Tribal Identity and Alliance Behavior Among Factions of the Kurdish National Movement in Iraq

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Tribal identity and alliancebehaviour among factionsof the Kurdish nationalmovement in IraqHanna Yousif Freij aa University of Utah ,Published online: 24 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Hanna Yousif Freij (1997) Tribal identity and alliancebehaviour among factions of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, Nationalismand Ethnic Politics, 3:3, 86-110, DOI: 10.1080/13537119708428512

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Tribal Identity and Alliance Behaviouramong Factions of the Kurdish National

Movement in Iraq

HANNA YOUSIF FREIJ

While most of the current literature on secessionist and nationalist movements treatsthem as a collective whole, the author of this paper argues that these movements donot always act as a cohesive unit in their attempts to achieve their nationalistaspirations. The article demonstrates that primary loyalty to sectarian group identitywithin these movements impacts on their alliance behaviour with the centralgovernment and foreign powers. The article integrates international relations theoryand nationalism and group behaviour theories and applies them to factions of theKurdish national movement in Iraq.

Introduction

The Kurdish minority in Iraq has striven for independence since theOttoman Empire was dismembered at the end of World War One. Iraqrecognized the Kurds as an officially constituted minority with legal rightsin 1925 as a League of Nations condition for including Mosul in Iraq.1 Sincethen the Kurds have waged a war of national liberation with autonomy asthe minimum goal and independence as the ultimate objective. They cameclosest to achieving their ultimate objective during 1972-1975 when theIranian regime actively supported Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader of theKurdish Democratic Party (KDP), in an attempt to weaken the Iraqi Ba'athand again after Iraq's 1991 defeat in the Second Gulf War. Although thelatter Kurdish uprising failed, subsequent international developments andthe strategy of the Kurdish Front led to autonomy and a semi-independentstate in northern Iraq in spite of ongoing conflict between Mas'ud Barzani,the current leader of the KDP, and his rival, Jalal Talabani, leader of thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).2 However, continuous inter-Kurdishfighting between the two rival factions has led to the partial return of Iraqisovereignty to the Kurdish area. The intent of this article is to offer anexplanatory logic for understanding the underlying impact and importance

Hanna Yousif Freij, University of Utah

Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol.3, No.3, Autumn 1997, pp.86-110PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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KURDISH TRIBAL IDENTITY 87

of group identity among the Kurds in Iraq and its relationship to thesucceeding patterns of alliance formation with the central governmentand/or external powers.

Much of the literature on secessionist movements focuses on allianceformation with outside powers as a mechanism either for seeking greaterautonomy and/or achieving independence.3 However, the literature largelyignores an equally significant issue related to alliance formation, i.e.,leaders of competing groups within a secessionist movement often seekalliances with the central government or external powers in order tolegitimize themselves to their ethnic constituency and to consolidate theirown positions relative to those of their rivals within the movement.Additionally, scholars of secessionist movements focus on a movement as acollective whole without delving into the impact of sectarian and identitypolitics, which this author argues play a significant role in shaping astruggle for independence, particularly for these groups seeking allies.

Conceptualizing Alliance Formation Among Secessionist Movements

Stephen Walt argues that states form alliances as a result of threat and thatthey behave in one of two ways, either by bandwagoning with thethreatening state or by seeking balance against that state.4 His refinement ofthe balance of power theory is the concept that states seek balance due tothreat rather than power. He illustrates his argument by pointing out that alarger number of states joined the Allies as opposed to the Triple Entente orthe Axis powers before and during both world wars.5 However, Walt and hisintellectual mentor, Kenneth Waltz, avoid discussion of domestic factorsand focus their attention on the international system and capability.6 Sincethey treat all states in the system as similar, they ignore domestic variablesand their impact on alliance formation for Third World states and, as can beargued, for secessionist movements.

Steven David offers the theory of 'omnibalancing'7 to overcome thisshortcoming. Omnibalancing is a further modification of the balance ofthreat theory in that David argues that Third World regimes 'must appeasesecondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal andexternal threats in order to survive.'8 Balancing against domestic threatsthrough external alliances becomes an attractive option for a regime thatlacks legitimacy, and often the power, to resolve internal conflicts.9

However, omnibalancing shares with realism the belief that politics focuson power and interests and that the international system is characterized byanarchy. The primary difference between realism and omnibalancing is thelatter's focus on the leader of the state as opposed to the state itself. Such afocus is necessary because Third World leaders are often more interested in

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88 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS

their personal survival than in the state's overall interests and exertunlimited decisional latitude on the decision making process.10 However,omnibalancing's loss of the parsimony that realism affords is compensatedby its increased ability to explain and predict.

This author follows the primary assumptions of omnibalancing byfocusing on the behaviour of the leaders of the Kurdish secessionistmovement in Iraq given their absolute control over their affiliated groups asopposed to treating the movement itself as a collective whole, and byarguing that leaders act rationally in order to maintain and enhance theirgroup's particular identity-based interests. Omnibalancing's focus onleaders is justified because they exercise unlimited decisional latitudewithin their factions and because secessionist movements are often riddledwith a multiplicity of ethnic, tribal, religious and political divisions.Additionally, national identity is not always as salient as that of othercompeting sectarian identities." Salient primordial identities among socialand political groups play a significant role in determining ideologicalidentification and add to inter-group categorization and the salience of'group centrism' in their political thinking.12

Penelope Oakes argues that any element that magnifies the'separateness' and 'clarity' of a category (in this case, political identity andlabel) will increase its salience leading to a heightened group consciousnessby accentuating similarities among group members while exaggerating thedifferences of out-groups.n Gary Green finds that the Iraqi Kurds' strongestidentity community has been the tribe, which has led only to a temporarycommonality of interest among the various tribes fighting for autonomyfrom the central government.14 Hence, identity shapes the in-group's notionof its well-being through categorization and the constitutive norms of thegroup, while treating out-groups as a threat to the well-being of the group.15

Groups actively seek to maintain, protect and enhance their identity since itprovides them with a sense of security.16 This, however, does not precludethe existence of national consciousness among the various groups.

In order to become a nation, a group must internalize the symbols of anation and 'act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or thepossibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity."7

According to Richard Cottam, nationalism

occurs when a large number of people perceive they belong to acommunity that is entitled to and capable of maintaining independentstatehood and who grant that community a primary and the primaryterminal loyalty. The phrase the primary terminal loyalty is meant toconvey the meaning that a nationalist as defined can hold a primaryattachment to only one community for which he desires independentstatehood.18

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Crawford Young stresses that the acquisition of a national identitymeans that the tribe and its members subordinate their tribal identity to thenational identity." Ernst Haas adds that building a national identity is aprocess that legitimizes the rulers and allows them to share power with thepeople, who in the process, accept 'a set of symbols that make themsubordinate their parochial and partial identities to the larger one.'20

This author argues that leaders of autonomous groups and/orsecessionist movements often form alliances with external powers or thecentral government in order to either strengthen themselves and theirlimited identity group within the movement or simply to legitimizethemselves at the expense of their rivals without necessarily engaging in theprocess of enhancing their group's national identity and its chances forautonomy or independent statehood. Barnett and Levy argue that 'analliance can be formed quickly to provide security guarantees in response toan immediate security threat [to the group] and can be discarded ifnecessary when the threat recedes.'21 Furthermore, alliance with the centralgovernment or external powers can be a source of funding to buy patronageor arms.22 As the Kurdish secessionist movement has not had a singleunified leadership, the most significant factions and the type of alignmentsthey have pursued are examined here. This provides the flexibility neededto examine how and why leaders form different types of alliances.

Even though this paper focuses on the impact of a secessionistmovement's own internal politics, the impact of international politics isaddressed as well. As Donald Horowitz suggests, the degree of success asecessionist movement has in achieving its goal is determined byinternational politics, i.e., 'by the balance of interests and forces that extendbeyond the state.'23 Heraclides reinforces this point by stating that externalpowers play a crucial role by functioning as the 'intermediate variable forthe conflict's violent or peaceful resolution or nonresolution.'24 Thus, inorder to better comprehend the alignment patterns of secessionistmovements one needs to examine how sectarian identity within themovement is shaped by perceptions of threat or opportunity in theinternational environment and the state from which they seek to secede.Jeffrey Checkel argues that international developments open 'windows ofopportunity' which provide political 'entrepreneurs' (leaders of secessionistmovements) with the means to challenge the central government, creatingan arena of competition between 'old' tribal and 'new' urban beliefs andidentities.25

This paper examines the alliance patterns of the two major factions ofthe Kurdish movement in Iraq. The cases were not selected randomly. Theintention is to illustrate how the two competing groups, the KDP of MullaMustafa Barzani and later his son, Mas'ud Barzani, and the PUK of Ibrahim

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Ahmed and Jalal Talabani, formed alignments to pursue opportunities andreact to threats at the domestic and international levels. Alexander Georgeargues that case studies offer us 'an opportunity to learn more about thecomplexity of the problem studied, to develop further the explanatoryframework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory.'26

Accordingly, the choice of these particular cases can be characterized as'heuristic case' studies.

Tribal Politics and Kurdish Alliance Patterns, 1963-1968

The Kurdish question within Iraq is complicated and has been discussed bymany competent authors.27 It is not the task of this author to discuss the issuein detail. The present section offers a brief discussion of the question ofidentity within the Kurdish movement in Iraq. Discussion of the Kurdishquestion after the fall of the Qassem regime in 1963 follows. The UnitedStates involvement in the 1970s Kurdish insurgency in Iraq is discussed inthe following section.

The literature on the Kurdish national movement argues that the Kurds'primary identity community is the tribe. Accordingly, primary loyalty isallocated to the family and tribe and then to the national movement.28 VanBruinessen argues that the origins of the Kurdish national movement can befound within two distinct groups. One group, comprised of largelyKurmanji speakers with strong tribal affinity living in Bahdinan (thenorthernmost part of Iraq's Kurdish region) and Turkish- and Syrian-controlled areas, is associated with the KDP. The other group, comprised ofthe urban classes that predominate in the Sorani-speaking areas that includemost major Kurdish cities in Iraq and Iran, is associated with the PUK.Sorani is also the language of intellectual discourse amongst the Kurds.Nonetheless, many of the leaders of the urban-based Kurdish movementrepresented by the PUK have descended from tribal families themselves.29

The Barzanis and Jalal Talabani also belong to different religious orders(tariqas), Barzanis to the Qadiri and Talabani to the Naqshbandi.30

With ever-present tribal, linguistic and religious differences, MullaBarzani's leadership never went unchallenged. KDP cadres led by IbrahimAhmed and Jalal Talabani, representing the leftist faction of the KDP andurban intellectuals, had grudgingly accepted Mulla Barzani's leadership atfirst. Nonetheless, they challenged him on a number of occasions between1961 and 1968. In the early 1960s, Barzani was perceived by Ahmed andTalabani as being indispensable for assuring the allegiance of the majorityof Kurdish tribes to the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.31 However,when Barzani accepted large amounts of arms from Iran in 1963 to enhancehis chances against the Iraqi army, the Ahmed and Talabani faction of the

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KDP joined the Iraqi government in accusing Barzani of siding with theenemies of Iraq. Moreover, they galvanized anti-Barzani Kurdish tribes andjoined the government forces fighting Mulla Barzani and his peshmergas?1

When Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, a civilian Iraqi nationalist, wasappointed Iraqi Premier in 1965, he declared that the aim of his governmentwas to 'establish a permanent constitutional regime' and to 'preserve Iraqiterritorial unity.'33 By mid-1966, however, Barzani had inflicted a seriousdefeat on the Iraqi Army with the Shah's arms. The defeat not onlydiscredited General Abd al-Aziz al-Uqaili, the defence minister known forhis hawkish views on the Kurds, but generated speculation and doubt aboutthe policy of force to settle the Kurdish issue within Iraq.34 Al-Bazzazsought to terminate the Kurdish uprising by presenting a 12-point programas a means of meeting Barzani's demands for autonomy.35 However, themilitary faction within the government perceived Al-Bazzaz as anineffectual premier and opposed his approach to the Kurdish issue. Soonafter the accord was agreed upon his government fell. Despite theirofficially neutral position on the inter-Kurdish conflict, the new Iraqimilitary government of Major General Naji Talib continued to support theAhmed-Talabani Fursan forces with arms and urged them to fight Barzani'speshmergas. Clashes between the competing Kurdish groups continued ona daily basis until 1968 while the Army turned a blind eye or even protectedand accommodated Talabani's forces.36

When the Ba'ath came to power in 1968, they were obsessed withsecurity and did not wish to share power with anyone, particularly theKurds, who posed the most organized challenge to the central government.Saddam Hussein, seeking to position the Ba'ath as the leader of all Iraq,declared that the Ba'ath would represent 'the will of the Arabs as well as theKurds'.37 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) pledged to bring apeaceful settlement to the Kurdish problem and praised the Bazzaz plan,making it the basis for any settlement of the Kurdish problem. In doing so,they revised Bazzaz's 12-point declaration and renamed it the MarchAgreement of 1970.38

The March Agreement was a little more elaborate than the 12-point planbut the key issue of Kirkuk remained unsettled. The Kurds wanted Kirkukwithin their region, given its rich oil resources and pipeline, but thegovernment claimed that Kirkuk's population was equally divided amongstArabs, Kurds and Turkomans.39 The Ba'ath did not want Kirkuk underKurdish control because it would give Barzani tangible influence in theregion and independent revenue to purchase weapons. Likewise, Barzani'sdemand for a fixed percentage of the oil revenues was not met because thiswould also allow him to build a base of support free from governmentcontrol, and thus pose a challenge to the Ba'ath's control and weaken the

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unity of the Iraqi state. The Ba'ath party was, however, willing to spendfinancial resources to develop the Kurdish region to ensure that loyaltywould go to Baghdad and not to Barzani. Barzani accepted the MarchAgreement of 1970 as a temporary measure because his forces wereexhausted after nine years of fighting and because he realized that he couldnot defeat the strongest government Iraq had known since 1958.

Although the March Agreement was scheduled to be implemented overa time frame of four years, three factors worked against it. First, Barzani didnot believe that an Iraqi Kurdistan could have real peace under the SocialistBa'ath. Besides, if Barzani allowed the Ba'ath to foster development andnational cohesion in his region it would undermine his legitimacy and thetribal authority upon which his rule rested.40 Barzani would be supplantedby the Ba'ath and Jalal Talabani, his socialist nationalist arch rival, whoallied himself with the Ba'ath in 1969. The Ba'ath leadership was allowingTalabani to publish the al-Nur newspaper. When hostilities between theBa'ath and Barzani broke out, al-Nur sided with the government andcharacterized the Kurdish conflict in Iraq as being 'between Kurdishrevolution and Kurdish reaction supported by imperialism', and accusedBarzani of committing 'violent crimes against the Kurdish people and theirproperty'.4' The Ba'ath regime was more than willing to exploit thesectarian divisions within the Kurdish national movement.

Second, the Ba'ath Party was gambling for time given its unwillingnessto share power in the RCC. The five cabinet posts given to the Kurds werenominal concessions in a cabinet that had no real power. This was not loston the Kurds. Mahmud 'Uthman, an aid to Barzani, stated that

[i]n the RGC we have nothing. In the army, we have nothing, no keypositions. In the oil ministry, we have nothing. In fact, we hold no keypositions. The Kurds have no part in decisions relating to domestic orforeign policies. Everything is done by the Ba'ath Party. We have noparticipation in the regime.42

Finally, an external element was at play here. The Kurdish leadershipdesired autonomy but their ultimate objective was to gain independence ifthe right international situation materialized.43 It was not lost on Barzani thatthe short-lived Kurdish Mahabad Republic of 1946 came about as a resultof foreign assistance from the USSR.44 Hence, he reasoned if anotherKurdish state was to come into existence, foreign assistance was vital.When the Iraqi government concluded an agreement with the Soviet Unionfor the purchase of new weapons in 1972, Barzani realized that the weaponswere likely to be used to undermine his power leverage and theimplementation of the March Agreement.45 Moreover, as early as October1971 an attempt was made on Barzani's life, which he attributed to both the

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Ba'ath and Talabani.46 By the end of that same year, correspondents in theregion were predicting that a full-scale war was possible.47 Barzani couldnot hope to take on the Ba'ath with its new weapons on his own; he neededforeign assistance and the right international and regional situation wascrystallizing that would present Barzani with his opportunity.

Foreign Intervention 1970-75, and the Barzani Leadership

The US was extremely uncomfortable with and suspicious of the Ba'athParty's avowed socialist ideology, its hostility to the moderate Arabmonarchies in the Gulf, its bitter disputes with the Shah, and its declaredsupport for the goals of the Soviet Union. Hence, when the Nixon-Kissingerteam took office in 1969, Iraq was not only seen as being disruptive to thestatus quo but perceived as being in the Soviet camp and as wanting toexercise undue influence in the Gulf following the 1968 British withdrawal.Meanwhile, the US had designated the leading role in enforcing the NixonDoctrine to Iran.48 Moreover, any conflict between Iraq and Iran was ofconcern to the US. If Iraq could be destabilized and kept off-balance, shewould not be able to challenge the Shah for supremacy of the Gulf.

In a 1970 New York Times interview, the Shah stressed that the Sovietswere seeking influence in the region and putting pressure on Baghdad toseek an accommodation with the Kurds, which if successful would gainthem favour with both the Iraqis and the Kurds.4' The Shah was well awarethat the Nixon administration did not want the Soviets to gain any suchinfluence and reasoned that the undermining of any Soviet-mediated accordbetween the Iraqi regime and Barzani would be welcomed by the Nixon-Kissinger team. Anticipating conflict with Iraq, Abbas Khalatbari, theIranian Foreign Minister, stressed that his country could assist the Kurds ifhostilities broke out between his country and the Ba'ath regime inBaghdad.50

The signing of the 1970 Agreement had been mutually perceived byBarzani and the Ba'ath as a tactical step to buy time but not to bring stabilityto Iraq. Barzani took certain steps to undermine the agreement, while theUS, Iran and Israel provided military aid and financial assistance to theinsurgency.51 A son of Mustafa Barzani who defected to the Iraqigovernment's side admitted in 1972 that his father had received aid from theWest since 1964 and that it was developed through Iranian and Israeliofficers.52 Luba Eliav, an Israeli member of Parliament, said that Barzanihad sought to establish an independent state in 1966 and that Israel hadresponded to his appeal.53 Barzani was later visited by different Israelidelegations who helped the Kurds organize an intelligence apparatus withthe assistance of the Mossad. Contacts were continued through Israeli

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Colonel Mordechai Hud who coordinated activities between the Iranians,the Israelis, and the Kurds.54 This cooperation between the Kurds and theIsraelis further enhanced the Kurdish leadership's sense of efficacy, leadingit to pursue policies that further undermined the March Agreement. Basedon this co-operation with Israel and Iran, the Kurdish leadership developeda false sense of power that led them to pursue policies that included'resistance to allowing the return of normalcy in the North; [and] theconstant escalation of demands against the government.'55

Given the intensity of the Cold War and American displeasure over Iraqirhetoric and the accommodation of the Iraqi Communist Party, the Shahapproached the United States with a plan to use the Kurds to destabilizeIraq. Nixon and Kissinger agreed to go along with the Shah's plan.However, it was never the Shah's intention for the Kurds to achieve a levelof success that would enhance their prospects for an independent state, asthat would have spelled disaster for his own rule in Iranian Kurdistan.Hence, as Cottam points out, aid to the Kurds was slow in coming wheneverthey were on the offensive or were achieving real success on thebattlefield.56 Nonetheless, Barzani and the KDP began to perceive a realopportunity to achieve an independent state in the region. Lee Buchheitaccurately notes that the Kurdish definition of autonomy has fluctuateddepending on their own chances for 'complete independence and thecapability of the Iraqi military to preserve the union'.57 Barzani stated in1973 that he would declare independence,

[i]f we have the backing of the United States and if they think it isadvisable, one could dare to think about, and even do it. We know thatwe have the oil for two more Kirkuks, which the Iraqis will notexploit. Those too, could be of interest to the United States.58

But the Kurdish leader was becoming highly dependent on the Shah forhis weapon supplies. Although the Israelis had supplied the Kurdishrebellion with several medium-range artillery pieces,59 the Shahintentionally kept the supplies limited so that they could be cut at anymoment. In fact, Barzani lamented that he had more men than weapons togive them and that the Kurds were 'of more military help to the Iraniansthan they are to us.'60 The Pike Report indicates that the US acted as theguarantor that the Shah would not drop the Kurdish cause.61 Furthermore,Barzani naively overestimated Cold War dynamics, believing that theAmerican-Soviet rivalry would be enough to guarantee him continuedsupport because 'America could not find a more dependable ally. Webelieve in America's ideals of democracy and its leadership.'62

The United States' role in embellishing the Kurdish sense of capabilityis critical. According to Ghareeb, US aid to the Kurds was first offered in

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August 1969. It came in the form of two American officers, GeneralAnthony Devery and an Officer Perkins, who served as advisors to theKurds; they were later joined by four other Americans. The Kurds and theUS government had a secret agreement that reportedly stipulated that

The main aim of the insurgency was to overthrow the Baath regime;The decision to continue or discontinue the movement following theoverthrow of the government was to be made by the United States;The United States would back the Kurdish struggle for autonomy, butthe Kurds must not go beyond the limits outlined in the agreement;Doors would be closed to communists seeking to join the movement;the Kurdish movement must not protect them;All Soviet aid offers must be rejected and the United Statesimmediately notified of such offers ...63

The existence of this secret agreement helps explain Barzani's laterrejection of the 1970 Agreement as well as Nixon and Kissinger's view thatthe Iraqi regime had to be destabilized since the Ba'ath were a challenge tothe stability and legitimacy of the Gulf order.

To solicit more US assistance Barzani stressed that his movement wouldcarry out American policy in the region by opposing Soviet expansionismand would turn over the Kirkuk oilfields to an American company toexplore for oil deposits and other minerals, including uranium, as well asconsider additional concessions on mining.64 He also stated that the Kurdsdid not trust the Iranian leader, who was supplying them with limiteddefensive weapons, while the Iraqi army was purchasing new weapons fromthe Soviet Union and using large helicopters to transport troops and surface-to-surface missiles to Kurdish villages." On the other hand, Barzani statedhe fully trusted the US and was 'ready to become the 51st state'.66 AfterBarzani sent rugs and other wedding presents to Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft,then an assistant to Kissinger, wrote that 'the relationship between theUnited States Government and the ethnic group remains extremelysensitive. Knowledge of its existence has been severely restricted, the factthat Dr Kissinger has received this gift should be similarly restricted.'67

The Pike Report reveals that Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah had nodesire or intention of allowing the Kurds to succeed in their attempts toestablish an autonomous state:

We would think that [Iran] would not look with favor on theestablishment of a formalized autonomous government. [Iran] likeourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation in which [Iraq] isintrinsically weakened by the [Kurds'] refusal to relinquish its semi-autonomy. Neither [Iran] nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolvedone way or another..™

A telling illustration of this stalemate policy was provided during the

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1973 Ramadan War when Israel urged the Kurds to open a front against Iraqso that Iraq would be unable to come to the aid of Syria or Egypt. Thiswould have presented an opportunity for the Kurds to achieve serious gainsand generate additional concessions from the Iraqi leadership. But under thedirect instructions of Kissinger it was stressed that, '[w]e do not repeat notconsider it advisable for you to undertake the offensive military action that(another government) [Israel] has suggested to you.'69

Barzani's dual dependence on Iran and the US precipitated his downfallwhen the Shah and Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Accord in 1975,which settled the major border dispute between the two countries relating tothe Shatt-al-Arab waterway.70 Once that accord was signed, the Iraniangovernment cut off all aid to the Kurdish rebels and left them at the mercyof the Iraqi army. It was not long after this that the rebellion was crushed.US policy followed suit. As a result of the sudden curtailment of aid,200,000 refugees fled to Iran. Humanitarian aid was not forthcoming fromeither the US or Iran. Barzani wrote several desperate appeals to Kissinger,but no answer ever came.71 The tragic end to this episode is best illustratedby a curt comment made by a high U.S. official - most likely Kissingerhimself - that 'covert action should not be confused with missionarywork'.72

As the above case illustrates, outside powers provided the Barzanifaction with the means to challenge the central Iraqi government. On theother hand, the rival and weaker faction known as the Ahmed-Talabanifaction (which later developed into the PUK), sought and got assistancefrom the Ba'ath regime as a means of weakening the tribal leadership of theKurdish national movement. Even though both factions claimed to representthe Kurdish people and to embody Kurdish national identity, their conflictand their alliance patterns illustrate that their commitment to, and thesalience of, their local identity was stronger than that of their Kurdishnational identity.

The Kurdish Uprising in 1991: Its Failure, and InternationalIntervention

When President Bush decided to terminate the ground war against Iraq on28 February 1991, a group of Kurdish leaders were in Washington meetingwith members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress, whowere informed of the Kurds' intense pro-US and anti-Saddam sentiments.Nonetheless, the Bush administration refused to meet with the group ofKurdish leaders that included Jalal Talabani.73 Talabani had traveled to theUS when Iraq invaded Kuwait and offered to mobilize several thousandfighters to destabilize and get rid of Saddam Hussein on the condition that

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the US provide him with adequate weapons and funding.74 A retiredAmerican Air Force Colonel stresses that the United States was arming theKurds 'before and during the [Second] Gulf War,' although the U.S.officially denied it.75 For their part, the Kurdish Front wanted internationalguarantees to secure their rights and have these issues on the agenda of anyfuture Middle East conference.

After Iraq lost the Second Gulf War, Iraqi Shi'ites began an uprising inthe south challenging the government's authority, while the Kurds revoltedin the north. The northern cities of Sulaimaniya, Halabja, Arabat, Arbil,Zakhu and Kirkuk erupted in revolt on 7 March 1991, a week after thesouthern revolt began.76 However, the Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings couldnot survive without outside help once the Iraqi leader reassembled his forcesand turned them against the Shi'ites and Kurds. Iraqi forces, usinghelicopter gunships, launched an attack on the northern oil city of Kirkuk.Iraqi forces then recaptured the Kurdish cities of Dahok, Arbil andSulaimaniya.77

The unwillingness of the West to openly support the rebellion createdsuspicion among the leaders of the Kurdish movement, which could explainwhy they opened negotiations with the Iraqi regime when the rebellion wascrushed. Mas'ud Barzani, who assumed leadership of the KDP after hisfather's death in 1979, feared that the Western allies wanted to keep thesame regime in place and stated that it was 'as if a green light had beengiven to the Iraqi army to come and slaughter our people, using its airforce.'78 The Kurds were totally bewildered as to why the US and otherWestern countries were indifferent to what Saddam Hussein did to themafter the collapse of the revolt. Peter Galbraith, a senior staffer on the SenateForeign Relations Committee, was outraged by Western policy and declaredthat as millions became refugees the US and other Western countries stoodat 'a complete arm's length' and that it 'took an awfully long period of timebefore the United States was prepared to respond to the humanitariancrisis.'79 When the West finally agreed to provide a safe haven for the Kurds,thousands had already fled to Iran and Turkey. However, the Kurdishleadership asked their people to return to the Kurdish areas in Iraq,emphasizing that they did not want to become another Armenia.80

The Bush administration had defeated Iraq, established a New WorldOrder in the Middle East, and positioned itself as the regulator of regionalpolitics. Getting involved on the side of the Kurds would have been toocostly and unacceptable to the US public, and as one administration officialprophetically put it, 'They spend as much time fighting each other as [the]central authority.'8' But in 1991 the Kurds had world sympathy on their side,due in large part to the 1988 Halabja massacres, and this time they werefighting alongside the Western allies. With CNN and various news networks

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heavily covering the events in the region as a result of the Second Gulf War,the Bush administration was embarrassed into acting on behalf of theKurds.82 The outcome was the passage of UN Resolution 688, whichcondemned Iraq for her repression of its people and forced her to givehumanitarian organizations access to all those affected by the conflict.83 Inorder to insure implementation of this resolution, the US established whatcame to be known as safe havens in Northern Iraq protected by US andallied ground and air troops based in Turkey. These safe havens evolved intothe areas that held elections in 1992, in which the Kurdish leadershipattempted to legitimize itself and establish a semi-independent state.

The leaders of the KDP and the PUK believed that the balance of powerwithin the international system had shifted in favour of the Kurdish cause inIraq, and thus made it suitable for them to seek a political settlement fortheir cause.84 Jalal Talabani declared that this was the first time that theKurds had 'gained so much popular sympathy abroad and this is a verystrong card in their hand.'85 Given the Kurdish leadership's enhancedbargaining position and the Ba'ath regime's weakened position, Barzani andTalabani engaged the Iraqi regime in a dialogue for a settlement. Talabanialso emphasized that the Kurds had no big neighbours to help them like theIraqi Shi'ites who have Iran.86

Aware that they could not dislodge the Iraqi forces, they opted to extractthe best possible solution from the weakened Iraqi regime. The Kurdishleadership also joined the Democratic Iraqi Opposition and asked the Iraqipresident for concessions on issues that were important for all of Iraq whilecontinuing to negotiate a separate autonomy agreement with him. Theseconcessions included a democratic government in Iraq with free elections,autonomy for the Kurdish region, and the establishment of a federal state inwhich the Ba'ath party would not have the leading role.87 To reach such anaccord, Talabani asked the allied forces to 'put conditions on theirwithdrawal from Northern Iraq'.88 Talabani was fully cognizant that theIraqi regime would not accept such conditions and thus knew the Kurdswould have allied forces guaranteeing their safety as long as SaddamHussein was in power. In a 1991 interview with Al-Hayat, the London-based Arabic daily, Talabani made some very revealing and interestingremarks that illustrated the Western commitment to the survival of theKurdish region. He asserted that the United States had promised the KurdishFront that it would protect the Kurds from any attack by the Iraqi regimeand that the US had, for the first time, 'established official relations with theKurds'.8'Talabani later emphatically insisted that there was 'no chance ofdiscussion with a dictatorship'.9C The outcome of the negotiations with theIraqi regime was that Mas'ud Barzani signed the agreement, but JalalTalabani did not."

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Both Talabani and Barzani were well aware of the favourableinternational situation and had embarked on complex strategies that wouldnot only ensure the survival of the Kurdish-controlled region, but enhancetheir own individual positions within the safe havens and the region overall.Once the safe havens were in place, Turkish newspapers expressednationalist sentiments accusing the United States and her coalition partnersof bringing in weapons to arm the Kurds with the aim of establishing aKurdish state.92 The Turkish government was facing its own challenge fromthe left-wing Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which has its training bases inLebanon's Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley and which the Turks havethreatened to bomb.93 To put Turkish fears at ease, the Kurdish leadersreleased statements that reassured their neighbour that they had no intentionof changing the borders of the five neighbouring countries with Kurdishminorities. Talabani added that 'we are asking for our national rights withinthe framework of Iraq. I know of dreams and reality. All Kurds dream of anindependent, unified Kurdistan, but we have to face the reality.'94 To furtheralleviate lingering Turkish suspicions about the relationship between thePKK and the Kurdish Front in Iraq, Mas'ud Barzani gave an interview to aTurkish newspaper in which he stated that we 'do not support the PKK'smethods. We do not want the PKK militants to organize their activitieswithin our borders.'95 Talabani went a step further by accusing the PKK ofbeing financed by the Iraqi regime96 in order to undermine its legitimacyamong Turkish Kurds. He stressed that no PKK members would bepermitted into Turkey from the border areas controlled by the KurdishFront.97

Having secured regional and international backing for their safe havens,the Kurdish leadership set out to legitimize itself within the Kurdishnational movement. However, inter-Kurdish conflict put a quick end to thisexperiment. The remainder of the paper deals with the attempts to reconcilethe diverse Kurdish objectives and the various alliances that were formed.

Inter-factional Kurdish Fighting and Alliance Patterns in the Post-Second Gulf War Period

As Kurdish strategies have not always been explicit, policy initiatives areinferred from a set of narrow and incremental decisions made over a periodof time. The Kurdish Front initially pursued a policy initiative aimed atreducing its dependence on Western aid, fully aware of the resentment inWestern countries about foreign aid. They also attempted to solve their ownfinancial problems by exporting oil from Northern Iraq. A report indicatesthat 30,000 barrels of oil were being exported daily to Turkey and that theyhad the future capability of increasing these exports to 500,000 b/d.98

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Moreover, the Kurdish leadership urged the UN to pass a resolution thatwould give the Kurds control over oil exports and the discretion to use oilrevenues to rebuild the Kurdish region. By allowing the Kurds to export oilthrough her territory, Turkey was able to get cheaper oil and offset lossesincurred as a result of the embargo on Iraq. However, the Turkishgovernment has used these oil exports as a means of dividing the Kurds andguaranteeing that the Iraqi Kurdish Front does not support the PKK. Mostimportantly, the export of oil has allowed the Kurds to become partiallyself-reliant by controlling the resources in their own areas and thusenhancing their sense of efficacy and their chances of declaring anindependent state.

The second initiative the Kurdish Front embarked upon from its enclavein Northern Iraq was the holding of elections to legitimize its control overits own territory. The Kurdish leadership had comprehended from recentexperiences in the former Soviet republics and in the Baltic that in the NewWorld Order, Western powers will endorse the independence of asecessionist republic if the leadership is democratically elected. By holdingtheir own elections the Kurds hoped to reduce the friction between thevarious factions forming the Kurdish Front. Talabani and Barzani wanted tolegitimize themselves, assess the relative strength of each other and divideresponsibilities and power between themselves, and thus reduce the frictionand constant rumours about the conflict between them. Talabani and thePUK hoped to win a narrow majority, while Barzani and the KDP believedthat they would garner between 50 and 60 per cent of the parliamentaryseats." Moreover, it was hoped that elections would bring the situation inNorthern Iraq under some form of central authority, as internal disputes hadresulted in a sense of lawlessness and large-scale corruption by localKurdish leaders.100

The results of the 19 May 1992 Kurdish elections did not resolve theleadership dilemma of the Kurdish Front. None of the five smaller partiesgot the seven per cent needed to get a seat in the assembly. Moreover, therewas a deadlock between the two main factions resulting in a 50-50provisional power-sharing formula with five seats allocated forChristians.101 Both major parties accused the other of large-scale multiplepolling and the Barzani faction lost its bid to get a majority when the Arbilpolling station was disqualified by a judge due to irregularities.102 Theapparent result of the elections was that neither leader could really claimleadership of the movement, which increased the significance of the mutualunderstanding arrived at prior to the elections aimed at reducing the fightingbetween the respective supporters of the two Kurdish leaders. However,Barzani lost the most in the deadlock since he was behind the electionmanoevre to break the 'shackles imposed by partnership with the more

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intractable Talabani and the PUK."03 With the power-sharing formula inplace, the Kurdish Front failed to gain international legitimacy andrecognition for their parliament in Arbil, as well as concrete political andeconomic aid. Since Barzani needed to maintain the stability of the newauthority and his accord with Talabani, he dropped the autonomy plan hehad negotiated with Saddam that called for a federal system in Iraq.104

However, the rivalry between the two Kurdish leaders could not becontained by the stalemated election results. Clashes between the PUK andKDP erupted in December 1993 over the shifting loyalties of the smallerKurdish factions.105 In May 1994, Ali Hasu, a local tribal leader in Qala Dizaand a KDP commander, sought to push some turf farmers off land his fatherhad acquired by force while helping Mulla Barzani in the 1970s. Since Hasuwas acting in his tribal capacity, the local peasants opposed to the tribalorder intuitively rallied towards the leftist-oriented PUK.106 The conflict wassimply a microcosm of the broader struggle between Barzani and Talabaniand the problems stemming from the 50-50 makeup of the Kurdish RegionalGovernment (KRG). The formula has led to a system of patronage at everylevel of administration in which each faction must balance the other'scommand structure. Furthermore, the PUK has armed tribal elementsamong the Harkis and Baradostis in opposition to the Barzanis.'07 In orderto maintain this patronage system, revenue is needed. It is also necessary formaintaining the evolving 'neo-tribalism' and retaining the loyalty of tribesalready compounded by linguistic-based divisions between northern KDPKermanji speakers and southern PUK Sorani speakers.108 Barzani controlsthe area that is closest to the Turkish border and is able to levy customsrevenues on about 600 trucks daily. Aid workers note that the KDP areasseem to be more prosperous. The PUK controls the area closest to Iran butis unable to raise similar amounts of revenue. Additionally, its area wasdevastated by the Iraqi regime in the 1980s.109

On a broader level the friction between the two Kurdish leaders isrelated to their strategy approaches. Barzani favors striking a deal withSaddam Hussein over, the autonomy agreement, stating that it is 'anagreement that meets our people's minimum demands.'110 Nonetheless, he isnot willing to do so at any price. He justifies his desire for a settlement byremarking that Kurdish interests require stability, that the roots of theKurdish problem are political, and that negotiations between Baghdad andthe Kurdish Front could resolve these problems. According to Barzani,while the draft of the agreement with the central government was not ideal,it was acceptable. As noted previously, Barzani put his acceptance of theagreement on hold when he formed the KRG following the 1992 elections.However, since then, Barzani has become more popular and the area hecontrols is prospering as a result of trade with Turkey. Furthermore, he has

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shown he can have stable relations with Turkey, Iran, and even SaddamHussein."1 In order to ensure stability in his area, Barzani co-operated withthe Turkish authorities and refused the PKK's request to be included in theKRG. He did so for two reasons. First, Barzani's prosperous relationshipwith Turkey would deteriorate if the PKK was included. Second, the PKKand the KDP are territorially adjoining and both compete for Kermanjispeakers."2

On the other hand, Talabani, who is more militant, considers theKurdish-Iraqi agreement unacceptable because he feels it only meets 15 percent of Kurdish demands."3 In addition, a secret part of the deal requires thatthe Iraqi Kurds help Saddam Hussein repress opposition to his regime, bothwithin and outside Iraq. Barzani was willing to go along with this condition,while Talabani rejected it outright."4 Second, Talabani and the Iraqiopposition, which includes the Kurdish Front, want to further humiliate theIraqi leader by showing him that they control a portion of Iraq and havelong-term American support for the Kurdish enclave and the Iraqi NationalCongress (INC). However, Barzani does not share Talabani's zeal for theINC and is sceptical of American support. However, from the United States'vantage point, the INC would police the truce between the Kurdish factionsand preserve the stability of the internationally protected area."5

Finally, Mas'ud Barzani wants to break the impasse with his main rivalthat has resulted in paralysis afflicting the Kurdish decision-makingprocess. However, Talabani wants to continue sharing leadership of theKurdish Front with Barzani, while increasing his stature by cooperatingwith the US. Barzani was hoping to win a clear-cut victory in the electionsthat were scheduled for the summer of 1995"6 and then strike an autonomyagreement with Baghdad that would be guaranteed by the UN. By doing sohe would be able to assume the title of 'Leader of the Kurdish NationalMovement', a title his father held for a long time. However, these electionsdid not take place.

The most recent significant alliance to come out of the ongoing Kurdishcontest is the alliance of Barzani's KDP and Iraqi dictator Saddam Husseinagainst the INC and the PUK. Two primary events induced a perception ofthreat and pushed Barzani to seek an alliance with Saddam. First, anuprising in Iraq was planned for March 1995. According to Barzani, a'representative of the American government' had promised that the USwould back a general uprising in Iraq by deploying air strikes againstSaddam's forces."7 Barzani, uneasy about such American support, checkedwith Washington to confirm this pledge. The answer he received was 'no'.Barzani withdrew his support for the uprising, but the PUK and the INC stilllaunched their attacks. Although 500 Iraqi soldiers were captured, a wide-scale uprising never materialized."8 This episode confirmed Barzani's

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suspicions that the US was not serious about overthrowing Saddam and thatit was simply toying with the INC. As the son of the man betrayed by theUS in the 1970s, he remembers doubly well the non-existent US backing forthe 1991 uprising. This episode weakened Talabani, who was seen as beingmanipulated by the US while Barzani stood his own ground.

The second event that pushed Barzani into Saddam's arms was Iran's1996 incursion into the Kurdish region controlled by Talabani. IslamicRevolutionary Guards crossed into Iraq to crush the Kurdish DemocraticParty of Iran (KDPI), with the PUK's permission. Talabani's desperation foroutside assistance was reflected in his April 1996 comment that 'anyonewho can achieve peace is welcome. If the US can do it, or if Iran can do itthey are welcome."" The KDP charged that the PUK collaborated with Iranin an attempt to get military and material assistance to gain the upper handagainst the KDP.120 The PKK also has Iran's backing to battle the KDP.121

After the KDP captured Arbil, they circulated a letter written by Talabanistating that the PUK's agreement with the Supreme Council of the IslamicRevolution in Iraq (SCIRI) which is stationed in Iran, was intended toappease Iran and ensure her co-operation in bringing down the Iraqiregime.'22 Barzani had other reasons to cooperate with Saddam. He wasaware that Turkey was ready to form a security corridor along the portionof the Iraqi-Turkish border that he controls. Barzani also reasoned that theIranian incursion on behalf of the PUK in the south would severely diminishthe area under his control.123 Moreover, Barzani was anxious that theopening of the Kirkuk pipeline to Turkey under the newly reached UnitedNations-Iraqi oil-for-food deal would undermine his control over the lorrytrade that generated close to $250,000 per day for his KDP.'24

Hence, Mas'ud Barzani sent his nephew, Nirchervan Barzani, toBaghdad to get Saddam's backing against the PUK. On 31 August 1996,Iraqi forces assisted the KDP's attack on Arbil, the KRG's capital that wascontrolled by the PUK. Tariq Aziz, Iraqi deputy prime minister, stressed thatIraqi forces were there at the KDP's request to counter Iran's assistance tothe PUK.125 Iraqi government forces attacked the Western-protected zonewith armour and artillery and dislodged the PUK from Arbil. The KDPjustified its alliance with Saddam's regime as necessary for counteringIran's incursion into northern Iraq. They also noted that their request forAmerican help after Iran invaded the PUK-controlled areas had goneunheeded.126

Following their initial successes, the KDP pursued two importantstrategies. First, in order not to alienate the Western powers and be left atthe mercy of Saddam, it asked for continued Western protection for theKurds to ensure their safety not only from Saddam but also from regionalpowers such as Iran and Turkey.127 Second, it declared that it would

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negotiate with the PUK in its capacity as a political party, not as a militia.128

Barzani was hoping to achieve two things. The first was to secure anAmerican and allied presence, and thus legitimize himself as theinternationally accepted Kurdish leader through his alliance with theinternational powers. Second, by offering to open the door for a dialoguewith the PUK, he could insure a semblance of the survival of the Kurdishdemocratic experiment but continue to portray himself as the sole leader ofthe Kurdish national movement. However, Barzani's success was short-lived as the PUK, with Iran's help, recaptured many of the cities they lostand the situation in the Kurdish region has virtually returned to the statusquo ante.

Barzani has, however, consolidated his position regionally with Turkey,which is anxious to cooperate with the KDP in order to suppress the PKKalong their common border area. Sami Abderrahman, a leading member ofthe KDP, asserted that the PKK will not be allowed to operate in KDP-controlled areas and accused the PKK of disrupting Kurdish villages alongthe border between Iraq and Turkey.129 The KDP sought to furtherconsolidate its security co-operation with the Turkish military by engagingin joint military campaigns against the PKK in June and September 1997.Not only has the KDP succeeded in expanding its influence within theautonomous areas of northern Iraq, but has showed itself willing to act as asecurity guarantor for Turkey by sacrificing the interests of the PKK andKurds in Turkey.

Conclusion

The research discussed above illustrates that the Kurdish nationalmovement in Iraq is divided by tribal and linguistic identities that largelypredetermine group loyalty for the two primary Kurdish factions, the KDPand the PUK. The existence of a national consciousness among the Kurdsin Iraq is not sufficiently strong to overcome ideological identification andgroup centrism based on tribal identity; thus, loyalty is ultimately given tothe tribal communal group. The research also illustrates that to maintain theloyalty of their group members, the leaders must assure themselves a supplyof weapons necessary for the defence of the group and the financialresources to buy patronage. This clearly supports the proposition advancedby Levy and Barnett that alliances are formed quickly in order to meetimmediate financial and security threats to the leaders. Both Talabani andBarzani formed alliances respectively with Iran and Iraq in order to offsetperceived threats to their movements from the opposing faction. In the1960s, Talabani allied himself with the Ba'ath against Mulla Barzani, whilethe latter countered by securing assistance from Iran, Israel and the US.

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But as stated earlier, one cannot underestimate the impact ofinternational and regional systems in terms of providing allianceopportunities for the pursuit of home rule or independence. The Kurdishleadership of the 1970s was too eager to declare its desire for anindependent state and to serve American Cold War interests in the region.Mulla Mustafa Barzani overestimated the US desire to support him againstthe Ba'ath, who were then allied with the USSR. The fact was that theNixon administration granted the Kurdish question low priority relative toits desire to destabilize Iraq in order to ensure the security of two of hermost important allies, Turkey and Iran. Kissinger viewed the Kurds simplyas an instrument to weaken a Soviet ally; his main interests were never thehuman and legal rights of the Iraqi Kurds. The internal divisions within theKurdish movement greatly weakened the bargaining position of the Kurdsvis-a-vis the Ba'ath regime. Both of the Kurdish leaders sought to utilizetheir alliances, Barzani with the US and Talabani with the Iraqi regime, inorder to strengthen themselves relative to each other. It is probable that theKurds could have achieved a limited, workable autonomy plan in the 1970shad Barzani not been encouraged by the Shah and the US to fight the Iraqigovernment and had Talabani presented a unified front against the Ba'athregime.

The second case and its aftermath, focusing on the post-Second GulfWar period, demonstrates that the Kurdish national movement benefitedfrom international intervention that led to elections and foreign protectionin the form of safe havens. A temporary commonality of interests aroseamong the Kurdish factions fighting Saddam Hussein fostered by thesupport of Operation Provide Comfort. Nonetheless, once the electionswere held in the Kurdish region, loyalty was once again granted to the tribalcommunal identity groups. Thus the Kurdish national movement continuesto be hindered by internal divisions. These divisions are actually sharpernow than they were in the 1970s given the rise and strength of the PUK andits leader, Jalal Talabani. These internal divisions result in the continuedformation of various shifting alliances by the two movements in order tobolster their respective positions. Hence, the strength of localized identityamong the Kurds appears to be the driving force behind their alliancebehaviour at the expense of the broader benefits that could be gained if theyacted as a cohesive national movement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Howard Lehman, Catherine Scott-Freij and Hakan Yavuz for their helpfulcomments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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NOTES

1. Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest forInfluence (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1991), p.63; Michael M.Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp.1-5.

2. For details and analysis of the Kurdish-controlled region in Iraq, see Robert Olson, 'TheKurdish Question and Geopolitic Changes in the Middle East After the Gulf War', Journalof South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No.4 (Summer 1994), pp.44-67; idem,'The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990s?' Journal of South Asian and Middle EasternStudies, Vol.15, No.4 (Summer 1992), pp. 1-25; and Michael M. Gunter, 'A De FactoKurdish State in Northern Iraq', Third World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993), pp.295-319.

3. George Modelski, 'The International Relations of Internal War', and 'InternationalSettlement of Internal War', both in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of CivilStrife (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 14-44 and pp. 122-53; PierreHassner, 'Civil Violence and the Patterns of International Power', Adelphi Papers, No.83(December 1971); C.R. Mitchell, 'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties',International Studies Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (June 1970), pp.166-94; Astri Suhrke and LelaGamer Noble (eds.), Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977);Frederick L. Shiel (ed.), Ethnic Separatism and World Politics (Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, 1984); Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); Alexis Heraclides, 'Secessionist Minoritiesand External Involvement', International Organization, Vol.44, No.3 (Summer 1990),pp.341-78; idem, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London:Frank Cass, 1991); K.M. de Silva and R.J. May (eds), Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and Rajat Ganguly, The Role of Ethnic Kin States inSecessionist Movements: A Comparative Study of Secessionist Movements in South Asia(Tulane University, 1996, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

4. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987),p. 17. For discussions of alliances literature, see Roger V. Dingman, 'Theories of, andApproaches to, Alliance Politics', in Paul Gordon Lauren (editor), Diplomacy: NewApproaches in Theory, History, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp.245-266; andRobert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press,1968).

5. M. Walt, 'Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia',International Organization, Vol.42, No.2 (Spring 1988), pp.279-80.

6. Ibid., p.281; and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chapter 6.

7. Steven R. David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', World Politics, Vol.43, No.2 (January1991), pp.233-56.

8. Ibid., p.236.9. Ibid., pp.242-3.10. Ibid., pp.237-8; Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, 'Domestic Sources of Alliances and

Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73', International Organization, Vol.45, No.3(Summer 1991), p.373.

11. For a survey of studies on nationalism, see Anthony Smith, 'The Nation: Invented, Imagined,Reconstructed?' Millennium, Vol.20, No.3 (Winter 1991), pp.353-68; for how the salienceof various identities can affect behavior, see Richard Cottam, 'Nationalism in the MiddleEast: A Behavioral Approach', in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism toRevolutionary Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp.28-52; fora psychological explanation of personal and national identity formation and its impact oninternational relations, see William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity andInternational Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

12. Michael A. Hogg, 'Intragroup Processes, Group Structure, and Social Identity', in W. PeterRobinson (ed.), Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel(Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996), pp.65-93; Pamela Johnston Conover, 'The Role of

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Social Groups in Political Thinking', The British Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, No.l(January 1988), pp.51-76.

13. Penelope J. Oakes, 'The Salience of Social Categories', in John C. Turner et al. (eds.),Rediscovering the Social Croup (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 117-41.

14. Gary Lee Green, The Historical Dilemma of Kurdish Tribalism in Iraq (University of Utah,1977, unpublished MA thesis). Emphasis added. Martin van Bruinessen reaches similarconclusions but adds that a sense of national identity coexists with other identities: 'TheKurds Between Iran and Iraq', Middle East Report, Vol.16, No.4 (July-August 1986),pp. 14-27.

15. Michael A. Hogg and John C. Turner, 'Intergroup Behaviour, Self-Stereotyping and theSalience of Social Categories', British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.26, No.4(December 1987), pp.325-40; Richard R. Lau, 'Individual and Contextual Influences ofGroup Identification', Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol.52, No.3 (September 1989),pp.220-31; and William Connolly, Identity/Difference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1992).

16. Bloom, p.23.17. Ibid., p.52.18. Cottam, p.29. Emphasis in the original.19. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1976), p.75.20. Ernst B. Haas, 'Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction', Millennium, Vol.22,

No.3 (Winter 1993), p. 514.21. Barnett and Levy, p.374.22. Barnett and Levy and Brand argue that alliances are driven by a need for revenue. Barnett

and Levy, p.374; Laurie Brand, 'Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations withSyria and Iraq, 1975-1981', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.26, No.3(August 1994), pp.393-413.

23. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,1985), p.230.

24. Heraclides, p.378.25. Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and

the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 128.26. Alexander George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured,

Focused Comparison', in P.Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theoryand Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp.51-2.

27. One of the better books dealing with this subject is written by Edmund Ghareeb, The KurdishQuestion in Iraq (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981); see also EdgarO'Balance, The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973); Sa'adJawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970 (London: Ithaca Press, 1981); andMichael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin's Press,1992). Three broader books that deal well with the Kurdish question in the region are NaderEntessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); GerardChaliand (ed.), People Without a Country (London: Zed Press, 1980); and Stephen C.Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1984).

28. Martin M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organizationof Kurdistan (Holland: Utrecht University, 1978).

29. van Bruinessen, 'The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq', p.16.30. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p.280.31. Sa'ad Jawad, p.161; Entessar, p.67; and Ghareeb, p.41.32. Sa'ad Jawad, p.205; Entessar, p.67-8. For a detailed analysis of Kurdish infighting and the

split within the KDP and the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, see Sa'ad Jawad,pp. 159-73.

33. Majid Khadduri, Republican 'Iraq: A Study in 'Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.253.

34. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to

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Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1990), pp. 103-4.35. Arab Report and Record (hereafter ARR), 16-30 June 1966, p.135.36. Sa'ad Jawad, pp.205-9.37. Saddam Hussein, On Current Events in Iraq (London: Longman Group Ltd. 1977), p.15.38. For the details of the 1970 March Agreement refer to ARR 1-15 March 1970, p.144.39. ARR, 1-14 February 1970, p.88.40. Richard W. Cottam, 'The Case of the Kurds: Minorities in the Middle East", paper presented

at the 1977 American Political Science Association meeting, p.25.41. ARR, 16-30 November 1968, p.371.42. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, pp.166-7.43. Cottam, 'The Case of the Kurds', p.26.44. The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad came about when Iranian Kurds declared their

independence in January 1946. Mulla Mustafa Barzani moved several thousand of his forcesfrom Iraq into Iran and fought the Shah's army. He was encouraged by the support that thenewly declared republic had received from the Soviet Union. However, the Western powerswere opposed to a Kurdish state, as were Turkey and Iran. The Shah eventually reached anaccord with the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Iran and terminate their support for theKurds and the Azerbaijanis in return for allowing the Soviets to explore for oil in northernIran. Once the Soviets withdrew their aid, the Republic of Mahabad collapsed in 1947. Fora detailed study on this issue, see William Eagleton Jr., The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad(London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

45. Lee Dinsmore, 'The Forgotten Kurds', The Progressive, Vol.41, No.4 (April 1977), p.39.46. Christian Science Monitor, 5 October 1971.47. See article by David Hirst, 'New War Possible: Ba'ath-Kurdish Pact Breached in Iraq',

Washington Post, 2 December 1971, pp.F1 and F7.48. Hanna Y. Freij, Perceptions and Behavior in U.S. Foreign Relations Towards the Republic of

Iraq (University of Pittsburgh, 1992, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,).49. New York Times, 26 April 1970. The Soviet leadership urged the Ba'ath Party to seek an

accommodation with the Kurds in an article in Pravda; see ARR 1-14 February 1970, p.87.50. ARR, 1-15 December 1971, p.625.51. Washington Post, 24 June 1973, p.C4.52. The interview was given by 'Udaydallah Barzani to Al-Watan, Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS), 18 October 1974, p.El.53. Ghareeb, p. 142. According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor, 6 October 1980,

former Israeli Premier Menachem Begin admitted that Israel provided the Kurdishinsurgency with advisors who were stationed in Barzani's headquarters and provided aid inthe form of weapons and money.

54. Ibid., pp. 142-3.55. Ibid., pp. 132-3.56. Cottam, 'The Case of the Kurds', p.33.57. Buchheit, p.160.58. Washington Post, 24 June 1973, p.C4.59. New York Times 29 September 1974; ARR, 16-31 May 1974, p.194.60. Washington Post, 24 June 1973, p.C4.61. 'The Pike Report' in The Village Voice, 16 February 1976, p.85. The Pike Report was issued

by the US House Select Committee on Intelligence dealing with CIA covert Activists in1976. It was a high incendiary document, which Congress refused to release without theWhite House censoring part of the document, but was leaked and published by The VillageVoice.

62. Washington Post, 24 Junel973, p.C4.63. Ghareeb, pp. 138-9. Emphasis added.64. Jim Hoagland, 'The Kurds Gird for Another War', Washington Post 24 June 1973, p.C4;

ARR, 16-30 November 1974, p.511; Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1974.65. Hoagland, p.C4.66. 'The Pike Report" in The Village Voice, p.87.67. Ibid., p.85.

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68. Ibid., p.87. Emphasis added.69. Ibid., p.87.70. For details of the agreement between Iraq and Iran see ARR 1-15 March 1975, p.163.71. Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New

York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), p.278. One of these messages read as follows,'Your Excellency, our hearts bleed to see the destruction of our defenseless people in anunprecedented manner. We feel, Your Excellency, that the United States has a moral andpolitical responsibility towards our people who have committed themselves to yourcountry's policy.'

72. The Village Voice, 16 February 1976, p.85.73. 'Civil War in Iraq', A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States

Senate (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, May 1991), p.13.74. The Middle East (London), February 1991, p.21.

'The War We Left Behind', Frontline, reported by Leslie and Andrew Cockburn (JournalGraphics, Inc., 1991), p.11.

76. Faleh Abd al-Jabbar, 'Why the Uprisings Failed', Middle East Report, No. 176 (May-June1992), p.8; see also 'Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath',Middle East Watch (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992).

77. 'Civil War in Iraq', p.4.78. The Middle East (London), November 1991, p. 16.79. Frontline, p. 10.80. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS), 1

November 1991, p.57. In the 1970s, the Ba'ath regime followed a policy of Arabization,depopulating the region of Kurds, particularly along the Iraq-Iran border. Martin vanBruinessen, 'The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq', p.19.

81. Newsweek, 15 April 1991, p.27.82. See Nik Gowing, 'The Media Dimension I: TV and the Kurds', The World Today, Vol.47,

No.7 (July 1991), pp.11-12.83. Helena Cook, The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi

Kurdistan (London: Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1995), p.37.84. For a detailed statement, see FBIS, 17 July 1991, pp.27-8.85. New York Times, 9 May 1991.86. Middle East International, No.399 (3 May 1991), p.3.87. For a detailed text of the Iraqi Opposition Charter, see FBIS, 9 April 1991, pp.36-8.88. New York Times, 9 May 1991.89. FBIS, 1 November 1991, p.55.90. FBIS, 11 December 1991, p.44.

For details of the agreement between the Iraqi regime and Mas'ud Barzani see, Entessar,p.149.

92. New York Times, 17 May 1991, p.A6.93. For reports on PKK attacks on Turkish troops in Turkish Kurdistan, see the following

articles in the New York Times: Alan Cowell, 'Turkey's Effort to Quell Rebel Kurds RaisesAlarm in Ankara and Europe', 27 March 1992, p.A6; and Chris Hedges, 'Kurds in TurkeySeem to be Nearing Full-Scale Revolt', 30 March 1992, pp.A1 and A6.

94. 'Civil War in Iraq', p.15.95. FBIS, 4 October 1991, p.11.96. FBIS, 4 September 1991, p.29.97. FBIS, 23 September 1991, p.39.98. FBIS, 10 April 1992, p. 16.99. Christian Science Monitor, 15 May 1992, p.6.100. Christian Science Monitor, 11 February, 11, 1992, p.3.101. Middle East International, No.426 (29 May 1992), p. 12, and Christian Science Monitor,

27 May 1992, p.2.102. Middle East International, No. 426 (29 May 1992), p.12.103. Ibid.104. Albrecht Metzger, 'Anxieties in Iraqi Kurdistan', Middle East International, No.436 (23

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October 1992), pp. 19-20.105. Middle East International, No.492 (20 January 1995), p.5.106. David McDowall, 'Dicing with Death: The KDP and PUK in Conflict', Middle East

International, No.476 (27 May 1994), p. 18.Ibid.

108. David McDowall, 'The Struggle for Kurdistan, 2) Iraq', Middle East International, No.499(28 April 1995), p. 18; for more on the differences between the Kermanji and Soranispeakers see Martin van Bruinessen, 'The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq', pp. 14-27.

109. Middle East International, No.513 (17 November 1995), p.15; The Times (London), 2September 1996.

110. FBIS, 3 January 1992, p.25.111. McDowall, 'The Struggle for Kurdistan', p.20.112. Robert Olson, 'The Spread of Kurdish Nationalism: A New Stage in Its Development',

Middle East International, 'No.511 (20 October 1995), p.18.113. FBIS, 13 December 1991, p.36.114. FBIS, 23 July 1991, p.33.115. Middle East International, No.506 (5 August 1995), p.13.116. McDowall, 'The Struggle for Kurdistan', p.20.117. Christian Science Monitor, 24 April 1996, p. 1.118. Ibid.119. Christian Science Monitor, 3 September 1996. The Iranian leadership has accused the US

of allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power in order to justify their presence in theGulf and exercise their hegemony in the region. However, they have also accused the USof having the desire to 'dismember Iraq'. Iran believes that the safe havens will graduallyexpand and increase the need for US military intervention in Iraq, which could lead to the'bud of a second Israel' in the region. The Iranian leadership is so weary of the sanctuariesfor the Kurds that they have compared the accord to the setting up of safe havens in theSykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 that led to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.Hence, Iran saw this as an opportunity to intervene in the Kurdish areas to protect their vitalinterests. Freij, 'The Kurdish Question in Iraq', p.34.

120. Middle East International, No.532 (16 August 1996), p.6; and The Times, 30 July 1996.121. Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 1996, p. 1.122. Middle East International, No.537 (8 November 1996), p.9.123. Robert Olson, 'Why (KDP)?' http://www.kurdistan.Org/B/whykdp.124. Ibid.125. The Times, 1 and 2 September 1996. Iraqi authorities stressed that Iran had sent close to

3,000 troops to assist Talabani in July 1996.126. Middle East International, No.533 (6 September 1996), p.4; The Times, 3 September

1996).127. The Times, 13 September 1996).

Middle East International, No.535 (4 October 1996), p.15.129. 'Iraqi Kurds vow to keep PKK out of northern Iraq', http://www.cnn.com/World/ (23 May

1997).

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Tribal Identity and Alliance Behavior Among Factions of the Kurdish National Movement in Iraq

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Transcript of Tribal Identity and Alliance Behavior Among Factions of the Kurdish National Movement in Iraq