Trust and Transparency Issues in the Future of Law Enforcement · law enforcement: Volume 8 of the...
Transcript of Trust and Transparency Issues in the Future of Law Enforcement · law enforcement: Volume 8 of the...
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Editedby:
J.AmberSchererandJosephA.Schafer
Trustand
TransparencyIssuesinthe
FutureofLawEnforcement
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TRUSTANDTRANSPARENCYISSUES
INTHEFUTUREOFLAWENFORCEMENT
VOLUME8oftheProceedingsofthe
FuturesWorkingGroup
EditedbyJ.AmberSchererandJosephA.Schafer
SuggestedCitation:
Scherer,J.A.,&Schafer,J.A.(Eds.).(2018).Trustandtransparencyissuesinthefutureoflawenforcement:Volume8oftheproceedingsoftheFuturesWorkingGroup.SocietyofPoliceFuturistsInternational.
ReleaseDate:June2018
The opinions and statements expressed throughout this volume are those of the individual authors and contributors and should not be considered and endorsement or a reflection of the official position of the Society of Police Futurists International, the Futures Working Group, or any other institution, or organization for any policy, program, or service.
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TrustandTransparencyIssuesinthe
FutureofLawEnforcement
TableofContents
AWordfromthePresident……..…..…………………………………………….……………………...5
UnderstandingTrustandTransparencyinContemporaryPolicing
JosephA.Schafer&JohnP.Jarvis………………………………………….…………………..6
Transparency,Truth,andPerception:AComplexRelationship
GeneStephens…………………………………………………………………………………………13
TheRoleofLeadershipinFosteringTruthandTransparency
RichardW.Myers………………………………………………………………..……………………17
Private/PublicPartnershipsforFosteringTrustwithintheCommunity
AlYoungs…………………………………………………………………………………….……………25
TheFridayCrabClub,Redux
JosephA.Schafer……………………………………………………………………………………..38
FosteringExternalTrustandTransparencythroughtheUseofPoliceAgencyWebsites
MicheleW.Covington&NicholasE.Libby……………………………………………….48
SocialMedia:UsePolicyandGuidelines
TobyM.Finnie…….……………………………….……………………………………………..……56
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TheExecutionofFourPoliceOfficers:LessonsfromaSocialMediaTempest
TobyM.Finnie&EarlMoulton…………………………………………………………………65
TheRighttoAccuracy:ANewFrontier
MichaelE.Buerger……………………………………..……………………………………………84
Bond-RelationshipDisruption:InDefenseofStrategicandTacticalDeception
SidHeal&MichaelE.Buerger………………………………………………………..…………91
Intelligence,Management,andtheManagementofIntelligence
BernardH.Levin…………………………………………………………..…………………………101
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AWORDFROMTHEPRESIDENT
ThismonographrepresentsanotherofferinginacontinuingseriesofworksauthoredbymembersandaffiliatesofPFI'sFuturesWorkingGroup(FWG).ThefoundationforthismonographwaslaidwhentheFWGwasco-sponsoredbyPFIandtheFederalBureauofInvestigation.TheFBI’ssupportofFWGspanned2002
-2016andthatsupportallowedFWGtodovaluablework.Althoughthismonographisnotbeingco-publishedbytheFBI,PFIgratefullyacknowledgestheFBI’ssupportinthisandmanyotherworkproductswrittenduringmorethanadecadeofstrongcollaboration.
Thecontributionscontainedinthismonographareintendedtosparkideasandincitecreativityinrespondingtothefuturechallengesandopportunitiesthatpolicingandthecriminaljusticecommunitymustconfront.Aswithmostmonographs,thisisaworkingdocument.Itisnotintendedtobethefinalwordordefinitiveperspectiveconcerningthetopicsdiscussed.Rather,thesecontributionsaredesignedtofosterfurtherdiscussionandconsiderationofpossible,probable,andpreferablefuturedirectionsforpolicing.Inthisvein,thecurrentpapersofferaperspectiveonthecriticalissueofhowtrustandtransparencyrelatetothefutureofpolicing.Wehopeyoufindthis,aswellaspastandsubsequentFWGwhitepapers,tobeuseful.
Dr.G.M.Cox
TarletonStateUniversity
2017-2018PresidentofPFI
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UnderstandingTrustandTransparencyinContemporaryPolicing
JosephA.Schafer&JohnP.Jarvis
Thisvolumeofworkingpapersconsiderstheroleoftrustandtransparencyin
contemporaryandfuturepoliceorganizationsandoperations.Trustandtransparencyareof
importanceacrossorganizationalcontexts,particularlywithingovernmentservices.Research
suggeststhatpeoplewhoperceivedecisionmakingtobejustandbasedonappropriate
proceduresaremorelikelytoseethedecisionmakerandtheirdecisionsaslegitimate(see
Sunshine&Tyler,2003;Tyler&Huo,2002;Tyler,2010).Whenpeopletrustdecisionmakers,
seethemashavinglegitimatepower,andbelievetheyuseappropriatepathwaystoselecting
specificchoices,theyaremorelikelytoobeyandcooperate.Thishasclearimportanceand
implicationsforthecriminaljusticesystem,whereobedienceandcooperationarecentralto
ensuringefficaciousandexpedientprocessingandoutcomes.Theseissuesareofcentral
importanceingovernmentservices,especiallywithinpolicing.Indeed,muchofthecontroversy
surroundingUSpolicinginrecentyearsisarguablyrootedindistrustandperceivedlackof
transparencyinpoliceprocesses,high-profilepolice-citizenencounters,andthebroader
oversightofpoliceorganizationsandoperations.TherecommendationsofthePresident’sTask
Forceon21stCenturyPolicing(2015)repeatedlytouchontheneedtomakepolicingmore
transparentandtobuildgreatertrustbetweenthepoliceandthecommunitiestheyserve.
Officersanddepartmentsfrequentlymakechoicesthatarenotpopularwithcitizens.
Thosebeingarrestedarerarelypleasedwiththatoutcome.Dr.Tyler’sworksuggeststhat,in
theaggregate,therewillbemoresupportfor,andcompliancewith,policedecisionsofalltypes
whencitizensperceivethepolicearejustandfair.1Trustandtransparencyarepresumably
centralpathwaystofosteringthebeliefthatofficersanddepartmentsareoperatingina
mannerthatisfair,just,andlegitimate.2Whencitizenstrustthepoliceandseethatoperations
1 Certainly this will not always be the case. Any group or individual can only do so much to ensure compliance and obedience, particularly when decisions are controversial, unpopular, or impactful. 2 This does not suggest that other pathways do not exist. Trust and transparency are important, but not the exclusive mechanisms for engendering public support and compliance.
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arehandledinanappropriatelyvisiblemanner,itwillbeeasiertoperceivethepoliceandtheir
authorityasbeinglegitimate.Whencommunitiestrustthereisappropriateoversightoftheir
police,trustthatofficersareheldsufficientlyaccountablefortheirdecisions,andperceivethat
organizationsoperatewithanappropriateleveloftransparency,thosecommunitiesshould,in
theory,bemoretrustingofthepolicewhencriticalandcontroversialeventsoccur.Thisshould
translateintogreatersupport,cooperation,anddeferencetopoliceauthorityandpower.
Inthecontextofthisvolume,trustrelatestotheabilityofthoseinsideandoutsidethe
organizationtohaveadegreeoffaithandconfidenceintheabilitiesanddecisionsofthosein
control.Trustsuggeststhatdecisionmakerscanengenderasensetheyarereliable,
dependable,andworthy.Trustmightoftensuggestadegreeofpredictability.Inpolicing
contexts,citizenswhobelievetheirpolicedepartmentisdiligent,hardworking,andprofessional
wouldbeexpectedtoshowgreatersupportforthatagencyanditsdecisions.Trustalsohasan
internaldimension;policeofficersmay(ormaynot)haveadegreeoftrustinthemotivation,
competence,andabilitiesoftheirsupervisors.
Inthecontextofthisvolume,transparencycapturesthedegreetowhichdecisionsare
beingmadeinavisiblefashion.Towhatextentareoperationssubjecttoreviewandscrutinyby
outsiders?Towhatextentarethechoicesofdecisionmakersreadilyevident?Asbureaucratic
entities,policeorganizationsandofficersmakeawiderangeofdecisionsonadailybasis.
Traditionallytheforcesandfactorsinfluencingthosedecisionshaveexistedinaratheropaque
environment.Ithasbeeneasytoseetheinputs(crimesreportedtothepolice;fiscalallocations
tothepolicedepartment)andtheoutputs(crimesreportedbythepolice;thebudgetuseto
“spenddown”thedefinedbudget),yetunderstandingwhathappenedinbetween(the‘why’
questions…whyweresomereportedcrimes‘counted’whileotherswerenot?...whydidthe
agencydecidetofundadrugsuppressionunitandnotadrugeducationprogram?)hasbeenfar
moreelusive.Transparencyspeakstoeffortsintendedtoshedmorelighton‘why’questionsby
helpingprovideanunderstandingofhowagenciesandofficersmakedecisions,ratherthan
merelyrelyingonspeculationandinference.
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Trustandtransparencyarerelatedconceptsthatbothseemlikelytoconditionand
shapethelevelofconfidencein,andsupportfor,thepolice.Thesetwoconceptsarenot,
however,identical.Anorganizationcanenjoyahighdegreeoftrustwithoutbeingparticularly
transparent;theconversemightalsobetrue.Likewise,weneedtoconsiderthetrustand
transparencyasforcesexistingbothwithin(internal)andoutside(external)police
organizations.Theformerreferstothenatureofrelationsbetweenanagency’sleadershipand
itsfront-linepersonnel.Internallyanagencymightbequiteopeninhowitoperates,makes
decisions,allocatesresources,etc.,whilethoseoutsidetheorganizationmayhavelittle
understandingorsenseoftransparency.
Likewise,anagency’sexecutivesmightbehaveinsuchawaythatinternaltrustisquite
high;insodoing,externaltrustmightbedamaged.Forexample,formerLAPDChiefDarylGates
hadawell-establishedreputationasa‘copscop’thatpresumablygeneratedahighdegreeof
internaltrust.Gateswasastaunchdefenderofofficersandtheiractionsduringcontroversial
situations.ItwouldbeexpectedofficersgreatlytrustedChiefGatesastheirleaderbecause
theyknewhe‘hadtheirback’iftheywerebeingsubjectedtopublicscrutinyoverhowthey
werepolicingthecommunity.Atthesametime,wemightexpectthatcitizensoftenfelt
disenfranchisedfromLAPDanditspersonnel,questioningwhetherChiefGatesandother
officialswerewillingtoholdofficerstohighstandardsofperformanceandaccountability(see
Reese,2005).
Whyshouldorganizationsvalueandpursuetrustandtransparency?Mostimportantly,
policeorganizationsarerepresentativesofthestateandaregrantedtremendouspowerand
authority.Withthatcomestremendousresponsibilitytothepublicandexternalsovereigns
(i.e.,thecity,county,state,orfederalofficialsoverseeinganagency).Ifpoliceorganizationsare
goingtobeeffectiveincontrollingcrime,theymusthavetheconfidence,support,and
cooperationofthepublictheyserve.Whencitizensperceivegovernmentagenciesandagents
areactinginafairandjustmanner,theyaremoresupportive,compliant,andobedient(Tyler,
2010).Byextension,wewouldexpectthisbehaviorresultsnotonlyinmoreorderly
communities,but,byextension,incitizenswhoaremorewillingtocooperatewiththepolicein
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theinvestigationofspecificcrimesandinbroadereffortstoimprovethequalityoflivingina
jurisdiction.Twomechanismsthatshouldfacilitatetheseprocessesaretrustandtransparency.
Conversely,ifagenciesdonotvaluebeingtrustedbythepublicandbeingtransparentin
theiroperations,theywillnotenjoythesameabilitytoinfluencecrimeandcommunity
conditions.Thedistinctionbetweenagenciesthatdonotanddoseevalueintrust,
transparency,justice,andlegitimacyistheformerseepolicingassomethingdonetothepublic,
whilethelatterseesitassomethingdonewiththepublic.Thisdoesnotsuggestthatagencies
operatingwithanemphasisontrustandtransparencywillexperienceapanaceainwhich
citizensalwayssupportthepoliceandcooperatewithofficers.Rather,itsuggeststhatany
benefitsperceivedtobeassociatedwithde-emphasizingtransparentpoliceoperationsor
emphasizingcontrolovertrustareshort-termgains.Intheaggregate,emphasizingtrustand
transparency(whichwillnotalwaysbeeasy)isbothphilosophically‘right’andwilldothemost
toadvancetheinterestsoftheagencyandcommunity.Furthermore,emergenttechnologies
areincreasinglyforcingtransparencyonagenciesandpolicepersonnel;ratherthanfighting
thatreality,agencieswouldbebetterservedtoseektomaximizethepotentialofthattrend.
Mattersoftrustandtransparencyarenotlimitedtohowpoliceagenciesandpersonnel
intersectwiththeirexternalenvironment.Trustandtransparencyarekeyconsiderationswhen
seekingtounderstandthenatureofpoliceorganizations,operations,andleadership.Parallels
havebeendrawnbetweenTyler’sworksonhowthepoliceinterfacewiththeirexternal
environmentbyexaminingtheleveloftrust,transparency,andperceivedjusticewithinpolice
organizations,aswell(Nix&Wolfe,2016;Rosenbaum&McCarty,2017).Partoftheembedded
logicdrivingthisresearchisthatofficersshouldnotbeexpectedtodemonstrateprocedurally
justandtrustworthypolicingtowardthepubliciftheydonotenjoyorganizationallyjustand
trustworthytreatmentbytheiremployingorganization.Ifpoliceexecutivesexpecttheirofficers
topolicewithaneyeforcitizenperceptions,trust,legitimacy,andfairness,thoseexecutives
mustfirsttreatemployeeswithaneyeforthosesameprinciples(Carr&Maxwell,2017;White
&Kyle,2017).Officerswanttoseeaworkforcewheredecisionsarefair,equitable,and
compliantwithgoverningpolicies,procedures,andlaws.Officerswantaworkplacethatdoes
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notissuearbitraryandinconsistentdiscipline,wherepromotionsarebasedonmeritandnot
favoritism,andwhereaccountabilitysystemsareviewedastreatingofficersfairlyandjustly.
Withina2x2matrix(seebelow)contrastingtheinternalandexternaldimensionsof
trustandtransparency,anagencymightbeassessedashigh,low,neutral,ornegativewithin
eachofthe4cells.Assessmentswouldbeexpectedtovarybothacrossagenciesandalso
acrosstime.Forexample,theexternaltrustinLAPDwouldpresumablybedifferenttodaythan
itwasintheearly1990sneartheendofChiefGates’tenure.TheformerKGBwouldlikelyhave
beenratedasbeingnegativeinall4cells.Presumablyfront-linepersonnelwerenearlyas
fearfuloftheagencyaswerecitizens,knowingthatmethodsweredubious,evidencestandards
non-existent,andthatcontrol,notjustice,wastheultimateobjective.
Internal External
Trust
Transparency
Onehundredyearsago,theBerkeleyPDunderAugustVollmer(seetheessaybySchafer
inthisvoume)wasveryhighoninternaltrustandtransparency,atleastaccordingtothelore
andlimitedhistoricalevidence.BasedonthelatteritislessclearifthemodelVollmerused
generatedexternaltrustandtransparency,thoughthatoutcomewouldseemprobable.It
wouldgenerallybeexpectedthatagenciesthathavehealthyinternaloperationswould
probablyfairwellonexternaltrustandtransparency.Whilethatisnotanautomaticoutcome,
officerscannotbeexpectedtooperateinsupportofahighdegreeofexternaltrustand
transparency(ifthatoutcomeisvalued)withoutseeingthatbehaviormodeledinternally.If
leadersdonottreatpersonnelinawaythatdemonstrateshowtoengenderinternaltrustand
ensureinternaltransparency,itwouldbeunlikelytoroutinelyseefront-linepersonnel
operatinginawaythatwouldfacilitatehighlevelsofexternaltrustandtransparency.
Itcanbeverydifficultforexecutives/agenciestosimultaneouslyandcontinuouslyexcel
inallfourcellsofthe2x2matrix.Sometimesbeinghighinoneareawillreduceandagency’s
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standinginanotherarea,atleasttemporarily.Ifanagencyisexternallytransparentinadmitting
toascandaloroperationalproblems,itmighttemporarilyworkagainstthepublic’strustinthat
agency.Overtime,however,thehonestyandexternaltransparencyofthisapproachwouldbe
expectedtoresultinmorepublicsupportandtrust.Furthermore,attemptingtoconceal
internalissues(lowexternaltransparency)oftencompoundsthedepthofascandalandits
fallout.Whatexecutivesneedtohopeisthatovertimeandintheaggregatetheycanfindways
toexcelinall4cellsofthetable,realizingthatinsomecontextsavictoryinoneareawillbea
defeatinanother.Perfectionwillnotbepossible,buttryingtohide/suppresssimplyyieldsfalse
victory.Andinanincreasinglytransparentworld,itisbecomingincreasinglydifficultto
hide/suppress,makingvoluntarytransparencyallthemoreimportantinordertoreduce
damagetotrust(recognizinglegalmatterscomplicatecompleteandtimelytransparencywhen
situationsarestillbeinginvestigated).
Thefocusofthepresentvolumeisofferingamixtureofperspectivesonhowtrustand
transparencycanbeunderstoodinthecurrentandfutureworldofpolicing.Theauthorsoffera
varietyofviewsonhowpolicingpracticesmightintersectwithtechnologyandcontemporary
socialnormstocreatenewexpectationsofficersandleadersmustunderstandandaddress.The
essaysdonotseektoprovideadefinitiveandfinalwordonmattersoftrustandtransparency.
Rather,theyseektoofferthoughtfulandthoughtprovokingcommentariesandinsightstohelp
guidepolicingtoafuturewheretrustandtransparencyareviewedastoolstoenhancepolice
operationsandpublicservice,notliabilitiesorrisksinneedofmanagementormitigation.
References
Carr,J.D.,&Maxwell,S.R.(2017).Policeofficers’perceptionsoforganizationaljusticeandtheir
trustinthepublic.PolicePractice&Research,DOI:10.1080/15614263.2017.1387784.
Kyle,M.J.,&White,D.R.(2017).Theimpactoflawenforcementofficerperceptionsof
organizationaljusticeontheirattitudesregardingbody-worncameras.JournalofCrime
andJustice,40(1),68-83.
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Nix,J.,&Wolfe,S.E.(2016).SensitivitytotheFergusonEffect:Theroleofmanagerial
organizationaljustice.JournalofCriminalJustice,47,12-20.
President’sCommissionon21stCenturyPolicing.(2015).FinalreportofthePresident’sTask
Forceon21stCenturyPolicing.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicing
Services.
Reese,R.(2005).LeadershipintheLAPD:Walkingthetightrope.Durham,NC:Carolina
AcademicPress.
Rosenbaum,D.P.,&McCarty,W.P.(2017).Organizationaljusticeandofficer‘buyin’in
Americanpolicing.Policing:AnInternationalJournalofPoliceStrategies&
Management,40,71-85.
Sunshine,J.,&Tyler,T.(2003).Theroleofproceduraljusticeandlegitimacyinshapingpublic
supportforpolicing.LawandSocietyReview,37(3),513-547.
Tyler,T.R.(2010).Whypeoplecooperate:Theroleofsocialmotivations.Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
Tyler,T.R.,&Huo,Y.J.(2002).Trustinthelaw:Encouragingpubliccooperationwiththepolice
andcourts.NewYork:Russell-SageFoundation.
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Transparency,Truth,andPerception:AComplexRelationship
GeneStephens
Transparencyhasbecomebothabuzzwordandsometimesarealityin21stcentury
government,includingthepublicsafetyarena.A2012presidentialmemorandumfromthe
WhiteHousePressOfficedeclaredtransparencythepolicyoftheUnitedStatesgovernment,
definingitas“todiscloseinformationrapidlyinformsthatthepubliccanreadilyfindanduse,”
andholdingsuchapolicy“promotesaccountabilityandprovidesinformationforcitizensabout
whattheirgovernmentisdoing.”Otherscallforabroadeningoftransparencyfrom“showus
whatyouhavedone”to“letmeparticipateinwhatyou’redoingwhileyou’redoingit”
(www.granicus.com/transparency).Thelatterdefinitioncorrespondstotheapproaches
advocatedinneighborhood-drivenpolicing,reformulatedcommunitypolicing,andeven
networkcentricpolicing.
Whileeveryonestandsfirmlyinfavorof‘truth’inalldealingsinatransparent
environment,thesearchfortruthismuchmorecomplexthanitmightfirstappear.Anyone
whohasbeenatthesceneofadomesticdisputeorstreetbrawlisawarethatthoseatthe
scenereadilyexpoundnumerousversionsof‘thetruth’.Evenaftercollectingallversionsand
physicalevidence,truthoftenremainselusive.Beyondthis,evidence(fromeyewitness
testimonytoforensic)oftenresultsinconflictinginterpretations;thewheelinganddealing
withinthecourtprocessoftenignoresorobscures‘truth’evenfurther.
Arelativelynewdiscipline,PopularCulture(Bailey&Hale,1998)views‘perceptions’as
moreimportantthantruthinthesearchfor‘reality’withinanyculture.Itgoessofarastoposit
thatperceptionsarethemajorfactorindetermining‘truth’andevenshapewhatisacceptedas
truth.Forexample,themyriadCSItelevisionprogramsprovideaperceptionthatforensic
evidenceisalwaysavailable,canbecollectedandanalyzedquickly,andisnecessarytoprovide
swiftandfairjustice.Whereastherealityisthatsuchevidenceissometimesavailableandcan
becollectedbytrained,competentinvestigators,oftensuchevidencehasbeendestroyed
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beforeauthoritiesarrived.Eveniffound,fewcrimelaboratoriescanprovidetestingand
analysisinhoursordays—usuallyitisweeksormonths—andisdoneatafacilitymanymiles
fromthecrimescene.Buttheperceptionhasledtotherealitythatnumerouscasesarelost
becauseforensicevidenceisnotforthcomingandjurors(manyofwhomareCSIfans)expected
itandaresuspiciousaboutwhyitismissing.Thustheperceptionismoreimportantthanthe
truthincreatingreality.
Transparencyrequires“openness,accountability,andhonesty.”Transparencyistobe
judgedbythe“depthofaccess”allowedandthe“depthofknowledge”providedtothepublic
(sunshinereview.org).Agenciesthatscorebestwouldnotonlyallowaccess,butwouldprovide
“proactivedisclosure”ratherthanwaitingforindividualrequestsforpublicrecords.Thus
providingtransparencyandtruthsupportedbypublicperceptionisfarfromsimple;the
complexrelationshipamongtheseandotherfactorsmustbestudiedanddecipheredifany
successistobeexpected.Itmaybethattheprocessismoreimportantthantheresultsand
thatprocessmustfollowfromcarefulanalysisandattentiontopolicydirectionthathasthe
bestchanceofleadingtothedesiredoutcomes.
Transparencyisdifficultinanypublicinstitution,buthasspecialproblemsinpublic
safetyagencies.Howmuchinformationcanorshouldbemadeavailableincaseswhere
suspectsareseeingandhearinginrealtimethesamebroadcasts/webcasts/blogsaseveryone
else?Whenmustinformationbewithheldtoprotecttheidentityandwellbeingofundercover
officersorinformants?Howmuchofdelicatenegotiationswithkidnappersorterroristscanbe
divulgedwithoutputtinglivesatrisk?Canvictims’namesbewithhelduntilnextofkinare
notified;isitevenpossibletowithholdsuchinformationinlightoftheomnipresentmedia?Isa
witnessprotectionprogramevenpossibleunderthisdefinitionordoesopennessrequirefull
disclosureofthewitness’whereaboutsandcircumstances?Howmuchcanbereleasedabout
interagencyhagglingforbudgetdollarswithoutsabotaginganychancethepublicsafety
missioncanbeaccomplished?Forthatmatter,cantherebeanyplaceleftforbehind-closed-
doorsmeetingswhereauthoritiescancandidlydiscussissuesratherthanpoliticallyposturefor
mediaand/orattendingcitizens?
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Evenwhentransparencyistheintentofagencies,truthdoesnotnecessarilyresultfrom
openness.Seeminglysimpletruths—whodidwhattowhomandwhy—areassociatedwith
doubtsanddisputesinmostcases.Keepingthepublicinformedassoonaspossibleinthe
interestoftransparencycanresultinwhatturnsouttobedisseminationofmisinformation,
whichcanruncountertothegoalofestablishingtrustwiththecommunity.Still,transparency
isnotachoice;itoccursinourhyper-connectedsociety—again,notnecessarilyrevealingtruth.
Truthforpurposesofthisdiscussionisbetterunderstoodasarelativeterm,ratherthan
anabsolute.Goodinvestigatorsrealizetheycollectevidence,notproof,andtheysupport
theories,notfact.Popularcultureliteraturepositsthattruthisaproductofperception.That
perceptionismoreimportantthantruthand,indeed,isthesourceoftruth.Thepreeminence
ofperceptionisbasictothepsychologicaltheoryofcognitivedissonance,whichholdsthat
whenanindividualisfacedwithdissonant(conflicting)cognitions(beliefs),discomfortis
createdandtheindividualseekstoreduceoreliminatethedissonance,usuallyintheeasiest
mannerpossible(Festinger,1957).Inmostcases,theindividualacceptingthecognitionthatis
closesttomatchinghis/herestablishedbeliefsremovestheconflict.Thischosenperception
thusbecomeshis/hertruth.Giventhesamechoice,anotherpersonmightfindtheoppositeor
adifferentcognitionmoreinharmonywithhis/herbeliefsystemandthusadoptthat
perception,whichthenbecomeshis/hertruth.Thusthesamesetof‘facts’becomesaseparate
truthfordifferentpeople.
Thisapproachissoingrainedinmostpeoplethattheychoosetheirsourcesof
informationbyhowcloselyitmatchestheirpreconceivedbeliefs,thusavoidingchallengesthat
couldresultincognitivedissonance.Thisisparticularlyevidentinthepublicsafetyarena,
whereadisagreementorconfrontationbetweenacitizen/suspectandapublicsafetyofficer
oftencanresultinvariouscitizengroupstakingsidesinthedisputebasedonpastexperience
andperceptions/beliefsabouteverythingfromcharacterofpolice,characteroftheethnic
groupofthesuspect,characteroftheagegroupofthesuspect,timeofdaytheeventoccurred,
etc.Whilestereotypingoftenisunfairandnotsupportedbythepreponderanceofavailable
evidence,itiswidelyusedbyallasanefficientwayofmanaginginformationandmaking
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decisions;cognitivedissonanceoccurswhenthosestereotypesarechallenged.Aftertheevent,
individualswillseekoutothersand/ormedia(e.g.,talkshows,websites,blogs)thatsupport
andthusreinforcetheirperceptions—theirtruths—aboutthedilemma.
Thustransparencydoesnotequaltruth,nordoestransparencyguaranteethatthe
opennessofprovidinginformationwillresultinthediscoveryoftruth.Still,theopennessand
sinceritywithwhichtheprocessisattemptedcanresultinthedevelopmentofthetrustand
dialoguethatisanessentialprerequisitetosuccessinanycommunitypolicingeffort.
Transparency,truth,andperceptionareinextricablyentwinedinacomplexrelationshipthat
publicsafetyofficialsmustdecipherinordertodevelopfairandeffectivepoliciesthatservethe
uniquecharacteristicsofeachindividualjurisdiction.
References
Bailey,F.Y.&Hale,D.C.(1998).Popularculture,crime,andjustice.Belmont,CA:
Wadsworth.
Festinger,L.(1957).Atheoryofcognitivedissonance.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress.
www.granicus.com/transparency
www.sunshinereview.org
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TheRoleofLeadershipinFosteringTruthandTransparency
RichardW.Myers
TransparencyShapesCulture
Theleader’sroleinorganizationsisoftentargetedforspeculation,bothinoverstating
andunderestimatingimportance.Havingservedasaleaderforover25yearsinmultiplepolice
agencies,thisauthorcanattestthatday-to-daydecisionmakingbecomeslessandlessofthe
routineoftheleaderasorganizationsgrowinsize.Theimpactthatonemanorwomancan
haveonagroupofemployeeshasmanyvariables,includingthenatureoftheirrole,
experience,thecultureoftheorganization,thehistoryofrelationships,andtheperceptionof
power,whethergenuineorcontrived.Withrespecttoorganizationalculture,however,thereis
nodenyingthecriticalrolethattheCEOplays.Overtime,membersofanorganizationwill
reflecttheculturaltonesetbytheleader,eitherbyembracingtheprinciplesandbehaviors
modeled,oractingouttheconflictthatarisesfrompoorleadership.Forexample,leaderswho
demonstrateactivecollaborationwithoutsideorganizationsgenerallywillseeanoverall
climateofcollaboration;leaderswhoareinsularwill,conversely,seepartitioned,protective,
andsurvivalbehaviorswithintheirmembership.Oneareainwhichtheleader’sexamplesetsa
strongorganizationalexpectationistransparencyandtruthfulness.Astrongexampleoftruth
andtransparencybyleadershiphasimplicationsbothinternalandexternaltotheorganization.
Internally,transparencyandtruthfulnessshapeanddefineelementsoforganizational
communication.Whenaleaderspeaksdirectly,honestly,andisnotafraidtorevealallsidesof
anissueofimportancetothemembership,itempowersotherstoexchangeinformationina
similarmanner.Withtime,honestandopencommunicationbecomesanexpectation,and
peersarelikelytoholdeachotherhighlyaccountableforsustainingthiscommunicationstyle.
Leaderswhoownuptothetruthandthepricetagthatcomeswithitaremuchmorecredible
thanthosewhoavoidit;thoseleaderswhoseektoconcealordenyfaceanevengreaterlossof
credibility,andwithit,thelossoflegitimacy.
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Externally,particularlyinhighvisibilityorganizationssuchaspolicedepartments,
leaderswhoareforthrightconveytotheoutsideworldthathonestyandtransparencydefine
howtheorganizationwilltreatcustomers,critics,constituents,andeventheirownemployees.
Nowhereisthismorecriticalthanintimesofcrisisandwhenanorganizationmakesamistake.
Noorganizationisimpervioustoerror;whenhigh-riskorganizationserr,however,the
expectationforaccountabilityishigh.FormerChicagoPoliceSuperintendentTerryHilliardwas
knownfortheexpression:“Ifyoumessup….fessupandcleanup.”Ultimately,aCEO’s
behaviorswilllargelyshapetheorganization’sreputationfortrustandlegitimacy.
Despitethewide-rangingconjectureoftheroleofthepoliceCEO,mostpoliceleaders
areinthebusinessofshapingorganizationalculture.TheCEOwill,fromthetimeoftheir
appointment,constantlyassessthoseculturalelementsthatarepositiveandshouldbe
strengthenedandthosethatneedchanging.Successfulculturalchangeismostlikelywhenthe
CEOengagestheemployeesintheprocessandmaintainsapacethatischallengingyet
attainableforthemembership.ACEOwhoarosefromwithintherankshasperceptionsto
overcome,relatedtopersonalhistoryandsomewhomightbelievetheirloyaltytohistory
trumpstheneedforchange.ACEOappointedfromtheoutsidehasthechallengeofquickly
assimilatingandunderstandingculturalnuancestowhichtheyhavenotbeenpreviously
exposed.Inbothcases,culturalchangeinvolves‘sacredcows’;CEOsmustbesensitivein
communicatinganyneedforchange,pacingthechangeappropriately,andsignificantly
engagingtheemployees.
InternalTransparency
Focusinginternallyintheorganization,analmostuniversalphenomenoninpolice
organizationsisavaryinglevelofinherentmistrustbetweentherankandfileemployeesand
theCEO.Anabsenceofthismistrustistheexception,despitethefactthateachandevery
policeorganizationhasitsownuniqueculture.Inanyindustry,includingpolicing,therearetwo
kindsofculture,however.ThefirstmaybestbedescribedasThePoliceCulture,containing
elementsthatseemuniversalinalmostallpoliceorganizations.Theseculturalelementsare
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perpetuatedbyboththenatureofpoliceworkandthestrongnetworkingwithintheindustry.
AnexampleofanalmostuniversaldynamicofThePoliceCultureisthesignificantimpactthata
line-of-dutydeathhasonanentireorganizationandthesurroundingregionalfraternityof
police.Thedeathofanofficeralmostalwaysbringsasenseofcloseness,theresultofthe
sharedpainandrealityofthedangersoftheprofession.ItisanecessityandexpectationofThe
PoliceCulturetoamassagreatgatheringofpolicefromfarandwide,toexpressthecollective
griefandcompassionforthesurvivingco-workersandfamilymembers.
Locally,thesecondkindofcultureisthatwhichisuniquetoeachandevery
organization,nomatterthesize.Thus,theindustry‘Culture’andthelocal‘culture’combineto
formthatwhichistrulyindividualandunique.Intheaboveline-of-dutydeathexample,the
localculturewilldictatesomeoftheuniquenuancesofthefuneral,alongwiththelingering
psychologicalimpactonthedepartmentmembers,andhowinvolvedthedepartmentwillbe
withthesurvivingfamily.Thelocalculturemayallowforananalyticaldissectionoftheincident
sothatthelostlifemaycontinuetoprovideofficersafetylessonsforthepeergroup,whilein
otherlocalcultures,itmaybecometabootocritiqueanyactionsofthedeparted.
Bothkindsofculturesworktofeedanypresentelementofmistrustbetweenlaborand
management.Manyagencieshaveanhistoric‘mushroomsyndrome’,whereintheemployees
feel‘keptinthedarkandfedcompost,’evenifthisiscontrarytothestyleofthecurrentleader.
Industry-wide,thereisacommonperceptionthattheCEOisfarremovedfromthe‘realwork’
ofthestreetofficers,andthereoftenisafactualbasisforthatsense.Aswrittenpreviouslyby
theFuturesWorkingGroup,strictlyhierarchicalorganizationsaresubjecttothefilteringthat
comesfrommultiplelayersofsupervision,distortingmessagingsothatresultsrarelyalignwith
thestated‘truth’(Jackson,Myers,&Cowper,2010).And,inmostorganizations,therumormill
operatesataspeedwithwhichformalcommunicationscannotcompete.Collectively,these
cumulativefactorsbreedadegreeofmistrust.
ConscientiousCEOswillinvestsignificantefforttoovercomethisinherentmistrustand
theirdirectmessagingtoemployeesisastrongopportunityfortransparency.Nomatterwhat
sizeorganization,CEOswhomeetdirectlywithgroupsofemployeesenjoyanunfiltered
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experiencethatcomeswithimmediatefeedback.Asanewlyappointedpolicechieffrom
outsidetheorganization,Ifounditextremelyhelpfultoscheduletimetoattendshiftchanges
ateachoftheregionalpolicestationsundermycommand.Theattendingofficersbeganto
knowmeastheleaderANDasaperson.Theinteractionsprovidedaplatformtodirectlyconvey
theleader’sintentandvision,aswellaslisteningsessionstohearemployeeconcernsdirectly.
DirectdistributionofwrittencommunicationfromtheCEOwillbefreefromfilteringaswell;
however,sometimesaCEOsmessagedoesnotconnectwelldirectlywithlinelevelemployees
withoutsomedegreeofloyalandaccuratetranslationfrommiddlemanagement.Middle
managerswillknowthelocalcultureandhowtobesttranslateanymessagesthatmaybe
viewedasesotericortooacademictorelatetolinelevelemployees.
Filter-freewrittencommunicationismorelikelytooccuriftheCEOreliesonhighly
repetitiveandcleartalkingpoints,resultinginsupervisorsandmiddlemanagers‘carryingthe
flag’astheyfulfilltheinformaltranslationrole.Fromthedayofmyappointmentasthenew
chieffromoutsidetheorganization,Ibegantalkingaboutfourstraightforwardkeythemesof
myleader’svision.Irepeatedthosethemesalongwithexpandeddefinitionsthroughoutthe
termofmytenure.Overthecourseoftime,itwasapparentthatothersreferredtothose
themesastheydiscussedprograms,tactics,andconcernswithintheorganization.Theriskwith
anylevelofdirectcommunicationbetweentheleaderandthetroopsisthatitcanbe
threateningtomiddlemanagers;unlessthemanagersunderstandandembracethisstrategy,
theymayresistorevensabotagewhileengaginginsurvivalbehaviors.Ultimately,leaderswho
arewillingtoputasideegotoexplaintheiractionsanddecisionswillincreaseboth
transparencyandtrust.
Internaltransparencycomeswithbothbenefitsandcosts.Thebenefitsincludean
increasedsenseoftrustamongandwithinemployees.TheCEOisbetterabletosetavisionand
philosophyfortheentireorganizationtofollow.Consistenttruthfulnessandtransparencyby
theCEOisusuallyaccompaniedbyincreasedrespect,akeyingredientforstrongfollowership.
TheCEOneedstobepreparedforthecosts.Especiallyearlyon,someemployeeswilltestthe
newtransparency,asktoughquestions,anddemandexplanations.Somewillstudiouslytrack
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whathasbeensaidandcalloutanydeviationfrompreviouslystatedfacts,evenif
unintentional.Consistencybecomescriticalinthisenvironment.Sometimestransparency
unavoidablyshedslightonindividuals;rankandfilemayoverlookorevenviewthiswithglee
whenitadverselyimpactssomeoneofrankorauthority.However,whenalinelevelemployee
suffers,itmayresultinanoverallorganizationalrejectionorrevolt.WheneveraCEObeginsto
lifttheveilawayfromanorganization’s‘dirtylittlesecrets’therewilllikelybepushback,
especiallyifitresultsininquiriesintolongstandingpractices,policies,andotherelementsthat
comprisethesacredculture.
ExternalTransparency
Evenwhensomeofthepreviouslymentionedpushbackspillsoutintotheexternal
environment,practicingstrongexternaltransparencyprovidesahighlyeffectivemeansforboth
theCEOandtheentireorganizationtotelltheirstorytothecommunity.Whiletherelationship
betweenthemediaandthepolicevariesfromcommunitytocommunity,almostall
organizationswilllamentacertaindegreeofspinanddistortionbysomelocalreporters.Many
organizationsaregeneratingtheirownnewsthroughtheproactiveuseofsocialmedia;this
offersadirectandunfilteredmeanstodemonstratetrustandtransparency.Itiseasierto
attackanonymitythanitistheknown.Proactiveanddirectpubliccommunication,bathedin
transparency,increasespublicawarenessandfamiliaritywiththeirlocalpolice,inturn
increasingtrust.Somepoliceagenciesarestrategicallyadvancinginthepathofprivatesector
marketing,developingarecognizablebrandandevendirectmarketingtheirstoryandoutreach
tospecificsegmentsofthepublicthatmaybenefitfromastrongerrelationshipwiththepolice.
Increasingtrustwithminoritygroups,mentalhealthprovidersandconsumers,schools,
businesses,andunderrepresentedsegmentsofsocietycanonlybenefitthepartnership
betweenthepoliceandthecommunity.Whileservingaschiefinalargecommunity,I
developedadvisorycommitteesfromwithintheminoritycommunitiesandthefaith
communitiestoprovideadirectexchangeofinformation.Overtime,themutualtrustlevelrose
significantly;thisrequiredaleveloffranknessthatattimeswasuncomfortableforthe
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attendingcommandstaff,butprovidedatimelymodelingopportunityasaleaderto
demonstratethevalueoftransparency.Thewillingnesstorevealaspectsofthepolice
organizationthathavehistoricallybeeninaccessiblecanreversepriormediadrivenperceptions
andgrowtrust.Genuinetransparency,however,isnotsimplymarketingthegoodnews.The
previousquoteabout‘ifyoumessup,fessup’highlightstheequallyimportantresponsibilityto
acknowledgemistakes,lessonslearned,andproposedsolutions.
Externaltransparencycarriespotentialcosts,aswell.Theinitialincreaseintransparency
mayincluderevealingpreviouslywithhelderrorsormisbehaviors;intheshortterm,thismay
increasemistrustasthepublicponderswhytheinformationwasnotreleasedpreviously.To
strengthenmyagency’scompliancewithpublicaccountabilitystandards,ouragencybegan
publishingannualInternalAffairsInvestigationsummarydata.Membersofthecommandstaff
werehighlyreluctanttopublishthesummarydata,rightfullyconcernedaboutstimulating
increasedmediascrutiny.Overtime,themediakeysinonthetrendsupordownandlesson
specificcases,exceptforthemoreegregiousandtitillatingexamples.
Someemployeesmaynotreadilyacceptorappreciatealeader’sairingthe
organization’s‘dirtylaundry,’resultinginlongertermresentmentandpushback.Atthe
extreme,nomatterwhatdegreeoftransparencyexists,renegadeemployeesatsomeagencies
haveembarkedontheirownexternaltransparencyefforts.Examplesinmanycitiesinclude
postedcommentsattheendofweb-basednewsstoriesbloggedbythoseidentifying
themselvesaspoliceemployees.Evenmoreseverearesocialmediapostsandcontrolledby
destructivecurrentorformeremployeeswhomayweaveathreadoftruthamongtheir
extremeperceptionsandmisstatements.SuchcontentposesasignificantchallengetotheCEO
whoseeksinternalandexternaltransparency;ononehand,theydonotwanttolegitimizethe
blogsbyacknowledgingtheirexistence,andontheotherhand,ignoringthemprovidesno
counterbalance.
Finally,anunintendedconsequenceofincreasedexternaltransparencymayresultin
the‘givethemaninchandthey’lltakeamile’syndrome.Oneormoremembersofthemedia
mayneverbesatisfiedwiththeincreasedflowoffactsandinformation,insteadincreasingtheir
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demandsformoreandmoreprobativeandsensitiveinformation.Eventhemosttransparent-
mindedCEOrecognizesthatinthepolicingbusiness,employeesafetyandcertainmissions
requirestrictconfidentiality.
FutureConsiderationsonTransparency
CEOswhoarehesitanttoembracethespiritoftransparencymayhavenochoiceinthe
future.Opensourceinformationisincreasinginspeedofavailabilityandisbecoming
ubiquitousforanyandall,includingpoliceorganizationmembers.Anyattemptstokeep
informationfromemployeeswillonlydrivethemtoseekalternativesources;thispreemptsthe
leader’sabilitytoremovefilteringthatmightaltertheperceptionsoftheemployees.
Conversely,theCEOwhohasaclearvisionofadvancedtransparencycouldturntosocialmedia
andsimilartechnologiesasameanstoproactivelygetinformationouttoemployeesaheadof
therumormill.
Despitetherelentlesspursuitoffasterdisseminationofinformation,speedwillneedto
bebalancedwithaccuracyandcompleteness.Informationinpolicingisdynamic;the‘truth’
oftenchangesasmorefactsareknown.Themediatendstooverlookthisdynamicinpolicing,
resultingintheappearanceofuncertaintybythepoliceorevenintentionaldeceit.Howpolice
employeesexplainandupdatedynamicinformationwilllargelyinfluenceifthetransparency
helpsorhindersincreasedtrust.Associalmediahasexploded,attemptstokeepinformation
secretorproprietaryhavebecomefutile.Thosewhoclingtothehistoricabilitytoconceal
unpleasantcircumstancesareatincreasedriskofirrelevance.Futureleaderswilldemonstrate
skillattransparencycoupledwithaccountability.
Finally,empoweredemployeesaremostlikelytobehavewithalevelofexternal
transparency.TheroleoftheCEOtofirmlygroundtheorganizationanditsmemberswith
valuesandprinciplesanddefinetheboundariesofacceptablebehaviorsiscrucialinthis
environment(Myers,2007).Inallqualityorganizations,aclimatethatallowsgrowththrough
innovationandevenmistakesservestoempoweremployeesandincreasetheircompetencies.
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Atransparentpoliceorganizationwillnottrytodisavoworcoverupmistakes;rather,itwill
rewardemployeegrowthandbuildtrustwithitscommunitythrougheducationand
accessibility.
References
Jackson,J.,Myers,R.,&Cowper,T.(2010).Leadershipinthenet-centricorganization.InJ.
Schafer&S.Boyd(eds.),Advancingpoliceleadership:Considerations,lessonslearned,
andpreferablefutures(pp.138-149).Quantico,VA:FuturesWorkingGroup.
Myers,R.(2007).Frompyramidstonetworks:Policestructureandleadershipin2020.InJ.
Schafer(ed.),Policing2020:Exploringthefutureofcrime,communities,andpolicing
(pp.487-519).Quantico,VA:FuturesWorkingGroup.
25
Private/PublicPartnershipsforFosteringTrustwithintheCommunity
AlanYoungs
OneneedonlyreviewtheeventsinAurora,Colorado,duringtheAuroratheatre
shootingonJuly20th,2012toseeanexampleofhowpolicecanbuildtrustinthecommunityin
timesofcrisis.Apoliceresponseof90secondsafterthefirst911callandtheabilitytomobilize
alargenumberofofficersforrapidresponsekeptthelossoflifefromreachingevenhigher
levels.Twelvepeoplediedand58wereinjured.Communicationbetweendepartmentsand
districtsweresecondtonone.Therespondingofficersexemplifiedprofessionalism.TheEMTs
andprivatesectormedicalpersonnelworkedwiththepoliceasateamandwereallattheir
best.TheleadershipfromtheAuroraChiefofPoliceDanOateswassuperb.Whilethemedia
clamoredfordetails,ChiefOatesgavethemimportantfacts,butclearlydeclaredthat
informationpertinenttothecasewouldnotbereleasedlestthecasebejeopardizedand
justicenotbedeliveredtothevictims.Hewascalm,hewasinformative,hewas
compassionate,andhereassuredthepublicthattheirsafetywasofutmostimportance.
Itwasobviousinthishorrificsituation,aswithotherssuchasSeptember11th,
Columbine,andLasVegasthatthepoliceproudlydisplayedthetrainingtheyhadreceivedto
protectandserve.Still,astheoldadagegoes,peopleloveandwantthepoliceincrisis.Trust
canbeerodedwhentransparencyandtrutharelacking.Transparencyandtruthshouldalways
bepartofdailypolicework.Itisnot,aswithChiefOates,alwaystellingeverythingthatis
happening,butcommunicatinginawaythatpeopleunderstandthereasonsinformationis
withheld.Itisnotjustwhatiscommunicatedbuthowitiscommunicated.Transparency
extendstopolicebudgets,salaries,pensions,training,andexpertise.Itisadmittingthatthe
privatesectorcaninsomecasesdoasgoodorbetterajobatalowercost.Itiskeeping
budgets,salaries,overtime,andpensionprogramsbeforethepubliceyebecausetheycanbe
andshouldbejustifiable.
Everyonesuffersinaneconomiccrisis.Thereneedstobebalancebetweentheprivate
andpublicsector.Governmentsworldwideareviewedaswastefulandoftencorrupt.Public
26
workersareviewedasbeingrewardedmorethantheprivatesectorworker,theirpensions,
medicalbenefits,andsalariesuntouchedbymarketconditions.Thisisnotalwaystrue,butthe
perceptionremainsandcutsarebeingdemandednationwidetopublicworkerbenefitsand
bargainingpowers.Buildingandmaintainingrelationshipsoftrustbetweenlawenforcement
andthecommunitiestheyserveisthecornerstoneofsuccessfulpolicing.Theimportanceof
trustingrelationshipswillpreventactsofcrimeandterrorism.Withtheevolvingnatureof
immigrantandminoritycommunities,communitypolicingisdescribedasasuccessfulstrategy
thatcanbeusedbylawenforcementtocollaborateandpartnerwithlocalcommunities.The
buildingandmaintenanceoftrusttakesagreatdealofcontinuouseffort.
Unfortunately,theethicalworkofthousandsoflocallawenforcementofficersiseasily
undonebytheactionsofoneunethicalofficer.Oftentheindictmentofoneseemslikean
indictmentofall.Thechallengesfacedmustbeaddressedwithlawenforcementand
communitiestodeveloprelationshipsoftrust.Forlawenforcementagencies,itmeansthat
meaningfuldialogandcollaborationwithcommunitiesneedstooccurinamannerthat
increaseslegitimacyoftheagencyintheeyesofthatcommunity.Forcommunities,their
leadersandrepresentativesmustcollaboratewithlawenforcementandshareresponsibilityfor
addressingtheproblemsofadministrationandbudgeting,aswellascrimeandterrorism
prevention.
Therearenearly18,000stateandlocallawenforcementagenciesintheUnitedStates
employingover700,000full-timeswornpersonnel(Reaves,2011).Ithasbeenestimatedthat
therearealmost2millionindividualsengagedinsomeformofprivatesecuritywithintheU.S.
Privatesecuritycompaniesofferawidevarietyofservicesfrombasicunarmedguardsto
sophisticatedcomputersecurity.Over80%ofourcountry’sinfrastructure(water,power,
transportation,etc.)isprotectedbyprivatesecurity.Publiclawenforcementhasthelegal
mandatetoenforcelawsandwhilesomeeffortshavebeenmadetoadoptapreventionmodel,
inrecentyears,theyhavemorefrequentlyfollowedtheenforcementmodel.Privatesecurity
generallyfollowsapreventionstrategy.Cooperativeeffortsamongthepublic,police,andthe
privatesectorarenotnew.However,sincetheattackonSeptember11,2001,therehasalso
27
beenakeeninterestinpublic/privatepartnershipsthatwouldincreasehomelandsecurity.
Collaborationandinformationsharingbetweenbothwillbecriticaltoanysuccesswewillhave
incombatingterrorism.
BuildingandSustainingTrustCanBeDifficult
Howthecommunityperceiveslawenforcementdependsoneachpolicedepartment.
Howthedepartmentinteractswithitscitizens,howaccessibleitistothecommunity,andhow
itmanagesinternalissuesareintegraltotheprofessionoverall.Itisforthesereasonsthat
buildingandmaintainingcommunitytrustisthehallmarkofeffectivepolicing.Thepublic’strust
inlawenforcementmaybefleetingifpoliceexecutivesdonotcontinuallyreinforcesound,
ethicalpoliciesandprocedurestoagencypersonnelandtothepublic.Maintaininghonorand
integritywithintheorganizationwillresultinbuildingandsustainingatrustingrelationship
betweenthepublicandthepolice.
TherapidlychangingdemographicfaceofAmericaischangingthelandscapeofthe
communitiesthatlawenforcementagenciesserve.TheUnitedStatesisanationbrought
togetherunderthepromiseofliberty,equality,andopportunity,foundedonprinciplesandthe
ruleoflaw.Thepolicearetheguardiansofthelawsandprinciplesandservethenoblecauseof
preservingourdemocracy24/7,365daysayearonthefrontlinesoftheUnitedStates,the
streetsandhomesofAmerica.UnlikethemilitarythatdefendstheUnitedStatesfromforeign
threats,thepolicemissionistoproactivelydefendandpreserveachosenwayoflife:
democracy.Assuch,thepolicebeingthemostvisiblerepresentativesofgovernmentinsociety
arethemostcrucialelementofajust,fair,andfreenation.
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TheFutureofPublic/PrivatePartnerships
Today’spolicedepartmentsareundermonumentalpressuretoreducecrimewithfewer
resources.3Privatizationoflawenforcementisnotanewconcept(Bayley&Shearing,2001).
Franceledthewayinthesystematicnationalizationofpolicinginthe17thcentury.
NationalizationofpolicingfollowedthroughouttherestofcontinentalEuropeandwas
concentratedlargelyintowns,whichoftendeferredtotheprivateauthorityofthelandowning
aristocracy.IntheUnitedStates,wherecitiesgraduallygovernmentalizedpolicinginthemiddle
ofthe19thcentury,privatepolicingneverreallydied.Theeconomicboominthelate1990’s
increasedwagesandratesofemployment.Thisimpactedthereductionofcrime.Duringthe
1990’scriminalpunishmentalsoincreased.Onceconvicted,prisonersnowstayedincarcerated
longer.Crimeappearstodecreasewhenpunishmentincreasesandthereverseprovestrueas
well.In2017,theneedformoreprisonspacehasincreasedandalthoughthecostofbuilding
andmaintainingmoreprisonsishigh,thecostofnotdoingsoappearstobehigher.Thecurrent
economyisforcingtheearlyreleaseofprisonersandtheeffectshaveyettobedetermined
especiallyinCalifornia.
TerenceJ.ManganandMichaelG.Shanahanhavedocumentedthemovementinmore
recenttimes(1990).Whilethe1960swascharacterizedasaperiodofindifferencetoward
privatesecurity,andthe1970sasoneofchangingperceptionsandsomemistrustofthe
industry,theyrightlypredictedthe1990swouldbeaneraofcollaborationandjointventures
betweenpubliclawenforcementandprivatesecurity.Inthefuture,thistrendwillcontinue.
Thisisnecessitatedbythefactthatindividualandcorporatecitizenswhoarepolicedbypublic
lawenforcementarealsoincreasinglybecomingtheclientsofprivatesecurity,asillustratedby
theuseofcorporatesecurityandtheincreaseinthenumberofgatedcommunities.
Thegoalforpolicedepartmentsistocontinuethereductionincrimerates.However,
achievingthisrequiresmorepolicingandmorecostpreciselywhenlawenforcementagencies
3For graphic representations of the trends on expenditures for law enforcement officers and number of police officers compared
to private security agents, please visit www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/gif/s181c.gif and www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/gif/s181d.gif
29
faceseriousrecruitmentproblems,additionalequipmentcosts,adecreaseintaxrevenues,and
legislativerestrictionsdenyingaccesstoanysurpluses.“Manymunicipalitiesandcountieslack
thenecessaryfundsduetolegislatedlimitsontaxationandspending.Fortunately,privatization
ofcertainpolicefunctionshasprovenapowerfulsolutiontotheproblem.Thesteadydeclineof
governments’capitalresourcesandtheirincreasinglyurgentsearchforwaystocontinue
providingtheservicesthatcitizensdemandwithoutraisingtaxesaredrivingtheprivatization
trend.Somefederalagencieshavesavedasmuchas50percentbyhiringcontractorstoprovide
services”(Smith,1991).Justascorporationsoutsourcemanyservicestoenablethemto
concentrateoncorecompetencies,theuseofprivatefirmsbylawenforcementagenciesfrees
themtoconcentratetheireffortsondutiesthatonlytrainedpoliceofficerscan,andshould,do.
Public-privatepartnershipscanprovidemanybenefits,especiallyintermsofpairinglaw
enforcementwithaprivatesecurityprovidertosavepublicmonies.
Perhapsthemostpromisingbutleaststudiedsourceofexternalsupportforpolice
reformistheprivatebusinesscommunity.Notonlydoprivatesectorcompaniescommand
politicalattention,theyholdtalent,dynamism,creativity,andawealthofresourcesthatcanbe
usefultoreformerswithinpoliceagencies.Atthesametime,partnershipswithprivate
businesses,ifpoorlystructured,canerodetheprofessionalismandlegitimacyofpolice
organizations.Themostsuccessfulpoliceleaderswhowelcomeorpromotepartnershipswith
thebusinesscommunityarecarefulnottoadopttheprofitmotiveofbusinessastheirown,nor
toassumethatallbusinesspeoplenecessarilyunderstandcustomerserviceorqualitycontrol
(Bhanu&Stone,2004).
Moreover,simplybyengagingwithpoliceleadersintheprocessofretrainingthefront-
linestaff,businessleaderscanhelpbuildacultureofserviceinpoliceorganizations.AsDavid
Bayleynotes,“Increasingcontactsbetweenpolicepersonnelandrespectable,non-criminal
membersofthepublicisanimportantwayofencouragingthedevelopmentofanaccountable,
service-orientedpoliceorganization”(Bayley,2001).Thepolicedependoncitizenstoassistin
almosteveryaspectofcrimepreventionandinvestigation.Mobilizingthatpublicsupportis
essentialtothecoremissionandgoodtreatmentofthepublicisonewaytobuildpublic
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support.Goodtreatmentandprofessionalservicearehardenoughtodeliverincalm
encountersbetweenpoliceandcitizens,butparticularlychallengingintheemotionallycharged
circumstancesinwhichcitizensandthepolicetypicallyturntoeachotherforhelp.“Apartfrom
officialsinspecializedcrimedetectionagencies,mostoperationalpoliceofficialsengagedin
routine,daytoday,policingprobablyspendmostoftheirtimeassistingpeoplewhoare
experiencingsomekindofpersonalemergency”(Crawshaw,Devlin,&Williamson,1998).Like
themostsuccessfulbusinesses,policeorganizationsshouldberecruiting,training,and
supervisingtoachievethehighestlevelofservicetocitizens.
ExamplesofPrivate/PublicPartnerships
Lakewood,Colorado
Lakewoodoffersanexampleofthebenefitsofoutsourcinglawenforcementtasksto
privatefirms.Lakewoodhasapopulationof154,000withinthemetropolitanDenverarea.Its
progressiveapproachtopublic-privatepartnershipsinlawenforcementisdemonstratedbyits
trackrecord.Thecityhascontractedwithoutsidefirmsforpolicedepartmentassistancefor
over25years.Thisprogressiveattitudecomesfromacommunityknownforitsqualitypolicing
—duetoitsrecruitmentandtrainingprograms,andits48-yearhistoryofrequiringcollege
degreesfromitsofficers.Lakewoodhasproducedmorepolicechiefspercapitathananyother
cityinthenation.ApproximatelyoneofeverytenofficershiredinLakewoodhasgoneonto
becometoplawenforcementexecutives.TheyincludethechiefsofdepartmentsinNaperville,
Illinois;Clearwater,Florida;Kettering,Ohio;andtherecentInternationalAssociationofChiefs
ofPolicepresident,Plano,TexasChiefofPolice,andCityManager.
TheLakewoodPoliceDepartmentwasrecognizedin1996asoneoftheeightbest
suburbanlawenforcementpoliceagenciesbyapanelofexpertsqueriedbyGood
Housekeepingmagazine.Itisatwo-timehonoreebytheColoradoAssociationofChiefsof
Policeforinnovationinlawenforcement.In2002LakewoodreceivedthePioneerAwardforits
public/privatepartnershipswithFirstWatchSecurity,whichwasalsoresponsibleforsecurityat
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theDenverInternationalAirport.AsofJanuary1,2011,anewagreementwasestablishedwith
G4SSecureSolutionsU.S.A.(formerlyWackenhut).Currentlytheypay$45.00perhourfor
CrimeSceneSecurity(12hourminimum)andHospitalPrisonerSecurity(4hourminimum)and
$60.00anhour(12hourshift)foramarkedvehicle.
Manycrimescenestakeanaverageoftwodaystoprocess.Since24-hourprotectionis
required,itmakescompleteeconomicsensetoutilizeprivatesecurityforthisassignmentata
muchlessercost.TheG4Sofficersarespeciallyselectedforcrimescenedetailbasedontheir
backgroundandexperience,andoftenattendLakewoodPoliceDepartmentrollcallsfor
training(justasmembersoftheLakewoodpoliceattendG4Srollcalls).TheG4Sofficersknow
therulesofevidence,andmanyarecertifiedpoliceofficersinthestateofColorado.They
provide24-hourassistance,typicallyrespondingwithinfourhoursofthedepartment’srequest.
Allhavebeeninvestigatedforbackgroundclearancesandhavebeenprocessedthroughthe
ColoradoBureauofInvestigationtoensuretheyhavenocriminalrecord.AsRussellRuffin,a
reporterforLawEnforcementTelevisionNetworkputsitsosuccinctly,“Payingaprivate
securityofficeranhourlyratetoguardaprisoneroracrimescenefreesuppoliceofficers.
Policedon’thavetocallinanofficeronovertimeorpullsomeoneoffpatrolduty”(Ruffin,
http://www.ncpa.org).
NewOrleans,Louisiana
DuringthewakeofHurricaneKatrina,aninvestigativereportcondemnedtheNew
OrleansPoliceDepartmentonvirtuallyeveryaspectofpolicework.AlthoughmanyNOPD
officersshouldbepraisedfortheiractions,theirstorieswilllikelynevergettoldbecauseofthe
callousdisregardforthetruthdisplayedbysomemembersofthedepartment.Trustistheglue
ofpolicing,andsuccessisimprovedwhenthereisapartnershipinkeepingcommunitiessafer.
Policecanhelpdevelopasymbiotic‘we’relationshipinsteadofan‘usandthem’onebymaking
transparencyandapproachablevisibilitypartoftheirequationin‘protectingandserving.’
32
Currently,theNOPDisunderaDepartmentofJusticeconsentdecree.TheDOJissued
recommendationstoimprovetheNOPDandensurefundamentalculturalchange.Thegoalof
theDOJrecommendationsistosparkreformsthatwilltakeholdandremaininplacemorethan
adecadefromnow.Therecommendationsincludeasignificantemphasisintransparency,
communityengagement,andsustainability.Twentycommunityleadersfromindustry,
academia,andtheclergyserveontheboardofTheNewOrleansPoliceFoundation,apublic-
privatepartnershipdedicatedtostrengtheningthepolicedepartmentandpromotingpublic
safetyinNewOrleans.Leavingpoliceoversighttootheragencies,thefoundationfocuseson
crimereduction.Sinceitscreationin1995,theFoundationhaschangedthepolice
department’sdefinitionof‘success’fromnumberofarrestsmadetoreductionincrimerates.It
hassustainedtheinterestofthebusinesscommunitybyshowingthecorrelationbetweenthe
dropincrimerateandriseinhotelroomoccupancy.Itprovidesmaterialsupporttopolice
officersbywayofhealthinsuranceandtuitionreimbursement.TheFoundationmaintainsopen
communicationswiththemayor’soffice,citycouncil,federalagencies,andthepolice
department.
Fresno,California
Injustoneexample,onecanseethesavingswhichwerereapedbytheFresno,
Californiasheriff’sdepartmentbyoutsourcingitstransportofprisoners.Itcostthedepartment
$284totransportaprisonerfromSanDiegotoFresnousingaprivatefirm.Thesametripusing
sheriff’sdepartmentpersonnelandequipmentwouldcostthreetimesasmuch(West,1993).
SanFrancisco,California
Likemanypolicedepartmentsaroundthecountry,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment
wasslowtoadoptcutting-edgetechnology—nosurpriseconsideringthechroniclackoffunding
forlawenforcement.HundredsofcitiesrelyonCOPLINK,asystemforsharinginformation
amongmultiplejurisdictions,butfewgotothetroubleofbuildingtheirowndatawarehouse.In
33
fact,SFPDuntilrecentlywaspracticallydevoidoftechnology—ironicconsideringSan
Francisco’sstandingasatechnologyhub.Crimereportingmethodsinthecitybythebayhad
notevolvedforalongperiodoftime.Thepolicedepartmentdidnotevenhavedepartment-
widee-mailuntil2011.SFPDhasquicklysheditsLudditepast.Theweb-basedcrimedata
warehouseisoperational(containingovertwodecadesoftext,photos,maps,sound,and
video),andthedepartmenthasrolledoutanappdesignedtoletofficersfilereportsandaccess
thecrimedatawarehousewithtabletsandsmartphones.FormerPoliceChiefGregSuhr
wantedtoallowofficerstostayinthefieldlonger,insteadofspendinghoursintheofficefiling
reportsoncomputers.
SanFrancisco’sembraceoftechnologyfollowedthearrivalofEdLeeasmayorofSan
FranciscoinJanuary2011.AppointedbytheBoardofSupervisorstoserveoutthetermof
GavinNewsom—whohadbeenelectedstatelieutenantgovernor—Leewentontowinthe
mayoralelection.Unfortunately,MayorLeepassedawayin2017.Leewantedtomodernizecity
government.Hecametoofficewithanimportantally–RonConway,SiliconValley’scurrent
super-angelparexcellence.ConwaybackedLeeintheelectionandwantedabusiness-friendly
citygovernment.HefiguredLee,withsomehelp,couldbringSanFranciscointothe21st
century.Aftertheelection,LeeandConwaycreatedSanFranciscoCitizensInitiativefor
TechnologyandInnovation,to“leveragingthecollectivepowerofthetechsectorasaforcefor
civicaction.”Itnowboastsnearly300membercompaniesrepresenting90percentofthecity’s
techpopulation.TheCitizensInitiativegave$100,000fordevelopmentofSFPD’scrimedata
warehouse,aswellasthenewmobileapp.Hewlett-Packardchippedinwith60high-end
notebookPCs,thatgaveofficersinthefieldaccesstothecrimedatawarehouse.
Thenewmobileapp,developedbyCitizensInitiativememberArcTouch,letspolice
dispensewiththepaper,cameras,andaudiorecorderstheyhavetraditionallycarriedintothe
field.Instead,officerswithtabletsormobilephonesuseGPS,imagerecording,andspeech
recognitiontocreatecrimereportsinthetimeittakestograbadoughnutandacupofcoffee.
Thereportscanbetransmittedfromamobiledevicetothecrimedatawarehouse,wherethe
real-timeinformationcanhelpotherdepartmentpersonneltracktrends,matchsuspects,and
34
generallymakethecityasaferplace.ArcTouchsaidtheappwilldelivered“theholygrail—any
informationyouneed,availableatanytime.”Whowouldhaveguessedthatthesupercopof
thefuturewouldbearmedwithaniPad?4
Chicago,Illinois
Partnershipsbetweenlocallawenforcementagenciesandprivatebusinessesare
trending,especiallyincyberspace.ThecityofChicago’scamerasystemincludesanetworkof
publicandprivatesurveillancecameras.AbouthalfofthevideofeedsavailabletotheChicago
policecomefromprivatecamerasthatcanbeaccessedbylawenforcementpersonnel.The
ChicagoSunTimesreportedina12/13/2016articlethatthereare2700publicsafetycameras
inChicagothatarepartofabroadernetworkof27,000privateandgoverned-owned
surveillancecameras.MayorRahmEmanuelstatedinthesamearticlethatcameras“havebeen
extremely”helpfulinfightingcrimeparticularlyontheChicagoTransitAuthority.Chicago’s
OfficeofEmergencyManagementandCommunicationsconductsauditstoensurethatonly
approvedpersonnelhaveaccesstothesurveillancesystemanduseitappropriately.
Publicandprivatesectorpartnershipsbetweenpoliceandprivatesecurityguardswill
continuetoexpand,especiallyinChicagowherehightechcamerasoutnumberpoliceofficers.
TheproblemwithprogramssuchasChicago'slatestpublic/privatepolicingstrategyislackof
oversight,clearboundaries,andvetting-justtonameafew.Privatesecurityagenciesare
regulatedbyeachstate.Therefore,hiringstandards,trainingandbackgroundchecksvary.
WhilethevideofeedwillgototheCPD,theprivatesecurityfirmwillhaveaccesstothelive
videofeedintheofficeandinthesecuritypatrolcars.5
4Einstein, D. “San Francisco Cops”. Retrieved July 25, 2012 from www.forbes.com.
5“Chicago police partner with private security firm”. Retrieved June 3rd, 2012 from www.examiner.com.
35
Minneapolis,Minnesota
In2003,TargetCorporationfootedthebillforatleast30securitysurveillancecamerasit
sharedwiththeMinneapolisPoliceDepartment.Target’sSafeCityinitiativewasan
unprecedentedmergeintothegovernment'sbusinessfollowing9/11.London-stylecameras
wereinstalledovera10-blockshoppingareaincludingTarget'scorporateheadquartersandthe
TargetCenter.CivilrightsgroupsarguedthattheSafeCityinitiativewouldimpactU.S.citizens'
rightstofreedomofexpressionandprivacy.
UnitedKingdom
Eveninsomeofthebestresourcedandmostrespectedpoliceorganizations,business
leadersareguidingtheprocessofcontinuingreform.IntheUnitedKingdom,forexample,
LondonFirst,amembershiporganizationofsomeofthebiggestLondonbusinesses,is
sponsoring‘jointmentorships’thatpairbusinessleadersandpoliceboroughcommandersto
exchangeviewsandexpertise.LondonFirstisapplyingbusinesspracticesinrecruitingand
trainingtoimprovethosefunctionsinthepoliceserviceandplanstousethebusiness
community’sexpertiseinmarketingandcommunicationstoimprovetheprofileofthepolicein
London.OrganizersassertthatLondonisalreadyoneofthesafestcitiesintheworld,butthey
insistthatbusinessleadershavearoleinmakingitevensaferandbetterpoliced.6
HowtoApproachaPublic/PrivatePartnership
Totakeadvantageofthemanybenefitsapublic/privatepartnershipcanprovide,
especiallyintermsofpairinglawenforcementwithaprivatesecurityprovidertosavepublic
monies,keepinmindthefollowingrecommendationsissuedbytheIndependentPolicyReport
(Blackstone&Hakim,1996):
6Partnership in Policing (February, 2001). http://www.c-london.co.uk/data/partnership in_policy.pdf.
36
· Servicesthathavethepotentialtobepricedshouldbeconsideredcandidatesforprivateprovisionorusercharges.
· Considerationshouldbegiventoprivatizingtasksthatdonotrequirethefullrangeofskillsofpublicpoliceofficers.Notonlywouldsavingsbeobtained,butalsopoliceofficerswouldbecomemoreavailableforperformingthetasksonlytheycanperform.
· Servicessuchasresponsetoalarmscouldbeprovidedprivately.Inanycase,theowners
ofalarmsshouldpayfortheservicestheydemand.SaltLakeCityandLasVegashavemodelverifiedalarmprograms.
· Privatesecuritycanbeeffectiveinadistinctgeographicarea.Therefore,apartment
complexes,amongothers,oughttobeencouragedtoconsiderprivatepolicing.Competitionamongapartmentcomplexestoprovidesaferenvironmentsoughttobeencouraged.Infact,requiringorencouragingpublicationofapartments’safetyexperiencemightbedesirabletopermitrenterstomakeinformedchoices.
· Governmentswouldprobablybewellservedbyfacilitatinganexpansionofprivate
security.Anyrelativelylow-skillorspecializedhigh-skillservicesthatarecurrentlyprovidedpubliclycouldbeconsideredascandidatesfortransfertoprivatesecurity.
· Monitoringcontractorcomplianceandperformancemustnotbesocostlyasto
eliminatethesavingsfromprivatization.
· Statelegislaturesshouldconsiderwhetherthecurrentlegalstatusandregulationspertainingtoprivatesecurityareappropriateinviewoftheexpandedroleexpectedfromprivatesecurity.Specifically,emergencyvehiclestatusandexpandedpowersofarrestoughttobeexamined.
· Problem-orientedpolicingisamethodthatofferstheprospectofimproved
police/privatepartnershipsindealingwithspecificcrimeproblems.
· Governmentsshouldbeencouragedtoexpandtheuseofcommunitypolicing,becausetheapproachoffershopeforimprovingpoliceperformanceandthecommunity’ssenseofparticipation.Likeprivatization,communitypolicinghelpssocietybetterdeterminetheuseofitsscarcepoliceresources.Further,itbringsthepolice“back”toconstituents.Successfulcommunitypolicingsatisfiesthedesiresofthecommunity.
Conclusion
Theimportanceoftrustandtransparencywithlawenforcementandthecommunityare
essentialtothesuccessofbothentities.Itisthedutyofeverypoliceleadertodaytoembrace
37
thechallenge,understandthecomplexities,andtakebold,proactive,transformativeactions
thatwillclosethegapbetweenwhereweareandwherewemustbe.Thedialogueistaking
placeincommunitiesacrosstheUnitedStates.Ifagenciesarewillingtolistenwithgraceand
respect,engageinintellectualhonestyandprofessionalintrospection,andseekthekindof
mindshiftsandheartshiftsrequiredoftwenty-firstcenturypolicing,thentheyhavethe
opportunitytotrulybeguardiansofthegreatdemocracy.
Reference
Bayley,D.H.(2001).Democratizingthepoliceabroad:Whattodoandhowtodoit.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofJustice.
Bayley,D.H.&Shearing,C.D.(2001).Thenewstructureofpolicing:Description,conceptualization,andresearchagenda.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofJustice,NationalInstituteofJustice.
Bhanu,C.&Stone,C.(2004).Public-privatepartnershipsforpolicereform.NewYork:VeraInstituteofJustice.
Blackstone,E.A.&Hakim,S.(1996).Policeservices:Theprivatechallenge.Oakland,CA:IndependentInstitute.
Crawshaw,R.,Devlin,B.&Williamson,T.(1998).Humanrightsandpolicingstandardsforgoodbehaviourandastrategyforchange.TheHague:KluwerLawInternational.
Mangan,T.J.&Shanahan,M.G.(1990).Publiclawenforcement/privatesecurity:Anewpartnership?FBILawEnforcementBulletin,59(1),18-22.
Reaves,B.(2006).Censusofstateandlocallawenforcementagencies,2008.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeStatistics.
Smith,W.J.(1991).Privatesectordevelopment:Awinningstrategyfornewpolicestations,sheriff’sstations,andjails.ThePoliceChief,63(8),29-33.
West,M.L.(1993).Getapieceoftheprivatizationpie:Privatesecurityagencies.SecurityManagement,37(3),54.
38
TheFridayCrabClub,Redux
JosephA.Schafer
AugustVollmerstandsasagiantinthehistoryofpoliceprofessionalisminAmerica.As
leaderoftheBerkeley(CA)PoliceDepartmentfrom1905-1932,Vollmerworkedtirelesslyto
advancetheimagethatpolicingwasnotsimplyajob,butwasaprofession.Assuch,officers
wereexpectedtobeeducated,articulateexpertswhocouldusecontemporarytechnologyand
knowledgetodeliverpolicingserviceswithintegrityandquality.Vollmerplayedamajorrolein
advancinghighereducationinpolicing,contributingtheemergenceofcriminologyandcriminal
justiceaslegitimateacademicdisciplines.Heemphasizedproblemsolving,analysis,andthe
empowermentoffront-linepersonnel.ThoughVollmer’svisionofprofessionalismand
educationmaydifferfromtheidealswepursueacenturylater,hislegacyendures.Though
historytendstoemphasizehisroleasanadvocateforeducation,Vollmerwasalsoinnovativein
howhethoughtaboutorganizationalpracticesandemployeerelations.
Asaniconicfigure,muchloresurroundsthewayinwhichVollmerledhisownagency.It
isquitepossiblehislegacyhasbecomeromanticized,yeteveniftheyarenotentirelyaccurate
theaccountsofhisapproachesinBerkeleyareinstructivebecauseofwhatcanbelearned
aboutmodelsfororganizationsandpersonnelmanagement.AmongotherapproachesVollmer
utilizedinBerkeleyPDwastheFridayCrabClub.Basedonarchivalresearchandinterviewswith
formerBerkeleyofficers,notedVollmerbiographersGeneandElaineCartedescribedthese
meetingsasfollows.
EveryFriday,allofficersnotondutyattendedagroupmeetingtodiscussdepartmentmatters.Oneofficerrecalled:“Ifyoufiredyourgun,youwouldhavetogetupbeforethewholegroupontheFridayCrabClubhourandgivethefactorsonwhathappened,andtherewasadecisionmadebythemenfromthestandpointofthiswayorthisway;rightorwrong.TheFridaymeetings,informallycalledtheCrabClub,wereacombinationgripeandlearningsession.“Forinstance,ifyouhadanythingagainstanymaninthedepartment,yousaiditrightthereinfrontofhim,andafteritwasoveritwasforgotten,“rememberedoneofficer.(1975,pp.46-47)
39
TheCrabClubservedtwoimportantfunctions.First,itwasavenueinwhichpeerreview
ensuredaccountabilityandprofessionalism.Officershadtoanswertotheirco-workerswhen
theyengagedinhighconsequenceactions,suchasdischargingafirearm.Oversightand
accountabilitywerenotsimplyimposedfromtopexecutives;theywereexpectedaspectsof
peer-to-peerrelationships.Second,theCrabClubwasavenuetoresolveinterpersonaldisputes
andconflicts.Problemsamongco-workerswerenotallowedtoremainhidden,wherethey
mightfesterandgrow;theyweretoberesolvedinadirectandtimelymanner.
ToVollmer’swayofthinking,itwasimportantforofficerstohaveachancetodiscuss
interpersonalconflictinasuitablemanner;badfeelingsshouldnotlingerandworsen.Iftwo
officershadadisagreement,thatmattershouldbeairedandresolvedquickly.Ifofficershad
questionsaboutmanagementpractices,theyneededtohavethechancetovoiceconcernsand
seekfurtherinformationbeforeresentmentandresistancecouldtakehold.Ifanincidenthad
occurredduringtheweekthatwasnoteffectivelyhandled,theinvolvedpartiesneededto
discusswhathappenedandwhatmistakesweremade.Officersneededtobeheldaccountable
totheirpeersfortheirdecisionsandactions.Inmanyways,thispracticewasaprecursortothe
contemporarymorbidityandmortalitymeetingsoftenheldinmedicalsettings.Suchevents
requiredoctorsintrainingtoexplaintotheirpeershowacasewashandledandhonestly
discussthepossibilityoferrorsandoversights.Theobjectivewasnottoshameorhumiliate
officers,butrathertocreatelearningmomentsandtoensurepoorchoicesdidnotbecome
acceptedinstitutionalpractice.Thisapproachservedtheaddedfunctionofreinforcingthat
officershadanobligationtoremainaccountableandprofessional,andthatthisobligation
extendednotonlytotheorganization,buttoone’speers,aswell.
Itispossibletheloresurroundingthispracticehasinflateditsactualefficacywithinthe
BerkeleyPD.Furthermore,changesinprofessionalpracticesandcivilliabilitymighthave
renderedsomeaspectsoftheapproachimpracticalinmodernagencies(i.e.,officersdiscussing
thechoicetodischargetheirfirearmsinapeer-to-peervenue).Itislikelypoliceunionism
furthercomplicatesthecontemporaryuseoftheclassicalmodeloftheFridayCrabClub.Even
atthetime,itispossibleparticipatingofficersviewedthesemeetingsnotasachancetoair
40
grievances,butasanuncomfortableexperience.Themeetingmayhavebeenmoreakintothe
hostilityandanimositywithwhichsomehavecharacterizedCompstatmeetingsintheNYPDin
the1990s(Greene,1999;Haberfeld,2006).Historicaldiscussionsofthesemeetingsarevery
limited(Carte&Carte,1975)andmaybeofquestionableveracity.Noneoftheselimitations
invalidatetheunderlyingideasimbuedintheCrabClubmodel,particularlyasitrelatestothe
ideasoftrustandtransparencyincontemporarypoliceorganizations.
Forthepurposesofthisessay,Iwouldaskthereader’sindulgencebystickingwiththe
mythical,ifnot-fullyvalidatedimage,oftheFridayCrabClub.Considertheidealizedimageof
aninstitutionalizedmanagementpracticethatcreatedareasonablysafeandneutral
environmentinwhichtwoofficerscoulddiscussinterpersonaldifferences,disagreements,and
conflicts.WhiletheseofficersmightnotbecomefastfriendsasaresultoftheFridayCrabClub,
theexperiencemightallowthemtopreventtheirconflictsfromgrowingandimpedingtheir
abilitytodotheirjobeffectively.Consideravenueinwhichofficerscouldaskquestionsabout
policiesandprocedures,allowingmanagementtoreceiveinputandallayconcerns.Ratherthan
operationaledictsbeingmeetwithresistanceandobfuscation,theycouldbeunderstoodand
(perhapsreluctantly)accepted.Consideramanagementpracticethatmadeaccountabilitynot
simplysomethingimposedonofficersbytheirsuperiors,butensuredaccountabilitywas
somethingofficersunderstoodtheyowedtotheircoworkers.
InconsideringthenexusbetweentheFridayCrabClubandpoliceunionism,Kellingand
Kliesmet(1995)suggestVollmerwasaheadofthemanagementthinkingofhistime.
Inotherwords,Vollmer,beforethemanagementtheoriesofFrederickTaylorbecameintegraltothereformmodel,wasexperimentingwiththedevelopmentofagenuinelyprofessionalmodelofpolicing.Thismodelincludedhighereducation,collegialcontrol,ageneralistpolicepractitioner,specialtiesattheserviceofgeneralists,devolutionofauthoritytopractitioners,andcollaborationwithotherprofessions(p.200).
Imaginetheexistenceofaforuminwhichofficersandorganizationslearnedfrommistakes,
ratherthanseekingtoburyerrorsand/orvilifythosedeemed(rightlyorwrongly)tobeatfault.
Policeofficersandagenciescouldbecomelearningorganizations(Geller,1997)byturningpast
41
problemsintoteachablemoments.TheFridayCrabClubcreatedaforuminwhichofficerscould
exertcollegialpeer-to-peeraccountabilityto,andcontrolover,oneanother,ratherthanrelying
onachieftoexertcompletecommandandcontroluponfrontlinepersonnelandtheir
professionalism.Controlintheworkplacewasdonewithone’sco-workers,ratherthanbeinga
forceimposedupononefromonhigh.
WhethertheFridayCrabClubtrulyworkedinthispurportedfashionorhassimply
becomeromanticizedovertimeislargelyimmaterial.Whatishelpfulforthesepurposesisthe
poweroftheimageratherthantheveracityoftheclaim.WhatsuchaCrabClubwouldprovide
isasafeforuminwhich‘dirtylaundry,’illwill,andmistakescouldbeairedinasafemanner.
Officersmightnotlikealltheirpeers.Officersmightnotlikeeverymanagementdecision.The
agencymightnotagreewitheverydecisionmadebyitsofficers.TheFridayCrabClubwould
nothavecreatedacompletelyharmoniousandfriendlyagency.Theidealizednotionconveyed
bytheexample,however,isofanagencythataddressespotentiallytoxicmattersinthe
healthiestwaypossible.TheFridayCrabClubwouldbeawell-regulatedsepticsystem.Fecal
matterisstillproduced,butitishandledinthesafestandmostsanitarywaypossible;properly
functioning,undesirableby-productsstillexist,buttheyarecontainedanddon’tspilloverinto
areastheydonotbelong.Internally,itmightbeexpectedthattrustandtransparencywouldbe
quitehigh.
TheefficacyoftheCrabClubisapowerfulandalluringorganizationaltoolthatcouldbe
beneficialinmyriadprofessionalcontextsfarbeyondjustpolicing.Oneissuethatmadethe
idealizedCrabClubsointriguingisthatitwasaninternalandprivatemechanismformattersto
beprocessed,addressed,andresolved.Thoughperhapsnotallparticipantswereorwouldbe
completelysatisfiedwiththeprocessandoutcome,theideaconveysavisionoforganizations
dealingwithinternalstrifeandconflictinaconstructivemanner.Ideaswouldbeallowedto
flourish,enjoyrefinement,andbenefitallinvolved.Thechoicesofexecutivesandsupervisors
mightbeexplainedtofollowers.Ineffect,the‘dirtylaundry’oftheorganizationmightbeaired
inasafe,private,andhealthymanner,whilealsoadvancinginnovationandemployee-initiated
effortsintheworkplace.
42
FridayCrabClub,Redux
FeworganizationsofanytypelikelymeettheidealizedvisionoftheFridayCrabClub.
Conflictisallowedtofester.Newideasarenotencouraged.Communicationflowsupthe
organization,whilethoseatthetopoftendonotdoenoughtoprovideinformationtothose
theylead.Thepolice,likesomanyotherorganizations,sufferfromunhealthyinternal
communicationandconflictmanagement.Inpasterasthissituationleftfewoptionsfor
affectedpersonnel.Officerswerelefttoventtooneanotherinsmallgroupswhilehuddled
aroundwatercoolers,meetingincoffeeshops,orsittinginidlingpatrolcars.Inrare
circumstances,shiftsupervisorsmightallowsucheventstooccurduringpre-shiftbriefings.In
theabsenceofaformalFridayCrabClub,officerscouldexpresstheirfrustrationtotheirpeers.
Agencysupervisorsandexecutives,however,hadnowaytoreceiveinputorcomplaintsfrom
personnel,perhapsbyveryconsciousdesign.Accountabilityremainedaforcelargelyimposed
uponofficersfromonhighwithintheorganization(thoughcertainlymyriadadhocexceptions
tothisobservationhaveexisted).Co-workerswhohadaconflictwithoneanotherdidnotenjoy
anestablishedframeworkwithinwhichtoexpresstheirconcernsandfrustrations.Ineffect,
muchofthebenefitoftheFridayCrabClubwasdeniedtopersonnelandtherewasnowayfor
themtocompensateforthatshortcoming.
TheriseoftheInternethasredefinedthecapacityofofficerstovent,dealwithconflict,
andexpressdispleasurewithagencyleaders,particularlysincetheearly2000s.Awiderangeof
discussionboards,listservs,blogs,andwebsiteshaveemergedthatallowofficerstoair
grievances(realorperceived),complain,andshareconcernswithoneanother.7Froman
organizationalperspectivethisisachallengingevolution.Twoofficersventingaboutthechief
whiledrinkingcoffeeinadonutshopmightactuallybeahealthyprocess.Thosesameofficers
havingthesameexchangeinapubliconlineforumopenstheconversationtotheentireworld
andcreatesarecordofthatconversationthat,ifnotpermanent,isatleastlong-lasting.Morale
7 Examples of this situation abound, though they tend to be transitory in nature. Among other examples is the website leoaffairs.com, started by two officers in the Tampa (FL) area and now hosting forums covering agencies from coast-to-coast. These forums were largely a public and anonymous venue for complaining about agencies, leaders, personnel, and practices. Countless blogs and websites have come and gone, creating (at least temporarily) a public Crab Club for a specific agency and/or issue.
43
canbeenhancedthroughdonutshopconversations;moralecanbeerodedthroughonline
discussions.
Intheabsenceofeffectiveorganizationalpracticesthatallowofficerstodealwith
conflictanddisagreement,whilesimultaneouslyadvancingcommunication,officershave
innovatedandcreatedonlinemechanismstofillthatneed.Someofthesemechanismsare
privateoratleastrestrictedtovettedmembersofthelawenforcementcommunity.Others
are,byintentanddesign,completelypublicandseektoreachcommunityresidents,themedia,
andlocalpoliticalofficials.Theproblemwithinformaltechnology-enabledalternativestothe
FridayCrabClubisthatsuchinnovativealternativesmaybepublicandenduring.Theyprovide
externaltransparencythatmightultimatelybecounterproductive,potentiallyerodingexternal
trust,andtheydonotactuallyprovidethefullrangeofbenefitspresumedundertheFriday
CrabClubmodel.TheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodelisdrivenbytechnologythatmakesconflict
anddisputesmattersofpublicrecord.Theyriskmakingallegationsanonymous(perhaps
elevatingtheriskofdistortions,half-truths,andblatantlies)andleantowardone-way
conversations(i.e.,anofficerorofficerscomplainingabouttheagencyand/oritsleaders,
withoutthebenefitofaresponsefromthetargetedparty).TheReduxmodelisdecidedly
inferiortotheoriginalmodelbecauseitfailstoprovidethehealthyaspectoftheoriginal
model…two-waycommunicationanddialog.
ThepointoftheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodelisthatwhatwasformerlyhidden(at
leastintheshorttermandtothegeneralbenefitoftheorganization)isnowquitepublic.
Membersofthepublicareprivytoinformationthatwaspreviouslyunavaible.Insome
instancesandfromsomeperspectivesthisisapositiveevolution.Iftherearefundamental
problemswithagencyleaders,operations,anddecisionsitisaboonforcitizensandcommunity
leaderstoknowaboutthatsituation.Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatnoteverythingexpressed
intheReduxmodelisaccurateorevenalegitimateproblem.TheReduxmodeltendstoonly
broadcasttheperspectiveandconcernsofthoseupsetwithasituation;theofficialpositionof
theagencyanditsleadersisalmostnevertransmittedthroughthesamemodalities.Thus,the
Reduxmodelcanbealoneofficerspeakingtruthtopower.Itisjustaslikelytobeadisaffected
44
employeeorsetofemployeeswhoaredistorting,maligning,andbesmirching.Itisnota
processthatfacilitatestwo-waydialogandtheresolutionofconflict.Rather,itisaprocessthat
inflamesalreadytenserelationswithinanorganizationandexposesabroadertoa
controversialsituation.
Messengerscananddohavetheirownagendas.Conflictscanbelegitimizedunderthe
glossofwhistle-blowingand‘speakingtruthtopower.’Liesandinnuendocanbeleveraged
againstthosethemessengerdislikesforanynumberofreasons.Everyorganization,asevery
family,hasproblems,conflicts,andskeletonsinthecloset.Revealingeventrueconcernswith
completetransparencycanmakeitmoredifficulttocorrectandresolveproblems.Itisnot
alwaysbeneficialforchildrentoknowtheirparentsareexperiencingmaritalstrife.Such
awarenesscansometimescomplicateorimpedetheabilitytocorrecttheproblem.Parallels
existwiththeproblemspoliceorganizationsconfront.Thepublicdoesnotalwaysbenefitfrom
knowingaspectsofanexecutive’spersonallifeorthatthesheriffhasjustpromotedher
nephewwithintheorganization.Sometimeswhatappearstobenepotismisblatantfavoritism;
othertimesthenephewmightbethebestpersonforthepromotion.
Achiefoncerelatedtotheauthorthatuponassumingcommandofalargeagencyhe
learnedofanofficerwhooperatedablogthatwaswidelyreadbyagencycriticsandthelocal
media.Theblogassailedanumberofproblemsintheagencyandamongitsexecutives.The
officerdidnotopenlydisclosehisidentityontheblog,buteveryoneintheagencyknewwho
waswritingtheblog.Thechiefexpressedthattheofficer’sactions,whilewellintentioned,were
misdirected.Theofficersoughttoshedlightonpersistentproblemsintheagency;theofficer
presumablysawhimselfasawhistle-blowerwhowasseekingtoadvancetheorganizationin
thelong-term.Fromtheperspectiveofthechief,however,theofficerwasactuallymakingit
moredifficulttoaddresspersistentproblemsintheorganization,particularlyasanoutsider
assuminganewcommand.Theblogreducedmoraleamongmanyintheagency.Itsowedthe
seedsofdiscontent.Itprovided‘ammunition’toagencycriticsthroughoutthecity.Itmadethe
agencyappearineptratherthannormal.Everylargeagencyhasproblemsandnoemployeewill
agreewithalldecisionsmadebytheirleaders.Ratherthanservingtohealwounds,theblog
45
aggravatedoldwoundsandinflamednewproblems.Eveniftheofficerwasgenerallyright,the
actionsinflictedfurtherdamageontheorganization.
FromtheviewpointofofficersengagingintheFridayCrabClub,Reduxmodel,however,
whatalternativedotheyhave?Theiragencyprovidesthemwithnoacceptablewaytoexpress
concerns,askquestions,anddealwithconflict.TheeaseandvisibilityoftheReduxapproachis
seductive.Thoughitbringsthewrongtransparencytotheorganization,atleastitprovides
transparencythatotherwisemightnotexist.Tomakeabroadgeneralization,theRedux
approachisnotlikelytoemergeinhealthyandfunctionalorganizations.Asagraduatestudent,
theauthortookseveralcoursesinlaborrelationstaughtbyanelderstatesmanoftheunion
movementinAmerica.Herepeatedlyremarkedthatunionsrarelyemergeinorganizationsthat
havehealthylabor-managementrelations.Ifemployeesarecontentintheworkplacetheyhave
littlereasontoseektoorganize.Parallelsmightbeseentotheuseofmoderntechnologyto
facilitatethepublicairingofwhatwasprivateintheclassicalFridayCrabClubmodeldeveloped
andemployedbyVollmer.TheReduxmodelisamoveofdesperationbythosewhofeelthey
havenootherwayfortheirvoicetobeheard.Clearlytheremightoccasionallybeaproblematic
employeeineventhebestorganization.Yetonthewhole,wewouldnotexpecttoseethe
Reduxmodelemergewhenemployeesarecontentwithexistingstructuresandmechanisms.
TheNexuswithTrust&Transparency
Theopeningchapterofthisvolumepresentedtheideathattrustandtransparencyexist
ontwodimensionsinpolicing:internalandexternal.Thoughperhapsnotexplicitorintentional,
thetraditionalFridayCrabClubmodelgeneratedneededinternaltrustandtransparency.
Officerswereheldaccountable,disputescouldberesolved,andmanagementinteractedwith
linepersonneltoexchangeideas,fieldquestions,andaddressconcerns.Yettheproverbialdirty
laundrywithintheseprocesseswasairedawayfrompublicview.Inthisway,Vollmercould
generatestronginternaltrustandtransparency.Becausematterswereresolvedinhousethere
waslittlefoddertofuelmediascrutinyorlocalconcernwithpoliceoperations.Inthiswaythe
FridayCrabClubmodelhelpedgenerateexternaltrustandtransparencybyminimizingpublic
46
evidencethatcitizenshadaneedtobeconcernedwiththeBerkeleyPoliceDepartment.8
Healthyinternaloperationsarelikelytoengenderhealthyexternalrelations.Whentopagency
leadersseektoaddressinternalstrife,conflict,andcontroversyinahealthy,direct,and
functionalmanner,itmightbeexpectedthatorientationwill(moreoftenthannot)extend
outwardtothewaystrustandtransparencyarenurturedandmaintainedwiththecommunity
andotherexternalparties.
TheeasewithwhichofficerscanimplementtheReduxmodelamplifiestheimportance
ofmodernleadersattendingtointernaltrustandtransparency.Unlikepriorerasoftechnology,
officersdonothavetosufferinsilencewithintheworkplace.Someoneupsetanddiscontent
withaspectsoftheirorganizationhasanall-too-easywaytoventthatsituationnotsimplytoa
co-workerovercoffee,buttotheentireworld(perhapsevenwhileon-dutyusingasmartphone
ortablet).LeaderscannotcompletelycircumventtheprospectsthatofficerswillusetheRedux
model,nomatterhowhealthytheinternalaspectsoftheorganization.Butleaderscannot
pretendorpresumetheycanpreventtheuseofReduxmodelapproaches.Thetransparency
foundthroughoutthecontemporaryworldwillonlycontinuetoexpandandgrow.Theriseof
Reduxapproachesshouldreinforcethatwiseleaderswillstudyandconsiderhowtheymight
facilitateahealthyandfunctionalrevitalizationoftheFridayCrabClub.Technologyhasmade
theReduxmodelaweaponusedagainstagenciesandleaders.Thisdoesnothavetobethe
case.TechnologycanbeusetoreinvigorateandreinterprettheclassicalFridayCrabClubmodel
inawaythat,whilenotperfect(anditcertainlywasnotperfectinBPD100yearsago),canlead
togreaterinternaltrustandtransparencyintheworkplace.
8 To be sure, this does not suggest that citizens would be accurate in viewing BPD (or any other agency handling internal disputes in a private manner) as trustworthy and transparent. The absence of smoke does not always mean there is an absence of fire. It might be expected that suppressing public awareness of officer/organizational misdeeds is a temporary fix. Over time, it would be expected that efforts to preserve public trust by decreasing external transparency will fail and perhaps have worse consequences for the agency and its executives.
47
References
Carte,G.E.,&Carte,E.H.(1975).PolicereformintheUnitedStates:TheeraofAugust
Vollmer,1905-1932.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
Geller,W.A.(1997).Supposewewerereallyseriousaboutpolicedepartmentsbecoming
‘learningorganizations?’NationalInstituteofJusticeJournal,234,2-8.
Greene,J.A.(1999).Zerotolerance:PolicepoliciesandpracticesinNewYorkCity.Crime&
Delinquency,45,171-187.
Haberfeld,M.R.(2006).Policeleadership.UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:Pearson-PrenticeHall.
Kelling,G.L.,&Kliesmet,R.B.(1995).Policeunions,policeculture,theFridayCrabClub,and
policeabuseofforce.InW.A.Geller&H.Toch(Eds.)Andjusticeforall:
Understanding&controllingpoliceabuseofforce(pp.197-204).Washington,DC:
PoliceExecutiveResearchForum.
48
FosteringExternalTrustandTransparencythroughtheUseofPoliceAgencyWebsites
MicheleW.CovingtonandNicholasE.Libby
Introduction
SinceitsinceptionintheUnitedStates,oneoftheinherentproblemsinpolicinghas
beenthelackoftrustbetweenagenciesandthecommunitiestheyserve.Trustandoversight
wereprincipalissuesformanyyears.Thiswasespeciallytruebeforetheageofprofessionalism,
whenagenciesbegantocleanuptheirmisconduct,cutpoliticaltiesandfocusonpolicingasan
independentprofession.Thelawlessnessofthepolice,theirsystematiccorruption,and
nonenforcementandselectiveenforcementofthelawswasoneoftheparamountissuesin
municipalpoliticsduringthelate1800s(Uchida,2010).Historically,thetenuousrelationship
betweenofficerandconstituenthascausedmanyproblems,butinrecentyears,withincreased
concernoverethicsandtransparencyandwiththedawnofthecommunitypolicingera,this
stressandmistrusthascometolightandstartedtodecline.Betweentherecentpopularityof
community-orientedpolicingstrategiesandamoreferventpublicdemandforhonestand
trustworthypoliceagencies,methodstoincreaseexternaltransparencyhavebecomemajor
topicsofdebateforagenciestoday.Trustandtransparencyinpolicingarenotoptional;they
aremandatoryforpoliceagenciesinanysocietythatwishtodemonstratelegitimacy(Markham
andPunch2007,300).Fosteringtrustandtransparencyisanespeciallyimportanttopicinthe
currenteragiventheriseof24/7newsnetworksandproliferationofpersonalaccountsand
experiencesthatmaybereadilyaccessibleonlineinbothtextandvideoformats,eventhough
bothnewsandpersonalaccountsmayhavequestionableaccuracyorsimplynotbedeveloped
enoughtotelltheentirestory.Whiletherehasbeenawiderangeofthelevelofopenness
basedonagencylocation,size,andleadership,therehasbeenarecentgeneralshiftinattitude
thathasledmanyagenciestobemoreopenwiththeirinformationandtowantto
communicatewiththepublicdirectly.
49
Alongthesametimelinesastheattitudinalshifttomoreopenagencies,therehasbeen
anupswinginsocietalusesoftechnology.Withinrecentyears,wehavewitnessedamassive
proliferationofpersonalcomputers,tablets,andsmartphonesalongsideincreasesin
availabilityofpubliclyaccessiblebroadbandwirelessinternetaccessandhomeinternetuse.
AccordingtotheUSCensusBureau(File&Ryan,2014),asof2013,74.4%ofhouseholds
reportedhavinganinternetconnectioninthehome,atrendwhichhasbeenincreasingsteadily
sincethelate1990s(File,2013).
ThisriseintheuseoftechnologyhascompletelyalteredtheAmericanwayof
communication.Forexample,theproliferationofcellphoneshasmadeitpossibleformost
peopletogetintouchwithnearlyeveryonetheyknow,nomatterwheretheyare.
Furthermore,increasesintheavailabilityofwirelessnetworks,tablets,andsmartphoneshas
madeitpossibleforpeopletogatherinformationonlineevenwhenawayfromtheirhomeand
officecomputers.Relativelyrecentadvancesincommunication,suchase-mail,havebegunto
beovershadowedwiththeadventofsocialnetworkingsitesandtheabilitytosendtext
messagesratherthanmakephonecalls.Withtherecentexponentialincreaseincapabilityand
affordabilityoftechnology,manypoliceagencieswiththeresourcestosparehavefoundlittle
reasonnottomovealongwiththetechnologicalrevolution.Thisisaproactiveapproachfor
agenciestotake.Usingtheinternet,specificallyagencywebsites,tovoluntarilyprovide
informationtothepublicshowsgoodwillandportraysthepoliceagencyasmoretransparentto
theoutsideworld,especiallytothecommunityitserves.
Therecentmovementstowardmoretransparentpoliceagenciesandmorewidespread
useoftechnologyarestillgoingstrong,andthereisnoindicationthateitherofthesetrends
willslowdowninthenearfuture.Consideringthis,manyagenciesarenowexploringdifferent
optionstoopenlyshareinformationwiththepublic.Onewayforagenciestoaccomplishthis
goalhasbeenthedevelopmentanduseofindividualpoliceagencywebsites,whichhave
becomeverycommonoverthelastfewyears.One-hundredpercentofthelargestagenciesin
theU.S.andover40%ofallagenciesuseanagencywebsitetosomeextent(Kilburn&Krieger,
2014;Rosenbaum,etal.,2011).Thesesitescanbetailoredtoanyagency’sspecificneed,and
50
almostanyagency’sbudget.Therearemanyoptionsforexternalinformationsharingthrough
anagencywebsiteandmanyadvantagestosodoing.
StrategiesforExternalCommunication
Informationgatheringonpoliceagencywebsitesisbidirectional:citizenscangoonline
toreceiveinformationfromapoliceagencyortoprovideinformationtotheagency.Many
policeagencies,suchastheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/)and
theOrlandoPoliceDepartment(www.cityoforlando.net/police)havedesignedtheirwebsitesto
beabletoreceiveinformationfromthepublic,suchascrimetipsorservicerequeststhatdo
notnecessarilyrequireone-on-oneinteraction.Thisfreesuppersonnelresourcesandmay
makecitizensmorecomfortableprovidingtipsorotherinformationiftheyfeelagreater
degreeofanonymityanddonothavetofaceanofficerorotherpoliceemployeeinperson.It
mayleadcitizenstofeelthattheyaremoreinvestedintheircommunitiesandthattheyenjoy
moreofaworkingrelationshipwiththeirlocalpoliceagencyratherthanfeelingingrainedinthe
traditional‘usvs.them’mentality.
Usinganagencywebsitetocollectinformationfromcitizenscanbenefitanagency,but
agencywebsitesaremosthelpfulinprovidinginformation.Recently,moreandmoreagencies
havebeguntousetheirwebsitesasadirectlineofcommunicationwiththepublic.Historically,
themainoutletofinformationaboutlocalpolicehasbeenlocalmedia,whichwasnotalways
anidealsituation.Thequalityofrelationshipsbetweenpoliceagenciesandmediaoutletsvaries
widelyfromjurisdictiontojurisdiction,andtherehaveoftenbeenproblemswhenastorywas
reportedinabiasedmannerorwhenthelocalnewsagencyranastorywithoutallofthe
pertinentinformation.Problemsstemmingfrommediacoverageofpolicestorieshaveled
agenciestofindtheirownmeansofcommunicatingwiththepublic;intheinformationagethis
hasmeantrapidlyincreasingtheuseofwebsites.
Furthermore,inmanyareasthetypesofinformationprovidedtothepublicbyinternet
isfarbroaderthaninthepastwhenwebsitessimplyshowedapictureofthechief,theagency’s
51
address,andaphonenumbertocalltobecomeanofficer.Agenciesnowprovidesuchawide
arrayofinformationthroughtheirwebsites,suchascrimemaps(Louisville(KY)MetroPolice
www.louisvilleky.gov/MetroPolice/)andmapsofcallsforservice(ColoradoSprings(CO)Police
www.springsgov.com/police),linkstocurrentagencyinitiatives(Phoenix(AZ)Police
http://phoenix.gov/police),andevenselectedinformationfromincidentreports(Madison(WI)
Policewww.cityofmadison.com/incidentReports).Policeagencywebsitesarenowusedto
publicizemostwantedsuspects(Roanoke(VA)Policewww.roanokeva.gov›Departmentsand
Divisions›Police),missingpersons(FortSmith(AR)Policewww.fortsmithpd.org),andto
providelinkstowebsitesforsexoffenderregistriesandotherpertinentlawenforcement
agencies(MetropolitanPolice(Washington,DC)http://mpdc.dc.gov).
Inadditiontocrimemapsandincidentreports,agenciescanmaketheirownrecordings
ofeventssuchasnewsinterviewswithpoliceofficialsandmeetingsbetweenpoliceofficials
andthegeneralpublicandposttheseonagencywebsites.Notonlydoesthisbroadenthe
scopeofinformationavailabletothepublic,butitcanalsoserveasarecordofpolice
interactionthatisuneditedbyathirdparty,suchasthenewsmedia.Tofurtherfosterpublic
andpoliceinteraction,manyagencieshavemadeuseofsocialnetworkingwebsitessuchas
FacebookandTwittertoprovideinformationtothepublicorreceivefeedbackfromtheir
constituents.Insomecases,thisroutecanbebeneficialtosmallerlawenforcementagencies
thatdonothavetheresourcestohostandmaintaintheirownwebsite.
AdvantagesofWebsiteCommunication
Thetypesofinformationprovidedbypolicewebsiteshaveincreasedsignificantlyin
recentyearsandbyallindicationstheywillcontinuetodosointhefuture.Inlargepart,thisis
becausetherearesignificantadvantagestothismethodofdirectcommunicationwiththe
public.Intermsofexternaltrustandtransparencyalone,theinternetisanexcellentrouteof
communication.ManyAmericansnowgoonlinetosearchforalmostanyinformationthey
needanditbehoovesagenciestobeasourceofthatinformation.Whenacitizengoesonline
andtypesthenameoftheirlocalpoliceagencyintoasearchengine,avideoofafightbetween
52
anofficerandacitizenonYouTubedoesnothavetobetheonlysourceofinformation;thisis
anexcellentopportunityforcitizenstofindalinktoastoryontheagencywebsiteabouta
recentsuccessfuldrugraidthatmadethecommunityasaferplace.Sooftenthepubliconly
seesthenegativeaspectsofpoliceworkandexamplesofbrokentrustbetweenofficersand
theircommunities.Agencywebsitescanprovideanoutletwheregoodnewscanbeshared,as
well.
Usingawebsitetodisseminateinformationcansaveagencyresourcesbecauseauser-
friendlywebsitecanpreventanemployeefromhavingtoanswersomanyinquiriespersonally.
Asurveyof1,379policeagenciesservingapopulationof25,000ormore,foundthatalmost
threeoutoffourchiefsreceivedstatisticsrequestsatleastmonthly(JRSA,2005).Almostonein
threereceivedtheserequestsatleastweekly.Requestsforsimplestatisticsandmorecouldbe
handledthroughawebsiteinwhichthepubliccouldretrievethedesiredinformation
themselves.Thiswouldrequirerelativelylittlemaintenancewhenupandrunningandthe
agencywouldhavefullauthorityoverwhattypesofinformationtorelease.Obviously,
disseminatinginformationondemandthroughawebsiteismorelikelytobecosteffectivefor
largeragenciesservinglargerpopulations,buttherearesomebenefitsthatapplyregardlessof
agencysize.Anytimeanagencywillinglyputsinformationoutforopenpublicconsumption,it
reflectsgoodwillonthatagency.Theagencyappearsopenandwillingtosharewiththepublic
andestablishesadirectlineofcommunicationbyusingamediumthroughwhichmanycitizens
enjoycommunicating.
ChallengesofWebsiteCommunication
Ofcourse,thereareinherentdangersinsharinginformationwiththepublicviawebsite,
somemoreproblematicthanothers.Obviously,policeagenciesmustcarefullycontrolthedata
thattheyreleasetothepublicfortacticalandsafetyreasons,aswellasforethicalandlegal
concerns.Someonemustapprovewhatinformationisreleasedandwhatistobeheldprivately.
Withthesedecisions,itisimportantnottochooseinformationtoreleasebasedonbiases
towardtheagency.Agenciesmustnotusetheirwebsitesasfalsetransparencytogarner
53
goodwillfromthepublicwhentheyareactuallyreleasingbiasedinformation;thiswillonlylead
tomistrustbetweentheagencyandthepublic.Alongthesamelinesofchoosingwhichdatato
release,thereisalwaysariskthattheinformationwillbemisinterpreted.Itiscrucialtokeep
theinformationsimpleandeasytounderstandandtoprovideexplanationsanddefinitions
whereverappropriate.Furthermore,thereisoftenatimelaginthedatadisplayedonthe
websitebecauseofthetimeittakestogetthedataputintothesystemandontothesiteafter
ithasbeenapprovedforrelease.Itisimportanttoavoidconfusionbyclearingstatinghowfar
behindthecurrentdatetheinformationisandtoprovideabriefexplanationforthegapin
layman’sterms.
Datamayhaveinaccuracies;itisofutmostimportancetoensurethequalityofthe
informationreleasedasmuchaspossible.Inalargeagencyreleasinglargeamountsof
informationthroughtheweb,someerrorsarelikely.Evenagencieswithconscientious
employeeswhodoublecheckthedatabeingreleasedwillprobablyfindanoccasionalminor
error.Thismaycauseethicalproblemsifincorrectinformationisreleased,butitcouldalsolead
tolegalproblems.Itmaybebeneficialforagenciestoconsultalegalauthorityabouttheir
responsibilitiesandabouttheoptionofincludingonthewebsiteadisclaimeragainsterrors
madeingoodfaith.
Anotherchallengeforanagencythatwishestocommunicatethroughawebsitemaybe
cost.Althoughhavingawebsitesetupisrelativelyinexpensivenow,manyagenciesare
strugglinginthecurrenteconomytofindfundsinthebudgettoremainstaffed,muchlessto
expandthetechnologyunderuse.Forlargeragencies,usingawebsiteforinformationsharing
willbecosteffectiveasthiswillfreeupmanpowertobeusedelsewhereratherthan
respondingtocallsforinformation,service,orcomplaints.Smalleragencies,however,maynot
receiveasmanyrequestsforinformation.Itmaystillbehoovesmalleragenciestohavea
websiteforexposure,butagenciesthatservesmallerpopulations(andusuallyhavesmaller
budgets)maychoosetoofferlessfeaturesonawebsitethanlargeragencies,allowingforvery
littlemaintenanceoncethesiteisupandrunning.Thiscanprovidebasicinformationforthe
publicthroughamediumthatmanycitizensnowprefertousewithalmostnocostafterthe
54
initialsetupofthesite.Furthermore,asmentionedpreviously,agenciescanalsoopttotake
advantageoffreeservicesprovidedbysocialnetworkingwebsitessuchasFacebookand
Twitterinordertomaintainanonlinepresencewiththepublicortosupplementtheirexisting
website.
AfinalpotentialissuetoconsideristhatwhileinternetuseisquitehighintheUnited
States,itisnotamethodofcommunicationthateverypersonuses.Theuseofawebsiteto
shareinformationandincreasetransparencywillreachmanycitizens,butnotallofthem.
Agenciesthatchoosetousethismodeofcommunicationshouldkeepinmindthatawebsiteis
anadditiontoothersourcesofpubliccommunication;itisnotabasestrategy.
Conclusions
Therecentpushtowardmoreaccountabilityandtransparencybetweenpoliceagencies
andthepublichasledmanyagenciestolookfornewandinnovativewaystoshareinformation
andbeopenwiththecitizensintheirjurisdictions.Onemethodofcommunicationthatmany
agencieshavechosenistheagencywebsite.Whiletheremaybesomeareasofconcern
regardingsharinginformationpubliclythroughawebsite,carefulplanninganddecision-making
abouttheinformationtobesharedcaneliminatemostofthesepotentialproblems.Atpresent,
however,researchhasfoundthateasily-accessiblewebsitesdoinfluencepublicperceptionina
positiveway(Kilburn&Krieger,2014).Thisstrategyseemstobeworkingwellforagencies,and
theinternetsavvypublicappearstoenjoycommunicatinginthisfashion.
Asagenciesgarnermoreandmoredatathroughtheuseofnewtechnologiessuchas
crimemappingandanalysistools,thereismuchmoreinformationtobeshared,andmuchofit
canbeveryusefultothepublic.Informationthatischosencarefullysoasnottocompromise
security,confidentiality,orthemissionofthejob,canbesharedrelativelyeasilyand
inexpensivelythroughwebsites,oftensavingagencyfundswhilesimultaneouslyfostering
goodwillandtrustamonglawenforcementagenciesandtheirconstituencies.Withtherapid
growthintechnologyinrecentyearsandthepushtowardmoreaccountabilityamongpolice
55
agencies,itmaysoonbeallbutrequiredthatuseofagencywebsitesbepartofthetoolkitused
bypoliceintheirinteractionswiththepublic.Unfortunately,recentresearchsuggeststhat
manyagencieswithwebsitesunderutilizethem(Rosenbaum,etal.,2011),indicatingalackof
foresightandproactivityinkeepingupwithexistingandemergingsocialtrendswithinthe
generalpublic.
References
File,T.(2013).ComputerandinternetuseintheUnitedStates:Populationcharacteristics.Washington,DC:U.S.CensusBureau,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce.
File,T.,&Ryan,C.(2014).ComputerandinternetaccessintheUnitedStates:2013.Americancommunitysurveyreports.Washington,DC:U.S.CensusBureau,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce.
JusticeResearchandStatisticsAssociation.(2005).Useofdatainpolicedepartments:Asurveyofpolicechiefsanddataanalysts.Washington,DC:JRSA.
Kilburn,M.,&Krieger,L.(2014).Policinginaninformationage:TheprevalenceofstateandlocallawenforcementagenciesutilisingtheWorldWideWebtoconnecttothecommunity.InternationalJournalofPoliceScience&Management,16(3),221-227.
Markham,G.,&Punch,M.(2007).Embracingaccountability:Thewayforward—partone.Policing:AJournalofPolicyandPractice,1(3),300-308.
Rosenbaum,D.P.,Graziano,L.M.,Stephens,C.D.,&Schuck,A.M.(2011).Understandingcommunitypolicingandlegitimacy-seekingbehaviorinvirtualreality:Anationalstudyofmunicipalpolicewebsites.PoliceQuarterly,14(1),25-47.
Uchida,C.D.(2010).ThedevelopmentoftheAmericanpolice:Anhistoricaloverview.InR.G.DunhamandG.P.Alpert(eds.)Criticalissuesinpolicing:Contemporaryreadings(5thed.)(pp.17-36).LongGrove,IL:Waveland.
56
SocialMedia:Use,PolicyandGuidelines
TobyM.Finnie
Theproliferationofnewandemergingsocialnetworkingtechnologiespresents
significantchallengesforpoliceadministratorsandmanagers.Witheachtechnological
breakthrough,administratorsshouldforestalluseandpracticesthatmayreflectnegatively
uponthedepartmentanditsemployees.Usepoliciesshouldbewrittenonlyafterdraftersgain
abasicunderstandingofhowthesocialmediaapplicationworks,andariskassessmentis
conducted.
Onecouldnot,forexample,draftusepolicyforatelephonewithoutfirstunderstanding
itsoperation:
• Lifttheheadsetfromthecradle
• Listenfora“dialtone”
• Enteranaccesscode(bydialorbypushbutton)
• Listenfora“handshake”(ringingtone)
• Waitforaresponsefromthepartycalled
• Initiateandcompletetheconversation
• Disconnectthe“handshake”byreturningthehandsettothecradle.
Termsofusetomitigaterisksandliabilitymightrequirethatofficersandstaffmakeandreceive
nopersonalcalls,limitlongdistancecalls,refusecollectcalls,andlogallincomingandoutgoing
calls.Officersmightalsoberemindedtomaintainaprofessionaldemeanorduringalltelephone
conversations.
Failuretoanalyzeemergingtechnologies,toevaluateforpossibleuseorabuseby
personnel,andtoprepareuseguidelinesforbothon-andoff-dutypersonnelmayleadto
unintendedandpotentiallycostlyoutcomes:
57
• ApolicedepartmentinthePacificNorthwestissuedcellulartelephonestoitsofficers
withnoguidelinesforuse.Administratorswerestunnedtolearnthat—amere30days
afterissuance—officershadexceededthedepartment’scontractedusageallowance
fortheentireyear!
• Threepoliceofficersweresuspendedwithoutpayandorderedtoundergosensitivity
trainingaftertheydiscussedpolicingdutiesandpostedoffensiveremarksabout
homosexualsanddevelopmentallydisabledpersonsonaMyspace.comwebsite.
(AssociatedPress,2006)9
• Acriminaldefenseattorneysuccessfullyusedanofficer’scommentspostedonasocial
networkingwebsitetoinfertothejurythattheofficerusedexcessiveforceduring
arrestofthesuspect.Duringtestimony,thejurylearnedthattheofficerhadsethis
MySpace.commoodto“devious”andhadposted“VaughaniswatchingTrainingDayto
brushuponproperpoliceprocedure”onhisFacebookhomepageonthesamedayhe
arrestedthesuspect.Theofficer
alsowrote,“Ifhewantedtotune
himupsome,heshouldhave
delayedcuffinghim”and“ifyou’re
goingtohitacuffedsuspect,at
leastgetyourmoney’sworth
’causenowhe’sgoingtoget
disciplined….”(Dwyer,2009)10
Theofficerhaduploadedimages
ofhimselfinbodybuildingposesthat
couldbeconstruedas“intimidating.”That
9 Associated Press (2006, July 7) Police suspended over MySpace comments. KXNet.com North Dakota News. Retrieved October 22, 2009 from <http://www.kxnet.com/custom404.asp?404;http://www.kxnet.com/t/drunken-driving/20905.asp> 10 Dwyer, Jim. (2009, March 10) The Officer Who Posted Too Much on MySpace. New York Times. Retrieved October 21, 2009 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/nyregion/11about.html?_r=3>
An officer’s photo images and comments posted on his social media web site came back to haunt him during trial testimony.
Photograph Source: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/03/13/1236447441188.htmll
58
imageaidedthedefendantandjurytopositivelyidentifytheofficerastheownerofthe
website.Thejuryacquittedtheaccused.
Inthesituationsdescribedabove,unnecessaryexpense,negativepublicity,andan
undesirableoutcomeattrialcouldhavebeenavoidedhadpolicemanagersproactivelyworked
todevelopguidelinesadvisingofficersandstaffonacceptableusesofnewtechnology.
Consistencyinenforcementofclearlywrittensocialmediausepolicieswillhelptoprotectthe
agencyagainstliabilityandreduceemployee’misunderstandingsaboutexpectationsofprivacy.
“WeareallPIOsnow”
Thedaysofdepartment-authorizedPublicInformationOfficersfunnelingtheflowof
informationtomediaandthepublicareover.Wisepoliceadministratorsunderstandthatnow
anyofficerorstaffmemberisaPIO,forbetterorforworse.Itshouldberememberedthat
newsreportersandjournalistsregularlyconductonlinesearchesforbackgroundinformation
onpoliceofficers,suspects,andwitnesses—andsodoordinarycitizens,criminals,anddefense
attorneys.Inthepast,newspaperandmagazinearticlestendedtobecomelostindustyold
librarystacks,butthatisnolongerthecase.InformationpostedontheInternetoftenremains
accessiblelongafterausertakesactivestepstodeletedataandimagestheypreviously
uploaded.Despitepopularbelief,websitesthatrestrictaccesstousersthroughlog-inpass
codesmaynotprovidesufficientbarrierstopublicscrutiny.
InJuly2009threeorganizations(NationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficer,
localchapteroftheNationalBlackPoliceAssociationandNAACP)filedaclassactionlawsuitin
federalcourtagainstthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartmentforallowingitsofficerstopost
“blatantlyracist…andoffensive”contentonapopularwebsitedevotedtopublicsafety.Also
namedasadefendantwas“McQ,”analiasallegedlybelongingtoasergeantwithPhiladelphia
policeandadministrator-moderatorofthewebsite“Domelights.com.”Thelawsuitrequested
thecourttoremedy:
“…invidious racial discrimination on the part of the Philadelphia Police
59
Department, inallowing,throughcustom,practiceandpolicy,agroupofwhitePhiladelphia Police Officers, including officers of supervisory rank, to operate,publish,disseminateandperpetuateduringtheiremploymentaspoliceofficers,bothonandoff duty, ablatantly racist, anti-minority, disgusting andoffensivepublic InternetwebsitecalledDomelights.comthathasbecomean insult toallAfrican-AmericanPoliceOfficers,andhascreatedaraciallyharassingandhostileworkenvironment….”(GuardianCivicLeague,Inc.2009)11
ThelawsuitallegedthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartment“…evidencedapolicy,practiceor
customofallowingtheuseoftheircomputersforaraciallyhostilepurpose,andallowingits
employeePoliceOfficerstoengagepublically[sic]inraciallyoffensiveandhostilecommentary
andpostings”(GuardianCivicLeague,Inc.2009).12
Accordingtosomelegalanalysts,asuccessfuloutcometothelawsuitwouldhingeon
whetherthePhiladelphiaPoliceDepartmentimplicitlypermitteditsofficerstopostcomments
viacity-ownedcomputers,orwhethercommandstaffwereawareofanddisregarded
informationthatofficerswerepostingraciallyoffensivecommentswhileonduty.Afterthe
lawsuitwasfiled,additionalriskmanagementproblemsbecameapparent:onceidentity
becomesknown,“McQ’s”susceptibilitytoretaliationmaydirectlyeffectstaffingassignments.
Alsoofconcernispotentialretaliationagainstotherofficers:
…[S]omeone outside the department has expressed an intent to operate awebsite identifying the Domelights regulars — complete with shifts, stationassignments, carnumbers andbadgenumbers—and that the command stafffearsescalationandthereforewantstodefusethissituation.(Post,2009)13
Notonlydoesthelossoftrustdisruptpolicedepartmentoperations,mistrustandracial
biasesmayflow—likeaminitsunami—intothecommunity,carryingwithitseedsofcivil
unrest.Someadministratorswilldecidetoforbidanyuseofsocialmediabutthatmaynotbe
thewisestcourseofactiontotake.Policemanagersshouldnotforestallsubordinates’useof
11 Guardian Civic League, Inc., et al. v. Philadelphia Police Department, et al. (2009, July 15) in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Page 19. Retrieved October 17, 2009 from http://www.whyy.org/news/itsourcity/complaint.pdf 12 Guardian Civic League, Inc., et al. v. Philadelphia Police Department, et al. (2009, July 15) 13 Post, David. (2009, July 26). The Volokh Conspiracy - More From the City That Brought You the First Amendment. Message by “Authur Kirkland” posted at 7.26.2009 2:15 pm to <http://volokh.com/posts/1248534075.shtml>
60
socialnetworkingtechnologiesbecausetobeeffectiveenforcersofthepeaceinthe
TechnologyAge,officersmustbecomeasfamiliarwithonlinecommunitiesastheyarewith
brickandmortarcommunities.Instead,managersshoulddeveloppolicythatguidesofficersto
maintainprofessionaldemeanorwhenusingsocialmediaapplications.
InCops2.0,guestbloggerLauriStevensdescribessevencoreprinciplesofficersshould
bemindfulofwhenusingsocialmediaapplications.Summarized,theyare:
Integrity.Whetheron-oroff-duty,officersshouldstrivetobeethicalandhonestintheir
communications,rememberingthattheyareheldtoahighstandardinthecommunity.
UseDisclaimers.Officersshouldclearlyidentifycommentsastheirown.
Identity.Officersshouldusetheirrealnameswhenrepresentingtheiragencies.
Department-sanctionedtools.Officersshouldbeencouragedtouseagency-approved
socialmediaandtheiruseshouldbecloselysupervised.
Competence.Officersshoulddemonstrateproficiencyintheiruseofsocialmedia
applications.
Commandstaffresponsibility.Policemanagersandadministratorsshouldavoidusing
publiclyaccessiblesocialmediatocommunicatewithofficersandstaff.
Training.Agenciesshouldprovidesocialmediatrainingforofficersandstaff.(Stevens,
2009)14
Socialmediaapplicationshaveprofoundlychangedthewaytheworldcommunicates.
Thereisnogoingback.Lawenforcementmustadaptorriskbecomingobsolete.Propertraining
andwell-craftedusepolicieswillmakeitpossibleforpolicetobetterservetheircommunities,
bothinthecorporealworldandtheonlineone.
14 Stevens, Lauri. (2009, August 17) Guest post: Social media policies for law enforcement. Cops2.0. Retrieved October 24, 2009 from http://cops2point0.com/2009/08/17/guest-post-social-media-policies-for-law-enforcement/
61
SocialMedia:ConsiderationsforBackgroundandInternalAffairsInvestigators
Policemanagersintendingtoconductinquiriesinvolvingemployees’useofsocialmedia
ortoreviewapplicants’socialnetworkingwebsitesshouldbeawareoflegalramificationsand
potentialexposuretocivilsuit,especiallyifitisdecidedtocompelemployeesorapplicantsto
provideuseridentificationandpasswordstotheirsocialnetworkingsites.
A search is constitutional if it does not violate a person's “reasonable” or“legitimate” expectation of privacy. (Katz v. United States, 1967)15This inquiryembracestwodiscretequestions:first,whethertheindividual'sconductreflects“an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, whether theindividual'ssubjectiveexpectationofprivacy is“onethatsociety ispreparedtorecognizeas‘reasonable.’”(USDepartmentofJustice,2002)16Thereisasyetnohardandfastguidelinethatclarifieswhetheranexpectationof
privacyinelectronicallystoredinformationisconstitutionallyreasonable:
Todeterminewhetheran individualhasa reasonableexpectationofprivacy ininformation stored in a computer, it helps to treat the computer like a closedcontainer suchasabriefcaseor file cabinet. TheFourthAmendmentgenerallyprohibits lawenforcement fromaccessing and viewing information stored in acomputer without a warrant if it would be prohibited from opening a closedcontainerandexaminingitscontentsinthesamesituation.(U.S.DepartmentofJustice,2002)17TraditionalFourthAmendmentprinciples,suchasthosegoverningclosedcontainers,
applytodigitalevidence.Backgroundinvestigators,intheireagernesstoexamineapplicants’
socialnetworkingsites,shouldnotlosesightofthefactthatevenduringahomevisit,
investigatorscannotreadpersonaldiariesandcorrespondence,flipthroughphotograph
albums,orperusedocumentsstoredinfilecabinets.Neithershouldtheycapriciouslyinspect
digitalfilesstoredonanapplicant’scomputer.
15 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967). Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute. Retrieved October 7, 2009 from <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-us-cite?389+347> 16 US Department of Justice (2002) Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations. United States Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division. Retrieved October 7, 2009 from <http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_IB_>17 U.S. Department of Justice, (2002)
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Severalfederalstatutesgovernaccesstoanddisclosureofcertaintypesofdigital
information:
• ElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct
• WiretapAct
• PenRegisterandTrapandTraceStatute
• StoredWireandElectronicCommunicationsAct
• PrivacyProtectionAct
Statestatutesmaybemorerestrictivethancorrespondingfederallaws.Policemanagersshould
befamiliarwithbothfederalandstatestatutesbecauseviolationsmayresultinevidentiary
challengesorcivilsuit.
Somedatastoredinsocialnetworkingsitesmaybeprivilegedorprotected.For
example,thesitemaycontainreferencestoreligioustexts,discussionsaboutreligiousbeliefs,
ormessagesfromareligiousadvisor.Theuserinquestionmayhaveexchangedemailwithan
attorneyaboutalawsuitorthedraftingofawill.Theusermayhavereceivedatextmessage
sentviaasmartphonefromhisphysician.Investigatorsshouldtakecaretobecognizantofthe
potentialforprivilegedinformationtoexistonsocialmediasitesunderreviewandtocomply
withapplicablelegallimitationsregardingsuchinformation.Onewaytoreduceriskwouldbe
tohaveanindependentreviewerexaminesocialmediaofapplicantsandreportfindingsthat
donotincludeprivilegedorprotectedclassinformationtothehiringboard.
Inthecourseofconductingareviewofanindividual’ssocialnetworkingsites,evidence
ofacrimemaybediscovered.Inthatcase,theinvestigatorshouldimmediatelydiscontinuethe
review,treatthecomputerasadigitalcrimescene,andobtainasearchwarrant.Forabasic
overviewofissuesregardingcareandhandlingofdigitalevidence,seeElectronicCrimeScene
Investigation:AGuideforFirstResponders(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
sum/187736.htm).Thepotentialtofollowuponanycriminalcasesthatmaybediscoveredare
notlikelytobecompromisedifreviewsofsocialmediasitesaretreatedasiftheywerecriminal
investigationsfromtheonset.
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Employeesorapplicantswhofeeltheyhavebeendiscriminatedagainstorwrongly
accusedofmisconductmayopttofilecomplaintsundertheNationalLaborRelationsAct,Civil
RightsAct,orclaimwhistleblowerprotection.Clearandconcisepoliciesthatbothguideand
protectinvestigatorsareneededtohelpguardagainstfederalandstateprivacylawviolations.
Carefullydrafted,wellthoughtoutconsentformsarealsoneededtoensureapplicants,
employees,theagencyanditsinvestigatorsareprotected.
InvestigativePolicyandProcedure
Procedureandpolicyforgainingaccesstoapplicants’andemployees’socialmedia
websitesarenotyetstandardized.Prudentadministratorswillproceedwithcaution,
rememberingthatanagency’sneedtoknowdoesnotoutweighapplicants’oremployees’
rightstoprivacy.Investigatorsshouldnotcastasidetrainingandstandardinvestigative
practicesforlackofcommonlyacceptedpoliciesandproceduresforsocialmedia
investigations.Thereisnoexcuseforinvestigatorstoactoutsideoftheirexistingtraining.
Humanresourcebackgroundinvestigatorsarecurrentlyexploringthreeapproaches:
• TorequestuserIDsandpasswordssothattheycanloginto“private”compartmentsof
socialmediawebsites
• Toeschewpasscodeaccessandtoonlysearchforandexaminepubliclyaccessible
socialmediasites.
• Tohavetheapplicantoremployeeaddtheinvestigatorasa“friend”togainaccessto
privatesectionsofsocialnetworkingsites.
Theagencyshouldworkwithlegalcounseltoensurethatconsentformsarecarefullydrafted,
takingintoconsiderationnondisclosureoutsidetheagencyorhumanresourceprovider,and
includelimitations(suchasnotfollowinglinkstoothersitesincluding“friends”sites).
Proceduralguidelinesshouldalsoalertinvestigatorstobeawareofandadheretothird
partyproviders’termsofservice(TOS)agreements.Forexample,both“Facebook.com”and
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“Google.com”TOSagreementsrestrictusersfromcertainactivities.Facebook's"Registration
andAccountSecurity"TOSstipulates:
1.Youwillnot...createanaccountforanyoneotherthanyourselfwithoutpermission.
[...]
6.Youwillnotshareyourpassword,letanyoneelseaccessyouraccount,ordoanything
elsethatmightjeopardizethesecurityofyouraccount.(See
<http://www.facebook.com/terms.php>)
Google's"PasswordsandAccountSecurity"TOSstate:
6.1Youagreeandunderstandthatyouareresponsibleformaintainingthe
confidentialityofpasswordsassociatedwithanyaccountyouusetoaccesstheServices.
(See<http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS>)
Investigatorsshouldalsorefrainfromexpandingthereviewoutsideoftheuser’s
website,forexample,byclickingonlinks,activatingvideooraudiofiles,orvisitingtheuser’s
friends’socialmediasites.Finally,investigatorsshouldbeawarethatauser’ssitemayhave
beenalteredbyanunauthorizedintruderwhocannoteasilybeidentified.Byadheringto
carefullydraftedoperationalpolicy,agenciescanavoidhiringdiscriminationclaimsandstill
conductthoroughbackgroundorinternalinvestigationsofsocialmediasites.
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TheExecutionofFourPoliceOfficers:
LessonsfromaSocialMediaTempest
TobyM.FinnieandEarlMoulton
TheNov.29,2009,murdersofSgt.MarkRenningerandOfficersTinaGriswold,
GregRichardsandRonaldOwensweretheworstincidentofviolenceagainstlaw
enforcementinstatehistory,andthemanhuntthatfollowedwasthelargest
fugitivesearchinstatehistory.—SeattleTimes
Whetherlocal,nationalorinternational,highprofileeventscapturethepublic’s
attentionandarousedesirestoparticipateinmeaningfulways.Socialmediaenablesand
facilitatescommunityparticipationatlevelsheretoforeunimaginable.WebsitessuchasTwitter,
Facebook,Flicker,andYoutubewereprimarilydesignedforonlinesocializing.However,these
andotherapplicationsandwebsitesalsoempoweruserscaughtupincrisestosharetext,
image,video,andaudiofilesinrealtime.Thissharingoccurswellbeforepublicinformation
officersorconventionalnewsmediacanobtain,processandpublishthedata.TheseWeb2.0
toolshaveturnedpassiveobserversintoactivereporters.Nolongercontenttostand
submissivelybehindthecrimescenetape,today’snet-savvycitizenjournalistscanunflinchingly
insertthemselvesintoinvestigativeprocesses,sometimesenhancingandsometimesinterfering
withpoliceoperations.
InWashingtonstate,theexecution-stylemurderoffourpoliceofficersandtheensuing
searchforthefugitiveshooterignitedafirestormofsocialnetworkingactivitiesandintroduced
anewparadigmforlawenforcement:It’snolongercrowdmanagement;nowit’scloud
management.
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TheInternet“Cloud”
CaseStudy:TheIncident
At8:15AMonaquietSundaymorning,MauriceClemmonsstrodeintoacoffeeshop,
shotandkilledfouruniformedLakewoodpoliceofficerswhiletheyworkedontheirlaptop
computers.Itwasatargetedattackagainstthepatrolsquadandtheirsergeant:Sgt.Mark
RennigerandOfficerTinaGriswoldwerekilledbeforetheycouldreact.OfficerRonaldOwens
waskilledashephysicallyengagedwithClemmons.PolicedeterminedthatOfficerGreg
RichardsalsostruggledwithClemmonsandfiredhisweapon,woundingClemmons(itwaslater
confirmed),beforebeingshotandkilled.WitnessesobservedClemmonsgettingintothe
passengersideofawhitepickuptruckandfleeingthescene.A40-hourlongmulti-jurisdictional
manhuntensuedinvolving600officersfrom16local,state,andfederalagencies.
TheSeattleTimesnewspapergavewidecoveragetothecrimeanditsaftermath,bothin
printandonline,usingsocialmediatoolssuchasTwitter,Facebookand“GoogleWave,”an
experimentalwebapplication(withfurtherdevelopmentcurrentlysuspended):
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AGoogleWavestartedbytheSeattleTimesisbeingusedtotrackinformationaboutthesearchforamansuspectedofkillingfourpoliceofficers.It'sthefirstGoogle-supportedmanhuntandfinallyadecentuseforWave.DuetoGoogleWave'srealtimeupdatingcapabilities,thisisactuallyaratherfittinguse.Peoplearepostingeverythingtheyknow,frominformationaboutthesuspect(rightdowntohisoldpicturesandTwitteraccounts)tonewsfrompolicescanners.AGoogleMapofthemanhuntisalsobeingmaintainedwiththemajoreventsofthesearch.(Golijan,2009)
Grippedbytheunfoldingdrama,citizenjournalistsimmediatelybeganpostingbriefmessages
toTwitteraccounts,includingthehashtag“#WAshooting”setupbytheSeattleTimes.Editors
creditedtenstaffers’tweetswithdrivingarecord-breaking3.3millionpageviewsto
Seattletimes.com,usingthelinkedTwitteraccounttopushupdatedinformationouttoreaders
(Cook,2009).ThesuccessoftheSeattleTimesindrivingtraffic,andtherebyrevenue,means
thatthismodelisapermanent,notephemeral,phenomenon.Theresultwasapowerful
informationflow,combiningresourcesfromseveralmediaoutlets,governmententities,and
ordinarycitizenswhoaddedfirstpersoninsights.
Thefirstindicationofaparadigmshiftincrisismanagementaroseearlyinthehuntfor
thefugitive.Anhouraftertheshooting,apickuptruckmatchingthedescriptionofthevehicle
usedinthegetawaywasspottedinaparkinglotnearthecrimescene:
StreetsaroundthecoffeeshopwereblockedofflateSundaymorning,andapolicehelicopterhoveredoveralargecrowdofinvestigators.TVvideoshowedpolicetakingpossessionofapickuptruckparkedinagrocerystoreinParkland(Johnson,2009).
Passersbynotedtheintenseinterestbythepoliceandusedcellularphonestosnappicturesof
thepickuptruckanduploadtheimagestoFacebook,Twitter,Flicker,personalblogs,andother
socialmediaaccounts.Beforelawenforcementcouldsendoutapressreleaseandbeforethe
mediacouldeditandbroadcastthevideotape,imagesofthetruckwere‘outinthewild.’This
clearlyraisedthelikelihoodthatrelativesandfriendsrenderingaidtothefugitivemightlearn
aboutandalerthimtothediscoveryoftheabandonedpickuptruck.Ontheotherhand,the
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informationservedtonotifythecitizenrytodiscontinuethecrowd-sourcedsearchforthe
vehicleandtoslowtheunrelatedreportingofwhitepickuptrucksflowingtolawenforcement.
Anadditionalpieceofinformationabouta‘personofinterest’brokeontheInternet
beforelawenforcementhadanopportunitytopubliclyannounceit.Inanafter-eventanalysis,
RenaySanMiguel(2009)explained:
TheSeattleTimes’fact-checkingandsource-workingcametotheforeSundayafternoon,whenitsWebsiteendedupidentifyingasuspect--beforethePierceCountySheriff'swerereadytorevealthatinformation.…InbetweenupdatesfromPierceCountySheriff'sspokespersonEdTroyer,IcheckedSeattleTimes.comandsawonthefrontpagethatreportershadconfirmationonasuspectname--MauriceClemmons,a37-year-oldwithalongstringofconvictionsinArkansasandWashingtonstates.However,Troyerhadyettonameasuspect.I'llswearonastackofAssociatedPressstylebooksthatmeresecondsafterthatstoryappearedonline,reportersatthecommandpostweregettingtextmessagesfromassignmentdesks,andtweetswereflyingwithlinkstothestory.Troyerwasforcedtosteptothemicrophonesabout15minutesafterInoticedtheWebpage,confirmingtheTimes'storybysayingsomethingtotheeffectthat"wehadtodothisbeforewewerequiteready."Atatelevisedpressconference,PierceCountySheriffPublicInformationOfficerEd
Troyerannounced:
"I know that someof youhavehad this name, and I appreciate that youheldbackonituntilwedidsomeoperationsbecausewedon'twanttogetanybodyhurtorjeopardizeit.We’restill inthemiddleofthoseoperationsbutweknowthecatisoutofthebag(sotospeak)onhisname,sowewantedeverybodytohave it at once. ...We’re not going to elaborate anymore; you guys knowwecan't.Weweren'teventotallyreadytodothisyet.Wewantedabitmoretimetoconfirmsomethings;we'restillintheprocessofconfirmingthings.Wewanttomake sure thatwehave everything accurate and, at this point, that'swhatwe'resaying, thathe'sapersonof interest. Ican'tchange ituntilwegetmoreinformationandthatmayhappenvery,veryquickly.”(TyneRoseMedia,2009)TheavailabilityofsensitiveinformationontheInternetposesongoingissuesforlaw
enforcement.TheverylegitimateconcernsalludedtobyTroyerremainedevenafter
confirmingthesuspectidentity.Withthebenefitofhindsight,itisusefultoaskwhatlaw
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enforcementpurposeordutywasservedbyconfirmingtheidentityofthesuspectpriorto
meetinglawenforcementneeds.
Asking“Whosepurposewasserved?”createsanotherperspective.Thequestion
suggeststhatthereporters‘forced’Troyer’sannouncementtomeettheirneeds.Justasthe
SeattleTimeswebsitehadalreadydone,thosereporterswerefreetoreporttheidentity
withoutconfirmation,butwereseekingconfirmationtomeettheirneedsforliabilitypurposes.
Inmakingthedifficultchoicesliketheseinmid-crisis,itmaybeusefultoreflectonthedifferent
audiencesbeingreachedbydifferentformsofinformationrelease.Inthiscasethereleaseto
mainstreamreporterslikelywouldreachamuchlargerlocalaudiencethanthatreachedbythe
variousInternetsources.
ThattheInternetsourcesprovedaccurateneedstobeacknowledged.Asanearlier
studyhasdemonstrated,adhocgroupsofindividualsaidedbysocialmediatoolsareentirely
capableofassessingcomplexdatasourcesandarrivingataccurateconclusions(Vieweg,etal,
2008).Theself-correctingnatureofsocialmediauseisillustratedbyaBOLAtweetedbythe
SeattleTimes:
“RT@dlboardman:Copslookingforgreen1997MazdaMilleniaWAlicense208SSXregistered
toClemmons'wife.”
—#washooting/carnitos/Mon30Nov200920:14:20+0000
Thatpostingwasretweetednumeroustimes,thencanceledwithanupdatedtweetfromKIRO
TV:
“Policenolongerlookingfor_1997MazdaMillenia-WSPTrooperBrandyKesslersaysitwas
sold2monthsago”
—#washooting/KIRO7Seattle/Mon30Nov200922:54:02+0000
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Inthemeantime,mediastaffandcitizen-userscontinuedtoprovideimages,linksand
commentaryatafastandfuriouspace.Forexample,about500GoogleWaveparticipantshad
accesstothefollowinginformation:
• LinkstorelevantTwitteraccounts
• Descriptionofthesuspectthatincludedamugshot,possiblealiasesandalinktothe
suspect’s(presumed)Twitteraccount
• Namesofschoolsplacedonsecuritylockdown
• Acopyofabulletinissuedbyauniversityadvisingthatcampuspolicewerefollowingup
onatipandsearchingthegrounds.Studentsandfacultywereadvisedtobealertand
especiallyawareoftheirsurroundings
• LinkstopolicescannertrafficsitesontheInternet
• LinkstovideofeedsonnewsmediaandYoutube.comsites
• Informationaboutvictims’memorials,includinglinkstoFacebookandMyspace
• Linkstodonationsitesforvictims’families
• Identificationofareasunderlawenforcementsurveillanceorsearches
• Arealtimechatareaforuserstoshareinformation
Thebarrageofonlinepostsanduploadedfileshadpotentialtojeopardizepoliceoperations,
threatenofficers’safetyandcompromiseinvestigations.“Newsorganizationssometimestook
theirstaffingcuesfromwhatresidentssentinfromsmartphonesorcomputers.…Acitizen
tweetedaboutcopssearchingontheirstreet;KING[TV]sentanearbyreportertocheckitout”
(SanMiguel,2009).
Tweetedon#washooting:“Ican'tbelievethey'rebymyhouse!UWPDhasnowarrivedat
CowenParkandtheycloseddownpartofthestreet!”
—AtomicPunk,Mon30Nov200912:59:45+0000
SeattleplaywrightPaulMullinreadthrough5710Twitterentries(#WAShooting,n.d.)in
apost-eventanalysisofthesocialconstructsthathadformed.InaninterviewwithKUWO
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producerJeremyRichards,Mullincommentedthatcertainpostsbegantostandoutfrom
others.Henotedthatwhetherinformationwasaccurateornot,somepeoplebegantoact
uponit:
SomebodyshowedupatCowenParkafterseeingonTwitterthatpolicethoughtMauriceClemmonsmightbethere—andthisguyshowedupatCowenParkinbodyarmor,withapistol!Needlesstosay,thepolicewerenothappyaboutthis.(Richards,2011)
Anotherwebsite,Seattlecrime.com,followingandreportingonSeattlepolice’sscannertraffic,
producedamoredetailedversionoftheCowenParkincident:
UPDATE@12:30p.m.:PoliceareformingaperimeteraroundCowenParkandpushinggatheredmembersofthemediabackfromtheirpositions.Apparentlytracesofbloodwerefoundinabathroominthepark.ScannerchatterindicatespoliceareclosingoffsegmentsofBrooklynAve.intheU-Dist.-Ravennaareatopedestriansandcartraffic.UPDATE1:44PM:AmanwhowaswearingbodyarmorandpackingapistolshowedupatCowenPark.Policebrieflydetainedtheman,whohasaconcealedweaponspermit,asitisapparentlyillegalforthosenotinlawenforcementtopossesssucharmor.WeagreewiththeP-I'sCaseyMcNerthneywhenhetweeted:“ReportsofmanwithbodyarmorshowsupatCowenParktohelp.Hedidn'thelp.”(Spangenthal-Lee,2009)Lawenforcementhaslongunderstoodtheimpactofradioscanningandmade
encryptionandradioprotocoldecisionsaccordingly.However,thosedecisionsmayneedtobe
revisited.Inthesocialmediaworld,asingleindividuallisteningtoascannerhasaneffect
amplifiedbypostingradiotransmissionsonsocialmedia.
Twitterpostto#washooting:“They'recomplainingabouttheTimes'photosonscanner.”
—AtomicPunk,Mon30Nov200912:59:45+0000
PolicewerealsodispleasedwithaphotographerwhoworkedfortheSeattleTimes.
AccordingtoMullin:
CliffDesPeaux,aphotographerwhowasaninternwiththeSeattleTimes,wasatoneofthelocationsthattheSeattleSWATteamhadsurrounded,thinkingClemmonswasinside.Itwasutterlydark,sodarkthattheotherphotographerDesPeauxwaswith
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couldn’tgetanypictures.ButCliffhadanewcamerathathewasshootingshotswith—thathewasjustpointingatthedark—andwhenhelookedathisviewfinder,hecouldseethattheSWATteamwasmovinginonthishouseatthreeinthemorning.He’stweetingfromthescene;hisTwitterfollowersexplodefromsevento700;CBSnewsistweetinghim,askinghimtocallthemattheirheadquartersinNewYorkCity.AndthenhegetsacallfromtheSeattleTimessaying,“Youneedtostoptweetingoratleastyouneedtostoptweetingpoliceactivityinanongoingmanhunt.”
Twitterpostto#washooting:“EdTroyerPierceCountyDetectivejustspoketo@Q13Foxat9
channel110oncomcast.Askedpeople2notreporttheirmovements”
—virginiagriffey,Tue01Dec200902:38:18+0000
Mullinfurtherexplained:
BasicallywhathadhappenedisthattheSeattlePolicewerefollowingDesPeaux’sTwitter feeds (because theSeattleTimeswas running it liveat theirweb site).What they [the police] said to the Times which the Times then passed ontoDesPeaux—whowas a young guy who didn’t know any better— You don’tcoverwhatthepoliceareabouttodo.Youcancoverwhatthey’redoingandyoucancoverwhatthey’vedonebutifyou’retippingtheirhandasthey’retryingtomoveoninonadangerousarmedcriminal….Youknow?That’sbad!
Theelementofsurprisenecessaryinsomepoliceoperationsislosingouttosocialmedia.Police
mustassumethatcriminalswillmonitorsocialnetworkingsitestolearn—asbesttheycanand
inrealtime—whatpoliceareupto.
TwofurtherlessonspresentthemselvesfromDesPeaux'sactions.Thefirstofthesemay
providesomecoldcomforttolawenforcementmanagers.ThemanagementoftheSeattle
Timesisfacing,andhavingasmuchtroubledealingwith,thechangescreatedbysocialmedia.
Theirtrainingandacculturationprocessesareclearlyinadequatetomeettheirownneeds.The
secondlessoncomesfromthetechnologyitself.ThetechnologythatrevealedtheSWAT
movementsisalsoavailabletocriminals.ThatchangeshowSWATneedstoconductoperations.
Itmaybecomenecessarytore-thinkthedistancesrequiredforoperationalperimetersinorder
toprotectagainstsuchuse.Theadvancementoftechnologymeansthatallaspectsoflaw
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enforcementresponseneedconstantre-assessment.ThelengthoftimethataStandard
OperatingProcedureremainsrelevantisrapidlyapproachingzero.
Notonlywerepolicecommunicationsbeingmonitored,butalsofireandrescue
broadcasts.Someindividualsattemptedtolearnaccesscodestomoresensitivepolice
communications—andotherusersrespondedwithsuggestions:
Twitterpoststo#washooting:
“SPDSWAToperationschannelstillellusivetome.Anybodyknowtheradiofrequency/
talkgrouptheyareusing” —esl_zone,Tue01Dec200907:41:42
“@esl_zonehereisalinkwithallthedifferentfreq'sforSPD
http://www.radioreference.com/apps/db/?sid=604”—akfirefighter,Tue01Dec200907:47:00
@esl_zonehere'slinktotrunkfreqshttp://www.muppetlabs.com/~chris/scanner/trunk.txt
—200TMaster,Tue01Dec200908:48:29
Thesetweetsshowanadditionalcomplexityofthesocialmediareality.Notonlyarelaw
enforcementobjectivesjeopardizedbymembersofthepublic,partnersinemergencyresponse
cancreateinformationleaks.Boththeintentionaltweetsmadebyfireandambulanceservices
fortheirownpurposesandtheleaksbytheironsitepersonnel,allofwhomarecarryingsocial
media-enableddevices,arebeyondthecontroloflawenforcementpoliciesandprotocols.
Understandingthoserisksforeachotherisoneofthenewdutiesofallemergencyresponse
personnel.
Createdwithweb-basedapplicationssuchasDipity.comtimelinesfollowedeventsfrom
onecitytoanother,storybystory,videobyvideo.Digital“pin”mapsdisplayedup-to-the-
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minuteactivitiesandgeographiclocationsofpoliceoperations.
PoliceResponseTrackingMapusingGoogleWaveApplication(GeneralGentry,2009)
MultiplepostsfromtheTwitteraccount“#washooting”describeeventsinvolvingthe
fugitiveMauriceClemmonsandhisfinalandfatalconfrontationwithSeattlePoliceOfficer
BenjaminKellyonTuesday,December1,2009atapproximately2:45AM.
Archivedpoststo#washooting(2009)(Note:usernamesandtimestampshavebeenomitted
butmessagesotherwiseappearasposted):
Possiblesuspectmaleblackwithmoleonface4430SouthCanyonStpossiblecapture
happeningnowlessthan5secondsago
Allunitsarerespondingtothatlocation.Soundsliketheythinktheyhavehim.
Guildrephasbeenrequested...Suspectproblyshot
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Theygotasuspectmatchinghisdescriptiononthegroundrightnow.Possibletheymighthave
him!
TheyarecallininMEDICtothesceneofthissuspect!!!Pleasetellmetheyjustgothim!
Scannerlisteners...besuretoturnonSFDAMRandhospitalfreqsforsuspectcondition.Hehas
beenshotbySPD
TheshooterfromLakewoodhasbeenshotat42nd
Suspectinroutetoharborview...
Scannerpeople:MonitorHarborviewandSFDfreq.SPDridingwithsuspecttoHarborview
Commandpostisgoigntobesetuponscenethislookslikeitisit!
45thandKenyon.SWATmovingin.ScannermentionedsuspectgoingtoHarborview.Isthisit?
Scannerisgettingquiet...channell3312isopened!containmentisdone!itisover!
Theyarejokingandlaughingonscannerpoliceseemhappy!Suspectvehiclesbeenlookingfor
2xatresidence.
Lawenforcementsourceconfirmssuspectarrestedon4400blockofS.KenyonwasMaurice
Clemmons.
Possibleofficerinvolvedshootinginthe4400blockofSKenyon.PIOsKappelandWhitcomb
enroutetothescene.
Epilogue:OnDecember1,2009,TwitteruserErikM.Hicks(“@emhicks00”)postedthe
followingmessage:
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IMAGESOURCE:http://twitter.com/#!/emhicks00/status/6254726791
RespondingtoaninquiryfromDavidQuinlan,KIROTV,“emhicks00”wrote:
IMAGESOURCE:http://twitter.com/David_Quinlan/status/6285059601
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Aswithsomany“facts”ontheInternet,thesourceofthephotouploadedby
“@emhicks00”isnotnecessarilyapostalinspector:
Forgiveme,butthat’saboutasclosetosegueingbackintoChristmasSeasonasI’mlikelytogetthisweek.Rightnow,Ican’tofferanythingmuchmorecheerfulthanapictureofadeadcop-killer,forwardedbyabrotherinthenorthwest.(Copshavecellphonecamerastoo)(Ayoob,2009).
Internalaffairsinvestigationswerelaunchedinpolice,fire,andmedicalexaminer’sofficesinan
attempttodeterminetheindividualresponsibleforobtainingandpublishingonlineapictureof
thedeceasedsuspect,MauriceClemmons.
ImplicationsforLawEnforcement
Whetherit’spursuitofawantedsuspect,rescueofalostchild,orresponsetoanatural
disaster,socialmedianetworkingenablesordinarycitizenstobecomeinvestedinthenarrative
whethercrisismanagementsupervisorswantthemtoornot.Inhisemergencymgmt.comblog,
GeraldBaroncontendsthat“It’snotyourresponseanymore—it’stheirs.”(Baron,2011April
12)Perhapsamorepracticalandusefulconceptisthattheadventofsocialmediaemphasizes
whathasalwaysbeentrue:Atbase,theresponseofemergencyservicesneedstobe
understoodas‘ours.’Alltheplayershaveneedsandaspirationsandallofthoseneedtobe
underactiveconsiderationinanyemergencyresponse.
Internetsavvyusersarenolongercontenttowaitfor“newsateleven.”Incident
commandersandpublicinformationofficersmustfindwaystousesocialnetworkingtoolsto
accuratelyinformthepublic,dispelrumors,monitorforactionableintelligenceandgenerate
trust.Whicheverwaysthatanagencymaydiscovertousesocialmedia,theywillneedto
understandthereasonthatsocialmediaispowerfulandsoeffective.Thehistoryof
communicationsuptotheadventoftheInternetwasabouttheprogressofmovingfromone-
to-onecommunicationtoone-to-manytechnology.Socialmediahasaddedthecapabilityfor
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one-to-allcommunicationswhileretainingthecapabilitiesforone-to-oneandone-to-many
communications.Thisevolutionhasbeencoupledwiththecompletelackofanycapacityissues
tocreatethesocialmediaworld.
Thesocialmediaworldisnotconfinedtoaparticulargroupofparticipants.Thesocial
mediaworldisnotconfinedtoparticularkindsofinformation.Thesocialmediaworldisnot
confinedtoanyparticulargeography,jurisdiction,nationstate,languageortimezone.Because
somuchofthecitizenryhaveharnessedthepowerofthesocialmediaworldintheirprivate
lives,theyhaveformedtheentirelyreasonableexpectationthattheirpublicinstitutionswilldo
thesame.
Crisisandemergencycommunicationplanningtodaymustincludeaprocessfor
managinginteraction.ChiefBillBoyd,CityofBellinghamFireDepartmentdescribesthe
challenges:
ThedaysofaPublicInformationOfficer(PIO)sittingdownatacomputerandgeneratingatwoparagraphmediareleaseacoupleoftimesaday,andaninterviewhereandtherearegone.IfyoustillthinkthisisallthePIOreallyhastodothenyoumightaswellgivethemanoldtypewriterandcarbonpaper.AsanIncidentCommander(IC),I“definethebox”thePIOwilloperatewithin(givingthemtheflexibilityandboundariestoimmediatelyreleaseinformationwithoutmehavingtoapproveit).TheICneedstoimmediatelysetpolicy,validatekeyrealtimemessageconceptsandthendothemostimportantthing-letthePIOloosetodotheirjob.AsanICinthisdayandage,Icanillaffordtogetfurtherbehindtheinformationdisseminationcurve(assumingwearealreadybehindthankstosocialmedia,cameracellphones,etc.).
ThisalsomeansPIOsmustbeskilledincreatingshortmessages,and
relayingtheminthemostsuccinctway(howwouldyourelayanevacuationorderonTwitter?).InthemajoreventsIhavebeeninvolvedwithovertheyears,thistypeofmessagingwasnotavailable.Now,itisthepreferredmethodofcommunicationbymany.Yet,itremainsforeigntomanyintheemergencyresponsecommunity.
ICsneedtowakeupandrealizetheimpactoftheexplosivegrowthof
socialmediaandtheresultingexpectationforimmediateandaccurateinformation.IfthepublicdoesnotgetitfromIncidentCommandtheywillgetitfromsomewhereelse,relayinaccurateinformationand/orundermineyourauthoritybyventingtheirfrustrationsaboutlackofinformation(Baron,2010).
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Socialmedianetworkinghasforeverchangedincidentcommanders’andpublicinformation
officer’roles.Forward-thinkingleaderswillfindwaystointegratesocialmedianetworkinginto
crisiscommunicationoperations.Inconstructingthesenewapproaches,thoseleaderswillneed
toconsidertwoprimaryaspectsofthesocialmediaworld.Aprimaryattributeofsocialmediais
thatitoccursinrealtime.Asthegraphicbelowillustrates,thereisvirtuallynotimelagbetween
eventsintherealworldandthereportingofthoseeventsinthevirtualworld.Anyintegration
ofsocialmediaintolawenforcement'sresponsesduringcrisismustgivefulleffecttothis
reality.
Source:
http://media.govtech.net/BlogFeeder/CRISIS_COMM/Before_Now_Public_Info_Grap
hic.png
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Asecondprimaryaspectofsocialmediaisthatcommunicationsinsocialmediaforums
becomemoderatedbyparticularusersthataretrustedbythewiderusercommunity(Vieweg,
2008).Thisaspectholdsanumberofimplicationsforcrisismanagers.First,inordertobe
trusted,auserneedstobeknownforprovidinggoodinformation.Whatthismeansisthatitis
possibleforagenciestoestablishtheirpresenceinvarioussocialmediacommunitiesin
advance.Byproperlymaintainingthatpresence,anagencycanmediatewhatinformationgets
sharedandwherethatsharingtakesplace.Havingestablishedtrustinadvance,anagencycan
leveragethattrustduringasubsequentcrisisevent.
Traditionally,policymakershavelookedataproblem,researchedit,developedapolicy
andthenmovedontothenextissue.Thismodelwillnotworkwhendealingwithsocialmedia.
TheInternetisconstantlycreatingnew,andre-creatingolder,functions.Eventhepeoplewho
designthesefunctionsdonotandcannotfullyanticipatealltheusestowhichafunctionwillbe
put.Forexample,theuseofTwitterasacommandandcontrolmechanismforactivistswasas
unanticipatedbyitscreatorsasbylawenforcement.Theimplicationoftheconstantchange
andexpansioninthesocialmediaworldisthatunderstanding,leveragingandrespondingto
thosechangesrequiresasimilarflexibilityinpolicy.Theveryconceptofflexiblepolicywillbe
viewedbysomeasanoxymoronbutisnonethelessanabsoluterequirement.
Asimilarflexibilitymayberequiredinrespectofagencypersonnelwhomaybe
expectedtohavetodealwithsocialmedia.Thepracticehasevolvedinemergencyresponse
agenciestoappointparticularindividualsorunitsasmediarelationsorpublicinformation
officers.Thatpracticeevolvedtomeettheneedsandrequirementsofmainstreammedia.
However,mainstreammediahasremainedrelevantonlytotheextentthatithasembracedthe
toolsandtechniquesofsocialmedia.Consequentlytheirneedscannowbemetbyanagency's
competentuseofsocialmedia.Thisobservationalsoleadstotheconclusionthatindividuals
whomayhavebeenselectedforPIOdutiesbasedontheirabilitytomeetmainstreammedia
needsmaynotbetherightindividualsforeffectivecommunicationsinsocialmedia.Itmay
evenbetimetoconsiderwhethercommunicationviasocialmediaisthejobforsomeoneoris
itsomepartofeveryone'sjob.
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Thespeedandvolumeofinformationthatemergesincrisissituationsontoday's
Internetcarrieswithitsignificantproblemsforlawenforcement.Ourabilitytomitigatethe
challengesandtoleveragetheopportunitieswillbereflectedbythedegreethatanagency
embracesthepositiveaspectsoftheInternet.People,policiesandproceduresinpolicingneed
tobeflexible.Theyneedtobecontinuouslyconnectedtomultiplesourcesofinformation.And
theyneedtobeabletorespondinInternettime:immediately.
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Ayoob,M.(2009,December7).Inaseasonoflove,undercurrentsofhate.
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Vieweg,S.,Palen,L.,Liu,S.B.,Hughes,A.L.&Sutton,J.(2008)CollectiveIntelligenceinDisaster:
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TheRighttoAccuracy:ANewFrontier
MichaelE.Buerger
Whether‘privacy’asweonceunderstooditstillexistsremainsahotlycontested
proposition.Mostofushaveencounteredthetersedismissalthat“Youalreadyhaveno
privacy;getoverit.”Whilewemightclingtothedesireforprivacy,wedailyencounter
evidencethattechnology’sCambrianexplosionhasseriouslyerodedandredefined,ifnot
eradicated,ouroldexpectationsofhavingcontroloverinformationaboutourselves.
TheimmediateimpactonmostAmericanswouldseemtobetargetedadvertising,but
therearemoreseriousconsequencesofthewidespreadavailabilityofpersonaldata:identity
theftistheonemostcommonlythoughtof,butintheinterconnectednessofcyberspace,other
negativeconsequencesmayresult.Identitytheft–thejournalisticmemeforaprocessbetter
describedas“identityappropriation”or“identitycloning”–cantakeseveralforms.
Unauthorizeddigital‘identities’canbeusedtomakecreditapplications,andthencompilehuge
unpaidbillsfrompurchases.Illegalimmigrantsuseappropriatedidentitydataascoverwhile
workingforU.S.companies.Andsomeindividualsadopttheclonedidentityofotherstoescape
anundesirableorunsavorypast:someseektoshedcriminalidentities,otherstoescape
abusiverelationships,andperhapssomemerelytostartover.
Identitytheftforfinancialgaincreatesconsiderablehavocforitsvictims,particularly
whentheirclonedpersonaehaverunupenoughunpaidbillstoaffecttherealperson’scredit
rating.Victimsofthiskindofidentitytheftrecounttalesoflaboriouseffortstocleartheir
names,aprocessrequiringmanymonthsifnotyearsofpainstakingreconstructionoftheir
finances.Forthosecitizenswhodiscoverthattheiridentitywasappropriatedforothercriminal
purposes,immediateconsequences(arrest,detentioninjail,etc.)canbemoresevere,butthe
resolutionisoftenfasterandsomewhateasier.Manyidentifytheftvictimsdescribe
circumstancesverysimilartothefictionalsceneattheresorthotelinthe1995movieTheNet,
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inwhichtheflesh-and-bloodAngelaBennetttriestoassertheridentitytothehotelclerk,who
repeatedlydeniesherbecause“thecomputersays”shecheckedoutseveraldaysearlier.
HowQuicklyWeArrivedHere
OlderAmericansinheritedexpectationsofprivacythatwereforgedinphysicality.
Closeddoors,sealedmail,face-to-faceconversationsandconfidenceswerethenorm,and
socialconventionsreinforcedtheexpectations.AllwereprotectedatonetimebytheFourth
AmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution:therightofthepeopletobesecureintheir
persons,property,papers,andeffects…allphysicalentities.Privatecommunicationswere
protectedbythePostalServiceandbylawsthatcriminalizedtampering.
Privatepaperrecordsonceexistedinoneplace.Theywerevulnerabletocompromise,
ofcourse,throughburglary,theftbyemployees,orerroneouslybeingdiscarded.Theywere
alsovulnerabletodestructionbyflood,fire,orothermeans.Atthecore,thephysicalrecord–
inadoctor’soffice,oratalocalstore–wasmaintainedbyoneorbothofthepeopleinvolved.
However,theadventofthephotocopier(andmorerecently,cell-phonecameras)createda
newhazard,lossofprivately-heldinformationwithoutthelossoftheoriginaldocumentto
markitspassing.
Inthelastquarter-century,analternativeuniversehasovertakenthephysicalworld.
Thetelegraph,theradio,thetelephone,andtelevisionwereallharbingers:infitsandstarts,
theytranscendedthelimitationsofphysicalspace.Thecomputeragehasknitthemintoa
singleentity–cyberspace–thatcombinesalloftheirfunctions,createsnewpossibilities,and
informsayounggenerationwithsocialunderstandingsfardifferentfromthoseoftheir
forebears.Thenpaperfilesweretransformedintodatabasesandtheolderexpectationsof
dyadicrelationshipsdisappearedasindividual,cash-basedtransactionswerereplacedbya
networkofintermediaries:banks,creditcardcompanies,insurancecompanies,andmultiple
layersofintermediaryvendors.Thesystemproliferatedbecauseofperceivedbenefitstothe
individual:timewascompressed,usuallytothebenefitoftheclients.Theprocessneededto
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duplicateandsharelargeamountsofinformationchangedfromalaborious,time-consuming
effortinfrontofaphotocopyingmachine,toasimpleseriesofkeystrokesandclicksona
computer.
Theunintendedconsequenceofthattransformationhasbeentomakeformerlyprivate
datasemi-public.Theprocessbeganlongbeforethedatabase,becausethesupposedlydyadic
relationshipbetweenpatientanddoctorisnotdyadicinfact.Insurancecompaniesreceivethe
informationinordertodetermineeligibilityforpaymentandallofthemajoractorsmay
outsourceportionsoftheiroperationstointermediaries.Bankrecords,creditcardrecords,and
otherfinancialhistoriesarecompiledintocredithistoriesandratingsthatareavailableto
individualsandcorporationsalike.
TheDirectionWeAreGoing
Seeninthemostfavorablelight,suchdatabasesallowthosewhowouldextendcredit(a
commercialtransaction)tomakeinformeddecisionsonthelikelihoodofbeingrepaid,reducing
theirriskoflossandtheoreticallyimprovingtheoveralleconomy.Asmoreandmore
informationemergesaboutthequietproliferationofdata-sharinganddata-mining
intermediarycorporations,themorethenegativesemerge.Targetedadvertisingisthemost
visiblemanifestation,butsubtleandoverteffortsatsocialengineering(“Peoplelikeyouwho
boughtthisitemalsobought…”)nowprovideanominousundertonetocommunicationsfrom
cyberspace.
Withtheadventofcomputerizedrecordssystemsasthefoundationofjudgment,society
inheritsfoursourcesofpotentialdistortionoftherecordsbase:
1. humanerroruponentry;
2. computer-locatederror,resultingfromcodingerrors,glitchesinpowersources,
anddegradationovertime;
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3. intentionaldistortionduetomalicioushacking(oftenaimednotatthe
individual,butatthecorporationhostingthedatabase);and
4. unintentionaldistortionasaresultofwidespreadvirusandothermalware
distribution“inthewild.”
Databasesareinherentlyabstract:atthebestoftimes,individualdataentriesarenot
accuraterepresentationsoftherealindividualwhosenametheybear,butratherselected
sliversofinformationpertinenttothecorporationororganizationthatoriginallycollectedthe
information.Thedefactoabolitionoftimeincyberspacecompoundstheproblem.The
TralfamadoriansinKurtVonnegut’sSlaughterhouseFivemighthaveseenhumansasalongpink
trailthroughtime,butincyberspacethattemporalelongationiscompressedintoasingle
dense,bloatedcaricatureofeverysecondoftheindividual’slifetodate.Maturation,changeof
externalcircumstances,heroiceffortsatself-improvementhavenoswaythere,noristhereany
discernibleefforttoidentifyorcorrecterror(routineverificationandcorrectiveprocedures
maybeintheprimarydatabases,butoncelooseinthesecondarymarket,itisunlikelythat
errorcouldbeidentified:thereisnofinancialincentivetodosoandthepresumptionof
accuracyreigns).
ThePersonwhosenameornumberiscontainedinadatabaseisrepresentedthere,but
onlybyaseriesofnumericalentriesinpreselectedcategories.Thosecategoriesaredetermined
byprivatevendorsfortheirownpurposesandrepresentonlytheslenderportionofthe
person’slifethatisofimmediateconcerntothecorporatehost.Whetherthosecategories–
andthevaluestheentityascribestothemforeachindividual–arepreciselyrenderedoreven
commonacrosstheuniverseofdatabasesinwhichtheyarecompiledisfarfromcertain.Even
lesscertainisthedegreeofpatternandvariabilitythattheyrepresent,inthesingularfora
particularvendororintheaggregatewhendatabasesaremerged.
Criticalreaderswillnodoubtobjectthatacarefulanalystwouldmakeallowancesfor
theprogressionoftime,butthatisinfactoneofthepointsofthisessay:a“righttoaccuracy”
requiressuchaneffortbeconducted,buthumanbehaviorisnotthatdiligent.Sloppinessdue
tofatigueordistractedattention,slipshodworkperformedunderconditionsofennuior
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resentment(ofboss,ofstationinlife,ofthewaytheworldisgoingtoHeckinahandbasket,
etc.),allintroduceunintended–anduncorrected–errorsintodatabases.Therateofthaterror
maybeknowntosome,butisnotwidelydisseminated;norareparticularsmadeavailableto
thosewhoserecordsareaffected.
Twodevelopmentshavearisenthatcastevenmorebalefulaspectsontheserecords.
Thisfirstisthecorporateannexationofthedataitself,claimingthatinformationprovidedbyan
individualforthepurposesofobtainingcreditortomakeapurchaseunderotherarrangements
becomesthesolely-ownedpropertyofthecorporation,divorcedentirelyfromtheindividual
thatabstractsetofdatarepresents.Thesecondistheuseofthecollectedandlinkeddatabases
–“BigData,”inthecurrentparlance–fornetworkanalysisandintelligencegatheringby
enforcementagenciesandagents.
Data-miningisthenexusoftheprivate-publicdivision.Thepoorly-namedOperation
Carnivorewaspremisedonthefederalgovernment’sabilitytocompilecommercially-available
databasesandexaminethemforpatternsthatsuggested(orverified)criminalactivity.The
specterof“BigBrother”rootingthroughtheeverydaytransactionsofprivatecitizenswas
sufficientlyrepellanttoforcetheterminationoftheprogram,despitethefactthatcorporate
entitiesroutinelyengageinthesamepractice.InthemovieMinorityReport,speakingofthe
Pre-Cogswhopredictmurdersbeforetheyhappen,thecharacterofDannyWitwerremindsus
that“[t]heoracleisn’twherethepoweris,anyway.Thepowerhasalwaysbeenwiththe
priests…eveniftheyhadtoinventtheoracle.”Moderndatabases--BigData--arethe
contemporaryoracles,siliconequivalentsofthePre-Cogsinthemovie:thebeliefthattheycan
predicthumanactivityispromotedbythepriestsofBigData.
Themostcriticaljunctureisthatofthedecision:judgmentsaremadeaboutindividuals
baseduponthecompilationand‘smoothing’ofmultipleabstractrepresentations,allwithout
anycontactwiththeactualperson.Dataarenot‘facts,’necessarily,andall‘facts’aresubjectto
interpretationinanyevent.Thattheremaybenodefenseagainstajudgmentmadeasaresult
ofinterpretingpatternsinadatabaseistroubling,raisingthespecterofawrongdecision,with
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near-catastrophicconsequencesfortheindividual:ineffect,constitutinga21st-centuryCourtof
StarChamber.
TheRighttoAccuracy
Ifprivacyisindeedanindefensiblerelic,applicableonlytophysicalintrusionintoa
privateresidenceorotherstructure,theninvokinga‘righttoprivacy’isthewrongargumentto
poseagainsttheperilsofcyberspace.ThosewhodefendBigDatacorrectlypointoutthatmost
‘private’informationissharedvoluntarily,eveneagerly,inordertoobtainsomegoodsor
serviceinreturn:inthatview,informationhasalreadybeencommoditizedbytheconsumer.
Thecounter-argumentthatitisallbutimpossibletoliveinthemodernagewithoutsuch
transactionsisaccurate,butultimatelyprobablyirrelevant.Thegenerationalshifttobroad-
scaleexposureviasocialmediaisanotheraspectthaterodesthenotionoftraditionalFourth
Amendmentprotectionsforcommercialdata,thoughsocietyisintheearlystagesofthat
transformation,andmayyetarriveatdifferentsocialpracticesiftheharmsthreatento
outweighthebenefits.
WhatisneededinitsplaceisaConstitutionalrighttoaccuracy,aconceptthatshould
includetime-relevanceaswellasindividualentryprecision,amongotherconcerns.Thereisa
time-honored,well-usedprocessforamendingtheUnitedStatesConstitutiontomeetthe
emergingdemandsofachangingworld;itispolitical,ittakestime,anditdoesnotalways
producethedesiredresults,butitspracticalandmetaphysicalcloutisfarmorelikelyto
producepositiveincrementalchangesregardlessoftheultimateoutcome.Whileitistruethat
theConstitutionprotectscitizensonlyagainstgovernmentaction,suchanamendmentcould
wellbefashionedtoinvoke,orcoordinatewiththeCommerceClause,andsimultaneously
empowergovernmenttoextendcomparableprotectionstocitizensthroughregulationofthe
datamarkets.Therearemany,manyissuesanddetailstobeworkedout–notleastofwhichis
theburdenofestablishingtheabilitytoverifytheaccuracyofbillionsofindividualentries–but
theprocessstartswiththeassertion.Thenextstepsneedtooccurinthepublicdomain,a
seriesofconversationsaboutthepositives,thenegatives,andthemechanicsofcreatinga
90
systemthatprotectsusfromhavingtodefendourrealselvesagainstasimulacrumcreatedby
demonsinthemachine.
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Bond-RelationshipDisruption:
InDefenseofStrategicandTacticalDeception
SidHealandMichaelE.Buerger
Toalesserorgreaterextent,allhumaninteractionsrelyonsomeformoftrust.Criminal
enterprisesarenoexception,thoughtheirinteractionsinvolveadifferentdefinitionoftrust
thanthatwhichmostlaw-abidingcitizenswouldrecognize.Streetgangs,drugcartels,and
othercriminalgroupshaverigidcodesofconduct,enforcedbyviolence.Thisisadarksideof
trustbaseduponpredictabilityofbehavior.Whilesomemightarguethatthesebondsare
basedonfearratherthantrust,acloserexaminationrevealsthatfearisjustthetoolusedto
establishtrust.Itisnotmutualtrust,butaone-wayrelationshipthatallowscriminalleadership
totrustitssubordinates.Itistheconfidentassurancethatfailingtocomplywiththerulesand
expectationsofthosewithauthoritywillresultinretribution.Moreimportantly,themeasures
takentoenforcethistrustaresurerandfarharsherthanthoseofagovernmentattemptingto
discourageit:itreliesonsureanddirectpunishment,unencumberedbychecksandbalances,
concernsaboutcivilrights,orsafeguardsagainsterror.Thelargerandmoreformalthecriminal
enterprise,themorepersuasivethisfactorbecomes.
Abondisthusformedbetweenmembersandgroupsofacriminalenterprisethat
enablesplansandtransactionstosucceedwithoutthecumbersomewrittencontractsthat
characterizebusinessarrangementsinthecivilworld.Crimelordscantrusttheirconfederates
becauseofacombinationofinternalizedloyaltiesandtheveryrealisticfearofretributionfor
thosefailingtomeettheminimumstandards.Weproposethateventhosebondscanbe
broken,oratleastrenderedlesstrustworthy,throughacombinationoftechnological
improvementandsocialengineering.Admittedly,thereareslipperyethicalslopesinherentin
theendeavor,butthelawrecognizesabalanceunder“competingharms.”
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Bondrelationshiptargetingisnotjustanewstrategy,butanentirelydifferentwayof
thinking.Ithasvalue,notjustinseriouscriminaloffenses,butinalltypesofcriminalventures.
Traditionalreversestingoperationshaveoperatedonthesameprincipleastheoptions
proposedbelow:ifanyon-streetdrugpusher,prostitute,orfencecanbeanundercoverpolice
agent,thethief’sabilitytorelyupon‘trust’tocompleteacriminaltransactionisseriously
eroded.Reversestingoperationsaretimeandlaborintensive,however.
Theremainderofthispaperwillhighlightsomeoftheconceptsinthehopesof
stimulatingthoughtandingenuityindeterringcrimeandmakingourcommunitiessaferwith
tacticsthatexploitnewtechnologiesaswellasold.Aswithanytacticsemployedbyagentsof
government,thereareethicalandlegalconstraintstoconsider,buteffectivelawenforcement
oftenpushestheenvelopeoflaw,especiallyinnewareaswheretechnologycreatesnew
possibilitiesnotenvisionedinearliereras.Weofferthesescenariosasthink-pieces,notas
panaceas.
ExamplesandIllustrations
Example#1:RadarChirping
Onesimpleillustrationoftheprincipleofbondrelationshiptargetinginvolvesspeeding
driversintentionallyavoidingthepostedlimitswiththeuseofradarandlaserdetectors.Inthis
case,thetrustrelationshipisbetweenapersonandapieceofequipment.Thelikelihoodofa
motoristignoringthepostedspeedlimitislargelyreliantupontheirdegreeofconfidencethat
theradar/laserdetectorwillprovidesufficientwarning.Thetrustoneplacesinsuchadeviceis
alow-level‘bond’andwithoutconstitutionalorhumanrightsimplications.
Attackingthisbondrelationshipinvolvespolicedepartmentsemployingportableand
inexpensivetransmitters,called‘chirpers,’thatpulseradarandlasersignalstointentionallyset
offthedetectorspurchasedbythewould-bespeedersandinviolationofthelocalspeedlimit.
Thismethodworksintwoways.Thefirstoccurswiththeslowingofdriverswhoarealertedofa
potentiallawenforcement‘speedtrap’whentheirdetectorsignalsthemandtheyslowdown
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toavoidthepenalties.Thesecondoccurswhendriversdiscoverthatpoliceareusingchirpers
insteadofactualradarorlaserspeeddeterminationdevices,becausetheirdetectorsbecome
lessreliableforpredictingwhentheyareactuallybeingtargeted.Infact,themoreoftenthese
detectorswerefalselyactivatedthelessreliabletheybecome,untilatsomepointtheycouldbe
consideredcompletelyworthless.Thus,thevalueofatechnologybuiltandusedtodefeatthe
legitimateeffortsofgovernmenttogaincompliancewithalawcouldbecompletelynegated
withoutthenecessityoflegallyprohibitingthemandtheaccompanyingcostandeffortof
enforcement.
Applyingtheprincipletohumaninteractionsraisessomeotherissues,butalsosuggests
similarbenefits.Inthisexample,therearecertainregulatoryconsiderations(licensingthe
‘chirping’unit,forinstance),butthepotentialbenefitsoutweightheinitialexpenseandeffort.
Becausethedevicesare‘send’only,withnocalibrationorcourtpresentationsinvolved,
ongoingcertificationisnegligible,andverificationoffrequencycanbedonein-houseatlimited
expense.
Example#2:PropertyIdentification
Thebondbetweenathiefandhis“fence”18isanoldone,paradoxicallyrestingupon
anonymity:theanonymouslinkbetweenanitemofstolenpropertyanditsrightfulowner.The
twentieth-centuryrequirementthatpawnshopownersandotherdealersinsecond-handgoods
keeprecordsofthepropertyattemptedtomitigatethislink,butwasunderminedbythe
anonymityofthethief.Whilethefencemightverywellknowathief’strueidentity,theuseof
falseidentificationservestofilltheblankspaceintheledgerexaminedbythepoliceandunless
thepolicearephysicallypresentatthetimeofthetransaction,thereceiverofthestolen
propertywouldhaveaplausible,ifthin,defenseagainstchargesofcomplicity.Theillicit
relationshipisfacilitatedbythethief’strustthatthefencewillnotrevealtheidentityofthe
personwhopawnedtheitem.
18 As used here, a “fence” refers to a person who receives and disposes of stolen goods.
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Theexpansionoftechnologyhasalreadylimitedthisanonymityandmoreisinthe
offing.Propertysuchasjewelry—difficulttomarkwithanowner-inscribednumber(OIN)under
earliertechnologies—cannowbelabeledusinglasertechnology,withoutdestroyingthe
estheticsoftheitem.ConcealedRFIDchipslinkspecificitemstospecificowners.Althoughany
electronicsystemisvulnerabletoelectroniccountermeasures,itrequiresagreaterinvestment
onthepartofthefence—thethiefisunlikelytomakesuchaninvestment—andthemere
possessionofequipmentcapableofalteringRFIDfrequencieserodesthefence’sclaimto
“honestmistake.”
Theadventofbiometricsonalargerscalethaniscurrentlyavailablewillfurtherstrip
theanonymityofthethief,especiallyifbiometricsystemsmakereal-timereportstoaproperty
databasemonitoredbyalgorithmsorbythehumaneye.Thelagtimebetweentheftand
discoverymaywellbegreaterthanthatbetweenthetheftandfencing,soimmediate
apprehensionmaynotoccur.Notwithstanding,thebenefitliesinincreasingthecertaintythat
theconnectionwillbemadeatsomepoint.Attheveryleast,thefencelosesthepotential
profitofpropertyidentifiedasstolen,aswellasthefundsalreadypaidtothethief,notto
mentiontheincreasedvulnerabilityforfutureventuresafterevenoncebeenidentifiedasa
possiblesuspect.
Thesystemwillremainvulnerabletoitsgreatestcurrentweakness,thehumanlaxness
thatfailstorecordserialnumbersoridentifyvaluablepropertywithanOIN.Tighteningthe
noosearoundpropertythatisrecordedneverthelessraisesthepotentialcosttothethief,and
tothefence.Anancillarybenefitoftheeffortliesinthefactthatwhatpropertyissoprotected,
andwhatisnot,isunknowntothefence.Thegreatergainwillbethatneitherthethiefnorthe
propertywillbeasanonymousasbefore,andthebondoftrustbetweenfenceandthiefwillbe
muchmoredubious.
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Example#3:CollaborativePolicing
Oneoftheearliestformsofpolicingiscalledthe“hueandcry”method.Datingbackto
atleasttheearlymiddleages,thismethodworkedbysummoningeveryable-bodiedmale
withinshoutingdistancetoassistintheapprehensionofacriminal.Asthepolicingfunction
becamemorecapablethesystemhasallbutdisappearedbutresidualformsstillexistinthe
lawsthatallowprivatepersonstomakearrests,andpossecomitatus.19Collaborativepolicingis
aformofbondrelationshiptargetinginwhichthebondsbetweenmembersofthecommunity
andlawenforcementofficersarestrengthenedthroughcollaboration.Similartothepopular
communityorientedpolicingmodel,collaborativepolicingisfarmorerobustanddescribesan
effortthatactivelyinvolvescitizens,especiallyvictims,inthesafetyandwell-beingoftheirown
communities.Considerthefollowingexample,whichexpandsthestolenpropertyexample
above.
Riskisthemetricwhenmeasuringtrust,withzeroriskequatingtocompletetrustand
one-hundredpercentequatingtonotrust.Hence,anymannerofraisingtheriskdegradesthe
trustbondnecessaryforacriminalenterprise.20Inthiscase,abondexistsbetweenthe
legitimateownerandhispropertybecauseofhisabilitytoidentifyandproveownership.The
bondisalsoincreasedinbothwayswhentheownerfindsandidentifieshispropertyandcalls
lawenforcementfortheappropriateenforcementaction.Ataminimum,thepropertyowner
recovershispropertybutoftenthepersonsellingitisarrestedandprosecutedforreceiving
stolenpropertyandeventhethiefbecomesvulnerable,especiallyifthefenceattemptsto
makeacaseofhisowninnocencebyclaiminghisignoranceofitsstolenstatusbynamingthe
thief.Thus,thebondbetweenthelegitimateownerandhispropertyisincreased
commensuratewithhisabilitytoidentifyandlocateitcoupledwithhisproofofownership.21
Conversely,thebondbetweenthethiefandhisfenceisdegradedcommensuratewiththerisk
19 Posse comitatus is a legal requirement compelling able-bodied men to assist a law enforcement officer when called upon. It is codified in the penal statutes of many states. 20 This method is often referred to as “ubiquitous risk” in that anything that increases the risk of unpleasant outcomes decreases the behavior likely to lead to it. The greater the risk (surety of detection) the less likely the behavior will be repeated. 21 Most often the only thing necessary to prove ownership is the fact that the legitimate owner has made a previous claim of theft and taken the legal steps to file a police report and seek recovery.
96
ofbeingdetected.Accordingly,anythingthatincreasesthisriskbecomesaforcemultiplierinits
ownright.
Whilelawenforcementofficerscurrentlyhavetheabilityofsearchingstolenproperty
databasesforstolenproperty,allowingcitizenstoidentifypropertyontheirowncan
dramaticallyenhancethelikelihoodofdetection.Thisisoccurringwithincreasingfrequencyas
victimsoftheftsactivelysearchwebsiteslikeeBay,Craig’slist,andotherplaceswhereused
goodsarecommonlysold,thenreporttopolicewhentheydiscovertheirownpropertyforsale.
AWeb-basedinventoryofstolenpropertyexpandsthereachofthecitizen’sabilitytosearch
withoutcompromisinganyoftheexistinginvestigatoryprocedures.Simplylistingstolen
propertywithadequateidentification(i.e.serialnumber)withthereportingagencyanda
meansofcontactingthemprovidestheabilityforcollaborationbetweenvictimsandlaw
enforcement.Evenunregulatedyardsalesandotherplaceswherestolenpropertyisliquidated
becomevulnerabletodetectionandconfiscationwiththepotentialofprosecutionand
penalties.
Withtheadventofcellphones,mobilecomputing,andthelike,appletswouldallow
nearinstantaneouscapabilitiestocheckpropertybeforepurchase.Inasimilarvein,many
portablecommunicationsdevices(cellphonesandtablets,e.g.)containsoftwarelinkedtoa
GPScapacitytolocatethemiflostorstolen.Whileaprofessionalorexperiencedthiefwillknow
howtodisablesuchprotectivemeasures,theyremainadefenseagainstcasualtheft.
Example#4:Under-ReportedDrugSeizures
AdrugcourierassociatedwithanotoriousMexicandruggangisinterceptedwith500
kilosofdrugs.Duringinterrogation,thesuspectrefusestoidentifyhissupplieroranypertinent
informationforfearthathislifewillbeindangerfromhiscriminalcompatriots,abondfar
strongerthananyincentivespolicecanprovideforbargaining.Aprisonsentencefortrafficking
isthepriceofdoingbusiness—oneforwhichhemaywellberewarded—andtheprison
environmentmayincludeagangthatwillprotecthim.Iftheindividualisshownapressrelease
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thatcreditshimwithonly400kilosatthetimeofhisarrest,thebondrelationshipchanges.He
knowshehad500kilos,thepoliceknowhehad500kilos,andmoreimportantly,thenarco-
bosswhotrustedhimwiththeshipmentknowshehad500kilos.Thenarco-bosswill
presumablyassumethatthetraffickerforapersonalprofitdivertedthe‘missing’100kilos.
Thusthetrustrelationshipbetweenthecourierandthetraffickerhasbeendegraded,perhaps
evendestroyed.
Thepolicehavenotexactlylied:thetraffickerdidindeedhave400kilos.Whatthe
policehavedoneiseffectivelyenlistedthenarco-bossasanunwittingconfederate,aproxy
whomightinflictaharmfromwhichthepolicethemselvesprovidethebestprotection.Useof
theunder-reportingstratagemshiftsthenatureofthebondbetweenthetraffickerandthe
narco-bosstothepointwhereanewbondisneeded,abondbetweenthepoliceandthe
trafficker,fortheprotectionofthetrafficker.Withthatshift,theinterrogatorhasleverageto
turnthetraffickerintoaninformant.
Whilethismayworkasatactic,itisunlikelythatitwilleverbeacceptedasastrategy
giventheadmittedpsychologicalinfluencesthatwillinevitablybeclaimed‘forced’asuspectto
confess.Variationsofthismethodmightbeusedinothermanners,evenifnotaseffective.
Considerthesamescenariomultipliedbythehundredsofincidentsinwhichitoccurs.Theonly
thingnecessarytoincreasetheriskisthatpolicenotreporttheexactamountofseizures,ever.
Thisiswellwithinthelegalitiesandabilitiesofpoliceagenciesandcreatesaconditioninwhich
couriersareshieldedwhenarrestedbecausesuppliersareneverquitesurehowmuchofthe
contrabandwasactuallyseized.Thisencouragescourierstobecome‘self-employed’by
skimmingdrugs(unappealingbutwithnogreaterharmtothecommunity)while
simultaneouslydiminishingthetrustbetweencouriersandsuppliersintoto.
Example#5:Prison/StreetGangCommunications
Gangenforcementofficersarewellawareofthebondbetweenprisongangsandstreet
gangs.Gangleaderscommunicatestrategyanddecisionstosubordinatesinthecommunity,
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retainingeffectivecontrolofthegroup’sactivitieseventhoughtechnicallyremovedfrom
society.Twohigh-profilecasesthatreceivedextensivemediacoverageillustratethecase:Luis
Felipe,knownasKingBlood,waskeptinsolitaryconfinementinNewYorkbecausedespitea
murderconviction,hewasdirectingnotonlygangactivityoftheLatinKings,butviolent
retributionsfrominsidethegeneralprisonpopulation.OntheWestCoast,theMexicanMafia
issuedadecreethreateningdeathuponarrivalinprisonforanylocalgangmemberswhoeven
accidentallyinjuredinnocentHispanicbystandersduringshootings.Withintwoweeksgang-
styleshootingsofhousesanddrive-byshootingshaddroppedbyhalf.Thefactthatthe
MexicanMafiahadachievedasignificantreductioninthesecrimeswherelawenforcementhad
failed—andwithoutforce—allbutwentwithoutnotice.
Likethenarco-trafficker,amutualtrust—initiallyandultimatelybaseduponretributive
force—bindstheallegianceoffree-worldsubordinatestoincarceratedelders.Wenote,
however,thatmemberscaninternalizetherigidgangcodesovertime,eliminatingtheneedfor
ongoingthreats.Thenotionofbonddisruptiondiscussedbelowhingesnotupontheinitial
violence,butupontheultimatecoerciveforcethatliesintheMexicanMafiaexample.
Disruptingthebondrelationshipamonggangmembersisasyetahypotheticalpossibility,but
technicallypossible.Thoughthegangcommunicationroutesinvolvebothhigh-andlow-tech
means(cellphones,wall-tappingincodes,notes,messengers,corruptionofprisonguardsand
manipulationofnon-ganginmatesthroughfavorsandthreats,etc.),increasinglyrobust
surveillancemeasuresmakeitpossibletointerceptthecommunicationsandbreakthecodes.A
seriesoffalsemessagessentbylawenforcementofficialsthroughagang’scommunication
networkswouldhavethedualadvantageoffirst,influencinganymemberwhofollowedthe
directive,andsecond,arousingsuspicionofevenlegitimatemessagessentbythegangs.
Countermeasureswouldhavetobeemployedbygangsthatwouldrequireadditionalsecurity
effortsandcomplicatecommunicationsforeverafter.
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Example#6:OlfactoryIsolations
Mobactionsareinmanywaystheantithesisofcriminalnetworks,whereleadersare
selectedadhocratherthanfromprovenmeritandtargetsaremorespontaneousthan
preplanned.Inconfrontationalstreetactions—whicharedistinctfromwell-plannedand
organizedprotestactivities—themobisoftenincitedbyasmallgroupofinformalleaderswith
anagenda.Inmostcasestheseprovocateursarenearlyimmunefromarrestwhileincitinga
crowdbecausetheforcenecessarytoaffecttheirarrestissufficienttostarttheveryriotthat
thepoliceareattemptingtoavoid.Thusadilemmaisrevealedinthatallowingthe
provocateurstocontinueislikelytoresultinariotbutarrestingthemisequallylikelytoresult
inthesameoutcome.Inthiscase,thebondsbetweentheprovocateursandthecrowdare
stronger(evenifonlytemporarily)thanthosebetweenthepoliceandthecrowd.Suchbonds
areephemeral,usuallyforgedbyemotionalreactionstoaparticularsetofcircumstances.The
provocateurexploitstheemotionalstateofthecrowdbyprovidinginflammatorystatements
andrationales,orfalselyclaimingtohaveobservedpoliceactionsthatdidnotoccur.
Conventionalriotcontroltechniquesandweaponsmaybejustifiedtoneutralizethe
provocateur,butcanonlybeemployedatgreatriskofincitingtheveryriotthepoliceare
attemptingtoavoid.Sometechnologiesnowprovideanabilitytosimultaneouslyattackboth
theagitatorsandthebondsnecessarytoorganizeandoverseeriotousbehavior.Onegood
exampleiswiththeuseofamalodorant.Unlikeconventionalriotcontrolagentsthatcause
extremediscomfortwithburningeyes,coughing,andpainfulbreathing,malodorantssimply
smellbad—horriblybad!Malodorantscanbedeliveredintheformofsmallprojectiles(i.e.
liquid-filledpaintballs)thatarepainfulbutotherwisenon-injurious.Oncedousedwitha
malodorant,however,theagitatorhasgreatdifficultyinenduringthestench.Moretothe
point,thenaturalprotectionmeasuresforthepeoplearoundhimaretomoveupwindand
fartheraway,thusdegradinganabilitytoorganizeandincitethecrowd.Furthermore,even
brushingagainstthepersoncontaminatedissufficienttotransferenoughchemicaltocontinue
100
thedispersal,muchliketheodorofaskunk.Inthismanner,theagitatorbecomeshisown
dispersalagentandforallintentsandpurposes,isthenonlethalequivalentofTyphoidMary.22
Aswithanynewstrategy,therearemanyconcernsthatremain,nottheleastofwhich
arelegalandethicalconcernsandpublicacceptance.Nevertheless,theprincipleofbond
relationshiptargetingprovidespromisingsolutionsforsituationsthatareinherentlydifficult
anddangerousandaversetoconventionalmethodsofdeterrence.Traditionalreversesting
operationshaveoperatedonthesameprincipleastheoptionsproposedabove:whenanyon-
streetdrugpusher,prostitute,orfencecanbeanundercoverpoliceagent,acriminal
associate’sabilitytorelyupon“trust”tocompleteacriminaltransactionbecomesseriously
eroded.
Applyingthebonddisruptionprincipletonetworksandorganizationswillalsocarrya
costintermsofpolicepersonneltimeandinvestmentinequipment.Thereturnforthat
investmentliesinthegreaterimpactacrossawiderpopulationthanjustthosewhoare
arrestedinastingoperation.Theeffectscanbemorelong-lasting,extendingtheuncertainty
andraisingthecostofdoingillegalbusiness,anyofwhichmakesthecriminalbehaviorless
likelytoreoccur.
22 Mary Mallon became known as “Typhoid Mary,” after it was determined that she was a healthy carrier of a deadly pathogen—typhoid fever. As used in this example, the agitator remains free but will continue to disperse the foul-smelling malodorant wherever he attempts to continue his illegal activities until he washes it off.
101
Intelligence,Management,andtheManagementofIntelligence
BernardH.Levin
Inanydiscussionoftrustandtransparencyasitrelatestointelligence,onewouldbe
remisswereonenottomentionTheNationalCommissiononTerroristAttacksupontheUnited
States(Kean,2004).MostreadersarefamiliarwiththefindingsoftheCommissionasthey
relatetointelligence.Thispaperwillnotre-plowthatground,butratherwillfocusmostlyon
classificationproclivitiesandhumanfrailtiesasweconsiderthefutureofintelligence.
Ihaveexperiencedthejoysandtravailsofvariousclassificationsystems,fromtheArmy
SecurityAgencyofyoretovariouslocalandstatepolicedepartments,3-letteragencies,andthe
privatesector.Inallofthosedomains,overthecourseofhalfacentury,Ihaveobservedthata
similarheuristichasprevailed--whenindoubt,classify.Inthewordsofoneofourcolleagues,
anexperiencedandwell-respectedpolicechief,"...theystampthat[‘lawenforcement
sensitive’]oneverythingincludingthelunchlist."Onemightsafelysaythesameof"forofficial
useonly,"“restricted”,andsimilarphrases.
ThatcolleagueandIarebynomeansthefirsttonotethis.TheInspectorGeneral
announcedyetanotherreviewofover-classificationattheDepartmentofDefense
(http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120208/DEPARTMENTS01/202080305/IG-reviewing-
overclassification-DoD).Acoupleofyearsago,PresidentObamasigned“Thereducingover-
classificationact”(http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/10/07/president-signs-hr-553-
reducing-over-classification-act).In2004,theHouseofRepresentativessubcommitteeon
NationalSecurity,EmergingThreatsandInternationalRelationspublished,“Toomanysecrets:
Over-classificationasabarriertocriticalinformationsharing”
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/082404transcript.pdf).Theearliestover-classification
reportthatIhavefoundisthereportoftheCoolidgeCommitteeof1956
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appg.html).Similarobservationsprobablydateto
thedawnofclassification.Theaboveaddressesonlyfederalclassification,butsimilarissues
occurinsideeverylawenforcementagencyinthenation,allapproximately18,000ofthem.
102
Sometimestheclassificationprocessmanifeststheabsurd.Forexample,mostofus
probablyhaveseenclassifiedsummariesofarticlesthathaveappearedinnewspapersand
withoutanyanalysisatall.Thatthesourcedocumentsappearedintheopenliteratureandare
readilysearchableontheInternetclearlydoesnotbarclassificationofcompilations.Itmerely
makestheclassificationabsurd.Sometimesevendocumentsthathavelongbeeninthepublic
realmhavebeenretroactivelyclassified,asifsomehowallthoseinpossessionofthemwould
disappearornolongersharethem(e.g.,Waxman,2004).
Anotherrangeofabsurdityisover-classificationthatresultsinmerelysensitive
informationbeinglabeledsecret,topsecret,orevenhigher.Andafinalrangeofabsurdityis
thedurationofclassificationforitemsthatmaybeembarrassingratherthanthreatening.Items
halfacenturyoldyetstillclassifiedarenotunheardof.Leonard(2011)providesuswithan
interestingcase,towit:
Considerthisstrangecasefromearlierthisyear.OnJune8,theNationalSecurityAgency,atop-secretgovernmentspyagency,heraldedthe"declassification"ofa200-year-oldpublication,translatedfromtheoriginalGerman,oncryptography.Itturnsout,however,asreportedbyStevenAftergoodoftheFederationofAmericanScientistsonhisblogSecrecyNews,thatthe1809studyhadlongbeenpubliclyavailableandhadevenbeendigitizedandpublishedonlinethroughGoogleBooksseveralyearsearlier.Infact,the19thcenturystudyhadnotmetthegovernment'sownstandardsforclassificationinthefirstplace.
So,whyisover-classificationaproblemforintelligence?Becauseclassificationiswhatsilosare
madeof,whatmakesitdifficultorimpossibleforustograspthat"needtoshare"musttrump
"needtoknow"andevenmakesthejobofanalystspointlesslydifficult.
Transparencyisanoverarchingforce.Itunderminestheincreasinglyproblem-prone
natureofclassification.Wenotewhentransparencytakesbigjumps,aswithvariousWikileaks
exposés(e.g.,Dishneau,2012),butthesocialphenomenonthatistheInternet,manifestviaan
evanescentsetofsocialmedia,isaninexorabledrivingforceforexposure.Wepushbackthe
ocean,buttheoceanwillwin.Ratherthancontinuingtopushbacktheocean,ourtimewould
bebetterspentfiguringouthowwecanusetrustandtransparencytomakeasaferandmore
securenation.Andworld.
103
Somepathsforwardarereasonablyobvious.Crowdsourcingofintelligenceisfamiliarto
manyreaders.Soisnet-centricinformationprocessingandsharing.Asomewhatmoreradical
approachmightapply,tosomeextentatleast--openbookmanagement(Stack,1992;Case,
1995).OnemightarguethatthebeginningofsuchanapproachtointelligenceistheIntellipedia
(https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/intellipedia-celebrates-third-
anniversary.html).However,evenifweweretodefeattheforcesofoverclassificationandwe
weretoachievetotaltrustandtransparencywithintheintelligenceindustry,wewouldstillbe
facedwithintelligencefailures.
TheFuture:WhenProphesyFails....
And,inevitably,itwill.So,whywillintelligencefail?Therearemanyreasons,well
beyondtheusualcomplaintsofclassification/silosandinadequate/insufficient
collection/processing.Itisworthre-readingHeuer'sclassicPsychologyofIntelligenceAnalysis
(1999).Heuerdevotesfivechapterstocognitivebiasesinintelligencework,althoughhedoes
nothappentodirectlyaddressthoselistedbelow.Therearemanymorecognitivebiaseswith
thepotentialtodistortorderailourintelligenceefforts,e.g.,seethe"Listofcognitivebiases"
pageofWikipedia.
1.Confirmationbias:Wesearchfor,selectandrememberinformationthatsupportsour
ownperspectivesandignore,rejectandforgetinformationthatconflictswithwhatwe
believetobetrue.Confirmationbiasisastrongeffectandexistsevenwhenpeopleare
quitecognizantoftheconfirmationbiasashavingpotentialfordistortingour
conclusions.InthewordsofKlein(2011),“Afulltabulationofall17questionsshowed
thatnogroupclearlyout-stupidstheothers.Theyappearaboutequallystupidwhen
facedwithproperchallengestotheirposition.”
2.Assumptionofself-knowledgeandself-prediction:Muchoftheevaluationand
applicationofintelligenceassumeswehaveaveridicaloratleastclose-to-veridical
pictureofourselves,ourbiases,ourlimitations,etc.However,availableevidencemakes
104
clearthatthefactsareotherwise,e.g.,WilsonandDunn(2004),andthatthereare
significantdifferencesinhowself-knowledgeworksin,e.g.,malesandfemales
(Boucher,2011).
Whenitcomestoself-prediction,wearenotverygoodeither.Koehler,WhiteandJohn
(2011),amongmanyothers,showedthatourabilitytopredictourownbehavioris
heavilyinfluencedbypresentconditions.Ifwehavetroublepredictingourown
behavior,itfollowsthattheuseofintelligencetopredictthebehaviorofothersis
unlikelytobeanybetterandisprobablyevenworse.
3.Therationalman.Theevidencethatpeopleareirrationalandoftenmaladaptiveis
overwhelming(e.g.,Park&Kim,2009;Reading,2011;Baumeister&Lobbestael,2011).
Onlytheirrationallyoptimisticwouldassumecollectors,analystsandconsumersof
intelligencetobeotherwise.
Onbalance,givenourintrinsichumanhandicapsandgiveninadditionourinsistenceon
hierarchicalcollection,processinganddistributionofintelligence,itisamazingthatwedoas
wellaswedo.
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