TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March, 2007 Sensor Networks: Technology Transfer Stephen Wicker –...

TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March, 2007

Sensor Networks:Technology Transfer

Stephen Wicker – Cornell University

TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007

TRUST SN Technologies

Self-Configuring, Wireless Systems Camera Network Technologies

– Mote Design– Localization– Privacy Policy

Real-Time Data Transfer Tools Security Models and Design Tools Medical Networking Transport Tools


Control Applications


Wireless Networked Embedded Systems: Next Generation SCADA/DCS Systems

DCS: Digital Control Systems– The overall collection

of control systems that measure and change the infrastructure state to facilitate delivery of the commodity (electricity, water, gas, & oil)

Opportunity for a new generation of secure critical physical SCADA and DCS depend on the gathering, monitoring, and control of information from distributed sensing devices.

Powerful platform for privacy policy development.


Water Supply Protection


A Typical Industrial Facility: 40+ years old, $10B infrastructure

~2 Square Miles

1400 Employees

Operating Budget:

$200M+/year

Primary products:

Chlorine, Silica, Caustics

Highly profitable facility

DHS, OSHA, EPA compliance


The Plant: A Complex EnvironmentThe Plant: A Complex Environment

sec

msec

1 sec

secs

min

hours

Plant Servers

OtherComputingDevices

Business Management

Area ServersPlantNetworkModules

NetworkGateway

NetworkGateway

Process Management

Subnetwork Gateway

ApplicationModule

HistoryModule

Personal ComputerNetwork Manager

Control Stations

ArchiveReplay Module

AdditionalCN Modules

Fiber Optics

NetworkInterfaceModule

Other DataHiway Boxes

MultifunctionControllerExtendedController

BasicController

AdvancedMultifunctionController

LocalProcessors

Subnetwork

CONTROL NETWORK

SmartineTransmitters

PLCGateway

OtherSubsystems

PLC

Logic ManagerProcessManager

AdvancedProcessManager

Transmitters

Control Network Extenders

Field Management


Comments from Marty Geering, BP Wireless Engineer, Cherry Hill, New Jersey


Camera Mote Daughter Board

Source: ITRI


Sharing of sensor readings in real time

EVENTS

Mobile display of locally obtained and globally shared sensor readings:

Local Sensorsare Queried:

EVENTS

SHARED

SH

AR

ED

Sensor readings are shared opportunistically:

SENSTRAC MobOS


Security: Threat Model

Mote-class Attacker– Controls a few ordinary sensor nodes– The attacker has the same capabilities as the network

Laptop-class Attacker– Greater battery & processing power, memory, high-power radio

transmitter, low-latency communication– The attacker can cause more serious damage

Outsider Attacks– Passive eavesdropping: listening to the ongoing

communication– Denial of service attacks: any type of attack that can cause a

degradation in the performance of the network– Replay attacks: the adversary captures some of the

messages, and plays them back at a later time which cause the network to operate on stale information

Insider Attacks: compromised node– Node runs malicious code– The node has access to the secret keys and can participate

in the authenticated communication.


Basic Security Requirements

Confidentiality Authentication Integrity Freshness Secure Group Management Availability Graceful degradation Design time security


Taxonomy of Security Attacks in Sensor NetworksTanya Roosta, Alvaro Cardenas, Shiuhpyng Shieh, Shankar Sastry, UC Berkeley


Embedded System Design (with security extensions)

“ESSC” 17

Embedded System Security Design Modeling and Analysis- Toolchain

SMoLES_SEC Partitions and Dataflows

SMoLES_SEC Deployment DiagramSMoLES_SEC

Adversary Model

Model Model TransformationTransformation

Security/Architecture ModelsSecurity/Architecture Models

Integrity Requirement Violated -- /SimpleSystem/PartitionB/Assembly_B1 has an integrity requirement which is violated by the information flow connecting /SimpleSystem/PartitionB/Port_B2 to /SimpleSystem/PartitionC/Port_C1.

Analysis

“ESSC” 18TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007

MedSN Progress

Examining various models for users involved and their method of access/integration in system

– Physician and support staff– Patient– Patient family– Non-family– Insurance/Payer

Collaborative effort with Vanderbilt, Berkeley

Agreement for testing at Nashville assisted living facility

Joint Publications

“ESSC” 19TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March 2007

Testbed Progress

Testbed Deployment at Cornell (supports medical effort with Vanderbilt and privacy effort with Berkeley)– Implementation of TinySec for MicaZ– Implementation of MAC layer power saving for

MicaZ– Implementation of power aware routing in network– Implementation of HP Jornada based sound

actuation overlay network– Deployment of PIR overlay network using Crossbow

security motes Joint Publications

TRUST NSF Site Visit, Berkeley, March, 2007 Sensor Networks: Technology Transfer Stephen Wicker –...

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