anywhere in the world and I’m sorry for the family, I’m very sorry. As

you’ve already explained that she was a mother, she had children, it will be painful

for the children to lose their beloved mother.

I’m saying it will be painful for the children to lose their beloved mother and I also

say as an individual, if I were to be given a chance I would like to meet the family

of the victims - the victims family, the party’s leadership. In my presence I would

like to go and ask for forgiveness from the victim’s family.

I would like to explain to them the reason why I did the act or committed the act. I

will say to them: as a soldier I had no option, I had to carry out the instructions

given to me by my seniors. I pity them, I am sorry for them and that’s deep from

my heart and nowhere else. I would like to think that if it was me in that situation,

how was I going to feel. I know that all that I did was because of politics and I

would like to ask forgiveness from the family.

MR ARENDSE: Now you and your co-applicants, Walter Tanda and Bongani

Malevu, you’ve requested of me to ask the Committee -Mr Chairman, to facilitate

such a meeting and in fact at the conclusion of the hearing of this matter for the

applicants to address Mrs Swart directly, who is a victim and the mother of the late

Ms van Wyk. Is that right?


MR ARENDSE: Thank you Mr Chairman, I’ve got no further questions at this

stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ARENDSE


ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Shiceka, after the attack, is it correct that you all gathered at Buthalezi’s house?


ADV PRIOR: I want to just follow on from what you said, that the killing of a

human being is a - I think in your words or in the summary of your words, was a

very serious matter.


ADV PRIOR: And if I understand your evidence that you’ve given this morning,

you didn’t particularly enjoy - if I can use that expression, shooting as you did but


you were simply carrying out an order that you received from your superiors which

was given in the context of the political struggle, is that correct?


ADV PRIOR: I want to draw your attention to what the Judge, Mr Justice Hugo

said at your trial - and I refer to pages 38 and 39 of Exhibit A Mr Chairman, at the

bottom of page 38.

Sorry, before I lead on with that, is it correct that at the trial you denied being part

of the attack, you said you had not partaken or not participated in the attack of the

disco, is that correct?


ADV PRIOR: The Judge commented as follows in summarising your evidence:

"He was awakened in the early hours of the morning by

the sound of voices and he joined a number of people in

the dinning room of Buthalezi’s house where they were

drinking beer"

Is that correct?


ADV PRIOR: Did you also drink beer with the others?


ADV PRIOR: I get the impression that [End of Tape A - no follow on sound]

MR SHICEKA: Buthalezi’s is the kind the house where we would normally sit.

Even during the day we would sit around and drink beer.

ADV PRIOR: No, you woke up, you were woken, you said to the Judge or the

Court you were sleeping, you got up but now we know that’s not true. When you

got back after the operation you started drinking beer. I want to know, was that a

form of celebration to celebrate the attack? What was the reason for drinking beer

at that time?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Prior, I’m going to interrupt you there because your

question is based on the assumption that the very sentence that:

"we drank beer"


is correct, whereas we know that he told a lot of lies to the Judge. Maybe we

should first find out, even if that portion is the truth.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I will.

Mr Shiceka, as Mr Chairman has pointed out, did you in fact drink beer?

MR SHICEKA: As I’ve already explained, we drink in that place. We did drink

beer.

CHAIRPERSON: No, listen to this sentence. The Judge says you joined a number

of people in the dining room of Buthalezi’s house where you were drinking in the

early hours of the morning, is that true?

MR SHICEKA: No, I wasn’t telling the truth before the Judge, I was lying, I was

trying to run away from the conviction.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, but in truth and in fact, was been consumed when you got back

to Buthalezi’s house after the attack?

MR SHICEKA: We didn’t drink.

ADV PRIOR: So there was no celebration at Buthalezi’s house?

MR SHICEKA: We didn’t celebrate, we would stand on guard during the night, we

didn’t drink.

ADV PRIOR: Did you tell the Court that you were the senior officer of APLA in

Newcastle at the time?

Mr Chairman, I refer to page 40 of the bundle, Exhibit A.


ADV PRIOR: Was that true or not true?

MR SHICEKA: It wasn’t the truth.

ADV PRIOR: Were you also running away from a conviction or maybe I can ask

you this question, why did you say that during your trial, that you were the senior

officer of APLA in Newcastle area?

MR SHICEKA: I was trying to avoid a situation in this way. It’s because I have to

convince the Judge that I didn’t go there to conduct operations but just to train

PAC members. That’s the difference in Newcastle since there were some faction

fights within political organisations at that time in the township. Therefore I was

trying to run away from the allegation that I was involved in the case.


ADV PRIOR: Tell me, Power, you indicted in your statement which was unsigned

but it’s been referred to, you said:

"Power told me at Umtata"

Mr Chairman, at page 4 of Mr Shiceka’s statement.

"Power told me at Umtata that we must meet at a certain

house and told me to prepare for a trip to Newcastle"

Now Power, did you ever see him, have you ever seen him after the attack whilst

you were in prison?

MR SHICEKA: We didn’t.

ADV PRIOR: You indicated in your evidence that the decisions or the decision to

attack white target, in other words white civilians was a political decision,

something over which you had no control.


ADV PRIOR: Now over the past four years whilst you’ve been in prison, have you

made any enquiries from the political leaders of the PAC or the military leaders of

APLA regarding that position, as to whether that in fact was the true position at the

time?

MR SHICEKA: I think in my application form at the bottom there is the name of

Leklapa Pathlele who was the director of operations of APLA.

CHAIRPERSON: What about it?

ADV PRIOR: Sorry, is that at page 5? Unfortunately he doesn’t have - can we just

show the applicant, Mr Shiceka the bundle Mr ...[indistinct], there’s a spare

bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Page?

ADV PRIOR: I think he’s referring to page 5 of his application Mr Chairman.

First of all, if you could just confirm that that is your application? Is that your

application?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, it is.

ADV PRIOR: And at page 5 you mention under paragraph 11(b):

"Under whose"


Sorry, the pages are hitting the microphone which is very sensitive. Could you just

move the document away, thank you.

"Under whose approval or order was the attack carried

out"?

You referred to:

"Comrade Umzala who issued the order to take the war

to the white areas and to destroy the state machinery"

Is that the person Leklapa Pathlele that you referred to?

MR SHICEKA: This is Umzala from Transkei, the man who gave us the

instruction to go and attack in Newcastle. When or while I was in prison, people

who came to visit me to help me with the amnesty application was a member of the

parliament, comrade Sizani. The second one who came to visit me in Worcester is

Leklapa Pathlele.

Therefore I think comrade Sizani, the MP in Cape Town is the one who put

through my application. I thought the one which was before the Commission is the

one that was put through Leklapa Pathlele because he also did an application on

my behalf. This is the one I’m referring to where below where it’s written

Commissioner of Oaths, as it was written by R K Sizani, Member of Parliament.

He’s the first person who came to me while I was Pollsmoor prison in 1994.

Thereafter comrade Leklapa Pathlele, director of operations came later. Therefore I

thought the application before the Commission was signed by Leklapa Pathlele.

However it was the one by comrade Sizane in 1994.

ADV PRIOR: Yes sorry, you seem to have missed the question. The question is

simply, did you ever make enquiries from any of the leadership who you now

confirm came to see you in prison, whether that in fact was the policy at the time,

to take the struggle into the white areas and to attack white target?

MR SHICEKA: Do you mean while I was in prison? I don’t understand you.

ADV PRIOR: While you were in prison because up until that stage you had no

contact, on your evidence, that you had contact with either leadership of the PAC

or of the high command of APLA. You were simply acting on what Umzala or

Power had told you in Umtata?

MR SHICEKA: When they came to me we never discussed anything, they only

helped me with the application.


ADV PRIOR: Were you aware - sorry, did you attend the conference of the PAC at

Umtata during December of 1993?

MR SHICEKA: I didn’t.

ADV PRIOR: Would you agree then, that attacking white civilians was a departure

from the normal targets that had been attacked by APLA in the past?

MR SHICEKA: I will not be in a position to comment on that point because the

people who took decisions were the seniors. We as foot soldiers, we had to carry

out orders.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, I understand that but your counsel also put to you that there

seemed to be a change on the nature of the targets that APLA were now

concentrating on. You as a soldier, were you not able to even formulate that in

your mind that: in the we were attacking military targets, policemen, police

stations, military headquarters, army headquarters, army bases, now suddenly we

are told to attack civilian targets? Did that not indicate to you that there was a

change in the policy of APLA?

MR SHICEKA: I can’t say I realised any change there.

ADV PRIOR: Are you saying you simply accepted the order and you saw no

difference in attacking civilians as opposed to policemen or military personnel?

MR SHICEKA: Sir, I am a soldier, I don’t question instructions from my seniors,

if they instruct me to do a particular thing I do it.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not the question. You are a soldier but even soldiers can

think surely, whether asking you is - is it not so that in the past your targets were

police and other security forces? Now did you not, when you were asked to carry

out this operation, did you not realise that: O, now we are shifting from attacking

security forces, we are now attacking civilians? The question is not whether you -

the question is not why you didn’t ask that, the question is, did you not yourself, as

somebody who has passed standard 10, did you not realise that: O, we are now

shifting from attacking strictly only security forces, we’re now attacking civilians?

Did you not notice that? That is the question.

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairman, the attack on white civilians is not a new thing,

when you look back at the history of PAC, the formation of Polko on the 11th of

September 1961, if you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those

comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into

APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days, even history

confirms that. Therefore I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members


says we’re shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were

attacking white civilians which I refer to as: "soft targets". Farmers were also

attired before the attacks on Gold Gloves and St James and other attacks. That’s

the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constitution

targets because this started long ago.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that was the question and perhaps that was the answer you

should simply have given from the beginning.

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairman, I didn’t understand before.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Shiceka, what I’m essentially driving at is that despite your

evidence that you were a soldier simply carrying out instructions, it would seem on

the very eveing of the Newcastle attack, you excersied a discretion, a discretion not

to attack the reastaurant which had been selected as a target. You decided against

that because you said african people in the vicinty may have been injured. You

assessed that risk and you decided nevertheless not to attack the restaurant and you

went elsewhere. Isn’t that so, isn’t that true?

MR SHICEKA: That’s not true.

ADV PRIOR: But that was your evidence Mr Shiceka. Are you saying that you

didn’t ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, no Mr Prior, that is not a fair statement put to the witness.

ADV PRIOR: As the Committee pleases.

CHAIRPERSON: He never exercised his discretion to move away from the

prescribed target. He never exercised his discretion to move away from the target

which was prescribed by the instructions.

ADV PRIOR: Well with respect Mr Chairman, on his evidence the restaurant was

the primary target, they went there ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Provided it will only be whites and that’s very important.

ADV PRIOR: It seems from his evidence that he did - that a discretion must have

been exercised not to attack because there was a risk to the safety in the vicinty,

surely that is a discretion.

CHAIRPERSON: Well suppose they had attacked and injured a lot of black

people, would that have been in line with the instructions?

ADV PRIOR: I take your point. I’m simply trying to highlight, and will argue

later, that that didn’t seem to be the case in other examples of APLA attacks.


CHAIRPERSON: I’m trying to say to you, the discretion, if that is a discretion at

all that you are referring to, did not allow him to attack anything other than white

people.

ADV PRIOR: I take your point Mr Chairman, I’ll move on.

Was the - let me put it this way, let me refer you to paragraphs 17 of your

statement, I beg your pardon, paragraph 15 at page 5. You said:

"Occasionally Tanda went out to check possible targets

in town. One day he came back saying we can attack a

restaurant. After he had selected a target he left with two

other africans whose names are not known to me, to find

a car for the operation"

You then discuss how you organised yourselves and how a vehicle ws obtained

and then you come to paragraph 17 where you say:

"We arrived in town and went to the restaurant but there

was too much movement outside the restaurant"

You make no mention that there was danger to african people, of them possible

getting injured, in your statement. Can you explain that?

MR SHICEKA: In front of the disco - two flats away from the disco there is a bar

which is for black people and that’s where people normally go to drink and it was

at night and there were many people on the streets and we realised that if we carry

out the operations and people started retaliating, many black people would be

injured and that will not be in line with our aim, that’s what I said.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, I understand that. The question is directed at what stands in

your statement, what appears in your statement. Are you able to explain why what

you’ve just told us, does not appear in your statement?


MR SHICEKA: What's in the statement?

ADV PRIOR: I'll read paragraph 17 again, and this is the statement that was

prepared by your counsel:

"When we arrived in town we went to the restaurant but

there was too much movement outside the restaurant.

While looking for another target I heard music noise. I

went to inspect and found many white dancing inside

this disco. I reported that we can attack there. Tanda

then gave the order that we attack. Only Tanda and I

went to attack and one remained in the car and another

was to give us firing cover as it became necessary.

When we got there the burglar door was locked. It was

not locked on my first inspection. We stood just outside

the door and fired inside. The attack lasted about three

seconds. We got into the car and sped away"

Do you understand that and do you accept that that is what you told your counsel?

MR SHICEKA: That's correct. I would just need some clarification. Aren't you

talking about the restaurant?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Shiceka, I don't want to engage you in any debate on this, it just

seems to me from reading that paragraph of your statement that you confirm you

did say, that there's no mention of any danger to african people being injured if you

attacked the restaurant. I just want to know, do you have any reason or can you

explain why you simply never said that to your counsel or why doesn't it appear in

your statement? There may be a reason why it doesn't appear, maybe you can give

us that reason.

MR SHICEKA: Are we talking about what happened at the disco or outside the

restaurants? Because where there were many people, it's in front of the restaurant.

I'm getting confused when you talk about the disco and also come back to talk

about the restaurant at the same time.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Shiceka, I'm referring to the restaurant, I'm referring to what

appears in your statement that you've confirmed a short while ago in fact you did

say and I'll read it to you again. The first sentence reads:


there was too much movement outside the restaurant"

and that's where you leave the restaurant alone, you don't say: there were too many

african people there, there was a possibility that they might get injured. You simply


say there was too much movement. In other words there was too much activity

there and that's why you looked for another target.

My question is, can you explain why you did not, in that paragraph when you

referred to the restaurant, simply say: "We didn't attack the restaurant because

african people might have got injured"? Do you understand what I'm asking for?

MR SHICEKA: I don't understand you.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior, maybe one can put the question this way.

Mr Shiceka, did you tell Mr Arendse why you did not open fire at the restaurant?

Did you give him the reason for not shooting there?

MR SHICEKA: That's correct, I did.

ADV SANDI: Mr Prior is trying to say to you that that does not appear from the

statement your lawyer prepared for you.

MR SHICEKA: I did give a statement to my lawyer. There were questions which

were asked. I explained that there were movements in front of the restaurant. He

wants me to clarify as to who was moving up and down, it's just that when we

mean - in Xhosa, when we say people were moving up and down, we normally

refer to black people moving up and down. That is ...[indistinct]

ADV SANDI: Can you tell us everything you said to your lawyer about the

restaurant?

MR SHICEKA: Sir, we arrived in a Cressida Toyota car. Tanda started to get out

to do some surveillance. I went out, I looked around the place and I came back.

The car was not far from the restaurant. In front of the restaurant there were many

black people, there were also white people moving up and down. I went back to the

car to report to Tanda that the situation is not good, we are not going to attack this

place because we could injure black people therefore we left the place.

ADV SANDI: You said all that to your lawyer?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, I told Mr Arendse.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I'll move on.

I want to refer you to page 64 of the bundle and a statement which was made by

Dube who apparently was the driver of your vehicle. With permission of the

Committee I want to possibly just put the whole paragraph to the witness.

Unfortunately or - I'll retract that, the statement is in Afrikaans, I understand there

may be some difficulty with the - would the Committee allow me to paraphrase or


to translate or to put the sense to the witness? Page 64 of the bundle, it's paragraph

8 of Dube's statement. Maybe I'll just put then the essential part Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the interpreters will interpret for him.

ADV PRIOR: I understand that there's - it's indicated that there'd be a problem

with the Afrikaans. Maybe I can just read it out. I mean the Committee is au fait

and I can then translate it and if that's a fair translation of the words then I can put

it to the witness. From the middle of the paragraph Mr Chairman.

"Reg oor die bakkery het die man langs my weer gesê:

"Stop hier moet ons begin werk". Daar is 'n

restaurant/steakhouse langs die bakkery wat vol mense

was op daardie stadium. Een van die drie agter het egter

gesê: "Nee, hier is te feel polisiemanne"

Sorry, I'll repeat that:

"Hier is te veel polisiemanne". Die mense het die hele

tyd in Xhosa gepraat. By die verkeerslig het die man

voor aan my gesê om links te draai. Net verby die

verkeerslig kon ek die geraas van musiek hoor. Net

verby die gebou met die musiek het die man voor my -

langs my gesê ek moet stop"

Now, it would appear from Mr Dube's statement, that when you stopped at the

restaurant or steakhouse someone said in the vehicle that there were too many

policemen there, whether that was in the restaurant or outside the restaurant.

And as a result of that the vehicle was then driven off and then turned at the robots

and stopped where the discotech was. What is your comment about that?

MR SHICEKA: I can't comment, maybe that's what Dube was thinking at the time.

Thats not what was in our minds.

ADV PRIOR: The question essentially is, did anyone in the vehicle say: "No, we

can't attack here there are too many policemen"?

MR SHICEKA: I don't remember anybody saying that because the person who got

out of the car is myself.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. You say you also were armed with a grenade, a hand

grenade?

MR SHICEKA: That's correct.


ADV PRIOR: And was Tanda, your colleague Mr Tanda also armed with a hand

grenade, that was an M26 grenade?


ADV PRIOR: And he also had a rifle grenade? That is what he referred to as a

launcher grenade?


ADV PRIOR: And had you and he discussed that at the discotech or at the

restaurant, whichever was to be attacked, that the grenades would be used? In other

words they would be launched or thrown into the crowd of people at those two

venues?

MR SHICEKA: We were going to use the rifle grenade when we get attacked. The

two hand grenades were supposed to be thrown into the area or whether the disco,

wherever we're going to attack.

ADV PRIOR: I want to just get clarity in my mind, were the targets selected to be

attacked together, sorry, not together but both targets were to be attacked on that

same evening or was the discotech an alternative target should the attack on the

restaurant not be able to be carried out?

MR SHICEKA: That's not the case.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, well what is the position then?

MR SHICEKA: We had two targets selected, if we had a problem with attacking

one we will go for the second option. We've already done reconnaissance and all of

that.

ADV PRIOR: Yes. If there was not problem at the restaurant, would you have

attacked the restaurant? If there were no black people milling around there, would

you have attacked the restaurant?

MR SHICEKA: That's correct, we would have attacked it.

ADV PRIOR: And then would you have left there and attacked the discotech on

the same evening? Was that the plan?

MR SHICEKA: So, two targets were selected but only one was to be attacked, is

that what you're saying?



ADV PRIOR: And what was the plan regarding the hand grenades, were they both

to be used in attacking the one target, either the restaurant or the discotech?

MR SHICEKA: One target.

ADV PRIOR: Two grenades?


ADV PRIOR: And we heard yesterday from Mr Tanda that these were offensive

grenades.


ADV PRIOR: And was your intention to kill as many people as you possibly could

by shooting and/or detonating the grenades?


ADV PRIOR: I must put to you the question that was raised by the Chairman

yesterday regarding - well, Mr Tanda seemed to suggest and the Chairman put it to

him, that the reason for not attacking the restaurant and attacking the disco instead

seemed to be a decision which smacked at racism. You weren't prepared to injure

anyone other than white people. Could you comment on that? Was that part of your

motivation in attacking the discotech?

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairman, APLA is not a racist organisation. I think you are

aware that white were oppressing us, that was the race that was oppressing us. We

didn't attack white people because we hated white people, we don't hate white

people.

Even the documents of the PAC clearly state that those who are accepting a

democratic goal in Africa should be recognised as africans. We didn't attack the

Crazy Disco because we are racist.

Right from the foundation of the organisation we are not

a racist organisation. However, the situation in which

we had to live created a conflict between a white person

and a black person, it's not that we are racist.

ADV PRIOR: Now in your amnesty application you indicated that one of your

aims or:

"The political objective that was sought was to liberate

AZANIA and that was at paragraph 10(a) and at 11(b)


you also indicated to take the war to the white areas and

to destroy the state machinery"

Would you say that is a fair reflection of the political objective that you had, which

motivated in carrying out this attack?

MR SHICEKA: May you please repeat the question.

ADV PRIOR: I'm referring to your amnesty application where you indicate that the

political objective which you sought to achieve was to liberate AZANIA by - the

reason or the objective that you gave in attacking the Crazy Beat Disco inter

alias was to liberate AZANIA.


ADV PRIOR: And then at paragraph 11(b), although it wasn't strictly dealing with

the objective, you indicated ...[intervention]

MR SHICEKA: Excuse me, may you please repeat your question?

ADV PRIOR: That one of your - the intention was to destroy the state machinery.

Do you understand the question? I'm putting to you what you said.

MR SHICEKA: I don't understand, please repeat your question.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. In your amnesty application that was completed on behalf -

the one that you looked at earlier, there are two statements that you make there,

one you say you did this attack or participated in the attack to liberate AZANIA.

And there's also a statement where you say you wanted to destroy the state

machinery, presumably the apartheid machinery of the time. Do you understand

that?

MR SHICEKA: I understand.

ADV PRIOR: Did you say that in you ...[intervention]


ADV PRIOR: And you adhered to that, you accept that that was part of your

application?


ADV PRIOR: Alright. The Crazy Beat Discotech, there was reconnaissance and

surveillance kept on that or done on that target, is that correct? - before the attack.



ADV PRIOR: Would you agree with me that for all intense and purposes it was a

place where people came and danced to music and drank spirituous liquor or

alcohol, is that correct?


ADV PRIOR: Are you able to say that the clientele at the discotech was solely

white people or were people of other races, did they also frequent that discotech?

Or don't you know?

MR SHICEKA: It was only used by white people.

ADV PRIOR: How do you know that or why do you say that?

MR SHICEKA: My comrade Tanda did the reconnaissance and I trusted him and

believed when said it was frequented by white people or that there were white

people in the place, I believed him and that's the reason why we attacked the place.

ADV PRIOR: I ask you this question because the restaurant also seemed to have

black people or african people in the vicinity. Maybe I can ask you the question

pertinently, did the restaurant also have a multi-racial clientele?

MR SHICEKA: No.

ADV PRIOR: In other words, did african or black people also eat at that restaurant

or don't you know?

MR SHICEKA: They didn't dine there.

ADV PRIOR: Why do you say that?

MR SHICEKA: The reason I'm saying this is because it was chosen as one of the

targets. To qualify as a target it had to be used by white people.

ADV PRIOR: You were there at the restaurant on that evening, did you see people

of any other race? For example, Indian people or Coloured people eating at that

restaurant?

MR SHICEKA: I saw people moving up and down, people of different races.

ADV PRIOR: Going into the restaurant and coming out of the restaurant?

MR SHICEKA: They were not getting in or getting out.

ADV PRIOR: Milling around outside, walking up and down?


MR SHICEKA: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. And at the discotech, you said there were burglar bars or the

burglar doors were closed so you saw no people milling around outside?

MR SHICEKA: We didn't.

ADV PRIOR: And it was dark inside or darkened, the lights were low inside the

discotech?


ADV PRIOR: So you don't know or you did not know on that evening and even

now, whether there were any people of any other race, any other racial group in the

discotech at the time, is that correct?

MR SHICEKA: When you say it was dark, I would say there were lights. The

lights were on, you will be able to see people inside. It wasn't so dark that you

couldn't recognise the people if you know them, people who were inside. I can't

say much but it wasn't that dark that you couldn't see people inside.

ADV PRIOR: I don't want to take it any further than that, it was simply a question

which I remember Mr Tanda, his evidence had indicated that the lights, it was

fairly dark inside the discotech at the time of the shooting. He wasn't able to

recognise specifically who he was shooting at.

I'm almost concluding my questioning, sorry did you want to add something to

that?

MR SHICEKA: I'm trying to say the lights only went off after we started shooting,

then the lights were switched off.

ADV PRIOR: Alright. I want to ask you this question, do you accept that for all

intents and purposes the people that were inside that discotech at the time when

you shot into the discotech, are you able to say whether they were connected in

anyway to the state, in other words to the police, to the army, to the security forces,

to the administration in anyway, of the apartheid government of the time? Are you

able to say that with any conviction?

MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairperson, I was instructed to go and attack white people.

As to the things that you are mentioning I don't know but what I know is that I will

attack white people anywhere I can find them meeting. The question as to whether

they were supporting apartheid or not wasn't relevant.


ADV PRIOR: So for all intent and purposes they could have been opposed to the

policies of the government, that that wasn't an issue with you because you were

acting on orders. Is that your reply?

MR SHICEKA: I can't answer that question.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV PRIOR

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Shiceka, had you been to Newcastle before the visit when

this incident happened that you testified about?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, I went there before.

ADV POTGIETER: Did you go to reconnoitre, to go and see what the situation

was like?

MR SHICEKA: The first time I went to Newcastle was to assist the task force to

train a few members of the PAC, I wasn't going there to carry out operations.

ADV POTGIETER: Were you part of the group that came out to reconnoitre in

Newcastle in August, about August of 1993 that Mr Molefu was referring to?

MR SHICEKA: There was another group to which I arrived. When I arrived there

were many people already there. I was only given a task to go and train the

members. I heard about the reconnaissance group but I wasn't part of that group.

ADV POTGIETER: Was that when you met Mr Molefu for the fist time?


ADV POTGIETER: During that visit in '93 in Newcastle?

MR SHICEKA: Yes, in it was in 1993. The people to whom I've arrived were

members of APLA.

ADV POTGIETER: And you said they had nothing to do with any operations, they

were just basically training, establishing units?

MR SHICEKA: Not the units. It was a different unit for PAC.

ADV POTGIETER: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Where were you coming from when you came specifically

...[End of Tape 1, Side B - no follow-on sound]


MR SHICEKA: I was from Umtata.

CHAIRPERSON: When I look at paragraph 17 of your statement which is the

paragraph which was read to you by Mr Prior, perhaps I should read it from the

beginning:


there was too much movement outside the restaurant"

and I want you to listen to the next sentence:

"While looking for another target I heard music noise"

and then you went on to say that you went on to the disco etc., etc.

The impression I get from the sentence:

"While looking for another target I heard music noise"

Yes, the impression I get here is as if the disco was not on your menu that night. It

is as if it was not one of the targeted areas or places for a target. The impression I

get is, once you were frustrated at the restaurant you started walking, looking for

another target aimlessly around town. Isn't that what you are saying here?

MR SHICEKA: It's not. I would like to be given an opportunity to explain myself.

Mr Chairperson, I'm trying to state that after we have seen the people moving up

and down near the restaurant I went back to report to my commander who was

Tanda in the car. Tanda realised that we cannot attack the restaurant.

After that we went straight towards Crazy Beat because it was one of the other

places that we have to attack.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] you are moving for the gist of my question. You

have just said, from there you went straight to the Crazy Beat, but that's the point,

the sentence doesn't say you went straight to the disco. The sentence you were

looking for another target, you went looking for another target. It doesn't say, from

the restaurant you went straight to the disco.

What I'm reading to you says from the restaurant you went on looking for another

target.

MR SHICEKA: Was that stated by myself, that we were looking for another

target?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if it was stated by yourself but I'm just reading

from your statement. Is that what you told your legal representatives, that from the

restaurant you went looking for another target or you didn't say that?


MR SHICEKA: Mr Chairperson, I clearly explained to my lawyer that we had

selected two targets, one was a restaurant and the second one was a disco. And

after discovering that we could not attack the restaurant we went straight to attack

the disco. We didn't go around looking for other targets, we went straight to the

disco.


ADV POTGIETER: Can I just ask you, sorry Mr Shiceka, have you seen this

document that we've been presented with? It purports to be a statement by you but

it's not signed, it's in English, a typed document. Have you ever seen this thing?

MR SHICEKA: Um um.

ADV POTGIETER: You haven't seen this?

MR SHICEKA: No, I haven't seen it.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Arendse, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ARENDSE: Just perhaps to help clear up the

statement.

Mr Shiceka, the statement you've just correctly told Advocate Potgieter, that you

didn't see this statement. You also were not asked by me or my colleague,

Advocate Ngulwana to sign this statement, is that correct?


MR ARENDSE: And the reason was that the statement did not correctly reflect

your instruction nor did it correctly reflect the other statements, I'm referring to the

statements by your co-applicants. Is that correct?


MR ARENDSE: Is it also correct that we then agreed that we should hand up the

statements unsigned and then correct it during the course of you and your co-

applicants giving evidence?

MR SHICEKA: I can't understand.

MR ARENDSE: Firstly, is it correct that the statement, the prepared statement

which is not signed does not accurately reflect your instructions?


CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Arendse, can I just, if you don't mind, assist you

because the witness will never understand and this is what is confusing, how you

can during his evidence correct a typed statement, it's impossible. In his version it's

impossible.

I think what we should ask him is, was it agreed that whatever the statement says,

when you get into the witness box you'll tell the truth as you know it?



Is it also so Mr Shiceka, - I just want you to confirm it, that the first time we as

legal representatives had an opportunity of consulting with the three of you

together in one room was yesterday morning?


MR ARENDSE: And it's for the first time during our consultations yesterday

morning that we discussed amongst other things, the written statement and the

other documents that is before the Committee?


MR ARENDSE: Do you also recall my colleague Ngalwana saying to you and to

the other applicants that we have been required to furnish the Secretariat of this

Committee with certain details before this hearing takes place?


MR ARENDSE: Because we haven't had the opportunity to consult together fully

and properly, that we would provide these details on what is legally referred to as

honour without prejudice basis. In other words we would try and provide as much

detail as we can but that mustn't be held - that those details that we provide won't

bind you?


MR ARENDSE: Do you recall receiving a letter while you were being held, I think

you were being held at Brandvlei Prison, is that correct, in Worcester in Cape

Town?


MR ARENDSE: This letter contained a lot of detail about not only the Newcastle

attack but also other attacks and that is why these attacks are dealt with in your

statement.



MR ARENDSE: Now, what you told the Committee today, particularly in regard

to what is contained in paragraph 17, i.e. that you went to the restaurant and the

reason why you did not attack the restaurant is that you saw african people, black

people milling around in front of the restaurant and that is why you never attacked

the restaurant? Is that the correct version?

MR SHICEKA: That is the truth.

MR ARENDSE: Is it also the correct version that you told the Committee today

that you had, in advance of the 14th of February, already selected two targets,

namely the restaurant and the disco?


MR ARENDSE: Is it correct that your decision, your joint decision to attack the

disco was not a spur of the moment decision but was a ...[intervention]


MR ARENDSE: Then there's just two other aspects I want to deal with Mr

Chairman.

Mr Shiceka, it was put to you that it wouldn't be possible for you to say how many

white people were inside the disco?

MR SHICEKA: I wouldn't know.

MR ARENDSE: And you wouldn't also know whether the white people inside that

disco, whether they supported apartheid or the apartheid structure, you wouldn't be

able to say that?


MR ARENDSE: But do you accept as a fact that the overwhelming majority of

white people in this country had in fact supported apartheid through the ballot box?


MR ARENDSE: It's also one of the aims of these attacks on white people, that it

was designed to change their attitude and to change their mind and for them not to

support the apartheid government?


MR ARENDSE: Then just a last item, it was put to you by my


learned friend Advocate Prior that you would have exercised the discretion by not

attacking the restaurant. In other words you weren't just a soldier blindly following

an order. You in fact - as the Chairman correctly put it, you matriculated and you

are able to use your discretion and change your mind.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior did not proceed with that line of ...[intervention]

MR ARENDSE: Sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: He did not proceed with that line of cross-examination after I

had some discussion with him.

MR ARENDSE: I won't pursue that point then. Thank you Mr Chairman, no

further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ARENDSE

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have one or two questions to put?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I'm a bit concerned and I need to voice my concern

on behalf of amnesty and the Evidence Leaders. I understand and I have empathy

with my learned friend's position, particularly in communicating with the client.

But the situation becomes untenable when we are supplied with statements on

whatever basis, that we are precluded from properly ventilating those matters

because of uncertainty as to the instructions.

I don't want to put my learned friend in an embarrassing situation but paragraph 17

contains factual information, and I believe in the interest of justice and the interests

of this process that some explanation would be offered to the Committee where

that information was obtained from. It simply could not have been dragged out of

the air.

I think Mr Chairman also had the same concerns as myself when I asked that

question because the impression certainly was created in the statement that the

discotech was a random target, they looked around.

And I think in all fairness to the process and to the victims I think it's necessary for

my learned friend, obviously if never personally consulted with the applicant Mr

Shiceka in obtaining this information, that some explanation be advanced which

obviously will be acceptable in the circumstances. But at the moment it is left in

the air.

And secondly, for purposes of certainty the onus is on the applicants to make a full

disclosure. If we look at Mr Shiceka's amnesty application, it is very thin and one

expects the - or expect the statement to be supplementary to that application.


Obviously if one can't then rely on any information supplied prior to the giving of

evidence, then it certainly I think detracts to a very large extent from the testing of

that evidence. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you want to comment on that?

MR ARENDSE: Mr Chairman yes, the applicants were held at three different

prisons. Mr Tanda at Pollsmoor and Mr Shiceka at Brandvlei and Mr Molefu at

waterfall in Newcastle. My learned colleague Advocate Ngalwana visited the three

of them separately and he took statements from them. He informs me that he would

like to address the Committee on what he was told.

I have, as I said earlier, had the opportunity for the first time to consult with them

jointly and I cleared up with them amongst other things what is contained in

paragraph 17 and I anticipated that it would raised during cross-examination.

Unfortunately, being away from your home base I didn't have the facilities to

amend the statement and to correct it and hand it up in that form to the Committee.

But I'm satisfied that what Mr Shiceka and Mr Tanda and Mr Molefu have told this

Committee are my instructions and that they've confirmed it under oath.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a moment, before we go that far, I'm uncomfortable about

that aspect of the matter. I think I must confer very quickly with my colleagues.

Before we, and in fact I don't think subject to what people may say and having

conferred with my colleagues I think I'm still feeling very uncomfortable about

whether we should counsel to explain what happened during his consultation with

his clients. It's just not done unless exceptional circumstances do exist to what I'm

not so sure whether they do in this case.

But perhaps Mr Prior I appreciate your concern but I think though that simply

speaking it is not correct that you are prevented from using the statement because

once the statement is given to you, you are free to use it in cross-examination like

you have done.

It would have been something quite different if once you started wanting to use

that statement Mr Arendse objected and said: "No, you can't use that statement

because during consultation my client told me that it was not true and soforth, he

didn't do that".

Had he done so we probably would have overruled him and said: "Well, let your

clients give an explanation". So you are free to use it in cross-examination and you

did in fact use that statement during cross-examination.

Once you confront a witness with a statement which he would have made in

consultation with his counsel, like an affidavit, once you confront him with the


contents thereof and he says: "Well, that's not what I told my counsel", you can't

take it further.

Unless for some reason counsel himself feels that the witness is lying and counsel

has got some other reasons why he would like to prove the witness a liar, like for

example counsel wants to say that he feels that perhaps it's a reflection on himself

and he wants to go into the witness box and then he wants to contradict the

witness.

But once the witness has said: "That's not what I told my counsel", there could be a

host of reasons. For example plain ordinary misunderstanding between the two of

them during consultation. And we normally just leave it there once a witness has

said: "I didn't say that".

Perhaps I should say this because it would appear that you're going to have

possibly more of this kind of problem and we don't want to set a precedent where

we call upon counsel to come and explain because in terms of the proposed

guidelines which have not as yet been proclaimed, the new guidelines which we

have drafted, it seems to me that legal practitioners are going to be required in

advance to submit a summary of the statements by their clients like just happened

now.

I can foresee that while this is going to be helpful in the sense that the leaders of

the evidence would know in advance more or less what the applicants are going to

say. We are going to also have this kind of problem where the statement will be

found to be wanting in one or more respects.

And if on each such occasion when an applicant says: "Well that is not what I told

my advocate", we would require of an advocate or an attorney to give an

explanation, I think it would lead to an untenable situation.

And I don't think we should start today to create that kind of precedent. We are not

saying that it can never happen but for now we feel that each has been sufficiently

ventilated and that it should be left there.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I did not intend to convey

any impression that Mr Arendse was required to - or his junior, to give evidence or

to come and make a statement.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just because Mr Arendse suggest that his junior should

explain.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And we don't think it's appropriate.


ADV PRIOR: I accept unequivocally the explanation placed on record by Mr

Arendse. There was no intention, there was no intention from my part to indicate

that there was anything improper. It was simply a request that there appeared to be

a material discrepancy, and Mr Arendse has answered that.

As far as he was concerned the instructions were as the evidence was tendered, and

I accept that Mr Chairman. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think this could be the appropriate stage where we could

adjourn? Or first I should ask Mr Arendse. Mr Arendse is that your case or do you

have any more witnesses to call?

MR ARENDSE: No, that is the case for the applicants Mr Chairman, we are no

further witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: The next witness would now be one of the relatives of the

victims.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, the position has changed since yesterday. I've

consulted with Mrs Swart who is the mother of Mrs van Wyk, the deceased in the

matter, and she said that after deliberation she does not wish to give any evidence.

She leaves the matter of amnesty in the hands of the Committee.

In other words she does not oppose it. What she simply wanted to ask was a

question of the third applicant, Mr Shiceka, which I understand was put. She

wanted to know in essence what Mr Shiceka would have said to the children of the

deceased if they were able to be here. And I think Mr Shiceka fully answered that

question. He would ask for forgiveness and would ask the Committee to a

recommendation at some later stage.

The only other aspect is, since the death of the mother of the four children,

Mirinda, Cathy, Neville and Dawie, is that his matter be referred to the R&R

Committee for consideration. She does not wish to give evidence viva voce. So

from Evidence Leader's side there are no witnesses that I can call in this matter.


CHAIRPERSON: Yes, like you say Mr Shiceka has publicly conveyed his

apologies. On another level though, I'm beyond that level on a person to person

level, normally the Committee doesn't get involved. Normally the representative of

the applicant and the leader of evidence, if an applicant wants to meet with the

family it is done extra curially and that could be done during our adjournment.

And don't we have a representative of some sorts here, Reparations Committee or

something or the briefer?


ADV PRIOR: Yes. Mr Chairman we do, we have two briefers, Mrs Mkhize is one

of them. She is present and contact has been made. I certainly will take it up with

her.

CHAIRPERSON: You'll put them in touch with the people because as you know at

this stage it's premature for us to say that they are victims because that could

depend on the - I think it's going to depend largely on the decision we come to.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So you can just put the people concerned, in touch with the

Commission. We will adjourn and resume at half past eleven unless you feel that

we need more time before you start arguing.

MR ARENDSE: Can we make it a half an hour adjournment Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: We can come back at a quarter to twelve.

MR ARENDSE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it going to be possible to finish by 1 o'clock?

MR ARENDSE: I think so.

ADV PRIOR: I agree with that. I'm in a position to address the Committee just on

several brief points.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well then we'll adjourn until a quarter to twelve.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION


MR ARENDSE IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman, learned members of

the Committee for allowing us some time to prepare very roughly a closing

argument.

Mr Chairman, members of the Committee, the applicants have applied for amnesty

in respect of several offences committed during an attack on the Crazy Beat Disco

in Newcastle on the 14th of February 1994 when one person was killed and two

people were injured.

These offences included murder, attempted murder and possession of arms and

ammunition and hand grenades.


The applicants were properly convicted and sentenced to long terms of

imprisonment for committing those offences and they were convicted and

sentenced in May of 1994.

Mr Chairman, although another tribunal trial court and therefore expressing it's

opinion found the applicants and guilty and sentenced them. We respectfully

submit that the trial court was well placed to make it's findings on the evidence

before it and it's therefore important to note that some of these findings included

the following factual findings.

That applicant Molefu was a member of the PAC at the time and that applicants

Shiceka and Tanda were soldiers of APLA. The trial court also found that these

offences were committed with a political objective, namely to further the aims and

objectives of APLA.

In fact the court found that the applicants carried out the orders given by APLA

High Command on the evidence before you by one, Power Mzala, also referred to

as Jones. The trial court also found that these offences were not committed for any

personal gain.

We respectfully submit Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, that the

uncontroverted evidence of the applicants before you confirm that trial court's

findings. Based on these findings it is submitted that the applicants are entitled to

amnesty and they have complied with the requirements of Section 20 of the Act.

Although not a factor in terms of the statute it is of importance and relevance to the

whole reconciliation process, the attitude of victims. In this case none of the

victims oppose amnesty. Mrs Swart who is here whose daughter was killed abides

the decision of this Committee.

If there is any basis for objection to this application then it's because of an alleged

lack of full disclosure. In this regard we respectfully submit that the applicants

have disclosed all the relevant and material facts relating to the Crazy Beat Disco

incident before, during and after the incident.

The evidence before this Committee in summary is as follows:

An order was given by Power Mzala in January that targets needed to be identified

in Newscastle for the purpose of APLA carrying out certain operations.

Mzala gathered together a unit comprising, Tanda, Shiceka, Sitembele and Funani

who are not before this Committee, they formed the unit.

Tanda was told that he commands the unit.

Tanda was also told that he must identify the targets.


They came to Newcastle, Tanda identified two targets, namely the restaurant and

the Crazy Beat Disco.

They were identified on the basis that these targets are frequented by white people

and they were told, in fact it was part of the order that they should do so.

The arms and ammunition were brought from Umtata by motor car by Molefu

already in 1993. He stored and hid these arms at his place here in Newcastle during

all this time. And these are the arms and ammunition used by the applicants to

launch the attack on the disco.

To launch the attack a car was highjacked and that car was highjacked by Tanda

and the two other members of his unit. Shiceka was not one of them. Molefu was

driving the other vehicle which took them to the highjacked car.

As far as the operation itself is concerned Tanda and Shiceka have admitted and

confessed to you that they were directly involved in perpetrating the attack. They

were armed with automatic weapons and grenades. The automatic weapons were

used.

Molefu was involved in the attack, he supported it, he knew about it. But his

involvement was confined to a supporting role both before the attack and after the

attack. In fact he was arrested together with Tanda and Shiceka the next day,

February the 15th.

Mr Chairman, the applicants have shown remorse, they have asked for forgiveness

and we submit with respect, that their plea is a genuine one and that they too are

the victims of our apartheid past as much as the actual victims are, who were either

killed or injured during this attack. And therefore Mr Chairman, they deserve

amnesty.

In terms of supporting our submissions we would just like to refer to the decisions

given in the Coetzee application and the Mitchell application and we submit that

the case of the applicants before you is even more clear cut, if one can put it that

way, than both of those decisions given by this Committee.



ADV PRIOR IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I only

wish to draw the Committee's attention to certain aspects of the evidence, as well

as certain aspects of the Act and certain general considerations when considering

whether amnesty should be granted or not.


I wish to refer to the submission made by a Mr D.J. Ackerman and Mr V.L. Smith,

who represented the victims at the St James attack. No doubt Mr Chairman you

were involved in that matter and you'd alive to those considerations. With

submission I submit they are also of application here.

The submission made is that the Committee ought to be mindful that not every act

committed in a political context is an act of a political character or one associated

with a political objective.

Secondly, nor is every politically motivated act or every act committed in a name

of a political party such an act.

And thirdly, nor does a political slogan amount to a political objective which

justifies murder. Particularly in the light of what the APLA command had

indicated, Mr Sabelo Palma, that 1994 was to be "The Year of the Ballot and the

Bullet". That certainly doesn't justify murder at any level.

Now the Committee must also be mindful of the limitations which is placed on

acts, whether they can be categorised as acts of a political character or associated

with a political object. And in the respect the well-known principles upon which

our Founding Act is based, being the Norgaard principles, I think it's appropriate to

say that it was clear in the Namibian context where the Norgaard principles

applied, that attacks on purely civilian targets were not considered to be acts of a

political nature or sufficient political nature which justified amnesty.

It is also important to analyse whether the act of the applicants before this

Committee was carried out in the furtherance or as assistance to the political

objective alleged. The general political objective stated by the applicants was to

liberate AZANIA to dismantle the apartheid regime or the apartheid state and

rewin the land taken by the oppressors.

It is significant that none of the applicants were able to explain how the attack on

the discotech could have advanced that objective. In contra distinction to that I

think the Committee, with respect, ought to be mindful that the process which was

in place at the time and in which is common cause, that is the negotiations which

led to the elections in April, were far more likelier to achieve the ends which the

attack was allegedly intended to achieve were in fact successfully in operation at

the very time of the attack which was only two months away.

It is also significant that the very political party to which they belonged were party

to those negotiations and were actively involved in those negotiations.

It would appear from the evidence that all was not well in the PAC camp. It

appears from the evidence that during the conference at Umtata there appeared to

be two schools of thought, one opposing violence and the other advocating

violence or the armed struggle to continue.


That also seems to be borne out by the press clippings annexed to the bundle,

which seems to indicate that the politicians were saying one thing, suspending the

armed struggle, yet APLA was saying another thing.

Another aspect is the gravity of the act in questions. It is significant that

defenceless civilians who pose not threat, and certainly on the evidence, were

unconnected to any state, organisation, or body were the object of the attack.

It is also significant that the weapons used, automatic machine rifles and hand

grenades, although they weren't in fact used, the intention was to create maximum

carnage.

The applicants have said they've acted under orders and in that context they were

not at liberty to defy those orders.

It is also significant that none of the applicants were able to advance any cogent

reason what would have happened if such orders were disobeyed. There seemed to

be no sanction in place to have been an effective way to have cohersed the

applicants to have acted as they did.

We heard from Mr Tanda that if one smoked dagga for example, one would be

stripped and made to roll in the dirt or the mud and the water but certainly there

was no indication that if they had failed to carry out the attack which they did, that

there would have been a type of court martial where they would have been

severely reprimanded or corporally punished or anything in that vein.

It certainly seems from the evidence that those on the ground were left to their own

devices. Power, alias, sorry with the other Mzala and soforth, seemed to give a

general indication of what the policy was. Yet it appears from Mr Tanda's evidence

and Mr Shiceka's evidence that the selection of the target was left up to themselves.

My argument in this regard is, despite the evidence that it was because african

people were on the pavement that desisted or caused them to desist from attacking

the restaurant.

My submission is that on a proper analysis of that evidence it would clearly

indicate that they had a discretion of whatever nature in order to effect the attacks

as their mandate indicated.

Regarding the question of proportionality, my submission is that the very nature of

the means used and the nature of the target and what was to be achieved thereby, as

I've addressed earlier, was disproportionate in the circumstances.

Mr Chairman, I also highlight the remark made by the Committee which appeared

to be forthcoming from the evidence of Mr Tanda, that if the target was selected


purely because the people were white then, with submission, that seems to have

been the motivation which was based on racial lines.

And if one then accepts Mr Shiceka's evidence as it is supported by Mr Tanda, that

the restaurant was avoided because black people may have been injured, then the

only inference that can be drawn was that white people were attacked purely

because they were white people and for no other reason.

CHAIRPERSON: At that aspect you know, it's a very - sorry to chip in here. You

could see that it made some of us a bit uncomfortable and it cropped in one or two

matters not referred to by Mr Arendse. I said in the applications of Botha and

Steyn I think - Marais, Botha Marais and Steyn, which I think we heard evidence

here in this hall.

That was the case in which Both and Steyn, they went around that evening and

they said that they were looking for a group of at least 10 people, black people to

kill and they said they were specifically looking for black people, to kill at least 10

of them because they said there had been - earlier that day there had been an attack

of white people by a group PAC people according to them, and they said they are

going to attack in revenge.

They said the policy of their organisation was that for every white, one white

person killed, 10 people must be killed and they then went out to go and - because

one white person had been killed. That evening they went out to go and kill at least

10 black people and they actually went about looking for a group of - specifically

10 black people to kill.

And then they saw a kombi, they let it go for some reason and then they spotted a

bus, a Putco bus and they were also armed with machine guns and two of them, it

was two of them who opened fire on the bus because they wanted to kill black

people. And the two of them got amnesty, that notwithstanding and because on the

basis that they were acting according to orders. They were carrying out the orders

that they must go around, get 10 black people and kill them.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It was a very uncomfortable decision and I won't disclose who I

stood in that Judgement but my recollection is that it was not a unanimous

Judgement. But the majority Judgement was that even though these people

specifically wanted to go and kill black people and they went out to go and kill

black people, they killed about six or seven of them, they got amnesty for ADV

PRIOR: I'm simply - I'm familiar with the facts of all the amnesty applications.

Each application should be on it's own merits. Unfortunately if the Amnesty

Committee has created a precedent that it must follow then it becomes very

difficult to argue in any given case, that one should deviate from that. It's


unfortunate that such precedence may have, for whatever reason, have been

formulated.

CHAIRPERSON: Another one was, somebody got amnesty for - he was convicted

for abducting and assaulting a black person and he said: well, they drove around in

the evening because they didn't want black people to be in town after 9 o'clock in

the evening. So they were specifically targeting black people and to forcefully

drive them out of town.

They were not just looking for any person, they said: "We're looking for

specifically black people to assault them, to beat them so that they could get out of

town simply because they were black and then he got amnesty for having abducted

a black person under circumstances.

You know this - if you consider these types of cases, there are precedents and

maybe uncomfortable ones but I'm just mentioning this you know, to make you

understand that there are certain precedents which seem to find the face of this

argument which make all of us, not all of us, most of us or some of us

uncomfortable.

ADV PRIOR: I simply raised it because the literature on amnesty indicates that.

And I think if acts were perpetrated on that basis alone, on race, then it's a factor

that must be weighed up. It is an uncomfortable area but it's an area that obviously

must be met head on, it must be ventilated and it must be analysed.

I accept that there are precedents and obviously this Committee will have to, in the

light of those precedents, whether it can deviate from those precedents or feel itself

bound by those precedents. I certainly accept what you say Mr Chairman, that

amnesty has been granted in - probably if you have to compare those incidents

with the one before you, are more shocking, are more barbaric and more savage.

However, I respect what you have said and I accept that there are precedents in that

nature. I simply refer to race because it was mentioned by the Chair itself, it was

mentioned that it seemed to be one of the motives for the attack and that is context

on which I address the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja well we can never stop examining very closely a case of that

nature.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, and I think it's part of the process that it is ventilated properly

and be talked about and not simply discarded because it is an uncomfortable

subject.

Just finally, it would appear that - I simply bring it to the Committee's attention,

that amnesty can only be granted to the applicants in terms of Section 20 (2) sub-

sections (a), (d) or (f). With submission, sub-paragraphs 2(a) and (d) don't seem to


be applicable because the targets or the object of the attack must another political

organisation or movement against the state or former state or other publicly known

organisations.

And (d) says it must be members of the security forces or the state or supporters of

such publicly known political organisations. It would appear that the application

may then be limited or restricted to sub-paragraph (f) which says:

"Any person referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)

above who on reasonable grounds believe that he or she

was acting in the course of scope of his or her duties and

within the scope of his or her express or implied

authority".

Thank you Mr Chairman, those are my submissions. I don't have any other

submissions in this regard, thank you.


MR ARENDSE: Mr Chairman, yes just on the racial aspect. I want to advance

three reasons why it should not be held, certainly not against the applicants, that

they - or found rather that they had committed a purely racist act.

Firstly, the applicants, on the uncontested evidence were foot soldiers carrying out

orders, that is not disputed. They were not part of the APLA hierarchy or high

command which it is well established made the policy decisions and decided on

matters of strategy. For the same reason that Brian Mitchell or Coetzee or any

other ex-South African defence force soldier wasn't part of the inner ...[indistinct]

of Botha's cabinet making decisions to pursue cross-border raids etc.

Secondly, the struggle for liberation in this country inevitably had to have a racial

dimension and the reason for that is quite simple and very glaring and we don't

need evidence for that because the applicants lived through it.

Black people in this country lived through it who were born here. They were

governed by whites, they were controlled by white, they were suppressed by

whites and the overwhelming majority of the white electorate voted in the same

government repeatedly by in fact increased majorities as we moved towards the

April 1994 election.

So that was an inevitable part of the history of this country. Now it's very

important that our parliament a democratic elected parliament recognised this by

making the cut-off date the 10th of May 1997. It recognised, the law makers

recognised that we were engaged in a racial struggle up to that point. And the 14th

of February falls within that cutt-off date.


Then just thirdly, again on a parity of - because this is what this Committee must

do, this is what the Commission as a whole must do is to be even-handed and to

treat people in the same fashion. The apartheid government targeted

overwhelmingly black people. Coetzee was told to get rid of Griffiths Xenge and

he did so very effectively.

Griffiths Xenge was a well-known human rights activist but he was a black

civilian. Brian Mitchell committed the trust feeds matter where he killed innocent

black young men, woman and children, he slaughtered them. Those were civilians

and both of them got amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: No, Brian Mitchell was a mistake.

MR ARENDSE: He was a mistake but in fact he ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't know that he was killing innocent civilians.

MR ARENDSE: For the same reason ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: His plan was not to kill innocent civilians, his plan was to kill

political activists.

MR ARENDSE: A plan that went wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: A wrong house was attacked.

MR ARENDSE: It went horribly wrong, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And Xenge, his killing was justified on the basis that - you see

the argument was that he was not really a civilian in the true sense of the word

because the allegation was that he was a functionary of the ANC in some way. He

was channelling funds into the country for the benefit of the ANC, something like

that and therefore he was a political activist of some kind.

MR ARENDSE: For the same reason then Mr Chairman, with respect, white

people wherever they were at the time, certainly in terms of the APLA policy were

regarded as enemies.

They were supporting the - they put the government in place and they supported

that government. They were also therefore seen by a logical extension as

functionaries supporting the state. Without them voting the government in who

knows what would have happened.

But in any case, the point that I'm making, those considerations, do you just kill

white people and so on, those considerations didn't feature for the applicants


because they were not part of the decision making process they were soldiers and

they carried out their orders.

Mr Chairman, then just on a few other matters. I think I made the point that yes,

there were negotiations on at the time. If one must take this factor seriously, and

with respect I say we can't, then the legislature would have made cutt-off point the

time when we had the negotiations at CODESSA. Then it would have been and I

think maybe it was, I think earlier December 1993 but the Act was amended and it

was extended to May 1994. And that period covers the applicants more than

adequately.

And in fact my learned friend made the point that even the PAC had by a majority

decision decided to continue with the armed struggle, so it wasn't to be complete

yet.

The issue of proportionality like all the other factors that are mentioned in sub-

paragraph 23(a) to (f) is not on it's own decisive. And clearly if we look at each

case in isolation then I think this Committee would have difficulty in giving

amnesty to anybody.

I mean how on earth could Coetzee's murder of Xenge or Mitchell's mistake where

he kills 11 people, how could that possibly be proportionate to the end which is

being sought i.e. to get rid, in Mitchell's case, to get rid of ANC, UDF activists.

And in Coetzee's case, to get rid of one functionary, a person who is alleged to

have been a ...[indistinct] for the ANC.

It clearly must be seen in it's overall context, in the context of the struggle in this

country.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Arendse, if I can just chip in for a moment here.

Consistent with your line of argument I thought in the Brian Mitchell matter you

were referring to, you were saying even if he ended up hitting a target which he

never intended, at the end of the day he would have hit black activists anyway. Isn't

that what you are saying?

MR ARENDSE: Yes, I mean the end result was not the same because he didn't hit

the intended target but I was just trying to draw some parallels with this case. I

didn't understand Advocate Prior's submission with regard to similar submissions

made in the St James that not every act is a political act and not every - evoking a

slogan doesn't mean that that's a political objective. I think the evidence is very

clear in this case.

With respect, it is very clear that these applicants, they are not what one can call

ordinary criminals. You've heard from them Mr Chairman and learned members of

the Committee, how they articulated their position, where they found themselves

in, where they come from, their background and why they joined the liberation


movement. They clearly don't deserve to be locked up for committing what was

purely a political act clearly on their evidence.

The Norgaard Principles which is referred to by my learned friend, the attacks on

purely civilian targets are attacks of a purely political nature which justifies

amnesty. I'm sure that our law makers had regard to the Norgaard Principles but we

have a process in this country which is unique and the Act is designed to cater for

that uniqueness.

The law ...[indistinct] has recognised that lots and lots, hundreds and thousands of

innocent people overwhelmingly black were caught up in the crossfire but to put

the past behind us it was necessary to have an amnesty process. Civilians would be

killed and they were killed and they were killed in this case.

Mr Chairman and learned members of the Committee, unless there's any aspect

you wish to raise with me, those are our submissions, thank you very much.

Mr Chairman, can I just raise one aspect which I raised at the previous hearing and

that is your decision. It concerns me and my clients who are not only the applicants

but the PAC and those in the APLA High Command, that such a long time elapses

and has already elapsed before the Committee makes a decision. It concerns us that

it would appear that the Committee, not this Committee but the big Amnesty

Committee, is waiting to hear all the evidence in all these matters.

With respect, I think that's irregular. Like my learned friend says, each case

depends on it's own facts and I can't see how if this is the intention that an

applicant may have a credibility finding against him or her in some other or

subsequent proceeding, that it would then influence the result in for example, this

particular matter.

I would accordingly urge this Committee to make a decision as soon as possible in

this matter. The applicants have been in jail now for almost five years. Mr Molefu

for example, who wasn't directly involved in the incident and was an accomplice is

also sitting in jail for a long time.

CHAIRPERSON: We have noted that point.


CHAIRPERSON: But it must be pointed out though that it's also a question of

practicalities. If you got only 12 members of the Amnesty Committee and an

applicant has got 50 incidents in respect of which he could apply for amnesty, a

difficulty may arise. And this has been as a result of the attitude adopted by some

of the applicants and I don't blame them for that, perhaps they are right in doing so.


They brought an application in respect of one incident and a particular combination

of the Amnesty Committee heard that particular application and took a decision

which was not favourable to the applicant. And the next thing that same applicant

comes again with another incident, in the meantime a decision had been given in

respect of the first incident.

He appears again before the same Amnesty Committee or slightly constituted,

differently constituted Committee, he comes with the next application and he says:

"No, no amongst you there's somebody who sometimes turned down may

application, I don't want you in this combination, let him go out. And then that

person or those two people get out of the Amnesty Committee because previously

they turned him down. And he's not through yet with his applications.

Next time we hear his third application, his fourth and his fifth, surely he's going to

exhaust members of the Amnesty Committee. Who is going to hear the balance of

these matters in the end, after everyone of us have been asked to excuse themselves

because they would have heard his applications one after the other.

Now it's an over-simplification of the problem. The solution may well be that when

a person brings applications in instalments, we should reserve judgement until we

have heard all his applications to avoid that kind of scenario. Particularly if it is

obvious that he has got a lot more applications to bring because the problem that

I've explained to you may arise and force us to withhold the Judgement. I'm not

necessarily saying that that is going to be the case but I'm just pointing out what in

fact has already happened.

You'll find that somebody with many applications has exhausted all the members

of the Amnesty Committee, all of them had to recuse themselves, what do we do?

MR ARENDSE: Mr Chairman, just to comment on that. I understand and I

appreciate the Committee's difficulty I'd also appreciate it if this - I think it's for the

first time that this kind of explanation which sounds to me like a rational

explanation is given in public. I would appreciate it if the organisations involved

and the applicants could be told perhaps in writing that this is the reason why there

is such a delay. Because I think there are some of them, and I think Mr Molefu for

example, is one such person and Tanda, well Mr Molefu certainly, they've only got

this one application before you. Do they also have to wait? Those kinds of things -

or perhaps have a meeting to explain the situation but we know for example

Coetzee I think, he had the one Xenge and he's - I'm not trying to exaggerate but

like tens, hundreds of other applications.

CHAIRPERSON: And maybe he's going to ask all of us to recuse ourselves you

know. But we have noted your point but I just wanted you to understand also that

there are many other factors involved, it's not such a simple matter but we've noted

your point. We will then reserve our judgment, thanks.


ADV PRIOR: Please rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

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