ec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:            (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;            (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or            (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probable in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.2.

Effect Of Death On Civil Actions

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused after  arraignment  and  during  the  pendency  of  the  criminal  action shall extinguish the civil liability  arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or  which  thereafter  is  instituted  to  enforce  liability  arising  from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal  representative  of  the  accused  after  proper  substitution  or against said estate, as the case may  be.  The heirs of the accused may   be   substituted   for   the   deceased   without   requiring   the appointment  of  an  executor  or  administrator  and  the  court  may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.  The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to  appear  and  be  substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.  A  final  judgment entered in favor of the offended party  shall be enforced  in  the manner  especially provided  in  these  rules  for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.  If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without  prejudice  to  any  civil  action  the  offended  party  may  file against the estate of the deceased.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS?

1.    If  the  accused  dies  before  arraignment,  the  case  shall  be dismissed, without prejudice to any civil action that the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased

2.    If the accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, both the criminal and civil liability arising from the crime shall be extinguished

> However,  the  independent  civil  actions  may  be  filed  against the  estate  of  the  accused  after  proper  substitution,  and  the heirs of the accused may also be substituted for the deceased 

E.

Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property.JUNE 24, 2015 / LEGALMIND

(The following is cited from Spouses Bonifacio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006)

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real

property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c)accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful

detainer (desahuico).  In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,

intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the

expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are

distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning,

and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the

defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or

metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in

case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the

right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper

regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to

determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of

the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants

possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,

but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in

the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have

been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.  Otherwise, if the

possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As

explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may

require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year

from the date of the demand to vacate.x x x x

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance   confirms   our view heretofore expressed that such

tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as

one of unlawful detainer – not of forcible   entry .  Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And

for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of

that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court – provided for in the rules. If one year from the

forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is

deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior

court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can

really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,

bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in – and summarily throw him

out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of

forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in

pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry

or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible

entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint

should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes

provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the

court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts

constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and

when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the

proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against

respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was

occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on

whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from

their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death,

by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent

refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment

he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of

tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.  This

is where petitioners cause of action fails.The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion

that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as

alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house

thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants

entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized

as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court

of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be

recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Devel

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:

 1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court; 2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and 3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.[

B.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant,

execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay

execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the

plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,

during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time

under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract,

he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for

the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth

day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court,

with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary

bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the

interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable

reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to

time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such

failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but

such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of

the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial

Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or

building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for

such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the

defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.

Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her petition stated simply

that she had filed a "timely notice of appeal which was given due course without the respondents filing a motion

for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo."11 On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed

in the RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on February 19, 2004.

The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals12 is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a

judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to

prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the

immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the

following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he

periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant

to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court

in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed

to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the

filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily

then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to

stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit

the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the

Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the

immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled

to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply with all of the three

abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected

the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond

and the deposit of the accruing rentals.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because it declared the judgment of

the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to

cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the

supervening declaration of the nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed against her has rendered moot

and academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned.

C.

RULE 18A. STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

Upon timely filing of an appeal or a motion to set aside the judgment, execution of the judgment shall be stayed

until the appeal or motion has been decided.

§ 18A Stay of Execution of Judgment

[1] General commentary

Rule 18A is straightforward in stating that a properly filed appeal or motion to set aside a judgment, stays

execution of the judgment until the appeal or motion to set aside has been resolved. As written, Rule 18A is self

executing. That is, the rule does not expressly require a party file a motion seeking to stay execution of a judgment.

Under the rule a stay is automatic upon a party properly filing an appeal or motion to set aside a judgment.

§ 18A.1 Enforcement of Judgments

[1] General commentary

The rules of civil procedure for magistrate courts do not set out matters pertaining to enforcement of judgments

rendered in magistrate courts. The mechanisms for enforcing magistrate court judgments is provided for by

statute. It is provided under W.Va. Code § 50-6-1(a) that the statutes applicable to enforcing a judgment rendered

in circuit court, apply to the enforcement of judgments rendered in magistrate court. The statute states further

that process for enforcing a judgment shall issue from magistrate court, but that any process issued in violation of

the judgment enforcement statutes shall be void. The statute also provides that.