Transnational Threat

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51

Chapter Five

TRAN SN ATIONAL THREATS

The spread of rad ical p olitical Islam, th e criminalization of state in-stitutions and economic transactions, the increase in cross-bordernarcotics trafficking, and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent an interrelated network of trans-national challenges to the states and societies within the Caspianregion an d serv e as a p otential catalyst for conflicts amon g these statesand between the Caspian states and their neighbors. 1 In addition,these transnational issues have the p otential to challenge the securityof the West.

Organized crime has the ability to corrup t and un derm ine the alreadywea k institutions in many of these states. To the extent that organizedcrime takes over the functions of the state, particularly those of local

law enforcement and the military, repression of society may increase.As these states become further weakened, they become morevulnerable to challenges from internal and external extremists,includ ing rad ical political Islamic mov ements that feed on societysresentmen t and fear of chaos. This weak ness, in turn, threatens tospill over into neighbor ing coun tries. The wars in Tajikistan,Chechnya, and Afghanistan have contributed to the emergence of

______________1See Graham Turbiville, Flashpoints in Central Asia: Sources of Tension andConflictDrug and Weapons Trafficking, paper presented at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, May 16, 1997; and Nancy Lubin, New Security Threats in theSouthern Tier, in Rajan Menon, Yuri Fyodorov, and Ghia Nodia (eds.), Russia, theCaucasus, and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Env ironment , M. E. Sharp e, Armon k,

NY, June 1999.


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52 NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?

political terrorism and the rise of Islamic extremism throughout theregion.

The criminalization of the economy and the increase in political ex-tremism an d terror ism are also tied to the thr eat of WMD proliferationin Central Asia and the south Caucasus. 2 Although political leadershave pledged to w ork together to curb the smuggling in w eapons andnarcotics that has increased as bord ers have become more p orous andenforcement more problematic, the task is beyond the capability of any of these states either ind ividu ally or collectively. Althou gh thereis no hard evidence of the transport of fissile material orchemical/ biological weap ons (CBW) along the main smu gglingrou tes, there is a grow ing concern th at the logistical capability exists. 3

This capability presents a potentially critical challenge to both NATOand th e West. The challenge is both direct, since the trad e routesbring dru gs and weap ons to Russia and Europe, and ind irect, becausethe rise in criminal trade and terrorism fuels conflicts betweenCaspian states attempting to pr eempt th e spillover of these problems.This chap ter examines the likelihood of both WMD proliferation andthe spread of political Islam in this region and the implications of these trends for NATO and the West. The related issues of theincreased trade in narcotics and the spread of organized crime arebeyond the scope of this study and are discussed only as they have abearing up on m ore traditional transnational geopolitical and securityissues. 4

______________2See Hearings on International Organized Crime and Its Impa ct on the United States,Senate Hearing 103-899, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 103dCongress, 2nd Session, 1994.3The main nar cotics and w eapons sm uggling routes are believed to be the Khorog-Oshhighway through Tajikistans border with Afghanistan and across the mountains intothe Fergana Valley in Kyrgyzstan, and the port city of Batum i in Georgia. See IrinaZviagelskaia and Vitalii Nau mkin , The South ern Tier: Non -Traditional Threa ts,Challenges and Risks for Russias Security, in Rajan Menon, Yuri Fyodorov, and GhiaNod ia (ed s.) (1999).4The spread of organized crime and the drug trade and their implications for regionalsecurity have been the subject of several additional excellent stud ies including GrahamH. Turbiville, Jr., Mafia in Uniform, the Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces,Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1995; and Turbiville, Narcotics Trafficking inCentral Asia: A New Colombia, Military Review , Vol. LXXII, No. 12, December 1992,

pp. 5563.


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Transna tional Threa ts 53

THE RISK OF WMD PROLIFERATION 5

Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, some policymakers andanalysts have worried that parts of the former Soviet Union couldcontribute to the spread of weapon s of mass destru ction. The deci-sions by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakh stan, wh ich inherited portionsof the Soviet Unions nuclear arsenal at the time of indep enden ce, tobecome nonnuclear states and to sign the nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT), eased m uch of this concern. So, too, did Russias w ith-draw al of tactical nu clear w eapons stockpiled on the territory of for-mer repu blics. Non etheless, some observers still wor ry that thecombination of fragile and un stable states and mu ltiple threats in theCaspian security environment could lead to the further spread of WMD.

NATO must worry about three types of WMD threats in the Caspianregion: (1) countr ies could seek to acquire their own w eapon s of massdestruction; (2) these countries could become a direct or indirectsource of proliferation of weapons grade material, technology, andexpertise to other areas, either because of government policies orbecause governments lack the capability to control exports and bor-ders; and (3) terrorist group s could acquire WMD, p articularly chem-ical and biological weap ons, for blackma il or regime destabilization.

A close examination of the factors that motivate countries to seek WMD suggests, as Figure 3 below indicates, that at least in the short-

to-medium term, there is a minimal risk that the countries of CentralAsia and the south Cau casus will seek to acquire WMD. In jud gingthe risks of WMD acquisition, several factors need to be taken intoaccount:

Whether any states would seek a WMD capability for national se-curity reasons, e.g., to deter WMD or conven tional military th reatsby a h ostile state

______________5The discussion of the WMD threat in the Caspian region is based on extensiveinterviews with U.S. government officials. The authors w ish to express their gratitud eto those individuals w ho agreed to be interviewed for this project. See also William C.Potter, N uclear Profiles of the Soviet S uccessor States, Monterey Institute of International

Studies, Monter ey, CA, May 1993.


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Whether there are any powerful bureaucratic or political interestswithin these states that might seek a WMD capability forparochial reasons

Whether any of the states might seek to acquire WMD for prestigeor to establish th eir national id entities or fulfill nationalist aspi-rations

Whether the country has the resources and the technologicalwh erewithal to develop and prod uce WMD

How these countr ies weigh the benefi ts of WMD acquisi tionagainst the potential military, economic, and political costs andrisks.

RAND MR1074-3

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan

ExternalSecurity

Status/ Prestige

TechnicalCapacity/

Resources

ArmsControl

Constraints

Economic/ PoliticalCosts

Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

Armenia

Kyrgyzstan

Key to risk factors: High Medium Low

Figure 3The Risks of Prolife ration

At least for the foreseeable future, countries in Central Asia and thesouth Caucasus p robably will not seek a WMD capability, because of the follow ing considerations:

For most of these countries, security and d efense against externalthreats are not a high priority. The current regimes see more


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immediate threats to security arising from internal stability, forwh ich WMD are irrelevant and possibly counterprod uctive. Fromthe perspective of the ruling elites, WMD development wouldhave a detrimental effect on economic development, which theysee as key to their survival and to long-term political and socialstability.

Some of the neo-communist governments, notwithstanding theirrhetoric, see Russia as the u ltimate gu arantor of security and thestatus quo, rather than a military or security threat. Developm entof WMD would put at risk the military cooperation, bilateralalliances, and collective defense arrangements that help maintainexternal security.

Given their modest plans for force development, the militaries of the various countries are un likely to pose a conventional militarythreat to any of their neighbors.

Because of the Russian presence in Central Asian mili tary andsecurity establishments, it is unlikely that any country couldcovertly acquire or dev elop a WMD cap ability. The Russianswou ld, therefore, be in a p osition to raise the costs of such a p ro-gram, w hich wou ld be a serious risk given the continu ed m ilitaryand economic dependence of these countries on Russia.

None of these countr ies has powerful nuclear es tablishmentswhose parochial interests would be served by developing WMD.

With the exception of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, none of thestates in the Casp ian region has asp irations for regional lead ershipor dom ination that m ight be advanced by WMD possession.

These countries do not possess any stocks of weapons grade orfissionable material and, because most were not part of the oldSoviet nuclear weapons infrastructure, do not have a cadre of scientific, eng ineerin g, and techn ological exper tise. Furt her , allnu clear weap ons of the former Soviet Union have been rem ovedfrom these countries.

In general, none of the Caspian countries has the economic andtechnological mean s, at least in the near term , to develop WMD orthe interest in allocating scarce resources to this task, w hich wou ld

retard economic developm ent.


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Finally, all the countries of Central Asia and the south Caucasusare memb ers of the NPT. H ence, any civilian nuclear reactorsthey might build w ould be subject to International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) safeguards. In add ition, these countries arememb ers of the Chemical Weapon s Convention (CWC) and Bio-logical Weapons Convention (BWC), which erect additional obli-gations to forgo CBW develop men t.

Tajikistan

As the poorest and least successful of the Central Asian states, Tajik-istan lacks the resources for a WMD p rogram. Moreover, the current

regime in Tajikistan is heavily dependent on Moscow (and others) forits survival and totally absorbed with managing its ethnic, tribal, re-gional, resource, and econom ic problems. Althou gh Tajik officials fearUzbek chauvinism and irredentism, they are likely to view thepresence of WMD on th eir territory as a liability rather than an asset,in light of the p otential for ethnic conflict and renew ed civil strife.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan does not feel threatened by any external actors; instead,Bishkeks main security concerns are control of the countrys porousbord ers and sp illover of instability from Tajikistan. Accommo da tionwith Russia is a central tenet of Kyrgyz security policy, and such a se-curity orientation would be jeopardized by pursuit of a WMD capa-bility. Moreov er, Kyrgy zstan , like Tajikistan, lacks the resour ces todevelop WMD and wou ld be extremely vulnerable to outside pres-sure, isolation, and san ctions w ere it to pu rsue su ch an effort.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan does not see any external threat to its security. Indeed,President N iyazov has said th at he could not foresee a threat to Turk-menistan for at least the next ten years. 6 While the government iscontinuing to ev olve a distinct security doctrine, two central tenets are

______________6See Bess A. Brown, Security Concerns of the Central Asian States, in Jed C. Snyder(ed.) (1995), p. 80.


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already evident: first, Turkm enistan can best ensur e its security andnational self-iden tify throu gh economic developm ent; and , second , thecountry should avoid entanglements in alliances and collectivesecurity arrangements that could embroil it in the regions manyconflicts.

Kazakhstan

In view of its decision to relinquish nuclear weapons and to join theNPT as a n onnu clear w eapons state, it is difficult to en vision circum-stances under which Kazakhstan would decide to pursue a WMD ca-pability. To be sure, many Kazakhs remain fearful and suspicious of

Russia, and worr y that Kazakhstans security could be threatened bythe revival of a neo-imperial or expansionist Russia. At the same time,however, Kazakhstan is more vulnerable to Russian pressure andmore d epend ent on Russias economic system than any other coun tryin the region. Moreover, even thou gh Kazakhstan developed acapable nuclear infrastructure during the Soviet days, many of itsmembers were ethnic Russians who would be unlikely to cooperatewith the Kazakh governmen t in an effort to acquire WMD. Further,most Kazakhs have a strong allergy to nuclear weapon s because of the ecological disaster caused by Soviet nuclear testing and weap onsdevelop men t in Kazakhstan . Thus, any decision by Kazakhstan toacquire nuclear or other unconventional weapons would be highlyunp opular an d potentially destabilizing.

Uzbekistan

Of all the countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan probably representsthe most plausible proliferation risk, but the odds that Tashkentwou ld seek a WMD capability are n evertheless low, especially in theabsence of any p erception of a Russian or Chinese military threat. Tobe sure, Uzbekistan aspires to regional domination, is preoccupiedwith national status, and has the potential economic and technicalresources to supp ort a WMD program. Moreover, Uzbekistan hasoutstanding territorial and ethnic conflicts with Tajikistan and Kyr-gyzstan, and fears the p ossible fragmentation of Afghanistan and theformation of a grea ter Tajikistan. Faced with these threats to theirterritorial integrity and national unity, future U zbek leaders might seeWMD as the ultimate guarantor of security or as an instrument of


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coercion and intimidation in resolving its many disputes or pressingits irredentist claims. On the other hand , Uzbekistan wou ld faceformida ble challenges to acqu iring WMD: It has no know n quan titiesof fissile material and no plans to build the necessary facilities toproduce such material; like other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan is amember of the NPT, and thus any facilities it might build would besubject to IAEA an d possibly su pp lemental bilateral safeguard s; andUzbek leaders have mad e it clear that they will continue to d epend onRussia to g uaran tee Uzbek security and stabilitya relationship thatcould be imperiled if the Uzbeks sought a tru ly ind epend ent defenseidentity based on possession of WMD.

Azerbaijan

The Azeris wou ld app ear to have neither the motives nor the means toacquire a WMD capability. Baku s priority is to develop relations withthe West, and Azeri officials un derstand that such ties would be pu t in

jeopard y by a WMD program . Although the Azeris have seriousdifferences with Arm enia and Iran an d rem ain worried abou t Russia,they are un likely to see WMD as an advan tage in thwarting p otentialthrea ts from th ese coun tries. Instead , Baku is allocating its resou rcesto imp roving Azerbaijans conventional, border control, and internalsecurity forces to contain threats from Armenia and Iran, and isrelying on its growing contacts with the West to counterbalanceRussian pow er. Although p rofits from oil and gas exports could

provide the resources to develop or acquire WMD, Azerbaijan h as noWMD infrastructure, and its resources are likely to be used to add ressthe countrys more pressing economic and social problems and toimprove its conventional defenses.

The Risk of Leakage

There appears to be little risk that the south Caucasus region couldcontribute to the leakage of WMD-related technology and materiel.The Soviet-era WMD infrastructure has d isappeared , and the UnitedStates and local governmen ts are cooperating in strengthening exportcontrol systems, bord er controls, and th e security of sensitive WMD-related items.


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There is virtually n o Soviet-era infrastructure remaining in the southCaucasu s. Basic research in ad van ced science in Georgia and Arm eniawas not directly part of weap ons development. Armenia continues toplan for nuclear power production; however, the reactors are notconfigured for the prod uction of weap ons-grade material. Armeniasexisting nuclear reactors, because of their poor maintenance andlocation in an earthquake zone, pose a safety rather than proliferationpr oblem. Likewise, Azerb aijan poses no proliferation threa titsWMD infrastructure is virtually nonexistent and the Azeris havemade strides in establishing more effective export and border controlsas part of its broader strategy to improve relations w ith the West andattract foreign investment for oil-related and infrastructure projects.Although some chemical weapons (CW) depots for riot control agentsprobably remain on Azeri territory, these stocks are not usablebecause of safety problems. Finally, the d anger that th ese coun triescould become transshipment points for the illicit transfer of nuclearmaterial has receded somewhat, largely because of U.S. export controland bord er security assistance. Given the priority the U.S.government attaches to controlling WMD material in the formerSoviet Union, strong congressional sup port for this progr am, and thebenefits host coun tries accrue from U .S. assistance, the United States islikely to rema in engaged in this area for some time.

The risk of WMD leakage from Central Asia is somewhat more com-plicated. Much of the area, particularly Kazakhstan an d, to a lesserdegree, Uzbekistan, played a sup porting role in the old Soviet WMDinfrastructure; nevertheless, the risks of proliferation are minimal andlikely to diminish further in the face of aggressive U.S. governmentefforts to police sensitive facilities and assist local governments insafeguarding nuclear m aterial.

Much of the regions Soviet nuclear weapons production infrastruc-ture, which was concentrated in Kazakhstan at Semipalatinsk, hasdecayed. Both the technical expertise that ran the facilities and thehighly enriched uran ium (HEU) associated w ith the operation of testreactors have been repatriated to Russia. In add ition, the UnitedStates, with the cooperation of the government of Kazakhstan, re-moved a large quan tity of HEU. Kazakhstan continues to operate anexperimental breeder reactor at Aktau, a facility that could be config-ured to prod uce plutonium suitable for weapons fabrication. Al-though this is a source of concern, especially because of proximity to


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the Iranian littoral, the proliferation danger at Aktau has been reducedfor several reasons:

The plutonium s tockpi le i s being re located to Semipalat insk,wh ere it will be more secure u nd er IAEA safeguards w ith the in-stallation of improved arrangements for protecting, controlling,and accounting for the material.

U.S. personnel at Aktau have improved monitoring and surveil-lance of the facility.

With U.S. assistance, Kazakhstan has made considerable progressin upgrading border controls, especially along the Caspian Seaapproach.

The Soviets maintained a portion of their CBW program in the region,but little of it remains. According to press rep orts, the Soviet Unionconstructed a plant in Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan for BW p rodu ction;however, according to Jonathan Tucker, director of the Chemical andBiological Weapons Project at the Center for Non-ProliferationStudies, the facility did not actually engage in large-scale productionand it is unclear wh ether BW were stockpiled at the site. 7 This portionof the facility is now defunct, and most of the equipment has beenreturned to Russia, destroyed, or rendered inoperable. The Kazakhs,with U.S. assistance, are converting the remaining facility to civilianuse.

Uzbekistan w as also part of the Soviet BW progra m, but m uch of theassociated infrastructure has atrophied. The Uzbeks and Kazakhs

jointly control an island in the Aral Sea that was used as a BW testingfacility; however, ther e were n o know n stockpiles of BW agents on theisland . According to press reports, the United States is prov idingassistance to Uzbekistan for the destruction of a former Soviet CBWpro du ction facility.

With respect to the other Central Asian states, Tajikistan and Kyr-gyzstan mine substantial quantities of uranium ore, but have no ca-pab ility for enrichment. N either coun try operates nuclear reactors norhas any weap ons expertise. Similarly, Turkm enistan has no WMD-

______________7Russia Cha llenged to Disclose Status of BW, The Washington Post , February 26, 1998.


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related infrastructure, material, or expertise. Bord er secur ity in allthree countries remains porous, but the lack of controls has mostbenefitted trafficking in drugs and conventional arms.

At the substate level, there are several real concerns about theacquisition and threatened u se of weapons of mass d estruction to fur-ther terrorist aims in the region. The jud gmen t of experts consideringsubstate groups with limited financial means is that the risk indescending order is chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons de-velopment and use. 8 Chemical and biological weapons are relativelyeasy for small substate groups to construct using dual-purposeequipment and materials, whereas acquiring fissile material, as pre-viously noted , is significantly more difficult. H ow ever, the pr obabil-ity of terrorist use of WMD is limited in the face of regional and fi-nan cial o bstacles:

Subnational groups face the same limitations as do states in ob-taining weap ons material. No indigenou s stocks of nu clear,chemical, or biological weapons material exist in the region.Furthermore, the presence of Russian as well as internationalmonitoring organizations greatly complicates the prospects forillicit acquisition .

Terrorist groups need sponsors or significant sources of wealth todevelop and prod uce WMD. As discussed earlier, the most logi-cal sponsors of such groups, such as Iran or other Persian Gulf

states, have little interest in d estabilizing the region, even in thename of an Islamic revolution. That said, there is one group w ithpotential resources that may have an interest in destabilization:Russian organized crime group s. This possibility should bemonitored.

In sum, at least for the next five to ten years, the states and likely sub-state terrorist groups of the south Caucasus and Central Asia gener-ally lack both the motivation and the means to become a significantWMD proliferation threat. Should una nticipated th reats to nationalsecurity emerge, governments are likely to rely on more traditional

______________8

James E. Goodby, Loose Nukes: Security Issues on the U.S.-Russian Agen da, anArthur and Frank Payne Lecture, Institute for International Studies, StanfordUniversity, April 10, 1997.


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means of defense and deterrence, such as conventional militarypreparations, alliance formation, and the search for an external pro-tector. Moreover, even if these states acquired WMD, it is un likelythat, with th e exception of an Arm enian WMD thr eat to Turkey, suchweapons would pose a threat to NATOs security or the security of moderate, pro-Western countries in the region, as long as theseregimes rema in out of the ha nd s of militant, anti-Western Islamists.

THE SPREAD OF POLITICAL ISLAM

In the immediate aftermath of independence, there was a pervasivefear in the region of the spread of Islamic fun da men talism. To a large

extent, this anxiety reflected a m istaken perception that the civil warin Tajikistan w as the result of an Islamist opposition movem ent thatwas incited and supported by Iranian religious propaganda andextensive Iranian military and finan cial assistance. Since thenegotiation of a cease-fire in Tajikistan and the consolidation of afragile governing coalition, fears of rampant Islamic fundamentalismhave abated. Furthermore, as noted earlier, Irans decision to pursu eits interests in a pr agmatic mann er have lessened an xieties about th egrow th of Islamic rad icalism.

Eight years after the Caspian and Central Asian states gained theirindependence, Islam has not yet emerged as the dominant politicalforce in the region, even though religious activism is on the rise.

However, as Graham Fuller has observed, over the long term, localconditions could make Central Asia ripe for the growth of anti-Western Islamic radicalism. First, in a time of rap id change an d tran si-tion, Islam resonates with those elements of society in search of na-tional identity. Second, fun da men talist Islam has appeal as areformist force, seeking to ad vance the cause of democratization, hu -man rights, and social justice. Thus, many of the oppr essed anddowntrodden people of Central Asia, suffering under the repressiverule of auth oritarian regimes, see Islamist mov ements as progressivein character. Third, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, the CentralAsian countries are governed by ex-communist elites who can nolonger rely on communist ideology or Soviet-era political structuresfor political control. Fourth , even thou gh man y Central Asian lead ers

have jum ped on the nationalist bandwagon to garner pop ular supp ort,the p opu larity and legitimacy that ru ling elites enjoyed at the time of


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independence are declining, in large measure because governmentshave been unable to meet the basic needs and expectations of thepop ulace. Fifth, Islam flourishes und er conditions that are pr evalentthrou ghou t the region: political repr ession, economic dep rivation anddeclining living standards, suppression of Islamic political activity,and the lack of legitimate an d organized political institutions for theexpression of popular grievances. 9

It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a renewal of interestin Islam throughout the region, as manifested in the creation of thousands of new mosques, the opening of new schools for Islamiceducation and training, the emergence of a more independent andactivist generation of Islamist leaders (especially in Tajikistan andparts of Uzbekistan), the growing observance of traditional Islamicreligious and cultural practices, and the growing popularity of theIslamic Renaissance Party. Moreover, Islamic aw areness and influ-ence are likely to grow as Soviet-era restrictions on Islamic religiousand p olitical activities are disman tled. N oneth eless, it is imp ortan t tonote that Islam in Central Asia, as elsewhere, is not monolithic butinstead has separate strands, which should not be confused withfund am entalism. In add ition, other cleavages in these societies willplay a role in shaping n ational identities and social mobilization. 10

Thus, few w ould d isagree with th e observation of one expert that:

No d oubt, given that Islam is a vital part of their cultural makeup

and the fact that for 70 years they were d eprived of expressing theirIslamic sentiments, Islam is bound to play a more prominent role inthe social and political life of the ex-Soviet Muslim states as theybegin to assert their cultural identity. 11

In terms of Western security interests, however, what matters is notwhether Islamic influence and awareness grow in Central Asia, butrather the brand of Islam that might em erge. A benign po ssibility is amore moderate, secular, nontheocratic version based on the Turkish

______________9See Graha m E. Fuller (April 1994).10See Rajan Menon, After Empire: Russia and the Southern N ear Abroad, in Michael

Mand elbaum (ed.) (1998), p. 153.11 Shireen T. Hu nter, The Muslim Repub lics of the Former Soviet Union: PolicyChallenges for the United States, The Washington Quarterly , Summer 1992, p. 57.


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mod el. If this were to happ en, the West w ould h ave little to fear fromthe revival of Islam in Central Asia. The more men acing p rospect isthat the region could be swept by a radical, revolutionary Islamicmovement under Irans influence and implacably hostile to Westerninterests in the greater Midd le East and b eyond . How likely is thisthreat and, if it is a serious risk, what options would NATO have tocontain the expan sion of Islamic radicalism and Iranian influence?

Although the influence of Islam and Islamic opposition groups islikely to grow, several factors militate against the emergence of mili-tant, anti-Western Islamic governments and the formation of anIranian-led p an-Islamic bloc: 12

Virtually all of Central Asias Muslims (the main exception isAzerbaijan) are not Shia but Sunni, and from the conserva-tive H anafi sect. The pred omina nt Sun ni chara cter of the Muslimrepu blics makes them less receptive to Iranian influen ce. Ad di-tionally, Islam never sank deep roots throughout the less-urban-ized parts of the region. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyr-gyzstan, in particular, the dominant nomadic culture was fallowground for the grow th of Islam.

The countries of Central Asia do not harbor the anti-Western, anti-colonial sentiments that ar e the signatu re of the m ilitant, radicalIslamic movem ent, for several reasons. First, the growth of rad icalIslam in Iran and throughout the Arab world resulted from the

failure of previous secular and Western-oriented governm ents tomeet the p olitical, economic, and social needs of their peop le. Thepopular d isenchantment wi th these governments and thepervasive Western presence in the Arab world sparked thedevelopm ent of a militant, anti-Western Islamic orthodoxy th ere.These cond itions d o not exist in Central Asia: no country in th eregion has experimented with Western-style government orendured colonial or other forms of repressive Western rule.Second, much of radical Islams anti-Western sentiment stemsfrom the perception that the United Statesand the West, ingeneralare biased towa rd Israel and h ostile tow ard Mu slims. Incontrast, the Muslim republics of Central Asia are essentially

______________12This discussion draws heavily on Shireen Hunter (1992).


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indifferent to the Arab-Israeli conflictindeed some have forgedclose ties with Israeland thus Western support for Israel doesnot engend er Central Asian resentment of the West.

Most of the Islamic groups in Central Asia have yet to developclose ties with th e Iranian clerical establishment and have not re-ceived significant financial or religious su pp ort from Tehran. As aresult, Irans ruling Islamic clergy exerts little influence over theirco-religionists in Centr al Asia. Moreov er, the lead ers of Islamicgroups in Central Asia have shown almost no interest inemulating the Iranian mod el.

Weighing the factors that might encou rage the grow th of radical Islam

and the constraints on its development, it seems reasonable toconclude that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism has been exag-gerated . As one scholar pu ts it:

Thus, even if [the governments of the Muslim republics] were toadop t a social and p olitical system based on Islam, it is unlikely thatthe newly independ ent Muslim states would display the sort of anti-Western sentiments observed among groups in the Middle East.Moreover, there is a significant difference between, on th e one ha nd,desiring a more p rominent p lace for Islam and Islamic culture in thesociety . . . and, on the oth er, desiring to establish a governm ent andpolity based on a m ilitant and extremist interpretation of Islam. 13

To say that it is unlikely that militant Islam will spread through theregion is not to say it cannot happ en. Governmen t policies andpracticesparticularly how governments manage the wealth pro-du ced by a boom ing energy sectorwill be key factors in determ iningthe grow th of Islamic fund amen talism. In general, if the leaders of theCaspian countries satisfy the rising political, economic, and socialexpectations of their populations, respect the rights of minorities andthe rule of law, and move tow ard pluralistic and d emocratic forms of govern men t, it will be difficult for extremist id eologies to take r oot.

There is no gu arantee, however, that the leaders of the states in Cen-tral Asia and the south Caucasus will embrace democratic values orthat energy-driven pr ofits will pr omote dom estic stability. On the

______________13Hu nter (1992).


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contrary, there are signs that the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,and Turkmenistan seek to suppress political movements that couldexpress p olitical, cultural, and economic grievances in a legitimate andpeaceful man ner. The real question, therefore, is wh etherthe states will pro vide good an d effective governan ce. If the neo-communist leaders of Central Asia fail this test, the Islamistmessagea call for democracy, human rights, social justice, bettersocial services, Islamic values, and an end to corruption andpr ivilegewill find fertile grou nd . And Islamic mov emen ts, w heth erindigenous or imp orted, are the prime candidates for opposition to thestate, especially when the state suppresses other political parties aswell. The greater the state repression, the more rad ical and violentIslamic mov emen ts gener ally are likely to become. Militantcrackdowns against any expression of Islam the state cannot controlcould lead to the creation of extremely violent, radicalized Islamicmovem ents akin to those in Algeria and Egyp t. In short, badgovernance creates radical Islam, whether or not Iran is involved.And wh en w rapp ed in the m antle of nationalism, these radical Islamicmovements could p rovide a rallying p oint for all disaffected elementsof society.

Moreover, as a growing number of scholars and economists warn,experience has shown that resource wealth tends to have a negativeeffect on economic growth and , in the case of the Casp ian states, couldimpede market reforms and exacerbate corruption that has reachednear-epidem ic prop ortions. The combination of grow ing economicinequality, runaway corruption, and exploding popular expectationsof general prosperity is a potential recipe for violence andextremism. 14

But even if events go sour and militant Islamic fundamentalismemerges as a serious political movement, it is unlikely that NATOwould have a military role to play in containing or rolling back thegrowth of radical Islam, or even mu ch leverage in trying to shap e de-velopments in a favorable mann er through dialogue and consultation:

Barring the emergence of fundamentalist rogue states that pose aWMD or conventional military threat to NATO members or key

______________14Ruse ckas (1998), pp. 1617.


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pro-Western governm ents in the Persian Gulf region, the odd s areextremely low that NATO would want to undertake operationsaimed at containing th e spread of Islam in Central Asia.

Other countries whose security would be directly threatened byradical Islam and wh o hav e greater capabilities to bring decisiveinfluence to bear (most especially Russia) will defend theirspecial rights to deal with this challenge and are unlikely tosupp ort a prominent role for NATO.

The fortunes of radical Islam will be determined primarily by theinternal dynamics of the Central Asian countries themselves;NATOs influence over this p rocess is sharply limited and wou ldalmost certainly not be d ecisive.

In sum, military force is an inappropriate tool for containing thespread of rad ical Islam. The most effective way to deal with thispotential danger, as many commentators have noted , is Western assis-tance for implementing p rograms th at sup port free-market economicdevelopment, the rule of law and basic human rights, and thepro motion of dem ocratic and civic societies. 15

______________15 See, for example, Ariel Cohen, The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia (1996).

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