Transnational Feminism and the Womens Ri · 2019-03-13 · Kamran Rastegar 145 Conclusion: The...
Transcript of Transnational Feminism and the Womens Ri · 2019-03-13 · Kamran Rastegar 145 Conclusion: The...
GLOBALIZING AFGHANISTAN Terrorism1 War1 and the Rhetoric ofNation Building
EDITED BY ZUBEDA JALALZAI & DAVID JEFFERE
Duke University Press Durham & Lo11do11 2011
© 2011 Duke University Press All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper x
Designed by Jennifer Hill Typeset in Arno Pro and Chestnut
by Keystone Typesetting, Inc_
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear on the last printed page
of this book.
For my parents Abdur Raheem e'7 Am ina Jalalzai
-ZJ
AnJ.erican Encounters/Global :Interactions
A series edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Emily S. Rosenberg
This series aims to stimulate critical perspectives and fresh interpretive frameworks for scholarship on the history of the imposing global presence of the United States. Its primary concerns include the deployment and contestation of power, the construction and deconstruction of cultural and politi-cal borders, the fluid meanings of intercultural encounters, and the complex interplay between the global and the local. American Encounters seeks to strengthen dialogue and col-laboration between historians of U.S. international relations and area studies specialists.
The series encourages scholarship based on multiarchival historical research. At the same time, it supports a recogni-tion of the representational character of all stories about the past and promotes critical inquiry into issues of subjectivity and narrative. In the process, American Encounters strives to understand the context in which meanings related to nations, cultures, and political economy are continually produced, challenged, and reshaped.
Contents
Ackno'W'ledgn1ents
ix
Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan
Zubeda Jalalzai & David Jefferess
It's the OpiUDJ., Stupid
Afghanistan, Globalization, and Drugs Nigel C. Gibson
31
Afghanistan in a Globalized World
A Longer View Rodney J. Steward
51
The "Afghan Beat"
Pukhtoon Journalism and the Afghan War Altaf Ullah Khan
79
\'iii Contents
Veiled Motives
Women's Liberation and the War in Afghanistan Gwen Bergner
95
Transnational Fe:r:nin.iszn and the Woznen's Rights
Agenda in A£ghanistan
Maliha Chishti & Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims 117
Global Fraznes on A£ghanistan
The Iranian Mediation of Afghanistan in International Art House Cinema after September 111 2001
Kamran Rastegar 145
Conclusion: The Current Azna.zeznent
Afghanistan, Terror, and Theory Imre Szeman
165
Bibliography
187
Contributors
201
Index
205
Ackn.o"W"ledg:zn.en.ts
We first conceptualized Globalizing Afghanistan in 2002 as the theme for Rhode Island College's October Series, an annual art, film, and lecture se-ries of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. We would like to thank all of those who helped to bring issues of globalization and Afghanistan to the fore at that critical historical moment. For this opportunity I thank Rhode Island College and in particular the Rhode Island College Foundation, the School of Arts and Sciences, the College Lectures Committee, the Committee on General Education, the Bannister Gallery, the Artists' Co-op, the Depart-ments of Arlthropology, Art, English, History, Political Science, and Sociol-ogy, and the Film Studies Program for financial as well as creative support. I thank my colleagues Paola Ferrario, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lob-ban, Spencer Hall, Claus Hofhansel, Donna Kelly, Laura Khoury, Marlene Lopes, Eung-Jun Min, Dan Moos, Dennis O'Malley, Katherine Rudolph-Larrea, Robert Shein, Arnritjit Singh, Claudia Springer, Bryan Steinberg, and Dave Thomas for helping to bring the series into being. For her administrative support I am greatly indebted to Bernadette Doyle. Most of all I would like to thank the dean of arts and sciences at that time, Richard Weiner, for not only supporting this October Series but for establishing the series in the first place. His tenure as dean did much to encourage faculty
ll6 Cwe11 Hcrgncr
of modernity suggests that \'\'estern humanist values have achieved a state of full realized women's rights; it glosses over the neoconservative erosions ofAm · y . encan women s reproductive rights in the past couple of decades for example d h ' 'an t e lack of commitment .in the U.S. to international women's rights, exemplified by the fact that the U.S. 1s one of only two countries not to ratify th ,., . . . e nomens ConventiOn (the other is Afghanistan; "Unveiling Imperialism," 774 _ 78).
2-;- Whitlock, "The Skin of the Burqa," 55· 2X Ibid., s8, 7o. 29 Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, "U.S. Supporters Wel-
come RAWA at V-Day in New York City and Washington, DC:' )0 Steve "Sharbat Gula, the 'Afghan Girl,' Holds the Image of Herself,"
Natrona/ Geographic News, online. '' Braun, "How They Found National Geographic's 'Afghan Girl.'" 32 Fan on, A Dying Colonialism, 35-36.
33 Nelson, "The AI-Mehdi Army Protests the Occupation in Iraq," New York Times, 4 April. 2004, sec. A, published with the caption ''A Show of Strength in Baghdad: Iraq1 women who belong to a Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army, marched yesterday m a Baghdad neighborhood to protest the U.S. occupation oflraq. The march also drew thousands of other protesters:·
.l4 Human Rights Watch, ''Afghanistan." 35 Human Rights Watch, "Women and Elections in Afghanistan."
Transnational Fe:aninis:an and the Wo:anen's Rights Agenda
in Afghanistan
Maliha Chishti e'7 Cheshmak Farlwumand-Sims
Globalization has invariably contributed to reconfiguring the international political landscape by enabling international nonstate actors to exert greater influence and decision-making capacities within the domestic af-fairs of states. New methods and systems of governance have emerged to transcend borders, linking states and nonstate actors in complex and inter-dependent relationships, from the supranational to the local level. 1 In Afghanistan new patterns of authority and power are taking form, mani-fested by the unprecedented growth and entrenchment of international actors (donor governments, multinationals, the UN, the World Bank, and international NG os) operating in the country to pick up where the state has ostensibly left off. These international networks are constructed as the long-awaited "corrective" to decades of conflict in Afghanistan and the former belligerent state practices of the Taliban government. Neoliberal marketization alongside immediate political democratization are the domi-nant blueprints for postconflict recovery in Afghanistan, entailing an exter-nally directed reordering and restructuring of the Afghan state. Integrally part of this new international apparatus is the transnational feminist move-ment advocating for gender reform as a sociopolitical corrective to the history of exclusion and oppression endured by Afghan women. Although
118 Chislzti and Lu·lw
zmw
nd-\i111s
er-w
omen's organizations based in Europe and N
orth Am
erica have p sistently increased international attention to the plight of A
fghan wom
en since the 1
99
0S
1 advancing the rights of Afghan w
omen is by no account the
original and exclusive domain of transnational fem
inist networks. In con-
trast1 the vast and impressive A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent is only recently receiving m
ore scholarly attention. Although the A
fghan wom
en's move-
ment in the post-Tali ban era is still in its infancy1 the A
fghanistan context reveals a diverse and extensive netw
ork of Afghan w
omen's resistanc e/
organizing/ public participation1 and political activism. 2
Since the fall of the Taliban many have sought to structurally im
prove the situation of w
omen and girls across m
any parts of Afghanistan. Al-
though not exhaustive and most certainly fraught w
ith tension1 many in-
roads have nevertheless been made; there are new
institutional instru-m
ents to facilitate and support wom
en's rights1 such as the Ministry of
Wom
en's Affairs1 the G
ender Advisory G
roup1 and the Office of the State
Minister for W
omen; 3 increased attendance of girls in schools; im
prove-m
ents in formal-sector fem
ale employm
ent; and a burgeoning of nonprofit w
omen-centered organizations. M
ost significant perhaps are legal and gov-ernance reform
s pertaining to wom
en's rights as well as constitutional
provisions to promote and protect their active political participation.; For
example/ in the parliam
entary elections of 20051 sixty-eight wom
en won
parliamentary seats; 25 percent of the seats w
ere reserved for them under
the new constitution. A
fghan wom
en represent roughly 27 percent of the N
ational Assem
bly and hold 16 percent of the seats in the Upper H
ouse.' These rather im
pressive developments require the caveat acutely observed
by Valentine A
zarbaijani-Moghaddam
1 reminding us of the history of both
intermittent gains and losses of A
fghan wom
en's rights since the late nine-teenth century under m
any different regimes. She w
arns that current cele-brated successes should not occlude sustained strategies to ensure far-reaching transform
ations in gender relations that will inevitably require
more tim
e/ comm
itment1 and resources. 6 Indeed the ongoing challenge
remains translating the w
ell-intentioned framew
ork for gender equality into m
eaningful practice that is actualized each day by the lived experience of both urban and rural A
fghan wom
en. How
ever1 by all estimations the
constraints and limitations for A
fghan wom
en remain trem
endous (as seen after the elections in 2009)1 and A
fghan wom
en activists and parliamen-
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
119
tarians have publicly questioned the intentions and strategies of the Af-han governm
ent and foreign powers operating in the country1 particularly
failed agenda to improve the lives and livelihoods of w
omen.
The challenge for national and transnational feminist netw
orks is to connect to the very m
aterial1 complex1 and m
ultifaceted lives of wom
en in Af. hanistan1 w
hile at the same tim
e ensuring that national and foreign g
d '
. h interests hold true to their com
mitm
ents on a vancing wom
en s ng ts. This essay exam
ines the intersections between the transnational fem
inist a paratus and the A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent in terms of political/ socio-
P c
d 1..
. cultural1 religious1 and ideological contexts that im
orm gen er po 1tiCs m
A
fghanistan. We define transnational fem
inism as the spectrum
of actors/ instrum
ents1 policies1 and programs that bring gender issues into the fore-
front of politics and society in Afghanistan that have either been form
u-lated or supported by those located in the W
est1 often within a W
estern liberal fem
inist discourse. We distinguish transnational fem
inism from
the A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent. Many A
fghan wom
en and Afghan w
omen's
organizations are1 however, part of the transnational fem
inist apparatus, w
hich consists of the gender policies and programs alongside individual
consultants, advisors, international wom
en's rights NG
Os, international
agencies such as the United N
ations Developm
ent Fund for Wom
en ( UN
I-FE
M), and international instrum
ents such as the Convention on the Elim
i-nation of A
ll Forms of D
iscrimination against W
omen (cEDAW
), UN Security C
ouncil Resolution 1325 (scR
1325), and the Beijing Platform
for A
ction that have arrived more or less in A
fghanistan after the fall of the
Taliban government.
Examining the relations that exist betw
een the transnational feminist
apparatus and Afghan w
omen's organizing is critical not only to assess the
front lines of collaborative and supportive work practiced am
ong wom
en, but to help identify and overcom
e gaps in understanding and to promote
wom
en's rights in the country. This analysis is imperative given current
discussions within the fem
inist comm
unity over what is increasingly con-
sidered a systemic failure of gender m
ainstreaming in international policy
initiatives to secure wom
en's full participation in conflict and postconflict states. A
lthough aid interventions in Afghanistan m
ay have shifted tradi-tional gender roles to som
e degree, they do not necessarily indicate re-negotiated gender relations. M
ore research is needed to examine how
aid
120 C
hishti and Farhoumm
rd-Sims
interventions have modified the specific roles of and relations behveen
men and w
omen.
Based on our ow
n research and work w
ith Afghan w
omen's organiza-
tions, we argue that the presence of the transnational fem
inist apparatus is m
ost certainly not separate or distinct from the larger international aid
nor is it disentangled from the active m
ilitary campaign w
aged m
the country as part of the global war on terror. Those w
orking in the field of gender equality m
ust reflect on the implications of the increased m
ilita-rization of the international aid apparatus, in addition to the latter's un-precedented decision-m
aking power w
ithin the politico-economic struc-
tures of the Afghan state and civil society. As C
handra Talpade Mohanty
emphasizes, "W
estern feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of
situating itself and examining its role in such a global econom
ic and politi-cal fram
ework. To do any less w
ould be to ignore the complex interconnec-
tions behveen First and Third W
orld ... and the profound effect of this on the lives of w
omen in all countries:' 7 In this sense, w
e argue that the gender agenda in A
fghanistan likewise does not escape the underpinnings typi-
cally associated with the interactions behveen the outsider "givers" and the
insider "receivers" of aid. Focusing on gender reform and the aid regim
e, w
e argue that the types of relationships forged most often operate from
un-equal and neo-im
perial power relations typically characterizing outsider-
insider dynamics. In A
fghanistan, however, w
e believe these relationships are prem
ised on a tension behveen promoting the universal applicability of
gender reform and the im
pulse to resist all forms ofW
estern imperialism
that seek to transform
Afghan cultural, political, traditional, and religious
paradigms. T
he politics of gender in Afghanistan once again thrusts Af-
ghan wom
en into the larger ideological, political, sociocultural, and re-battlefields unfolding in the post-Septem
ber 11 environment, pit-
tmg the highly sim
plified binary of an "us" against "them," against the
backdrop of a highly visible international presence in the country. C
ertainly these tensions need not exist in all interactions behveen the A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent and the transnational feminist apparatus, nor
are they the only barrier to improving gender relations in the country. W
e do insist, how
ever, that the tensions behveen insider and outsider, Afghan
and and indigenous and neo-im
perial directly or indirectly contnbute to gender politics in A
fghanistan. We trace these tensions first
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
121
from the transnational fem
inist campaign to rescue and reform
Afghan
wom
en leading up to the fall of the Taliban, to international aid in rebuild-ing A
fghan society and efforts to promote gender equality w
ithin an Af-ghan context. G
reater understanding of the broader relationships forged in the pre-
and post-Tali ban periods is a necessary starting point to address the potential im
pact, efficacy, and nature of the wom
en's rights agenda. A
new com
municative and political practice m
ust be forged among w
omen
across their diversities that works in principled solidarity and critically
moves aw
ay from the traps of neo-im
perialism.
The Politics of R
epresentation: R
eforming and R
escuing Afghan W
omen
The transnational wom
en's movem
ent has made significant inroads in
prioritizing wom
en's rights internationally. Over the past three decades the
movem
ent has realized several impressive accom
plishments, w
hich include codifying w
omen's socioeconom
ic and political and civil rights in inter-national conventions ( C
ED
AW
), gender reform in policies and program
s at national and international levels (such as donor aid policies and the w
ork of the United N
ations and World B
ank), and advocating for wom
en's rights in international law
(scR 1325). A
lthough the transnational wom
en's m
ovement has heightened gender sensitivity am
ong many W
estern states and international institutions, very seldom
do international wom
en's orga-nizing and advocacy directly im
pact interstate relations by exerting direct pressure on pow
erful states to formulate foreign policies and regulate their
interactions with other states based on the violations of w
omen's hum
an rights. C
ertainly the rather persistent and high-profile advocacy campaign
against the Tali ban government w
aged by wom
en's rights activists since the m
id-1990s contributed to successfully persuading powerful governm
ents, such as the U
nited States, to officially not recognize the Taliban govern-m
ent and urged the UN
to practice greater gender inclusion in peacemak-
ing and humanitarian efforts in the country. T
he tragic events of 9 I 11 and the subsequent w
ar on terror rapidly recentered the plight of Afghan
wom
en, culminating in the rather sw
ift initial military defeat of the Taliban
government by the U
nited States in late 2001. Although the overthrow
of the Taliban governm
ent was certainly not instigated by the concerns and
122 C
hishti m1ci Farlzoumand-Sim
s
campaigns of W
estern feminist netw
orks, the task of liberating Afghan w
omen w
as nevertheless conveniently grafted onto the war agenda as
a positive outcome. This m
oral impetus to "rescue and reform
" Afghan
wom
en from w
hat was constructed as a "backw
ard and arcane" culture justified w
ar, inevitably sparking debate within fem
inist academic and
activist circles over what appeared as the tem
porary engagement of wom
-en's rights discourse w
ithin the nexus of militarization, racism
, and imperi-
alism that characterized the content as w
ell as the context of the new global
security framew
ork. The m
ilitary defeat of the Tali ban government by the
United States brought to the forefront the racialized and gendered dim
en-sions of the w
ar on terror and the need to raise critical questions about how
feminist rhetorical and political practices are taken up and im
plicated in broader geopolitical contexts. T
he Afghanistan context is im
portant in the study of global w
omen's rights advocacy in exam
ining not only the very high profile and rather sensationalist politics of representations of A
fghan w
omen leading up to the w
ar, but also how subsequent international pres-
sure to structurally "reform and rescue" A
fghan wom
en even in post-Taliban A
fghanistan is fraught with com
plexities, particularly in the con-text of globalization.
Since the 1990s the relentless and sensationalist images of burqa-clad
Afghan w
omen and accounts of their struggles have sym
bolized oppres-sion and served as dem
onstrable proof of the oppressive political rule of the Taliban. T
he pervasive images of the veiled, secluded, and oppressed
Afghan w
omen w
ere politically mediated by fem
inist groups (including the R
evolutionary Association of the W
omen of A
fghanistan and the Femi-
nist Majority) to bring international attention to the plight of A
fghan w
omen. (For a detailed analysis, please see G
wen B
ergner's essay in this book.) O
perating with the best of intentions, these w
omen's rights activists
dedicated tremendous resources to consistently revealing the brutal vio-
lations of basic rights endured by Afghan w
omen, w
hich arguably would
not otherwise have registered on the radar of international concern. H
ow-
ever, the campaigns invoked an archetypal im
age of the downtrodden,
oppressed, and veiled Afghan w
oman that very problem
atically muted the
historical, sociocultural, religious, and political complexities that shape the
lived realities of the majority of A
fghan wom
en. The fem
inist gaze thereby obstructed not only the m
ultiple forms of resistance and resilience that
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
123
informed the lives of m
any Afghan w
omen, but displaced a m
ore textured reading of their lives that w
ould not have positioned gender as disassoci-ated from
the multiple locations they inhabit-across ethnicity, class, geog-
raphy, and historical experience. .
Furthermore, in assessing the politics of fem
inist representations of Af han w
omen w
e need to make salient the historical and political legacy
racially minoritized w
omen and M
uslim w
omen in particular have
been represented in order to advance imperial relationships, particularly
between the W
est and the Islamic w
orld. Leila Ahm
ed's historical analyses of M
uslim w
omen across the M
iddle East, for example, show
how w
omen
were used as political paw
ns to warrant colonial intervention in the nam
e of civilizing and em
ancipating other cultures. 8 Colonial w
ritings of Muslim
w
omen as oppressed and victim
ized reinscribed European dominance over
the Orient by advancing colonial expansionist agendas that m
asqueraded as euphem
istic expressions to civilize and tame barbaric societies. In this
sense images of w
omen w
ere historically constructed as politicized sites of contestation, control, and conversion. A
s Jasmine Zine notes, the result of
the 9111 tragedy revived Orientalist im
ages of Muslim
societies, such that the liberation of M
uslim w
omen served to justify all form
s of military
action. She writes, "O
nce again, Muslim
wom
en's bodies are being posi-tioned upon the geopolitical stage not as actors in their ow
n right, but as foils for m
odernity, civilization, and freedom:' 9 T
he feminist cam
paign to liberate A
fghan wom
en colludes with O
rientalist tropes by constructing a singular, m
onolithic Afghan W
oman, w
hose agency and heterogeneity is appropriated and controlled to advance a neo-im
perialist agenda as part of the w
ar against terror. In the absence of a nuanced political analysis the U
.S. and other out-side agents positioned culture and religion as the key culprits fueling the oppressive nature of the Taliban regim
e. The representations of A
fghan w
omen w
ere thereby conveniently packaged in a dichotomized sim
plicity of equality versus inequality, freedom
versus oppression, and civilization versus barbarism
. 10 The events of 9 I 11 and the im
mediate w
ar-mongering
brewing in the U
nited States and in Europe widely appropriated these
existing images to legitim
ize a war that w
ould pit the civilized world against
the uncivilized. Images of the oppressed and dow
ntrodden Afghan w
omen
that were long part of the dossier of fem
inist advocacy against the Tali ban
124 C
lllshtland Far-hownand-Si111s
regime m
erged into the jingoism and patriotism
fueling the U.S. govern-
ment's efforts to gain support for the w
ar on grounds of promoting liberty,
freedom, and an end to evil and terror. A5 G
wen B
ergner examines in this
book, the Bush administration, and Laura B
ush in particular, promulgated
an Am
erican rescue of Afghan w
omen in such a w
ay as to infantilize them,
thereby masking the true m
otivations for the war. This m
erging of wom
en's rights discourse into the agenda of m
ilitarization, racialization, and imperi-
alism w
as self-evident and rightly resisted by a vast number of fem
inist academ
ics and organizations around the world.
11 VVhile many W
estern fem
inist groups debated the issues, the images of A
fghan wom
en neverthe-less w
ere reinscribed to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy that did
not question the racist and imperialist m
otivations of the war or elucidate
the historical and political complexities that inform
ed the conflict. Instead the fall of the Tali ban regim
e was situated in an "us" versus "them
" binary, placing A
fghan wom
en at the center of the mission to reform
Afghanistan
under the supervision and watchful eye of the W
est. This fram
ing of Afghan w
omen to legitim
ize the war requires m
ore scholarly attention, particularly in term
s of how this (m
is)information
influenced and determined the w
omen's rights agenda in the country and
the types of relationships fostered between the transnational fem
inist ap-paratus and A
fghan wom
en in the postwar period of reconstruction and
rebuilding. Inevitably the sensationalized stories of Afghan w
omen leading
up to the war precipitated particular kinds of interventions. T
he stereo-typical im
ages created misleading, sim
plistic, and superficial understand-ings of gender relations and A
fghan wom
en. In many w
ays the archetypal im
age succeeded in dislocating Afghan w
omen's agency and w
as hence re-inscribed into m
any of the post-Tali ban gender policies and programs. For
instance, gender programs assum
e that culturally and religiously conserva-tive w
omen are less likely to advance w
omen's rights com
pared to more
educated, nonreligious wom
en (or, for example, rural w
omen com
pared to urban w
omen, or w
omen w
ho wear the burqa com
pared to those who do
not). As Azarbaijani-M
oghaddam notes, international fem
inists were set
on working w
ith wom
en who shared their values, w
ho could converse and engage in w
ritten English comm
unication, and who w
ere less outwardly
religious. In doing so the transnational feminist apparatus initially focused
on a small group of A
fghan wom
en who m
irrored their own politics,
Transnational Fem
inism in A
fglunist,m
125
thereby comprom
ising Afghan w
omen's agency and access to the w
o_men's
rights agenda. Azarbaijani-M
oghaddam is convinced that gender
have been oversimplified by advisors w
ho lack a general understandmg of
the complexities of religion, culture, and history. She argues that w
eak analyses, oversights, and oversim
plifications can make interventions very
disruptive: "Badly conceived and facile analyses based on the assum
p-tion that A
fghan wom
en are vulnerable individuals living in a vacuum
may eventually isolate rather than reintegrate w
omen:' 12 Elaheh
Povey's study of Afghan w
omen provides a m
uch needed correct1ve to the history of w
omen's organizing. In her research she "w
rites back" by reposi-tioning A
fghan wom
en's agency and ownership of their struggle and by
highlighting the history of wom
en's secret organizations and netw
orks under the Taliban regime. H
er study counters the domm
ant sensationalist im
ages of Afghan w
omen and hence im
plores the trans-national fem
inist apparatus to build on existing capacities and work w
ith all A
fghan wom
en-conservative and moderate, urban and rural, literate
and illiterate.I3 Clearly an accurate reading and engagem
ent of the com-
plex lives of Afghan w
omen across their diverse locations w
ill ensure _social and political gender reform
that acknowledges their struggle and m
cul-cates m
ore nuanced approaches required to advance wom
en's rights across
Afghanistan. T
he Wom
en's Rights A
genda and International A
id Apparatus in A
fghanistan after 9 I 11
Afghan w
omen quickly becam
e the trophies of liberation, their images
paraded around the world as proof of a just and m
oral victor; over Tali ban regim
e. VVhile the media presented stories of w
omen s clothm
g stores and beauty salons reopening in K
abul, the swift m
ilitary defeat of the Taliban regim
e was accom
panied by the unprecedented arrival of inter-national agencies setting up shop, m
any for the first time, in a country now
w
itnessing an unprecedented influx of foreign expatriates and substantial donor funds. D
uring the Taliban period Afghanistan received on average
U.S.$
25
0 m
illion annually in aid, with only a couple of hundred inter-
national expatriates working in the country. In contrast, since the fall of the
Taliban aid money pledged in the billions at large donor conferences is
126 Chislzti and Farhow11r.md-Sims
transforming the country into an expatriate haven for seasoned postw
ar expert agencies, consultants, and organizations. It w
as anticipated that the "liberators" w
ould prioritize the needs of ordinary Afghans, yet after six
years of foreign intervention many A
fghans are frustrated and disenfran-chised due to the lack of sustained and visible im
pact, particularly in the rural areas. T
he hopefulness we observed in 2
00
3 has transform
ed into the im
pression that outsiders are politically ambivalent tow
ard the needs of local people. T
he Foundation's national survey in 2
00
6 revealed grow
-ing skepticism
and animosity am
ong Afghans tow
ard the international and the A
fghan government. T
he key issues raised in the survey m
clude concerns over security, the lack of reconstruction, the weak econ-
omy, and high levels of unem
ployment. 14 B
oth the illicit economy and the
informal econom
y continue to account for So to 90 percent of the total econom
y, and according to the World B
ank, among others, the deteriorat-
ing economic condition threatens governm
ent legitimacy and stability and
in many regions helps to increase the pow
er of the warlords.'s
Transnational feminist netw
orks are not isolated from the m
essy terrain of real and perceived failures of aid interventions in the country. Frustra-tions about the national interests of foreign pow
ers are looming, specifi-
cally against the outright political bargaining with w
arlords, which signifi-
cantly undermines any efforts to advance w
omen's rights. D
espite aid flow
ing into the country wom
en's formal rights are not translated into
lived experience, particularly since forced marriages, dom
estic violence, 16 threats and intim
idations, kidnappings, honor killings, and daily harass-m
ents are all major obstacles to the safety and security of w
omen across
the country. The lack of security has been identified as a significant prob-
lem for the m
ajority of Afghans, but w
omen and girls bear the brunt of it as
it impairs their active participation in the reconstruction and developm
ent process, clearly corroborated by the events after the second presidential elections.
In 2
00
6-7
the security situation deteriorated significantly, with an
increased number of explosions, suicide bom
bings, and armed attacks.
In Kandahar the assassination in Septem
ber 20
06
of Safiye Am
ajan, the head of the D
epartment for W
omen's A
ffairs, illustrated the dangers facing w
omen, especially those active in hum
an rights organizing. It has been repeatedly stressed that in public spaces all w
omen and girls are potential
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
127
targets of resurgent opposition forces, local warlords, and pow
erful crimi-
nal groups, who threaten, intim
idate, and enact physical and sexual vio-lence. In this fraught environm
ent gender programm
ing will have only a
superficial impact if the m
ajority of wom
en continue to be constrained and the underlying political changes are not m
ade. The foreign agenda in the
country, and the transnational feminist engagem
ent with it, m
ust take greater responsibility for w
hat Azarbaijani-M
oghaddam describes as a sit-
uation in which w
omen's rights are being "transacted" by foreign pow
ers to pursue their m
ultiple and contradictory agendas in the country.17 Efforts
to support Afghan w
omen becom
e trapped inside the complex w
eb of political and m
ilitary objectives, priorities, and criminalizing partnerships.
Transnational feminist advocacy needs to reveal the dangerous im
plica-tions of im
perial play in Afghanistan and the role of internationals that, on
the one hand, engage the rhetoric of gender equality and promote safety
and security for all wom
en, but on the other simultaneously underm
ine state legitim
acy and the rule of law through their continued direct and
indirect support of warlordism
. In this sense the end of the first Tali ban regim
e ushered in a new and different era of challenges for w
omen. T
he situation, as D
enize Kandiyoti acutely observes, is one in w
hich "wom
en continue to be w
ards of their comm
unities and households and have little recourse to protection or justice outside these dom
ains:' 18
Provincial Reconstruction Team
s and the M
ilitarization of Aid
The m
ilitarization of aid found expression in Afghanistan in 2
00
3, w
hen the U
nited States established the first provincial reconstruction teams
( p R T s) in the three provinces of G
ardez, Kunduz, and B
amiyan. 19 This w
as follow
ed shortly by Britain's establishing P R
T s in Mazar-e-Sharif in the
north and Canada's establishing PR
TS in K
andahar in the south. Over the
past several years more than fourteen countries have established PR
TS
across Afghanistan, em
blematic of the new
security face of postconflict developm
ent operations. Am
ong the aid comm
unity in Afghanistan, the
purpose of the PRT
S remains unclear even though their official and stated
objective is to "advance the central government's presence throughout
h .
a: "20
Afghanistan and to provide direct support to t e reconstructiO
n euorts.
128 Clzislzti and Farhoum
and-Sims
Observers argue that the PRTs w
ere primarily created to engage soldiers in
aid, development, and reconstruction in order to "w
in the hearts and m
inds" of the people and promote the success of the m
ilitary campaign.
Feminists too have had m
ixed responses to the growing politicization and
securitization of aid in Afghanistan that very quickly blurred distinctions
between strictly political, m
ilitary, and humanitarian m
otivations. The m
ultiple and arguably contradictory motivations of PRTs have created
frustration and concern among aid w
orkers and recipients. Aid and de-
velopment N
GO
s, researchers and activists alike, argue that the militariza-
tion of aid is not conducive to sustainable peace or development and
threatens the integrity of this important w
ork for decades. They argue that
the militarization of aid has greatly dim
inished humanitarian space, and
aid agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to distance themselves from
the w
ar on terror's active combative cam
paigns in the country. Any efforts
on the part of aid actors to interact and establish trust and good relations w
ith comm
unities on exclusively humanitarian term
s is met w
ith suspicion or am
bivalence. The blurring of lines betw
een military and hum
anitarian w
ork has consequently comprom
ised the safety and security of aid work-
ers, as demonstrated by a noticeable and disturbing increase in violent
attacks against foreign aid workers and their M
ghan colleagues, who are
accused of collaborating with the foreigners. As a result m
any NG
Os w
ith a long history of w
orking in the harshest and most challenging of tim
es in M
ghanistan have suspended their operations. Fem
inist scholars and practitioners must pay closer attention to the
authoritative presence of internationals, particularly in terms of the im
-plications of the w
ar on terror's varied geopolitical and military interests
that not only frame the postconflict agenda, but im
plicate (by extension) gender program
s in Mghanistan. A
cross the country the current foreign (m
ilitary as well as civilian) presence has evoked concern and a desire to
"protect" Mghan w
omen from
the "foreign gaze," thereby not only hin-dering w
omen's participation in aid projects, but further restricting their
access to public space. The PRTs in particular reinforce w
orking primar-
ily with M
ghan men as the key developm
ent partners, since wom
en are largely prohibited from
engaging with m
en who are not directly related to
them by blood or m
arriage (such as soldiers). Although the m
ilitarization of aid is posited as creating m
ore peace and security for comm
unities, these
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
129
goals are highly suspect given the premise that the use and threat of
are the means to conflict resolution. U
nless these fundamental
contradictions are all taken into account and addressed, the militarization
of aid will hinder rather than serve the cause of peace in Afghanistan and
negatively impact the local populations, particularly the w
omen.
International Aid and the Politics ofW
omen's O
rganizing
The lack of accountability not only of the multiple political m
andates in the country but also the billions of dollars entering the country is a key concern, especially in term
s of how this m
oney is being distributed and w
ho benefits. The failure of the international com
munity to m
aintain a consistent course of aid further exacerbates the w
eariness and suspicion am
ong Afghans, already troubled by the lavish and revolving presence of
the expatriate comm
unity. In our own w
ork in Afghanistan in the spring of
20
03
, we observed that A
fghan wom
en from both rural and urban areas
recognized the scattered international agenda and criticized aid agencies particularly for their distance from
the lives of the majority of A
fghans. Indeed the international aid apparatus has set its ow
n subculture and infrastructure, operating in w
hat Antonio D
onini calls the "Kabul B
ub-ble:'21 T
hey work w
ithin a hierarchical, donor-driven structure of policies and practices, dispensing aid m
oney unevenly across Afghanistan. T
he practices and politics of w
omen's rights are m
ost often defined the
international aid apparatus in terms of its relationship to transnational
feminism
networks. W
e have observed that in the context of Afghan w
om-
en's organizations, transnational feminism
, consistent with the interna-
tional aid apparatus, promotes the institutionalization of w
omen's orga-
nizing to encourage an urban-based humanitarian aid fram
ework in the
country. Wom
en's organizing is specifically directed to create "functional and efficient" NGOS that are structured like their international counter-parts. T
he transnational feminist apparatus needs to recognize that ten-
sions arise when policies and practices re-create dem
arcations made by the
international aid comm
unity between the secular and religious, the form
al and inform
al, the urban and rural, and so on. This agenda often disem-
powers the illiterate, rural-based A
fghan networks of w
omen organizers
and puts them in com
petition with the m
ore urban-based, educated, and
130 C
hishti and Farh01mum
d-Sims
professional Afghan w
omen's organizations. M
ore often than not, the in-form
al networks of w
omen are perceived as inexperienced, hindered by
their own cultural and religious conservatism
, and are assumed to lack the
skills to properly manage their financial resources. These perceptions can
further exacerbate the disparities among w
omen's groups and inevitably
challenge national and transnational feminist hopes for building a politics
of solidarity across the diversity of wom
en's locations and experiences. This can lead to a divisive fragm
entation of the wom
en's movem
ent if, for exam
ple, English literacy and donor history are the key determinants to
receiving support. Transnational fem
inists operating within the postconflict aid apparatus
in the country need to be diligent against donor-driven agendas, which can
nurture a rigid and privileged hierarchy of Afghan w
omen's organizing.
The protracted exclusion of these w
omen not only dislocates their agency
as co-constructors of a wom
en's rights agenda, but will have a detrim
ental im
pact on Afghanistan's overall capacity to instigate long-term
changes in attitudes and perceptions. To w
ork against the normative structures of the
international aid comm
unity, the transnational feminist apparatus m
ust im
plement flexible and creative approaches that depart from
normative
donor practices that all too often facilitate the entry of wom
en into institu-tionalized civil society at the expense of building alliances and pooling resources (financial and hum
an) in order to work tow
ard mutually agreed
upon goals and objectives.
The C
onvention on the Elimination of
All Form
s of Discrim
ination against Wom
en and the A
fghan Wom
en's Rights A
genda
In an effort to ensure that wom
en's rights are firmly entrenched in the
critical early stages of nation building in Afghanistan, the transnational
feminist apparatus actively sought to advance tw
o important international
United N
ations documents that ostensibly w
ould protect and promote
wom
en's rights and participation in peace building and reconstruction: the U
nited Nations International C
onvention on the Elimination of A
ll Forms
of Discrim
ination against Wom
en ( CE
DA
W) and the U
nited Nations Se-
curity Council R
esolution 1325 on Wom
en, Peace, and Security (scR
1325). 22 Although not perfect and certainly fraught w
ith limitations and
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
131
controversy, these documents are nevertheless considered instrum
ental in advancing and guaranteeing w
omen's rights, particularly in the form
ative period of social, political, and econom
ic state building in Afghanistan. T
he advocacy efforts of transnational fem
inist networks and of A
fghan wom
en them
selves enabled both CE
DA
W and S
CR
1325 to bear some influence over
the drafting of Afghanistan's new
constitution and in ensuring that Afghan
wom
en's rights were prioritized under the B
onn Agreem
ent. 23
The first of these tw
o documents, C
ED
AW
, was adopted on 18 D
ecem-
ber 197 9 by the UN
General A
ssembly and cam
e into force on 3 September
19 31 after tw
enty countries ratified it. Despite debates about and criticism
s of C
ED
AW
and its applicability in a diverse international comm
unity, 185 states w
ere party to the Convention. T
he Convention w
as the "culmina-
tion of more than thirty years of w
ork by the Com
mission on the Status of
Wom
en;' whose w
ork was "instrum
ental in bringing to light all the areas in w
hich wom
en are denied equality with m
en:' 24 Of all the U
N declarations
and conventions CE
DA
W in particular is the m
ost critical and comprehen-
sive document created to address the advancem
ent of wom
en and the fulfillm
ent of their human rights. It not only defines equality, but also
addresses a wide range of hum
an rights issues relating to wom
en. It also provides an agenda for action for those states w
ho are party to the Conven-
tion, often referred to as the Wom
en's Convention and International Bill of
Rights for W
omen. T
he Convention's pream
ble and thirty articles address civil rights and the legal status of w
omen; it is the first treaty in history to
consider issues relating to human reproduction and the im
pact of culture on gender relations. 25 T
he Convention discusses such varied topics as
freedom of religion; freedom
of movem
ent, opinion, and association; na-tionality; sexual and reproductive rights; 26 and rights to education, health-care, and the political arena. It defines discrim
ination against wom
en as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction m
ade on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoym
ent or exercise by w
omen, irrespective of their m
arital status, on a basis of equality of m
en and wom
en, of human rights and fundam
ental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field:' 27
By ratifying CE
DA
W states com
mit to incorporating the principle of the
equality of men and w
omen in their legal system
, abolishing and revising all discrim
inatory laws, establishing tribunals and other public institutions
to ensure the effective protection of wom
en against discrimination, and
132 Chishtz and hnlzozm
wnd-Sim
s
eliminating all acts of discrim
ination against wom
en by persons, organiza-tions, and enterprises. A
lthough the UN does not have enforcement m
ech-anism
s, the strength of the Convention is rooted in the requirem
ent that state partie!> w
ho have acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put
its provisions into practice. As w
ith other treaty bodies the implem
entation of the Convention
is monitored by a com
mittee com
posed of "independent experts." The CEDAW
comm
ittee is composed of tw
enty-three experts who are nom
i-nated by their governm
ents and elected by the Economic and Social
Council to serve four-year term
s. Experts are chosen based on their "high m
oral standing and competence in the field covered by the C
onvention:'28 T
he comm
ittee meets three tim
es a year with a designated num
ber of state delegations w
ho have submitted their reports. States are expected to sub-
mit reports to the treaty body once every four years. In their reports
countries are expected to outline measures they have adopted to bring
their country's laws and practices m
ore in line with their obligations under
the Convention. A
t the reporting sessions the delegations from each coun-
try provide a summ
ary of their written report, including statistical infor-
mation and updates, w
hich allows the com
mittee to then question the
delegation on its progress in implem
enting CEDAW and to provide general
recomm
endations concerning the elimination of discrim
ination against w
omen. T
he comm
ittee reports to the Economic and Social C
ouncil and the G
eneral Assem
bly with a list of its activities and recom
mendations
based on its examination of reports and inform
ation received from state.
parties and NG
Os. States parties to CEDAW
present their first report to the com
mittee one year after ratification, and every tw
o years thereafter. A
fghanistan's history of engagement w
ith CEDAW began on 14 A
ugust 1980, w
hen the country signed onto the Convention. By signing, A
fghani-stan m
ade a salutary endorsement w
hereby it agreed not to undermine the
spirit of the Convention w
hile it carried out an internal review to deter··
mine w
hether or not to ratify. 29 Over the years of conflict and unrest,
however, the C
onvention was forgotten; it regained attention only after the
fall of the Taliban and the arrival of the international aid apparatus in the country. G
rassroots wom
en's organizations and UN
IFEM im
mediately be-
gan to provide training workshops on CEDAW
, and there was a grow
ing interest in the A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent to learn about the Convention
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
133
and consider ways it could be used as an advocacy tool for w
omen's rights
in Afghanistan. In addition to this grow
ing interest within civil society, the
interim A
fghan government w
anted to demonstrate its com
mitm
ent to gender equality in the face of intense international pressure to im
prove the situation of w
omen. It w
as in this climate that the interim
government
unexpectedly undertook measures to form
ally ratify the Convention on
5 March
20
03
. 30 Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW
was an im
portant m
ilestone for wom
en's rights, not only in that country but also across the M
uslim w
orld. Afghanistan m
ade history by becoming the first M
uslim
state to ratify CEDAW w
ithout reservations.-H
The tim
ing of Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW
was extrem
ely signif-icant given that it preceded the drafting and adoption of the new
Afghan
constitution in January 20
04
. The transnational fem
inist movem
ent along w
ith national actors within the A
fghan wom
en's movem
ent quickly mobi-
lized to lend support and help embed CEDAW
comm
itments w
ithin the new
constitution. In the months leading up to the constitutionalloya jirga
much of their advocacy centered on dem
anding that international human
rights principles pertaining to wom
en, such as equality before the law and
advances in political rights, be included in the constitution. Adoption
of CEDAW did have opponents, how
ever; there was a clear cam
paign to discredit the C
onvention as Western, un-lslam
ic, and incompatible w
ith A
fghan culture and religion. Despite great resistance by conservative ele-
ments before and during the constitutional loya jirga, how
ever, interna-tional and local fem
inists achieved some successes that w
ere celebrated by w
omen in A
fghanistan and their supporters around the world. T
he chair-person of CEDAW
, Ferida Acar, noted:
The new
ly approved Constitution explicitly guarantees that m
en and wom
en have equal rights and duties before the law
. This is a significant victory for wom
en and girls in A
fghanistan who barely three years ago w
ere completely excluded from
all spheres of life and faced system
atic violations of their human rights on a daily
basis. Gender equality is a crucial factor not only in achieving sustainable peace
but also in ensuring respect for human rights, dem
ocracy and the rule oflaw in all
societies. Enshrining the principle of gender equality within the C
onstitution is a vital starting point for the transform
ation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. It
legitimizes the im
portant role played by wom
en and girls in Afghanistan in reshap-
ing their future and in rebuilding their country. 32
134 Chi$hti and Farhozm
wnd-Sim
s
Still, Afghan w
omen w
ere only guardedly optimistic. W
hile they cele-brated the explicit inclusion of gender equality and other positive develop-m
ents in the constitution, according to Lauryn Oates and Isabelle Solon-
Helal, "they rem
ain[ ed] cautious due to other constitutional provisions that proclaim
[ed] Afghanistan an 'Islam
ic Republic' and declare[d] that
'the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion oflslam' [had J precedence
over any law in A
fghanistan:' 33 This apparent conflict will pose an obsta-
cle to the advancement of w
omen if extrem
ist interpretations of Sharia are used to determ
ine wom
en's rights and responsibilities in Afghanistan.
Their concerns are w
ell placed; the vast majority of the reservations to
CEDAW are entered by M
uslim governm
ents who argue that Islam
ic Sharia law
supersedes international law and therefore prevents them
from fully
complying w
ith CEDAW. 34 By attaching a reservation to a particular article
a state party articulates its decision not to be held accountable to that article.
Given the potential for w
omen's rights to be underm
ined, the trans-national fem
inist network's agenda in A
fghanistan sought to strengthen the w
omen's m
ovement there by creating aw
areness and generating wide-
spread grassroots support for CEDAW and SCR 1325 in public and legal
discourses. It was assum
ed that once Afghan w
omen's organizations be-
came fam
iliar with these international instrum
ents they would be able to
contextualize their own struggles and activism
from w
ithin these political fram
es and diligently monitor governm
ent accountability and compliance.
While training A
fghan wom
en on CEDAW in A
fghanistan in May 2oo3 ,'
we w
ere inspired by their intense interest in and serious consideration of the applicability and relevance of the C
onvention to Afghanistan. In w
ork-ing w
ith formal (urban-based) and nonform
al (rural-based) Afghan w
om-
en's organizations and networks from
across the country, we found that in
many cases introducing the contents of these international docum
ents generated an overall positive response by m
any wom
en, who felt these
documents w
ere useful tools for advocating wom
en's rights. In training sessions on CEDAW
we noticed that som
e of the participants were con-
fused about or opposed to it because of anti-CEDA
W propaganda they had
heard on the radio or read in local newspapers. U
pon a closer reading and exam
ination of the Convention, how
ever, many of these w
omen w
ere able to have som
e of their misconceptions and concerns addressed. 35 N
everthe-less the suitability and applicability of the C
onvention in helping to trans-
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
135
form gender inequities in the country produced intense discussions. This
is not surprising, as various other Muslim
states have raised concerns or opposed CEDAW
specifically around wom
en's rights to free movem
ent and nationality (article 9) and other rights related to m
arriage and family life
(article 1 6). Traditionally the desire to limit a w
oman's role to that of w
ife and m
other has prevented her from entering public life and being an active
mem
ber of society through social and political participation. While w
ork-ing in A
fghanistan we saw
some of the sam
e concerns raised by those apprehensive about CEDAW
's impact on that country. W
hile a great major-
ity of wom
en were eager to learn about these instrum
ents and use them to
their advantage, a very small group of equally passionate traditionalists
(men and w
omen) harbored suspicion of CEDAW
as part of a 'Western
imperialist agenda:' As in other M
uslim states, the forces of opposition led
by conservative clergy and their supporters invoked religious grounds for noncom
pliance. Ariane B
runet and Isabelle Solon-Helal of the organiza-
tion Rights and D
emocracy, w
ho have worked extensively in A
fghanistan,
suggest:
In Afghanistan, w
omen's rights are view
ed as part of a Western agenda; they are
used as a propaganda tool by all sides and linked to cultural and religious values. Every possible roadblock to the realization of w
omen's rights and to the par-
ticipation of wom
en in decision-making processes has been installed: the per-
petuation of warlordism
, the lack of security, and the lack of effective gender policy coordination. 36
One of the difficult tasks w
e encountered was how
to promote CEDAW
across the country w
ithout disavowing A
fghan culture and religion while
simultaneously not supporting patriarchal attitudes and structures that
undermine the rights of w
omen. A
lthough discussions of CEDAW are a
platform for dialogue and critical engagem
ent among w
omen, as one A
f-ghan w
omen's rights activist recently noted, the task is not easy:
Despite years of C
ED
AW
related activities in Afghanistan, m
ost wom
en's political activists w
ere not really aware of w
hat CE
DA
W is exactly about, but w
hen we began our activities and cam
paigns for wom
en's political rights, it became the
discourse among political activists. But due to the sensitivity of the topic, we w
ere always arguing based on all international hum
an rights conventions signed by A
fghanistan, and tried not to focus on CE
DA
WY
136 C
hishti and Farlzownmui-Sim
s
A critical challenge is to address the suspicions Afghan m
en and wom
en have about CEDAW
, primarily as a W
estern imperialist im
position that Will
abruptly modernize and secularize A
fghanistan's cultural and religious tra-ditions. C
learly, using international provisions to change and challenge w
omen's and girls' realities in A
fghanistan must therefore be predicated on
the ownership of these instrum
ents by Afghans them
selves. This entails a m
ultifaceted approach whereby national and international actors m
ust collaboratively w
ork through the messy terrain of dialogue and action to
engage CEDAW from
within a negotiated cultural and religious fram
ework.
This is not to say that Afghan w
omen m
ust concede to misogynist and
extremist perspectives, but if w
omen-and m
en-believe that interna-tional tools do not respect their religious and cultural traditions, they w
ill not support their application in dom
estic practice. What w
e found in A
fghanistan was a split betw
een those who thought these tools did not go
far enough in protecting and promoting w
omen's hum
an rights, and those w
ho were concerned about the im
pact of their application on the status quo. T
he former group challenged CEDAW
for not implicitly discussing
violence against wom
en in the private sphere as a human rights violation;
they believed the Convention should dem
and that states make dom
estic abuse a crim
inal offense. One w
oman com
mented, ''A
ll the rights in the w
orld are meaningless if I have to suffer abuse at the hands of m
y husband and his fam
ily on a regular basis. Why does this C
onvention not protect me
from this?" T
he other group believed that private sphere rights should not be codified in international law
in order to preserve Afghan and Islam
ic. cultural and religious practices pertaining to w
omen's fam
ilial and social roles. These w
omen seem
ed to be resisting wom
en's rights in order to protect their ow
n social status. As Rostam
i-Povey argues, "The responsibil-
ity for the injustice and violence lies not only with the im
mediate fam
ily but also w
ith individual comm
unities, religious organizations, health and education institutions, professionals and law
enforcers."38
To dispel fears and concerns about CEDAW local w
omen's N
GO
s in A
fghanistan have been engaged in educational campaigns that serve tw
o im
portant purposes: familiarizing w
omen w
ith these international provi-sions and allow
ing them to develop independent opinions about their
content and relevance, and encouraging locally based plans of action to im
plement these provisions and ensure that CEDAW
and SCR 1325 directly
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
137
relate to the needs of Afghan w
omen and not be perceived as e:x1:ernally
imposed. These efforts have resulted in increased dialogue, particularly
about Afghanistan's responsibilities as a signatory to CEDAW
, but these-curity situation and other barriers to w
omen's participation in public life
have made it only m
arginally possible for wom
en to demand changes to the
status quo. Lack of security is preventing wom
en from enjoying freedom
of m
ovement and dem
anding their rights without being threatened. This w
as clearly dem
onstrated in loya jirgas where w
omen delegates suffered verbal
abuse and threats to their physical safety because of their outspoken de-m
ands for rights and their criticism of the status quo. Public discourse
clearly impacted the C
onstitutional Drafting C
omm
ission whose m
andate called for "broad participation of w
omen in the constitution-m
aking pro-cess" and the inclusion of nine w
omen m
embers serving on the C
omm
is-sion.39 T
he mandate also m
ade a comm
itment to w
ork with the W
omen's
Ministry and U
NIFEM
to hold public education programs about the consti-
tutional rights of wom
en throughout the country in order to reach out to w
omen and to increase public aw
areness. Without a doubt, the develop-
ment of a national w
omen's m
ovement is critical to prom
oting change. B
runet and Solon-Helal reflect on their extensive w
ork in Afghanistan:
The elusive gains made w
ith Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW
, the very new
concept of a Ministry of W
omen's A
ffairs, the weak coordination am
ong donor countries regarding w
omen's rights, the varied and contradictory gender policies
proposed in a variety of U.N
./ AT
A [A
fghanistan Transitional Authority] docu-
ments, and the lack of gender-focused staff appointm
ents at the United N
ations A
ssistance Mission to A
fghanistan (UN
AM
A), indicate that w
omen's hum
an rights also need to be protected by civil society organizations and by the building of a w
omen's m
ovement that is educated and capable of being a valuable interlocutor
to a State that should be governed by the rule of law. This cannot happen over a
few years, let alone over a few
months: 10
In our work w
e found wom
en expressing a desire to connect with
wom
en and wom
en's groups outside Afghanistan to share experiences and
lessons, particularly in addressing the issue of Islam and law
. Case studies
of wom
en's activism in other M
uslim countries and in the rest of the
developing world provide these organizations w
ith encouragement, sup-
port, and valuable ideas about how to m
eet the challenges they face as
138 C
hishti and Farhoumand-Szm
.<
Muslim
wom
en struggling to realize their rights within an Islam
ic frame-
work. O
ur references to the work of w
omen's m
ovements in Iran, Pakistan
Egypt, and other Muslim
states were m
et with great enthusiasm
and prid: by the A
fghan wom
en we w
orked with, w
ho felt that they shared similar
challenges and would benefit from
meeting w
ith other Muslim
wom
en on such issues.
this need for regional cooperation and networking
among w
omen s groups, the transnational w
omen's m
ovement has m
ade little effort to facilitate this process. A
small num
ber of NG
Os are spear-
heading this effort, 41 but without international financial support these
efforts will prove arduous.
The
of Afghan w
omen is absolutely critical to creating
framew
orks that Implem
ent CE
DA
W and other international instrum
ents that speak to w
omen's lived realities in A
fghanistan. Universal hum
an rights norm
s come to life only w
hen they find relevance to those they serve. A
ttempting to apply only one m
odel will not only fail, but w
ill give impetus
to opponents of these valuable tools. Efforts to promote C
ED
AW
and SC
R
I325 must not only educate w
omen but also sharpen their analytical abilities
so that they may interpret C
ED
AW
within the fram
ework of Islam
ic legal and cultural discourses.
Challenges to the C
onvention
Although m
isunderstandings of CE
DA
W abound, the follow
ing discussion of key articles illustrates that international hum
an rights need not be in-· com
patible with Islam
ic customary and legal discourse, and that dialogue
and education would serve to bridge the gap and benefit w
omen in A
f-T
he most challenged C
ED
AW
articles include article 4 , on spe-Cial m
easuresi article 51 on sex-role stereotyping and prejudicei article 6, on
prostitutioni article 9, on nationalityi article IS, on lawi and article I6, on
marriage and fam
ily life. In our training programs w
e were m
et with exten-
sive questions about the meaning and intent of articles 6 and 1 6, w
hich had received negative press in the m
edia and had been challenged by critics including various local and national Islam
ic scholars. Article 5 addresse:
the universality of wom
en's human rights and encourages state parties to
the Convention to m
odify social and cultural of conduct to elim
i-nate the idea of one sex as superior and stereotypical roles for m
en and
Transnational Fem
inism in A
fghanistan 139
wom
en. This is a particularly challenging article in the Muslim
world
because of the debate around wom
en's roles and responsibilities in Muslim
society and the need to preserve cultural norm
s}Z Some M
uslim scholars
who have debated this issue argue that the question is not one of the
universality of human rights but rather the application of universal norm
s to protect and preserve "legitim
ate" cultural traditions that do not pro-m
ote the suffering of groups based on ethnicity, sex, nationality, religion, or any other category. C
learly the solution to this dilemm
a lies within the
Muslim
world itself.
Another revealing discussion about C
ED
AW
dealt with article 6, w
hich requires states to take all appropriate m
easures, including legislation, to suppress the trafficking of w
omen and the exploitation of prostitutes. M
e-dia discussions of this article gave the im
pression that it "promotes" pro-
miscuity. \"/hen w
e began to discuss this article in detail, its relevance becam
e increasingly clear to our female participants, w
ho discussed the plight of w
idowed w
omen w
ho had to turn to prostitution to earn a living, and the increasing num
ber of trafficked wom
en who have w
orked in Af-ghanistan since the arrival of foreign troops. A
rticle 9, on the right of w
omen to hold nationality independent of their husband, is particularly
problematic in A
fghanistan and the Muslim
world, w
here a wom
an's-and her children's-nationality and freedom
of movem
ent are tied to the hus-band or father. A
rticle 16 allows w
omen to decide w
hether to get married
and to choose their spouse. It allows a w
oman the pow
er to decide the num
ber of children she would like to have and their spacing and gives her
an equal say in their custody and guardianship. She would also have equal
rights to ownership, acquisition, m
anagement, and adm
inistration of prop-erty. D
espite opposition to the rights articulated in this article, Afghan
wom
en noted that Sharia law already provides M
uslim w
omen w
ith many
of these rights. Some w
omen noted that only extrem
e interpretations of Sharia law
and wom
en's ignorance of their Islamic rights lead to disagree-
ments about the roles and responsibilities of M
uslim w
omen in the fam
ily. T
he Muslim
world is not a hom
ogeneous entity, and religious precepts are clearly influenced by historical, regional, and cultural factors, w
hich in turn im
pact the interpretation and the practice of religion. As Abdullahi
An-N
a'im argues, "It is not difficult to establish the responsibility of m
any Islam
ic states to change aspects of religious law in accordance w
ith their
140 C
hishti and Farlww
nand-Sims
obligations under international law. T
he question is how to effect such
change in practice."41
We w
ould argue that a good way to start effecting change is for trans-
national feminists w
orking in Afghanistan to build solidarity by creat-
ing more spaces for the exchange of ideas, critical reflection, and m
utual learning. By engaging, not disavow
ing, traditional religious sources of the Q
!.!ran and Sunnah, in addition to centering the nuances of culture, our discussions w
ith Afghan w
omen w
ere able to move into those difficult
spaces where a closer reading of each article helped to clarify and con-
textualize its varied meanings and purposes. O
ur collective assessment that
these principles could be applied in a culturally and religiously appropriate m
anner served to overcome m
any of the initial concerns and skepticism.-!-!
Conclusion
Wom
en's organizing is not a new phenom
enon in Afghanistan. A
fghan w
omen have a long tradition of activism
and resistance in the face of insecurity and grave hum
an rights abuses. Their activities have continued
throughout twenty-three years of protracted conflict and have led to a
burgeoning wom
en's rights movem
ent that is comm
itted to the advance-m
ent of Afghan w
omen and their full enjoym
ent of their most basic rights,
including access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunity and
important civil and political rights. A
ccording to the Beijing D
eclaration and Platform
for Action, "Equality betw
een wom
en and men is a m
atter of hum
an rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundam
ental prerequisite for equality, development and peace:' 45 In Af-
ghanistan "the low social status of w
omen, and the consequent pow
er im
balances between w
omen and m
en that it generates, are the underlying reasons for harm
ful and discriminatory practices and physical and sexual
abuse against girls and wom
en:' 46 The international fem
inist movem
ent has a strategic role to play in supporting and building solidarity netw
orks w
ith the existing wom
en's movem
ent in Afghanistan. H
owever, it is critical
to note that the global and local complexities and contradictions that
underpin the rights agenda in Afghanistan can also backfire, w
ith the very real possibility of a backlash against A
fghan wom
en seen as betraying A
fghan culture and traditions by participating in foreign aid projects. At the
Transnational Feminism
in Afghanistan
141
very least the feminist international apparatus needs to be aw
are of percep-tions on the part of both A
fghan wom
en and men that equate w
omen-
centered and gender-targeted programs as a direct challenge to traditional
culture and religion. The e::.:pansive internationally directed rights agenda
across Afghanistan is perhaps already fueling and further legitim
izing rigid interpretations of sacred texts in order to "rescue" A
fghan wom
en from the
tyranny ofWestern neocolonial quests to reconfigure A
fghan wom
anhood. B
oth local and international actors must therefore be attentive to the m
essy terrain of advancing and im
proving the lives of Afghan w
omen and girls
in the current postconflict dynamics of outsider-insider politics. As Zine
acutely observes, we m
ust be aware of "the w
ay bodies and identities are scripted in service of neo-im
perialist goals and from w
ithin fundamentalist
worldview
s. Both ideological view
s limit [w
omen's] agency, autonom
y, and freedom
and seriously circumscribe their lived conditions, choices, and
experiences:' 47 Moving beyond this ideological battlefield is perhaps an
impossibility, but principled solidarity based on collaborative efforts and
genuine dialogue can help facilitate mutually defined goals to further pro-
mote the overall w
ell-being of Afghan w
omen in postconflict A
fghanistan.
Notes
The coauthors of this essay are listed alphabetically.
1 For an extensive discussion, see M
ark Duffield's G
lobal Govem
ancc and the New
Wars.
2 See Elaheh R
ostami Povey's study 'W
omen in A
fghanistan:· 3 W
e recognize that these institutions are still in their infancy and have yet to meet
their full potential. For example, see International C
risis Group, "A
fghanistan: W
omen and R
econstruction:· 4
For a concrete analysis of Afghan w
omen's participation in the constitutional
process, see Oates and Solon-H
elal, At the Cross-Roads of Conflict mrd D
emocracy.
s Afghan R
esearch Education Unit, A House D
ivided, 15. 6 A
zarbaijani-Moghaddam
, "Afghan W
omen on the M
argins of the Twenty-first
Century:'
7 M
ohanty, Feminism
witlw
ut Borders, 20
.
8 L. Ahm
ed, Wom
en and Gender in Islam
. 9 Zine, "M
uslim W
omen and the Politics of R
epresentation;· 2. 10
Chishti, "The International W
omen's M
ovement and the Politics of Participation
for Muslim
Wom
en;· 86. 11
Interview w
ith Lauryn Oates by C
heshmak Farhoum
and-Sims, 25 O
ctober 20
07
.
142 C
hishti and FarhowHand-Sim
s
12 A
zarbaijani-Moghaddam
, "Afghan W
omen on the M
argins of the Twenty-First
Century," 103.
13 R
ostami-Povey, "W
omen in A
fghanistan." 14
Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2006."
15 W
orld Bank, ''Afghanistan." See also Senlis C
ouncil, ''Afghanistan Five Y
ears Late " .
r and "Losing H
earts and Minds in A
fghanistan." 16
Oates, National Report on D
omestic Violence against W
omen: Afghanistan.
17 A
zarbaijani-Moghaddam
, "On Living w
ith Negative Peace and a H
alf-Built State."
18 K
andiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 32.
19 For a m
ore thorough discussion and analysis of P R Ts, gender issues, and A
fghani-stan, see Farhoum
and-Sims, "T
he Three Block W
ar:· 2
0
Peace Operations W
orking Group of the C
anadian Peace Coordinating C
omm
it-tee, "N
Go/G
overnment D
ialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Team
s (PRTs) in A
fghanistan and the Militarization of H
umanitarian A
ssistance:· 21
Donini, Nation Building Unraveled, 2004.
22 For a m
ore complete discussion of C
ED
AW
, see Cheshm
ak Farhoumand-Sim
s's dissertation, currently in progress, "Im
plementing C
ED
AW
in Afghanistan:·
23 For the U
nited Nations D
ivision for the Advancem
ent of Wom
en, see the UN
website.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 T
he Convention is very careful in addressing this issue and refers only to w
omen's
right "to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to information, education and m
eans to enable them
to exercise these rights" (cED
AW
, article 16:1e). 27
CE
DA
W1 article!.
28 Their m
andate is outlined in articles 17-30 of the Convention.
29 M
edica Mondiale Basic G
erman W
omen's G
roup, "Information about
and CE
DA
W in A
fghanistan:' 30
Farhoumand-Sim
s's interviews w
ith Afghan w
omen activists and w
orkers in the M
inistry of Wom
en's Affairs and the M
inistry of Foreign Affairs reveal that no
one seemed to have know
n that the Ministry of Foreign A
ffairs was pursuing
CE
DA
W ratification until it w
as announced in March 2003.
31 Turkey is the only M
uslim country that has rem
oved all reservations to the C
onvention. 32
Wom
en's International League for Peace and Freedom, "cE
DA
W C
hairperson A
pplauds New
Afghan C
onstitution." 33
Oates and Solon-H
elal, At the Cross-Roads of Conflict and D
emocracy.
34 Farhoum
and-Sims, "Im
plementing C
ED
AW
in Afghanistan:·
35 O
ne of the major w
eaknesses of CE
DA
W that the w
omen highlighted w
as the absence of any discussion about dom
estic violence. We explained that this w
as due to resistance and opposition, largely by M
uslim states, against any inclusion
Transnatitmal Fem
inism ill Afghanistan
143
in the Convention of w
omen's private sphere rights. A
rticles dealing with other
"private" rights, such as marriage, are highly contested by M
uslim states and
continue to elicit reservations. The feeling w
as that if such an article about violence against w
omen w
ere added to CE
DA
W few
er parties would sign it. It
would be better to have countries sign on and w
ork toward full com
pliance rather
than alienate them.
3 6 B
runet and Solon-Helal, "Seizing the O
pportunity," 20.
37 Em
ail comm
unication with an A
fghan wom
en's rights activist who w
ishes to
remain anonym
ous, 16 Novem
ber 2007.
3 s Rostam
-Povey, "Wom
en in Afghanistan," 175.
39 B
runet and Solon-Helal, "Seizing the O
pportunity;' 12.
40 Ibid., 7·
41 See w
ebsite for Wom
en Living under Muslim
Laws, http:/ /w
ww
.wlum
l.org/. .p
For a fuller discussion of the challenge of w
omen's hum
an rights and cultural relativism
, see the works by A
n-Na'im
, Afshar (co-editor of D
evelopment, W
omen
and War: A Fem
inist Perspective), and Azarbaijani-M
oghaddam cited in this essay
as well as M
ayer, Islam and H
wnan Rights.
43 A
n-Na'im
, Hum
an Rigl1ts in Cross Cultural Perspectives, 182.
44 W
omen Living under M
uslim Law
s is an excellent organization doing work in
this area.
4 5 See Beijing D
eclaration and Platform for A
ction. 46
Rostam
-Povey, "Wom
en in Afghanistan;· 175·
47 Zine, "B
etween O
rientalism and Fundam
entalism;' u.