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RANSFORMING UN UST STRUCTURESe Capa ty Approac


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LIBRARY OF ETHICS AND APPLIED PHILOSOPHYVOLUME 19

Managing Editor:

Govert A. den Hartogh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.


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dited by

t mun s o ege, am ri ge, . .

ATHIA NEBE Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, Mexico City

an

Liverpool Hope University, U.K.

NI H L V KY

S

STJTRANSFORMING UN U

The Capability ApproachSTRUCTURES


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A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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Table of Contents

Intro uction

Séverine Deneulin, Mathias Nebel and Nicholas Sagovsky

1

Part I The Capability Approach: Theoretical Discussion

Chapter 1 Capabilities and Rights

Pau R coeur

17

Chapter 2 “Necessary Thickening”: Ricoeur’s Ethic of Justice as aomplement to Sen’s Capability Approach

Séverine Deneulin

27

C apter 3 Structural Injustice and Democratic Practice: TheTrajectory in en’s Writings

Sa na A re

7

Chapter 4 “Capable In ivi uals” an Just Institutions: Sen an Rawls

N c o as Sagovs y

63

Chapter 5 Justice for Women: Martha Nussbaum and Catholic SocialTeaching

Lisa Sowle Cahill

83

Part II Transforming Unjust Structures: Five Case Studies

Chapter 6 arrative Capability: Telling Stories in the Search for Justice

Teresa Godwin Phelps

105

C apter 7 romoting Capa i ity or Wor : T e Ro e o Loca Actors

Jean-Michel Bonvin and Nicolas Farvaque

121

C apter 8 nhancing Students’ Capabilities?: UK Higher Educationan the Wi ening Participation Agen a

M c ae Watts an Dav Br ges

143

Trans orming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach


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C apter 9 nter the Poor: American Welfare Reform, Solidarity ant e Capa i ity o Human F ouris ing

Vincent D. Rougeau

161

Chapter 10 “Patent Injustice”: Applying Sen’s Capability Approach toiotechnologies

Julie Clague

177


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1

INTRODUCTION

SÉVERINE DENEULIN, MATHIAS NEBEL AND NICHOLAS

SAGOVSKY

HE CAPABILITY APPROACH

Structural injustice has traditionally been the concern of two major academicdisciplines: economics and philosophy. The dominant model of economics has long been that of neo-classical economics. For neo-classical economists, human well- being is to be assessed by the availability of disposable income or according to

oods consumed; it is measured by the levels of utility achieved in the consumptionof commo t es. Soc a or er s fas one y t e ways consumers max m se t e rwell-being and enterprises maximise their profits.1 A core assumpt on s t at acommo t es are commensura e: t ey can a e measure accor ng to a s ng enumer ca cover ng va ue, w c s t e r pr ce. W t n t s neo-c ass ca para gm,ust ce s ac eve w en t e ut ty eve of someone cannot e ncrease w t out

anot er person see ng s or er ut ty eve ecrease.

when development and welfare economist Amartya Sen received the Nobel Prize forEconom cs n 1998. H s wor offere an a ternat ve to t e neo-c ass ca eva uat onof uman we - e ng n t e ut ty commo ty space. T e un er n ng p osop cantu t on e n Sen’s wor s t at the standard of living lies in the living and not in

the consumption of commodities. In searc ng for an a ternat ve measure of umanwe - e ng, Sen ev se s capa ty approac .Sen’s capa ty approac c aracter ses uman we - e ng n terms of w at

peop e are or o (for examp e, e ng ea t y, rea ng or wr t ng, ta ng part n t efe of t e commun ty): e ta s of “funct on ngs.” Furt ermore, Sen cons ers

freedom to be one of the most basic aspects of human life. Thus, well-being is to beassessed not so much by what people are or what people do, as by what they are reeto be or do – what they are able to be or do (for example, being able to be healthy,

e ng a e to rea an wr te, e ng a e to part c pate n t e fe of t e commun ty).

Sen calls such abilities “capabilities.”

5

A capa ty s “a person’s a ty to o

2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.

The dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics was strongly challenged

TRANSFORMING UNJUST STRUCTURES

The Capability Approach

. Deneulin et al. (eds. ), Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach, 1-16.


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2 S VERINE DENE LIN, MATHIA N BEL AND NI H LA SA KY

va ua e acts or reac va ua e states of e ng; [ t] represents t e a ternat vecom nat ons of t ngs a person s a e to o or e.”6

The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has extended the capability approach by

temising a list of the capabilities that people have reason to choose and value. Thisist of what she calls “central human capabilities” (such as the capability of bodily

health, the capability of affiliation, the capability of exercising practical reason)7

constitutes for her the normative goal that societies should pursue and defend intheir political processes. Nussbaum’s central human capabilities form a moredynamic list than, say, the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights, but, like human rights, they are patently usticeable. A ust society for Nussbaum is a society that provides its citizens with the opportunities to exercisethose central human functional capabilities they choose to develop.

Sen’s work has brought back the field of economics to where it first belonged:within the scope of moral philosophy.9 In his concern for human flourishing, hestan s n a tra t on t at can e trace ac to Ar stot e ut s more mme atentellectual lineage is that of Kant and Mill. He stands within the liberal tradition

w c oes not spec fy any part cu ar goo as e ng a ove ot ers (espec a y not any putat ve “common goo ”), ut n o ng so ma es free om an p ura sm centra to

ts account of uman f our s ng. In ts comm tment to t e free om of eacn v ua to c oose – n an unconstra ne manner – t e goo s w c s e va ues,

t s tra t on s mp aca y oppose to a forms of ut tar an sm, w ccharacteristically argue that the individual is expendable in the service of the greatergood. Though Sen does not put the case in these terms, he might well accept thatut tar an sm s pecu ar y angerous, ecause t s manner of argu ng a too eas y prov es a cover for structura n ust ce: for examp e, conscr pts w o are sa nwars pro patr a mor ” – to e for t e fat er an – ave ten e to e poor ansoc a y sa vantage .10

T e free oms t at eac n v ua en oys are for Sen ot t e en s an means ofeve opment. He aff rms t at suc “concentrat on on free om can prov e a

genera f ramewor for ana ys ng n v ua a vantage an epr vat on n acontemporary soc ety.” Moreover, t e presence of free om s “const tut ve of t e

goo ness of t e soc ety w c we ave reasons to pursue.” W at s mportant for justice to be achieved is not so much the quality of life that people are actuallyliving, but the quality of life they have available to them within an available set offunctionings. For Sen, a capability is, then, “a set of vectors of functionings,ref ect ng t e person’s free om to ea one type of fe or anot er […] to c ooserom poss e v ngs.”14 Individual freedom and action thus occupy a central placen Sen’s capability approach.

The capability approach has in the last twenty years become a hugely influentialtheory for international social justice. For example, it now underpins the work of the

Un te Nat ons Deve opment Programme (UNDP). S nce 1990, t e UNDP as published annually a Human Development Report which documents the successesand failures of countries in promoting the capabilities that people have reason tochoose and value. More than 120 national or regional human development reports

ave een pro uce y oca eve opment organ sat ons. Hence t e mportance o


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cont nu ng to eve op t e capa ty approac , ot at t e t eoret ca an pract caeve s.

UNJUST STRUCTURES

One of the questions that has been repeatedly put to the advocates of the capabilityapproach has been that of structural injustice: does the capability approach addresssufficiently the extent to which lack of human flourishing can be attributed to un ustsocial, political and economic structures and can it be deployed to bring about theirtransformation? This is the question discussed in this volume. In various ways, thecontributors explore whether the way freedom and action have been understood inthe capability approach overlooks two elements that are crucial to engagement with

questions of structural injustice: human sociality and human fallibility. To speakabout “unjust structures” is to see such structures, which are necessary expressionsof human sociality, as marked by human finitude and fallibility. To take forward thisdiscussion, the capability approach must be brought into dialogue with approachest at focus attent on on soc a structures. In t e essays t at fo ow t ere s a part cu arengagement with the “hermeneutical tradition” represented by Paul Ricoeur, whowas himself on this issue much indebted to the thought of Hannah Arendt, and alsow t t e mo ern “soc a contract” tra t on represente y Jo n Raw s.

Paul Ricoeur’s ethics tells us that an unjust situation (one in which thecapa t es t at peop e ave reason to c oose an va ue, suc as t e capa ty of being fed, the capability of being healthy, of being educated, or of expressingoneself freely, have been denied) emerges from the fragility and fallibility of humaninstitutions. In One Self as Another , he famously proposed his definition of the endof et ca ntent ona ty as “t e goo fe w t an for ot ers n ust nst tut ons.” 5

For R coeur, ust ce s not so muc a matter of promot ng n v ua capa t es as amatter of promot ng t e nst tut ons t at w ensure t e v ng toget er of a goo fean w g ve some protect on from uman fa ty.

Fo ow ng Hanna Aren t, R coeur un erstan s uman act on as a mo e ouman soc a ty. We cannot act a one n so at on from ot ers. Soc et es emerge

rom t s power of cooperat ve act on: “T e po s, proper y spea ng, s not t e c ty-state n ts p ys ca ocat on; t s t e organ zat on of t e peop e as t ar ses out oacting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living togetherfor this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.” 16

Arendt suggests that that the ultimate meaning of personal action cannot bereduced to the intention of an individual agent. If the interior life of a person isexpressed and revealed by an action, the field out of which that revelation takes place is the whole life of the polis. This em e e ness of actions in social networksmakes their outcomes essentially unpredictable. Noone can be fully in control of the

actions that she attempts to undertake:t is because of this already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable,

conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose; but it isalso because of this medium, in which action alone is real, that it “produces” storieswith or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.17

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4 SÉVERINE D NE LIN, MATHIA NEBEL AND NI H LA SA KY

For both Ricoeur and Arendt, human freedom is fallible: it “is open to the actual,disruptive conditions of existence.” This unpredictable and intrinsically socialcharacter of human action leads, for Arendt, to another essential characteristic of

uman act on: remem rance.19

Act ons can on y e un erstoo after av ng eencarr e out. L e Aren t, R coeur recogn ses an scusses t e cruc a mportance onarrat ves n nterpret ng uman act ons. Narrat ves a ow uman act ons tru y to eappre en e ; t s narrat ves w c ren er uman act ons nte g e to ot ers. Mucof R coeur’s wor as een concerne w t t e cr t que of narrat ve, a cr t caen eavour w c as roug t m to t e necessary cr t que of soc a nst tut ons.

T s power ecomes mater a se an expresse n soc a structures. We canst ngu s t ree sp eres of t e nst tut ona sat on of power n structures, or t ree

structure f e s of act on w c set spat o-tempora m tat ons to n v ua uman

act on: t e cu tura , econom c an po t ca .Soc a structures e ong ng to t e cu tura sp ere are w at we cou ca

“essent a s”, for t ey are necessary to t e structur ng of t e person as person,actualising the social dimension of human being. These are the structures throughw c a c s nstructe a out t e wor w c s s own, an w c r ng m tot at age w ere e w e recogn se as respons e for s act ons y scommun ty. T ese structures are fun amenta y comm tte to t e transm ss onof commun ty, nasmuc as t s commun ty s structure , organ se , t e carr er ofa common story an t us a memory. T ese structures are comm tte to transm t a

savoir- aire a out t e wor , n e to t e pract ce of nst tut ons t at organ se t efe of t e commun ty. T erefore, t ey ave, n t e roa sense of t e wor , an“educative” function: they have to instruct the new generation so that this world

ecomes t e r wor .2 They ensure the historical continuity of a community.The structures of the economic sphere cover the satisfaction of the needs of

human beings – whether biological or to do with security, whether aesthetic orsymbolic – all of those needs the satisfaction of which contributes to a person’swell-being and can be acquired by the means of exchange. It is in such a perspectivet at one can ma e sense of Aren t’s stu y of a our as t e uman act v ty w cconfronts natural necessity.25 The activity humans share with all living creatures isthat of survival: to survive within the natural cycle of generation and decay. This permanent activity of production and consumption is sealed by necessity which, togive it its true value – that of survival – is not an activity peculiar to humanity.2

Structures of the economic sphere are thus all committed to survival, allowing one to

According to Hannah Arendt, structures are the manifestation of the institu-tionalisation of human freedom. She defines freedom as the power of innovation,“Men are free – as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom – as long as

they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.”

21

This specificexper ence of t e power of act on, env sage at t e eve of a commun ty an not at anindividual level, Arendt calls . Power, says Arendt, “corresponds to the humanaptitude to act and act in a concerted way. Power is never an individual property; itelongs to a group and continues to belong to it as long as it is not divided.” 22 Poweroes not, then, belong to the category of domination or violence, power is the “will to

act and to live together” in a historical community.2


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live. They give access to well-being, to what is useful and pleasant in the realm ofthat which money can buy. Among these structures, the market is the most importantinasmuch as it presides – even if not exclusively – over the huge processes of

production, distribution and consumption.Thirdly, the structures of the political sphere efine the structure fiel of actionin which humans are able to act and to act with political freedom. Indeed, life incommunity, seen as the will to live and to act together, is inspired by the hope of agood, which is the recognition of each and every one of its members in his or herfree om. T e ope w c nsp res suc fe s t at of v ng-we , t e content ow c s ust ce. We ave, ere, a c ear st nct on: on t e one an we ave t e

and dignity will be rationally established within a State governed by Law, whose

universality rests precisely in the fact that it applies to each and every one in thatcommun ty, an constra ns t e r act v t es for t e sa e of ust ce. It s t e Law-overne State w c effect ve y ena es t ere to e po t cs. However, t e conf ct

which bears upon the definition and the enactment of the good-life and of ustice isrecogn se as a strugg e n w c power s at sta e. T e structures of t e po t casp ere are t us comm tte y means of po t cs to esta s ng ust ce n t ecommunity.

For both Arendt and Ricoeur, the structures that emerge from, or within, thecommon life in a particular historical community are not necessarily oriented

towards a “good” common life. Social structures, whether belonging to the cultural,economic or political sphere, are marked by the flawed humanity of those whoconstitute them; they are marked by human finitude and fallibility. Social structurescan e perverte .

When for example structures of the cultural sphere are perverted, it is the verytransmission of the life of the community which is compromised. The commonworld gets lost and a particular society disappears. With the perversion of structuresin the economic sphere, it is the very possibility of survival which is endangere(through starvation, restricted access to the market, or restricted purchasing power).

When the structures of the political sphere are perverted, the very conditions of theood-life – of living as a human being – disappear (as with apartheid, torture, orenocide). For example, under the apartheid regime in South Africa, black people

were the victims of social policies and political decisions which set out to deny themopportunities to live a flourishing human life. Apartheid survived as long as it di because it expressed the moral framework embedded in many white people’s minds,a moral framework also embedded in the functioning of the institutions of society.At this level of shared assumptions, there was very little any individual could do toovercome apartheid.

It is accepted within this volume that structural in ustice is a reality. Structuralin ustice has an identifiable existence of its own and imposes itself on us with amalign and pernicious rationality. To take a simple economic example: a companymay be forced to move its activities from the UK to India to minimize labour costsand so maintain its competitive share of the market. If it does not follow competitorswho have previously invested in low-wage countries, the company will be doomed

po itica an on t e ot er po itics. T e ea equa ty of everyone n t e r free om

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6 SÉVERINE D , MATHIAS N BEL A D NICHOLAS SAGOVSKY

to an ruptcy. T e aws of supp y an eman mpose t e r rat ona ty on econom cactors w t a mat emat ca p re cta ty t at ta es tt e note of t e uman ves ot e n v ua uman e ngs t at are e n mar et transact ons. To c te an even

more trag c examp e of p anne structura n ust ce, t e Naz reg me pus e t rougt e “F na So ut on” to t e “Jew s Quest on” w t an aston s ng ureaucrat ceff c ency. T e operat ona rat ona ty of t e genoc e conferre a spur ousaccepta ty on an exterm nat on programme t at wou ave een mposs ewithout countless personal acts of compliance. 8 In such cases, the commitment toact together is no longer oriented towards the good life in common: it goes againsthuman flourishing. Structures have themselves become sinful; that is, they are perverted from their subsidiary function as structures which sustain the good life

or all.

Under the influence of liberation theologians, 9 after the Second Vatican Council(1962-5) the Catholic Church introduced the language of “structural sin” into itsmainstream social doctrine, but it drew the sting of the notion by prioritising the sinof in ivi uals:

Structures of sin are rooted in personal sin, and thus always linked to the concrete actsof individuals who introduce these structures, consolidate them and make them difficultto remove. And thus they grow stronger, spread, and become the source of other sins,and so influence people’s behaviour.30

Unjust structures, or structures of sin, were said to be rooted in personalwrongdoing: such acts of personal wrongdoing cumulatively build a structure whichcreates a “reality” in which it becomes difficult for human beings to amend or evensee their personal wrongdoings. The structure comes to represent a reality whichconstrains individuals’ actions in ways over which they have no control, and oftenno insight.

Theologians have identified two main characteristics of these “sinful” or un uststructures, which inhibit human flourishing. First, un ust structures generate theexperience of an impossible choice. The person is driven to undertake actions that hedisapproves of, producing what can be called “alienation”. Within the perverted

structure, the person is bound to play a social role which he disapproves of butcannot escape. There is a dis unction between what the person really is and the rolehe plays in the social structure. For example, a public servant in a country wherecorruption is rampant may not have been paid his wages for the last six months. Hisamily is close to starvation. As an honest man, he does not want to emulate his

colleagues and live by corrupt practices. He has been looking for another ob in the private sector, but, given the severe economic crisis, he has been unable to find any.At the sight of his starving family, he finally decides to participate in the corrupt practices by which he is surrounded. Such a person is forced into wrongdoing he has

not chosen and of which he disapproves – but that has been imposed on him byan unjust structure. He can neither change the situation himself nor escape it. In theshort term at least, and as an individual, he has no option but to contribute to thecorrupt system in order to survive. The personal and willing actions of othermembers of the society before him have created a reality which imposes


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wrongdoing32 on all its current members, a reality from which in the short term thereis no escape. Second, when alienation is prolonged and when the perversion ostructures in all spheres is such, people may become “enslaved”. The person can no

longer see his own alienation. He has been blinded as much to his complicity in theunjust structure as to the contradiction between what he says and what he does.Worse still, this inability to see is intensified, so it seems, by an inability, even if hewanted – but he does not – to break free from this dynamic of unjust interaction.That was, for example, precisely the situation of the South Africans of Europeanorigin who, under the apartheid regime, seemed incapable of recognising thescandalous nature of their practical racism and energetically rejected any change inthe apartheid system.

hen injustice is institutionalised, the danger is that the individuals whomaintain these unjust structures will become blinded to the wrongdoing of their ownactions. The sense of powerlessness (one could even speak of the sense of fatalism)with regard to what one can do individually to change such an unjust structure soon becomes indifference. Why care about the Rwandan genocide? What could I havedone to stop it? Why care about the street child in Colombia? My having less foodon my plate in the UK (or not throwing away what I have left!) will not make onechild less hungry. Beyond indifference lies acquiescence: what can one do to promote human development but work with the all-powerful structures of globalcapitalism?33

e trage y of structura n ust ce s t at t ese structures are not amena e tocorrect on y t e exerc se of one n v ua ’s w – ne t er s t e n v ua free to

ssoc ate mse f from t ese structures. T e act on of a s ng e n v ua can, n t es ort term, o very tt e to c ange t e s tuat on. uman beings are born into unjuststructures in which they seem to have no other option but furthering the in ustice.For individuals who suffer from structural in ustice, there is no escape; there are nogood solutions. No unfettered possibility or course of action seems to be open tothem. Here we must face the question as to what an individual can do, all alone,when faced by an un ust structure. Certainly, not what he can achieve with others in

opposition to a malign institution. For if individual action is in effect doomed tofailure, concerted, coordinated action by a group can often achieve success. One canonly, in fact, resist an institutionalised interaction by opposing it with anotherinteraction, that is to say by situating oneself at the same level of power.

None of the authors in this volume adopt a position of social determinism.Underlying their critique of the capability approach is the conviction that unjuststructures can be transformed if people oin their efforts together. While, in the shortrun, there may seem to be no other possibility than for the perpetrators to maintainunjust structures and the victims to suffer from them, in the long run, individualvictims have the power to unite and overcome structural injustice. Victims can joinwith others in the society who are in solidarity with them, and raise an outcry againstthe situation. Those within the “unjust structures” may become responsive (whetherin response to the outcry or because of their own moral markers) and organisetransformation from within the “unjust structure”. It is, for example, because of the



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8 SÉVERINE D , MATHIAS N BEL A D NICHOLAS SAGOVSKY

o nt efforts of numerous n v ua v ct ms of apart e n Sout Afr ca (toget erw t externa pressures from o es suc as t ose t at app e sanct ons an nterna pressures from w te Sout Afr cans an ot ers w o res ste t e system) t at

apart e was eventua y overcome; or, to ta e anot er examp e, t s ecause of t eo nt efforts of numerous n v ua women (an some men) t at women ave wont e r g t to vote. T e extent to w c n v ua s can confront an even overcomeun ust structures, an t e way n w c effect ve strateg es for t e transformat on ofunjust structures and the realisation of human capabilities can be developed, are twoof the central issues discussed in this book.

The essays in this book were delivered at a conference sponsored by the Von HügelInstitute in Cambridge, UK, on 26-27 June 2003, on “Transforming UnjustStructures.” This was the third in a series of conferences sponsored by the Institute,all of which have engaged with the capability approach of Amartya Sen. The first,“Justice and Poverty: Examining Sen’s Capability Approach”, which took place inJune 2001, focused on the capability approach directly; the second “PromotingWomen’s Capabilities: Examining Nussbaum’s Capability Approach” brought thecapability approach of Sen into dialogue with that of Martha Nussbaum. The HumanDevelopment and Capability Association was then founded in September 2004 to promote high quality research in the interconnected areas of human development

and capability, including inter alia the quality of life, poverty, justice, gender,development and the environment.

T s vo ume opens w t a eynote a ress y Pau R coeur on “Capa t es anR g ts.” R coeur r ngs toget er t e concepts of capa ty an r g ts un er t eencompass ng not on of recognition, y w c e means t e ent f cat on of anytem as e ng tse f an not anyt ng e se. He attr utes t e not on of capa t es to

t e oma n of t e recogn t on of persons, an w t n t at oma n to se f-recogn t on,w st e attr utes t e concept of r g ts to mutua recogn t on. L e Sen, R coeur

un erstan s capa t es to e ong to t e ex con of uman act on. He ent f es t ea ty to spea , to act an to te (an so to ave “narrat ve ent ty”). He goesfurther by claiming that such action pertains to the assertion of selfhood at thereflexive level, that is, to a recognition of responsibility. Because I know myself to be able to act in this way, I am responsible for my actions. Agents are, however, noton y accounta e to t emse ves for t e r own act ons, t ey are a so mutua yaccounta e. T e recogn t on of suc mutua accounta ty r ges t e gap etweent e ant ropo og ca anguage of capa ty an t e ur ca anguage of r g ts. ForR coeur, r g ts are nstruments w c ensure t e mutua accounta ty of peop e’sact ons. T roug t e ascr pt on of r g ts, t e capa t es of peop e are mutua yrecognised. The struggle for such recognition takes place in different “spheres” – forexamp e, t e soc a , t e po t ca an t e cu tura . W ere suc recogn t on can eachieved, it brings the benefit of increased self-esteem tightly linked to increasesocial esteem.

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T e approac es of Sen an R coeur are furt er compare an comp emente nSéver ne Deneu n’s essay. S e scusses Sen’s capa ty approac to eve opmentas a freedom-centred view of development which is built upon three foundational

e ements: t e a m of eve opment as t e expans on of t e capa t es or free omst at peop e ave reason to c oose an va ue; n v ua agency as t e means t rougwhich these freedoms are to be expanded; and participatory or democratic decision-making as a privileged way through which that individual agency will be expressed.Deneulin argues that, as it stands, the capability approach is too “thin” to offerguidelines for actions which could transform the unjust structures that impedemany peop e from exerc s ng t e capa t es t ey ave reason to c oose an va ue.R coeur’s et c of ust ce s put forwar as a way of comp ement ng an“t c en ng” t e capa ty approac n ts tas of remov ng unfree oms. F rst, Sen’sre uctance to spec fy t e va ua e capa t es t at are t e en s of po c es nee sto e t c ene y a v s on of t e goo fe, eyon uman free om. T econsequent a st eva uat on of act ons nee s to e comp emente y a te eo og caapproach that directs actions towards specific ends of human flourishing. Second,Sen’s emphasis on individuals as subjects of development needs to be thickened bythe acknowledgment of the existence of collective subjects, or of what Ricoeur hasca e “structures of v ng toget er.” T s mp es t e use of soc o- stor canarrat ves for un erstan ng eve opment po c es an outcomes, for uman act ons never a- stor ca an etac e from a commun ty. An t r , ecause of t e

frag ty an fa ty of t e exerc se of uman free om, po cy ec s ons w c are

pure y ase on t e exerc se of free om n t e po t ca commun ty nee to et c ene y proce ures of ec s on-ma ng w c ma e ess frag e t e processes

y w c t e con t ons for a goo uman fe are secure . Sa ne A re argues t at t e wr t ngs of Amartya Sen t emse ves conta n t e

necessary elements to transform unjust structures. In addition to his writings onwelfare economics and social choice theory, Sen has written extensively on publicaction and democratic practice. Democratic practice, complementing Sen’sun erstan ng of we - e ng as t e fu f ment of as c capa t es, s t e eye ement for confront ng structura n ust ce. A re eg ns w t Sen’s we - nown

stu es of t e ro e of pu c outcry n effect ng pos t ve c ange n fam ne-prones tuat ons. S e t en traces Sen’s use of re ate concepts suc as pu c act on an part c pat on, an t e ro e e env sages for t em n a ress ng n ust ces suc asc ron c unger an e ucat ona epr vat on. S e a so ana yses t e ro e of emocrat c pract ce n va ue format on an c ange. Sen’s wor comments on emocrat c pract ce an re ate act ons as nstruments y w c to confront n ust ce – ut owis such democratically-based action to come about? One mechanism is the self-interest of decision-makers: politicians facing re-election must respond to popular

eman s. However, many of t ose w o operate un ust nst tut ons are notemocrat ca y accounta e: on s of so ar ty an mperfect o gat on must e

cu t vate to confront t em. To overcome t e “em e e co ect ve act on pro em,” comm tte act v sts w t n nst tut ons seen to e un ust nee to organ zean wor toget er for construct ve c ange. T ey nee to recru t “comm tte power ro ers” as agents of c ange.

TRANSFORMING U JUST S


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Nicholas Sagovsky widens the debate on the capability approach and structuralinjustice by introducing the thought of the most influential political philosopher ofhe twentieth century: John Rawls. First, he asks to what extent Sen pays attention to

he social. He argues that for Sen, social factors are always seen to be subsidiary tohe fulfilment of individual well-being. By contrast, though Rawls is similarlyconcerned with individual well-being, his primary focus remains on the social.

A Theory o Justice (1971) begins with the lapidary statement, “Justice is the firstvirtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” Sagovsky sets out to bring Rawls into dialogue with Sen, asking what contribution Rawls has to make, both to the debate about human capabilities and to that about structural in ustice. Heinterprets Rawls’ concern with ustice as a concern for a polity that will enableindividuals to flourish in a way similar to that outlined by Sen. However, althoughRawls offers a programme for the conforming of social institutions to the regulativenorm of a ust “basic structure” in society, he fails to confront the issue as towhether certain social institutions are intrinsically un ust. Sagovsky suggests that byRawlsian criteria some social institutions may be seen as impervious toransformation for the better; also, that there is an urgent need to recover the sense,

alongside Rawls’ “primary goods,” of “common goods.” To this end, Sagovskysuggests a third principle of justice to add to Rawls’ other two: that the basicstructure of society must not work to the disadvantage of future generations. He alsosuggests, as a complement to Sen’s capability approach, the notion of “socialcapability”, which echoes the language of Sen but fits more comfortably with the

hought of Rawls.Discussing the potential of Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach and her

work in feminist ethics for transforming the structural injustices that oppress womenworldwide, Lisa Sowle Cahill argues that if the capability approach is to achieve its potential for improving the situation of women worldwide, it can profitably be brought into dialogue with insights from Catholic social teaching. Both take auniversalist standpoint on values, and both take embodiment as the basis for

efining human values and obligations, but Catholic social teaching has a lot tocontribute regarding the intrinsic sociality of the person, and has a more positive

attitude towards the role of religion as an empowering factor. The Catholic traditionhas insisted that women’s sexual embodiment is intrinsically social (although it linkssexuality with reproduction for women, but not for men), in contrast to Martha Nuss aum w o ana yses sexua em o ment n t e mo e of n v ua c o ce.Moreover, while Nussbaum sees compassion as a basic social virtue to promote justice, she ignores the power of religion in nurturing that virtue. Finally, theCat o c tra t on, w t ts emp as s on t e common goo , so ar ty, su s ar tyand the dignity of work, has a potentially significant transformative impact on peop e’s ves, a e t treat ng women fferent y from men. T s contrasts w t Nuss aum’s comm tment to gen er equa ty an ( n t e Kant an sense) emp as s oneach person as an end in herself or himself. Each could thus learn from the other inorder to be a liberating force in the lives of oppressed women.

he second part of the volume deals with more concrete examples of structuraln ust ce an ways n w c t e capa ty approac can t row g t on t ese. Teresa


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Godwin Phelps examines the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission inSouth Africa in restoring justice. She particularly highlights the importance of thecapability to narrate (a capability which Sen’s capability approach has tended to

overlook but which Ricoeur has highlighted) in order to transform an un ustoppressive state into a ust democratic one. Remembrance and the capability to tellstories can be a powerful instrument for restoring structures which have been perverted by inhuman actions. Godwin Phelps argues that truth reports, by narratingthe stories of the victims, can work as a compensatory mechanism for the victims, asa satisfying response from the state to recognise its past abuses and inhuman actsand to open a more human and ust future. She especially inquires into what storiescan do and how they operate in people’s lives, and puts forward seven ways inwhich the activities of truth commissions may provide justice to victims. First,storytelling is an essential human activity through which humans assert theirhumanity; narrating gives humans an identity as persons inserted in a certaincommunity and history. Second, stories can balance acts of violence by giving theopportunity to victims to recover a sense about themselves and to tell the truth.Third, stories are ways of discovering the truth. As perpetrators and victims willoften not be able to give their testimonies in a court, truth reports can be a way ofdelivering the truth that would otherwise be unknown. Fourth, stories can translateand communicate among diverse people. In contexts of great social, ethnic ancultural diversity, stories help to communicate between people with a universallanguage. Fifth, storytelling is carnival, that is, a space in which people are

temporarily freed from the existing social structures, an alternative social space thatallows the participation of all. Sixth, storytelling is also a sacramental act, a way ofmaking visible what is invisible, of putting back together what was once dismantledand fragmented. And, finally, the collection of stories into truth reports issues indocuments that contribute to the creation of a renewed country with more ustoun ations.

Jean-Michel Bonvin and Nicolas Farvaque examine the particular in usticesengendered by contemporary social policies aimed at tackling exclusion from theabour market in Europe. They analyse the relevance of the capability approach as

an alternative framework for assessing the structures to which social integration policies give rise, and for proposing actions that would make these structures more just. They note that, when assessed according to the framework of the capabilityapproach, unemployment has many faces beyond the loss of income. Whenemployment policies focus on the loss of income as an instrument of socialntegration while ignoring the institutional framework that disallows people from

exercising the capabilities they have reason to choose and value, they fail to meettheir aim of reinserting the unemployed into the labour market. The choice of anadequate informational basis for judging states of affairs has thus far-reaching policyconsequences. Employment policies ought fully to take into account theconsequences of unemployment upon people’s wide range of capabilities, amongwhich Bonvin and Farvaque single out the capability for work (the capability tochoose the kind of work one has reason to choose and value) and the capability “forvoice.” When assessed against the criterion of the promotion of these capabilities,some current employment policies in Europe generate patently unjust structures.



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Bonvin and Farvaque focus on three types of employment policies: those which provide people outside the labour markets with cash benefits (decommodification policies), those which attempt to make job-seekers more employable via training

mechanisms (human capital approaches to social integration policies) and thosewhich constrain the unemployed back into work (workfare policies). They argue thatan effective way of expanding people’s capabilities is to make employment policiesncorporate the capability for voice of the unemployed and other local actors, that is,

the capability of people to make their own concerns heard and to take part in theecisions that affect their lives. In conclusion, some instances of the incorporation

of this capability for voice in employment policies and in the work of localemployment agencies are described.

Michael Watts and David Bridges address the structural injustices through whichyoung people from families with no tradition of higher education and from lowersocio-economic groups are underrepresented in the student body. They focus on theUK Government White Paper he Future o Higher E ucation which calls attentionto the injustices embedded in current access to higher education. In calling forgreater equality of access, the White Paper makes the assumption that highereducation is desirable – at least for 50 per cent of the country’s young people. Thisreflects policies which, out of a concern for social inclusion and economic

evelopment, seek to extend access to higher education. Watts and Bridges drawupon their recent study of the aspirations and achievements of young people whohave chosen not to enter higher education to address the relationship between

“capability” and higher education. They contest the widespread view that lowaspirations and low achievements prevent young people from entering highereducation. They discuss why some young people choose to exercise their capabilityno to enter higher education. Past injustices and the deficiencies of present policyare examined and illustrated through one of the life histories generated by theresearch. In order to consider the freedoms young people have to achieve the

ifferent lifestyles they aspire to (the real opportunities they have regardingeducational participation) the authors posit three “typologies”: those who arenitiated into, aspire to, or are outside higher education. Each of these is analysed in

terms of capabilities. Although the drive for wider access to higher education is to be applauded, they conclude, the failure to address the real opportunities peoplehave to enjoy the educational lives they want to lead (including the opportunities toqu t e ucat on free from t e accusat on of av ng ow asp rat ons an ac evements)suggests that this may be an enterprise that is doomed simply to establish othere ucat ona n ust ces.

Anot er concrete case of structura n ust ce s ana yse y V ncent Rougeau,w o exam nes t e part cu ar n ust ces t at poor, ma n y ac , peop e are suffer ngn t e Un te States an t e extent to w c current Amer can we fare po c es are

contr ut ng to ma nta n ng, f not eepen ng, t ese n ust ces. Amer can we fare

po c es, an n ee Amer can cu ture, are c aracter se y an entrenc ecommitment to individual freedom and autonomy. Within the Americanconservative mind-set, poverty is seen as a failure of personal virtue, as a statedeserved by those who lack sufficient will and ambition to work, gain an income,an c m t e soc a a er. T e aut or s ows t at w ere persona autonomy s


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valued more than community integration, American law and public policies are poor y equ ppe to tac e poverty. Current Amer can we fare po c es of ass stanceto the poor (such as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconc at on Act of 1996 w c gave r se to t e “we fare-for-wor ” po c es) arease upon t ese era va ues of persona autonomy an eserve poverty, ma nga mean ngfu strugg e aga nst poverty even more ff cu t. Rougeau argues t at away for po c es n t e Un te States to e more con uc ve to poverty re uct on s tore- scover a not on of t e common goo . Draw ng espec a y from R coeur’s et cs,w t ts un erstan ng of so ar ty (se f-esteem an so c tu e) an of nst tut onsnecessary for good-living-together, from Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approach,and from David Hollenbach’s recent work on the common good (i.e., the good ofe ng a commun ty), Rougeau reassesses Amer can we fare reforms. He part cu ar y

exam nes ways n w c reforms cou etter ntegrate t e poor nto Amer cansoc ety, ways n w c t ey cou en n e a sense of communa respons ty nAmer can cu ture as an a ternat ve to t e va ue of persona autonomy, an ways nw c t ey cou u t e structura f oun at ons for a equate ncomes an soc asupport for t e Amer can poor.

u e C ague app es Sen’s capa ty approac to t e wor of commerc anvestment n otec no ogy, supp ement ng t w t t e anguage of t e common

goo w c s fun amenta to Cat o c soc a teac ng. S e f rst s ows t eenormous importance of biotechnology for the future health (and so the futurecapa t es) of peop e t roug out t e wor an t e concentrat on of e cate

otec no ogy f rms n Amer ca, Europe an Japan. C ague t en scusses t e processes of patent ng w c protect t e returns upon t e uge cap ta nvestmentrequ re for researc an eve opment n t s f e . T s protect on of nte ectua property operates mass ve y to t e sa vantage of poorer nat ons an may a so

n er future researc . New tra e agreements n t e 1990s, espec a y t e Tra e-re ate Aspects of Inte ectua Property R g ts (TRIPs) Agreement s gne n 1994t g tene nternat ona nte ectua property ru es, ra s ng furt er concerns a out t e

sa vantag ng of poorer nat ons n access to t e enef ts of otec no ogy. T esequestions have become yet more acute with the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic

amongst poorer countries and the need for cheap anti-retroviral drugs. The WorldBan , t e Wor Hea t Organ sat on, t e Un te Nat ons Deve opment Programmean t e European Comm ss on ave a expresse concern a out t e ong-term effectof TRIPs on t e ava a ty of ea t care n t e ess eve ope countr es. In t e ast part of er essay, C ague focuses on t e ust ce ssues ra se y otec patent ng,argu ng t e nee for structures, nst tut ons an po t ca systems w c ave aconcern for ust ce an t e common goo at t e r eart. S e eve ops t e ea o“ enef t-s ar ng,” s ow ng w y t e enef ts of genet c researc s ou e seen as acommon goo an s are accor ng y.

CONCLUSION: A WAY FORWARD?

The origins of this volume lie in a close and appreciative study of the capabilityapproach of Amartya Sen, which has been found fruitful not only for development



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economists, but for social and political critics of developed societies. The work ofthe Von Hügel Institute is to look for ways of transforming poverty and in ustice,whether in the developed or in the developing world. Its foundation is Roman

Catholic – hence a concern in its work for the engagement of Catholic socialteaching with contemporary political and social critique. The work of Amartya Sen,which espouses no explicit religious or metaphysical basis, has nevertheless prove particularly congenial in this regard because of its open concern with humanflourishing (human capability), and its thoroughgoing commitment to humanfreedom.

Nevertheless, the work of Sen needs careful probing. He writes much more aboutreedom and freedoms than about ustice: within the Christian tradition freedom andustice must be held in close relation to one another, for both find their metaphysicaloundation in the being and activity of God. Sen offers us a peculiarly rich construal

of freedom, because of his commitment to the freedom of the individual to identifyand pursue the goals that he or she chooses and values. Nussbaum, who has alsodeveloped her own version of the capability approach, is no less committed toreedom as intrinsic to her anthropology, but is prepared to be much more

prescriptive about the kinds of goals that human beings will choose and value, andshould be enabled to pursue. In being more prescriptive (in identifying and listing“central human capabilities”) she opens the way to the social affirmation and thesocial prescription of such goals – she reconnects the capability approach withthe subsidiary function of social institutions such as those of health, education, the

me ia an the law. Nussbaum, by being more prescriptive in her anthropology than Sen, may besaid to suggest a more clearly defined subsidiary social agenda, and in this to drawcloser to Catholic social teaching. Nevertheless, the flourishing of the individual, theullest possible realisation of the capabilities that the individual chooses to develop,

remains for her the social goal that can best be espoused by a plural society with aliberal agenda for ustice. There are, however, complementary questions to beexplored which are raised by those for whom the social agenda is more clearlydefined. For them, human action is embedded within the life of a particular society

as it persists through time. It is supported and developed by the society’s history, itsnarratives, its traditions and rituals (an area where Catholic social teaching has in itscritique a great deal to offer). Human action is sustained by the deployment o power in its favour, whether illegitimately, as in totalitarian regimes, or legitimately

n what Rawls calls “deliberative democracies.” In the study of this power, particularly as it is deployed institutionally and in the service of justice (orotherwise), thinkers like Ricoeur, Arendt and Rawls have a great deal to offer – anare partners in dialogue with the capability approach.

It is the conviction of the editors that the capability approach, particularly asdeveloped by Sen, is robust enough to sustain still further searching enquiry. It is

also the conviction of the editors that within this volume there lie important pointersto ways in which Sen’s approach needs to be complemented if it is to be still moreeffect ve y ep oye n t e serv ce of uman f our s ng. T e e ate s far fromconcluded.


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NOTES

1 That social order emerges from utility and profit maximisation has been mathematically “proved” byArrow-Debreu’s general equilibrium theorem in 1958.

2 The critique of commodification – of air, or water, or land, or labour – is an important factor at this po nt, for t at w c can e commo f e can e tra e w t n t e un ust systems of nternat ona

xc ange. Envronmenta sts suc as George Mon ot cf. Mon ot, 2003 ma e t s po nt verystrongly.

3 Nuss aum, 1997; Sen, 1987.4 Hence, t e famous Pareto opt ma ty cr ter a w c ave ong serve as normat ve gu e nes for

we fare econom cs.5 See for examp e Sen, 1992, 1993, 1999.6 en, 1993: 30.7 Nuss aum, 2000: 76-80.8 Nuss aum, 1990.9 A am Sm t , often cons ere to e t e f rst econom st, e t e C a r of Mora P osop y at t e

Un vers ty of G asgow, see Sen, 1987.10 Cf. W fr Owen’s poem Dulce et decorum est ” “It s goo an onoura e” , w c conc u es y

speaking of “The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori”. See E. Blunden, ed. The Poems ofWilfred Owen. Lon on: C atto an W n us, 1931, 66.

11 Sen, 1999: chapter 2.12 Sen, 2002: 83.13 Sen, 1992: 151.14 Ibid.: 40. Italics are ours.15 Ricoeur, 1992: 172.16 Arendt, 1958: 198.17 Ibid.: 184.18 Ricoeur, 1966: xxix.19 For a summary of Arendt’s thought, see for example Passerin d’Entrèves, 1994.20 Ricoeur, 2000, 2004.21 Arendt, 1961: 153.22 Arendt, 1973: 113.23

ommun ty fe. Inst tut ons wor out a social situation y organ s ng an mpos ng a pattern oe av our n or er to ac eve a common goa . R coeur, 1990: 230.

24 Aren t, 1961: 173-196.25

Aren t, 1958: 79-135.26 Ibid.27 Aren t, 1961: 153-154, 162-165.28 McFadyen, 2000: 80-104.29 ustavo Gut errez notes t at from t e eg nn ng erat on t eo og ans st ngu s e etween 1

political and social liberation, which “points to the immediate causes of poverty and injustice,spec a y w t regar to soc o-econom c structures,” 2 uman erat on, mean ng t at, “a t oug

aware t at c ang ng soc a structures s mportant” we nee to go eeper, an 3 erat on fromse f s ness an s n. I t was ecause t e erat on t eo og ans focuse on t e pro em of poverty t att ey were confronte w t t e en em c n ust ce of soc a structures w c mpover s e – structuresrom w c t e poor nee e to f n t e strengt to erate t emse ves, as no one e se was go ng to o tor t em. See Gut errez, 1999: 26.

30 Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 1987, § 36.2. Italics are ours.31 Nebel, 2002.32 One has to note that in Catholic social teaching, the wrongdoing (corruption) is objectively wrong, but

the intention of the person doing the wrong (feeding his family) is not wrong.33 For popular critique, see Stiglitz, 2004; Monbiot, 2003.34 See http://www.hd-ca.org.

Power usua y oes not ac eve “somet ng,” ut rat er creates a pecu ar conf gurat on of



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REFERENCES

Aren t, Hanna 1958 , The Human Condition, C cago: C cago Un vers ty Press ________ 1961 , Between Past an d Future: Six Exe rcises in Poli ti ca l Thou ght , Lon on: Fa er

an Fa er ________ 1973 , Crises of the Republic, Harmon swort : Pengu n

ut errez, Gustavo 1999 , “T e Tas an Content of L erat on T eo ogy”, n C. Row an , e . ,Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, Cam r ge: Cam r ge Un versty Press

cFa yen, A. 2000 , Bound to Sin, Cam r ge: Cam r ge Un vers ty Presson ot, G. 2003 , The Age of Consent , Lon on: F am mgo

Ne e , Mat as 2002 , “In ust ce an Inst tut ons: A Ref ect on on S n an Soc a Structures”,Mimeograph. Paper presente at t e Von Hüge Inst tute, St E mun ’s Co ege, Cam r ge, June.

Nuss aum, Mart a 1990 , “Ar stote an Soc a Democracy”, n B. Doug ass t al., e s, Liberalism andthe Good, Lon on: Rout e ge

________ 1997 , “F awe Foun at ons: T e P osop ca Cr t que of a Part cu ar Type oconom cs”, University of Chicago Law Review 4: 11 -1 14

________ 2000 , Women and Human Development: A Study in Human Capabilities , Cam r ge:Cam r ge Un vers ty Press

Passerin d’Entrèves, Maurizio (1994), The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt , London: Routledgecoeur, Pau 1966 , Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, Trans. E. . Ko á

ort western Un vers ty Press ________ 1990 , oi-Même comme un Autre, Par s: Seu ________ (1992), Oneself as Another, Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press ________ 2000 , La Mémoire, l’Histoire et l’Oubli , Par s: eu

________ 2004 , Memory, History and Forgetting, Trans. Kat een B amey an D. Pe auer, C cago:n vers ty of C cago Pressen, Amartya 1987 , On Ethics and Economics, xfor : Bas B a c we

________ 1992 , Inequality Re-examined , Oxfor : C aren on Press ________ 1993 , “Capa ty an We -Be ng”, n M. Nuss aum an A. Sen, e s, Quality of Life,

xfor : aren on Press ________ 1999 , Development as Freedom, Oxfor : Oxfor Un vers ty Press ________ 2002 , Freedom and Rational Choice, Cam r ge, MA: Harvar Un vers ty Press

t g tz, Josep 2004 , Globalisation and its Discontents, Lon on: Pengu n


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CHAPTER 1

PAUL RICOEUR

CAPABILITIES AND RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

My purpose n t s c apter s to r ge t e og ca gap w c separates t e two as cconcepts t at our t t e puts s e y s e. T e term capa i ity e ongs to p osop caant ropo ogy; t at o rig ts to t e p osop y of aw.

My suggest on s to su or nate t ese two eterogeneous not ons to anencompass ng not on of w c t ey wou e part a components. T e estcan ate for t s ntegrat on enterpr se s, to my m n , t at of recognition,understood as a dynamic process connecting a plurality of points of view as thedistinctive steps of the same development. In a study that I am now devoting to the process of recognition, I start with the preliminary logical use of the term at stake,name y recogn t on, w c I ta e to e ent f cat on of any tem as e ng tse f an

not anyt ng e se. T s f rst step n t e process of recogn t on w not e superse ey t e fo ow ng ones: quest ons of ent f cat on w rema n mp e n t eass gnment of capa t es an r g ts at anot er stage. From t s f rst og ca step ot e process I move to ts use n a more ex stent a context, t at of t e recogn t on of persons. T e not on o capa i ities e ongs to a st nct ve prov nce of t erecogn t on of persons, t at of se f-recogn t on, as I s a try to s ow. As to t econcept of rights, it refers to a further step, that of mutual recognition, according toits juridical connotation.

The first part of this study will be devoted to capabilities as the basic topic of

se f-recogn t on. T e secon part, to r g ts nvo ve n mutua recogn t on.

CAPABILITIES AND SELF-RECOGNITION

aken in its broader sense, the word capabilities belongs to the lexicon of humanaction. It designates the kind of power that we claim to be able to exercise. In itsturn this claim expresses the kind of recognition pertaining to the assertion oselfhood at the reflexive level. This kind of self-recognition may be already detecten the most ancient literary documents of our western culture. In his book hame

an Necessity, Bernard Williams speaks in the most natural way of the recogn t on responsi i ity w c e etects n t e e av our o Homer c an trag c eroes, to

2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.. Deneulin et a . ds. ), Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach, 17- .


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t e extent t at t ey eep as ng t emse ves w at t ey nten to o. T ey pract sedeliberation, in a sense of the term that Aristotle will later elaborate systematically:the heroes keep comparing, weighing, preferring one party to another, then choosing

a course of act on an fac ng t e consequences.

1

The recognition of responsibilitymp es suc quest ons as: “W o w at?” an answers of t e form: “I, so an so,did it!” To follow Bernard Williams a little further, the Greek heroes may be held to

e “centres of ec s on”, w atever nterpretat on may e g ven of t e r mot vat on.T s as c examp e re ate to a past cu ture a ows us to propose a m n madefinition of capability as the power to cause something to happen; it is this powert at s a e to se f-recogn t on.

Starting from these introductory remarks, I consider as a philosophical task theexploration of the main structures of what is held to be human capability. From anepistemological point of view, I want to underline the semantic proximity between

self-recognition and attestation as concerns the kind of certitude and confidenceattac e to assert ons ntro uce y t e mo a ver “I can”. “I e eve t at I can”wou e t e as c assert on concern ng capa t es; t e term “ e ef” use w t nt s framewor of attestat on or se f-recogn t on s st nct from ts use n at eoret ca context w ere t amounts to a wea form of t eoret ca t n ng, o

now e ge.T s conf ence (attac e to assert ons ntro uce y t e mo a force of t e

express on “I can”) as not ou t as ts contrary ut susp c on, w c can e refuteonly by some reassurance of the same epistemic nature as the contested certitude. A

whole phenomenology of certitude in its theoretical and practical use is requiredhere. To the same phenomenological investigation belongs the reference of eachassert on of capa ty to ro es p aye y ot er peop e, suc as e p ng, prevent ng,or ng, or co-operat ng w t t e agent. T s n etween se f-assert on an

ot erness or a ter ty w come to t e forefront w en we cons er t e connect ngn s w t n t e ant ropo ogy of capa t es an t e ur ca sp ere of r g ts.

W at I nten to o after t ese forma remar s s to escr e a ser es of as ccapa t es n a erarc ca or er cu m nat ng n a spec f c capa ty: t at w c prov es t e trans t on from factua to normat ve capa t es an , accor ng y, t etrans t on from capa t es at arge to r g ts at arge.

The first basic capability is the capacity to speak: I can speak . The priority givento t s capa ty may e v n cate from severa po nts of v ew: t e Homer c antrag c eroes eep spea ng a out t e r ee s; t e r ver a exc ange s t e su stanceof t e ep c or trag c poem. T ey es gnate t emse ves as t e “cause” or t e“pr nc p e” of t e r act on. T e contemporary pragmat cs of scourse conf rms t sv ew: accor ng to t e famous motto of Aust n’s p osop y of or nary scourse,to spea s “to o t ngs w t wor s”. In t s way, act on an speec go an n

an , to t e extent t at spea ng s tse f a n of act on. T e ana ys s of t e

performat ve component of any statement, nc u ng factua assert ons, prov est e expecte prec s on; t e spea ng su ect s a e to es gnate mse f erse f ythe use of specific linguistic devices, among them personal pronouns, possessiveadjectives, proper names, etc. For the sake of our enquiry, I want to underline thet g t connect on etween se f- es gnat on an nter ocut on; t e s mp est ver a


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expression requires an ear to receive it; the structure “question-answer” is para-gmat c as regar s t e corre at on etween e ocut on an nter ocut on. Even

constat ve assert ons are n nee of conf rmat on an approva on t e part of t e

ot er. We may a rea y ant c pate t e c a m to e ear as a r g t to spea .From t e capa ty to spea , we move to t e apacity to act , n t e spec f c

mean ng of e ng a e to ma e events appen. T e su ect may recogn se mse f orerse f as t e “cause”, g v ng t e form of a c a m to t e assert on: i it ; am t e

one w o i it. For mo ern t oug t t s c a m as ost a nnocence. We cannot e pevoking the Kantian antinomy opposing, at the cosmological level, the causalconnection to the assignment of free spontaneity to moral agents. We shall laterreturn to the basic concept of imputation, or liability, as the capacity bridging thegap etween escr pt ve an prescr pt ve not ons. At t e present stage of our

presentat on t s enoug to ay t e stress on our capac ty to generate c anges at t e p ys ca , nterpersona an soc a eve . T s capac ty ma es us nto agents n t estrong sense, agents capable of answering questions related to the w o structure oact on, as st nct from quest ons nqu r ng nto t e w at s e of events as mere yoccurr ng. To un er ne t e st nct on etween w at an w o, some p osop ers

orrow from the sphere of law and urisprudence the concept o ascription, fillingt e gap etween escr pt on an prescr pt on. In t e same way as we ascr e r g tsto individuals, we ascribe to them the capacity to designate themselves as the trueauthors of their deeds. Such ascription of action to an agent is part of the meaning of

action as a capacity. It characterises as “agency” this tight link between action andagent. We may then say that the action belongs to the agent who appropriates it andcalls it his own.

I now want to put in the third place the capacity to tell , to tell stories aboutevents and characters, including oneself. To a large extent, what we call personalidentity is linked to this capacity and may be characterised as narrative identity. Inthis regard the branch of semiotics devoted to narrative structures under the label onarratology may be put in line with the categories forged by Aristotle in the oetics,the categories of muthos, translated as “plot”, and of mimesis, i.e. imitation orrepresentation of action. In this way, the characters themselves may be said to beemplotted and the notion of character becomes a narrative category. This connection between plot and character may be held to be the conceptual matrix of our modernnotion o narrative i entity. The adoption of this category has several implicationswhich play a decisive role in discussions bearing on capabilities and rights. First ofall, it provides a temporal dimension to the very notion of identity. Second,concerning the relation of the told action and its agent, it allows us to distinguish between the two kinds of identity. In nese as not er I propose t e st nct on

etween idem an ipse, between sameness and selfhood. It wou e wrong to

assign only ipse identity to persons. Narrative identity relies rather on the ongoingdialectic between idem and ipse identity, between sameness and selfhood. As wes a s ow ater, t s t s a ect ca const tut on of persona ent ty w c c a msrecogn t on at t e eve of ur ca , soc a an po t ca re at ons ps. MacIntyre asg ven to t e not on of narrat ve ent ty ts fu scope y propos ng t e not on of t e


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narrative unity o a i e. According to him this concept is able to support Aristotle’sconcept o goo li e. In fact, how could a sub ect of action assign an ethicalqualification to his or her personal life if he or she were not able to gather this life in

the terms of a narrative identity? One more remark concerning the capability to tell:thanks to narrative identity, the capability to tell provides a structure to personal andcollective memory. This implication is particularly relevant to our furtherdiscussion. If we take into account the encounter between competitive memoriesrelated to the same traumatic events, we are confronted with a situation of conflict preventing any attempt to reconcile antagonistic groups of any kind. Collectivememories are threatened with being swallowed by what Freud called the impulse torepeat instead of remembering. Psychoanalysis assigns to hidden resistances this pathology of memory which has its cultural and political expression in the claim oftraditional accounts of past sufferings to shape collective memory in terms of war

between narrative identities. Such misuse of our capability to tell should not beignored when we come to the topic of capabilities and rights. Narrative identitiesmay claim recognition according to their differences but this claim calls for a kind oftherapy as regards the so-called impulse to repeat and to hate foreign traditions builton narrative identities held as adversary.

The frightening fragility of narrative identity brings us to our last cycle ofconsiderations concerning personal capabilities. The successive questions - whospeaks to whom? Who acts with or against other agents? Who tells stories about

himself or herself and about strangers held to be friends or enemies? - find a kind ofculmination in the question: who is capable of imputation? (in German we speak o Zurechnungsfähigkeit . “Liability” could be held to be an appropriate equivalentas could “accountability”, which maintains a link with the concept of account,compte”, “ Rechnung ”. Such account makes the subject accountable before

some o y e se. W at oes t s new ea a to t at of ascr pt on evo e ear er? Itadds the ability to bear the consequences of one’s own acts, particularly those whichare e to e arms nf cte on some o y e se as t e v ct m. Among t e mp econsequences comes t e compensat on ue for t e arm one, ut a so t e a ty tosuffer t e pa n of pun s ment. A t res o as een crosse : t at of t e su ect or g t. How oes t at trans t on occur?

A new mo a ty of se f- es gnat on gets attac e to capa t es opene too ect ve escr pt on. As concerns t e act on as suc , some et co-mora pre cates,linked either to the idea of the Good or to that of obligation, follow the formulationof verbs of action. These predicates characterise the action in question as good orwrong, as a owe or for en. W en app e ref ex ve y to t e agents t emse ves,t ese agents are e to e capa e of mora mputat on. W t mputa tyor accounta ty, t e concept of capa ty reac es ts pea n terms of se f-

es gnat on.

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CAPABILITIES AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION

As I have just said, a threshold has been crossed, but a long way has still to becovered, leading from the notion of imputability as a capability, to that of rights,

implying the framework of institutions ruling the sphere of legality. Theaccountability of moral agents provides only the anthropological ground for thecharacterisation of human actions in terms of validity, o Gültigkeit , as Habermaswould say. How to bridge the logical gap implied by the title of this chapter:Capabilities and rights”? Anticipating the present argument, I have already

underlined the difference between the anthropological concept of capabilities anthe juridical context of rights. But, at the same time, I did propose as a connectinglink the concept of recognition, as a dynamic process making its way throughseveral stages. In the above section, we went across the logical step of identifying

something in general as being itself and not something else, and we moved to thestep of self-recognition, to which we assigned the ascription of capabilities to auman being accountable for his/her actions. I propose to move one step further, to

the stage of mutual recognition as it is used in ordinary language, as when we speakof recognising, acknowledging an authority as legitimate, or a debt, or a crime, a

enefit, a service or a gift. The question then is to proceed from self-recognition tomutual recognition. It is not enough to take advantage of the reference to the other asimplied by each modality of the “I can”, be it “I can speak”, “I can do”, “I can tell”,I can hold myself as accountable”. The idea of reciprocity was included in this

consideration of alterity connected to the self-assertion of the subject of capabilities.Our basic hypothesis concerning the breadth of the process of recognition needs

the addition of a complementary hypothesis in order to allow the transition fromself-recognition to mutual recognition.

his complementary hypothesis relies on the reversal in the very use of the verb,a reversal from the active to the passive voice: to recognise. Used in the active voice,to recognise implies a claim, that of intellectual mastery over the field of meaningsat stake in the conceptual situation. Regarding self-recognition, we did notice theassurance, the confidence which goes with the assertion of any capability. I stronglybelieve that I can The reversal, which finds its grammatical support in the use of the

verb in the passive voice, may be summarised in the following way: from the claimto recognise to the need to be recognised.

s not on of nee to e recogn se w e encefort our gu ng t rea . T sneed requires the mediation of institutions providing stability and durability to the process, fulfilling step by step the need to be recognised. At the same time thecategory of a ter ty or ot erness assumes t e form of rec proc ty or mutua ty w cwas lacking (or remained implicit) at the previous stage of self-recognition in termsof capabilities.

I o not want to e my scovery of ec s ve support, at t s stage of my

inquiry, in the concept of Anerkennung received from Hegel. It appears for the firsttime in the philosophical fragments belonging to the Iena period of the years 1802-1806, ust efore t e pu cat on of t e famous P enomeno ogy o Spirit. TheseHegelian works generated a rich heritage in the field of political philosophyespecially among some followers of Habermas, such as Axel Honneth, the author of


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a oo ent t e trugg e or Recognition, w c e pe me to groun t e n between capabilities and rights on the concept of Anerkennung as the leadingcategory in the field of mutual or reciprocal recognition. By characterising

ner ennung as a strugg e, Honnet prepares us to ta e nto account t e con ct ngaspect of t e ynam c process at sta e an t e ro e of a negat ve fee ng suc ascon emp , which may be transcribed as a denial of recognition.

T e ma n a vantage of an enqu ry gu e y t e concept of ner ennung s toopen the path for social theories grounded on normative motivation as a reply to any

the state of nature may be held as the paradigm of all following social or politicaltheory excluding moral motives from the constitution of the social bond: only the passions of rivalry, defiance and glory are held as originary. They contain the war of

everyone against everyone and the fear of violent death which leaves no other wayout t an t e spossess on of eac pr vate c a m to power n favour of t e Lev at an,as ot a mac ne an a morta go . ner ennung as groun e on normat vemot vat on a ows us to see conf ct ng nteract ons const tut ve of t e process o

ner ennung as t e ma n ey to t e resu t ng en argement an u ment o t en v ua capa t es escr e n t e f rst part of t s c apter.

In t s way, mutua recogn t on r ngs se f-recogn t on to fru t on. At t s stage,my ana ys s n terms of recogn t on conf rms t e attempt of severa contemporaryenterprises aiming at a normative account of social relationships and using the

concept of capability as the corner stone of their theory. This is possible only if thenotion of capability itself is held as the expression of some normative motivation notconf ne to emp r ca escr pt on. T e ff cu ty es n t e treatment of apa i ity smp y ng some sort of nee to e recogn se an t us eve op ng a r g t to

accomp s ment, fu f ment or f our s ng. T en, t e og ca gap t at I not ce at t eeg nn ng etween t e escr pt ve status of capa ty an t e normat ve status o

r g t wou e r ge . But w at a ows us to ea w t capa ty as t e as ccomponent of a normat ve soc a t eory? To my m n , t e concept of mutuarecogn t on may assume t s funct on to t e extent t at t ea s from an n t a stageof nee to a term na stage of fu f ment requ r ng t e me at on of ur canst tut ons un er t e tute age of t e ea of r g t. Before cons er ng some

contemporary attempts to co-ordinate capabilities and rights, in a way compatiblew t Amartya Sen’s normat ve economy, I s a focus my attent on on some tra ts ot e post Hege an ner ennung-recogn t on w c ena es suc new app cat on.

T e f rst c aracter common to a arge spectrum of contemporary actua sat on ot e t eory of recogn t on s to assume t e quas -ax omat c postu at on of t e conceptof erty rece ve from Kant an c anne e y F c te, w o was f rst among t eGerman ea sts to n t e concept of free om to t at of nter-su ect v ty, as t econ t on not on y of ts mp ementat on ut a so of ts const tut ve structure. T s

as c presuppos t on f n s n t e ast wor of Hege evote to t e su ect – name yt e Princip es o t e P i osop y o ig t – ts most e a orate express on: t e philosophical concept of right covers the whole range of institutions devoted to thehistorical actualisation of freedom. The realm of right can be equated with the

nst tut ons of free om”.

PAU R COEUR

natura st c ant ropo ogy suc as t at of Ho es n t e Leviat an. Ho es’s t eory of


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CAPABILITIES AND RIGHT 23

T e secon common c aracter s t e ro e ass gne to negat v ty n t s process oactua sat on; or, to put t n ot er wor s, t e ro e of conf ctua ty as t e spr ng ot e ynam sm of recogn t on. T e rea ers of t e Hege an p osop ca fragments

e ong ng to t e per o of Iena eep n m n t e famous fragment on crime (crimenevote to t e re e ous e av our of t e n v ua en e t e recogn t on of s

singularity by the law at the stage of “abstract right” which proceeds from the practice of contractual relations in the exchange of goods. The same conflictuals tuat on may e seen at wor n t e success ve eve s of nst tut ons mp y ng a persona part c pat on an governe y ru es em o y ng t e stor ca er tage ofs are va ues, suc as t ose of fam y, of soc a nteract ng, an cu m nat ng n t eState c aracter se y ts const tut ona structures. A toget er, t ese nst tut ons oree om const tute t e rea m o itt ic eit , n t e sense of concrete mora ty (some

trans ators ave c osen t e term “et c ty” to preserve t e ntent of t e German

itt ic eit , tse f er ve rom t e term itten, w c means customs, manners,mores, n a wor , co ect ve prax s.

Axel Honneth, one of the successors of Jürgen Habermas, proposes a“reactualisation” of the Hegelian argument in which he takes into account theempirical contribution of contemporary thinkers such as Herbert Mead. From thiscoup ng of specu at on an emp r ca ana ys s, e er ves t ree para gms orecogn t on, eac of w c mp es spec f c forms of creat ve conf ctua ty. At a pre ur ca stage, e cons ers t e affect ve mo a t es of recogn t on anconf ctua ty, w ere t s a rea y poss e to app y t e famous Hege an formu at on:

“to e onese f n a stranger”. For t e sa e of our scuss on I w not stay at t sstage for ong; nevert e ess, t s wort o serv ng n ear y c oo a rea y t e f rstconf ct ng structures perta n ng to t e emot ona re at ons etween mot er an can a m ng at overcom ng t e stage of epen ency n e to fus ona attac ment.Even in adulthood, love and friendship are confronted by the trial of separation, the benefit of which lies in the ability to be alone, and consequently to rely on one’sown capabilities. Now, this capacity grows in proportion to the trust of partners int e permanence of t e nv s e on t at un er nes t e nterm ttent presence ana sence. Spec f c negat ve exper ences an fee ngs are re ate to t s f rst range ofmutua exc ange. If we may spea of contempt as t e negat ve fee ngcorrespon ng to t e arm one to n v ua s at eac stage of t e process orecogn t on, um at on wou e t e spec f c form of contempt proper to t e pre ur ca stage; we cou ef ne um at on as t e en a of recogn t on at t atstage, ts contrary e ng appro at on. Hum at on, fe t as t e en a of appro at on,harms each partner at the prejuridical level of his or her “being-with” others.

MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND RIGHTS

We come closer to a field of reciprocal relations, where capabilities and rights

could be connected, when we move to the juridical level of the fight for recognition.Hegel did not pay much attention to the field of commercial exchange and to the passions linked to the competitivity between partners at the economic level,although he was well aware of the preference given to the value of utility in that


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field. He laid the main stress on the claim to universality linked to the conquest ofnew rights at the level of juridical relationship at large: the juridical person isdefined as the bearer of rights implying normative obligations as regards the other partner in this kind of relationship. Recognition at that level amounts to theidentification of each person as free and equal to any other in terms o rights recognition in the uridical sense adds to the basic capabilities considered in our first part under the aegis of self-recognition the new capabilities proceeding from theconjunction between the universal validity of the norm and the singularity of the persons. The enlargement of the sphere of rights ascribed to persons goes hand in

and with the increase of the sphere of capabilities that the juridical subjectsrecognise in one another. Such conjunction between new rights and new capabilities proceeds from the struggle which gives a historical dimension to both processes. At

he same time the concept of respect elaborated by Kant needs to take account of the

history of rights which provides each time an appropriate new content for thisunhistorical moral concept of respect. The struggle for recognition related to this purely juridical sphere requires an equal attention to the normative constraints and

he concrete situations within which persons exercise their abilities.As to the enlargement of the normative sphere of rights, it may be taken from

wo different points of view, that of the enumeration of new subjective rights anhat of the ascription of these rights to new categories of individuals or of groups.

political rights and social rights. The first category includes the negative rights

which protect the person as concerns her life, her freedom of movement, her property against the encroachments of the State. The second concerns the positiverights related to participation in activities linked to the formation of the public will.The third one concerns the rights to receive a fair share in the distribution of basicgoo s. T s ast category concerns rect y one t eme of scuss on: c t zens of acountr es suffer from t e str ng contrast etween t e equa ascription of r g ts anhe unequal distribution of primary goods.

s contrast f n s ts su ect ve counterpart n t e quest for new capa t es ate persona eve , to w c correspon new forms of en a of recogn t on, of

contempt. T e exc us on from access to e ementary goo s s part cu ar y fe t as ahumiliation generating indignation, anger and violence. Here too, a negativemotivation is a powerful factor in social change, under the condition of a parallelncrease of se f-respect an of t e w to p ay a ro e n t e en argement of t e sp ere

of su ect ve r g ts. In t s regar , t e pro em s not on y t e emergence of newr g ts ut t e extens on of t e r sp ere of app cat on. As Joe Fe n erg says n

Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty: “W at we ca uman gn ty s not nge se t an t e recogn se capac ty to requ re a r g t .” 6 To this capability of higherorder recognition corresponds the positive feeling of pride.

If we now move beyond the juridical stage of mutual recognition, we encounter

new normative requirements which have more to do with social esteem than withequality in terms of rights. New forms of conflictual situations are at stake and newcapabilities come to light in connection with the new normative requirements.Axiological components are implied here in terms of shared values. But otherimportant factors interfere with the diversity of the social mediations involved. To

PAUL R I EU

W t respect to t e f rst perspect ve, we s ou st ngu s etween c v r g ts,

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t s var ety of soc a me at ons correspon s a var ety of soc a ro es w c ca forst nct n s of soc a esteem. I propose ere, as a mo e for t e esta s ng of a

typo ogy of soc a esteem, t e wor of t e Frenc sc o ars Bo tans y an T évenotevote to w at t ey ca “ conomies de la grandeur .” T e ea s t at n v ua s

may e e to e “great” or “sma ” accor ng to t e eva uat ons ru ng spec f ccategor es of soc a act v t es. You may e “great” as a mus c an; some o y e se ast e ea of an n ustr a company. T ese two aut ors ave tr e , n a waycomparable to Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice,8 to reduce to a limited numberof “worlds” or “cities” the variety of evaluations governing such an “economy ofgreatness”, omest c, art st c, n ustr a or ot er. W at concerns us n t s regar sthe competitive behaviour thanks to which individual agents fight for recognition inone or another of these “cities”. Our authors call ustification these strategies to getrecogn t on for t e ran t at t ey occupy n t e or er of greatness at sta e n t e r

case. This competition constitutes a new component in the fight for recognitionw c s one of t e ea ng concepts n my stu y. We ave ere to o more oftenw t arguments t an w t p ys ca v o ence. Peop e argue for t e r p ace an t e rro e. At t e same t me, new negat ve fee ngs come to t e foregroun concern ngspec f c forms of n ust ce n e to t e tests to e passe so as to sat sfy t eexpectations of those in charge of the evaluation of performances of a certain type.Some other kinds of dispute appear in connection with the plurality of the systems ofeva uat ons govern ng t at of t e “wor s” compos ng t e “économies de la

grandeur .” W at s at sta e ere are t e cr ter a of greatness n use n a g ven

segment of t e soc a structure. A typo ogy of cr t ques a resse from one “c ty” toanot er may e esta s e . T ese ena e n v ua agents to eve op a newcapa ty: t at of u g ng t e system of va ues preva ng n t e m te wor w erea p ace s ass gne to m or er. A new mens on of t e person s revea e n t atway, n connect on w t t e capa ty to un erstan anot er wor t an s er own.T s capa ty may e compare to t at of earn ng a fore gn anguage an otrans at ng a message from one anguage nto anot er.

Some other forms of struggles for recognition could be evoked besides thesespecifically social ones. They have to do with social and political forms of

scr m nat on concern ng cu tura m nor t es of fferent n s. T e scuss onsw c ave to o w t mu t cu tura sm are we - nown. C ar es Tay or as evoteto t s spute confront ng “ fference” an “ emocracy” an nterest ng vo umew c e mse f puts un er t e t t e of “po t cs of recogn t on.” W at nee srecogn t on s t e co ect ve ent ty of t e m nor t es at sta e. A “po t cs ofrecogn t on” s at t e same t me a “po t cs of fference”. W atever n

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