Transportation Law- SCRA Rulings From Mirasol v. DPWH to Cruz v. Holidays

7/21/2019 Transportation Law- SCRA Rulings From Mirasol v. DPWH to Cruz v. Holidays

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Mirasol v. DPWH

Actio ns; Injunctions; A prel iminary injun ction does not s erve as a final determination of

the issues —i t is a provis ional remedy, which m erely serves to preserve the status qu o

unti l the cou rt cou ld hear the merits of the case.—Petitioners rely on the RTC’s Order dated

28 June 2001, which granted their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since respondents

did not appeal from that Order, petitioners argue that the Order became “a final judgment” on

the issues. Petitioners conclude that the RTC erred when it subsequently dismissed their

petition in its Decision dated 10 March 2003. Petitioners are mistaken. As the RTC correctly

stated, the Order dated 28 June 2001 was not an adjudication on the merits of the case that

would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the

issues. It is a provisional remedy, which merely serves to preserve the status quo until the court

could hear the merits of the case. Thus, Section 9 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure requires the issuance of a final injunction to confirm the preliminary injunction should

the court during trial determine that the acts complained of deserve to be permanently enjoined.

A preliminary injunction is a mere adjunct, an ancillary remedy which exists only as an incident

of the main proceeding.

Limited Access Highway Act (R.A. 2000); The Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) ruling is

based on a wrong premise —the RTC assumed that the Department o f Public Wo rks and

Highways (DPWH) derived its authori ty from its predecessor, the Departm ent of Public

Works and Communications, which is expressly authorized to regulate, restr ict, or

prohibit access to l imited access faci l i t ies under Section 4 of RA 2000, but such

assumption fai ls to consider the evolut ion of the Department of Public Works and

Communicat ions .—RA 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was

approved on 22 June 1957. Section 4 of RA 2000 provides that “[t]he Department of Public

Works and Communications is authorized to so design any limited access facility and to so

regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is

intended.” The RTC construed this authorization to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited

access facilities to apply to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The RTC’s

ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority

from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is expressly

authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section 4 of



RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the Department of Public

Works and Communications.

Same; Revised Adm inistrat ive Code (Act No. 2711); Under the Revised A dmin istrat ive

Code, approved on 10 March 1917, there were only seven executive departments,

namely: th e Department of th e Interior, the Department of Finance, the Department of

Justic e, the Department of A griculture and Commerce, the Department of Public Works

and Communications, the Department of Public Instruct ion, and the Department of

Labor .—Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, approved

on 10 March 1917, there were only seven executive departments, namely: the Department of

the Interior, the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, the Department of

Agriculture and Commerce, the Department of Public Works and Communications, the

Department of Public Instruction, and the Department of Labor. On 20 June 1964, Republic Act

No. 4136 created the Land Transportation Commission under the Department of Public Works

and Communications. Later, the Department of Public Works and Communications was

restructured into the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.

Same; Under Executive Order No. 546, it is th e Department of Transport at ion and

Comm unications (DOTC), not the Department o f Public Works and Highways (DPWH),

which has the authori ty to regulate, restr ict, or prohibit access to l imited access

faci l i t ies.—DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access

facilities on 5 April 1993 and 25 June 1998, respectively. Later, the TRB, under the DPWH,

issued the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities. However, on 23 July

1979, long before these department orders and regulations were issued, the Ministry of Public

Works, Transportation and Communications was divided into two agencies—the Ministry of

Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications—by virtue of EO 546. The

question is, which of these two agencies is now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit

access to limited access facilities? Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works

(now DPWH) assumed the public works functions of the Ministry of Public Works,

Transportation and Communications. On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry of

Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications

[DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the

preparation and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive transportation and

communications systems at the national, regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate, whenever



necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect

fees in the exercise of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which

has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.

Same; Departm ent Order No . 74 (DO 74) and Departm ent Ord er No. 215 (DO 215) are void

because the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) has no authori ty to

declare certain expressw ays as l imit ed access faci l i t ies; Since the Department o f Public

Works and Highways (DPWH) has no authori ty to regulate activ i t ies relat ive to

transportat ion, the Toll Regulatory B oard (TRB) cannot derive its pow er from th e DPWH

to issu e regulat ions gov erning l imit ed access faci l i t ies —the DPWH cannot delegate a

power of function which it does not possess.—Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125)

and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A), which further reorganized the DOTC, the authority

to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with

the DOTC. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare

certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is

authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation

and to regulate related activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative

to transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations

governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it

does not possess in the first place.

Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void.

Same; Adm inistrat ive Law; Adm inistrat ive issuances have the force and effect of law.—

We emphasize that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications

issued AO 1 on 19 February 1968. Section 3 of RA 2000 authorized the issuance of the

guidelines. In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO 123 after EO 546 devolved to the

DOTC the authority to regulate limited access highways. We now discuss the constitutionality of

AO 1. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from the same

presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a

heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations. The burden of proving

unconstitutionality rests on such party. The burden becomes heavier when the police power is

at issue.



Same; Police Power; Public Highw ays and Toll Ways; The use of pub l ic highw ays by

mo tor vehic les is sub ject to regulat ion as an exercise of the police pow er of the State.—

The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the

police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the “most essential,

insistent and illimitable” of all government powers. The tendency is to extend rather than to

restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness.

What is “reasonable” is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing

test of reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A tol l w ay is not an ordinary ro ad —the sp ecial

purp ose for which a tol l way is construc ted necessitates the imp osit ion of gu idel ines in

the manner of its us e and op eration.—We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable

restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must

adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic

within limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by

a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but

one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic

behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which

a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and

operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights

are restricted does not invalidate the rules.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The test of const i tut ional i ty of a po lice power m easure

is l imited to an inquiry on w hether the restr ict ion imp osed on consti tut ional rights is

reasonable, and not wh ether it imposes a restr ict ion o n those rights.—Consider Section

3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways. The regulation affects the

right to peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being

implicit in the power itself. Thus, the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited

to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on constitutional rights is reasonable, and not

whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Motorc ycles; The means by wh ich the governm ent choos es

to act is not judged in terms of what is “best,” rather, on simply whether the act is



reasonable —reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the government

regulation.—None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and capricious. The

DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed to

accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and

traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that

the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents.

Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the “best” measure to

ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways. However, the means by which the

government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is “best,” rather, on simply whether

the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the

absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon

the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the

measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is “best” are

arguments reserved for the Legislature’s discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will

only be warranted if the assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in

this case to be so.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no thing oppressive in being required to take a

bus o r drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a

to l l way.—Neither do we find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right

to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public,

to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to

travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized

vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and

practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in

being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or

motorcycle upon using a toll way.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police pow er does not rely upon the existence of

defin i t ive studies to support its use —the yardstick has always been simply whether the

government’s act is reasonable and not oppressive; Scientific certainty and conclusiveness,

though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation, otherwise, no government will be

able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up

conducting studies.—Petitioners’ reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police



power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, no

requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by

research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government’s act is reasonable

and not oppressive. The use of “reason” in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary

and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable,

may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to act in

situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up conducting

studies.

Same; Same; Equal Protect ion; Motorc ycles; A classif icat ion can only b e assai led if it is

deemed invidiou s, that is, it is not b ased on real or substantia l dif ferences.— A police

power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like

due process and equal protection of the law. Petitioners’ attempt to seek redress from the

motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail. Petitioners’ contention that AO 1

unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not

prohibited. A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based

on real or substantial differences.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Not all motorized vehicles are created equal —real and

substantia l dif ferences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport

suff ic ient to just i fy its classif icat ion amo ng those prohibited from p lying the tol l ways.—

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable

classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all

motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other

light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive.

Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models. We find that real and

substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to

justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of

motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car,

a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle

is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judic ial Notice; A classif icat ion based on practical

conv enience and comm on know ledge is not uncon sti tut ional simply because it may lack



purely theoretical or scienti f ic unifo rmity; The Court takes note that the Phil ippines is

home to a host of unique motor ized mod es of transport ranging from m odi f ied hand-

carts (kuliglig) to bicycle “sidecars” outfitted with a motor.— A classification based on

practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may

lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that the Philippines is

home to a host of unique motorized modes of transport ranging from modified hand-carts

(kuliglig) to bicycle “sidecars” outfitted with a motor. To follow petitioners’ argument to its logical

conclusion would open up toll ways to all these contraptions. Both safety and traffic

considerations militate against any ruling that would bring about such a nightmare.

Same; Same; Freedom of Movement; The right to travel does not mean the right to

choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way.— A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility

designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and

maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain

restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but

reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it. The right to travel does not mean the right

to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from

one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or

public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point

B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public

can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a

subject that can be validly limited by regulation.

Same; Same; Same; The right to travel does not enti t le a person t o the best form of

transport or to the mo st convenient route to his destination.—Petitioners themselves admit

that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the

safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue

curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person

to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions

found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction

barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone.

Same; Same; Same; There exists n o absolute righ t to dr ive —th is priv i lege is heavi ly

regulated; A driver’s license merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport—i t



is not a l icense to drive or operate any form o f transportat ion on any type of road.—

Petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation Office

(LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds

of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive.

On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive

motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by

the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or

operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the

other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the

government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles. [Mirasol vs.

Department of Public Works and Highways, 490 SCRA 318(2006)]

(AIR) Philippine Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Evidence; Presumption; Legal presumption that official duty of administrative agencies

has been performed.—There is a legal presumption that official duty has been duly

performed.

Such presumption is particularly strong as regards administrative agencies, like the CAB, vested

with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws

affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a

technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions,

relevant to said field, obtaining in the nation. (Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Utility

Commission, 70 Phil. 221).

Administrative law; Findings of fact of administrative agencies are respected by the courts;

Exception.—The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that

courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there

is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently

insubstantial (Heacock v. National Labor Union, 95 Phil. 553). This, in turn, is but a recognition

of the necessity of permitting the executive department to adjust law enforcement to changing

conditions, without being unduly hampered by the rigidity and the delays often attending

ordinary court proceedings or the enactment of new or amendatory legislations.



Same; Case of Ang Tibay v. C.I.R. (60 Phil. 553) distinguished from case at bar; Interlocutory

orders may be issued ex parte without violating due proces.—The case of Ang Tibay v. C.I.R.,

supra, refers to the conditions essential to a valid decision on the merits, from the viewpoint of

due. process, whereas, in the case at bar, we are concerned with an interlocutory order prior to

the rendition of said decision. In fact, interlocutory orders may sometimes be issued ex parte,

particularly, in administrative proceedings, without previous notice and hearing, consistently with

due process (Cornejo v. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 199). Again, the constitutional provision to the effect

that “no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based” (Art. VIII, Sec. 12, Constitution of the

Philippines), applies, not to such interlocutory orders, but to the determination of the case on the

merits (Soncuya v. National Loan & Investment Board, 69 Phil. 602). [Philippine Air Lines, Inc.

vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, 23 SCRA 992(1968)]

Common Carriers—Definition and Essential Elements

U.S. v. Tan Piaco

PUBLIC UTILITY, CONTROL BY PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION; CRIMINAL L lAB ILITY OF

OWNER OF AUTOMOB ILE TRUCK OPERATED UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT AND NOT

FOR GENERAL PUBL IC BUSINESS.—The owner of an automobile truck who operates thesame under a special contract for carrying passengers and freight, in each case, and has not

held himself out to carry all passengers and freight for all persons who might offer, is not a

public utility and is not criminally liable for his failure to obtain a license from the Public Utility

Commissioner. If the use is merely optional with the owner, or .the public benefit is merely

accidental, it is not a public use, authorizing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the public utility

commission. The true criterion by which to judge of the character of the use is whether the

public may enjoy it by right or only by permission. [United States vs. Tan Piaco., 40 Phil.

853(1920)]

Home Insurance Co. v. American Stearship

Code of Commerce; Charter party; Civi l Code on comm on carriers does not apply to

charter party.—The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not apply where the



common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. Under American jurisprudence, a

common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only,

becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability

for the negligence of its agent is valid.

Same; Same, Stipulat ion on abso lv ing owner from liabi l i ty for loss due to n egligence of

i ts agent is val id.—The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss

due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing

common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved,

as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. The stipulation exempting

the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed

valid.

Civi l Code; Comm on carriers; Origin of provis io ns.—The provisions of our Civil Code on

common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law.

Code of Comm erce; Bil l of lading; Nature; Not the contract in a charter party.—In a

charter of the entire vessel, the bill of lading issued by the master to the charterer, as shipper, is

in fact and legal contemplation merely a receipt and a document of title, not a contract, for the

contract is the charter party. [Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23

SCRA 24(1968)]

De Guzman v. Court of Appeals

Comm on Carriers; Definit ion of; Art. 1732 of the Civi l Code makes no dist inct io ns

between a person or enterprise offering transportat ion s ervice on a regular or scheduled

basis and such service on an occasional, episodic or u nscheduled basis.—The Civil Code

defines “common carriers” in the following terms: “Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,

corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting

passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to

the public.” The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business

activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an

ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any

distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or



scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.

Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general

public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits

business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733

deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

Same; Same; Same; The concept of “common carrier” under Art. 1732 coinc ides with the

notion of “Public Service” under the Public Service Act (CA No. 1416).—So understood,

the concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the

notion of “public service,” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as

amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil

Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, “public service” includes: “x x

x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,

for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or

accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street

railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or

without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class,

express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the

transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice

plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water

supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire

or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A cert i f icate of pub l ic con venience is not a requis ite for the

incurrin g of l iabi l i ty under the Civi l Code provis ions go verning common carriers.—The

Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public

convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate

of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code

provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as

a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the

requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been

granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent

from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of

public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private



respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. The business

of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and

property of those members of the general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The

law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those

who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and

liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

Same; Same; Same; Liabi l i ty of common carriers in case of loss, destruct ion or

deteriorat ion or destruct ion of goods they carry; Extraordinary di l igence, required;

Exceptions.—Common carriers, “by the nature of their business and for reasons of public

policy,” are held to a very high degree of care and diligence (“extraordinary diligence”) in the

carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the

care of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to Article 1733, “further expressed

in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7” of the Civil Code. Article 1734 establishes

the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of

the goods which they carry, “unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1)

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public

enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the

goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and (5)

Order or act of competent public authority.” It is important to point out that the above list of

causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for responsibility

therefor, is a closed list. Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to

constitute a species of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article 1735.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The hijacking of the carriers tru ck does n ot fal l within

any of the five (5) categories of exemptin g causes in Art. 1734.— Applying the above-quoted

Articles 1734 and 1735, we note firstly that the specific cause alleged in the instant case—the

hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting

causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier’s vehicle

must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private

respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.

This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part

of private respondent.



Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 1745(6), a common carrier is held

responsib le even for acts of strangers l ike thieves or robb ers except where such th ieves

or robbers acted “with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”— As noted earlier,

the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods is, under Article 1733, given

additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4,

5 and 6. Article 1745 provides in relevant part: “Any of the following or similar stipulations shall

be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy: xxx xxx xxx (5) that the

common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its employees; (6)

that the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act

with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished; and (7) that

the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods on

account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in

the contract of carriage.” Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible

and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility—even for acts of strangers

like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted “ with grave or

irresistible threat, violence or force.” We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of

extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are

lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Common carriers are not made absolu te insurers

against al l risks of travel and of transport of g oods and are not l iable for fortuitous

events; Case at bar.—In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must

reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly

regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made

absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for

acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have

complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. We, therefore, agree with the

result reached by the Court of Appeals that private respondent Cendaña is not liable for the

value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond

private respondent’s control.



Bascos v. Court of Appeals

Civi l Law; Common Carriers defined.—Artic le 1732 of the Civi l Code defines a common

carrier as “(a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of

carry ing or transport ing passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for

compensat ion, offering their services to the public.” The test to determine a common

carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier

which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent

of the business transacted.” In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she

was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial

admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.

Same; Same; No dist inc t ion between person o ffering service on regular basis and one

offering service on occasion al basis.—But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of

lease because they offer their services only to a select group of people and because the private

respondents, plaintiffs in the lower court, did not object to the presentation of affidavits by

petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Regarding the first

contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. In

referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: “The above article makes no distinction

between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and

one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article

1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering

transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an

occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a

carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and

one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general

population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.”

Same; Same; Obligation of carrier to observe extraordinary di l igence; Presumption of

negl igence.—Common carriers are obl iged to observe extraordinary di l igence in the

vigi lance over the goods tr ansported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been

at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are

very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances

are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common



carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the

presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Liabi l i ty aris ing from h ijacking.—To exculpate the carrier from

liabi l i ty aris ing from hijacking, he mu st prove that the robbers or the hi jackers acted with

grave or irresist ib le threat, violence, or forc e. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the

Civil Code which provides: “Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be

considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy: x x x x x x (6) That the common

carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or

irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished.” [Bascos vs. Cou rt of

Appeals, 221 SCRA 318(1993)]

Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Words and Phrases; Shipping; “Charter Party” defined.— A “charter -party” is defined as a

contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another

person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or

other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of

goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight; Charter parties are of

two types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping space on vessels

leased by the owner in part or as a whole, to carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise

or bareboat charter, by the terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer

to him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its navigation,

including the master and the crew, who are his servants. Contract of affreightment may either

be time charter, wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or

voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party

provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or

consecutive voyage, the shipowner to supply the ship’s stores, pay for the wages of the master

and the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship.

Same; Same; “Common Carrier” defined.—Upon the other hand, the term “common or public

carrier” is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition extends to carriers either by land,

air or water which hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting

passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation.



The distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or special carrier” lies in the

character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the

general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or

corporation offering such service is a private carrier.

Shipping ; Transpor tat ion; Evidence; Comm on carriers required to observe extraordinary

di l igence and presumed at fault ; no such presum ption applies to private carriers.— Article

1733 of the New Civil Code mandates that common carriers, by reason of the nature of their

business, should observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry. In

the case of private carriers, however, the exercise of ordinary diligence in the carriage of goods

will suffice. Moreover, in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, common carriers

are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the burden of proving

otherwise rests on them. On the contrary, no such presumption applies to private carriers, for

whosoever alleges damage to or deterioration of the goods carried has the onus of proving that

the cause was the negligence of the carrier.

Same; Same; Same; In a tim e or v oyage charter, in contr ast to a bareboat charter, the

ship remains a common or publ ic carr ier .—It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall

remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more

persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or

voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a

bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular

voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage

charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be

the property of the charterer.

Same; Same; Same; In the commo n carriage of hig hly solu ble goods , l ike fert i l izer, it is

the shipper or owner of the goods that comm only face r isk of loss or damage.—Indeed,

we agree with respondent carrier that bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries

with it the risk of loss or damage. More so, with a variable weather condition prevalent during its

unloading, as was the case at bar. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to

face. Clearly, respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods

which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of its packaging

which further contributed to the loss. On the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner



showing that the carrier was remiss in the exercise of due diligence in order to minimize the loss

or damage to the goods it carried. [Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA

476(1993)]

Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

Civi l Law; Negligence; Damages; Cabil was grossly n egl igent and should b e held l iable

for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.—Considering the

foregoing —the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove

his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20

kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and

should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.

Same; Same; Same; Cabil’s negligence gave rise t o the presumption th at his emplo yers,

the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the select ion and supervis ion of their

employee.—Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the

presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and

supervision of their employee.

Same; Same; Same; Employer sh ould also examine the applicant for his qual i f icat ions,

experience and record of service.—Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by

finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license. The employer should also

examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in

supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the

guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation

and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.

Same; Same; Same; The existence of hir ing pro cedures and superviso ry pol ic ies c annot

be casual ly invoked to overturn the presumption of negl igence on the part of an

employer.—In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,

apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from

their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a

two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could

remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his



qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union

was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually

invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.

Same; Same; Same; As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise

“extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the passengers to their

destination.— As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence”

for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not

excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection

and supervision of their employee. [Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 426(1996)]

Same; Same; Same; On the theory that peti t ioners are l iable for breach of contract of

carriag e, the award of m oral damages is author ized by Art. 1764, in relation to Ar t. 2220,

since Cabil’s gross negligence amounted to bad faith.—With respect to the other awards,

while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the

factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless supported by evidence in the

records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within the

purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On

the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral

damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil’s gross negligence

amounted to bad faith. Amyline Antonio’s testimony, as well as the testimonies o f her father and

copassengers, fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result

of the injuries caused by petitioners’ negligence.

Same; Same; Same; In Dangwa Trans. Co., Inc. vs. Cour t of Ap peals, the Court held th e

bus c ompany and the driver joint ly and several ly l iable for damages for injuries suffered

by a passenger.—The decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the theory

of quasi delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts below

held, petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond jointly and

severally to private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa Trans. Co., Inc. v. Court

of Appeals, on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the bus company and the driver

jointly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor

Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let

off passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the passengers



jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable

with the bus company to the injured passengers.

First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals

Contracts; Common Carriers; A “common carrier” is one who holds himself out to the

public as engaged in the busin ess of transport ing person s or property from p lace to

place, for com pensation, offering his services to the public g eneral ly.—There is merit in

the petition. A “common carrier” may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out to the

public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for

compensation, offering his services to the public generally. Article 1732 of the Civil Code

defines a “common carrier” as “any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the

business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for

compensation, offering their services to the public.”

Same; Same; Test for determin ing whether a party is a comm on carrier of goo ds.—The

test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is: 1. He must be engaged in

the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as

ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a

casual occupation; 2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is

confined; 3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and

over his established roads; and 4. The transportation must be for hire.

Same; Same; The fact that peti t ioner has a limited cl ientele does not exclud e it from the

defini t ion of a common carrier.—Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is

no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or

carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry

for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and

transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited

clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The definition of “common carriers” in the Civil Code

makes no dis t inct ion as to the means of transpor t ing, as long as it is by land, water or

air.— As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of “common carriers” in the Civil Code



makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It

does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle.

In fact, in the United States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.

Same; Same; Taxation; Legis lat ive intent in excludin g from the taxing power of the local

governm ent unit the imp osit ion of bu siness tax against common carriers is to prevent a

duplic at ion of the so- called “common carrier’s tax.”—It is clear that the legislative intent in

excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of business tax

against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called “common carrier’s tax.”

Petitioner is already paying three (3%) percent common carrier’s tax on its gross sales/earnings

under the National Internal Revenue Code. To tax petitioner again on its gross receipts in its

transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the Local Government Code.

Loadstar Shipping Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Contracts; Common Carriers; Damages; The law impo ses duties and liabi l i t ies upon

commo n carriers for the safety and protect ion of tho se who uti l ize their services and the

law cannot al low a commo n carrier to render such du ties and liabi l i t ies merely facultat ive

by sim ply fai l ing to obtain the necessary permits and author izat ions.—The Court of

Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience,

and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of public

convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions

governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common

carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of

the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a

certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the

liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public

convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private

respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. The business

of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and

property of those members of the general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The

law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those

who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and

liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.



Same; Same; Same; For a vessel to be seaworthy, it mu st be adequately equipp ed for the

voyage and manned with a suff ic ient number of comp etent off icers and crew.—Moving on

to the second assigned error, we find that the M/V “Cherokee” was not seaworthy when it

embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984. The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at

the time. “For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and

manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common

carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear

breach of its duty prescribed in Ar ticle 1755 of the Civil Code.”

Same; Same; Same; Since it was remiss in the perform ance of its duties, LOADSTAR

cannot hide behind the “limited liability” doctrine to escape responsibility for the loss of

the vessel and its cargo.—Neither do we agree with LOADSTAR’s argument that the “limited

liability” theory should be applied in this case. The doctrine of limited liability does not apply

where there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent. LOADSTAR was at fault

or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail

despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any event, it did not sink because of any

storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the wind condition in the area where

it sank was determined to be moderate. Since it was remiss in the performance of its duties,

LOADSTAR cannot hide behind the “limited liability” doctrine to escape responsibility for the

loss of the vessel and its cargo.

Same; Same; Same; A stip ulat ion reducing the one-year period for f i l ing the action for

recovery is nul l and void and mus t be struck down.—Neither is there merit to the contention

that the claim in this case was barred by prescription. MIC’s cause of action had not yet

prescribed at the time it was concerned. Inasmuch as neither the Civil Code nor the Code of

Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act

(COGSA)—which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage

to, cargoes sustained during transit—may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. This one-

year prescriptive period also applies to the insurer of the goods. In this case, the period for filing

the action for recovery has not yet elapsed. Moreover, a stipulation reducing the one-year

period is null and void; it must, accordingly, be struck down.



Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Civi l Law; Contracts; Comm on Carriers; Definit ion.—The definition of common carriers in

Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose principal business

activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an

ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or enterprise offering

transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an

occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not

distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, and one who offers

services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Same; Same; Same; Determin ation of a common carrier.—The test to determine a common

carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier

which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent

of the business transacted.”

Same; Same; Same; Presum ption o f Negligence; Comm on carriers are presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or

deteriorated.—Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance

over the goods transported by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of

negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier

must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule.

Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when the presumption of negligence

does not attach. [Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA

340(2003)]

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals

Civi l Law; Common Carriers; Damages; Definit ion of comm on carrier.—By d efini t ion, a

contr act of carriage or transportat ion is one wh ereby a certain person or assoc iat ion of

persons o bligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to

another for a fixed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and



are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers. A common carrier is

defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by lane, water

or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.

Same; Same; Same; Respon dent is not an enti ty engaged in the business of t ransport ing

either passengers or go ods and is th erefore neither a private nor a comm on carrier.—It is

obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of

transporting either passengers or goods and is there fore, neither, a private nor a common

carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its

covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s

services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as

well as booking customers for tours.

Same; Same; Same; Respon dent not b eing a comm on carrier but a travel agency is no t

bound under the law to observe extraordinary di l igence in the performance of its

obl igation.—The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is

determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the latter’s obligation under

the contract. For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by

law to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost

diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for all the circumstances. As earlier

stated, however, respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound

under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation, as

petitioner claims. [Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 528(2003)]

Same; Same; The degree of di l igence required depends o n the circumst ances of the

specif ic obl ig ation and whether one has been negligent is a question of fact.—The

negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for

the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure

to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the

obligation so demands. There is no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each and every

contractual obligation and each case must be determined upon its particular facts. The degree

of diligence required depends on the circumstances of the specific obligation and whether one



has been negligent is a question of fact that is to be determined after taking into account the

particulars of each case. [Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 528(2003)]

Cruz v. Holidays

Civi l Law; Common Carriers; Definit ion of Common Carriers.— As De Guzman instructs,

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making

distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business,

whether it is offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent

of the law is thus to not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other

distinctions may be concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of

persons or goods in order to avoid the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.

Same; Same; Degree of Dil igence Required; From the nature of their b usiness and for

reasons of publ ic pol icy , common carriers are bound to obs erve extraordinary di l igence

for the safety of the passengers transported by th em, accordin g to al l the circumstances

of each case.—Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and

for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the

passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. They are

bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the

utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

Same; Same; Negligence; Presum ption of Negligence; When a passenger dies or is

injured in th e discharge of a contract of carriage, it is presum ed that the common carrier

is at fault or negl igent.—When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a contract of

carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or negligent. In fact, there is even no

need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common

carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised

extraordinary diligence. [Cruz vs. Sun Holidays, Inc., 622 SCRA 389(2010)]

Same; Same; Same; For tuitous Event; Element of a “Fortuitous Event.”—The elements of

a “fortuitous event” are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the

failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been independent of human

will; (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if



foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it

impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must

have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To ful ly free a common carrier from any l iabi l i ty , the

fortuito us event must have been the proximate and onl y cause of the loss.—To fully free a

common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only

cause of the loss. And it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss

before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Liabi l i ty of a commo n carrier in breach of its c ontract of

carriage result ing in the death of a passenger.— Article 1764 vis-à-vis Article 2206 of the

Civil Code holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death

of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for loss of

earning capacity and (3) moral damages [Cruz vs. Sun Holidays, Inc., 622 SCRA 389(2010)]

Transportation Law- SCRA Rulings From Mirasol v. DPWH to Cruz v. Holidays

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Transcript of Transportation Law- SCRA Rulings From Mirasol v. DPWH to Cruz v. Holidays