Trial by Wind and Water - AIRS · 2011. 9. 16. · services (water, ice, food), rescue needs,...

Trial by Wind and Water:How 2-1-1 Played a Vital Role During the 2004 Florida Hurricanes

ii TRIAL BY WIND AND WATER:

iiiHOW 2-1-1 PLAYED A VITAL ROLE DURING THE 2004 FLORIDA HURRICANES

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About This Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

1. Establishing the Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2-1-1 in Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Variables Affecting the Role of 2-1-1 in the Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . .6Limitations and Lost Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7The Volume of Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8The Nature of the Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

2. Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

3. The Contribution of 2-1-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Expanding Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Managing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Identifying Unmet and Emerging Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Reassuring Callers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Mobilizing and Managing Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25Serving as Intake Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26Sustaining the Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

4. The Value of Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Partnerships with United Ways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29Partnerships with Volunteer Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31The Value of the 2-1-1 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

5. Operational Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

The Value and Limitations of Advance Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34Remaining Open in an Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34Taking Care of 2-1-1 Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

People Interviewed for This Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

iv TRIAL BY WIND AND WATER:

vHOW 2-1-1 PLAYED A VITAL ROLE DURING THE 2004 FLORIDA HURRICANES

Executive SummaryIn 2004, Florida became the first state in 130 years to be hit by five “tropical cyclones” in a singleyear—Tropical Storm Bonnie, Hurricane Charley, Hurricane Frances, Hurricane Ivan, and HurricaneJeanne. For the first time, 2-1-1 centers across a state played a vital role throughout a major emer-gency—in the days leading up to each of the storms, during the storms themselves, in the immedi-ate aftermath, and in the long-term recovery.

United Way of America commissioned this report to document the work done by the 2-1-1 centers, to offer the Florida 2-1-1 centers the opportunity to reflect on and learn from their experience, and toshare their stories with 2-1-1 centers and emergency management staff throughout the country.

2-1-1 in Florida2-1-1 is the three-digit telephone number designated by the Federal Communications Commission in2000 as “an easy-to-remember and universally-recognizable number” to connect people with humanand social services. There currently are twelve active 2-1-1 regional and local call centers that serve33 of Florida’s 67 counties, providing 2-1-1 access to 75 percent of its population, and handling over500,000 calls per year. There are nine additional comprehensive information & referral centers inthe state, many of which have announced their intention to become 2-1-1 centers. The 2-1-1 centerscome together in the Florida 2-1-1 Network, a cooperative effort of the Florida Alliance of Informationand Referral Services (FLAIRS) and the United Way of Florida.

While 2-1-1 is available to 75 percent of Florida’s population, it is not accessible in half of the state’s67 counties. The lack of statewide coverage limited the extent to which 2-1-1 could serve the state duringthe emergency—there could not be a coordinated state-level decision to establish 2-1-1 as the dialingcode to be used throughout the state to reach disaster response services. Until 2-1-1 becomes a trulystatewide system, it is unlikely that it will be fully recognized as a partner in emergency managementand, thus, continue to be ineligible for the funding from FEMA and other sources required for it to makethe maximum possible contribution during an emergency.

The Value of 2-1-1During the Emergency, 2-1-1 made seven primary contributions:• expanded the capacity of Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) by providing trained information

and referral specialists and by offering the public an alternative access point for information;

• managed information about availability of services and the status of health and human serviceorganizations and government agencies;

• identified unmet and emerging needs, helping direct resources to high priority places;

• provided critically needed telephone reassurance and crisis support for callers;

• helped mobilize and manage volunteers and cash and in-kind donations;

• served as intake points on behalf of government agencies and nonprofit organizations,increasing the efficiency of connecting people with needed help; and,

• offered a sustained connection to help for people whose lives were dramatically affected by thestorm as 2-1-1 became part of long-term recovery efforts.

Trial by Wind and Water:How 2-1-1 Played a Vital Role During the 2004 Florida Hurricanes

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Lessons Learned1. 2-1-1 centers conclusively demonstrated thesignificant contribution that they can make inan emergency.

2. 2-1-1 centers need to clarify the roles theywant to play during an emergency, to build rela-tionships in advance to enable those roles, andto be very flexible and innovative.

3. 2-1-1 centers must build strong relationshipswith partners who will support them and whoare in a position to respond to the data 2-1-1 iscollecting-with key response organizations likethe Salvation Army and American Red Cross,with United Way and Volunteer Centers, andwith government and nonprofit serviceproviders.

4. Emergency management does not intuitivelyunderstand the potential value add of 2-1-1 toits work, suggesting the need for 2-1-1 toengage in significant education, advocacy, andrelationship-building with emergency manage-ment at all levels-national, state, and local.

5. 2-1-1 centers must prepare for a new kind ofoperation during an emergency with the empha-sis on advance preparation, flexibility and inno-vation to respond to sustained spikes in call vol-ume, rapidly changing information that is hardto collect but which must be managed and dis-seminated, and breakdowns in planned staffingand existing emergency plans.

6. “Telephone reassurance” is an essential rolefor 2-1-1 to play in all phases of an emergency.

7. The emergency reinforced the importance ofdeveloping 2-1-1 as a system at the local, state,and national levels to ensure the highest sus-tained level of performance and to secure thefunds required to enable 2-1-1 to respond toemergencies and the new needs that come withthem.

Volume and Nature of CallsThe volume of calls was so great that it provedimpossible for 2-1-1 centers to track them accu-rately. Estimates ranged from 60,000 calls insix days in Lee County to a 300 percent increasein Orlando to increases of 25-40 percent atother 2-1-1 centers.

The nature of the calls received changed rapidlyas communities moved from one phase of thestorm to the next:• Pre-storm—information about evacuation,

location and availability of shelters,inquiries from people with special needs,preparation for the storm

• During the storm—reassurance, crisis inter-vention, emergency assistance

• Immediate aftermath—location of essentialservices (water, ice, food), rescue needs,debris removal, power outages

• Recovery—disaster relief financial assis-tance, property damage, disaster-causedhealth issues, disaster-related transporta-tion issues

The Partnership with United WaysThe state-level partnership between 2-1-1 andUnited Ways existed well before the storms.FLAIRS and United Way of Florida joined togeth-er to develop the strategic business plan for theFlorida 2-1-1 Network; worked together to passthe state legislation authorizing development of2-1-1; and now are jointly seeking funding fromthe legislature to make statewide access to 2-1-1 a reality.

During the Emergency, the partnership servedboth parties well. By working together, 2-1-1and United Ways expanded each other’s capaci-ty to serve their community and enabled both tobuild stronger relationships with EOCs and withother nonprofit organizations.

For 2-1-1 centers, the partnership directly con-nected them to the significant community lead-ership roles undertaken by United Waysstatewide, leveraging the value of 2-1-1’s data,focusing greater attention on their contribution,and bringing them new resources. For UnitedWays, the partnership with 2-1-1 better posi-tioned them to be at the heart of the emergencyresponse effort and gave them new opportuni-ties to demonstrate community impact.

1HOW 2-1-1 PLAYED A VITAL ROLE DURING THE 2004 FLORIDA HURRICANES

IntroductionHurricane / Typhoon: A tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind(using the U.S. 1-minute average) is 64 kt (74 mph or 119 km/hr) or more. The term hurri-cane is used for Northern Hemisphere tropical cyclones east of the International Datelineto the Greenwich Meridian. The term typhoon is used for Pacific tropical cyclones north ofthe Equator west of the International Dateline.

Hurricane Season: The portion of the year having a relatively high incidence of hurri-canes. The hurricane season in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico runs from June1 to November 30.2

On July 29, 2004, a “tropical wave” crossed Dakar, Senegal and moved westward for sev-eral days, accompanied by cloudiness, thunderstorms, and “a well-defined cyclonic rota-tion at the mid-levels.” Less than a week later, a tropicaldepression grew out of the system as it passedBarbados. Within another week, it had become TropicalStorm Bonnie near the northeastern tip of the YucatanPeninsula. It made landfall near Saint Vincent and SaintGeorge Islands just south of Apalachicola, Florida mid-morning on August 12.3

The 2004 hurricane season had begun for the more than17 million residents of Florida.

By the time the last winds and rains of Hurricane Jeannehad subsided on September 27, 48 days after Bonnie’slandfall, 110 people in the United States and over 1,600 people in the Caribbean weredead and an estimated $60 billion in damages had been incurred.

For the first time in 130 years, a single state had been hit by five “tropical cyclones” in asingle year—Tropical Storm Bonnie, Hurricane Charley, Hurricane Frances, HurricaneIvan, and Hurricane Jeanne.4

Preparations for and recovery after the storms generated a massive response on the partof federal, state, county, and municipal emergency management agencies, nonprofitorganizations, faith-based groups, and businesses, and by individual citizens not onlythroughout Florida but from around the United States who volunteered their time andmade cash and in-kind contributions.

For the first time, 2-1-1s across a state were able to play a vital role throughout the emer-gency—in the days leading up to each of the storms, during the storms themselves, inthe immediate aftermath, and in the long-term recovery. This is the story of what theyexperienced, how they performed, and what they learned from their experience.

June too soon.

July stand by.

August look out you must.

September remember.

October all over.—Mariner’s poem1

1 As quoted from Inwards, Richard, 1898: Weather Lore. Elliot Stock, London, p. 86 by Edward N. Rappaport andJose Fernandez-Partagas in “The Deadliest Atlantic Tropical Cyclones, 1492-1996”, NOAA TechnicalMemorandum NWS NHC 47, May 28, 1995, which may be found at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastdeadly.shtml2 op. cit., Rappaport and Fernandez-Partagas.3 “Tropical Storm Bonnie: 3-13 August 2004” by Lixion A. Avila of the National Hurricane Center, October 5,2004. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/4 “As hurricane season ends, Floridians wonder what’s in store for the future” by Ken Kaye, posted November28, 2004 on http://www.sun-sentinel.com/.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastdeadly.shtml

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

http://www.sun-sentinel.com/

2 TRIAL BY WIND AND WATER:

HOW 2-1-1 PLAYED A VITAL ROLE DURING THE 2004 FLORIDA HURRICANES 3

About This StudyTrial by Wind and Water: How 2-1-1 Played a Vital Role During the 2004 Florida Hurricanes was com-missioned by United Way of America: • to document the work of 2-1-1s and other comprehensive I&Rs in Florida during the 2004

hurricane emergency;

• to gain perspective on the contribution that the 2-1-1s and I&Rs made to the overall organizedcommunity response to that emergency;

• to offer the 2-1-1s and I&Rs the opportunity to reflect on and learn from their experience; and,

• to share what they experienced and learned with 2-1-1s, United Ways, and emergency manage-ment agencies of government nationwide.

The research included:• site visits to five of the hardest-hit counties—Lee, Charlotte, Brevard, Orange, and Palm Beach;

• face-to-face and telephone interviews with 77 people;

• review of internal and public reports provided by the 2-1-1s, news reports, and web sites; and,

• a meeting of 21 people from 2-1-1s and other comprehensive I&Rs organized by the FloridaAssociation of Information and Referral Services (FLAIRS) and the United Way of Florida.

This report is organized into five chapters:• The first establishes the context for understanding the emergency and the role of 2-1-1s.

It describes the status of 2-1-1s in Florida, identifies three major variables affecting the role the2-1-1 played, explores the limitations of the 2-1-1s and the implication for the contribution theycould make, and discusses the volume and the nature of calls received by 2-1-1s during theemergency.

• The second describes lessons learned from this experience. These lessons are valuable not onlyfor the Florida 2-1-1s as they examine how they will respond to future hurricanes and other natu-ral disasters, but also to 2-1-1s in communities throughout the United States as they prepare tomeet a wide variety of natural disasters.

• The third describes the contributions of 2-1-1—expanding the capacity of emergency response,managing information, identifying unmet needs, reassuring callers, mobilizing and managingvolunteers, serving as intake for service providers, and sustaining the connection. It is here thattheir stories are told, both in their own words and in the words of those who worked with andobserved them.

• The fourth discusses the value of partnerships—with emergency management agencies of gov-ernment, with United Ways, with Volunteer Centers, and with one another.

• The fifth presents three operational issues of interest—the value and limitations of advance plan-ning; issues around whether, when and how to close during an emergency; and, concerns abouthow best to support 2-1-1 staff and volunteers who work through an emergency.

There also are a number of sidebars throughout the report devoted to specific examples. A completelist of people interviewed and footnotes will be found at the very end.


There are four terms that recur throughout thereport:• “2-1-1” has been defined to include those

comprehensive I&Rs currently operatingwith the 211 3-digit dialing code, those whoare actively preparing to become 2-1-1s, andthose who are exploring the possibility ofbecoming 2-1-1s.

• “the Emergency” is the term chosen torefer to the total experience. It began, asnoted above, in early August 2004. Forthose most affected by the storm, it has yetto end. For some 2-1-1s, the term refers tothe immediate period around a singlestorm; for others, the entire period.

• “EOC,” which technically means“Emergency Operations Center,” the facilitythat houses county government’s emer-gency management team during an emer-gency, is used as an umbrella term to referto that entire effort. Thus, “the relationshipbetween 2-1-1 and the EOC” refers to therelationship with whatever the specificemergency management structure is withinthe county or municipality.

• Hurricanes and tropical storms are referredto by the name given them by the WorldMeteorological Organization—Bonnie,Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.

About 2-1-1

Information & referral services are specifi-cally designed to connect people with thehealth and human services they need, usu-ally through telephone interaction with atrained referral specialist. ComprehensiveI&Rs deal with the broadest range ofcallers’ requests. Specialized I&Rs mayfocus either on a specific population group(seniors, youth, etc.) or with a specificissue area (substance abuse, HIV-AIDS, cri-sis counseling, etc.). Some I&Rs “blend”comprehensive I&R services with crisisintervention.

2-1-1 is the 3-digit telephone number des-ignated by the FCC in July 2000 as “aneasy-to-remember and universally-recog-nizable number that would enable a criticalconnection between individuals and fami-lies in need and the appropriate communi-ty-based organizations and governmentagencies.”

By the fall of 2004, 139 2-1-1 systems hadbegun operating in 28 states and theDistrict of Columbia, allowing over 34% ofthe U.S. population, more than 100 millionpeople, to gain access to information about the social services they need bydialing 2-1-1.


Chapter One

Establishing the ContextThis chapter provides the context to understand the experience of the 2-1-1s during the Emergency. The chapter describes the current status of2-1-1 in Florida, identifies three major variables affecting the role the 2-1-1s played, explores the limitations on the 2-1-1s and the implication forthe contribution they could make, and discusses the volume and thenature of calls received by the 2-1-1s during the emergency.

2-1-1 in FloridaThere currently are twelve active 2-1-1 regional and local call centers thatserve 33 of Florida’s 67 counties, providing 2-1-1 access to 75% of its pop-ulation and handling over 500,000 calls per year. There are nine addition-al comprehensive I&Rs in the state, many of which have announced theirintention to become 2-1-1s.

The 2-1-1s come together in the Florida 2-1-1 Network, a cooperative effortof the Florida Alliance of Information and Referral Services (FLAIRS) andthe United Way of Florida. In 2002, the Florida state legislature adoptedFlorida Senate Bill 1276 which authorized “the planning, development,and...implementation of a statewide Florida 211 Network which shall serveas the single point of coordination for information and referral for healthand human services.” By specifically naming FLAIRS, the statewide asso-ciation of local information and referral providers, the legislature recog-nized the strength of the state’s existing 2-1-1 assets.

In 2003, FLAIRS and United Way of Florida joined together in a strategicplanning process that resulted in a strategic business plan to guide thedevelopment of the Network, to achieve statewide coverage and to buildstrong collaboration with the public sector. It described their vision of

...an integrated, efficient statewide system of local and regional call cen-ters that will work together to provide telephone access to trained referralspecialists 24 hours a day, 365 days a year—providing the right informa-tion in the right way at the right time.

The business plan foresaw the role of 2-1-1 in response to natural disasters:

We must be prepared to respond immediately and effectively to the realityof natural disasters. We know better than any other state the devastatingimpact of natural disasters. Not only do they create immediate emergencysituations that require intensive first response but also have long-term con-sequences for victims, increasing the need for access to health, humanservices, and other support for full recovery....By building the statewide 2-1-1 network and collaborating on emergency planning, we can ensure that2-1-1 remains available to all people in Florida during emergencies by re-routing calls to 2-1-1 call centers outside the immediate area of a disaster.


This sense of collaboration was not new withthe business plan. Indeed, Florida had longhad, in FLAIRS, a strong statewide associationof both comprehensive and specialized I&Rs.

Variables Affecting the Role of 2-1-1 inthe EmergencyThe experience of the various 2-1-1s in Floridaduring the Emergency was highly situational,based on three key variables:

• The nature of the 2-1-1 itself. Some 2-1-1s

are independent non-profit organizations;some are operating departments within aUnited Way; one is a unit of county govern-ment (Charlotte County); one is a combina-tion 2-1-1 and Volunteer Center (Tampa BayCares). Many are blended services—that is,they offer both comprehensive I&R and cri-sis intervention services—but some are onlyI&Rs. Of those 2-1-1s that are independentorganizations, some have close, sustainedpartnerships in place with their local UnitedWay; others do not. Some have built rela-tionships with those responsible for emer-gency management and disaster responsein their counties; others have not. Each ofthese differences helped influence thenature of the role and extent of responsibili-ty of each 2-1-1. They are not cookie-cutterreplicas of one another; they are distinctentities with varying levels of capacity andexpertise.

• The extent of damage from the storms.While it is true that virtually every county inFlorida was affected by one or more of thestorms, the nature of the impact variedwidely, sometimes even within the service

The Storms

Tropical Storm Bonnie made landfall near Saint Vincent and SaintGeorge Islands just south of Apalachicola, Florida—in the Florida panhandle, 75 miles southwest of Tallahassee—as a tropical storm onAugust 12. Its winds were confined to coastal sections to the east ofthe center. As a depression, Bonnie continued to move northeast-ward, across the eastern United States, dissipating south of Cape Codtwo days later. Although no damage or casualties were recorded inFlorida, a tornado spawned by the storm killed three people in PenderCounty, North Carolina.5

Hurricane Charley struck Jamaica, the Cayman Islands, and westernCuba before making landfall just before 8:00 p.m. on August 13 on thesouthwest coast of Florida just north of Captiva, as a Category 4 hurri-cane, the strongest to hit the U.S. since Andrew in 1992. An hourlater, the eye passed over Punta Gorda and “the eyewall struck thatcity and neighboring Port Charlotte with devastating results.Continuing north-northeastward at a slightly faster forward speed, thehurricane traversed the central Florida peninsula, resulting in a swathof destruction across the state.” It moved off the northeast coast,near Daytona Beach, around 3:30 AM on August 14, less than eighthours after its landfall. Charley was directly responsible for ninedeaths in Florida and indirectly responsible for another 18. Total dam-ages from the storm are estimated at $15 billion.6

Hurricane Frances was an extremely slow-moving Category 2 hurri-cane that battered the east coast of Florida, between Fort Pierce andWest Palm Beach, for most of Saturday, September 4 before comingashore around 11:00 PM. It took another two hours for its 80 mile-wide eye to be fully over the state. It took almost 24 hours from thetime of landfall for it to exit near Tampa as a tropical storm. As a trop-ical depression, its heavy rains continued to cause flooding as farnorth as the Canadian border. Frances was responsible for 20 deathsand approximately $16 billion in damages.7

Hurricane Ivan “was a classical long-lived Cape Verder hurricane thatmade two landfalls along the U.S. coast and reached Category 5strength three times.” It did extensive damage throughout its journeyacross the Caribbean Ocean from Granada to the tip of western Cuba.It spent three days moving northwest over the Gulf of Mexico beforemaking landfall southwest of Pensacola. Ivan was responsible for 52deaths in the U.S and 70 in the Caribbean and an estimated $20 bil-lion in damages.8

Hurricane Jeanne caused over 3,000 deaths in Haiti from torrential rain-fall flooding before making landfall in the United States eight days latereast of Stuart, Florida on September 26. It moved across centralFlorida, moving north into Georgia almost 30 hours later. Jeanne wasresponsible for 11 deaths in the United States and 1,531 in theCaribbean and an estimated $12 billion in damages.9

5 Avila, op. cit.6 “Hurricane Charley: 9-14 August, 2004” by Richard J.Pasch, Daniel P. Brown, and Eric S. Blake of the NationalHurricane Center, October 18, 2004.http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/7 “Hurricane Frances”. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Frances8 “Hurricane Ivan”. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Ivan9 “Hurricane Jeanne: 13-28 September, 2004” by Miles B.Lawrence and Hugh D. Cobb of the National HurricaneCenter, November 22, 2004. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

7HOW 2-1-1 PLAYED A VITAL ROLE THROUGHOUT A MAJOR EMERGENCY

area of an individual 2-1-1. Some of the2-1-1s accurately described their county as“devastated;” others spoke of receiving“glancing blows of 100 MPH winds andgales of rain;” others were affected verylittle. Those in the most severely damagedareas had greater demands placed on themand more opportunities to provide a broad-er range of service to the community.

• The phase of the storm. There were at leastfour distinct phases of the storms that 2-1-1s

identified—pre-storm, during the storm, theimmediate aftermath, and the long-termrecovery. Some 2-1-1s played active roles inall four. Others were limited by circum-stance, relationships, or lack of resources tobeing active only in the post-storm phases.

In short, there is no “typical 2-1-1,” no “typicalstorm,” and no “typical experience.” In and ofitself, this is an important lesson to learn fromthe Florida experience. When the 2-1-1s mettogether at the debriefing organized by FLAIRS,one of the key points made by the group wasthat the nature of the disaster will determinethe nature of the response needed and the rolesthat 2-1-1s can play.

Limitations and Lost OpportunitiesWhile 2-1-1 is available to 75% of Florida’s popu-lation, it is not accessible in half of the state’s67 counties. This lack of statewide coveragelimited the extent to which 2-1-1 could serve thestate during the Emergency in two ways.

First, it meant that there could not be a coordi-nated state-level decision to establish 2-1-1 asthe dialing code to be used throughout thestate to reach disaster response services. One of the valuable attributes of 2-1-1 is that itis an easy-to-remember phone number. InCharlotte County, one of the hardest hit in thestate, the 2-1-1 dialing code had not yet beenadopted by the county’s Human Services

Department which provides comprehensive I&Rservices. Kelly Studenwall, Assistant Director ofthe department compared their situation with thatof neighboring Lee County. She said, “Our EOCnumber was hard for people to remember. In Lee County, it was ‘dial 2-1-1.’ Which is easier?”

Because of the size of media markets and thedivision of EOCs by county, there were areas ofthe state where multiple 10-digit phone num-bers were publicized for citizens to reach stormhotlines, citizen response centers, and rumorcontrol centers.Had there been both statewideaccess to 2-1-1 and adequate advance planning,it would have been possible for the Governor toannounce a single number—2-1-1—that anyonein the state could call to get the information andconnection to services that they needed.

Second, until 2-1-1 becomes a truly statewidesystem, it is unlikely that it will be fully recog-nized as a partner in emergency managementand, thus, continue to be ineligible for the fund-ing from FEMA and other sources required for itto make the maximum possible contributionduring an emergency.

The need for statewide coverage was recog-nized in the state business plan as one of thegreatest challenges facing the Network. Now, inreaction to the role 2-1-1 played during theEmergency, Florida’s United Ways and FLAIRSare, according to Ted Granger, President of theUnited Way of Florida, “moving forward togetherto expand 2-1-1 to the entire state. Becausefunding is a major barrier to achievingstatewide coverage, and because state govern-ment and Florida residents receive such bene-fits from 2-1-1, the 2005 Florida Legislature willbe asked to provide funding to supportstatewide implementation; an appropriationthat, among others, will position the State as afull partner with United Ways, county andmunicipal governments, and others in support-ing this community resource.”


The Volume of CallsThe truth is that no one will ever know howmany calls the 2-1-1s in Florida received in the48 days from beginning to end of the storms.Nor perhaps does it matter. As one I&R special-ist put it, “The phone never stopped ringing.Every time you looked at the phone, all thelights were lit up. As soon as I hung up, thephone rang again.”

Libby Donoghue, Executive Director of 2-1-1Brevard, in her report to her board about thestorms, noted that an upgrade of computer systems disabled the call tracking software.Consequently, “staff and volunteers were askedto record calls handled with hash marks on asheet designed for storm responses. The callvolume was so high that this proved difficult, ifnot impossible to do accurately. [The charts inthe report] represent the number of callslogged, estimated to represent as little as onethird of actual numbers in the days immediatelyfollowing [Hurricane Frances].”

Here is the best information available about callvolume in some of the hardest hit areas:

• In Lee County, population 450,000, theUnited Way 2-1-1, working from the countyEmergency Operation Center, estimatedthat they handled 60,000 calls in the firstsix days, including 900 per hour at theheight of Hurricane Charley.

• In Charlotte County, the I&R division of thecounty’s Department of Human Services,which is slated to become a 2-1-1, estimat-ed that it handled 16,000 calls from theircounty’s 142,000 residents as well as fromconcerned family members and potentialvolunteers and donors nationwide.

• 211 HelpLine in Palm Beach County actuallycounted 9,389 calls during September fromPalm Beach County, an increase of 26%over the same month the previous year, and2,435 calls from the four counties of theTreasure Coast, as many as in the entirethird quarter of 2003.

• 2-1-1 Community Resources in Orlando,which serves the three counties of Orange,Osceola, and Seminole with a combinedpopulation of 1.5 million, took 19,551 callsbetween August 12 and September 20—a 300% increase over their normal call vol-ume. [See box, “Mapping the OrlandoCalls”, for more detail.]

• 2-1-1 Brevard (county population of480,000) had a 41% increase in calls imme-diately after Hurricane Charley, includingmany from people wanting to know how toassist people in parts of the state with themost severe damage. In the three daysprior to Hurricane Frances, they counted3,650 handled calls [see the caveat above],62% more than they handled in the entiremonth of August. They logged over 25,000calls in September. Libby Donoghue report-ed, “The actual number of calls handled isestimated to be about 20% higher. Eventhe recorded volume is 61/2 times the num-ber of calls taken in September of 2003, aswell as 12% more than the total number ofcalls handled in FY2003.”

Mapping the Orlando Calls

2-1-1 Community Resources in Orlando did one of the most extensivejob reporting on the calls, including mapping call distribution by Zipcode, allowing for animmediate visual repre-sentation of the originof calls. For example:

The 2-1-1 organizationuses mapping tech-niques to compare theorigin of calls for specif-ic needs against thelocation of availablecommunity resources.A classic example ofthis would be to plotcalls for emergencyfood assistance againstlocations of existingfood pantries.

2-1-1 Calls (August 12 - 19)Call Count

0 - 2526 - 5051 - 100101 - 175176 - 250251 - 325326 - 400401 - 600OtherHighway TypesInterstateUS HighwayPrimary State HighwayState Highway


From counties less hard hit:

• 2-1-1 First Call for Help of Broward in Ft.Lauderdale reported a 10% increase in callvolume.

• 2-1-1 Big Bend in Tallahassee did not see a sig-nificant increase in call volume because of thelack of serious damage in their service area.

• For First Call for Help of the United Way ofVolusia and Flagler Counties in DaytonaBeach, not yet a 2-1-1, there was a 20%increase in normal call volume in the weekafter Hurricane Charley.

The Nature of the CallsThe nature of the calls received changed rapidlyas communities moved from one phase of thestorm to the next:

• Pre-storm—information or advice aboutevacuation, location and availability ofshelters, inquiries from people with specialneeds, preparation for the storm

• During the storm—reassurance, crisis inter-vention, emergency assistance

• Immediate aftermath—location of essentialservices (water, ice, food), rescue needs,debris removal, power outages

• Recovery—disaster relief financial assis-tance, property damage, disaster-causedhealth issues, disaster-related transporta-tion issues

The common denominator throughout the phas-es was the clear need that callers had for reas-surance.

The experience in Lee County, where the UnitedWay 2-1-1 worked from the county’s EmergencyOperations Center, was very representative.Linda Pankow, manager of the 2-1-1, describedthe progression this way:

• “For the two days prior to Charley the callswere do I need to evacuate, what supplies doI need, where can I get them? People want-ed to hear a live voice even if it was sayingthe same thing that was on the TV news.”

• “The day the storm hit, we got panicky callsabout how to protect themselves since theycould no longer leave.”

• “The day after the storm, the calls werewhere to get ice and water. We got informa-tion from stores on whether they wereopen. And we could send people to agen-cies close to them that were getting sup-plies from distribution centers. We weregetting calls about power outages and bythe second day we were getting updatesfrom Florida Power and Light. We were get-ting calls about the curfew, about whetherpeople could return to their homes.”

• “Now [six weeks later] we are getting callsfrom people who have lost their jobsbecause of the storms.”

The report of 2-1-1 Community Resources inOrlando for the week of August 12-19 is a goodillustration of the nature of disaster-related calls.

Disaster-Related Calls in Orlando From August 12 through 19

5%Disaster-relatedTransportation

5%Disaster-causedHealth Issues

8%Tree Removal

9%EmergencyShelter

9%PropertyDamage

10%Power Outage Inquiry

12%Disaster ReliefFinancial Assistance

12%Emergency Water and Ice

13%Canteen Services

17%Disaster-relatedCommodityShortages

Call Type Count

Disaster-related Commodity Shortages . . . . .710

Canteen Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .485

Emergency Water and Ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .450

Disaster Relief Financial Assistance . . . . . . .445

Power Outage Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .392

Property Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334

Emergency Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .331

Tree Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .326

Disaster-caused Health Issues . . . . . . . . . . .208

Disaster-related Transportation . . . . . . . . . . .177

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3,858


Chapter Two

Lessons Learned

The purpose of this chapter is to look across the data collected during theresearch and to draw conclusions that may inform not only the future workof the 2-1-1s in Florida but also of 2-1-1s across the country and of thosewith whom they must partner during an emergency.

1. 2-1-1s conclusively demonstrated the significant contribution that theycan make in an emergency—expanding the capacity of emergencyresponse, managing information, spotting unmet needs, reassuringcallers, mobilizing and managing volunteers, serving as intake for serviceproviders, and sustaining the connection. This contribution was recog-nized by those with whom they worked—emergency management, publicsector service providers, other nonprofits, and funders. As described indepth in Chapter Three, 2-1-1s’ work earned them a new level of respect intheir communities and, hopefully, a “place at the table” as preparationsare made for the next emergency.

2. 2-1-1s need clarity on the roles they want to play during an emergency,need to plan and build relationships in advance to enable that role, andprepare to be very flexible and innovative in what they actually do.

Clarity of role. There are a wide variety of roles that 2-1-1s can play duringan emergency, from providing supplementary staffing for governmentemergency call centers to proactively putting call data to work in directingattention to gaps in service. They can be an integral part of government’sresponse to an emergency or they can stand outside, modifying their reg-ular work to complement the government’s activities. They can help tomobilize volunteers—or not. They can serve as intake mechanisms forservice providers—or not. All are legitimate choices. In Florida, no single2-1-1 seemed prepared or positioned to do it all. In many cases, theydetermined their actions and role as they went along, responding to thecircumstances and opportunities, not driven by advance planning.Ideally, 2-1-1s will answer the “what do we want to be?” question well inadvance and will have taken the steps necessary to position and enablethemselves to play that role, whatever it may be. Equally important, theywill have considered what they do not want to do.

Advance planning. It is essential that 2-1-1s develop strong emergencymanagement plans, test them with knowledgeable partners, rehearsethem with those partners, and practice them internally. They must alsorecognize the limits of planning. As discussed in Chapter Five, the entireexperience of an emergency is one extended learning process. The mostcarefully developed plans may not stand up in the rapidly changing realityof an emergency when the behavior of others becomes much less pre-dictable than advance planning had anticipated.


Flexibility and innovation. Linda Pankow,Manager of the United Way 2-1-1 in Lee County,captured it when she said, “Don’t be disap-pointed if you don’t have everything right. Youneed to figure out what is needed every day.”Throughout the stories of how the 2-1-1sre-sponded to the Emergency are examples ofinnovation—from finding new ways to organizeand share rapidly changing information to creat-ing new partnerships to help get volunteers tothe places they were needed to seeing patternsin calls that revealed gaps in services.Innovation was possible because the innovatorscould step outside the bounds of their everydayexperience, putting what they knew to work innew ways. Libby Donoghue, executive directorof 2-1-1 Brevard, understood that it takes mentalpreparation to innovate: “Be prepared in yourmind to be flexible and creative.” Then, takethe new ideas that grow from that creativity andturn them into action, into innovation.

3. It is essential that 2-1-1s build strong rela-tionships with partners who are prepared tosupport them and who are in a position torespond to the data 2-1-1 is collecting.

After a 2-1-1 has clarity about the roles it wantsto play and has developed its advance plans, itmust turn attention to developing the relation-ships it needs to enable it to succeed. The mostimportant of these clearly is with the emergencymanagement structure in their service area. Butthere are more that must be cultivated and for-malized—with key response organizations likethe Salvation Army and American Red Cross,with the United Way and Volunteer Center andwith both government and nonprofit serviceproviders.

Where 2-1-1 seemed to make the greatest con-tribution in Florida, it appeared that these rela-tionships were the strongest and had been pur-posely built. But even in those places, it wasclear that some of the relationships were moread hoc than others, that they were the result ofworking together over time and not becausethere had been purposeful planning to worktogether in an emergency.

Building a strong, mutually beneficial partner-ship with United Way is essential. This is not tosay that every 2-1-1 should be merged into aUnited Way. Rather, it is to recognize that whenthey worked closely together, 2-1-1s and UnitedWays strengthened one another’s ability to playa significant role in responding to the emer-gency - and that was to the clear benefit of theircommunities. Such a partnership is a naturalpart of the growing United Way commitment to“community impact.”

A key aspect of relationship-building is tosecure the funding to enable 2-1-1s to be fullparticipants in emergency response. All of the2-1-1s in Florida incurred some additional costsas a result of expanded work during theEmergency, primarily from the need to pay foradditional staffing beyond that normally sched-uled. While these were not large costs in thegreat scheme of things—perhaps in the range of$5,000 to $10,000 each—most 2-1-1s are notresource-rich and do not have significant discre-tionary funds. It was clear that for several ofthe 2-1-1s, their financial limitations also limitedtheir work during the Emergency. With ade-quate advance relationship-building, 2-1-1 canbe positioned as one of the primary emergencyresponders and thus able to share in fundingthat may become available from federal or stategovernments, as well as be recognized by localfunders as “essential organizations” to receiveemergency funding.

Libby Donoghue, executive director of 2-1-1Brevard, spoke for all of the 2-1-1s when shesaid, “2-1-1s must be funded adequately to beable to respond. The partnerships are critical,but the expectations of the partners can’texceed the capacity of the 2-1-1s.”

4. Emergency management does not intuitivelyunderstand the potential value add of 2-1-1 toits work.

It is relatively easy to develop a strong rationalefor 2-1-1—indeed, the proliferation of 2-1-1s

throughout the United States demonstratesthat. That rationale typically includes the role


that 2-1-1s can play in response to an emer-gency or disaster or as part of “homeland secu-rity.” Too often, however, that case is built in avacuum, without adequate consultation withemergency management or first responders.Thus, it remains more hypothetical than real, an assertion rather than a conclusion reachedin concert with the customers for that role.

While it may be difficult for those who arechampions for 2-1-1 to admit, not everyoneautomatically “gets it.” Scott Badesch, ChiefProfessional Officer of the United Way of PalmBeach County, had a realistic view when heobserved, “People didn’t see the benefit of 2-1-1until they needed it.”

In Florida, the EOC in Lee County clearly “got it”long before the hurricane season. As a result,the United Way 2-1-1 there was an integral partof the county’s emergency response and,because of that, the United Way came to thetable in a new way and played a significantleadership role in the community, one that pre-viously had not been available to them. Insome of the other counties, the EOCs “got it” tothe extent that they had made some provisionsfor the involvement of 2-1-1—but those provi-sions too often were not enough to allow the 2-1-1 to make the contribution that they werecapable of. In addition, in some counties, therewas little recognition prior to the Emergency ofthe value 2-1-1 could add. Fortunately, asScott Badesch also observed, “...during thisemergency they [2-1-1s] proved that they couldrespond. They were there every minute of theday for us.”

One possibility was expressed by Don Lusk,Assistant County Manager in Brevard County,that “information and referral” should be man-dated as one of the core emergency manage-ment functions that need to be fulfilled, thusgiving it legitimacy, a seat at the table, and theresources it needs to be done effectively.

To accomplish achieve this status will require 2-1-1s to engage in significant education, advo-cacy, and relationship-building with thoseresponsible for emergency management. 2-1-1s

must engage emergency management officialsat all levels—national, state, and local. 2-1-1s

should build their case on as much data as pos-sible, including that presented in this report,about how 2-1-1s have contributed in emergencysituations. Emergency management officialsneed to be understood as customers of 2-1-1,with a concomitant understanding of those cus-tomers’ needs, priorities, and realities.

The relationship with emergency managementis the one that will define the roles 2-1-1 willplay during an emergency. It is the one thatmust receive the highest priority attention.

5. 2-1-1s must prepare for a new kind of opera-tion during an emergency.

Everything changes in an emergency. Theremay be a huge and sustained spike in call vol-ume, perhaps overwhelming established proce-dures for tracking the volume and nature of thecalls. Existing databases may be essentiallyworthless, particularly during and in the imme-diate aftermath of an emergency. The informa-tion required will be hard to get and will bechanging rapidly. Even EOCs may not have ade-quate information management procedures inplace. Regular facilities may no longer be safeto occupy. Power may be lost for extended peri-ods. Volunteers and paid staff may be unableor even unwilling to come to work. 2-1-1s mustbe prepared, through playing through “what if”scenarios, learning from those who have beenthrough emergencies, and advance planning, tooperate in new ways during an emergency.

6. “Telephone reassurance” is an essential rolefor 2-1-1 to play in all phases of an emergency.

The distinct phases in a hurricane emergencyoffer different roles for 2-1-1s. The role that cutacross all of the phases in Florida, however,was the high demand for “telephone reassur-ance.” As discussed in the next chapter, anxi-ety and the need for reassurance was perhapsthe defining characteristic of the vast majorityof calls received by 2-1-1s immediately prior to,during, and immediately after the storms.

Responding to this need was one of the mostimportant ways that 2-1-1s demonstrated theirvalue to EOCs, which, by their own admission,were not prepared or staffed to handle such


calls. 2-1-1s brought a level of skill, trained tele-phone specialists, and experience that allowedEOCs to divert both crisis calls and reassurancecalls to the 2-1-1 staff, thus providing better cus-tomer service while freeing up other EOC staffto do the work they were trained to do.

This suggests that 2-1-1s need to be prepared toperform this role, ensuring that paid staff andvolunteers are trained to provide reassurance tocallers—and, if necessary, being prepared togive sufficient on-the-job training for phoneanswerers who may have been recruited at thelast moment.

7. The Emergency reinforced the importance ofdeveloping 2-1-1 as a system.

One of the first issues raised in the AIRS 2-1-1Toolkit is whether the goal is to plan an I&R“system” with 2-1-1 in the lead role or to delivera call center service. The preferred answer, ofcourse, is to build a system. At the local levelthat means defining “2-1-1” as including spe-cialized I&Rs, service providers, emergencymanagement, and other stakeholders. At thestate level, it means finding ways for 2-1-1s towork together effectively and, as a group, tobuild a broader system that includes thoseother stakeholders. At the national level, it ulti-mately will mean finding ways to enable 2-1-1s

to work together across borders, to move calls ifneeded, and to share and aggregate data.

The experience in Florida reinforced the poten-tial value of such systems:

• At the local level, 2-1-1s seemed to makegreater sustained contributions where therewere well-established partnerships and ahistory of working in concert.

• At the state level, the existence of a strong,established I&R state association plus theshared intent to build a true statewide 2-1-1system set the stage for ongoing informa-tion-sharing, back-up support, learning,and support among the 2-1-1s as well asfacilitating their collective engagement withother networks.

• At the national level, there was initial evi-dence that data gathered from 2-1-1s can befed through other national systems to helpdeploy resources in local communities, thatcalls can be successfully forwarded to andhandled by 2-1-1s at a distance, and that, ifthe contact information is available, 2-1-1s

outside the affected area can direct callersto 2-1-1s in the affected areas to seek infor-mation on family members or to determinewhether and when to return to the area.

Looking to the FutureHow, then, can 2-1-1s in Florida give evengreater benefit to the state in future hurricaneemergencies? Consider these possibilities:

• If there is 100% statewide coverage by2-1-1s, it will be possible for the state toadopt 2-1-1 as the phone number to beused during an emergency to reach EOCs—a single number that can be promotedstatewide as the single access point toinformation.

• If all 2-1-1s are prepared to collect and mapcall data, it will be possible to construct a pic-ture of emerging needs and gaps in services.

• If all 2-1-1s are adequately funded and areintegrated into emergency response plans,they will be able to take an even greaterburden off of first responders and front-linedisaster relief organizations, freeing themto do their work and leveraging the skills oftrained 2-1-1 specialists to provide betterservice to the public.

• If there is a strong, consistent statewidepartnership between 2-1-1s and VolunteerCenters, 2-1-1s can serve as the intakemechanism for people who want to volun-teer, freeing the Volunteer Centers todeploy and manage volunteers.

• If their expertise in information manage-ment is recognized, 2-1-1s can take on thetask of collecting, organizing, and dissemi-nating information about the availability ofhealth and human services during and afteran emergency.


• If 2-1-1s work out procedures for sharingresource information that are acceptable toall of them—whether through an integratedstatewide database, efficient networking ofdatabases through the Internet, or creationof a shared database specifically designedto handle rapidly changing emergencyinformation—they will be better able tosupport one another, front-line responders,and service providers.

• If the 2-1-1s build a strong statewide net-work, they will be better positioned to com-mand a “place at the table” at the statelevel and thus eligible for emergency fund-ing from state and federal governments.

In the strategic business plan for the Florida 2-1-1 Network, FLAIRS and the United Way ofFlorida declared their intention to build astatewide system that could achieve theseresults:

• People will be better able to manage theirown lives successfully because they havebeen provided with the information and toolsthey require to find and make decisionsabout accessing the support they need.

• Service providers will have an expandedstatewide resource to help them betterserve their consumers.

• Policy makers and resource allocators, bothpublic and private, will have more completeinformation about trends in demand for serv-ices and early awareness of emerging needs.

• Public officials will be assured that theirconstituents are better able to get connect-ed with the services they need in cost-effec-tive and responsive ways that make bestuse of scarce resources.

The work of the 2-1-1s during the hurricaneemergency of 2004 made it clear that such anambition can be made real, particularly with thesupport of public sector leaders committed togiving the people of Florida the best possibleaccess to the information they need to managetheir lives.

The response of the Florida 2-1-1s to theEmergency confirmed that the people who buildand manage state and local 2-1-1 systems areamong the “best and brightest” of the nonprofitcommunity. They understand the potentialpower of 2-1-1 to bring greater efficiency tohuman service delivery systems, to the benefitof both consumers and providers. They aredeeply committed to performing with the high-est possible quality. Perhaps most important,they believe in the absolute importance of con-necting people who are on the margins of theircommunities with the information they need totake greater control over their own lives andfutures. The leadership, commitment, and skillsthey bring to play are critical to a community’sability to cope with an emergency.


Chapter Three

The Contribution of 2-1-1

Brevard 2-1-1 took calls during the extended time Hurricane Frances waspassing through from people who had not evacuated, including one from awoman who was huddled with her nine-year old daughter in a closet.Another came from a woman, caring for her bi-polar husband, whose roofhad blown off and whose house had a foot of water in it.

In Palm Beach County, 2-1-1 received some calls from people seeking guid-ance on whether to leave the area or not and asking their help in convinc-ing others to evacuate. In one case, they brought a translator on to the callto help them communicate with a non-English speaking woman who didnot want to leave her home.

On the fourth day after Frances hit Charlotte County, the I&R staff therereceived a call from a man in Montana. He had been watching a televisionreport about the storm and saw his father in the background, walkingaround and looking confused. The I&R specialist who took the call notifiedthe city police who went out and found thefather. The I&R specialist then called the son tolet him know where his father was.

In Orange County, 2-1-1 staff were able to identi-fy a need for food in an area of Osceola Countythat had not been reached by the disasterresponse teams. As a result, the Heart of FloridaUnited Way stepped in to provide canteen serv-ices for over 1,000 people.

For the seven weeks from the first warnings ofTropical Storm Bonnie until the last winds ofHurricane Jeanne and in the weeks that fol-lowed, 2-1-1s conclusively demonstrated thevalue they can add to emergency managementand disaster relief. While some of the storiesare as dramatic as those above, many are aboutmaking sure people knew to which shelter theyshould go during the evacuation, helping peo-ple find emergency rations of water and ice,connecting people with debris removal and roofrepair services.

Even more of the stories are about how 2-1-1s resumed their normal role ofconnecting people with the services they need but in the new context oflives dramatically altered by the storms. As Randy Nicklaus, executivedirector of 2-1-1 Big Bend in Tallahassee, noted, the calls are from peoplewho “had lost the structure of their lives and didn’t know what to doabout it.”

“That bank of phones was an

extremely important area of the

EOC immediately following the

storm. Many people needed to

hear a voice at the other end.

It was amazing that they were

trained call-takers, trained to

listen and to hear not only what’s

being said but what’s not being

said. The stress level for them

was unbelievable, the same as

for 911 operators. They went

above and beyond.”Dale Phillips, Office of the Sheriff, Charlotte County


Answering several hundred thousand telephonecalls, 2-1-1s’ trained information and referral spe-cialists provided timely information, connectedpeople with services they needed, provided tele-phone reassurance and handled crisis calls.

During the Emergency, 2-1-1 made seven pri-mary contributions:

• expanded the capacity of EmergencyOperations Centers (EOCs) by providingtrained information and referral specialistsand by offering the public an alternativeaccess point for information;

• provided critically needed management ofinformation about availability of servicesand the status of health and human serviceorganizations and government agencies;

• identified unmet and emerging needs,helping direct resources to high priorityplaces;

• provided critically needed telephone reas-surance and crisis support for callers, com-plementing the work of the EOCs;

• helped mobilize and manage volunteersand cash and in-kind donations;

• served as intake points on behalf of govern-ment agencies and nonprofit organizations,increasing the efficiency of connecting peo-ple with needed help; and,

• offered a sustained connection to help forpeople whose lives were dramaticallyaffected by the storm as they became partof long-term recovery efforts.

This chapter explores these contributions ingreater depth, using the stories told by the 2-1-1s themselves and by people who observed

their work to underscore the value theyadded to the overall response to theEmergency.

Expanding CapacityAlthough the specifics varied widely from com-munity to community, almost without exceptionthe 2-1-1s expanded the capacity of EmergencyOperations Centers (EOCs) by providing trainedinformation and referral specialists and byoffering the public an alternative and easy-to-remember access point for information. Theextent to which 2-1-1 was able to fulfill that role,however, depended on the nature of their rela-tionship with county government, the degree ofadvance planning, and the operational capacityof both partners.

Don Lusk, Assistant County Manager in BrevardCounty, perhaps gave the best summary whenhe said, “It was absolutely beneficial to have 2-1-1. Without it, it would have been a lot moredifficult for our citizens. But we need to have arecognized, official 2-1-1 function within emer-gency preparation and management plans. 2-1-1 needs to be officially designated as amajor player so they have the possibility ofbeing funded the way they should be.”

The relationship between 2-1-1 and emergencymanagement is critical in determining the roles2-1-1 can play. Looking at the experience in anumber of different communities is an excellentway to see how that relationship played out andalso to understand how the 2-1-1s operated dur-ing the Emergency.

Lee CountyThe United Way 2-1-1 went live in mid-August,2003. By April, 2004, they had a contract inplace with the EOC in Lee County, the largest ofthe three counties they serve with some450,000 people. The contract built on an exist-ing MOU with 911 that established protocols totransfer calls between the two services. Therewere two primary tasks 2-1-1 was to perform:providing support for people with special needsand recruiting and managing volunteers tomaintain the county’s storm hotline.

2-1-1 committed to place two trained I&R staff inthe EOC and to provide 20 trained volunteers.The recruitment of volunteers was to have beendone by the local Volunteer Resource Center,but when they were not successful, 2-1-1 didtheir own recruitment via their network of serv-


ice providers and through their newsletter. Twotrainings were done in advance of the hurricaneseason, one for 10-12 volunteers and one forUnited Way staff.

Linda Pankow describes how events actuallyunfolded: “The reality was that we started man-ning the hotline on August 11 [two days beforeHurricane Charley hit them]. We used four ofthe volunteers we had trained. We couldn’treach many of those we had recruited. We alsoused United Way staff. On August 14, we putout a press release asking for volunteers for thehotline and got a good response. We tried to do

some screening and provided 10-15 minutes ofon-the-job training. We had at least fifty peopleinvolved with probably a dozen core volunteers.People really felt they made a difference, eventhough it was organized chaos.”The originalidea was to lay 2-1-1 on top of the county’s oper-ation as the primary access number but therehad not been time to test it. So both 2-1-1 andthe county’s hotline number were promoted.Although the 2-1-1 normally contracts with a cri-sis line to provide after-hours coverage, all callsreceived during the hurricane emergency wereforwarded to the Sheriff’s office and handledthere by the 2-1-1 team.

Matt Recommier, 911 Coordinator at theSheriff’s office, was responsible for managingthe relationship with 2-1-1. He explains, “The idea was to take the load off of 911. We knew how to set up the hotline but thequestion was how to staff it. We never realizedhow well [the partnership with 2-1-1] wouldwork out for both sides. We got trained call tak-ers who knew how to deal with people and acore staff who were being paid to be there. It worked out excellently for us.

“We have never had a storm hit this county withboth its front end and back end. It was sosevere that we kept the hotline open for a week.We couldn’t have done it with county employ-ees. United Way 2-1-1 really stuck with it.

“It was good to have 2-1-1 here with us. Wecould provide generator back-up, computers,internet access, food and it is the place whereinformation flows in to.”

Charlotte CountyIn Charlotte County, I&R services are providedby the county’s Department of Human Services.

Since 2002, the same office has pro-vided the Elder Helpline for sevensurrounding counties. Although theyare close to becoming 2-1-1, oneaffect of the storms has been adelay due to uncertainty about thecounty budget.

According to Joy Duperault, supervi-sor of I&R services, “We had been

pushing EOC to build a relationship and to pre-pare together but they had always been toobusy to meet. A few days before the storm[Hurricane Charley], I contacted them again. As a result, two of our staff went to the EOC themorning the storm hit [Friday, August 13]. Overthe weekend, the EOC used volunteers but itwas difficult because their homes had beenaffected and they needed to take care of them-selves. So they invited us to come back onMonday. We worked 8 AM to 8 PM that Mondaythrough Friday and then 8-5 for another week-end and full week. We took our entire staff.

“We also had volunteers, including county gov-ernment employees and people from other com-munities. We did twenty minutes of crash train-ing for the volunteers. Without some training,they will feel they aren’t being helpful tocallers.”

Based on their experience, it is clear to her that“2-1-1 needs a continuous relationship withboth emergency management and 911. Weneed to know each other. There needs to be aframework that doesn’t fall apart or fade away.Neither one can do it effectively without theother one. 2-1-1 can’t do it on its own because it

“We estimated that 2-1-1 got 60,000 calls

that normally would have gone to 911,

freeing those operators to handle

emergency calls.”Matt Recommier, 911 Coordinator for Lee County


can’t get the information it needs. EOC needs2-1-1 to become phone staff for them during anemergency.”

Dale Phillips who normally runs prevention pro-grams for the Sheriff’s office was on duty at theEOC for four days, spending much of her timeconveying messages from the phone bank tothe agencies that were in the best position torespond to the need. She is very convinced ofthe value that Joy and her staff brought to theEOC. She says:

They were phenomenal. They are true “call-tak-ers,” the first line of information. They werethere faithfully for hours on end.

The first three days were largely emergencycalls, ranging from out-of-town family memberslooking for loved ones to residents needing infoon food, water, where to go for help, etc. TheI&R staff handled it all so professionally, withcompassion and sensitivity.

The initial information needed to come in accu-rately for us to be able to help. Having themhere alleviated the pressure on me. They didn’tneed my guidance. Joy ran her operation.

If I was assigned to prepare a first point of con-tact, a phone information unit in the event of acrisis, my first call would be to Joy and her team.In my opinion, a trained team of call-takers isthe first and many times one of the most impor-tant lines of communication immediately follow-ing a crisis.

Brevard CountyLibby Donoghue, executive director of 2-1-1Brevard explains that “when 2-1-1 was beingplanned, we had meetings with county govern-ment about emergency situations. Our directorof emergency management, Bob Lusk, saw thepotential value of 2-1-1 from the outset.”

In 2001, during the anthrax scare, the countyDepartment of Health publicized 2-1-1 as theplace to call for information. That resulted inover 500 calls, “the only test we had of using 2-1-1 for emergencies.”

2-1-1 took different approaches for each of thestorms. Because Hurricane Charley originallywas not expected to hit Brevard County, the EOCinitially did not indicate that they planned toactivate. As a result, 2-1-1 developed their owncontingency plans, closing their office and for-warding calls to a staff person’s home. Whenthe EOC did decide to activate, 2-1-1 then wasunable to provide support because their staffwas too dispersed and travel was discouraged.

For Frances, they followed their original planwhich was for 2-1-1 to help out at the EOC andto transfer the 2-1-1 phone lines there.Unfortunately, that resulted in the forwarding of“phantom calls” with no way to screen themout. (2-1-1 usually uses an auto attendant inwhich callers must push the number four to talkto a live operator.)

2-1-1 had a corner of the EOC with six of theirlines transferred in and at least two lines pro-vided by the county. Both the county’s emer-gency number and 2-1-1 was publicized.Because work conditions were far from ideal,Libby says, “As soon as we confirmed that wecould do it, we hustled home to work.”

The difficult reality, says Rob Rains, President ofthe United Way of Brevard County, is that “2-1-1doesn’t have adequate resources to step in andhandle such an increased workload. We have towork on clarifying what additional resources canbe committed during an emergency to expandcapacity.”

That is why, as quoted above, Assistant CountyManager Don Lusk argues that “2-1-1 needs tobe officially designated as a major player sothey have the possibility of being funded theyway they should be.”

Palm Beach CountyAccording to Susan Buza, executive director of 2-1-1 HelpLine serving Palm Beach County and thefour counties of the Treasure Coast, her staff hadworked hard to develop a relationship with thePalm Beach County EOC, primarily at the middlemanagement level, and had developed a goodproposed plan, including moving their 2-1-1operations to the EOC and trying out their staffon the EOC phones. The partnership was to


begin in 2004 by relocating a few 2-1-1 staff tothe EOC in event of a hurricane emergency.However, the agreement was not finalized, duelargely to concerns raised by upper managementof the EOC. As a result, Susan made the decisionto close 2-1-1 during the storm because theirbuilding is not hurricane-safe. Because of loss ofpower, they ended up closed for three days.

Scott Badesch, Chief Professional Officer, of theUnited Way of Palm Beach County, was con-cerned that 2-1-1 would not be available sointervened with county government to securespace in the EOC for 2-1-1 to operate.Limitations on the phone lines there, however,meant that 2-1-1 calls were forwarded to onlytwo lines, severely limiting the number of callsthey could take and having callers consistentlyexperience a busy signal.

From the perspective of Paul Milleli, Director ofPublic Safety for Palm Beach County, 2-1-1 was apre-storm and post-storm resource. Before thestorm, he says, “anyone could handle the callsbecause it’s all in the book [resource notebook]and they could transfer tough calls to the EOC.”

The experience of having 2-1-1 staff come intothe established Emergency Information Center(EIC) run by the EOC—remembering that theywere there only because of intervention by theUnited Way—underscores the kind of on-the-ground problems that may be encountered with-out advance planning. “During the first storm[Hurricane Frances],” he says, “there were prob-lems with integration. The 2-1-1 people wantedto limit themselves to 2-1-1 calls. They weretaking calls but staying separate.”

However, “integration started to improve withthe recovery phase. There were more calls thatEIC people couldn’t handle, that they were notprepared to handle. So we saw more integra-tion and more helping each other out....Overtime, the camaraderie built.”

Although there was little time before HurricaneJeanne for reflection and change, he did reor-ganize the EIC to bring in more victim assis-tance and consumer affairs people from countygovernment. “We had 2-1-1 people sitting in theEIC section to answer pre- and post-storm calls.

That helped a lot with the integration and rela-tions seemed to get a lot better.”

While he saw a “real change” from one storm tothe next in “integrating 2-1-1 into the EIC func-tion,” he does not believe that 2-1-1 couldassume full responsibility for the EIC. Rather,Milleli says, “It is the partnership that is goingto be important. 2-1-1 is the one to lead duringthe long-term recovery.”

Scott Badesch believes that “people didn’t seethe benefit of 2-1-1 until they needed it. Butduring this emergency they proved that theycould respond. They were there every minute ofthe day for us.”

Broward County2-1-1 Broward has an MOU with the EOC to allowthem to relocate there and to transfer calls.But, according to Susan Byrne, “The countydoesn’t perceive that we are benefiting them.They see themselves as doing a favor for 2-1-1,not that 2-1-1 is beneficial to them.” As a result,their capacity at the EOC is limited to two lineswhich “makes it hard to promote 2-1-1 during anemergency since we can’t handle many calls.”

During Hurricane Frances, 2-1-1 sent four staff tothe EOC, allowing them to have two on duty andtwo off throughout the five days and four nightsthey were there. “We are in a separate room

GREAT IDEAS

Here are a group of “great ideas” that emerged during the interviewsand debriefing.

• Prepare as many people as possible in advance to answer calls ifneeded or to assist in other ways in the call center—all staff,board members, staff from agencies in close proximity to you,United Way staff, other volunteers, etc.

• Have a television in the call center to provide up-to-the-minuteinformation and so you are hearing what your callers are hearing.

• Think through alternative ways for your “core group” to remain incommunication with one another.

• Build a strong volunteer base before an emergency, not during it.• Think ahead about what you may need to know—for example,

how to contact providers of medical equipment and oxygen afterhours—and collect as much of that information as possible inadvance of an emergency.


from the county’s Hurricane Hotline which isgiving information about shelters and debrispick-up. We want to renegotiate so that we canhandle crisis calls that come to them.” In fact,during Hurricane Frances, the 2-1-1 staff han-dled six potential suicide calls during thecourse of 2 hurricanes, underscoring the needfor crisis intervention services to be available.

Marion CountyIn Marion County, 2-1-1 (First Call for Help) is partof the United Way, with after-hours coverageprovided by United Way 2-1-1 in Jacksonville.The hurricanes were a new experience for them.“This is always the place people come fromother parts of the state to get away from them,”said Pete Foy, Vice President, CommunityInitiatives, United Way of Marion County.

They went into “emergency mode” at theSheriff’s office 24 hours ahead of the arrival ofHurricane Charley and made plans to transfer allof their calls to Jacksonville if their power wentout. The director of 2-1-1, Madeline Franco,went to the EOC and transferred up to dateinformation to Jacksonville via fax and phone.“Calls for help to 2-1-1 went to Jacksonville.They then called back to us with names, loca-tions, and needs. But because of the relativelylow severity of storm impact in Marion County,very few storm-related calls actually went toJacksonville. Most calls for help went directly tothe EOC who then routed them to United Waywhich is the designated ESF 15 agency.”

Based on their joint assessment after theEmergency, Pete says, “We and the EOC feelstrongly that our presence was of considerablevalue to the entire EOC operation inasmuch wereduced time consuming non- emergency callsand requests. At the request of the Sheriff andEOC, we plan to remain within their centraloperations during emergencies.”

But he does see the value in keeping 2-1-1 oper-ating “at home” as much as possible. “It givesus instantaneous information sharing, it isunder our control, and we would be prepared todo it around the clock during an emergency.”Toward that end, he has negotiated for fundingfrom the Sheriff’s office for United Way to pur-chase its own generator.

JacksonvilleIn Jacksonville, 2-1-1 “has a pretty good workingrelationship with the EOC,” says Bob Arnold,director of United Way 2-1-1. “We want to con-tinue working together so that in the event ofanother hurricane or disaster, both sides willknow what the other has to offer. We presentlydon’t have a seat at the EOC, but feel like weneed one because we have a great deal of infor-mation and expertise to offer.”

2-1-1 Tampa Bay CaresIn Pinellas County, the county government oper-ates its own Citizen Information Center which isstaffed during emergencies by county employ-ees. However, due to the number of calls theCIC was receiving and the experience and train-ing the 2-1-1 staff possess, the VolunteerServices Manager requested 2-1-1 staff assis-tance. They did not, largely because of con-cerns about asking staff to travel outside in haz-ardous conditions, particularly when massiveevacuations had been ordered in the county.

But, according to Micki Thompson, programmanager for 2-1-1, “This raised to the fore theissue of our obligation to county governmentbecause of the funding we receive from them,even though there is no provision in our con-tract to do this work.”

Now, active discussions are underway to clarifythe role 2-1-1 will play. Tim Closterman, volun-teer services manager for Pinellas County,explains, “We realized after the storm howmany calls 2-1-1 took. Even last year during awater main break, we recognized that peoplecalled 2-1-1. People are used to that number asthe place to call to get and give help.

“Before and during a storm, there is only somuch you can do. After is where we hope toincrease our relationship with 2-1-1. One possi-bility for them is to take on resource manage-ment after a storm - information, unaffiliatedvolunteers, etc.” Although he oversees theESF15 function for the county, he has only twostaff so “it is unimaginable for us to manage theunaffiliated volunteers.


“We only see 2-1-1 as a benefit, an asset, tous. Their operators are trained to deal withpeople in crisis. They are in tune with thecommunity. If they don’t have the resources,they know who does.”

OrlandoBecause many of the 2-1-1s serve multiple coun-ties, one of the challenges they face is the needto relate to the emergency management staffsin each one. For Orlando, according to El CabrelLee, at that time Vice President of 2-1-1Community Services, which serves three coun-ties, “there was a very real question about ourcapacity to do that. So we worked as best asour services allowed by sharing health andhuman service resources and agency availabili-ty and needs requests. If 2-1-1 had a year-roundworking relationship with EmergencyManagement Services more coordinated servic-es may have been possible.”

However, starting before Hurricane Charleyarrived, 2-1-1 began sharing resource informa-tion with all three EOCs, beginning with a print-out of the disaster resources already in theirdata base. Although they did not get a lot ofpublic credit for it, 2-1-1 was behind the scenes,feeding updated resource information to each ofthe EOCs in support of their own citizen infor-mation lines as well as to the news media.

Jerry Demings, Director of Public Safety forOrange County, the largest of the three countiesserved by 2-1-1, credits 2-1-1 for “allowing us toseparate out many of the calls for social servic-es. That freed up the calls coming into the 911center so we could keep our lines as open aspossible. 2-1-1 proved to be critical to us in ourresponse to a natural disaster.

“The partnership really worked. We involvedthe Heart of Florida United Way [host organiza-tion for 2-1-1] in many of our press briefings as away to promote 2-1-1 as an option for people tocall. While people may not remember the spe-cific list of phone numbers that are announced,they can remember 2-1-1.”

Managing InformationRight after the storm, we had a Health andHuman Services Coordinating Group meeting.Everyone had their own source of resources. No one knew what anyone else was doing.Within one afternoon, Susan [Buza] got it goingto use 2-1-1 as the clearinghouse.

It worked out unbelievably well. There wasinstant updating on the web with a special website established and publicized for this purpose.My staff bookmarked it, checked it daily,emailed it to the entire staff, and printed it outfor people going into the field. It was an excel-lent tool.

I was going crazy with false information up tothe point that 2-1-1 took it on. No one had theinformation we needed.

The speaker is Marilyn Munoz, District 9Manager for the Florida Department of Childrenand Families, based in West Palm Beach. She istalking about Susan Buza, executive director ofthe 2-1-1 serving Palm Beach County and thefour counties of the Treasure Coast.

Susan Buza describes their work this way. “The best thing we did was the data base of cri-sis information. We segmented it by county, setup an internet site for our staff to get the infor-mation they needed and then took the site pub-lic. We became the information clearinghouse.”

She stresses the point that “you don’t realizethat your data base the way it is the day beforeis of limited value the day after.”

The work of 2-1-1 to organize and make avail-able current information was a critical contribu-tion throughout Florida. As Micki Thompson of2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares put it, “We figured outthat our new job was to determine which agen-cies were open and where they had moved.”

But in virtually every locale, obtaining and man-aging rapidly changing information was one ofthe greatest challenges. Listen to these keyleaders from Brevard County:


Libby Donoghue, 2-1-1: “The information weneeded was probably floating around the room[in the EOC] but we couldn’t figure out how tofish it out.”

Don Lusk, Brevard County government: “Withinthe room itself, people were so busy on theirown tasks, they didn’t have time to share infor-mation. In such an intense environment, therealways will be problems sharing informationwithin the EOC as well as with others.”

Rob Rains, United Way: “People ten steps awayfrom you had key information but you couldn’tget it.”

Paul Milleli, Director of Public Safety for PalmBeach County agrees. He says, “There is noeasy way to respond to the information flowchallenge, even though everyone is in closeproximity. It is still one of the big issues toresolve.”

It became clear through interviews for thisstudy that toolittle thought had been given tohow to collect, organize, and communicateinformation needed by the public to handle theemergency. While great efforts had been madeby EOCs to provide call centers to receive calls,much less attention had been given to puttingaccurate, timely information into the hands ofpeople who called. As a result, as Judi Leggett,2-1-1 Counselor at 2-1-1 Brevard, put it, “We did-n’t have a choice about the information we weregiving out. We had to go with what we had. Ifwe found out we were wrong, we had to changeit and go with it.”

Public information officers within county gov-ernment were criticized by a number of peopleinterviewed for limiting themselves to puttingout press releases and coordinating media con-tacts rather than taking on a broader informa-tion management role. As one person put it,“They need to get past that limit to ask ‘whatdo people need to know and how do we get itto them?’”

By assuming the information management func-tion, 2-1-1s helped their partners have greaterimpact. Cliff Smith, President of the United Wayof Lee County, home of the 2-1-1, says:

In the past, United Way agencies would springinto action and United Way’s role was to be acheerleader and then, later on, to give recogni-tion. Now, 2-1-1 has dramatically changed that.It put us into the middle of the information loop.It created opportunities that we didn’t imagineuntil they happened. We knew more about whatwas going on and what was needed than any-one else.

We called all of our agencies to assess theircapabilities, how they were affected by thestorm, what they needed. We became the link—if we hadn’t, it would have taken longer andpeople would have been calling agencies thatcouldn’t help them—we knew who could helpand we knew how to get information about thatout to the agencies.

We weren’t late to the table, creating a role forourselves. That wasn’t necessary. It put us inposition to play a natural role in organizingthings. We weren’t bystanders. We have beenable to play an active role.

As a result, the United Way helped put togetherbilingual teams to go into migrant labor campson one of the barrier islands that was worst hit,pulled people together to set up a distributioncenter for water and ice at a rest stop on theinterstate, and distributed $20,000 in gift cardsthey had purchased from Publix supermarkets,Lowe’s, Shell, and Home Depot to respond tothe overwhelming level of basic needs.

Despite any advance planning they may havedone, most of the 2-1-1s ended up inventingsolutions to the problem of information man-agement. In Lee County, says Linda Pankow,“We had thought about using laptops but endedup using white boards. We had 15 phone sta-tions and two large dry-erase boards. As infor-mation came in, we updated the boards andhanded information sheets out to everyone. Wecreated our own resource information as wewent along.”

At the 2-1-1 in Palm Beach County, the staffmoved from “cutting and pasting into a Worddocument” to an internal web site for their staffand then an external web site for other agenciesand the public. Jesus Rodriguez, Human


Services Resource Specialist, described theprocess of building their collection of resourceinformation this way: “Marilyn Munoz at DCFwould call us with stuff she was picking up.United Way staff were calling in. We wouldbrowse newspapers for information, look at EOCweb sites for our five counties, read pressreleases from county government.” BruceGreenstein, Network Systems Coordinator, hisoffice mate, continues, “It was a snowballeffect. Once they saw Jesus was doing a goodjob, people began providing information.”

The experience in Orlando was very much thesame. Tino Paz, then Director of InformationResources and now Interim Vice President of2-1-1 in Orlando, said, “Normally, social serviceinformation is on a ‘level 4’ of volatility, that is,it is fairly stable. During the storm it was closerto a ‘level 8 or 10’ on that scale, changingalmost from hour to hour.” He describes thethree key challenges that had to be faced as:

• tracking down data;

• verifying the reliability of information andits source; and,

• repurposing the information for phoneoperators, after hours support, and otherswho come for the information.

Their progression was similar to that in PalmBeach. “We had one person compiling newinformation in Microsoft Word and putting it onthe internal share drive. It was updated daily.By the end, we were bookmarking the informa-tion for easier access by multiple users. We gotbetter, more user friendly as we went along.”

He identified four key lessons that will informtheir work in the future:

• “Simple is best.”

• “Get as much information as possible intothe system in advance, even if it is dor-mant. We will put as much as we can aboutdisaster resources in and then only activatewhat is appropriate. For example, we willtry to put in all possible shelters and thenactivate only those that are open.”

• “We need to establish MOUs and protocolswith both the Red Cross and EOCs for infor-mation exchange—and figure out a way toconduct a dry run in advance.”

• º“We need to work it out with agencies inadvance for them to call us and report theirstatus. Agencies also could use 2-1-1 as aservice center for information exchange fortheir own staff.”

According to Randy Nicklaus, executive directorof 2-1-1 Big Bend in Tallahassee, his staff “hadto be very creative in getting information duringthe crisis because agencies typically would notnotify us about changes in their operations dur-ing the crisis.” Because the 2-1-1 has a memo-randum of understanding with the Red Crosschapter that covers the same eight county areathat they do, he assigned one of his staff to beat the Red Cross operations center to coordinateinformation flow.

Identifying Unmet and Emerging NeedsOne of the most powerful arguments in favor of2-1-1 is that it provides data that can be useful inidentifying unmet needs and gaps in services.During the Energency, the Florida 2-1-1s demon-strated that value in real time. “The calls,” saidEl Cabrel Lee, then Vice-President of 2-1-1Community Resources in Orlando, “were tellingus what we needed to prepare for and to do.”

That value extended beyond the individual 2-1-1service areas. Ande Miller, executive director ofthe National Voluntary Organizations Active inDisaster (NVOAD) convened daily conferencecalls of her member organizations and facilitat-ed many of the Florida VOAD daily conferencecalls. She says, “Through their participation inthe calls, 2-1-1s were able to report on the prior-ity of the type of calls they were getting. Thiswas extremely helpful as another measure ofthe ebb and flow of needs. In addition the 2-1-1representative was often able to clarify informa-tion for us and shared information from ourcalls to their daily conference calls. There is noquestion in my mind that the participation of2-1-1 added value to our organizations’response and relief efforts.”


Jane Morgan from the American Red Cross,President of NVOAD, echoes that. “2-1-1s weregiving us good information on the type of calls.They also were finding information on servicesavailable which allowed us to shift resources tobest meet needs.”

Consider these examples:

• After Hurricane Frances,2-1-1 Community Services inOrlando was able to identifyneeds for food in OsceolaCounty and compare that withthe availability of resourcesthere. As a result, the Heart ofFlorida United Way stepped into provide feeding services forover 1,000 people.

• During Hurricane Charley,the 2-1-1 HelpLine in LeeCounty identified a group ofseniors who did not havetransportation to a shelterbecause they had not pre-reg-istered as having special

needs. 2-1-1 staff later shared that storywith a home health agency that had evacu-ated its clients to a motel. DuringHurricane Frances, then, that agency calledUnited Way and offered to transport thosestranded seniors.

• In Charlotte County, it was the I&R staff whodiscovered that Meals on Wheels hadceased operation. “We didn’t know theirfolks weren’t getting meals for a week,when they began to call us,” said JoyDuperault. “We hooked up with anotheragency to send case managers to find thepeople. The Meals on Wheels building hadbeen severely damaged and their volun-teers either had evacuated or were dealingwith damage to their own homes.”

Cliff Smith, President of the United Way of LeeCounty, underscored how 2-1-1 assisted themhelp other agencies focus their resources. Hesaid, “We began to alert the Red Cross aboutcommunities not getting help. Then, the RedCross started asking for input on where to tar-

get their efforts. We were able to do it because,with 2-1-1, we were in the middle of it all.”

Reassuring CallersAnxiety and the need for reassurance was per-haps the defining characteristic of the vastmajority of calls received by 2-1-1s immediatelyprior to, during, and immediately after thestorms. In each phase, the intensity of the callswas ratcheted up from those normally received.For example:

• Joy Duperault in Charlotte County: “We weregetting calls from people who seemed to bein shock. They weren’t even sure what toask for. They would describe their circum-stances and we would try to figure out howto help. We had lots of calls from home-bound seniors and from seniors whosehomes had been severely damaged.”

• Debra Harris at the 2-1-1 Crisis Center ofTampa Bay in Tampa: “We have seen anincrease in the number of mental healthcalls, up to 40% of our total versus the nor-mal 20-25%. People are anxious andscared.”

One of the key roles played by 2-1-1s, then,was to provide reassurance to callers removinga burden from EOC staff who were not trainedfor that role. For example, Paul Milleli,Director of Public Safety in Palm Beach County,said, “Staff in our Emergency InformationCenter were glad to have [2-1-1 staff] therebecause they could handle calls from peoplewho were emotionally upset.”

Similarly, Kasha Owers, Chief Operating Officerof the Area Agency on Aging based in West PalmBeach, said, “2-1-1 was able to crisis counsel.They really excel in that. Where we tend to dealwith the request, not the emotions, they did anexcellent job with the intangibles.”

This service was particularly important to herclientele because, she says, “There is a lot ofemotional devastation in seniors’ lives [as aresult of the storms]. That is the worst...lotsof shock and denial. A lot of people havegiven up.”

“People were lonely,

scared, couldn’t leave their

houses. They wanted

to talk. Some were just

so thankful they could call

and get a person and not

a machine. We could relate

to the situation because

we were here.

People liked that.”

Demetra Russell, I&R Specialist at211 HelpLine in West Palm Beach


Even when information was otherwise avail-able, 2-1-1s reported getting calls from peopleseeking to hear it again. Rene Favreau, I&RSpecialist at 2-1-1 in Palm Beach County talkedabout the importance of 2-1-1 in getting peopleto shelters. Even though it was in the paperand on TV and radio,” she said, “people want-ed to talk about it. They needed a lot of reas-surance.”

Linda Pankow in Lee County had a similarobservation. “People wanted to hear a livevoice, even if it was saying the same thing thatwas on the TV news,” she said. “A lot of thecalls were ‘anxiety calls’.”

Mobilizing and Managing Volunteers2-1-1 is not only a way to “get help;” it also canbe a way to “give help.” While the extent towhich 2-1-1s play a “give help” role varieswidely from community to community, not onlyin Florida but around the country, it becameclear during the Emergency that there areimportant ways in which 2-1-1 can help mobi-lize and manage volunteers and cash and in-kind contributions.

ManasotaThe United Way 2-1-1 of Manasota, Inc.,Volunteer Services of Manatee County, Inc., andthe United Ways of Sarasota and Manatee coun-ties created one of the strongest “give help”partnerships.

The Volunteer Center of Manatee County is con-sidered one of the most innovative in the coun-try and is well-known for its ManaTEENS pro-gram. Because Manatee County was not signifi-cantly impacted by Hurricane Charley, theVolunteer Center put priority on serving neigh-boring DeSoto County, a rural county of only35,000 people in which almost half of the hous-ing units were significantly damaged and halfthe population displaced by Charley. TheVolunteer Center, with support of local UnitedWays, opened a volunteer reception center inthe American Legion post.

Adraine LaRoza, Executive Director of theVolunteer Center, describes the partnershipthis way:

There was no communications structure left inDeSoto County, no cell phones and no landlines. The only way to get information outabout needs was to leave there. In theevenings, we would communicate with 2-1-1.Then they would update their web site and theirstaff and go to the media.They let the public knowwhat volunteers had doneeach day, what was need-ed, when and where volun-teers should go the nextday and how they shouldprepare for the work.

Alberto [Suarez, executivedirector of 2-1-1] evencame out and worked as avolunteer to see what itwas like so the 2-1-1 wouldbe better prepared to helpvolunteers who called.

2-1-1 was incredible. Wedepended on them totally.It worked like a charm...agreat partnership. I can’tsay enough about it.

In an email posted on theUnited Way of America 2-1-1 Listserv, AlbertoSuarez, executive directorof United Way 2-1-1 ofManasota, described theexperience this way:

The Volunteer Center’s reports would let usknow what was needed in the field (ie-workgloves, water, rakes, chainsaws, etc). Thesenewsletters were done DAILY by Adraine andposted on the 2-1-1 website.

Because of the ability of our Board Chairman tohave contacts developed within the localmedia...we were getting lots of air time for2-1-1...driving our website traffic and call vol-ume up. The night Charley hit, our call centerdid 800 calls in one night. Extra staff duringafter-hours for our call center was provided bythe Manatee Volunteer Center.

Through the partnership

created among United Way

2-1-1 of Manasota, Inc.,

the Volunteer Center of

Manatee County, and the

local United Ways, some 8,800

volunteers were mobilized and

managed over the first two

weeks after Hurricane Charley,

providing an estimated 80,000

volunteer hours of help to the

people of DeSoto County.

“It worked because, in terms

of our mentality, 2-1-1 has

always been about both

getting and giving help.”

Alex Young, President, United Way of Sarasota County


Every 2-1-1 call center should have the type ofrelationship we have with our local VolunteerCenter. Because of this relationship 8,800 vol-unteers were screened and put to work to helpthose in need. It really helps promote and opti-mize the GIVE HELP portion of our system and atthe same time make an impact in the communityby coordinating and collaborating in an effectivemanner all volunteers who want to help.

Alex Young, President of the United Way ofSarasota County, stresses the multi-countyresponse:

While both Sarasota and Manatee counties wereimpacted by every storm with flooding andwind, we were not really hit hard. Our most sig-nificant contribution was as a place throughwhich people could give help. 2-1-1 was theconduit to get people into the volunteer recep-tion center and also a way for people to find outwhere to give money or in-kind contributions.

As a result of the partnership, longer-termchanges are happening. On January 17, 2005,Martin Luther King Jr. Day, the Volunteer Centeropened a permanent office in DeSoto County.Funding is being sought to expand 2-1-1 servic-es to DeSoto County. Discussions also areunderway to strengthen the relationshipbetween 2-1-1 and county governments. AlexYoung says, “County government now under-stands better the need to get 2-1-1 into the EOC.We also have proposed to give them the 2-1-1number to use throughout the three counties touse during emergencies, rather than the 10-digit number for each county.”

Broward CountyIn Broward County, 2-1-1 Broward was part of acoordinated county effort, the CommunityResponse team that, according to Susan Byrne,2-1-1 President, “got put together at the lastminute. It included the school system, VolunteerBroward [the Volunteer Center], the United Wayand the Sheriff’s Office as well as us.

“2-1-1 was the entry point and others were thedelivery mechanism. Low income, disabled,and elderly people were asked to call 2-1-1. Wescreened their requests and then relayed themto Volunteer Broward which organized the vol-

unteer help to respond. In the week or so it wasactive, we had 156 separate calls, about half ofwhich we referred on for assistance.”

2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares is both a 2-1-1 I&R and aVolunteer Center. As a result, says Cynthia Fox,their executive director, “we see ourselves asmobilizing and managing volunteers to helpand connecting them with specific locales.There is no one else wanting to deal with unaf-filiated volunteers. We believe the message inits entirety—2-1-1 is to both find and give help.”

They are unique in Florida in that the 2-1-1 is thepublic access point for the Volunteer Centerwith I&R specialists doing volunteer referral.

After Hurricane Charley, they received “tons” ofcalls from volunteers and donors. They wereable to send volunteers directly and immediate-ly to DeSoto County to help with water and icedelivery and debris removal. They handled over150 such offers of help in the first five days.

GainesvilleIn Gainesville, the United Way Information &Referral stepped in to fill the gap created whenThe Volunteer Center, which had recently under-gone major staff changes, was unable to performits designated role. Jan Zak, I&R ProgramDirector, stated, “We made heavy use of groupsof volunteers from civic, social and faith groups.Because of liability issues around matching indi-vidual volunteers with individuals in need, weassigned unaffiliated volunteers to work withexisting groups.” The unexpected need forUnited Way to step into this role reminded herthat “you always have to have a fallback position.But, even when there are a million things goingon, the people calling must come first. Period.”

Serving as Intake PointsIt is not unusual for 2-1-1s to provide intakeservices for public sector human service agen-cies, often doing initial screening to determineeligibility. In Palm Beach County, the 211HelpLine is the manager of the homeless hot-line and daily screens callers and makesappointments for clients with county socialworkers. That work began 18 months before thehurricanes. In response to another natural dis-


aster, a major tornado that hit the county, 211HelpLine established a track record of being theplace to call to get connected with housingrecovery assistance.

When county agencies began meeting afterHurricane Frances to discuss how to help resi-dents with home repairs, a person from thecounty housing agency who had been involvedwith the tornado relief efforts suggested that“the 2-1-1 lady should be here.”

Now, the 2-1-1 HelpLine is provide the samescreening service for people seeking help fromthe county for home repairs because of thestorms, screening for eligibility and makingappointments with government agencies whilethe caller is on the phone.

Becky Gregory, Director, Human Services andVeterans Services for Palm Beach County, is astrong believer in the value of 2-1-1. She says,“2-1-1 has given an exceptional boost to the effi-ciency of our operations and the effectivenessof our staff. Because 2-1-1 is respected as theplace to call, it is considered neutral. It has cre-ated the ability for us to say, ‘This is our gate,how you come in if you are serious about chang-ing your life.’ It is doing a level of triage thatcouldn’t be done any other way. 2-1-1 alwaysexceeds our expectations.”

The United Way of Central Florida serves threecounties—Polk, Highlands, and Hardy—with acombined population of over 600,000 people.Their I&R is not a 2-1-1 but does provide compre-hensive services to the three counties and pro-vides 24/7 access through an arrangement with alocal crisis line. Terry Worthington, President ofthe United Way, describes the role the I&R playedin response to the storms this way: “AfterHurricane Charley, we discovered that there wasnot a strong plan to put volunteers to work and toreceive donations. We were able to respondimmediately and worked with the Salvation Armyto set up a receipt mechanism and warehousethat became the volunteer coordination center.

“We were seen by the community as a center ofactivity for hurricane response. The I&R becamethe intake center for everything we are doing.The connecting point for most of it was the I&R.”

Sustaining the ConnectionThe actual time a hurricane is present in anygiven area is relatively brief. In a fast-movingstorm, the eye can move over in a matter of min-utes. Even in slower storms, it may be only oneor two hours of the most intense winds and rain.

But the impact of the storms has lasted muchlonger, of course. Linda Pankow at United Way2-1-1 in Lee County, says, “We need to be pre-pared for it to be long-term. It is likely to be atwo-year recovery. It is not a two-day thing.”

For 2-1-1, this means continually increasingdemand for their services. Patty Maddox of theWinter Park Health Foundation, a funder of 2-1-1Community Resources in Orlando, points to theongoing value of 2-1-1. She says, “As time goeson, the importance of 2-1-1 won’t diminishbecause there are long-term impacts on people.This is a source of valuable data both for plan-ning and resource management.”

Six weeks after the storm, Linda Pankow atUnited Way 2-1-1 in Lee County where call vol-ume was still 150% higher than normal, couldsay that “80% of the calls are storm-related.They may sound like regular 2-1-1 calls but theneed was created by the storm. For example,we are seeing the need for financial assistancebecause of kids not being in school and it cost-ing the family more for food. We also are get-ting calls from middle class as well as lowincome people because of business closuresand loss of work.”

At 2-1-1 Brevard, call volume was 36% higherthan normal for the three months after theEmergency. But it is not just a matter of highercall volumes. It also is the nature of the callsand the callers. Libby Donoghue says, “Thethings people are calling about now are moredifficult—for example, an isolated seniorwoman on oxygen with home damage andunable to get help to repair it. It is a real sourceof stress for our staff.”

An Associated Press story datelined September28 reported that “mental health experts cautionthat the emotional strain will worsen in the nextfew weeks as numbness wears off and peoplegrasp the devastation around them. Authorities


are warning of an increase in alcohol and druguse, as well as child abuse and other violence.” 10

This was confirmed by the observation of ElCabrel Lee in Orlando that just weeks after thestorms his staff was seeing an increase indomestic violence calls.

The high quality of the work done by the 2-1-1salso has raised expectations. Linda Pankownoted that even over the course of the crisis“new people found their way to 2-1-1. BeforeFrances [the second storm to impact LeeCounty], we were getting calls even before theHotline was activated. Word of mouth is build-ing call volume.”

Government officials also have heightenedexpectations.

Marilyn Munoz of the Florida Department ofChildren and Families underscores the esteemin which they now hold 2-1-1 when she says,“We now say, ‘Please hang up and call 2-1-1’rather than our staff doing I&R. We don’t wantto do I&R because 2-1-1 is the best source ofreferrals.”

Don Lusk, assistant county manager in BrevardCounty, sees a “large role that 2-1-1 can playpost-storm. They could be collector of informa-tion from people with needs and complaints.We need a local number for people to call whothink they are not getting help and for peopleafraid to call the government for help. We needto have a local advocate to help people who fallbetween the cracks. 2-1-1 could do thosethings.”

Fortunately, he goes on to stress the need todecide how they want 2-1-1 to fit in and, indeed,whether their work should be classified as aseparate “emergency service function” in theoverall array of emergency management anddisaster response services. There needs to be,he says, “a recognized, official 2-1-1 functionwithin emergency preparation and managementplans” that positions 2-1-1 to receive significantto resources to build their capacity to fill theseroles.

10 “Storm stress mounts: experts see rising suicides and violence,” by Jill Barton, Associated Press Writer, Associated Press.New York: September 28, 2004.

29HOW 2-1-1s PLAYED A VITAL ROLE DURING THE 2004 FLORIDA HURRICANES

Chapter Four

The Value of Partnerships

A disaster is not a time for “turf” to get in the way of responding to theneeds of the community. It is a time for strong, collaborative efforts thatbuild on the capacity, expertise, and talents of many different organiza-tions. For 2-1-1s, there were four key partnerships—with EOCs, withUnited Ways, with Volunteer Centers, and with one another—that helpeddefine the nature and scope of the role they played and the contributionthey made.

The most important of these, with EOCs, was discussed in detail inChapter Two. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the other three keypartnerships—with United Ways, with Volunteer Centers, and among the2-1-1s themselves.

Partnerships with United WaysTed Granger, President of the United Way of Florida, captured the centralimportance of the partnership between 2-1-1s and United Ways throughoutthe crisis in this way: “2-1-1 proved in many communities that it is of ines-timable value in linking people with resources and services, and in posi-tioning United Way as the community impact agent in their areas.”

The state-level partnership between 2-1-1s and United Ways existed wellbefore the storms. Ted Granger has long been a valued member of theFLAIRS board of directors. FLAIRS and United Way of Florida joined togeth-er to develop the strategic business plan for the Florida 2-1-1 Network.The two organizations worked together to pass the state legislationauthorizing development of 2-1-1 and now are jointly seeking funding fromthe legislature to make statewide access to 2-1-1 a reality.

At the local level, five of the 2-1-1s are departments of a United Way. In the balance, the local United Ways are major funders and advocates for2-1-1 and, in many of the communities where 2-1-1 is not yet available, theUnited Way is stepping forward to encourage its development.

During the Emergency, the partnership served both parties well. By work-ing together, 2-1-1s and United Ways expanded each other’s capacity toserve their community and enabled both to build stronger relationshipswith EOCs and with other nonprofit organizations.

For 2-1-1s, their partnership directly connected them to the significantcommunity leadership roles undertaken by United Ways statewide, lever-aging the value of the data being collected by 2-1-1s, focusing greaterattention on their contribution, and bringing them new resources.Together, United Ways in Florida raised and committed over $4 million fordisaster relief, arranged distribution of hundreds of thousands of gallonsof water and tons of ice, mobilized and managed thousands of volunteers,and organized and managed in-kind contributions of everything fromtrucks and fork-lifts to clean uniforms power company linemen and clothes


for people who had lost their homes. For UnitedWays, the partnership with 2-1-1 better posi-tioned them to be at the heart of the emergencyresponse effort and gave them new opportunitiesto demonstrate community impact.

John Hawkins, President of the Heart of FloridaUnited Way in Orlando, the host organizationfor 2-1-1 Community Services, Inc., says, “2-1-1is not only a resource to connect citizens to thehelp they need, but also serves as a strategictool that positions us as an impact organization,planning for the future needs of this growingcommunity. I can’t think of a better example ofhow United Way should be seen in the commu-nity. It demonstrates that we are more than afund-raiser.”

Patty Maddox, president of the Winter ParkHealth Foundation and chair of the 2-1-1Advisory Board says that “the most striking evi-dence of the impact of 2-1-1 can be seen in thechanging attitude of the United Way board ofdirectors. After Hurricane Charley, the reportscoming from 2-1-1 led to a new understanding ofthe value of 2-1-1 and that has escalated since.In a recent United Way planning exercise, everygroup identified 2-1-1 as a priority.”

In those places where the 2-1-1 is part of the UnitedWay, the strength of the partnership was clear:

• In Lee County, “We weren’t late to the table,creating a role for ourselves,” said UnitedWay president Cliff Smith. “That wasn’tnecessary. 2-1-1 put us in position to play anatural role in organizing things.”

• For the United Way of Central Florida, theirI&R was what Terry Worthington called “theintake center...the connecting point...” forthe massive effort the United Way under-took to contribute to disaster relief.

• In Gainesville, where the United Way is thedesignated ESF 15 agency, the I&R played akey role not only in connecting people withservices but also in mobilizing and manag-ing volunteers. The entire United Way ofNorth Central Florida staff came together asa team, staffing the EOC, assisting withcommunications, and working right along

side volunteers to make sure people got thewater, food, ice and other help they needed.

There are similarly strong examples in placeswhere the 2-1-1 is not within the United Way:

• In Palm Beach, the United Way served as anadvocate for 2-1-1, ensuring that therewould be a place for them within the EOCwhen they had to leave their own building.That 2-1-1 could continue to handle callsbenefited not only people in Palm BeachCounty but also in Martin County which italso serves. “If not for 2-1-1, our ownphone lines would have been swamped,”says Jim Vojcsik, President of the UnitedWay of Martin County. “Since they handledcalls from people who needed help, a lot ofthe calls to us were from people who want-ed to help.”

• In Brevard County, the United Way helpedcollect and manage the resource informa-tion needed by 2-1-1. “We consolidated themost relevant information in a simplifiedform,” explains Rob Rains, President of theUnited Way of Brevard County, “and provid-ed it to the media and to employers to passon to their workers. We saw this as a goodrole for us to fill in partnership with 2-1-1.”

GREAT IDEAS

Here are a group of “great ideas” thatemerged during the interviews and debriefing.

• Test your emergency plan with peopleoutside your agency.

• Be on the “priority power list” with yourpublic utility if possible.

• Build the expectation among agenciesin the community that they will contactyou during and immediately after anemergency to report their status sinceyou won’t have time to contact them.

• Offer agencies a “message center”service through which their workerscan call 2-1-1 to get instructions aboutreporting to work.


• In Broward County, the 2-1-1 and the UnitedWay were two of the four key partners in theCommunity Response Team pulled togetherto help low income, disabled, and elderlypeople get help with debris removal.

United Way and 2-1-1 officials are asking theirhuman service agency partners, emergencymanagement and local media to engage directlywith their local 2-1-1 call centers to help create adatabase of available resources, so that 2-1-1can better serve the tens of thousands of callersthey are expecting to serve in the coming days.At the same time, partner agencies are alsorequested to inform these call centers with thetypes of resources they need, so 2-1-1 can helpdirect these needed resources their way as well.

Partnerships with Volunteer CentersIn communities with Volunteer Centers, determin-ing how 2-1-1 can best play a “give help” rolemust come from a dialogue between the twoorganizations. Ideally, that will result in a wellconceived partnership in which 2-1-1 can be lever-aged to make it easier for people to volunteer.

The Emergency underscored the potential forsuch partnerships. In Manasota, for example,the 2-1-1 and the Volunteer Center have repre-sentatives on one another’s boards and theirexecutive directors are in regular contact. ForDeSoto County, 2-1-1 became the “front office,”presenting the need for volunteers to the publicand serving as the way people who wished tovolunteer could do so, while the VolunteerCenter was the “back office,” on the ground inthe county, organizing and managing volunteersand feeding information back to the 2-1-1.Not all of the partnerships worked as well. InLee County and in Gainesville, for example, the2-1-1s had to assume larger than anticipatedroles because the Volunteer Center did not havethe capacity to fulfill their agreed to roles.

Some Volunteer Centers, not only in Florida butthroughout the country, have expressed concernsthat 2-1-1s might pre-empt their leadership rolefor volunteering in the community. AdraineLaRoza, Executive Director of Volunteer Servicesof Manatee County, admits that when 2-1-1 wasfirst established through a merger of two existingI&R services, she “saw it as a real nightmare.”

But now, she says, “I see it as a great way tobuild capacity in our community. It is so silly thatit can’t work this way everywhere.”

The experience in Manasota is a clear exampleof what can happen when the two work togetherin ways that build on their respective strengths,toward a shared goal of increasing the level andeffectiveness of volunteer engagement in the lifeof their community. As with so many of theother elements of 2-1-1s’ response to an emer-gency, however, the foundation for that collabo-ration and the protocols for how it happens mustbe worked out in advance if, together, the twoorganizations are going to make the maximumcontribution to their community.

The Value of the 2-1-1 NetworkFLAIRS is consideredto be one of thestrongest I&R stateassociations in thecountry—with astrong stable mem-bership, a web sitethat directs users toonline databases formost counties, asubstantive annualconference, and ahistory of providingnational leadershipfor the I&R field. Ithas provided theframework within which 2-1-1 has developed inFlorida and has encouraged and supportedongoing networking among the emerging 2-1-1s

as well as partnering with United Way of Floridato develop the strategic business plan for theFlorida 2-1-1 Network.

That history served the 2-1-1s well during theEmergency as they found one another to besources of mutual support, learning, and back-up.

The primary communications vehicle was aseries of conference calls convened by PeterBishop, 2-1-1 Manager of United Way of Americaand President of FLAIRS. United Way of Americaoffered their 800 conference line to the 2-1-1programs so that there could be a daily one hourcall to coordinate services throughout the state.

“The outstanding work done by

the 2-1-1s in Florida during the

hurricanes epitomizes the

community impact role of 2-1-1,

especially when built upon strong

partnerships with local United Ways,

human service agencies, emergency

management, and local media.” Brian GallagherPresident and CEO, United Way of America


All 2-1-1 and I&R programs were invited to be onthe calls.

The daily calls were well attended in the few daysleading up to a hurricane and for two or so weeksafter each. As a new hurricane came up, thefocus would switch to preparations. Each pro-gram made a situation report, and reported anyneeds or special circumstances.

UWA staff who had been monitoring other nation-al group daily calls such as FEMA and VOAD alsowere on the line. The information from the FEMAand VOAD calls as well as daily Florida United Way

CEO calls would becommunicated to the2-1-1s. Similarly, anyquestions 2-1-1s hadfor these groupswould be capturedand later communicat-ed to the othergroups. In this man-ner, the 2-1-1s becamean integral part in thenational response tothe hurricane by avariety of national

organizations and at the same time had a some-what coordinated response statewide.

In addition, Peter Bishop became the centralclearinghouse for email information about thehurricane, getting information and forwarding tovarious listservs and email groups. During thealmost two months of hurricanes, he sent outover 150 email reports, questions, comments, etc.to all of the 2-1-1 programs, forwarding on vari-ous information from other hurricane responders.

“Those conference calls were very valuable,” saidSusan Byrne of 2-1-1 Broward, “because we werelearning from each other.” They also were valu-able, observed Bonnie Baker, Vice President ofthe Florida Children Children’s Forum, host of theFlorida Child Care Resource and ReferralNetwork, because “as another statewide net-work, I could see people’s anxiety and their needto connect with others. The communication linkwas vital. It was very moving to see how support-ive everyone was.”

Randy Nicklaus, executive director of 2-1-1 BigBend in Tallahassee and former national presi-dent of AIRS, concurred in the value of the callsbut pointed out that “as a network, we had notyet worked through system issues. The callsmade it easier to communicate with each other.But it also was clear that those who haveworked well together in the past, worked welltogether here. For those who hadn’t been veryinvolved before, it was harder.”

When FLAIRS convened the 2-1-1s to debriefabout their work during the Emergency, the par-ticipants identified five key implications for theNetwork. They were:

• We need to take a new look at some of theelements of the statewide system wedescribed in the business plan to makesure they stand up against this experience.

• We have greater recognition for 2-1-1 now.How do we take advantage of it?

• We need to get in the state government’semergency plan so that we can become eli-gible for cost reimbursement just like otheremergency agencies.

• The more we know about each other, themore we learn and the more we canimprove, individually and collectively.

• We need to accelerate our work toward astatewide system so that we don’t let ruralcounties fall out.

The group agreed that one of the elements ofthe proposed statewide system that they wouldwant to reconsider was the plan to develop asingle, integrated statewide database withinthree years. Among the rationales for that planwas that it would “ensure complete system-wide redundancy in case of natural disaster oremergency, allowing any center to accept andhandle calls from any other, potentially impor-tant should one or more centers be forced toclose.” It also would facilitate statewide cover-age by simplifying access to the resource datarequired for some call centers to handle afterhours calls for others and it would support asingle publicly accessible web site.

“The beauty of the system was the

ability for us to work with other

2-1-1s, not only in-state but

beyond. From outside, it was

seamless. Everyone was operat-

ing under the same standards.”Emery Ivery, Senior Vice President,

Heart of Florida United Way, Orlando


Although this is a sound rationale, similar tothose adopted by other statewide 2-1-1 systems.there seem to be three reasons why the experi-ence of the hurricane emergency led to the con-clusion that it should be rethought.

First, it became clear that, as Susan Buza of WestPalm Beach put it, “Our existing data base hadno value.” As described earlier, in the immediateperiod of the storm—immediately prior, during,and in the first phase of recovery—the 2-1-1s hadto deal with rapidly changing new informationthat, for the most part, could not possibly havebeen in their data bases in advance. There wasgeneral agreement that simply putting what wasalready in their databases together in a singlelocation would not have been of great value inresponding to the emergency.

Second, although there were limited examples of2-1-1s forwarding calls to other 2-1-1s to handle—most notably in Orlando where calls were for-warded at different times to Tallahassee, Tampa,Jacksonville and Atlanta—it only worked if theoriginating 2-1-1 continued to develop and shareresource information, often simply in a PDF for-mat. Again, having a single statewide databasedid not appear that it would be helpful becausethe information most in demand was rapidlychanging and often difficult to obtain.

Third, a strong feeling emerged that it was ofhigh importance for 2-1-1s to remain open andoperating in their own communities, that beingpart of the local reality contributed to their abilityto effectively respond to callers. Because noneof the 2-1-1s were forced to shut for a lengthyperiod following the storm, there was no signifi-cant need for other 2-1-1s to access their regulardata bases. As was stated by the debriefinggroup, “We need to prepare to share informationglobally but respond locally.” It was notassumed that doing so would require a singledatabase.

It is important to put this discussion in the con-text of the original development of the idea of astatewide database. In fact, it had been one ofthe most difficult considered by the originalstrategic planning team because it went to theheart of the kind of collaboration needed to makethe Network successful. It was symbolic of the

need for well-established 2-1-1s to think and actdifferently in order for the Network to be trulysuccessful. While there was sufficient consen-sus to include the single database in the plan,there was not deep commitment to it. The expe-rience of the hurricanes thus offered a goodopportunity to revisit the issue.

This is not to say that the Network will choosenot to move forward with the original plan for astatewide database. Rather, the experience ofactually going through a major emergencytogether has provided members of the Networkwith new data and perspective that will maketheir consideration of the issue more effective.

The basic idea of cooperating to make resourceinformation easily available remains strong. TedGranger points out that “while creating a singlestatewide database has been put on hold, all2-1-1s are working to ensure their databases areavailable on the web so, in effect, there will be astatewide database comprised of the individual2-1-1 sites. They all can be accessed through theFLAIRS website, which will act as the single pointof entry to the statewide system.”

It is important to note that there was some evi-dence of the potential contribution of an extend-ed 2-1-1 network. For example, Sharon Tierra,Project Manager for Vermont 2-1-1 was referringpeople in Vermont to 2-1-1 call centers in Florida.Calls from Florida also came into the call centerin Vermont. She says, “In one case, we got a callfrom a woman who lives on one of the islands inPalm Beach County that was heavily damaged.Both she and her husband have lost their pro-fessional jobs as a result of the storm and nowneed to relocate because a dispute with theirlandlord over damages. The caller was consider-ing relocating to Vermont but described financialand legal obstacles. We referred them directly totheir local 2-1-1 center in West Palm Beach.”

On a lighter note, the Connecticut 2-1-1 senttheir colleagues in Lee County a “care package”of what Mary Hogan described as “homemadestuff, cookies, and keep up the good worknotes.” Linda Pankow of the United Way 2-1-1there reports that it “had a huge positive impacton the staff.”


Chapter Five

Operational Issues

The Value and Limitations of Advance PlanningNo Florida 2-1-1 would dispute the absolute value of advance planning.But they would mix it with the recognition that plans need to be changedas the situation warrants. For example:

Bob Arnold, United Way 2-1-1 in Jacksonville: “We all have emergencyplans. Ours worked to a point and then we had to improvise.”

Libby Donoghue, 2-1-1 Brevard: “We had an emergency plan that wasgood enough for accreditation. But now, we will be revising it based onour actual experience. We had to play it by ear a lot of the time but welearned as we went along.”

Linda Pankow, United Way 2-1-1 in Lee County: “You need a plan—actually, plans A, B, C, and D.”

2-1-1 Big Bend which ironically was in one of the least impacted areas ofthe state, had developed relatively extensive emergency plans. Executivedirector Randy Nicklaus noted that they had participated in a special simu-lation exercise prior to Tropical Storm Bonnie and, as a result, had put inplace a basic structure for disaster management and had developedtwelve emergency handbooks for their staff. They also had establishedmemorandums of understanding with each of the EOCs in the eight coun-ties they serve.

Micki Thompson at 2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares, also in a relatively less impactarea, used the experience they were gaining in preparing for the impend-ing storms to “rewrite the disaster plan to fit reality into it, primarily in thepreparation phase. It became a truly experiential plan.”

Among the features of the plan were check lists of duties for each staffmember for both pre- and post-storm. “We learned the importance ofdefining specific roles for everyone,” she said, “including the chair of ourboard.”

The most important lesson to be drawn from the total experience, per-haps, is of the need for flexibility. Linda Pankow says, “Don’t be disap-pointed if you don’t have everything right. You need to figure out what isneeded every day.” In the same vein, Libby Donoghue advises, “Be pre-pared in your mind to be flexible and creative. You may not be able to doexactly what you thought was in your little box of responsibility.”

Remaining Open During a HurricaneOne of the key features of 2-1-1 is that it is available all the time—24/7/365. Offering people the ability to reach a live, trained informationspecialist is even more important in an emergency situation. But, in


Florida, the Emergency raised real questionsabout the ability of 2-1-1s to achieve that goal.

Hurricanes are unique natural phenomena.Their existence usually is known weeks inadvance. With sophisticated tracking tech-niques, the paths they likely will take can beprojected relatively accurately. People in theirpath usually have time to evacuate. And, theymove through any given geographic point rela-tively quickly, usually in a matter of a few hours.

It was in the period immediately before the stormhit and during the storm itself that the questionof remaining open was raised. Two major factorscame into play in reaching a decision.

First, there is the question of the safety of thefacility in which 2-1-1 is located. At 2-1-1 TampaBay Cares, hurricane shutters were on orderprior to Hurricane Charley but had not yetarrived. “We are in a glass building so it wasclear early on that we couldn’t stay in it,” saidMicki Thompson. Although the shutters hadarrived and were installed by the time HurricaneFrances came, concerns about their roof ledthem to close late on Saturday evening,September 3 when they thought the storm wasimminent. As it turned out, the hurricane wasvery slow moving and did not hit until the fol-lowing Monday, Labor Day, keeping themclosed until early Tuesday morning.

A similar decision was made by Susan Buza at2-1-1 in West Palm Beach because “our buildingis not hurricane safe.” She later described herimmense relief at “going back and seeing thatbuilding was still there.”

Second, there is the question of whether 2-1-1staff is able to and willing to be at work. This wasthe case at the Crisis Center of Tampa Bay whenthey made the decision to close for 24 hours dur-ing Hurricane Jeanne because, according to DebraHarris, “We don’t want our people on the roads ifthe emergency folks aren’t on them.”

The Crisis Center introduced another factor intotheir decisions on whether to remain open.“We also decided we need to give our people achance to evacuate if they wish to,” says Debra.

Bob Arnold at United Way in Jacksonville echoedthat when he said, “We realized that you can’tforce people to stay on the job. We may have torevisit the ‘we will stay open no matter what’belief as it may not be completely logical.”

There may be a difference, however, between“being open” and ensuring that the 2-1-1 num-ber is answered throughout an emergency. RoyMcBean, chair of the board of United Way 2-1-1of Manasota, says, “During the storm we gotsignificant exposure because the number wasappearing on TV. The public needs to know youare there. If you aren’t when they think youshould be, it causes a problem.”

El Cabrel Lee in Orlando says that although “we stayed up and running because we haveclientele who call us no matter what,” he feelsthat there is a need for emergency managementservices to work with 2-1-1 across the state wellin advance before disaster strikes. He adds, “I think greatest value is post-storm and thecoordination and distribution of met and unmetneeds.” Like others, he sought a way to keep

GREAT IDEAS

Here are a group of “great ideas” that emerged during the interviewsand debriefing.

• Be prepared to be mobile and self-sufficient. Have at least onelaptop and small portable printer, up to date data base on CDs,and basic office supplies ready to go.

• Have a generator, sufficient to power lights, computers, andphone system, lined up in advance.

• Be sensitive about children and pets—in identifying available shel-ters and in accepting the need for your employees to bring theminto the workplace.

• Encourage staff to have their own personal disaster plans—andsupport them in taking care of themselves and their families ifdisaster strikes.

• Consider whether you need to provide transportation for staff toensure they can make it to work safely.

• Have emergency contact information, including cell phone andhome phone numbers, for key staff of other agencies and forother 2-1-1s.

• What’s Plan B for your facility?• Explore the possibility of acquiring battery back-up for your

phones.


the 2-1-1 number as accessible as possible. So,during Hurricane Charley, they forwarded calls tostaff cell phones. “For the people who called,they were very appreciative of being able to talk tosomeone, he says.” 2-1-1 Brevard, when it closedduring Hurricane Charley, made a similar choiceby forwarding calls to a staff person’s home.

As the Emergency wore on, Orlando went a stepfurther, forwarding calls to other 2-1-1s to han-dle. At various points, calls were forwarded toTallahassee, Tampa, Jacksonville, and whenFrances blanketed the entire state, to Atlanta,Georgia. The key to being able to do so, howev-er, was to have 2-1-1 staff at home continue todevelop resource information and pass it alongto where the calls were being answered.

In those places where the 2-1-1 played an integral role within the EOC—either by prior

arrangement as inLee County or inresponse to a newlyrecognized need as inCharlotte County —the question ofwhether 2-1-1 wouldbe open at all timeswas moot.

In those places where2-1-1s had limited

capacity within an EOC to handle calls they hadforwarded there, as in Brevard County and PalmBeach County, there would be a reasonablequestion as to what extent they were, in fact,“open.” Bob Arnold poses the question thisway: “We may have to close and forward calls[to a location outside our community] for 12-24hours. Is it better to only answer 2 lines locallyor all 15 lines from a distance?”

When the 2-1-1s came together for a debriefingin November, they concluded that in this case,like so much associated with their experiencewith the hurricanes, there is no single rightanswer. The impact of the storms simply wasso variable and the local relationships so differ-ent as to preclude having a single standard forhow 2-1-1s should operate during such a crisis.

They did agree on three basic principles:

• They should have plans in place to havetheir phones answered whether by them orby someone to whom they forward thecalls.

• The 2-1-1 in the community hit by an emer-gency needs to be prepared to collect andcommunicate the information required forsomeone else to adequately respond totheir forwarded calls.

• It is important to return to full operation“at home” as quickly as possible becausethey will be more effective in serving theircommunities from within than from longdistance.

Taking Care of 2-1-1 Staff“People are tired. We have been beaten up.Without the hurricanes, we already had a fullagenda. We need to get back to normalcy. It has been a wonderful ordeal.”

Although that was El Cabrel Lee in Orlando talk-ing, it could have been any of the executives ofany of the 2-1-1s. The storms disrupted the livesof those who were taking the calls at 2-1-1s, notonly because of damage to their homes anduncertainty brought to their personal lives butalso because of the constant exposure they hadto the problems of others. Dale Phillips of theSheriff’s Office in Charlotte County captured thechallenge when she said, “The stress level forthem was unbelievable, the same as for 911.”

Listen to the voices of just a few of the I&R spe-cialists:

Diane Elliott in Charlotte County: “It was frustrat-ing to hear people in such a panic. You wishyou could have done more.”

Terry Vail in Charlotte County: “It was exhaust-ing when the calls were so repetitive about rooftarps.”

Latanya Russell in West Palm Beach: “We feelhelpless now because there may not beresources available to help people.”

“We are tired,

mentally exhausted,

and need a break.

But if another one comes,

we’ll be here.”

Debra Harris, Director2-1-1 and Hotline, Crisis Center of Tampa Bay, Tampa


Judi Leggett in Brevard who spent four dayslocked down in the EOC for Frances and threedays for Jeanne: “You just have to work the call,get the person calm. You have to know when itis getting to you. I would walk outside and havea cigarette.”

The effect on staff was cumulative. LibbyDonoghue of Brevard 2-1-1 describes the changefrom Hurricane Frances to Hurricane Jeanne:“The first time we went to the EOC, for Frances,there was a lot of activity, it was very high ener-gy, really busy and noisy. But for Jeanne, it wasmuch quieter, more subdued. People lookedlike someone had hit them.”

On a conference call just prior to the arrival ofHurricane Jeanne, Libby reported to her col-leagues statewide, “Our staff is tired andcranky. But they are squaring their shouldersand getting ready to go to work.”

Despite their demonstrated ability to care forothers, it was not clear that the 2-1-1s generallyhad prepared to care for their own staff mem-bers during a crisis. Most efforts in that direc-tion seemed spontaneous rather than plannedin advance.

• In Lee County, after Frances, the United Wayasked the Southwest Florida AddictionCenter, that provides United Way’sEmployee Assistance Program, to come inand meet with the staff to debrief andprocess. During this session, staff sharedexperiences related to the storms. This dia-log also led to discussion on coping tech-niques. Staff were also informed of otheravailable resources available through theEAP should they want additional counsel-ing. Staff also received time and a half payfor extra hours worked during and after thestorms. In exchange for working on a holi-day day, staff received another day off.

• In Palm Beach County, Susan Buza arrangedfor a masseuse to come in and give staffneck massages after they had worked longstressful hours during the storms. Thosewho worked at the EOC for 24-hour periodsreceived time and a half pay and some com-pensatory time off.

• At the Crisis Center of Tampa Bay, staff wasgiven hazard pay during the time they wereon site during the storm.

• The board of 2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares gave itsstaff a day off.

• At 2-1-1 Brevard, all staff received a one-week pay bonus from the board of directorsin recognition of “outstanding performancein difficult circumstances.”

It likely was coincidental that Debra Harris atthe Crisis Center of Tampa Bay and her col-league, Sandra Charbonnier, at the CitizenAction Center of Hillsborough County (Tampa)were in synch when Sandra said of her staff,“For awhile, we were existing on sugar” andDebra advised, “Lay in lots of chocolate!”

Taking care of one’s staff is, of course, a seriousissue. Even in situations where a staff person’sown life is not directly affected by an emergencysituation, the requirement that they deal with aconstant stream of people whose lives havebeen significantly disrupted can wear on them.It was clear from the interviews that front-linestaff had a difficult time handling both the workload and the stress that came with the sheervolume of problems and with inevitably beingunable to help some of the people because of alack of resources in the community.

A challenge for 2-1-1s is to think through, inadvance, how to provide appropriate supportfor their staffs, through facilitated debriefings,availability of counselors, and feedback on theaffect of their work as well as by providing extrapay and time off.


People Interviewed for this Study

Brevard County

At 2-1-1 Brevard* Libby Donoghue, Executive Director

Judi Leggett, 2-1-1 CounselorLakesha McLaughlin, Community Resource CoordinatorJim Wilder, 2-1-1 Counselor

OthersDon Lusk, Assistant County Manager for Human Services, Brevard CountyRob Rains, President, United Way of Brevard County

Charlotte County

At the Information and Referral Division, Charlotte County Human Services DepartmentChristie Allen , Information & Referral SpecialistClaudette Baines , Elder Helpline Outreach Coordinator Elizabeth Beckworth , Database Manager Maria Conrado, Information & Referral SpecialistSharon deLorenzo , Senior Employment trainee

* Joy Duperault, Supervisor, Information and Referral DivisionDiane Elliott, Information & Referral SpecialistTerry Vail, Information & Referral Specialist

OthersJoan LeBeau, Planner, Charlotte County Community Development DepartmentDale Phillips, Project Coordinator, Charlotte County Sheriff’s DepartmentKelly Studenwalt, Assistant Director, Charlotte County Human Services Department

Lee County

At United Way of Lee CountyNicole Nelson, I&R Specialist, United Way 211

* Linda Pankow, Program Manager, United Way 211Cliff Smith, President

OthersMatt Recommier, 911 Coordinator, Lee County Sheriff’s Office


Orange County

At 2-1-1 Community Resources, Inc.El Cabrel Lee, Vice PresidentTino Paz, Director of Information ResourcesGeorge Wolfenden, Shift Supervisor

OthersJerry Demings, Director of Public Safety, Orange CountyJohn Hawkins, CEO, Heart of Florida United WayEmery Ivery, Senior Vice President, Heart of Florida United WayPatty Maddox, President and CEO, Winter Park Health Foundation (Board Chair, 2-1-1 Advisory Board)Joan Nelson, Director of Research, University of Central Florida/Heart of Florida United Way

Palm Beach County

At The Center for Information & Crisis Services, Inc. (2-1-1)* Susan K. Buza, Executive Director

Rene Favreau, I&R SpecialistBruce Greenstein, Network Systems CoordinatorElise Powell, Director, Call Center OperationsJesus Rodriguez, Human Services Research SpecialistDemetra Russell, I&R SpecialistLatanya Russell, I&R Specialist

OthersScott Badesch, Chief Professional Officer, United Way of Palm Beach CountyBecky Gregory, Director, Palm Beach County Human Services Division Paul Milleli, Director of Public Safety, Palm Beach CountyMarilyn Munoz, District Manager, Department of Children and Families, District 9Kasha Owers, Chief Operating Officer, Area Agency on AgingJim Vocsjik, Executive Director, United Way of Martin County

United Way of America

David Albritton, Vice President, Field and Media Communications* Peter Bishop, Manager, 2-1-1

Trisha Ferrell, Lead Associate, 2-1-1Kelly Levy, Director, 2-1-1Tamara Schomber, National Director, Crisis Preparedness & Response


Telephone Interviews

* Robert E. Arnold, Director, United Way 2-1-1, Jacksonville* Susan Byrne, President and CEO, 2-1-1 First Call for Help of Broward, Ft. Lauderdale

Sandra Charbonier, Manager, Citizen Action Center of Hillsborough CountyTim Closterman, Volunteer Services Manager, Pinellas CountyCynthia Fox, Executive Director, 2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares, Largo

* Peter Foy, Vice President, Community Initiatives, United Way of Marion County First Call for Help, Ocala* Ted Granger, President, United Way of Florida

Janet Bard Hanson, Director of Management and Information Programs, 2-1-1 Big Bend, TallahasseeDebra L. Harris, Director, 2-1-1 and Hotline, Crisis Center of Tampa Bay, TampaAdraine LaRoza, Executive Director, Volunteer Services of Manatee County, Inc.Ande Miller, Executive Director, National Voluntary Organizations Active in DisasterJane Morgan, American Red Cross, President National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

* Randy Nicklaus, Executive Director, 2-1-1 Big Bend, TallahasseeStephanie Radtke, Volunteer Services Coordinator, 2-1-1 Tampa Bay CaresSusan Senkarik, Director of Community Impact, United Way of Escambia CountyShari Sinwelski, Director of Hotline Programs, 2-1-1 Big Bend, Tallahassee

* Alberto Suarez, Executive Director, United Way 2-1-1 of Manasota, Inc.* Tim Sylvia, Director, First Call for Help, United Way of Volusia and Flagler Counties, Daytona Beach* Micki Thompson, Program Manager, 2-1-1 Tampa Bay Cares, Largo

Sharon Tierra, Project Manager, Vermont 2-1-1Terry Worthington, President, United Way of Central FloridaAlex Young, President, United Way of Sarasota CountyJennifer Yunker, Voluntary Agency Liaison, Region 1, FEMA

* Jan Zak, I&R Program Director, United Way Information and Referral, Gainesville

Participants in FLAIRS Meeting

People marked above with an asterisk [*] plus the following:

Bonnie Baker, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Florida Children’s Forum Madeline Franco, First Call for Help Coordinator, United Way of Marion County, Inc. Gretta Jones, Government Operations Consultant, Florida Department of Elder AffairsRoy McBean, Board Chair, United Way 2-1-1 of ManasotaDennis Ross, CEO, Crisis Center of Tampa BayBrett Slocum, Information & Referral Specialist, United Way 2-1-1 of Lee CountyAlan Zak, Information Technology Consultant, United Way of North Central Florida, Gainesville


About the Author

This report was researched and written by Dr. Kenn Allen, President of theCivil Society Consulting Group LLC in Washington DC. Dr. Allen has beenactively involved since early 2002 in the development of 2-1-1 around thecountry. He has led state strategic business planning processes for 2-1-1in Florida, Texas, Washington, and Oregon and is currently doing so inNew York City, Northern Virginia, and the states of Rhode Island, Michiganand Minnesota. He also has worked with 2-1-1s in Indiana, Illinois, andOhio. In 2003, he researched and wrote “The Essential Attributes of aCommunity Impact United Way” for United Way of America. He can bereached at [email protected].

United Wayof America

701 North Fairfax StreetAlexandria, Virginia 22314-2045

Trial by Wind and Water - AIRS · 2011. 9. 16. · services (water, ice, food), rescue needs,...

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