Transforming settler states: communal conflict and internal security in Northern Ireland and...
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TransformingSettlerStates
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Zimbabwe
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NorthernIreland
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TransformingSettlerStatesCommunalConflictandInternalSecurityinNorthern
IrelandandZimbabwe
RonaldWeitzer
UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESSBerkeley·LosAngeles·Oxford
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UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyandLosAngeles,California
UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.Oxford,England
©1990byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Weitzer,RonaldJohn.Transformingsettlerstates:communalconflictandinternalsecurityinNorthernIrelandandZimbabwe/RonaldWeitzer.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferences.ISBN0-520-06490-9(alk.paper)1.InternalsecurityNorthernIreland.2.NorthernIrelandPoliticsandgovernment1969-3.InternalsecurityZimbabwe.4.ZimbabwePoliticsandgovernment19651979.5.ZimbabwePoliticsandgovernment19791980.6.ZimbabwePoliticsandgovernment1980-I.Title.HV8197.5.A2W451990363.2'09416dc2089-20692CIP
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
123456789
ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials,ANSIZ39.48-1984. Ô
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Contents
ListofTables ix
Preface xi
1.SectarianSecuritySystems:StructureandTransformation
1
2.ThePillarsofSettlerRule 24
3.BuildingSettlerStates:FoundationsinRhodesiaandNorthernIreland
42
4.Rhodesia:GuerrillaWarandPoliticalSettlement,19721980
82
5.NorthernIreland:BreakdownofSettlerRule,19691972 111
6.Zimbabwe:One-PartyState 134
7.NorthernIrelandunderBritishRule 190
Conclusion:TransformingSettlerStates 244
SelectedBibliography 257
Index 269
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Tables
1.SelectedSocietieswithSettlerPopulations 32
2.SecurityExpenditures 144
3.IncidenceofInsurgentActivity 162
4.PublicAttitudes,byPartyAffiliation 184
5.PreferredFormofGovernment 199
6.TheSecuritySituation,19691988 202
7.DeathsfromPoliticalViolence,19691988 203
8.AttitudestowardSecurityMeasures,1985 230
9.AttitudesonLawandOrder,1985 231
10.AttitudestowardSecurityMeasures,1988 232
11.AttitudesonDefeatingTerrorism,1988 234
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PrefaceMaxWeberdescribedthestateasasystemof"organizeddomination"that"claimsthemonopolyofthelegitimateuseofphysicalforcewithinagiventerritory."Thatcoercivestructuresarequintessentialelementsofstatepowerthescholarlyliteratureoftenseemstotakeforgranted,butfewstudiessystematicallyexamineinternalsecuritysystems.
Thisstudypaysspecialattentiontothecoercivedimensionsofstatepowerintwosocietieswithhistoriesofsettlerrule.Settlersocietiestendtobe"communallydivided":fracturedpoliticallyandsociallyalongracial,ethnic,orreligiouslines.Thedominantcommunalblocconsistsofsettlersandtheirdescendantswhotypicallybuildahighlysectarianinternalsecurityapparatustopreemptorsuppressthreatsfromtheindigenouspopulation.Thetransformationofsettlerstatesremainsdeficientinsofarasthesecurityestablishmentoftheoldregimeremainsintact;lastingsubstantivedemocratizationrequiresaradicaloverhaulofinheritedsecuritystructures.
ThisworkanalyzestheriseandbreakdownofsettlerstatesinNorthernIrelandandRhodesia/Zimbabweandproposesanexplanatorymodelforunderstandingtheconditionsofchangeandcontinuityininternalsecuritysystemsafterthedissolutionofsettlerrule.InNorthernIrelandandZimbabwesettlerrulewasreplacedin1972and1980,respectively.Thesecasesrepresentverydifferentroutesawayfromsettlerruleanddistinctoutcomesundernewpoliticalorders.
Intheinterestofexamininglargerquestionsandthemesincomparativeperspective,theempiricalchaptersnecessarilysacrificesomeofthe
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specificityandthoroughnesspossibleinasingle-casestudy.AlthoughIpresentsubstantialmaterialoneachsociety,myoverridingaimistodemonstratethevalueofaparticularanalyticframeworkapplicabletoothercases.ThemodelsectariansecuritysystemdiscussedinChapter1andsettlerstatedescribedinChapter2,Iargue,applytoothersettlersocietiessuchasSouthAfrica,Liberia,andIsrael,towhichoccasionalcomparisonsaredrawnthroughoutthebook.
ThestudyisbasedonfieldworkinNorthernIrelandandZimbabwe.Unfortunately,thecollectionofdataonmattersofstatesecurityandpoliticallysensitiveissuesisfraughtwithdifficulties.Manyofthebestpotentialsourcesareofteninaccessible:cabinetminutes,classifieddocuments,orkeyeliteswhorefusetograntinterviews.Thedatacollectedarethereforedestinedtobeincomplete.Awareofsuchproblemsattheoutsetofmyresearch,IhopedthatconditionsinZimbabwetwoyearsafterindependencewasdeclaredmightyieldfreerresearchaccessthanhadbeenthecaseunderthewhiteRhodesianregime.Myexpectationswereonlypartiallyaccurate:severaldatasourceshadbeendestroyed,hadbeenremovedfromthecountrybeforeindependence,orwereotherwiseunavailable.Collectingmaterialonthenewregimewastrickierstill,giventheincumbentgovernment'sacutesensitivitytoanykindofscrutiny.Nevertheless,considerableinformationwasobtainedfromgovernmentpublications,parliamentarydebates,newspapers,andthereportsofofficialcommissionsofinquiryandindependenthumanrightsorganizations.IdenticalsourceswereexaminedinNorthernIreland,wheretheresearchclimatewasconsiderablymorefavorable.Thedocumentarymaterialswerecomplementedwithin-depthinterviewsinbothsettings.Giventhesubjectmatter,thespecificfindingsonbothsocietiesshouldbetreatedcautiously,butIbelievethedatapresentedherearesufficientforthepurposesofaddressingthelargerthemesofthebook.
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DocumentaryresearchwasconductedinZimbabweattheNationalArchives,theLibraryofParliament,theUniversityofZimbabwe,andtheMinistryofInformationLibrary;inNorthernIrelandatthePublicRecordsOffice,theLinenhallLibrary,andQueen'sUniversity;andinEnglandattheInstituteofCommonwealthStudiesLibraryandthePublicRecordsOffice.
Icarriedoutapproximatelyfiftyintensivesemistructuredinterviewsinbothcountrieswithformerandincumbentjudges,legislators,cabinetministers,seniorcivilservants,policeandmilitaryofficials,andleadersofpoliticalparties,humanrightsorganizations,andthemedia.Insome
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casesIwassuccessfulatinterviewingthemostseniorofficialintheagencyunderinvestigation;inothersIspoketolessseniorofficials;inafewcases,requestsforinterviewswereflatlyrejected.Interviewswerearrangedeitherdirectlybyphoneorafterlettersofintroductionthatbrieflydescribedthepurposesoftheresearch.Aftertheinitialinterviews,snowballsamplingwasusedtogeneratenamesofprospectiveinterviewees.
Theinterviewsexplored,interalia,decision-makingprocesses,assessmentsofsecurityproblemsandrequirements,andassessmentsoflegalandinstitutionalarrangementsandactualorhypotheticalreforms.Igearedeachinterviewtotheparticularrespondentsintheirofficialcapacities,andeachinformantmadeadifferentanduniquecontributiontothestudy.Everyeffortwasmadetocrosschecktheinterviewfindingswithdatafromotherinterviewsanddocuments.Gapsindocumentarysourceswere,inturn,addressedinthecourseofinterviewing.Someinformantsagreedtoasecondinterview,andothersrespondedinwritingtospecificfollow-upquestionsthatImailedafterreturningtotheUnitedStates.
Asiscommoninintensiveinterviewing,Igatheredmuchinterviewmaterialthatdoesnotappearinthetext.Withafewexceptions,however,theinterviewsnotdirectlycitedofferedimportantinsightsintolargerissues,stimulatednewresearchquestions,helpedtestworkinghypotheses,andgaveuniquemeaningtospecificeventsandactors'constructionsofreality.
Althoughmanyinformantsgavemepermissiontonamethem,inmostcasesIhavepreservedtheiranonymity;onlyincaseswheresomeone'sidentitycouldnotbedisguised,becausetherewasonlyonesuchperson(aprimeminister),haveInamednames.Asinterestedparties,manyofmyrespondentsmaydisagreewithsomeoftheargumentsandconclusionsinthiswork,butIremaindeeplygrateful
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fortheirinsightsandhospitality.Inadditiontotheirobservationsandinformation,theseinformantsbroughtthesubjectmattertolifeasnoothersourcecan.
FromAugust1982throughJune1983,IwasaresearchassociateattheCenterforAppliedSocialSciencesattheUniversityofZimbabweinHarare,andIamgratefultothecenter'sdirector,MarshallMurphree,forhissupportandencouragement.Inthesummersof1983and1984,IwasaresearchfellowattheInstituteofIrishStudiesatQueen'sUniversityinBelfast.Ireturnedin1986forfollow-upresearch.SupportfortheinitialresearchcamefromtheAfricaProgramoftheSocialScienceResearchCouncil,theInstituteofInternationalStudiesattheUniversityof
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California,Berkeley,theLawandSocialScienceProgramoftheNationalScienceFoundation,andtheInstitutefortheStudyofWorldPolitics.ThefacultyenrichmentcommitteeoftheUniversityofPugetSoundsupportedareturnvisittoZimbabwein1987.
Fortheirinsightfulsuggestionsonpartsofthiswork,IwishtothankAdrianGuelke,LeonGrunberg,WilliamKornhauser,NormaKriger,CarlRosberg,PhilipSelznick,NeilSmelser,StevenTuch,MichaelWatts,LaurieWermuth,andLoisWest.MichaelBurawoydeservesspecialthanksforhisenthusiasticsupportfortheprojectfromitsinception;Ideeplyappreciatehispenetratingcriticismsandsuggestions.IamalsoindebtedtoDavidPageforhisencouragementandassistance.
IamgratefultoCambridgeUniversityPressforpermissiontoreprintpartsofmyarticle''InSearchofRegimeSecurity:ZimbabwesinceIndependence,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies22,no.4(December1984),inChapters4and6,andtoComparativePoliticsforpermissiontouserevisedsectionsof"ContestedOrder:TheStruggleoverBritishSecurityPolicyinNorthernIreland,"ComparativePolitics19,no.3(April1987),inChapter7.
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Chapter1SectarianSecuritySystems:StructureandTransformationInthepastdecadesurprisingnumbersofauthoritarianstateshaveyieldedtodemocraticexperiments,primarilyinLatinAmericaandSouthernEurope.Theprocesshasawakenedacademicinterestintransitionstodemocracyinthecausesofregimebreakdownandthedynamicsofthetransition.Theliteraturehasaccordedmuchlessattentiontooutcomesundertheneworder.
Ofthefactorsaffectingtransitionstodemocracy,coerciveinstitutionshaveattractedlittlescholarlyattention.1Theirneglectisamajortheoreticaldeficiency:notonlydomostauthoritarianregimesrelyonhighlyrepressiveforces,butthelatteroftenassumeacriticalroleinthebreakdownofanauthoritarianorderandthevitalityofanynewdemocraticexperiment.Mostnewpostauthoritarianregimesimmediatelyfaceanunreconstructedsecurityestablishmentwhoseresidualpowerandresistancetoitsownreformandtomeaningfulpoliticaldemocratizationareoftendecisive.Forceswithinthissectorhavefrustratedeffortsinmanytransitionalsocietiestoinstitutionalizetheruleoflawandstandardsofhumanrights,thusreversingtheprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.Thoroughgoingchangeofarepressivesecurityapparatusseemstobeapreconditionforgenuinedemocratization.
1.ExceptionsaretworecentworksonBrazil:MariaHelenaMoreiraAlves,StateandOppositioninMilitaryBrazil(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1985);andAlfredStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics:BrazilandtheSouthernCone(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988).
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Thisbookexaminesthepivotalroleofinternalsecuritysystemsinbuildingandtransformingtwodistinctivecommunallydividedsocieties,NorthernIrelandandZimbabwe.Inthesesocietiesfracturedalongracial,ethnic,linguistic,orreligiouslinesonegroupsystematicallydominatespoliticalandeconomicrelations.2Afteroutliningthekeyfeaturesofthesectariansecuritysystemthatliesatthecoreofthesestates,Ipositconditionsfortheirliberalizationinsocietieswherearegimeostensiblycommittedtodemocraticreconstructionhasassumedpower.InChapters6and7Iapplythisexplanatorymodeltoourtwocases.
StatesandInternalSecuritySystems
Theparamountpurposeofthemodernstateistoprotectitsinhabitantsfrominternalandexternalthreats.Whiletheconceptof"nationalsecurity"iselasticandambiguous,3the"primacyofnationalsecurityamongtheresponsibilitiesofgovernment"iscommonlyconsideredaxiomatic.4Thesecuritysectorofastate,thatclusteroforganswithdirectresponsibilityfordomesticorderandexternaldefense,isastate'sinnercore,thelocusofitsultimatepower.Unfortunately,statesecuritystructureshavereceivedfarlessscholarlyattentionthantheydeservebecausesuchsensitiveandsecretiveinstitutionsaredifficulttoresearchorbecausetheyareoftenviewedinstrumentally,astoolsofpoliticaloreconomicinterestsratherthanasdynamicforces.Theneglectisparticularlyglaringwithrespecttocoerciveinstitutionsincommunallydividedsocietieswhere,ananalystofSouthAfricaconcluded,itoftenseemsthat"somuchofpoliticsisreducibletosheerbruteforceandtheapplicationofstatecoercion."5
Thistheoreticallacunatypifieseverymajorperspectiveinpoliticalsociology,includingthestate-centeredparadigm.6Anidealpointofde-
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2.MiltonJ.Esman,"TheManagementofCommunalConflict,"PublicPolicy21(Winter1973).Intracommunalcleavagesnotwithstanding,thegreatdivideisintercommunal(seeAlvinRabushkaandKennethShepsle,PoliticsinPluralSocieties[Columbus,Ohio:Merrill,1972]).3.ArnoldWolfers,"'NationalSecurity'asanAmbiguousSymbol,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly67,no.4(December1952):481502;BarryBuzan,People,States,andFear:TheNationalSecurityProbleminInternationalRelations(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1983).4.RichardSmoke,"NationalSecurityAffairs,"inHandbookofPoliticalScience,ed.F.GreensteinandN.Polsby(Reading,Pa.:Addison-Wesley,1975),8:248.5.PhilipFrankel,Pretoria'sPraetorians:Civil-MilitaryRelationsinSouthAfrica(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),p.xii.6.RobertR.AlfordandRogerFriedland,PowersofTheory:Capitalism,theState,andDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).
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partureforouranalysis,thisperspectiveconceptualizesthestateasanetworkofformalorganizationsthatclaimauthorityoverandresolveconflictswithinaspecificterritory,exercisecoercivepower,andhavedistinctivepoliticalandinstitutionalinterests.7Highlightingtherelativeautonomyofthestatefromsocialforces,thestate-centeredmodelstressesthestate'soperationalintegrity,materialobjectives,andideologicalgoals;itholdsthatthestatefunctionsbothasan"organization-foritself"andasaservantofoutsideactors.8Asadynamicforceinitsownright,thestatenotonlyrespondstosocialpressureswithappropriateoutputsbutalsoadvancescertaininterests,moldsoutsidedemands,fosterscompliancewithstatepolicy,freesitselffromsocietalconstraints,andengagesinotherautonomy-enhancingstrategies.9
Despitethestate-centeredparadigm'sWeberianoriginwhichseesthemonopolyoflegitimateforceascentralindefiningthemodernstatetheuseofcoercivepowerhasattractedlittletheoreticalattention.Thisstudyoffersafreshperspectiveonthisvitalareaofstatepower.
Aninternalsecuritysectororsystemreferstotheclusteroforganizationswithdirectresponsibilityforinternalsecurityanddomesticorder.Includedwithinthisinnercitadelofstatepoweraretheintelligenceservices,themilitary(initsdomesticduties),thepolice,specializedsecurityunits,andthecommandingheightsofdecisionmakingwithintheexecutivebranch(e.g.,acabinet-levelsecuritycommittee,anationalsecuritycouncil).10
Thesecuritysectorcanbeunderstoodasthecoreofthestatebecauseitisthelocusofultimatecoercivepower;ithasauniquemandateandcapacitytodefendthenation-statefrommortalthreats;andtheremainderofthestatedependsforitsexistenceonthesecuritysector'ssurvival.Oncethecorehasbeencapturedorcrippledbyanenemy,theexecutivebranchandotherstateorgansbecomevulnerabletoa
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hostiletakeover.Havingthisvitalrole,securitysystemsthroughouttheworldfeature
7.Theseincludedomesticorder,territorialdefense,legitimation,extractionofrevenue,andbasicideologicalcommitments.8.ThedaSkocpol,StatesandSocialRevolutions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),p.27;seealsoEricNordlinger,OntheAutonomyoftheDemocraticState(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1981);StephenSkowronek,BuildingaNewAmericanState:TheExpansionofNationalAdministrativeCapacities18771920(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982);PeterEvans,DietrichRueschemeyer,andThedaSkocpol,eds.,BringingtheStateBackIn(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).9.Nordlinger(Autonomy)drawsspecialattentiontotheseautonomy-enhancingtechniques.10.Excludedaredepartmentsthathavesomeinputintosecuritymattersbutnodirectresponsibilityforthisfunction.
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commonproperties:atendencytowardsecrecy,autonomyfromoutsidescrutinyandaccountability,andagreaterinsulationfromspendingcutsthanotherstatebureaucracies.11
Notwithstandingthesecommonalities,thereissignificantcrossnationalvariationinthestructural,ideological,andoperationaldimensionsofsecuritysystems.Idealtypesrangefromtheliberaltothetotalitarian.InthelattercategoryintheSovietUnion,forexample"'security'aspectsareperceivedtobepresentinvirtuallyallaspectsofSovietlife"andalmost"theentireSovietpopulationisthetarget"ofitssecurityapparatus.12Intheliberalsystemassociatedwithdemocraticstates,theoppositewouldobtain:threatswouldbenarrowlydefinedandthetargetsfew.Fallingsomewherebetweenthesetwotypesarethevariousauthoritariansystemsautocracies,oligarchies,andmilitarydictatorships.Wefocusonanotherformofauthoritarianism,settlerrule,anditssectariansecuritysystem.Characteristicofsettler(aswellasothercommunallydivided)societies,thissecuritysystemisdesignedtoperpetuateracial,ethnic,orreligiousdominationthroughthesuppressionofthreatsfromthesubordinatepopulation.
Asectariansecuritysystemdisplaysthefollowingfeatures:
aconcentrationofpowerandresourceswithinthesecuritysector,whichcontributestoitsautonomouspositionoverotherstatebranches;
atendencytopursueorderandmaintainrelationsofdominationinahighlyrepressivefashion,unleavenedbyconsiderationsofjustice,legitimacy,andbasichumanrights;
apartisanorientationonbehalfofthedominantsectorofsociety,insteadofthecollectiveinterestsofthewiderpopulationorthenationstate.
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Itsautonomyandrepressivefeaturesalsotypifyotherauthoritarianpollties,butitscommunallypartisanorientationisspecifictothesectarianmodel.Letusexamineeachofthesedimensionsingreaterdepth.
11.SeeNicoleBall,SecurityandEconomyintheThirdWorld(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988).12.JeffreyRichelson,SwordandShield:TheSovietIntelligenceandSecurityApparatus(Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1986),pp.39,247.SeealsoAlexanderDallinandGeorgeBreslauer,PoliticalTerrorinCommunistSystems(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1970);ZbigniewBrzezinski,ThePermanentPurge:PoliticsinSovietTotalitarianism(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1956).
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IntrastateAutonomy
Thesecuritycoretypicallyenjoysgreaterinsulationbothwithinthestateandfromcivilsocietythanotherstatesectors.13Yettherelativepowerandautonomyofthisbranchvarysignificantlyacrosstimeandplace.Itmaybeomnipotent,soshieldedfromotherstatebranchesthatitconstitutesaformidablestate-within-a-state,itsagencies"independentcentersofpower...isolatedfrommoderatingsocialcontextsandcapableofresistingpoliticalauthority."14Thissituationreflectseitherthepoliticalsubordinationofjudicialandlegislativebranchesortheiractivecollusionwiththesecurityestablishment.
Insectarianandotherauthoritariansystems,securityagencieshavetremendouspoliticalinfluence,elitestatus,andaccesstostateresources.15Notonlyisthesecuritybranchprivilegedandautonomousinthesestates,itoftendominatesotheragencies.Attheextreme,itmayoperateabovethelawandbe"empoweredtocontrolunilaterallyotherbodiesofthestateandthecivilsociety."16SouthAfrica,forexample,haswitnessed"theenthronementofthesecurityauthoritiesasalawlesspowerinthecountry."17
Inliberalsystems,theagenciesofcontrolhavelesssweepingpower.18Thelegislature,judiciary,andotheroversightagenciesmaytaketheinitiativeinexertingcontroloversecurityinstitutionsandserveaslociofincursionbyoutsidegroupsseekingtoinfluencesecurityarrangements.Securitysystemsinliberaldemocraciestypicallyoperateundergreaterlegalandfinancialregulationthansectarianandauthoritariansystems.19
Thereis,ofcourse,continualtensionindemocraticstatesbetweensecurityagencies'questforautonomyandlegislativeandjudicialeffortsto
13.J.A.Tapia-Valdés,"ATypologyofNationalSecurityPolicies,"Yale
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JournalofWorldPublicOrder9,no.1(Fall1982):1039;Nordlinger,Autonomy,pp.39,96.14.PhilippeNonetandPhilipSelznick,LawandSocietyinTransition:TowardResponsiveLaw(NewYork:HarperandRow,1978),p.33.15.OnauthoritarianBrazilandArgentina,seeStepan,MilitaryPolitics;andJuanCorradi,"TheModeofDestruction:TerrorinArgentina,"Telos,no.54(Winter19821983):6970.16.Tapia-Valdés,"Typology,"p.27.17.AnthonyMathews,Freedom,StateSecurity,andtheRuleofLaw:DilemmasofApartheidSociety(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1986),p.267.18.OnthedifferentiatedstructureoftheAmericannationalsecuritysector,seeRobertH.Trice,"TheStructureoftheNationalSecurityPolicySystem,"inNationalSecurityAffairs,ed.B.TroutandJ.Harf(NewBrunswick:Transaction,1982);seealsoTapia-Valdés,"Typology,"p.18.19.Stepan(MilitaryPolitics)makesanidenticalargumentincomparingBrazilwithliberaldemocracies.
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keepthemonashortleash.20TheeffortsoftheUnitedStatesCongress,particularlysincetheearly1970s,tocontroltheFBI,CIA,andNationalSecurityCouncilareacaseinpoint.21Congressionalsupervisionoftheseagencieshasbeenintermittentanddiffusedamongvariouscommittees;Congresscontinuestogivethemsignificantlatitude.22Thedegreeofaccountabilityinliberaldemocraciesthereforeshouldnotbeexaggerated,buttheexistenceoflegalandadministrativecheckspointstoqualitativedifferencesbetweendemocraticstatesandthosewhereinstitutionaloversightisabsent.
Theinsulationfromotherstatebranchesthatthesecuritysectorpossessesisalsoevidentinitsautonomyfromgroupsoutsidethestate.Duringnormaltimes,andrelativetootheragencies,securityorgansseemuniversallyconcernedtoshieldthemselvesfrompopularaccountabilityandfromliberalizinginfluencesincivilsociety.Outsideactorstypicallyhavelittleinformationaboutandfew,ifany,channelsofaccesstothesehiddencorridorsofpower.ToborrowEaston'smetaphor,thesecuritybureaucracyhasperfectedtheartofexclusionary"gatekeeping,"systematicallyblockingorneutralizingthedemandsofoutsidegroups.23
Securitysystemsactivelyseektomaximizetheirautonomyfromcivilsocietybyexaggeratingtheseriousnessofthreatstothenationandstressingtheir"ultra-sensitive"position,"dangerous"work,andtheneedforabsolutesecrecyindecisionmaking.Theytypicallybrandoutsidecriticism"unpatriotic"andelevatenationalsecuritytothemosthallowedpositioninthepoliticaluniverse,identifyingitwiththesurvivalofthenation-state.Theirdefenseofsacrosanctvaluesprovidesanironcurtainbehindwhichtheycanpursueprioritiesotherthanthoserelatingtointernalsecurity:ensuringtheincumbencyoftherulingparty,neutralizingdissent,aggrandizingelites,expandingthenationalsecuritybureaucracy,andsoforth.
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20.Securityagenciesattempttomaximizetheirautonomyfromoneanotheraswellasfromotherstateorgans(MortonHalperin,BureaucraticPoliticsandForeignPolicy[Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution,1974],pp.5154.SeealsoMaxLowenthal,TheFederalBureauofInvestigation[NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1950];VictorMarchettiandJohnD.Marks,TheCIAandtheCultofIntelligence[NewYork:Dell,1974];PhilipAgee,InsidetheCompany:CIADiary[NewYork:Stonehill,1975];FrankDonner,TheAgeofSurveillance[NewYork:Vintage,1980];JamesBamford,ThePuzzlePalace[Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1982];NigelWest,AMatterofTrust:M.I.5[London:Coronet,1983];MortonHalperin,JerryJ.Berman,RobertL.Borosage,andChristineM.Marwick,TheLawlessState[NewYork:Penguin,1976]).21.Beforethe1970stheU.S.CongresspaidlittleattentiontotheactivitiesoftheCIAandFBI.22.Theimpositionofadministrativeorlegalchecksonsecurityagenciesmayencouragetheirillegalactivity,whereasinnondemocraticstatesthelackofthesechecksreducestheneedforillegalactivity23.DavidEaston,ASystemsAnalysisofPoliticalLife(NewYork:Wiley,1965),pp.8793.
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Repressiveness
Bytheirverynature,domesticsecurityagenciesareinclinedtoputapremiumonorderandsocialcontrol.Thequestionis,howdoesastatemaintainorder?Whatbalancedoesitstrikebetweencontrolandindividualrights?Inonecornerarethosestatesthatstrivetomaintainorderandcopewithoutbreaksofunrestinamannerthatisbothfirmandjust;theirsecurityestablishmentsfollowtheruleoflawandthenormofminimumforce.Bycontrast,thesectariansecuritysystemisstructurallypredisposedtoimposehighlyrepressivecontrols.Ofcourse,communallydividedsocietiesfeaturesignificantcross-nationalandlongitudinalvariationinthemagnitude,targetgroups,duration,geographicalscope,andkindsofrepression.Still,inaccordancewiththeinstitutionalizedmissiontodefenddecidedlypartisaninterests,thethreatorrealityofrepressionisendemic.
Staterepressionrefersheretothedeliberateviolationbystateagentsoffundamentalcivilandpoliticalrights,asthesearecataloguedinthemajorinternationaldeclarationsofhumanrights.24Repressionmaybeeithersystematicorhaphazardandindiscriminateandcanrangefromtortureandkillingtorestrictionsonfairtrials,freepress,elections,assembly,andspeech.Allstatesengageinrepressivepracticesfromtimetotime,butinsomerepressionisarelativelyisolatedandsituationallyspecificevent;inothersitisaninstitutionalizedcondition,aroutinelyusedmechanismofstatepower.
Theinstitutionalsourcesofstaterepressionhaveattractedlittlesystematicresearch.25Therelevantliteratureisoftenhighlyimpressionisticorpaintsthestateasadependentvariableorblackbox,unproblematicallyregisteringandpunitivelyrespondingtosocietalstimuli:itfailstoadvancepersuasiveexplanationsortheoreticalunderstanding.26Some
24.TheseincludetheUnitedNationsDeclarationofHumanRightsand
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theEuropeanConventiononCivilandPoliticalRights.25.JuanLinz,"TotalitarianandAuthoritarianRegimes,"inHandbookofPoliticalScience,ed.F.GreensteinandN.Polsby(Reading,Pa.:Addison-Wesley,1975),vol.3;AmosPerlmutter,ModernAuthoritarianism(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1981);GuillermoO'Donnell,ModernizationandBureaucraticAuthoritarianism,2ded.(Berkeley:InstituteofInternationalStudiesPress,1979);DavidCollier,ed.,TheNewAuthoritarianisminLatinAmerica(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979).26.ErnestA.DuffandJohnF.McCamant,ViolenceandRepressioninLatinAmerica(NewYork:FreePress,1976);RobertGoldstein,PoliticalRepressioninModernAmerica(Cambridge,Mass.:Schenkman,1978);AlanWolfe,TheSeamySideofDemocracy:RepressioninAmerica(NewYork:Longman,1978);MichaelStohlandGeorgeA.Lopez,eds.,TheStateasTerrorist:TheDynamicsofGovernmentalViolenceandRepression(Westport,Conn.:Greenwood,1984).Oneimpressiveexceptiondiscussestheauthorities'competinginterestsinorderandlegitimacythatshapedrepressiveresponsestounrestinU.S.ghettosinthe1960s(IsaacBalbus,TheDialecticsofLegalRepression:BlackRebelsbeforetheAmericanCriminalCourts[NewBrunswick,N.J.:Transaction,1977]).
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formulationsportrayrepressionasaninevitableconsequenceofgrosssocietalinequalities,deeplyrootedculturalproclivities,chronicoracuteeconomicproblems,andsoforth.Whenadvancedinamechanicalfashion,theseargumentsignoreimportantvariablessuchastheinstitutionalsourcesofrepressivepracticesandtheinterestsandobjectivesofelites.Anexaminationofthesedimensionsofstaterepressionislongoverdue.OuranalysisofZimbabweandNorthernIrelandwillbeconcernedprimarilywiththestructuralfactorsthatincreaseanddecreasethelikelihoodofrepressiveevents.
CommunalBias
Tosaythatsecurityagenciesarerelativelyautonomousorganizationsisnottosuggesttheirpoliticalneutralityorideologicalindifference.Securityorganseventhosethatareinfusedwithuniversalisticstandardsarelikelytoactinwaysthatbenefitcertaingroupstothedetrimentofothers.Intheidealliberalsystem,however,suchagenciesdonottargetparticularsocialstrataforpacification,noraretheyhighlypoliticized.Thestatemayattimesassertcontrolinanilliberalfashionoversocialmovements,labor,politicalextremistsbutitisnotdependentonthesystematicimmobilizationorphysicalrepressionofacategoryofpeople.Whenthesepracticesoccur,thestateviolatesitsuniversalisticideals.27
Incommunallydividedsocieties,internalsecuritytendstobeprofoundlysectarianhowevermuchtheregimestrivestoassociateitselfwiththeloftygoalsofdefendingthepublicinterest,lawandorder,ornationalsurvivalitself.Whilerelativelyautonomousofsocialpressures,securityagenciesdisplayaprofoundcorporateattachmenttotheinterestsofaparticularracial,ethnic,orreligiousconstituency.Therepressivesystemisdesignedtomaintaincommunalstructures,not"thesharedinterestsofahorizontallybondedcitizenry"incollectivesecurity.28Theparamountfunctionof
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thesecuritysystemistopreemptor
27.DemocraticstateshaveexportedrepressiontoThirdWorldclientstatesbytrainingandsupplyingsecurityforcesandbysupportingauthoritarianregimesforreasonsofstability,ofstrategicoreconomicinterests(MichaelKlareandCynthiaArnson,SupplyingRepression:U.S.SupportforAuthoritarianRegimesAbroad[Washington,D.C.:InstituteforPolicyStudies,1981];NoamChomskyandEdwardHerman,TheWashingtonConnectionandThirdWorldFascism[Boston:SouthEndPress,1979]).28.CynthiaEnloe,EthnicSoldiers:StateSecurityinDividedSocieties(Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1980),p.232.
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neutralizeoppositionrootedinthesubordinatepopulation.Bydefinitionlinkedtoadominantcommunalgroup,asectariansystemismorepermeabletoprivilegedforcesincivilsocietythanareotherauthoritarianandliberalsystems.Communallydividedsocieties,inshort,featuredifferentialaccesstoandinfluenceoverthesecuritycore,whichissensitivetodominantforcesandinaccessibletosubordinateinterests.
Thislinkdoesnotmeanthatthedemandsofdominantracial,ethnic,orreligiousgroupsarenecessarilysynchronizedwiththeactivitiesofcontrolorgansorthatthelatterareconvenientinstrumentsofdomination.Paramountorganizationalpriorities,doctrines,andconsiderationsofresourcesmayclashwiththedemandsofsectionsofthedominantcommunity.Thegrowingclamorofright-wingSouthAfricanwhitesandIsraeliJewsformoreruthlesssanctionsagainstmilitantblacksandArabsarecasesinpoint.
Theidealtypesketchedhereonlyimperfectlyfitsspecificcases.Inparticular,thepremiseoffunctionalitythatsectariansecuritysystemseffectivelymaintainthepositionofadominantcommunalgroupneedsqualification.Inspecificcasesthedegreeoffunctionalityisaffectedbycountervailingpressuresandunintendedconsequences.Foremostamongsuchfactorsareserious,sometimesdebilitating,conflictswithinthecontrolapparatusorbetweencoerciveagenciesandotherstateorgans;29limitedresourcesandsheeroverloadoncontrolfacilitiesthatmayexceedthesystem'scapacityforeffectiverepression;andtheroutineoperationsoftheseagencies,whichmaydamagesocialcohesion,thesystem'slegitimacy,andpoliticalstability.Unrestandinsurgencyarelikelytointensifytheseproblems,asanalysisofourtwocaseswillshow.
DimensionsofSystemicLiberalization
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Socialscientistshavepaidinsufficientattentiontotheroleofpolice,military,andintelligenceorgansinnationbuilding,30andtotheprecondi-
29.Althusser'sdiscussionof"repressivestateapparatuses"wronglyassumesthattheyarenecessarily"unified"andthatthiscohesionisreproduced"easily"(LouisAlthusser,"IdeologyandIdeologicalStateApparatuses,''inLeninandPhilosophyandOtherEssays[NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1971],pp.14249).30.Enloe,EthnicSoldiers;SamuelHuntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1968);CharlesTilly,ed.,TheFormationofNationalStatesinWesternEurope(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975);MorrisJanowitz,TheMilitaryinthePoliticalDevelopmentofNewNations(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1964);DavidBayley,ThePoliceandPoliticalDevelopmentinIndia(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1969);ErnestLefever,SpearandScepter:Army,Police,andPoliticsinTropicalAfrica(Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution,1970).
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tionsforliberalizationormodernizationoftheseinstitutions.31DrawingontheWeberianliteratureonpoliticaldevelopment,Isuggestthatliberalizationconsistsofchangesthattranscendnarrow,sectarianinterestsandreflectfidelitytoidealsofneutrality,universalism,andrationalizedauthority,whichmaybridgecommunalcleavagesandpromotenationbuilding.32
Ourdependentvariablethestructuralandideologicalliberalizationofasecuritysystementailstransformingthethreebasicdimensionsofthesectariansecuritysystemoutlinedintheprecedingsection.Itmeansreconstitutingsubstantivegoalsandvaluesandredistributinginstitutionalpower.Asanidealtype,systemicliberalizationincludesthefollowing:33
amarkedshiftinthebalanceofpowerbetweenthesecuritybureaucracyandotherbranchesofthestate,whichsubjectssecurityagenciestolegalrestraintsontheirjurisdictionandpracticesandmakesthemaccountabletootherstatebranches;
aninstitutionalizedsensitivitytoconsiderationsoflegitimacy,theruleoflaw,civilandpoliticalrights,andtheidealofjustice,whichhelpstorestraintheuseofrepressiveforce;34
areconstitutedagencyculture:auniversalisticethosandanormativecommitmenttoimpartialmaintenanceoforderreplacethesecuritybranch'sparochialinterestsandencouragerestraintinsecuritypractices.
Aliberalizedsecuritysystemisnotacontradictioninterms.Itdoesnotstripthestateofitsinstitutionalcapacitiestomaintainpublicorder,althoughstateelitescommonlypleadthatsignificantliberalization
31.Iusetheterminstitutionalmodernizationassynonymouswithliberalization,withoutimplyingagreementwithmodernizationtheory's
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evolutionaryassumptionsortheWestern-orientedpoliticaldevelopmentmodel.Ihaveusedaspectsofthelatterapproachinmyframeworkofinstitutionalliberalization.32.Inthisparadigmamodernpolityhasahighlydifferentiatedsystemofgovernment,rationalizedauthority,masspoliticalparticipationandequality,andanexpandingcapacityofstateinstitutions(seeLeonardBinderetal.,CrisesandSequencesofPoliticalDevelopment[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1971];DankwartRustowandRobertWard,introductiontoPoliticalModernizationinJapanandTurkey,ed.RobertWardandDankwartRustow[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1964],pp.67).33.OurmodelofliberalizationdrawsinpartonNonetandSelznick'sdiscussionofautonomouslaw,whichtheycontrastwithrepressivelaw(LawandSociety).SeealsothereformsadvocatedforU.S.intelligenceagenciesinHalperinetal.,TheLawlessState,chap.12.34.Mathews'sanalysisofSouthAfricaemphasizesthatthesecuritysystemneedsaradicallydifferent"frameworkofvalues,"basedontheruleoflawanddemocraticaccountability(Freedom,StateSecurity,p.273).
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wouldspellstatesuicide.35Infact,byminimizingarbitraryandrepressivepracticesthatfuelpopularunrestandpoliticalviolence,liberalizationcanenhanceorderandstabilityandthuspromotethelong-terminterestsofthesecurityestablishment.Elitesatthehelmofsectarianagenciesrarelyseeanyvalueinliberalization,intentratheronmaintainingabsolutecontroloverthesubordinatepopulation.Similarly,theyrarelyappearsensitivetothepotentiallycounterproductiveeffectsofrepression.IncontemporarySouthAfrica,forexample,the"authoritiesappeartohavelearntnothing"fromthefactthat"disorderhasincreasedindirectproportiontotheapplicationofharshsecuritymeasures."36Thisexampleunderscorestheparadoxthatsecurityagenciesmaythemselvesunwittinglythreatenstatesecurityanddomesticorder,justasliberalizationmaypromotesecurityandstability.
Thethoroughgoingliberalizationofasecuritysystemshouldbedistinguishedfrommoreroutineorganizationaladjustments,innovations,andreforms.37Thesechangesordinarilyreinforce,ratherthanshake,thefoundationsofthesystem.38Likewise,theincrementalrepealoramendmentofrepressivelawsoftenhaslittleimpactontheunderlyingstructureorvaluesofasecuritysystem,whichmayreplaceitslegalpowerswithextralegaldevicesorrevivethemlater.Similarly,replacinghardlinesecuritypersonnelwiththosemoremoderatelyinclinedmaynotchangetheorganization'svaluesandpractices.
Inasense,liberalizationinthesecuritysystemmaybeviewedasanintegralpartofdemocratization,butforanalysisitisusefultoseparatetheseprocesses.Changesandcontinuitiesinsecurityandinpoliticalarrangementsmay,butdonotnecessarily,havereciprocaleffects;considerthreedifferentpossibilities:
1.democraticformalism:theintroductionofuniversalsuffrageandproceduresforfreecompetitiveelections,whichdonotnecessarily
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underminerepressiveinstitutions.Formaldemocratizationmayoccurwithoutacorrespondingchangeinthesecuritysysteminheritedfromtheoldorder:Zimbabweexemplifiesthispoint.
35.Mathewspointsoutthat"areductioninsecuritypowersinasituationofcrisisisnotnecessarilyharmful"(ibid.,p.279).36.Ibid.,p.277.37.PeterM.Blau,TheDynamicsofBureaucracy(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1963).38.Forexample,MarchettiandMarksconcludethat"theCIAandtheintelligencecommunityareincapableofreformingthemselves"andrequire"intenseoutsidepressure"togeneratemeaningfulchanges(CIA,pp.12,351).
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2.liberalizationofasecuritysystemwithoutformaldemocratization.Althoughitmayberare,significantreformofinstitutionsofcontrolmayoccurwithoutcorrespondingdemocratizationofthepolity.NorthernIrelandillustratesthispoint.
3.liberalizationofasectariansecuritysystemasanecessaryconditionforgenuine,notformal,politicaldemocratization.Substantivedemocratizationcannotproceedfarifsecurityorgansremainpoliticized,sectarian,unaccountable,andpowerfulenoughtointervenetoreversetheprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.AsMathewsforcefullyargues,"Onlythosesocietiesthathavesuccessfullygrappledwiththeproblemofthepoliticalaccountabilityoftheirintelligenceandsecuritycommunities,canhaveanyclaimtobeingfullydemocratic."39
Inanutshell,theargumentisthatchangesinthepoliticalorderandinthecoerciveordermayhavereciprocaleffectsormayvaryindependently,butthatlasting,substantivedemocratizationrequiresliberalizationofthesecuritysystem.Byremovingthesupportsforrepressionwithinandamonginstitutions,sweepingliberalizationmayhelptopreservedemocraticgains.
ContinuityandChange:RivalModels
Cautionisneededinspecifyingtheconditionsfordemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentandforliberalizationofasecurityapparatus.Someanalystsinsistthatpoliticaltransitionsarehighlyindeterminateandthattheiroutcomesareimpossibletodeducefrommacrostructuralfactors.40Otherstaketheoppositeview.Thissectionexaminesthreegeneralperspectivesontransitionstodemocracy:thosethatfocusalmostexclusivelyonsocioeconomicfactors,onpoliticalfactors,orontransitionalcontingencies.
SocioeconomicAccounts
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Thefunctionalistparadigmpositsasetofsocialrequisitesofdemocracy.Amongthefactorsthatseemtocorrelatewithstabledemocraciesare
39.Mathews,Freedom,StateSecurity,p.290.40.GuillermoO'Donnell,PhilippeSchmitter,andLawrenceWhitehead,eds.,TransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule:ProspectsforDemocracy(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1986),pp.5,19;DankwartRustow,"TransitionstoDemocracy:TowardaDynamicModel,"ComparativePolitics2,no.3(April1970):33763.
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economicdevelopmentandsocietalcomplexityormodernization.41Criticschargedthatitwasimpossibletoproveacausalrelationbetweensocioeconomicfactorsanddemocraticstability;thesefactorsarepreconditionsneitherforthedecayofauthoritarianismnorfortheriseofdemocracy.Toomanyactualcaseshavefailedtoevolveinthepredicteddirection.ThreeofthemostadvancedsocietiesinLatinAmerica,forinstance,weretraumatizedbymilitaryregimesinthe1970s:Argentina,Chile,andUruguay.Dahlputsthematterforcefully:"Theevidencesimplydoesnotsustainthehypothesisthatahighlevelofsocioeconomicdevelopmentiseitheranecessaryorasufficientconditionforcompetitivepoliticsnortheconversehypothesisthatcompetitivepoliticsiseitheranecessaryorasufficientconditionforahighlevelofsocioeconomicdevelopment."42
Anothersocioeconomicapproachcentersonunderdevelopment.OnevariantpositsanaturalaffinitybetweeneconomicdependencyandauthoritarianismandportraysrepressiveThirdWorldstatesasservantsofinternationalcapital;someaccountselevatetheexistenceofrepressiveregimestoalawofdependentdevelopment.Petrasflatlyasserts:
Theoriginsandproliferationofrepressiveregimesarenotproductsofinternaldevelopments,butresponsestodemandsthatoriginateprimarilyonagloballevel....Theneo-fascist[ThirdWorld]statefunctionsessentiallywithinandasaninstrumentofdependentdevelopment....Inthiscontexthighgrowthratesareanindexofthehighratesofexploitationandrepression.43
Seneseconcurs:"InLatinAmerica...nationalsecurityisthesecurityofforeigneconomicgroupswhoarepillagingthecountry."44
Moresophisticatedeconomisticformulationsincludethebureaucratic-authoritarianmodel,whichlinkstheeconomicrequirementsofhighlevelsofmodernization(asinArgentinaandBrazil)totherepression
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andpoliticaldeactivationofthepopularsector.45Otherworkscarefullycorrelatelevelsofpoliticalrepressionorchangesofregimewithmacroeconomicdevelopments(hyperinflation,balanceof
41.SeymourMartinLipset,"SomeSocialRequisitesofDemocracy:EconomicDevelopmentandPoliticalLegitimacy,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview53,no.1(March1959):69105.42.RobertDahl,Polyarchy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1971),p.71.43.JamesF.Petras,Class,State,andPowerintheThirdWorld(Montclair,N.J.:Allanheld,Osman,1981),pp.125,129,133.44.JudgeSenese,"TheTransformationofJuridicalStructuresinLatinAmerica,"inTheRepressiveState,ed.J.Weil(Toronto:BrazilianStudies/LARU,1976),p.87.45.O'Donnell,Modernization.
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paymentscrises,highcostorfailureofeconomicstabilizationprograms).Oneversionofthisapproachclaimsthat(manifestorexpected)popularoppositiontoorthodoxeconomicpoliciespredisposesanincumbentregimetowardrepressionandhelpstoexplainthesurvivalofauthoritarianrule.46Anotherversionseeseconomicfactorsbotheconomiccrisesandthepressuresofeconomicdevelopmentascausingtheerosionofauthoritarianismandtherestorationofciviliangovernment.47AsRouquiesuggests,theseexplanationsareweakenedbytheirreversibility.48
Thecausalpowertobeattributedtomacroeconomicfactorsintheimmediateorlong-termcollapseofanauthoritarianregimeortheriseofademocraticstatemustclearlybereconsidered.Commontotheeconomisticformulationsdescribedaboveistheassumptionthatdomesticpoliticalrealitiesandotherextraeconomicfactorsareepiphenomenalanddeterminedbyeconomicforces.Amoretenablepositionwouldacknowledgetheroleofpoliticalvariablesinmediatingordirectlyaffectingoutcomesandwouldacknowledgethateconomicandpoliticaldevelopmentsmayvaryindependently.Insomecaseseconomicproblemshaveundoubtedlycatalyzedorcontributedtoaregime'sbreakdownorchange,buttheycannotbeelevatedtothestatusofnecessaryconditions.Abodyofliteratureoffersthreecorrectivestoeconomicallydrivenmodels:authoritarianismisnotarequirementforthesurvivalofdependenteconomicrelations;underdevelopmentcanbefoundinawidevarietyofpoliticalsystems,somehighlyrepressive,somenot;stateelitesoftenhaveinterestsinrepressionthatareindependentofprevailingeconomicpressures.49
46.DavidPion-Berlin,"ThePoliticalEconomyofStateRepressioninArgentina,"inTheStateasTerrorist,ed.StohlandLopez;JohnSheahan,"Market-orientedEconomicPoliciesandPoliticalRepressioninLatinAmerica,"EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange28,no.2
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(January1980).47.GordonRichards,"StabilizationCrisesandtheBreakdownofMilitaryAuthoritarianisminLatinAmerica,"ComparativePoliticalStudies18,no.4(January1986).48.AlainRouquie,"DemilitarizationandtheInstitutionalizationofMilitary-DominatedPolitiesinLatinAmerica,"inTransitions,ed.O'Donnell,Schmitter,andWhitehead,p.125.49.FernandoHenriqueCardoso,"OntheCharacterizationofAuthoritarianRegimesinLatinAmerica,"pp.5152;JoseSerra,"ThreeMistakenThesesRegardingtheConnectionbetweenIndustrializationandAuthoritarianRegimes";andRobertR.Kaufman,"IndustrialChangeandAuthoritarianRuleinLatinAmerica,''pp.24752,allinNewAuthoritarianism,ed.D.Collier.SeealsoDouglasChalmers,"ThePoliticizedStateinLatinAmerica,"inAuthoritarianismandCorporatisminLatinAmerica,ed.JamesMalloy(Pittsburgh:UniversityofPittsburghPress,1977),pp.3741.
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PoliticalAccounts
Analternativemodelplacesspecialemphasisonpoliticalvariables,particularlyintrastatefactors.50O'DonnellandSchmitterstatecategoricallythat"thereisnotransitionwhosebeginningisnottheconsequencedirectorindirectofimportantdivisionswithintheauthoritarianregimeitself,principallyalongthefluctuatingcleavagebetweenhardlinersandsoft-liners."51Thismodeldoesnotsuggestthatpivotalstruggleswithinthestateoccurinasocialvacuumbutplacesprimacyonintrastatedevelopments.SchmittergeneralizesfromthePortuguesecase:
Thesourcesofcontradiction,necessaryifnotsufficientfortheoverthrowofauthoritarianrule,liewithintheregimeitself,withintheapparatusesofthestate,notoutsideitinitsrelationswithcivilsociety...."Objective"constraintsand"subjective"opponentsmaycreateand/orarticulatethepersistentstrainsandepisodicpressuresthatexacerbateinternalcleavages,upsetdelicatebalancesbetweenestablishedhierarchicalorders,weakentheresolveofregimesupporterstoact,anddecreasetheviabilityofcertainpreemptiveandrepressivepolicyoptions.However,alone,withoutsuchprior"reflexive"changeswithinthegoverningapparatusitself,theyarenotlikelytobesufficienttothreatentheregime,muchlessoverthrowit.52
Thismodelpositsdisturbancewithinthestateseverestrain,contradiction,orconflictasanecessaryconditionforthebreakdownofauthoritarianrule.53Itdoesnotimplythatequilibriumorhomeostasisisanormalconditionthatthestateistypicallyfreefrominternaldiscordbutclaimsthatatexceptionaljuncturesthepressuresintensifyandreachbreakingpoint.InSchmitter'sformulation,pressuresfrom
50.GuillermoO'DonnellandPhilippeSchmitter,"TentativeConclusionsaboutUncertainDemocracies,"inTransitions,ed.O'Donnell,Schmitter,andWhitehead.O'Donnellhasnowmovedawayfromhisearlierstressonmacroeconomicfactorsinshapingauthoritarianrule.51.Ibid.,p.19.RelatedargumentsarethoseofAdamPrzeworski("Some
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ProblemsintheStudyoftheTransitiontoDemocracy,"inTransitions,ed.O'Donnell,Schmitter,Whitehead)andofJoseCasanova("ModernizationandDemocratization:ReflectionsonSpain'sTransitiontoDemocracy,"SocialResearch50,no.4[Winter1983]:92973).52.PhilippeSchmitter,"LiberationbyGolpe:RetrospectiveThoughtsontheDemiseofAuthoritarianRuleinPortugalm,"ArmedForcesandSociety2,no.1(November1975):2021.53.Eastoh'ssystemstheoryemphasizesthestressofexternalsocietalpressuresonthepoliticalsystemandneglectsdisturbancegeneratedfromwithinthestateitself(SystemsAnalysis).SeealsoNeilSmelser,TheoryofCollectiveBehavior(NewYork:FreePress,1962);andChalmersJohnson,RevolutionaryChange(Boston:Little,Brown,1966).
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civilsocietyarenotnecessarytothedevelopmentofintrastatefrictions.Thelattermaybegeneratedbyafactionalbacklashagainstanewpolicyoraninstitutionalreform,achangingbalanceofforcesinsidethestate(e.g.,fromhard-linerstomoderatesorinnovators),acrisisofconfidencewithinthesecurityagencies,orasharpeningofjurisdictionalconflictamongagencies.Iftheregimecannotreducesuchdissonance,internalstrainmayfurthererodestatecohesionandauthority,activateoutsidesocialforces,andleadtoacrisisoforderandgovernance.
Thisstate-centeredperspectivemustbetempered,sinceitunderplaystheroleofsocialforcesincatalyzingordeepeningconflictswithinthestate.54Itistruethatsocialforcesrarelytriggerdemocraticchangeontheirown,letalonethetransformationofaninternalsecurityapparatus.Anecessaryconditionisthatthe"resurrectionofcivilsociety"touseO'DonnellandSchmitter'stermcoincidewithimportantdislocationswithinthestate.Thepressuresofsocialforcesthusbecomesalientonlyinconjunctionwiththedevelopmentofseriousstrainswithinthestate.Thisstate-societynexusduringcrisesandtransitionsneedsfurtherstudy.
TransitionalContingencies
Theparametersofatransitionfromauthoritarianrulemaybedifficulttopinpointinanempiricalcase,butitcanbesaidtobeginwiththedissolutionoftheoldregimeandculminateintheinstallationofanewone,whetherdemocratic,authoritarian,orrevolutionary.Thefluidityoftransitionsgivesstateelitesunprecedentedopportunitiestochangesecuritysystems,howeverrarelyinpracticetheyseizethismoment.Inthetransition,securityagenciesmaybeuntouched,reformed,fortified,ordismantled,buthavingasurvivalinstincttheydonotsimplywitheraway.
Thehighlycontingentandindeterminatecharacteroftransitions
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makespredictionsproblematic.55Oneargumentisthatthetypeoftransitionisitselfanimportantvariableshapingpoliticaloutcomes.Forourpurposes,themostimportantquestioniswhetheraparticulartypeoftransitionrelatespositivelytotheliberalizationofasecuritysystemor,
54.Asocialforceisagroupofactorsoutsidethestate,withcollectiveresourcesandidentifiableinterests,e.g.,communally-basedgroups,laborunions,socialmovements,churches,interestgroups,thepress,extra-parliamentaryparties,andinsurgentorganizations.55.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"p.19.
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alternatively,whethervariablesunaffectedbytransitionalcontingenciesbestexplaintheoutcome.Someauthorspredictthatatransitioninitiatedandcontrolledfromabove(e.g.,inSpainorBrazil)willfeaturesubstantialinstitutionalcontinuity,whereasatransitionthatfollowsthebreakdownofanauthoritarianregime(e.g.,inArgentina),willdisplayamorepronouncedrupturewithearlierstructures.56Howeverplausible,thesehypothesesdonotseemtofitcasessuchasHaiti,thePhilippines,Paraguay,andevenSpain.
Externallyorchestratedtransitions,suchastheinterventionsthatfollowamilitarydefeat(inJapan,WestGermany,Italy),areperhapsthebestexamplesofextensiveliberalization.Moregenerally,aperiodofforeigndominationmayadvanceratherthanimpededemocratization.Dahlfoundthatseventeenofthetwenty-ninedemocraticstatesexistingin1970hadbeeninauguratedduringforeigndomination.57Chapter7examineshowthispatternappliesnowtoNorthernIrelandunderBritishrule,aspecialcaseofexternalintervention.
Transitionsdrivenbyrevolutionaryorguerrillastruggleseemtoclusterattheotherendofthecontinuum:theyrarelyyieldliberalizedsecuritysystemsandgenuinelydemocraticpolitiesandinsteadproducenewauthoritarianorders.58Chapter6examinesthispatternincontemporaryZimbabwe,whereanewregimewasinstalledafteradecadeofguerrillawar.
AnAlternativeModel
TheperspectivesIhavediscussedabovemaybefaultedfortheironedimensionalemphasisonsocietal,onstate,orontransitionalvariables.Asuperiormodelwouldsystematicallylinkthesevariables.
Considerfirsttheimpactofthetransitionalperiod:ourpositionisthatthisprocessshapesbutdoesnotrigidlydetermineimportantvariables
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suchasthesurvivalandpowerofsecurityinstitutionstiedtotheoldregime,theactorswhoarelikelytoprevailundertheneworder,andthecapacitiesofthenewregime.Themodelpresentedbelowincorporatesthesetransitionaleffectsbutalsoplacesconsiderableindependentweightonwhathappensafterthetransition.
56.EduardoViolaandScottMainwaring,"TransitionstoDemocracy:BrazilandArgentinainthe1980s,"JournalofInternationalAffairs38,no.2(Winter1985):193219.57.Dahl,Polyarchy,pp.19398.58.ThedaSkocpol,"SocialRevolutionsandMassMilitaryMobilization,"WorldPolitics40,no.2(January1988):14768;SamuelHuntington,"WillMoreCountriesBecomeDemocratic?"PoliticalScienceQuarterly99,no.2(Summer1984):213.
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Inadditiontothescopeandintensityofprevailingsecurityproblems,ourmodelhighlightsfourinteractingmacrovariablesthatshapetheprospectsforasecuritysystem'sliberalizationafterthedemiseofsettlerrule:(1)thevaluesembeddedinthepoliticalculture;(2)theindependentpowerandproclivitiesofsurvivingsecurityagencies;(3)thestrengthandinterestsofgroups(parties,movements,insurgents)andkeyinstitutions(churches,laborunions,themedia,voluntaryassociations)incivilsociety;and(4)theinterestsandcapacitiesofthepostsettlerregime.59Eachvariablemayfunctioneithertoconstrainorfacilitatesystemicliberalization,thefrequencyandintensityofrepressiveevents,andtheprospectsforpoliticaldemocratization.
Thefourvariablesareinterrelated.Thefirstvariableconditionstheotherthreethroughitsimpactonpoliticalvaluesandinterests.Thesecondandthirdvariablesinteractwiththefourthinsofarastheydeterminemuchofthecapacityofthenewregime,helpingtofetterorempowerit.Thefourthfactoristhemastervariable,greaterthantheothersinexplanatorypower.Itisdecisivebecausethepostsettlerregimeisdirectlyresponsiblefordeterminingsecuritypolicy,law,andinstitutionalstructuresandpracticesconditioned,ofcourse,bytheothervariables.Letusconsidereachvariableinthecontextofourcases.
PoliticalCulture
Thestudyofstatestructuresinnewnationsmusttakeintoaccountbothinstitutionalandculturalfactors.60Theseedsofademocraticpoliticalcultureseemnecessaryforthegrowthofliberalizedstructuresoflawandorder.Yettheircultivationischronicallyproblematicindeeplydividedsocietieswherecommunalgroupslackasenseofnationalidentityorasharedculturaltradition.Persistentcommunalcleavagesandat-
59.ThismodelbuildsonargumentsinO'DonnellandSchmitter
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("TentativeConclusions"),Stepan(MilitaryPolitics),andLarryDiamond,SeymourMartinLipset,andJuanLinz,"BuildingandSustainingDemocraticGovernmentinDevelopingCountries,"WorldAffairs150,no.1(Summer1987):519.Binnendijkcomesclosetoourmodelwhenhearguesthatatransitionfromauthoritarianruleisshapedbythecontingenciesofthetransitionitselfandtheinterrelationsamongthreevariables:ademocratictraditionorasupportiveexternalmodel,the"institutionalfoundation"forthegrowthofdemocracy,andtheorientationandcapabilitiesofthenewregime'sleaders(HansBinnendijk,''AuthoritarianRegimesinTransition,"WashingtonQuarterly10,no.2[Spring1987]:159).Noneoftheseauthors,however,incorporatesallfourdimensionsofthemodelproposedhereorgivessufficientweighttoourmastervariable.60.PragerdemonstratestheimportanceoftheculturaldimensioninhisstudyofIrelandafter1921(JeffreyPrager,BuildingDemocracyinIreland[Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986]).
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tachmentssettightlimitsoninstitutionalchangesandsuggestthenecessityofreconstitutingculturalorientationsinconjunctionwithinstitutionalreform.Apoliticalculturedevoidoftrustandcompromisemaynotsentencesocietiestoperpetualauthoritarianismbutitclearlyfrustratestheirdemocraticprogressandfuelsinstabilityanddisorder.61Theirculturalheritage,therefore,isanamorphousbutcrucialcontextualvariablethatisresilientandresistanttochangeatleastintheshortterm.Thisculturallagpresentsaformidablechallengetomodernizingelites.
Giventheirsettler-orientedhistories(describedinChapter2),bothNorthernIrelandandZimbabwelacktraditionsofdemocraticaccommodation,toleranceofpoliticalopposition,andinstitutionalizedsupportforbasichumanrights.NorthernIrelandhasa"polarizedpoliticalculture"parexcellence,rootedintwonationalidentitiesthatdefinecompromiseasbetrayalofone'sside.62ThecontiguityofNorthernIrelandtoBritainmakesdemocraticvaluesonlyslightlymoresalienttherethaninZimbabwe.ThepopulationviewstheBritishregimeasamorallybankruptactor;hence,theBritishoperatewithinahostileculturalenvironmentandhavemetwithonlymodestlocalacceptanceintheirattempttoimposechangeonUlster.InpostsettlerZimbabwe,theofficialdemocraticideologyclasheswiththeauthoritariantendenciesoftheregime.Inneithercase,therefore,istheexistingpoliticalcultureconducivetodemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentorliberalizedsecurityarrangements.
TheInheritedSecurityApparatus
Amoreimmediateproblemfacinganewregimeisthatofgrapplingwiththesecurityestablishmentinheritedfromitspredecessor,insofarasitsurvivedthetransition.Somebureaucraticinertiacanbetakenasanironlawoforganizationallife.Organizationshaveaninterestintheirsurvival(orexpansion)andacommitmenttoentrenched
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doctrinesand
61.Theliteratureassumesabasiccongruencebetweenanation'spoliticalcultureandpoliticalstructure.NorthernIrelandillustratesonewaytheymaydiverge;Argentina,Chile,andMexicoexemplifyanother:thecoexistenceofauthoritarianregimeswithdemocraticpoliticalcultures(seeJohnBoothandMitchellSeligson,"ThePoliticalCultureofAuthoritarianisminMexico,"LatinAmericanResearchReview19,no.1[1984]:10624;andSusanTiano,"AuthoritarianismandPoliticalCultureinArgentinaandChileinthemid-1960s,"LatinAmericanResearchReview21,no.1[1986]:7398).62.GabrielAlmondandG.BinghamPowell,ComparativePolitics,2ded.(Boston:Little,Brown,1978),pp.2829.
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traditionalmodioperandi.63Theyrarelyundertakeself-reformevenunderanewregime.Ifallelseisconstant,itisreasonabletopredictthatunreconstructedsectariansecurityorganswillcontinuerepressiveoperationsintheneworder.
Justastheymaythreaten,andoftensubvert,nascentdemocraticinstitutions,survivingsecurityagenciesandotherprotagonistsoftheoldregimecanoftensabotagereformsofcoerciveorgans.Recenthistoryisfilledwithexamplesofnewcivilianregimesunabletotame,letaloneoverhaul,inheritedcoercivestructures.Notonlyunlikelytocommitsuicide,theagenciesoftenfighttheirbroaddemotionwithinthestate,jurisdictionalencroachmentfromotherorgans(e.g.,courtsorlegislatures),cutsinmaterialresourcesandpersonnel,andplanstopunishsecuritypersonnelforpriorabusesofhumanrights.
Noneofthisshouldimplythattheseagenciesarecompletelyaversetochange;underanewexecutivetheyarelikelytoreflectbothtraditionalcommitmentsandnewdemands.Likewise,aseventsinmanydemocratizingstateshaveshown,aregimemustoftenseekabalancebetweenplacatingandreforminginheritedsecurityorgans.Anaggressivestrategytowardthemilitary,ontheonehand,mayrenderaciviliangovernmentunstable(vulnerabletomilitaryinterferenceoracoup),asincontemporaryArgentina.Ontheotherhand,anoverlyaccommodatingposturethatallowsthemilitarytokeepitsgriponofficialcoercion,asinBrazil,maypromotepoliticalstabilitybutdenythecivilianregimeeffectivepower,thuscompromisinggenuinedemocratization.64InBrazilsince1985thisarrangementhascontributedtowidespreadrepression.Stepansuggeststhatthealternativetoanegativeexecutive(theArgentinianmodel)orapassiveexecutive(theBrazilian)isa"positiveexecutive"thatactivelypersuadessecurityelitestoacceptciviliancontrol,increasedprofessionalism,andanarrowingoftheirprominentroleindomesticaffairs.65
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AfterthecollapseofsettlerruleinNorthernIreland,therepressiveorientationofthesecurityapparatuswasdiluted:someagenciesweredissolved,othersreformed,andnewoversightbodiescreated.InZimbabwetheoppositeoccurred:existingagencieswerefortifiedandmobilizedforpunitiveaction.Inotherwords,therepressivetraditionsof
63.Grundywritesthat"institutionsinstinctivelybehaveinwaysdesignedtosolidifyorenhancetheirpower.Thesecurityestablishmentisamodelexample"(KennethGrundy,TheMilitarizationofSouthAfricanPolitics[Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1986],p.109);seealsoBall,SecurityandEconomy,chap.2.64.SeeStepan,MilitaryPolitics,chap.7.65.Ibid.,p.139.
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settlersecurityorganshavebeensomewhatcheckedinUlster,officiallycountenancedinZimbabwe.
CivilSociety
Centralizationofpowertendstoweakendemocracyandencouragerepression,whereasdispersalofpowerwithinthestateandthroughoutcivilsocietymayhavetheoppositeeffect.66Theextenttowhichdemocraticallyorientedforcesincivilsocietymobilizepressurescanaccountforsomecross-nationalvariationindemocraticoutcomes.67Despitetheirinstitutionalinsulation,securityorgansdonotexistinasocialvacuum;influentialelitesandcivicbodiesmayprovidearichsourceofoppositiontopoliticalrepression.Goldsteinconcludesthatalackofopposition"facilitatesanexpansionofrepressivepolicies,"68butthepresenceofoppositionmayalsogeneraterepression.Ifoppositiongroupshaveattimessucceededincurbingstatepower,theyoftenprovidethetargetsforrepressionandunwittinglycontributetothefortificationofcoerciveinstitutions.
Theforcesthatmayaffectstructuralchangeinasecurityapparatusincludecivicorganizations(media,churches,laborunions,intelligentsia,businessgroups),socialmovements,andoppositionpoliticalparties.Thereis,ofcourse,substantialcross-nationalvariationintheorganizationalsophistication,availabilityofresources,andresultantpotentialleverageoftheseforces.Insomecasestheinfrastructureofcivilsocietydevelopsthroughvibrantalliancesamongvariousorganizedforces.Inothers,anearlierhighlychargedcivicorderhasbeendeactivated,yetalatentsocialnetworkremains.Stillotherslackatraditionofciviclifealtogetherorfeatureahighlyfragmentedcivilsociety,incapableofeffectingevenminorchangesinsecurityarrangements.Manyauthoritarianelitesareexpertsatatomizinganddepoliticizingcivilsociety,usingcooptation,ideologicalcontrol,ornakedforce.69
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SocietalfragmentationexiststhroughoutpostcolonialAfrica.70Evenwhereindependencewaswonthroughaprotractedstruggleandpopular
66.Alves,StateandOpposition;Diamond,Lipset,andLinz,"BuildingandSustainingDemocraticGovernment."67.ThishypothesisissupportedbyarecentcomparisonofLatinAmericaandsouthernEurope(PhilippeSchmitter,"AnIntroductiontoSouthernEuropeanTransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule,"inTransitions,ed.O'Donnell,Schmitter,andWhitehead,pp.79.68.Goldstein,PoliticalRepression,pp.57273,559.69.O'DonnellandSchmitter,"TentativeConclusions,"p.48.70.JeanFrançoisBayart,"CivilSocietyinAfrica,"inPoliticalDominationinAfrica,ed.P.Chabal(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986).
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mobilization,itispossibleforthenewregimetodeactivatecountervailingsourcesofpowerincivilsociety.ThishasoccurredinZimbabwe.InNorthernIreland,bycontrast,civilsocietyishyperactivebutitsachievementsareuneven,largelybecausecivilsocietyistornasunderbytwoantagonisticcommunities.Progressiveforceshavepressedforreforms,yetopposingforcesmainlythoseofthesettlercommunityhavealsosomewhatcontainedliberalization.Thisoutcomesuggeststhatadevelopedcivilsocietymaybeablessingoracursefordemocratizationandliberalization,dependingontheinterestsandvaluesoftheactorsinvolved.AsStepanargues,lastingdemocratizationrequiressocialforcesto"revalorizedemocracy"andcommitthemselvestoholdingsecurityagenciesaccountable.71
TheNewRegime
Afourth,binaryvariableseemstohavethegreatestpowerinaccountingforsecuritysystemoutcomesafterregimetransitions:theinterestsandcapacitiesofthenewregime.72
Liberalizationrequires,first,thatthenewregimehaveagenuineinterestinandcommitmenttobuildinginstitutionsthatareimpartial,accountable,legitimate,andinformedbyhumanrightsnorms.Theinterestsofgovernmentalleadersareshapedinpartbythevaluesembeddedinthepoliticalcultureandbythecentralgoalsoftheregimeorrulingparty.Theregime'sabilitytoimplementitsgoalsdependsonthelegacyofthetransitionalperiodaswellasnewcontingencies.Specifically,itscapacitydependsonitsmaterialresources,itsleaders'skills,thesupportorresistanceofitspopulation,thepostureofcoerciveagencies,andthemagnitudeofdomesticunrestandsecuritythreatsthatmaylimititsroomformaneuver.73
Insum,thenewregime'sindependentvaluecommitmentsandresourcesarecriticallyimportant.Butitscapacitiesarealso
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contingenton
71.Stepan,MilitaryPolitics.72.Moststudiesofdemocratizationhaveplacedinsufficientweightonthisfactor.Forarecentexample,seeDemocracyinDevelopingCountries,ed.Diamond,Linz,andLipset.73.Cf.CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution(Reading,Pa.:AddisonWesley,1978),chap.7;S.N.Eisenstadt,RevolutionandtheTransformationofSocieties(NewYork:FreePress,1978),p.251;KarenRemmer,"PublicPolicyandRegimeConsolidation:TheFirstFiveYearsoftheChileanJunta,"JournalofDevelopingAreas13,no.4(July1979):44161;JuanLinz,TheBreakdownofDemocraticRegimes:Crisis,Breakdown,andReequilibration(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1978),pp.8788.
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thesupportitcanmarshalfromoutsidesocialforcesandotherbranchesofthestate,includingthesecuritysector.InZimbabwe,theregimeitselffunctionsasthemajorconstraintonliberalization;inNorthernIreland,theBritishgovernmentisakeyproponentofreform.Intheformer,theregimehasthecapacityforbutlittleinterestinmodernizingthesecurityapparatus;inthelatter,thesituationisreversed.
ThenextchapterdiscussesthebasicfeaturesofsettlersocietiesasapreludetoanexaminationofRhodesia/ZimbabweandNorthernIreland.Thesechaptersexaminelongitudinalchangesincomparativeperspective:theriseofsettlerruleineachcase,thebreakdownofbothsettlerstates,andthedynamicsoftheneworder.Chapters6and7payspecialattentiontodevelopingatheoreticalperspectiveonchangeandcontinuityininternalsecuritystructures.Theexplanatorymodelshouldbeusefulinunderstandingoutcomesinotherpostsettlersocieties,whicharelikelytofeaturedifferentialmappingofourvariables.ContemporaryTaiwan,forexample,scoresfavorably(forliberalization)oneachvariableexceptforitssecurityagencies;LiberiacloselyresemblesthepatternofZimbabwe.74
74.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheQuestforDemocracy(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1987);LawyersCommitteeforHumanRights,Liberia:APromiseBetrayed(NewYork:LawyersCommittee,1986).
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Chapter2ThePillarsofSettlerRuleSettlerruleisoneformofpoliticaldominationthatisindeclinearoundtheworld.Recentlyanumberofsettlerregimeshaveeithercollapsed(Liberia,Rhodesia,NorthernIreland)orgrownincreasinglyvulnerable(SouthAfrica,Taiwan).Theyshareinthegeneralhistoricaldeclineofcolonialism,butsettlerstateshaveshownmoreresiliencebecausetheyrepresentpermanenthometoadominantgroupthatispreparedtoresistmetropolitanpressuresforchangeandanyhintofnativeresistance.Thesettlers'characteristicintransigencemakesthetransformationofthesestatesconsiderablymoredifficultandcomplicatedthanthedecolonizationofconventionalcolonies,whereimperialpowersdisengagedwiththebroadsupportoflocalsocialforces.Thischapterexaminestheconditionsofexistenceandcharacteristicsocialandpoliticalstructuresofthemodelsettlerstate,settingouttheframeworkthatinformsourinvestigationofRhodesiaandNorthernIreland.
DefiningtheSettlerState
Settlersocietiesarefoundedbymigrantgroupswhoassumeasuperordinatepositionvis-à-visnativeinhabitantsandbuildself-sustainingstatesthataredejureordefactoindependentfromthemothercountryandorganizedaroundthesettlers'politicaldominationovertheindigenouspopulation.(Throughout,thetermsnative,indigenous,andindigeneareusedinterchangeablytoidentifytheinhabitantsoftheterritorypriortothearrivalofthesettlers:blacksinRhodesia,CatholicsinIreland.)In
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somecases(Rhodesia,SouthAfrica,Liberia),economicinterests(exploitationofnativesandprosperityofsettlers)provideakeyrationaleforpoliticaldomination;inothers(NorthernIreland,Israel,Taiwan),economicconsiderationshavebeensecondarytootherimperatives:maintainingaspecificreligiousorculturalorder(NorthernIreland,Israel),arefugeorhomeland(Taiwan,Israel).
Toconstituteasettlerstate,thedescendantsofsettlersmustremainpoliticallydominantovernatives,whopresentatleastalatentthreattothesettlers'supremacy.Theperiodduringwhichthefoundationsofsettlerdominationwerelaidisthereforenotthedistinguishingfeature;settlerstateswereestablishedintheseventeenthcenturyinSouthAfrica,thenineteenthcenturyinRhodesiaandLiberia,the1920sinNorthernIreland,andaslateasthe1940sinTaiwan.
Incertaincases,originaldivisionsbetweensettlersandnativesnolongershapethesociopoliticalorder.Societiesthatassimilatedorannihilatedtheindigeneswouldfalloutsidethecategoryofsettlerstates.Anumberofformersettlementcoloniesimposedfinalsolutionsontheir"nativeproblems."IntheUnitedStatesandAustralia,theindigenouspopulationwasforciblydisplacedandlargelyeliminated,andquasi-Europeansocietieswereestablished.Conversely,inLatinAmericaracialandethnicassimilationwasfairlycommonbutrarelycomplete,aslingeringconflictsinBrazilandelsewhereattest.
Settlerstatesshouldalsobedistinguishedfromconventionalcolonialstates,whichwereorganizedaroundimperialeconomicandgeopoliticalobjectives,suchasacquiringterritoryfromotherEuropeancompetitors,establishingmilitaryoutposts,monopolizingtrade,openingmarkets,andexploitingnaturalresources.Tomaintainimperialadvantages,extensiveoccupationandadministrationwereusuallyunnecessary.Variationsamongcoloniesnotwithstanding,theirinfrastructureswereoftenreducedtobareessentials,withaskeletal
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coercivestructureandsmallcontingentsofcolonialadministratorsa"thinwhiteline"throughoutAfrica.1Asthesatelliteofametropole,acolonialstateapparatuswassuperimposedoncivilsociety,notrootedinit(evenunderindirectrule,wheretraditionalnativeelitesexercisedadministrativedutiesinthe
1.Tocontrolnativepopulations,smallcolonialadministrationsmadeuseofnativecollaboratorsandtheselectiveapplicationofcoercion.SeeA.H.M.Kirk-Greene,"TheThinWhiteLine:TheSizeoftheBritishColonialServiceinAfrica,"AfricanAffairs,no.314(January1980):2544;DavidKillingray,"TheMaintenanceofLawandOrderinBritishColonialAfrica,"AfricanAffairs,no.340(July1986):41137;D.K.Fieldhouse,Colonialism:18701945(NewYork:St.Martin's,1981).
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countryside).Giventhesedistinguishingfeatures,aconventionalcolonywascriticallyvulnerabletoshiftingimperialinterests.
Settlerstatesdevelopedmuchmoreelaboratepoliticalandeconomicinfrastructures,encouragedmoreintensiveEuropeansettlement,andachieveddefactoordejurepoliticalindependencefromthemetropole.2Settlersconsideredtheterritorytheirpermanenthome;thisparamountinterestshapedallsocial,economic,andpoliticalrelationswiththeindigenouspopulation.Comparedtotheminimalistcoerciveapparatusoftheclassiccolonialstate,asettlerstateisinstitutionallystrong:thesecuritycoreofthestatehasatitsdisposalsubstantialresources(finances,personnel,weaponry),andtheexerciseofrepressionisdeterminedbysettlers'assessmentsofsecurity,notmetropolitanapproval.3Independentcontroloverstatecoercionempowerssettlerregimestoresistdomesticthreatsandforeignmachinations;thusattemptstotransformthemhavebeenmoreproblematicthanthosetodecolonizeconventionalcolonies.
Thefirstimperativeofstablesettlerrule,therefore,istoachieveautonomyfromthemetropoleintheexerciseofpoliticalauthorityandcoercivepower.Thegreaterthedegreeofautonomy,thegreaterthesettlers'roomformaneuverinmoldingeconomic,social,andpoliticalstructures.Underdejureindependence(e.g.,inLiberia,SouthAfrica,Israel),themetropolerelinquishesitsjuridicalauthoritytointerfereinissuessuchasnativepoliticalrights,landexpropriationandlaborexploitation,andthefundamentalconstitutionalstatusoftheterritory.Thisfreedomfromimperialinterventiondoeslittle,however,toshieldasettlersocietyfrominternalconflictsandinternationalpressures,astherecenthistoryofIsrael,Liberia,andSouthAfricaattests.Underdefactoautonomy(e.g.,inRhodesia,NorthernIreland,Taiwan),theimperialpowerlosescontroloverpoliticalandcoerciveinstitutionsbutcontinuestoclaimsovereigntyovertheterritory.Itmayassertthisresidualauthorityagainstthewishesofthesettlers,withorwithout
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success,asouranalysisofRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandwillshow.Bothcasesillustrate,first,howconcertedandprotracteddefiancebysettlersmayexposethelimitsofmetropolitanleverageoverasettlerstateand,second,
2.LeoKuper,"PoliticalChangeinWhiteSettlerSocieties"inPluralisminAfrica,ed.LeoKuperandM.G.Smith(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1969).3.Onethniccontroloversecurityindividedsocieties,seeCynthiaEnloe,EthnicSoldiers:StateSecurityinDividedSocieties(Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1980),pp.1823.
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howprecariousdefactostateautonomycanbeinkeepingthemetropoleatbayduringcrises.
Thesecondconditionofstablesettlerruleistoconsolidatecontrolovertheindigenouspopulation.Effectivecontrolisnecessarytopreventorcontainnatives'politicalmobilization,unrest,andthreatstothesystem'sstabilityandalsotodiscouragemetropolitaninterferenceontheirbehalf.Ofcourse,thescope,intensity,andsubstanceofcontrolvaryovertimeandplace.Controlsmaybeextensiveandintensiveinpolitical,economic,andsocialspheresasinSouthAfricaorlesscomprehensiveasinIsraelandNorthernIreland.Variationisalsoevidentintherelativeimportanceofideological,coercive,administrative,andcooptativemechanisms.
Thesystemofcontrolmaybesosuccessfulindisorganizingpoliticalmobilization,restrictingphysicalmobility,andensuringeconomicdependenceofthesubordinategroupthatovertphysicalrepressionisrarelynecessarytomaintainstability.Kuper'sargumentthat"whitesettlersocietiesarenotoriouslyrepressiveandundemocratic"andBiermannandKössler'sclaimthat"directbrutalforceisthusaconstantandnecessaryelementofsettlerrule"thereforedeservesomequalification.4Nakedforcealoneisrarelysufficientordesirabletomaintainsocialcohesion;selectiveuseofthecarrotmayofferstabilizingdividends.Settlerstatesvarysignificantlyinthedegreetowhichtheyaccommodateindigenouspopulations;conciliationhasbeenmoreevidentinlatter-dayLiberiaandTaiwan,forinstance,thaninRhodesia,Ulster,andSouthAfrica.InIsraelproper(excludingtheWestBankandGaza),anelaboratesystemofsegmentation,dependence,andcooptationhasmaintainedcontroloverIsraeliArabs;untilrecently,writesLustick,thissystemwaseffective"atverylowcosttotheregimeintermsofresourcesexpended,overtviolentrepression,andunfavorableinternationalpublicity''5Notwithstandingtheseexampleswhereameasureofaccommodationandsoftcontrol
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hasbeenpresent,theimperativesofsettlersupremacymilitateagainstsubstantialadvancementofthesubordinatecastethatmightencroachonthesettlers'politicalpower.6
4.Kuper,"PoliticalChange,"p.170;WernerBiermannandReinhartKössler,"TheSettlerModeofProduction:TheRhodesianCase,"ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy18(May-August1980):112.5.lanLustick,ArabsintheJewishState(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1980),p.26.6.AccordingtoGood,settlerruleisdistinguishedby"politicalrigidity"(KennethGood,"SettlerColonialism:EconomicDevelopmentandClassFormation"JournalofModernAfricanStudies14,no.4[December1976]:597620).
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Thethirdpillarofsettlersupremacyistomaintainthesettlers'castesolidarityandthestate'scohesion.Althoughthegreatdivideisthatbetweensettlersandtheindigenouspopulation,settlerunityisneveraforegoneconclusion.Internalconflictswithinthestateanddominantcommunityalongclass,ethnic,political,orculturallinescanbedangerousinsofarastheycompromisethestate'scapacitytodeliverrepressionorifcracksinthesettlermonolithpresentanopportunityfornativestomobilize.Ideologicalglueandmaterialincentivespromotecohesion.Intheirideologiesregimesoftendramatizecommunaldifferencesbymarshalingthefolkwisdomofnative"paganism""barbarism,""animalism,""untrustworthiness,"and"subversiveness''Asmaterialincentives,theycommonlydispenseprivilegestothelowerechelonsofthesettlercastewheretheyexistinsignificantnumberstoavertthegrowthofclassallianceswithnatives.Hence,theemergenceof"laboraristocracies"ofProtestantworkersinNorthernIrelandandwhiteworkersinSouthAfricaandRhodesia.
Asingle-ordominant-partypoliticalsystemmayalsolessenfrictionamongsettlers.ItisnoaccidentthatasinglepartyruledNorthernIrelandfor50consecutiveyears(theUnionistparty),Taiwanforover40years(theKuomintang),SouthAfricaforover40years(theNationalparty),andLiberiafor103years(theTrueWhigparty).Duringthedecadesofone-partyruleinthesecases,oppositionpartieswithinthesettlerpopulationwereeitherdiscouraged,marginalized,orbannedoutright.Liberia'srulingminorityenduredachronicdanger:
thepossibilityofdissensionwithintheranksoftheAmerico-Liberian[settler]communityweakeningitduringamomentofcrisis.Thus,meanshadtobefoundtocontrol...thetendencytowardfactionalismthathascharacterizedAmerico-Liberiansociety.Theultimatesolutiontothisproblemwastheemergenceofasingledominantpartywhichhasmaintainedthesolidarityofthesettlercommunityinthefaceofbothinternalandexternalthreatsforalmostacentury.7
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Nevermonolithicpoliticallyorsocially,settlerpopulationsneverthelessmustmaintainsomethresholdlevelofcohesioninthefaceofthecommonenemythesubordinatepopulationand,insomecases,themetropole.InIsraelandSouthAfrica,moderateandhard-linefactionshaverepeatedlytestedthisthreshold.Yettensionsbetweenthemhavenotyetbecomeunmanageable,inthesenseofthreateningcriticalsettler
7.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheEvolutionofPrivilege(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1969),pp.5960.
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unityonthefundamentalnativequestionorleadinginfluentialsettlerelitestobreakrankstoallywithnativeinterests.InNorthernIrelandandRhodesia,thebasiccommitmenttosettlerdominationtendedtoovershadowintrasettlercleavagesonmoresecondarymattersformostofthelifeofeachstate.WhenseriousinternaldivisionsdidsurfaceinRhodesiain1962,theywereresolvedbyapuristregimethatreplacedthereformistsandsucceededinrebuildingsettlersolidarity.UlsterProtestantswerenotsofortunate.TheerosionofUnionistcohesionfrom1969to1972wasaprocessthatcouldnotbereversed;itculminatedinthebreakdownofthesettlerstateanditsreplacementwithdirectBritishrule.
Itshouldbeclearthatthethreeconditionsofstablesettlerruleidentifiedabovemaybemetinvaryingdegrees,butstabilityislikelytobeenhancedifallthreearesatisfiedtoahighdegree.Thegreatertheautonomyfromthemetropole,controlovertheindigenouspopulation,andsettlersolidarity,thegreaterthelikelihoodthatsettlerrulewillbemaintained.Theweakeningofoneconditiondoesnotnecessarilyjeopardizesettlerruleintheshortrun,butitmaygraduallyincreaseitsvulnerability.InRhodesiaduringthe1970swhitesolidarityandautonomyfromtheCrownremainedintact,whileblackradicalizationandinsurgencyintensifiedandshookthefoundationsofthestate.Thefailureofonlyoneconditioninthiscasehelpstoexplainwhytheinevitablecollapseofthesettlerorderwasdelayedforadecade.Inshort,Rhodesiainthe1970sexemplifiedunstablesettlerrule.IncontemporarySouthAfricatwopillarsofsettlerstabilityareincreasinglyproblematic:whitecohesionandcontrolovertheblackpopulation.InNorthernIrelandinthelate1960sallthreeconditionsquicklydeteriorated,thusexpeditingthedemiseofsettlerrule.
SettlerSocietiesasCasteSocieties
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Settlerruleisaparticularlyresilientformofauthoritariandomination.Viewingthecountryastheirpermanentabode,settlerstypicallyregardthepoliticalsystemastheirprivatepreserve,andthesocioeconomicorderasthevehiclefortheirexclusiveprosperity.Theyoftenexpropriatetherichestland,layclaimtoprimenaturalresources,introducesocialsegregation,andexploitnativelabor(underminorityrule)ormarginalizeit(undermajorityrule).
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Settlersocietiesareextremeexamplesof"plural"or"communallydivided"societies.8Unlikesocietiesintegratedalonguniversalisticlines,apluralsocietyischaracterizedbypersistentandmutuallyreinforcingcleavagestypicallyethnic,racial,orreligiousbetweentwoormoresectionsofthepopulation.Byvirtueoftheirculturaldiversity,communalinterests,andascriptivesocioeconomicinequality,theseparatecommunitiesaredifferentiallyincorporatedinthesocialorder.
Theconceptofacommunallydividedsocietyshouldnotsuggestthatcommunalgroupsliveinworldsapart,thatsocialrelationsarefilledwithtensionandhostility,orthatpoliticalpolarizationbetweenthemisnecessarilyintense.Commoninstitutionsandsharedinterestsarenotaltogetherabsent,anddivisionsmaynotpervadetheentiresocialorder.Somecooperationandinterdependence(e.g.,ineconomicrelations)areevidenteveninthemostrigidlystratifiedandsegregatedsocieties.Yetthesebondsareinsufficienttoneutralizesocialdivisions.Onthemostvitalissuesfacingthesociety,thenormisabasicintracommunalconsensusandintercommunalestrangement,withintracommunaldiscordandintercommunalharmonytheexceptionstotherule.9
Themodelsettlersocietyistypicallystructuredalongcastelines:thatis,ahierarchicalstructureofendogamous,hereditarygroups,withpronouncedsocialdistanceinintergrouprelations,differentialsocialization,andacasteetiquettegoverningcontactsbetweendominantandsubordinategroups:10
Intermarriageisdiscouragedacrossthecasteline,butsexualunionsoftenobeyadoublestandardthatofsexualapartheidfornative
8.SeeKuperandSmith,eds.,PluralisminAfrica;IanLustick,"StabilityinDeeplyDividedSocieties:ConsociationalismversusControl"WorldPolitics31,no.3(April1979):32544;SammySmooha,"Controlof
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MinoritiesinIsraelandNorthernIreland"ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory22,no.2(April1980):25680;HermannGiliomee,"TheElusiveSearchforPeace:SouthAfrica,Ulster,Israel"Optima36,no.3(1988):12635(Smooha'sandGiliomee'scomparativeanalysesaredeeplyflawed).9.AlvinRabushkaandKennethShepsle,PoliticsinPluralSocieties(Columbia:Merrill,1972),pp.6768.10.Theconceptofcastehasbeenappliedtocommunallydividedsocieties,includingtheAmericanSouth,Liberia,Israel,NorthernIreland,andSouthAfrica(seeW.LloydWarner,"AmericanCasteandClass"AmericanJournalofSociology42,no.2[September1936]:pp.23437;JohnDollard,CasteandClassinaSouthernTown[GardenCity:Doubleday,1949];AllisonDavis,BurleighGardner,andMaryGardner,DeepSouth:ASocialAnthropologicalStudyofCasteandClass[Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1941];GeraldBerreman,"CasteinIndiaandtheUnitedStates"AmericanJournalofSociology66,no.2[September1960]:12027;SammySmooha,Israel:PluralismandConflict[Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978];Liebenow,Liberia:Evolution).
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menandsettlerwomenbutnotforsettlermenandnativewomen(thepatterninRhodesiaandSouthAfrica).11
Socialdistanceisrelativelyhighintheareasoffriendships,leisureactivities,andwork.
Intercommunalinteractionineverydaylifemaybesuperficiallycordial,asmembersofeachcastekeeptheirprescribedplaces.Casteetiquetterequiresdeferentialconducttowardsuperiors,expressedinspeech,bodymovement,andgeneraldemeanorbehaviorthatreaffirmsdominantorsubordinatestatus,reducesfriction,anddefusesdominantmembers'fearsofthesubordinategroup.
Suchpatternedinterpersonalrelationsarereinforcedbyeconomicandpoliticalinequalityandbythedominantvaluesystem.InRhodesia,SouthAfrica,Israel,Liberia,and(toalesserextent)NorthernIreland,dominantstereotypesportraythesubordinatepopulationasbackward,primitive,subhuman,childlike,irrational,lazy,andimmoral;12theseattributionshelptojustifytheprivilegesofthedominantcasteandworkagainstsocialassimilationandpoliticalincorporationofthe"uncivilized"caste.
Thereisnaturallysomevariationinthedegreetowhichactualcasesapproximatethesecastepatterns.Variationmaybefoundinotherareasaswell:(1)racial,ethnic,orreligioussimilitudebetweenthecastes;(2)theratioofsettlerstonativesandwhetherthedominantgroupisaminorityormajority(seeTable1);(3)thedegreeofassimilationandmiscegenationallowed;(4)settlers'andnatives'attitudestowardoneanother;and(5)thebalancebetweencoerciveandotherformsofsocialcontrol.Althoughthesevariationsareoftensignificantinthesettlers'andthenatives'lives,theuniversalsinequanonremainsthepreservationofsettlerpowerandprivilege.
Thefirsttwovariablesdeservemoreextensivediscussionhere.In
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somecases,racialorethnicsimilaritybetweensettlersandnativesmaysoftentheharshfeaturesofsettlerdomination.CommonracialbackgroundbetweenChinesesettlersandnativesinTaiwanisassociated
11.ForIsrael,seeDavidShipler,ArabandJew(NewYork:Penguin,1986),chaps.10,17.ForRhodesia,seeCyrilRogersandCharlesFrantz,RacialThemesinSouthernRhodesia(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1962).OnsexualnormsintheAmericanSouth,seeDollard,CasteandClass.12.Dollard,CasteandClass;Smooha,Israel;RogersandFrantz,RacialThemes;Shipler,ArabandJew;SammySmooha,"JewishandArabEthnocentrisminIsrael"EthnicandRacialStudies10,no.1(January1987):126;SallyBelfrage,LivingwithWar:ABelfastYear(NewYork:Penguin,1987).
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TABLE1SELECTEDSOCIETIESWITHSETTLERPOPULATIONS
TypeofStatePercentageofSettlersin
Populationa
Settlerstate:dejureindependent
Israel(1948-present) 86b
Liberia(18471980) 3SouthAfrica(1910-present)
15
Settlerstate:defactoindependent
NorthernIreland(19211972)
63
Rhodesia(19231980) 5Taiwan(1949-present) 14
Colonialstate:dependent
Algeria(until1962) 12
Kenya(until1963) 1Namibia(until1990) 7NewCaledonia 37Zambia(until1964) 3Zanzibar(until1964) 17aPopulationfiguresarefor1987,exceptforAlgeria(1954),Kenya(1960),Rhodesia(1979),andZanzibar(1948).bThefigureforIsraelexcludestheoccupiedterritoriesoftheWestBankandGaza.
withsignificantassimilationandlowsocialdistance.InNorthernIrelandandLiberia,however,racialsimilaritycouldnotneutralize
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profoundethnicandculturaldifferences.WhenformerAmericanslavessettledinLiberiainthe1820s,
theirviewsofAfricaandAfricanswereessentiallythoseofnineteenth-centurywhitesintheUnitedStates.Thebondsofculturewerestrongerthanthebondsofrace,andthesettlersclungtenaciouslytothesubtledifferencesthatsetthemapartfromthetribal"savages"intheirmidst.13
Generally,thecorecharacteristicsofthesettlermodelseemtobelittleaffectedbyracialorethnicfactors.
Whetheraminorityoramajority,thesettlercastemonopolizesstatepowerandexcludesthenativecastefrommeaningfulpoliticalparticipation.Yettherespectivemechanismsofpoliticaldominationdiffer.Dominantmajoritiescanaffordtoextendformalpoliticalrightsto
13.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheQuestforDemocracy(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1987),p.23.
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subordinatepopulationsasinNorthernIrelandandIsrael.14Bycontrast,dominantminoritiesuniversalizethefranchiseonlyattheirperil,drivenbythe"overridingfear...thattheystandtobeoverwhelmedbyavastlylargermajority"15Thesettlersmustprotecttheirislandofprivilegebydejurepoliticalexclusionofnatives,limitationsonnatives'civilrights,andrelianceondraconianmeasuresofcontrol(e.g.,inRhodesia,SouthAfrica,andLiberia).Minoritysettlerruleisnormallyassociatedwitha"Herrenvolk"ormaster-castedemocracy,inwhichthesettlerspracticeinternaldemocracywhiletheindigenesexperienceauthoritarianrule.16Thiscontradictorycombinationdemocraticprinciplesforsettlersanddictatorshipovernativessuggeststhatthe"Herrenvolkdemocraciescontainedtheideologicalseedsoftheirowndestruction";17butrigidandcomprehensivemechanismsofdominationmaylongpostponetheircollapse.
Adominantmajorityhoweverpoliticallysecurebecauseofitsnumericaladvantagemayattempttomanipulatethedemocraticrulesofthegamethroughelaboratevotingqualifications,gerrymandering,andotherdevices.Thesemechanismsservetwopurposes.First,theyhelptoexcludetheminorityfromthepoliticalarenaandseemparticularlydesirablewherethemajorityconsiderstheminoritytobeinnatelyinferior(intheAmericanSouth)orpoliticallysubversive(inNorthernIreland)orboth(inIsrael).Second,politicalconcessionsmaycreaterisingexpectationsoradominoeffect,givingminoritygroupstheimpressionthattheydeserveequalopportunitiesineconomicandsociallife.Theirsocioeconomicadvancement,inturn,mayappeartothemajorityasachallengetoitsownprivileges,prosperity,andexpectationsofdeferentialtreatment.
Forthesereasons,asettlermajoritymaybejustaswaryasasettlerminorityofgrantingconcessionstothesubordinategroup.Underbothmajorityandminorityrule,attemptstointroducereformsby
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"enlightened"settlersmayberejectedasprematureorself-destructive.Becauseoftheirdeviationsinthisregard,reformistpremiersinRhodesiain1962andNorthernIrelandin1969werereplacedbyhard-liners.Inmostcaseswheremodernizingeliteshavegainedpower,theconcessions
14.TheexceptionisIsrael'soccupiedterritories,whereArabslackallpoliticalrightsundermilitaryrule.15.RabushkaandShepsle,PoliticsinPluralSocieties,p.158.16.PierrevandenBerghe,RaceandRacism(NewYork:Wiley,1967),p.18;KennethVickery,"HerrenvolkDemocracyandEgalitarianisminSouthAfricaandtheU.S.South,"ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory16,no.3(June1974):30928.17.VandenBerghe,RaceandRacism,p.216.
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grantedareusuallytoolittleandtoolate.This"failureofreformism"toquoteKuperisrootedinthesettlers'continuingrefusaltorelinquishstatepowerandinthesubordinatecommunity'sresultingradicalization.18Facedwiththefutilityofreform,thesubordinatepopulationtypicallyabandonspeacefuloppositioninfavorofarmedstruggle.19
Fewcontemporarysettlerregimeshaveattemptedtoopenthepolitytotheextentofthreateningcontinuedsettlersupremacy.Taiwanmayprovetobeadeviantcase.20Since1987theregimehasliftedmartiallaw(whichhadbeenineffectforthirty-nineyears),toleratedtheformationofoppositionparties,easedpressrestrictions,andfreedpoliticalprisoners.AnativeTaiwanesehasbecomepresident(afterthesuddendeathofChiangChing-Kuo).Despitethesesignificantreforms,repressiveemergencylawsremainineffect;mainlandsettlers(14percentofthepopulation)arevastlyoverrepresentedinthethreelegislativebodies(morethan80percent);andpowerfulmilitaryelitesandrulingpartystalwartsremainopposedtofurtherdemocratizationandliberalization.Accordingtooneobserver,thebottomlineisthattherulingparty(theKuomintang)willnotallowitselftobedislodgedfrompower,andthesofteningofauthoritarianruleshouldnotbeconfusedwithgenuinedemocratization.21ItremainstobeseenifareformistsolutionwillindeedmakeTaiwanuniqueamongsettlerstates.
ThecaseofTaiwannotwithstanding,settlersaregenerallymorelikelythanotherauthoritarianelitestoperceivegenuinedemocratizationasathreattotheirvested(caste)interests.ForEuropeansettlersinAfrica,theidealsoftheEnlightenmentliberty,equality,anddemocracywerestrippedoftheiruniversalisticvalueandreservedforthesettlersalone;thenativesweresimplytooprimitivetoqualify.ThoughthegreatsealofLiberiaproclaimed,TheLoveofLibertyBroughtUsHere,ithadaterriblyhollowringfortheindigenous
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populationandreflectedtheparadoxofaformerlyenslavedgroup(havingfledAmericatoescapeoppression)systematicallydenyinglibertytoAfricannatives.Rhodesianwhitessawthemselvesasembodying"WesternChristiancivilization,"
18.Kuperelevatesthis"failureofreformism"toa"law"ofminorityracialandethnicdomination(LeoKuper,ThePityofItAll:PolarizationofRacialandEthnicRelations[Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1977],pp.27071).19.Kuperconsidersinevitabletheviolentoverthrowofsuchsystems(ibid).20.EdwinWinckler,"InstitutionalizationandParticipationonTaiwan:FromHardtoSoftAuthoritarianism,"ChinaQuarterly,no.99(September1984):48199;YangsunChouandAndrewNathan,"DemocratizingTransitioninTaiwan,"AsianQuarterly27,no.3(March1987):27799.21.MarcJ.Cohen,TaiwanattheCrossroads(Washington,D.C.:AsiaResourceCenter,1988),p.65.
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butitwasnevercleariforwhentheywouldallowblackstoadvance.Wherethenativeshadundeniablyevolved,elitesmarshaledotherargumentstomaintainthesectarianordersuchas"majorityrule"orthedefenseofauniquereligiousorculturaltraditioninNorthernIrelandandIsrael.
Someofthepreconditionsforaflourishingdemocracy(discussedinChapter1)aretypicallylackinginsettlerpoliticalsystems.Absentisaunitarypoliticalculturebasedonaccommodation,agreementonconstitutionalprinciples,orasharednationalidentity.Rather,settlersystemscommonlycounterposeasupremacistpoliticalculturetothenativesubcultureandasserttheirideologicalhegemonyoverit.Aseconddeficiencyisthatofdynamiccivicinstitutionstoserveasabrakeonrepressivepoliciesandpromotedemocraticchange;mostsettlersocietieshaveapoorrecordinthisregard.Rhodesia'ssettlerstatedependedonthethoroughgoingpacificationofallcountervailinginstitutions,particularlythoseofthenativecommunity.SouthAfrica'smoredevelopedcivicorderhashadarelativelyminorimpactontheregime'spolicies.InUlsterandIsrael,CatholicsandArabshavetheirownmedia,churches,schools,politicalparties,andvoluntaryassociations.YetArabinstitutionshavelittleleverageovertheIsraelistate;Jewishcivicorganizationshaveregisteredmuchmoresuccessincontainingstatepower.InNorthernIrelandinthelate1960s,widespreadCatholicprotestsandBritishpressuresprofoundlyinfluencedthesettlerregime.Priortothat,CatholicforceswereaspowerlessastheirIsraeliArabcounterparts.
FailuresinStateBuilding
BeforeturningtoNorthernIrelandandRhodesia,letusexamineafewcaseswheresettlerswereunsuccessfulatstatebuilding,primarilybecausetheyfailedtocapturecoerciveinstitutionsandfreethemselvesfrommetropolitaninterference.InseveralAfrican
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colonieswithwhitepopulations,themetropolesupportedsettlerdominationpolitically,economically,andmilitarily.Settlersystemsoffereduniqueadvantagestothemetropole.Itcouldmaintainthematlowcost,yettheyserveditsgeopoliticalandeconomicinterests.Themetropolecouldassertitsclaimtoterritoryagainstothercolonialpredators,andtheterritorysupplieditwithfoodandrawmaterialsaswellasanexportmarket.
Nevertheless,theimperialgovernmentandthesettlersoftenbecamepartnersinconflict;theirinterestsandvisionsregardingcriticalissues(thepaceandscopeofterritorialexpansion,thetreatmentofnatives,
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theterritory'sconstitutionalstatus)inmanycasesledthetwopartiesintoprotractedstruggles.22AlthoughtheBritishcolonialadministrationoftenactedinconsistently,itwasformallycommittedtoprotectingnativeinterestsunderthedoctrineof"trusteeship"whichhadenoughrealitytoarousesettlers'insecurityandanxietyabouttheirfutureinAfrica.RotbergwritesofcentralAfrica:
Intheperiodbetweenthetwoworldwars,whitesettlersnorthoftheZambezihadbutonemajorpoliticalpreoccupation:theytrieddesperatelytofreethemselvesfromoverseas-imposedrestrictionsinordertosecuretheirownwayoflifeforthefuture,andinordertopreventAfricansfromeverchallengingthatwayoflife.23
TensionsbecameparticularlyacuteinsettlerdomainsduringthetwilightofcolonialisminAfrica.Emmanuelarguesthatsuchconflictwasinevitableandthatitultimatelydrovethesettlersandthehomecountryinoppositedirections:independenceundersettlerruleversusindependenceundernativemajorityrule.Thesettlercommunity,writesEmmanuel,"couldonlybesavedbysecessionfromthemetropolisandbysettingupanindependent'white'state"Theratherabruptgrantingofindependencetosomecoloniesreflected"thehomecountries'needatacertainmomenttostealamarchontheirownsettlerswhowerethreateningnearlyeverywheretosecedeandformWhiteStates."24
ThemetropoleprevailedinKenya,wherewhitesettlersnevermanagedtopersuadeLondontosupporttheirquestforfullautonomy.25ExercisinggreatinfluenceoverthelocalColonialOfficeadministrationinmostterritorialaffairsandreceivingrepeatedassurancesfromLondonofitssupport,thesettlersnevermanagedtomakelastingallianceswithlocalsecurityagenciesor,better,tocapturethestateinitsentirety.Thisfailuresealedtheirfate.Kenya'swhiteswereunable"tomaintainpoliticalandmilitarydominancewithoutexpensivesupportfromthemetro-
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22.SeeGeorgeFredrickson,WhiteSupremacy:AComparativeStudyofAmericanandSouthAfricanHistory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1981);LouisHartz,ed.,TheFoundingofNewSocieties(NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandWorld,1964).23.RobertRotberg,TheRiseofNationalisminCentralAfrica(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1965),p.93.24.ArghiriEmmanuel,"White-SettlerColonialismandtheMythofInvestmentImperialism"NewLeftReview,no.73(May-June1972):39,43;seealsoK.Good,"SettlerColonialism."25.GeorgeBennett,"BritishSettlersNorthoftheZambezi,1920to1960"inColonialisminAfrica,ed.L.GannandP.Duignan(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970),p.61.
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pole"26ThatthesesettlersrequiredBritishmilitaryforcetoputdowntheMauMaurebellionwasameasureoftheirweakness.Themetropolethathadcrushedblackresistanceinthe1950sthendidavolte-faceandgrantedindependencetothecolonyin1963,inthemidstofstiffbutunsuccessfulsettlerresistance.
AfterfailedattemptstowinhomeruleinNorthernRhodesia(nowZambia)andNyasaland(nowMalawi)afterWorldWarII,whitesettlersstruggledtoconvincetheBritishColonialOfficetodevolveanotherformofminorityruleonthesecoloniesthroughamergerwithSouthernRhodesia,whichalreadyenjoyedself-government.ThegoalofsuchanalliancewastoinsulateNorthernRhodesiaandNyasalandfromBritishinterference"tonegatethecomparativelybenevolent,andtherefore,to[thesettlers],distastefulBritishregardforAfricanrights"27andpreventthefearedgrantingofindependencetotheblackmajority.Thecampaignresultedintheformationin1953oftheCentralAfricanFederation.Afterthefederationdisintegratedin1963,thesettlersofNorthernRhodesiaandNyasalandonceagainfoundthemselvesatLondon'smercy.Theimperialgovernmentabruptlygrantedindependencetothetwocoloniesoneyearlater.TheexperienceofadecadeinthefederationunderSouthernRhodesia'sprotectiveumbrelladidnothingtoenhancetheleverageofthesetwosettlerenclavesinimperialdecisionsaffectingthestatusofthecolonies.
ThesamefateawaitedArabsettlersinZanzibar.DuringmostoftheperiodwhenZanzibarwasaBritishprotectorate(18901963),BritishofficialsconsistentlyendorsedtheArabs'politicalandeconomicdominationovertheAfricanmajority.Arabsreceivedpreferencefortopgovernmentalpositions;aminorityofthepopulation(17percent)dominatedtheLegislativeCouncilandhadadisproportionateinfluenceoverpublicpolicy.YetArabrulingelitesenjoyedonlyaprecariousdominance.TheirpowerwasconditionedbytheBritish
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ColonialOffice'scontrolofthecoreofstatepower:thepoliceandtheministriesofdefense,finance,andinternalsecurity.TheArabs'failuretogaincontrolofthesevitalorgansunderscoredthefragilityofsettlerruleinZanzibar,whichcollapsedinthe1964revolution.28
26.GaryWasserman,PoliticsofDecolonization:KenyaEuropeansandtheLandIssue(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1976),p.21.27.Rotberg,Nationalism,p.93.28.SeeMichaelLofchie,Zanzibar:BackgroundtoRevolution(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1965);MichaelLofchie,"ThePluralSocietyofZanzibar"inPluralisminAfrica,ed.KuperandSmith.
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Britain'sdevolutionofpowersforlawandordertoAmerican,Canadian,andAustraliansettlerswasnotthepatterninitsAfricancolonies.TheBritishpatterninAfricawasevidentalsointheFrenchandPortuguesecolonies.Totheirshockanddismay,Algeria'scolonsandMozambique'ssettlersfoundthemselvesultimatelysacrificedbyParisandLisbonafterthecoloniesbecamepolitical,military,andeconomicliabilities.Theirabandonmentparticularlyperplexedsettlerswhohadbenefitedfromthemetropole'scommitmentofmilitaryforcestocrushnativerevolts.MuchlikeKenya,Mozambiqueisatextbookexampleofthispattern.UnliketheirRhodesianneighbors,PortuguesesettlersinMozambiquedependedonthemetropoleforprotectionagainstorganizednativeresistance.Whenaguerrillawarbrokeoutinthe1960s,thesesettlerswereatthemercyofthePortuguesemilitary.Increasinglyfrustratedasthewarworeon,theoccupyingtroopsandthesettlercommunityexperiencedariftthatdevelopedinto''theworstrelationsbetweenacolonialarmyandawhitecommunityonrecord."29AfterthemilitarycoupinLisboninApril1974,theinterestsofMozambique'ssettlerswerejettisonedandstatepowertransferredtoanewblackregime.
InAlgeriaanarrangementofdualpowerexisted,wherebysettlerscontrolledthebureaucracyandmuchofthecivilgovernmentwhileinternalsecurity(policymaking,military,police)remainedinthehandsofthemetropole.30AlgeriancolonsmanagedtowinthesympathyofthelocalFrenchadministrationandmilitary,givingaddedforcetosettlers'resistancetothemetropole'seffortsatdecolonization.Buttheseallianceswerenosubstituteforindependentcontrolofallinstrumentsofstatepower;thesettlers'interestswereultimatelysacrificedonthealtarofnationalindependence.31
Ineachcaseandpreciselybecausesettlershadfailedtocapturethecoreofstatepower,theyprovedunabletomaintaintheiradvantagesinthefaceofnatives'politicalmobilizationandmetropolitanpressure.
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Dependencyonthemothercountrywasinitiallyablessing,lateracurse.Itwasablessingbecausethemetropole'smilitarydefenseofthesettlersagainstnativeattackswasoftendecisiveinensuringthesettlers'survival.Butthisprotectionalsoleftthesettlerscriticallyvulnerabletotheshiftingcalculationsofthemetropole.Thebestwaytoensurethelong-
29.DouglasPorch,ThePortugueseArmedForcesandtheRevolution(London:1977),p.32.30.IanLustick,State-BuildingFailureinBritishIrelandandFrenchAlgeria(Berkeley:InstituteofInternationalStudies,1985).31.MilesKahler,DecolonizationinBritainandFrance(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),chap.5.
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termsurvivalofthesettlercommunitywasnotthroughdependencyonthemetropole,asLustickbelieves,butratherthroughthebuildingofafullyindependentstate,completewithcoercivemachinery.32
Namibia'swhites(7percentofthepopulation)recentlysufferedthesamefate,atthehandsofanothersettlerstatecumcolonialpower,SouthAfrica,whichcontrolledthemilitaryandpoliceinNamibiauntilindependencein1989.33Thepredictionthat"atrulyindependentNamibiawouldalsoremainheavilydependentontheSouthAfrican-trainedsecurityforcesandcivilservice"isacontradictioninterms.34Anynation"heavilydependent"onanoutsidelife-supportsystemisonlynominallyindependent.
Insomecasestheascendancyofthesettlercommunitycameonlyafterprotractedorviolentstruggleswiththeimperialgovernmenthadescalatedintofull-scalewarsofindependence.TheBritishMandateinPalestine,forexample,wasfraughtwithtensionsbetweenJewishsettlersandthecolonialgovernment.AfterWorldWarII,guerrillaforces(Irgun,SternGang)foughtBritishtroopsuntiltheywonindependenceforthenewstateofIsraelin1948.InSouthAfrica,AfrikanersettlerstookuparmsagainsttheBritishGovernment'sattemptstoenforceitsnativepolicyinthemidnineteenthcentury.WhendirectconfrontationcouldnotforceLondontoaccepttheirclaimsforself-governmentandunfetteredcontrolovernativeaffairs,AfrikanersembarkedontheirGreatTrekawayfromtheCapeColony(tenthousandsettlersdidsofrom1836to1846).OnlybyrenouncingandphysicallyescapingBritishjurisdictioncouldthesesettlersfullyinstitutionalizetheirracialsupremacy.ThestrugglebetweenLondonandtheAfrikanerscontinuedwellintothetwentiethcentury,butbythenAfrikanerascendancycouldnotbearrested;arepublicwasdeclaredin1961.
Liberiamaybeuniqueinthatsettlersfairlysmoothlyachieved
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independencefromthehomecountry,theUnitedStates.WiththehelpoftheprivateeffortsoftheAmericanColonizationSociety(ACS),emanci-
32.Lustick,State-BuildingFailure,pp.8,61.Asettlerpopulation'ssizeappearstocorrelatewiththeextentofitsmaterialinterestsinthecountry(Kuper,"PoliticalChange"pp.17172)anditscapacitytoresistmetropolitaninitiatives(Kahler,Decolonization,p.317).Thereareexceptions,however:Zanzibar'sArabsettlerswere17percentofthepopulationyetremainedsubordinatetoLondon;Rhodesia'sandLiberia'smorepowerfulsettlers,bycontrast,totaledonly5percentoftheirpopulations.Sheersizematteredlessthanautonomywithdomesticpower.33.TensionsbetweenNamibia'ssettlersandtheSouthAfricanauthoritiesintensifiedasNamibiaapproachedindependenceinNovember1989.34.JohnBattersby,"NamibiaChallengeforSouthAfrica,'NewYorkTimes,29June1987.
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patedAmericanblacksbegantosettleinLiberiain1822.Onlytwenty-fiveyearslatertheydeclaredthemselvesindependentoftheACS;in1862theUnitedStatesgovernmentextendeddiplomaticrecognitiontothenewstate.Sincethequasimetropolehadneverclaimedimperialrightsoverandresponsibilitiesforthisterritory,itcouldeasilyturnablindeyetooppressionofthenatives.Therewas,inshort,littlejuridicalbasisforconflictbetweenthesesettlersandthemothercountry.
ComparingRhodesiaandNorthernIreland
Thestudyofasinglecaseisoflimitedvalueiftheaimistoaccountformacrostructuralcontinuitiesaswellaschanges.Onlythroughcarefulcomparativeanalysiscanscholarsbegintoexplainimportantcontinuitiesandchangesincoercivestructuresandeffectivelyaddresslargertheoreticalissues.SeveralbasicsimilaritiesinthecreationofsettlerstatesinRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandandintheirpoliticalinstitutionsprovidecommongroundforouranalysisofkeydifferencesinthebreakdownofsettlerruleandtheriseoftworatherdifferentpostsettlerorders.
Atfirstglance,theseseeminglydisparatecasesappeartoofferlittlebasisforcomparison.Onewassettledintheearlyseventeenthcentury,theotherinthelatenineteenth.35OneislocatedinwesternEurope,theotherinsouthernAfrica.NorthernIrelandisthesiteofalong-standingnationalidentitycrisis;asinIsraelandTaiwan,survivalasadistinctpoliticalentityhasbeenchronicallyproblematic.NorthernIrelandsharesaborderwithastate,theRepublicofIreland,whoseconstitutionlaysclaimtoUlster;atthesametime,itisofficiallyanintegralpartoftheUnitedKingdom.UnlikeScotlandandWales,however,itisonlyaconditionalmember:detachableoncethemajoritysodecides.Bycontrast,thefundamentalconflictinRhodesia(andSouthAfrica)centeredoninternalstructuresandpracticesrather
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thantheintegrityofthenation-state.
Otherdifferencescanbementioned.SomeofthefeaturesofcastesocietiesaremutedinNorthernIrelandbutratherpronouncedinRhodesia:Catholicssufferedlessextensiveeconomic,political,andsocial
35.In1609,KingJamesIestablishedtheplantationofUlster,whichattractedScottishsettlers.PioneersfirstcametoRhodesiafromSouthAfricainthe1880s.Onetreatmentofthetwo,shortondirectcomparisons,isBarrySchutzandDouglasScott,"PatternsofPoliticalChangeinFragmentRegimes:NorthernIrelandandRhodesia,"inThePoliticsofRace,ed.I.Crewe(London:CroomHelm,1975).
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subordinationthanRhodesianblacks;theywerenotexpectedtoshowroutinedeferencetowardProtestants;theywerenotsubjectedtotheintenselaborexploitationsufferedbyRhodesianblacks.AlsounlikewhiteRhodesians,Ulster'ssettlersconstitutedthemajorityofthepopulationandbuiltamajoritarianpoliticalorder.
Despitetheseimportantdifferences,thecasesrevealbroadandstrikingsimilarities.FormallysubordinatetoBritain,thesesettlerstatesenjoyedpracticalautonomyfromthemetropoleininternalaffairs,includingcontroloverkeypoliticalandcoerciveinstitutions.Thesecuritysectorswereasettlerpreserve,withsectarianorientationandmodusoperandi.Aspluralsocieties,bothfeaturedimportantdivisionsalongcultural,political,andeconomiclines.Althoughthedegreeofsubordinationwasbynomeanssimilar,bothCatholicsandblacksweredisproportionatelyunderprivileged,politicallypowerless,andsociallysegregated.
Afteralmostadecadeofguerrillawar,whiteRhodesianrulesuccumbedin1980toblackmajorityrule.Afterthreeyearsofsectarianpoliticalviolenceandunrest,ProtestantruleinUlsterwasreplacedin1972bydirectBritishrule.Inbothcases,thenewgovernmentsproclaimedtheirintentionstomodernizethestateapparatus,dismantlerepressiveinstitutions,andcreatearadicallydifferentpoliticalorderonethatwouldnolongerprivilegesettlersandignorenativeinterests.Sincethetransferofpower,eachgovernmenthasconfrontedpersistinglow-intensityinsurgency(fromCatholicandProtestantmilitantsinNorthernIrelandandruralguerrillasinZimbabwe)andtraditionalcommunalrivalries:Protestant-CatholicinUlster,Shona-NdebeleinZimbabwe.
ThedemiseofimperialjurisdictionandwhitesettlerdominationinZimbabwehasnotcontributedtotheliberalizationoftheinternalsecuritysystem;basicfeaturesoftheinheritedsystemremainintact
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andcontinuetofosterrepression.Thiscasedemonstratesthatthecollapseofsettlerruleisnotnecessarilyassociatedwiththedismantlingofthestateapparatussupportingit.Bycontrast,thereimpositionofBritishcolonialruleinUlsterhashelpedtomodernizecertainfeaturesofthesecuritysystem.ContrarytotheconventionalwisdomonNorthernIreland,significantbutbynomeanscompletechangeshavetakenplaceinthesecuritysystem'sstructureandnormativeorder.
ThenextchapteranalyzestheriseandconsolidationofsettlerstatesinNorthernIrelandandRhodesia;subsequentchaptersexaminetheirbreakdownanddistinctiveoutcomesunderaneworder.
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Chapter3BuildingSettlerStates:FoundationsinRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandThedevelopmentofstablesettlerstatesdependsonthreeconditions:thesettlersmustsecurepoliticalandmilitaryautonomyfromthemetropole;theymustbuildaneffectivesystemofcontroltopreemptorcrushnativeresistance;finally,theymustcultivateinternalsolidarityonvitalissuesfacingthesettlercommunityandminimizeconflictsalongclass,generational,orpoliticallinesthatweakentheircontroloverthesubordinatepopulation.Theshatteringofonepillarofsettlerrulecanrocktheentirehouse,althoughitmaytakesometimetocrumbleasinRhodesiainthe1970s.ThedecayofallthreeislikelytohastenthecollapseofthesystemasoccurredinUlsterfrom1969to1972.
SecuringIndependencefromLondon
In1889LondongrantedCecilRhodesandhisBritishSouthAfricanCompany(BSAC)achartertooccupy,exploit,andgovernwhatbecameSouthernRhodesia.ThesettlementoftheareawaspartofaBritishstrategytoestablishaterritorialcounterbalancetotheregionalclaimsofGermany,Portugal,andSouthAfrica.Inthisinstance,ratherthandirectinvolvementBritainpreferredabsenteeexpansionthroughitsBSACproxy,becauseitsimultaneouslyextendedBritain'ssphereofinfluenceinAfricaandavoidedtheexpenseofformalcolonization.1
1.ClairePalley,TheConstitutionalHistoryandLawofSouthernRhodesia(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1966),pp.2426.
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Britainretainednominaljurisdictionovertheterritory,includingthepowertorevokethecompany'scharter;behindthisfacade,theBSACexerciseddefactocontrolovertheterritory.Londonwaspreparedtoassertitselfonly"ifCompanyactionwaslikelyeithertoresultindiplomaticdifficulties,toinvolveBritainwithpowerfulchiefs,toinvolveexploitationoftheBritishname,ortooccasionadverseparliamentaryorpresscomment"2Inpractice,interventionwasrareandthecompanyenjoyedextraordinaryquasi-stateautonomyandlatitudefrom1890to1896.3
Conflictsoverlandandlaborprovidedtheinitialsourceofhostilitiesbetweensettlersandnatives.Fortheblacks(or"Africans"),companyrulemeantsummarylandexpropriation,forcedlabor,andphysicalabuse.4InreactiontothismistreatmentamassiveAfricanrevoltbrokeoutin18961897.Therebellionwasofsuchmagnitude10percentofthesettlerpopulationdiedthatLondoncouldnolongerturnablindeyetothecolony'sracerelations.ALegislativeCouncilwasintroducedwhereinpowerwasdividedbetweenrepresentativesofthecompany,thesettlercommunity,andaBritishcommissioner.
Britain'sslightlyincreasedinvolvementaftertherebellionwasdesignedtomitigatetheoppressivenessofBSACrule;yetthemetropoleavoideddrasticstepssuchasabolishingthecompany'scharter,becauseitwasunwillingtoassumethefinancialburdenthatsuchactionwouldrequire.5
AlthoughtheBritishSouthAfricaCompanyretainedcontroloverinternalaffairs,itspositionwaserodingasBritishinvolvementroseandthesettlercommunitygrewbolderinassertingitsinterestsagainstBSACpower.6Discontentmountedoverdisputedminingclaimsandoverthecompany'sexpropriationofunalienatedland,andthesettlersbegantopressforthereplacementofthecharterwithdevolvedgovernment.Thecenterofpoliticalgravityshiftedfromthecompany
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tothesettlersin1922,whensettlersvotedinareferendumfordevolvedgovernmentratherthanincorporationintotheUnionofSouthAfrica.7Southern
2.Ibid.,pp.4243.3.LewisGann,AHistoryofSouthernRhodesia:EarlyDaysto1934(London:ChattoandWindus,1965),p.208;Palley,ConstitutionalHistory,p.100;RobinPalmer,LandandRacialDominationinRhodesia(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1977),p.25.4.CharlesvanOnselen,Chibaro:AfricanMineLabourinSouthernRhodesia,19001933(London:PlutoPress,1976).5.Palley,ConstitutionalHistory,p.129.6.TerenceRanger,RevoltinSouthernRhodesia:18961897(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967),p.336.7.Becauseoffranchiselimitations,theAfricanvoicewasnotheardinthiselection.Only60ofthe18,810voterswereAfrican(JamesMutambirwa,TheRiseofSettlerPowerinSouthernRhodesia,18981923[Cranbury,N.J.:AssociatedUniversityPresses,1980],p.217).
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Rhodesiaofficiallybecamea"self-governingcolony"in1923.(Hereafter,referencestoRhodesiaandSouthernRhodesiaareinterchangeable;NorthernRhodesia,whichbecameindependentZambiain1964,wasaseparatecolony.)
Londonretainedsovereignauthorityovertheterritory,butRhodesiaenjoyedvirtualdominionstatus.8Britainretained"reservedpowers"overnativeaffairsandforeignrelationsbutalmostnevervetoedlegislationpassedbyRhodesia'sall-whiteLegislativeAssembly.9PrimeMinisterGodfreyHugginsboastedinJuly1951that"theBritishGovernmentknowthatinpracticethereservationsarenotworththepapertheyarewrittenon"10UnlikeotherBritishcoloniesincludingthosewithsizablesettlerpopulationslikeKenya,Zanzibar,andNorthernRhodesiaRhodesiawasnotsubjecttotheadministrativeormilitaryauthorityoftheBritishColonialOffice(aresidentgovernorperformedlargelyceremonialduties).By1923thesettlershadattheirdisposalboththepoliticalandcoerciveleversofstatepower.InachievingdefactoautonomyfromBritain,Rhodesiamasteredthefirstimperativeofasettlerstate.
NorthernIrelandisoftendepictedasthesceneofadeep-rooted,ifarchaic,religiousconflict.Butreligionisonlypartoftheproblem.Civilstrifetendstooccuralongreligiouslines,buttheessenceoftheconflictliesinthedistributionofpoliticalpower,disputesovernationalidentity,andtheconstitutionalstatusoftheterritory.NorthernIrelandcontains"twonations"withdiametricallyopposednationalidentities,IrishandBritish,whichrenderthesurvivalandintegrityofthestateproblematic.InthisitislikeIsraelandTaiwanbutunlikeRhodesiaandSouthAfrica.InbothIsraelandNorthernIreland,religiouscleavagesaresecondaryto,butclearlyexacerbate,conflictsonfundamentalconstitutionalandexistentialquestions.
UnlikeitsRhodesiancounterpart,theNorthernIrelandstatewas
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forgedintheheatofameltdownoforderandauthoritythataccompaniedthepartitionofIrelandin1920.TheAnglo-IrishWarof19191921wasfollowedbyacivilwarinthesouthin1922;inthenorthcontinuingpoliticalviolencebytheIrishRepublicanArmywascoupledwithsectarianattacksbetweenrivalgroupsofCatholicsandProtestants.Between
8.ThedominionsofCanada,NewZealand,andAustraliaformallyrecognizedtheBritishmonarchasheadofstatebutenjoyedfullself-government.9.LarryBowman,PoliticsinRhodesia:WhitePowerinanAfricanState(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1973),pp.68.10.Huggins,quotedinC.LeysandC.Pratt,eds.,ANewDealinCentralAfrica(London:Heinemann,1960),p.28.ThroughoutthetextIfollowBritishusageincapitalizingGovernmentwhenIrefertotheexecutive.
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June1920andJune1922inUlster,428peoplewerekilledand1,766wounded.11
AfterdecadesoffrustrationindealingwithunrestandviolenceinIreland,Westminsternotsurprisinglybecametheprimemoverinfoundingthissettlerstate,whereasinothercasesthesettlersoftentooktheinitiative.SinceLondonwishedtoextricateitselffromitsexhaustingentanglementsinIreland,itrejectedthealternativeofdirectruleoverUlster.
Beforepartition,BritisheffortstogranthomeruletoallofIreland(in1886,1893,and19121914)werefiercelyresistedbyProtestants,whofearedthathomerulewouldmean"Romerule"thatis,thatCatholicdoctrineswouldbecomestatepolicyandthattheProtestantminoritywouldloseitspoliticalandeconomicprivileges.Unlikesettlerselsewhere,theycampaignedagainstdevolvedpower,convincedthattheirparamountinterestinremainingoutsideaCatholicIrelandwasbestprotectedunderthemantleoffullincorporationintheUnitedKingdom.
FacedwithstiffProtestantoppositiontohomerule,Britishpoliticalelitessoughtacompromise.InanefforttoplacatebothnorthernProtestantsandsouthernCatholics,Britaingrantedhomeruleordominionstatustothesouth(theIrishFreeState)anddevolvedseparatepowertosixoftheninenortherncountiesoftheprovinceofUlster(whichremainedwithintheUnitedKingdom).DecadeslaterBritainwouldfindthatpartitionhadbeenacolossalmistake.Butbefore1921itseemedthebestsolutionfornorthernProtestantsandsouthernCatholicsalike,justasitpromisedtofreetheCrownfromits"Irishproblem"onceandforall.InordertoensurethatProtestantpreferenceswouldprevailinNorthernIreland,BritaindeliberatelydrewtheboundariesinawaythatguaranteedaProtestantmajorityenclave.
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Afterpowerwasdevolvedonthenewnorthernstatein1921,theUnionistsquicklydiscovereddistinctadvantagesinreducingtheirvulnerabilitytothevicissitudesofmetropolitanpolicyshifts.Acandid1936reportbytheUlsterUnionistCouncilrevealeditsprimaryfear:
HadwerefusedtoacceptaParliamentforNorthernIrelandandremainedatWestminster,therecanbelittledoubtthatnowwewouldeitherbeinsidethe[Irish]FreeStateorfightingdesperatelyagainstincorporation.NorthernIrelandwithoutaParliamentofherownwouldbeastandingtemptationtocer-
11.PatrickBuckland,AHistoryofNorthernIreland(Dublin:GillandMacmillan,1981),p.46.
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tainBritishpoliticianstomakeanotherbidforafinalsettlementwiththeIrishRepublic.12
TheGovernmentofIrelandActof1920establishedtheconstitutionalrelationbetweenBritainandNorthernIrelandwherebyWestminsterremainedthesupremeauthority.MattersconcerningtheUnitedKingdomasawholeincludingforeignrelations,defense,revenueandtaxation,andexternaltradewereexcludedfromthepowersofthenewUlsterparliament.Allothermattersbecametheconcernofthesettlerstate.TheProtestantgovernmenthadcontroloverthecivilserviceandinternalsecurityforces.Undertheconstitution,defenseoftheborderwasametropolitanresponsibilityandasmallcontingentoftheBritisharmywasgarrisonedintheprovinceforthispurpose.Buttheprincipalinstrumentsoflawandorderwereanswerabletothesettlerregimealone:theRoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC),theUlsterSpecialConstabulary(USC),andtheMinistryofHomeAffairs.UnlikeBritain'sconventionalunarmedpolice,Ulster'sforceswerearmedandmilitarized,almosttotallyProtestant,andfiercechampionsofProtestantsupremacy.Controlovertheforcesoforderputthesettlersinmuchbettersteadthantheircounterpartsinconventionalcolonies,wheremetropolitan-controlledforceshandledbothinternalandexternalsecurity.LondoninitiallyarmedandfinancedtheProtestantsecurityforces.13TheUnionistGovernmentwasawarethattheBritishmightproveunreliablealliesandtookstepstoensurethatitwouldnothavetodependonthemorfaceLondon'sinterferenceinthefuture.(Settlergroupselsewhereweremuchslowertotakesuchsteps.)
OvertCatholicresistancetotheneworderwascrushedintheearly1920s;thereafter,theminoritybecameratherpassive.YetCatholics,likeIsraeliArabsafter1948,remainedopposedtothenewstateanddismisseditasanartificialcreationdesignedtoperpetuatedominationbyafactitiousmajority.Totherespectivesettlers,therefore,Ulster's
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CatholicsandIsrael'sArabsseemedtoconstitutean"enemy-affiliatedminority."Catholicalienationfromthenorthernstate,14coupledwiththe
12.ReportquotedinR.J.Lawrence,TheGovernmentofNorthernIreland:PublicFinanceandPublicServices,19211964(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1965),p.75.13.MichaelFarrell,ArmingtheProtestants:TheFormationoftheUlsterSpecialConstabularyandtheRoyalUlsterConstabulary,19201927(London:Pluto,1983),p.280.14.CatholicpoliticalpartiesconsistentlydemandedthedissolutionofthenorthernstateandunificationofIreland;Catholics'alienationwaswidelyperceivedbyProtestantciviliansandstateofficialsandisgenerallyacceptedbyscholars.Unfortunately,thereisnorepresentativeattitudinaldataonperceptionsofCatholic"disloyalty"from1921to1972;onattitudestowardArab"disloyalty"inIsrael,seeSammySmooha,"JewishandArabEthnocentrisminIsrael,"EthnicandRacialStudies10,no.1(January1987):126.
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perceivedthreatfromsouthernIreland,perpetuatedasiegementalityinUnionistquartersandhelpedjustifysectariandiscriminationagainsttheminority.15Atwo-thirdsmajorityinUlster,theProtestantsareaminorityinIrelandasawhole(one-fourthofthepopulation)thatremainsimportantinlightoftheRepublicofIreland'sconstitutionalclaimofsovereigntyoverUlster.16Drivenbychronicinsecurity,theProtestantregimeorganizedtoarrestminoritypoliticalmobilization,cementtheborderagainstanirredentistneighbor,andconsolidatesettlersupremacyintheprovince.ItwasnotsomuchaquestionofwhetherCatholicswereactuallyplottingorengagedinsubversiveactivitybutinsteadwhattheymightdoifgiventheopportunity,thatis,ifcontrolswererelaxed.RatherthanseekaccommodationwiththedisaffectedCatholiccommunityinthewakeoftheearlydisturbances,successiveUnionistregimestookstepsthatexacerbatedcommunaldivisionsandthusreinforcedProtestants'senseofinsecurity.17Thelogicwasclear:sinceCatholicswerebeyondthepaleasincorrigiblefifth-columnists,anyofficialaccommodationwouldbesuicidalforthestate.
CatholicoppositiontopartitionanddisloyaltytothesettlerstatehaduniqueadvantagesfortheProtestants.MacDonaldarguesthatthecontinuationofProtestantdominationrequired,andthusencouraged,Catholicdisloyaltyinordertolegitimatesettlerprivileges,amplifythesalienceofProtestant"loyalty"toBritain,andreproduceclasssolidarityamongProtestants.18CatholiclegitimationofthenewstatemighthaveshatteredtheargumentsjustifyingtheProtestantmonopolyofpower:thatProtestantsalonecouldbetrustedbyLondontomaintainorderandtheunion.
PublicorderandpoliticalstabilitywerefromthebeginningandremaintodayLondon'soverridingconcernsinNorthernIreland.TheintegrityofthepoliticalsystemandtheextenttowhichUlster'spoliticalculturedeviatedfromBritishstandardswerenotuntilthelate
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1960s
15.ThetermsUnionistandLoyalistrefergenerallytotheProtestantpopulation,andareoftenusedinterchangeably.UnionistssoughttomaintaintheunionofNorthernIrelandwiththerestoftheUnitedKingdom.Yettheir"loyalty"totheBritishCrownhasbeencontingentonthemetropole'sperceiveddefenseofProtestantinterests;asa1978surveyfound,85percentofProtestantsstatedthata"loyalistisloyaltoUlsterbeforetheBritishgovernment"(EdwardMoxon-Browne,Nation,Class,andCreedinNorthernIreland[Aldershot:Gower,1983],p.86).16.Article2oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofIrelandreads:"ThenationalterritoryconsistsofthewholeislandofIreland."17.DavidMiller,Queen'sRebels:UlsterLoyalisminHistoricalPerspective(Dublin:GillandMacmillan,1978),p.139.18.MichaelMacDonald,ChildrenofWrath:PoliticalViolenceinNorthernIreland(NewYork:BasilBlackwell,1986),pp.22,24.
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seriousconcernsinthemetropole.Duringtheformativeyearsofthenewstate,BritaindidattempttotempertheUnionistGovernment'slargelyconfrontationalapproachtowardCatholics,butonceorderhadbeenrestoredintheearly1920s,metropolitaninterestreceded.InMay1923WestminsteradoptedaconventionthatUlster'sdomesticaffairswerenottobediscussedintheHouseofCommonsandturnedablindeyetotheprovince'spoliticalandinternalsecurityarrangements.InthissameyearBritaindevolvedpoliticalpowertotheRhodesiansettlers.
Overthenextseveraldecades,''thepolicy...wastominimiseBritishinvolvementpoliticallyandmilitarily.Actionwastakenonlywherethealternativeappearedultimatelytoentailagreaterdegreeofinvolvement."19Britainretainedthepowertosuspendorabolishdevolvedgovernmentintheprovince,butthisultimatesanctionalsoposedthegreatestriskofabacklashandwouldhaverequiredtheveryinvolvementthatLondonwasconcernedtoavoid.
MembersofParliamentinWestminstershowednointerestintheaffairsofthenewsettlerstate.AsinRhodesia,theresidentgovernoralmostneverexercisedhisvetopoweroverlegislation.Similarly,thepremieragencyresponsibleforAnglo-Ulsterrelations,theHomeOfficeinLondon,playedaminimalroleintheprovince.20ItsskeletonstaffforNorthernIrelandaffairsoperatedunderthe(incorrect)assumptionthat"questionsoflawandorderareentirelyfortheGovernmentofNorthernIreland"21AsoneHomeSecretaryadmitted,"IhadnooccasiontoseekmoreworkortogooutandlookattheproblemsofNorthernIreland,unlesstheyforcedthemselvesuponme."22Withrespecttointernalaffairs,themetropolitangovernmentineffecttreatedUlsterandRhodesiaasiftheywereindependentstates.
Finally,thefactthattheUnionistregimewasbasedonmajorityrule
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gaveitameasureofmoralcapitalthatsettlerminoritieselsewherecouldneverclaim.ThatthismajoritystatusdependedonanartificiallycreatedProtestantenclavewasbesidethepoint.ThecontestedoriginsandproblematicexistenceoftheUlsterstatewereirrelevanttometropolitanelitesaslongaspoliticalstabilityandthetrappingsofdemocracywerevisible.Majorityrulewasatthattimeidentifiedwithdemocraticgov-
19.PaulBew,PeterGibbon,andHenryPatterson,TheStateinNorthernIreland:19211972(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1979),pp.18586.20.Bew,Gibbon,andPatterson,TheState,p.177.21.FrankNewsam,PermanentUnder-SecretaryofStateattheHomeOffice,quotedinibid.22.JamesCallaghan,AHouseDivided:TheDilemmaofNorthernIreland(London:Collins,1973),p.4.
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ernmentintheUnitedKingdom.NoalternativepoliticalsystemsuchaspowersharingseemedacceptableintheUlstercontext.Londonassumedthatmajorityrulewouldoperatesatisfactorilyandthe1920actcontainednospecialprotectionsfortheCatholicminorityorinducementsfortheirpoliticalparticipation.23Inpractice,majorityruleinUlsterwasarecipeforpermanentsettlerruleand"majoritydictatorship."24
SettlerUnityandNativeSubordination
Intheabsenceofseriouspressurefromthemetropole,NorthernIrelandandRhodesiansettlershadlittleincentivetoincorporatetheCatholicsandblacksintothepolity,elicittheirconsent,ornurturerelationsthatwouldbridgetheethnicorracialdivide.Indigenesfaredsomewhatbetterwherethepresenceofimperialauthoritiesdilutedthesettlers'power,suchasZanzibarandKenya.DefactoordejureindependenceinRhodesia,NorthernIreland,Liberia,andSouthAfricaineffectallowedthesettlerstoconstructthepolitical,social,andeconomicarrangementsbestsuitedtoconsolidatingtheirsupremacy.
ForallthedifferencesbetweenRhodesiaandNorthernIreland(e.g.,minorityvs.majoritydomination;geographicalrelationtothemetropole;racialvs.ethnicandreligiousdivisions),settlerrulerestedonsimilarfoundations.Commontobothwasacommitmenttobuildandsustainonecaste'ssolidarityandinstitutionalizetheother'ssubordination.
Fissureswithinasettlerpopulationcanprovedisastrousintwoways:theymayprovideanopeningfornativemobilizationandtheymayunderminethestate'scapacitytodefendsettlerrule.Settlercohesionisnotinevitableconsideringthepotentialforclass,generational,andpoliticaldifferenceswithinmostsettlerpopulations.Thereisalways
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thepossibilitythatenlightenedsegmentswithinthesettlerenclavemightdecidetochampiontherightsorforgepoliticalallianceswithleadersofthesubordinatepopulationeitherfromgenuinehumanisticconcernsoraconvictionthatpoliticalandeconomicconcessionswouldadvance,nothinder,thelong-termsurvivalofsettlersupremacy.(ThisbeliefmotivatedmoderatesettlersinLiberiaandZanzibartoseekthepoliticalincorporationofindigenousblacks.)WhenmodernizingelitesinRhodesiainthelate1950sandUlsterinthelate1960smadesuchinitia-
23.Buckland,History,p.23.24.ArendLijphart,"ReviewArticle:TheNorthernIrelandProblem,"BritishJournalofPoliticalScience5,no.1(January1975):94.
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tives,theywerepromptlythrownoutofofficebytraditionalists.Hardlinesettlersinbothcaseswereconvincedthatevenminorconcessionsalthoughposingnoimmediatethreatwouldprecipitatearevolutionofrisingexpectationsthatwouldultimatelyendangersettlerpowerandprivilege.Bothpoliticalsystemsdisplayeda"built-intendencytowardsilliberalism"thatdoomedallexperimentswithreform.25
Itisalsopossiblethatworking-classsettlerswillenterintoallianceswithworkersinthesubordinatepopulation,basedontheircommonclassaffinities.Insettlersocieties,however,classinterestsareoftenneutralizedbycasteinterests.Working-classsettlers,typicallyfeelingthemostthreatenedbycompetitionandadvancementofindividualsfromthesubordinatecaste(becauseoftheirsocioeconomicproximitytoitstopechelon),oftenbecomethefiercestchampionsofunadulteratedsettlersupremacy.ThispatternisevidentinRhodesia,NorthernIreland,Algeria,andSouthAfrica.
Inourtwocases,bothmaterialincentivesandsymbolicthreatsreinforcedthedominantcasteidentityofworking-classsettlers.Materially,theyenjoyedtheprivilegesofalaboraristocracy:formalorinformalmechanismspreventednativesfromcompetingwithworking-classsettlersforparticularjobs.Symbolically,thesettlers'cultural"superiority"wascounterposedagainstthe"primitive"waysoftheindigenes,whichreinforcedtheirconvictionthatsettlersupremacywasmorallyjustified.Casteunitywaspresentedasvitaltoavoidthedireconsequencesofcapitulationtonativeinterests.ProtestantelitesinNorthernIrelandroutinelyinsistedthatanyconcessionstoCatholicswouldultimatelyleadto"Romerule"and"papistdomination"inareunitedIreland;whiteelitesinRhodesiapointedtothespecterof''blackbarbarism"andahostofotherevilsassociatedwithprematureAfricanadvancement.Inbothcases,working-classsettlersnotonlyacceptedtheseclaimsasarticlesof
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faithbutbecametheirmostcommittedexponents.
Thisideologicalgluewasreinforcedwithpoliticalcement.Astrongone-partyordominant-partystate,forexample,mayhelptounifyasettlercommunity,asitdidfortheTrueWhigpartyinLiberia;itsfullcenturyinofficehelpedcontainfactionalism.Thedominant-partysystemsofUlsterandRhodesiasimilarlyminimizedintrasettlerconflicts.Howdidthesettlerpowerstructurescontributetocontrolovernatives?
25.ColinLeys,EuropeanPoliticsinSouthernRhodesia(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1959),pp.293,175.
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ThefactthatstatepowerwasbasedonmajorityruleinUlsterandminorityruleinRhodesiaaccountsforsomeofthevariationintheorganizationofpoliticsingeneralandofthefranchiseinparticular.Asasmallminorityofthepopulation,Rhodesiansettlers(likethoseinSouthAfricaandLiberia)dependedonrigid,dejurepoliticalexclusionofthemajority.Nativesweredeniedvotingrightsandtheirpoliticalpartieswereharassedorproscribed.Havingthestrengthofnumbers,UlsterProtestants(likeIsraeliJews)hadlittleneedtodisenfranchisetheminoritypopulation.Theycouldmaintainsettlerdominationthroughostensiblydemocraticinstitutions.
Nevertheless,Ulster'selectoralandparliamentaryorderwasdefactoexclusive.Thepoliticalcultureallowedlittledemocraticaccommodationofthosewhoseloyaltytothestatewasdeemedsuspect.Thus,Catholicswereexcludedfromtopexecutivepositionsapatternofexclusionthat,accordingtoRose,was"matchednowhereelseintheWesternworld."26Ulster'suniquenessisdimmed,however,onceitisplacedinpropercomparativecompanywithothersettlerstates.
Thenationalfranchisewasformallyopen,butcircumstancesmadeCatholicrepresentationhollowandreinforceda"tyrannyofthemajority."PartyrepresentationintheStormontParliamentdidnotfluctuatemarkedlyovertime(therewerefewfloatingvoters);27theCatholicvotewassystematicallyunderrepresentedafterthepluralitysystemreplacedproportionalrepresentationin1929;propertyandotherqualificationsinlocalelectionsservedtoreducethevotesofthedisproportionatelydisadvantagedCatholics(aboutone-fourthofthoseeligibletovoteinWestminsterelectionswereineligibleinlocalelections).28ThesedeviceshelpedensurethatCatholicswouldnotwincontrolofLondonderryorthethreebordercountieswheretheyconstitutedthemajorityinlocalorparliamentaryelections.Finally,politicalpartiesdidnotcirculateinandoutofpower.TheUnionist
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party'sgriponpowerlastedforthestate'sentirefifty-yearlife;inEnglandnopartyhasremainedinpowerformorethantwentyconsecutiveyearssincetheearlynineteenthcentury.
InthefirstelectiontotheStormontParliamentinMay1921theUnionistswonfortyseatsandtheCatholicpartieswontwelve,underrepre-
26.RichardRose,GoverningWithoutConsensus:AnIrishPerspective(Boston:Beacon,1971),p.443.27.Roughly5percentofCatholicvotersvotedfortheUnionistpartyand1percentoftheProtestantsvotedfortheNationalistparty.28.Rose,Governing,p.441.
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sentingtheCatholicpopulation.Expressingtheminority'sgeneralreluctancetocooperatewiththenewregime,CatholicMPsrefusedtotaketheirseats.ForProtestants,thisactionwasproofpositiveofCatholicdisloyaltytothestateandjustifiedthestate'sreluctancetoaggregateCatholicinterests.Inlaterdecades,CatholicrepresentativesvacillatedbetweenparticipationandabstentionatStormont.
TheRhodesianandUlsterParliamentshadsomeofthetrappingsofBritishparliamentarydemocracybutlittleofthesubstance.Neitherparliamentwasagenuinecenterofpower,aggregatorofinterests,orarenaforpoliticalstruggleoverlawandorder.Membersweretypicallyeitheruninterestedinorincapableofchallengingsecuritylegislationandpolicy.Inthismostvitalareaofstatepower,theseparliamentsgavetheexecutivecarteblanche,delegatingtoCabinetmuchbroaderpowersthaniscustomaryundertheWestminstersystem.InBritain,thepoliticalculturepermitsfreerdebateandencouragesoppositionpartiestotakeanactiveroleinreviewingproposedlegislation.UlsterandRhodesianlegislaturesfunctionedprimarilytoendorseexecutivepolicy.29
ThejudiciaryinsettlerRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandwasanequallyineffectiveconstraintonexecutivepower,forseveralreasons:judgesidentifiedstronglywiththebasicpreceptsofsettlerdominationandweredemonstrablyinclinedtofavortheclaimsofsettlersovernatives(somejudgesweredirectlyaffiliatedwiththerulingparty);andthenarrowscopeofjudicialauthorityinthesecurityfieldreducedopportunitiestoissuedecisionsagainsttheexecutive.Individedsocieties,avigoroustraditionofjudicialreviewcanbeaparticularlyvaluable,ifpartial,correctivetoabusesofstatepower.30
TheexclusivistcharacterandsettlerorientationoftheUlsterandRhodesianstateswerepredictablymostpronouncedintheCabinetandtheupperreachesofthecivilservice.Thestatebureaucracywasa
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settlercitadel,despitethepresenceofafewCatholicorblackofficialsatlowerlevels.
Thebranchesofthestatetendedtoactinconcertonsecuritymattersbecauseoftheexecutive'sdominanceoverotheragenciesandthesharedinstitutionalcommitmenttoupholdsettlerrule.InNorthernIrelandandRhodesia,divisionswithinthestateandwithintherulingparty
29.SeePatrickBuckland,TheFactoryofGrievances:DevolvedGovernmentinNorthernIreland,19211938(NewYork:BarnesandNoble,1979),pp.27,35.30.ThisisevidencedtosomeextentincontemporarySouthAfrica(HughCorder,"TheSupremeCourt:ArenaofStruggle?"inTheStateofApartheid,ed.W.James[Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner,1987]).
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weregenerallysecondarytoandovershadowedbythegreatdividebetweensettlersandnatives.Thisremarkableintrastatecohesionwasshakenonlyduringcrises,thatis,periodsofmetropolitaninterventionornativemobilization(examinedbelowandinChapters4and5).
Stateslackingtheactiveconsentofthegovernedarenotnecessarilyprecarious;theymaysurviveforlongperiods.Aneffectiveapparatusofcontrolmayproducesufficientpopularacquiescenceforrelativestability.RegimesinRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandplacedtheconsentofthesubordinatepopulationsecondarytothepremiumofmaintainingtheregime'slegitimacyamongthesettlerpopulationavaluethatconcessionstoUlsterCatholicsorRhodesianblackswouldvitiate.31Theconfidenceofthesettlerpopulationcouldnotlongsurviveattemptstowinthesupportofthenativepopulationthroughseriousreformofthesystem;conversely,nativeswerehardlylikelytosupportaregimesteadfastlycommittedtoundilutedsettlersupremacy.Althoughthisformulaofsectarianlegitimacycannotbeelevatedtoagenerallawofsettlerdominationsincesomeregimeshaveattemptedtostrikeabalancebetweennativeandsettlerconsentitappliestothemmorethantosomeotherformsofauthoritarianrule,whichplaceasomewhatgreateremphasisonsecuringpopularorcorporatistlegitimacy.32
Ifbuildingnativeconsentwasnothighontheagendainourtwocases,howthendidtheymaintainorder?ControloverCatholicswasachievedinpartthroughtheenforcementofsecuritylaws,electoralgerrymandering,policeharassment,andperiodicintimidationbyProtestantvigilantegroups.ThesecontrolshelpedperpetuateCatholics'acquiescenceandservedtodiscourageorganizedresistance.
CoerciveandadministrativecontrolswerelesssevereandextensiveinUlsterthaninRhodesia,becauseasaminoritytheCatholicswereeasiertohandle,andhighlyrepressivecontrolinaprovinceofthe
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UnitedKingdomriskedunwantedattentionfromLondon.Comparedwith
31.RacerelationsinRhodesiahadameasureofwhitepaternalismliketheromanticizedAmericanSouthernversion,whichviewedwhitedominationasbeneficial,contributingtogradualblackadvancement.In1938,PrimeMinisterGodfreyHugginsoutlinedRhodesia's"twopyramid"or"paralleldevelopment"policy:
thecountryshouldbedividedintoseparateareasforblackandwhite.IntheNativeareatheblackmanmustbeallowedtorisetoanypositiontowhichheiscapableofclimbing....IntheEuropeanareatheblackmanwillbewelcomed,when,temptedbywages,heoffershisservicesasalaborer,butitwillbeontheunderstandingthatheshallmerelyassist,andnotcompetewith,thewhiteman.(QuotedinBowman,PoliticsinRhodesia,p.15)
32.SeeMariaAlves,StateandOppositioninMilitaryBrazil(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1985).
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RhodesianandSouthAfricanblacks,Ulster'sCatholicswerelessdependenteconomicallyonthedominantgroup(havinganindependenteconomicbase),hadmoreautonomousinstitutions(parties,churches,media,schools),andwerenotsubjectedtoformalapartheidrestrictions(thoughinformalsegregationexistedinhousing,jobs,andeducation).
ThefactthatinRhodesia,asinSouthAfrica,thedifferencebetweensettlersandnativeswasracialandthatthesettlerswereatinyminoritymadeanelaborateandrigidinfrastructureofcontrolnecessarytoinhibitblackmobilization.Fromthebeginning,extralegalcoercionexercisedbywhitefarmersandminingcompaniestoacquireandexploitcheapblacklaborcoexistedwithdiscriminatorylegalinstruments.Atleasttwenty-fourstatutesappliedsolelytoblacksandmanyothersaimedprimarilyatcontrolofnatives.33Mostimportantwerethe1930LandApportionmentActandthe1934IndustrialConciliationAct.Thefirstactlegalizedtheextantsystemoflandinequality(by1930,thewhitepopulationcontrolled51.7percentofthecountry'sland,theAfricans29.7percent;bycontrast,settlersowned7percentofthelandincolonialKenya,14percentinAlgeria,and87percentinSouthAfrica).Thesecondactlegalizedanindustrialcolorbarthatsegmentedblackandwhitelaborersintodifferentrewardstructuresanddisallowedcompetitionbetweenthemandmobilityacrossthisracialchasm.(Amongwhitesunemploymentwasalmostnonexistent;forblacksjoblessnessandunderemploymentwerefactsoflife.)
Inadditiontobeingdeniedrightsofpoliticalparticipationandequaleconomicopportunities,Africanswerecaughtinawebof"pettyapartheid"restrictionsinRhodesiaasinSouthAfrica.Castenormspreventedinterracialmarriages,discouragedinterracialfriendshipsandrecreationalactivities,andexacteddeferentialbehaviorfromblacks.Passlawsexistedfromthebeginningofthestate.A1902
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statuterequiredthatblackscarryaregistrationcertificateatalltimes,andtheNativeRegistrationActof1936stipulatedthaturbanAfricanscarryadditionalidentitypapers.Racialsegregationwasinstitutedinhousing,education,healthcare,publictransportation,andotherpublicfacilities;governmentspendingintheseareassystematicallydiscriminatedinfavorofwhites.AstheydidinSouthAfrica,whitesvariedsomewhatintheirattitudestowardspecificcasterestrictions,asRogersandFrantzfoundina1958survey(responsesrangedfromrelativelytoleranttorigidlycon-
33.L.H.GannandPeterDuignan,"ChangingPatternsofaWhiteElite:RhodesianandOtherSettlers,"inColonialisminAfrica,ed.L.H.GannandPeterDuignan,vol.2(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970).
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servative).34Butsubsequentevents(discussedbelow)showedthatthemajorityofthewhitepopulationwasnotpreparedtoendorsereformsofthecastesystem.
ThiscomprehensivestructureofinequalityandsocialcontrolfragmentedtheAfricanpopulationandensuredthatanyresistancewouldbesporadicandineffective.35Forthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,Africanswere"politicallyinert,passive,andvirtuallypowerless,"andwere"acteduponratherthanactingtoadegreeunusualeveninacolonialsituation)."36Theeffectivenessoftheextensivesystemofcontrolmeantthattheauthoritiesrarelyneededtoresorttoarmsandthatinternalsecuritylawswerefewuntilthelate1950s,whenblackpoliticalfermentbeganinRhodesiaasthewindsofdecolonizationsweptthecontinent.Onlythendidblacks'"resignedacceptanceofwhiterule''begintoerode,whichmadeinnovationsinthesystemoflawandorderseemnecessary.37
Ulster'sSystemofLawandOrder
Rhodesia'sinternalsecuritysystemevolvedgraduallyafter1923topreempttheriseofAfricanoppositionbutwasgalvanizedasnationalistoppositionintensifiedafter1958(discussedbelow);NorthernIrelandlaidtheinstitutionalfoundationsofitssecuritysysteminthesettlerregime'sfirstyear,attheheightofpoliticalviolence.BothcaseslendsupporttoAlves'sargumentthat"thecharacterofthenationalsecuritystatecanonlybeunderstoodinrelationtoitsinteractionwith...oppositionmovementsincivilsociety."38Alves'sargumentexaggerates,however,theroleofoppositionmovementsintworespects.First,thedevelopmentofarepressiveinternalsecurityenterprisedoesnotlogicallyrequiremanifestoppositionbutmaybedesignedtopreventitsgrowth.Second,inanationwherecivilsocietyisundeveloped,theimpactofoppositionforcesisunderstandablymuchlesssalientthaninnations
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(suchasBra-
34.CyrilRogersandCharlesFrantz,RacialThemesinSouthernRhodesia(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1962),pp.9094.35.OntheroleoftheminingcompoundsysteminsubduingAfricanworkers,seeDuncanClarke,"AfricanMineLabourersandConditionsofLabourintheMiningIndustryinRhodesia,19401974,"RbodesianJournalofEconomics9(December1975):177218,andvanOnselen,Chibaro.36.RichardGray,TheTwoNations(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1960),p.167;TerenceRanger,CrisisinSouthernRhodesia(London:FabianCommonwealthBureau,1960),p.12.37.Bowman,PoliticsinRhodesia,p.16.38.Alves,StateandOpposition,p.9.
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zil,thePhilippines,orSouthKorea)wherecivicinstitutionsprovidearichsourceofresistancetorepressivepolicies.
NorthernIreland'sinternalsecurityinstitutionswerefromthebeginningblatantlysectarianinoutlookandoperation:securitypowerswerevigorouslyappliedtoCatholics,whoseslightestprotestwasdefinedas"treachery,"whileProtestantpoliticalcrimewastreatedlenientlyorwithimpunity,undertherubricof"Loyalistactivity."39AccordingtoFarrell,"TheUnionistsdidnotacceptthebasicassumptionofBritishdemocracythatthepublicadministrationandthesecurityforcesshouldbeneutralbetweenthecontendingpartiesinthestate."40"Between1920and1968,"writesO'Dowd,"Unionist'lawandorder'remainedinviolatefromthemodernizationofrepressiveapparatusesinBritain.''41Hadtheregimetakenstepstoreducethesecuritysystem'ssectarianorientation,itmighthavesigneditsowndeathwarrant,forsuchactionwouldhaveviolatedtheraisond'êtreofthesettlerstate:namely,thedefenseofspecificallyProtestantinterests.AsinRhodesia,thehegemonicforceswithinthedominantcasteneveracceptedthattheirlong-terminterestsmightbestbeservedbysomeaccommodationwiththesubordinatecommunity;theyconceivedpowerasazero-summatter,rulingoutconcessions.Inthisdeeplydividedsociety,thesettlercommunitywouldalmostcertainlyhavedefineduniversalisticenforcementoflawandorderasbetrayalandresisteditpreciselywhathasoccurredsince1972underthemoremodernizedsecuritysystemimportedintoNorthernIrelandbythemetropole,asChapter7shows.
Duringtheformativeyearsofthenewstate,grass-rootsProtestantpressurewasanimportantcatalystinthecreationofapoliticalandsecuritysystemthatwouldtoleratenooppositionfromtheCatholicminority.42Protestantsupremacistforceswereparticularlyinfluentialinthepassageofthedraconian1922SpecialPowersActandthecreationandpreservationofthesectarian,paramilitaryUlsterSpecial
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Constabulary.PopularProtestantdemandsweregenerallyconsistentwiththeGovernment'sinterestsinthedevelopmentofrepressivesecuritypoliciesandinstitutions:theUnionistregimesoughttomaximizeitscontrolovertheminority,nurtureProtestantsolidarity,perpetuatetheparty'sincum-
39.Buckland,FactoryofGrievances,pp.200,206.40.Farrell,Arming,p.278.41.LiamO'Dowd,"ShapingandReshapingtheOrangeState,"inL.O'Dowd,B.Rolston,andM.Tomlinson,NorthernIreland:BetweenCivilRightsandCivilWar(London:CSEBooks,1980),p.21.42.ThisisamplydocumentedinFarrell,Arming.
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bency,andachievethelevelofstabilityrequiredtokeeptheBritishGovernmentatbay.43
Theseinterestsshapedthedevelopmentofthecoreexecutiveorganizations,rangingfromtheCabinettothevarioussecurityagencies.FormerBritishPrimeMinisterJamesCallaghanoncewrotethathe"founditdifficulttotakeseriouslytheideathattheNorthernIrelandCabinetandPrimeMinisterboreanyresemblancetowhatweinBritainunderstoodbythoseoffices."44LikeUnionistMPs,almostallCabinetministersweremembersofthebitterlyantiCatholicOrangeOrderandtheyweresometimesunabashedinexpressingtheirsectarian,antiCatholicviews.45Thefirstprimeminister,JamesCraig(19211940),proclaimed:"AllIboastisthatwehaveaProtestantparliamentandaProtestantstate."46Thethirdpremier,BasilBrooke(19431963),cautionedagainstemployingCatholicsanddeclared,"Ninety-sevenpercentofRomanCatholicsaredisloyalanddisruptive."47SuchviewscoloredthethinkingoftheCabinetandotherstateelitesatleastuntilthelate1960s.48Generally,themoremoderateCabinetmemberswereeclipsedbyhard-liners,butthemoderatessometimestemperedextremepoliciesthatmighthaveinvitedproblemswiththeBritishGovernment.49
TheMinistryofHomeAffairswasthecenterofgravitywithinthesecurityestablishment.Inleaguewithtoppoliceofficials,itwasinstrumentalinshapingasectariansecuritypolicy,targetedalmostentirelyagainstCatholics.50Inadditiontopolicing,theministryhadresponsibilityforthecontroversialareasoflocalgovernment,electoralaffairs,andgenerallawandorder.ThoseinchargeofHomeAffairswerestridentdefendersofProtestantandUnionistinterests.ThefirstPermanentSec-
43.Bew,Gibbon,andPatterson,TheState,pp.131ff.44.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.77.
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45.From1921to1969,138outof149MPswereOrangemen(EdmundA.Aunger,InSearchofPoliticalStability:AComparativeStudyofNewBrunswickandNorthernIreland[Montreal:McGill-QueensUniversityPress,1981],p.123).46.QuotedinMichaelFarrell,NorthernIreland:TheOrangeState(London:Pluto,1976),p.92.47.QuotedinGeoffreyBell,TheProtestantsofUlster(London:Pluto,1976),p.40.48."CouncilsofmoderationandconciliationfortheirownsakewerealmostunknownamongtheUnionistleadersand,withoutstrongandpersistentoutsidepressure,thepragmaticelementshadnoincentivetourgeconciliatorypolicies"(Farrell,Arming,p.280).SeealsoBuckland,FactoryofGrievances,p.22;DerekBirrellandAlanMurie,PolicyandGovernmentinNorthernIreland:LessonsofDevolution(Dublin:GillandMacmillan,1980),p.142;C.E.B.Brett,"TheLessonsofDevolutioninNorthernIreland,"PoliticalQuarterly41,no.3(July1970);PatrickShea,VoicesandtheSoundofDrums(Belfast:Blackstaff,1981).In1972,approximately85to95percentofthecivilservantsabovethelevelofdeputy-principalwerestillProtestant.49.Bew,Gibbon,andPatterson,TheState,pp.131ff.50.Buckland,FactoryofGrievances,p.206.
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retary,SamuelWatt,doubtedin1921whether"itwasevercontemplatedthattheseextraordinarypowers[intheexistingemergencylegislation]shouldbeusedagainstthosewhoareloyaltotheCrown[i.e.,Protestants]."51HesuggestedthattheordinarycriminallawbeusedagainstLoyalists.DawsonBates,ministerfrom1921to1943,regardedallCatholicsasfifthcolumnists,andkeptthemoutofhisministry.Allinall,HomeAffairsdisplayedwhatonehistoriancallsa"contemptuous"attitudeanda"hostilespirit"initsdealingswithCatholics.52
ThetoplevelsofthepolicewerecloselylinkedtotheUnionistestablishment,andtherankandfileferventdefendersoftheProtestantstate.ItisthusnotsurprisingthattheRoyalUlsterConstabularyandtheUlsterSpecialConstabularydevelopedareputationforsectarianlawenforcement.Notonlydidtheforcesoforderoperatewithbias,buttherewerenoindependentmechanismsofaccountability.53CompletelylackingwasabodyrepresentativeoftheentirecommunityanddetachedfromtheHomeAffairsministrywithamandatetoscrutinizecontentiouspolicemattersandhearpublicgrievances,anentitythatseemsvitalincommunallydividedsocieties.
Intheeventoftheslightesthintofunrest,thepolicewerepreparedforparamilitaryaction.54Indeed,thegenerallackofdisorderduringthehalf-centuryofUnionistrulewasinpartafunctionofthefactthat"Catholicsdidnotwishtochallengeapoliceforceandaparamilitaryservicethatwerereadytodieorkilltomaintaintheirconstitution."55MembersoftheUlsterSpecialConstabulary,inparticular,hadareputationamongCatholicsasstate-sponsoredProtestantvigilantes.OneformerChiefConstabletoldmeoftheUSC'sseriousproblems:"Theywerenottrainedinnormalpolicing,werenotsubjecttodiscipline,andtendedtobealawuntothemselves."56
OneofthefirstpiecesoflegislationpassedbythenewParliamentwas
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the1922SpecialPowersAct(SPA).ItsharshfeatureswereofficiallyjustifiedasawelcomedeparturefromBritain'sprevious"inept"and"vacil-
51.Watt,quotedinibid.,p.193.52.Ibid.,pp.204,205.53.[HuntCommittee]ReportoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonPoliceinNorthernIreland,Cmnd.535(Belfast:HMSO,October1969),LordHunt,Chair.54.Buckland,History,p.64.55.RichardRose,NorthernIreland:ATimeofChoice(London:Macmillan,1976),p.16.56.Interviewwithauthor,2August1984.TheUSCstaffedroadblocks,patrolled,guardedpublicutilities,andassistedinriotcontrol.
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lating"securitypolicyinIreland.57Theact'sprovisionsprobablywentfurtherthannecessaryeveninthemidstoftheseriousunrestandviolenceof1922.58Itprescribedpunishmentsofwhippinganddeathforthepossessionoruseofexplosivesorweapons,andtheMinisterofHomeAffairswasgivenpowertoissueregulationsofwidelatitudethatwereexemptfromparliamentaryscrutinyandjudicialreview:to"takeallsteps...asmaybenecessaryforpreservingthepeaceandmaintainingorder."Induecourse,ahostofexecutiveregulationswerepromulgated.Theseincluded,interalia,policepowersofarrestandsearchwithoutawarrant,theproscriptionofclubsandorganizations,censorshipofpublications,impositionofcurfews,andseizureofproperty.Onesweepingregulationcriminalized"doingorattemptinganyactcalculatedorlikelytocause...disaffectionamongthecivilianpopulationortoimpede,delayorrestrictanyworknecessaryforthepreservationofpeaceormaintenanceoforder."
Tocoveranyunforeseenactivities,ablanketprovisionwasincludedinsection2(4)oftheact:
IfanypersondoesanyactofsuchnatureastobecalculatedtobeprejudicialtothepreservationofthepeaceormaintenanceoforderinNorthernIrelandandnotspecificallyprovidedforintheregulations,heshallbedeemedtobeguiltyofanoffenceagainsttheregulations(emphasisadded).
Thisprovisionclearlyviolatestheprincipleofnullapoenasinelege(nocrimewithoutviolationofaspecificlaw).
Duringtheformativeyearsofthestate,themeasurewasusedfrequentlyagainstsuspectedCatholicrebels,politicalopponents,and"innocentandlaw-abidingpeople"butrarelytosuppressProtestants'sectariancrimesagainstCatholics.59TheSPAwasusedtobanRepublicanpublications,proscribemeetingsandmarches,crushlaborprotestsinthe1930s,internsuspects,andfacilitategeneralpolice
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harassmentoftheCatholicminority.60From1938to1945andfrom1956to1961,the
57.ParliamentarySecretaryofHomeAffairs,RobertMegaw,NorthernIrelandHouseofCommons,Debates,vol.2,21March1922,col.87(hereafter,CommonsDebates).58.HarryCalvert,ConstitutionalLawinNorthernIreland(LondonandBelfast:Stevens,1968),p.385.59.[CameronCommission]DisturbancesinNorthernIreland,Cmnd.532(Belfast:HMSO,1969);Buckland,History,p.66;KevinBoyle,TomHadden,andPaddyHillyard,LawandState:TheCaseofNorthernIreland(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1975),p.7.60.Farrell,OrangeState,p.94.
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actwasusedforinternmentwithouttrial.Duringperiodswhenitsusewasmorerestrained,itcontinuedasageneraldeterrenttoorganizedopposition.
ByassentingtotheSPA,Stormontineffectsurrendereditspowertomakeandrevokesecuritylegislationandauthorizedrulebyexecutivefiat.Althoughtheactwasdesignedasatemporarymeasure,itwasmadepermanentin1933,whenparadoxicallyseriousunrestintheprovincehadlongabated.AccordingtoBuckland,thetimingofitslegalentrenchmentwasanattempttopreemptparliamentarydebateoverrenewaloftheactatamomentwhenCatholicoppositionMPshaddecidedtotaketheirseatsatStormont.61Buttheofficialreasoninghighlightedtheact'seffectiveness:thestatutewasresponsibleforthepeacefulconditionsthatprevailedandthe"slightestrelaxationofthelaw"wouldenablesinisterforcesto"plungethisProvinceintoawelterofbloodshed."62A1936inquirybyBritain'sNationalCouncilforCivilLiberties(NCCL)disagreed:"DespiteoccasionaldisordersitcannotbesaidthatthespecialcircumstancesallegedtohaveexistedwhentheActwaspassedin1922prevailtoday."63Bythe1930s,theIrishRepublicanArmyhadbecomeaspentforceandtheexternalthreatfromsouthernIrelandhadessentiallyvanished.
Buttheacthadprovenaconvenientandeffectiveinstrumentfordisorganizingoppositionpoliticalforces.TheNCCLconcludedthat"theNorthernIrishGovernmenthasusedSpecialPowerstowardssecuringthedominationofoneparticularpoliticalfactionand...towardscurtailingthelawfulactivitiesofitsopponents."Theacthadbecomethekeystoneof"apermanentmachineofdictatorship"intheprovince.64
Ifmanifestdisorderhadceasedintheearly1920s,theGovernmentcouldreadilydefinedeepCatholicdisaffectionfromtheProtestant
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stateandsouthernIreland'sirredentistclaimstoUlsteraslatentsecuritythreats.Yetthose"threats...hadnoindependentsignificance"inexplainingthecharacterofthepoliticalsystemandthesectarianstructureoflawandorder.65TheselatentthreatsinteractedwithabidingsettlerinterestsinupholdingProtestantsupremacyintheprovince.Catholicdis-
61.Buckland,FactoryofGrievances,p.219;Buckland,History,p.65.62.MinisterofHomeAffairs,CommonsDebates,vol.9,15May1928,col.1688.TheParliamentarySecretaryofHomeAffairsmadethesameargumentin1933(CommonsDebates,vol.15,14March1933,col.848).63.NationalCouncilforCivilLiberties,ReportofaCommissionofInquiryAppointedtoExaminethePurposeandEffectoftheCivilAuthorities(SpecialPowers)Acts(NorthernIreland)1922and1933(London:NCCL,1936),p.24.64.Ibid.,pp.39,40.65.Bew,Gibbon,andPatterson,TheState,p.216.
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loyaltyservedProtestantinterestsinsofarasitcouldbeusedtoremindLondonoftheimperativeof"Loyalist"ruleinUlster.MacDonaldstressesthefunctionalconsequencesofCatholicalienationfromthestate:
ProtestantshadavestedinterestinsustainingtheCatholicdisloyaltythat,first,legitimatedProtestantprivileges;secondly,accentuatedthesalienceofProtestantloyaltytoBritain;andthirdly,providedthethreatthatmaintainedProtestantsolidarity.66
Theexceptionaloutbreakofdisorderthatpunctuatedthehalf-centuryofsettlerrulesuchastheabortiveIRAinsurgencyfrom1956to1962suggeststhattheCatholicminoritydidnotthreatensecuritytotheextenttheProtestantpopulationimagined.InordertoendBritishoccupationandtoreunifyIreland,theIRAin1956launchedacampaignofsporadicsabotageandarmedattacks.Ultimatelythecampaignlostmomentumfortworeasons:itencounteredswiftpoliceactionanditfailedtogeneratesupportwithintheCatholicenclave.Catholicsweresimplynotwillingtoendorseaviolentfrontalassaultonthestate.WhentheIRAcalledoffitscampaigninFebruary1962,itlamentedthisverylackofpopularsupport:"ForemostamongthefactorsmotivatingthiscourseofactionhasbeentheattitudeofthegeneralpublicwhosemindshavebeendeliberatelydistractedfromthesupremeissuefacingtheIrishpeopleunityandfreedomofIreland."67
Thecentralfeaturesofthispolitico-securitysystemdevelopedinacontextofdeepcommunalandpoliticalcleavages.ThesystemofmajoritariandemocracyfacilitatedthepoliticalsubordinationoftheminorityamajoritydictatorshipundertheveneerofBritishparliamentarydemocracy.Thesecuritysectorwaswellinsulatedfrompotentialchecksbothinsideandoutsidethestate.AnditdisplayedapatentlysectarianslantindefenseofthenarrowinterestsoftheProtestantcommunity.
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Thestateanditssecuritywinghadnotonlyclearsectariancommitmentsbutalsotheobjectivecapacitytoinstitutionalizethem.Thefirstdecadeofthenewstate'sexistencewasahistoryofitssuccessfuleffortstosecureautonomyfromBritishinterference,winthesupportofthevariousProtestantclasses,extractfinancialresourcesfromBritain,and
66.MacDonald,ChildrenofWrath,p.24.67.QuotedinJ.BowyerBell,TheSecretArmy:TheIRA(Dublin:AcademyPress,1979),p.334.
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liquidatepocketsofviolentoppositiontothestate.Overthenextdecades,theUnionistswereinagoodpositiontomaintainProtestantdominant-partyrule,cementpartition,disorganizebothovertCatholicnationalistmobilizationandperceivedsubterraneanthreats,andsatisfytheProtestantelectorate.Theseweresimultaneouslyendsinthemselvesandmeanstoguaranteeaparamountinterest:thatofthestate'sverysurvival.WithoutautonomyfromBritain,aninviolableborder,thepacificationofCatholicopposition,andbroad-basedProtestantsupport,thepillarsofthesettlerpowerstructurewouldhavecracked.Inthelate1960stheycrackedirreparably,asChapter5shows.
Rhodesia'sSystemofLawandOrder
LikethatofNorthernIreland,thecoreoftheRhodesianstatewasessentiallyimmunefromoversightbythejudiciary,legislature,andotheragencies;thestatedisplayedlittleconcernfortheconsentorthehumanrightsofitssubordinatepopulationandorganizedlawandorderaroundthenarrowinterestsofthesettlerminority.AresourcefulandintransigentsettlerbloccreatedanapparatusofcontrolthatwasconsiderablymoreelaboratethaninconventionalcoloniesaswellassomesettlersocietiessuchasNorthernIrelandandLiberia.
DuringmostofRhodesianhistory,theleadinginternalsecurityinstitutionswerethenationalpoliceforceandtheNativeAffairsDepartment.Untilthelate1960s,thecountrymaintainedonlyarudimentaryterritorialarmy.Theproportionofpublicrevenueearmarkedfordefensewassmall,andthearmyplayedasmallroleindomesticorderandexternaldefenseuntiltheoutbreakofguerrillawarinthe1970s.Rhodesia'sBritishSouthAfricanPolice(BSAP)wasthedefactodefenseforce.Formedin1896,itperformedbothconventionalpolicingandparamilitarytasks.TheMinistryofJusticehad(until1962)responsibilityforpolicing,aswellasprosecution,the
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courts,andlaw-and-orderpolicy.
ThelargestandmostpowerfulbranchofthestatewastheNativeAffairsDepartment(NAD),whichoperatedwithconsiderableresourcesandautonomyandhadbroadgeographicalandfunctionaljurisdiction.Asastatewithinastate,thedepartmentsuccessfullyresistedinterferencefromotheragencieswellintothe1970s.NADofficersinthecountrysideweretheprincipalagentsofsocialcontrolandintelligence,largelyfreefrominterferencebyotherstatesectors.Theygovernedruralblackswithamixtureofpaternalismandcoercionformallyembracing
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thedoctrineofAfricans'gradual"advancement"intheir"separateareas,'butskepticalthatAfricanscouldeverproceedveryfar.
ThelegalandinstitutionalchangesintroducedinRhodesiaduringthewatershedyearsof1959through1962providedthecornerstoneuponwhichtheinternalsecurityenterprisewouldbefurtherrefinedoverthenexttwenty-fiveyears.(AsChapter6shows,theessenceofthissystemsurvivesinindependentZimbabwe.)Thepost-1959periodanalyzedhereisnotoneofunmediatedAfricanresistanceasportrayedinmuchoftheliteratureonRhodesia,inwhichAfricanoppositionappearstobethesolecauseofrepressivestateresponsesandsystemicinnovations.Ouranalysispresentsamorebalanced,multicausalaccountbylinkingpressuresfromtheAfricancommunitytointra-whitepoliticsandthedistinctiveinterestsofthesettlerregime.
The1959StateofEmergency
Inadawnswoopon26February1959,theRhodesianGovernmentstagedasurprisearrestoffivehundredmembersoftheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)andproclaimedastateofemergency.Itlabeledthosearrested"agitators,""fanatics,"and"extremists"bentondefyingauthorityandcausingpandemoniuminthecountry.TheofficialjustificationforthestateofemergencywascontainedinapamphletwrittenbytheChiefNativeCommissionerandSecretaryofNativeAffairs,StanleyMorris,anddistributedtoAfricansandthepress:
Itisclearthattheseself-appointedleadersofCongressesinSouthernRhodesia,whocomefromthetowns,areworkingtogetridofthetribalauthorities,sothattheycantakecontrolandforceeveryonetoaccepttheirpower.Theserabble-rousers...couldnotevenmanageabusiness...yettheyseektogovernthepeopleandrecklesslydisregardtheharmtheywouldbringtoeveryoneinthecountry....Abuse,threatsandintimidation
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havecreptintotheirwords.Defianceandinsolencehavebecometheirclaimtoleadership....ThepeopleofcertaindistrictshavebeencalledtomeetingsbytheseCongressleadersandexhortedtobreakthelawsofthecountryandtoignoretheirNativeCommissionersandChiefs....Governmenthasdecidedtoremovetheseagitatorsandtrouble-makerstoremovefromthemthepowertoplaywithhotwords,tomakeitimpossibleforthemtocollectmoremoneyfromyou,andifnecessarytokeeptheminaplaceofdetentionuntiltheymendtheirthoughts....NowyoucancontinueyourpeacefullivesintheReservesandyourworkinthetownsandonfarmsandonmines,secureintheknowledgethatGovernmentintendstopreservelawandorder,andtosupporttheChiefsintheirstatusandtheirauthority....Settledownconscientiouslytoyourwork,youhavenothingtofear.Usetheproperchannelsfor
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addressinganygrievancesorrequeststhatyoumayhavetoGovernment...andnottoagroupofnoisyboyswhoarenotouttohelpyoureally,butarelookingonlytotheirpersonalaggrandizementandpoweratyourexpense.68
ThepamphletsuggestedthattheAfricandetaineeswereguiltynotofviolentconductorspecificcriminalactsbutratherof"hotwords,"intimidation,anddefianceanddisobediencedrivenbyalustfor"aggrandizementandpower."Inclassicfashion,theregimebrandedpoliticaloppositionsubversive.69
VisiblepublicsupportforAfricannationalistorganizationschallengedtheregime'sdefinitionofthesituation.Urbanrallieswerebeginningtodrawunprecedentedcrowds:fivethousandatanANCrallyinDecember1958,threethousandinJanuary1959.70Whileprivatelyalarmedatthesizeofthesemeetings,theRhodesianauthorities(likethePretoriaregimetoday)publiclydismissedthemastheresultof"intimidation"bythefewonthelunaticfringe.TohavedoneotherwisewouldhavebeentoacceptthattheANCwasgeneratingbroadsupport.Thepreambletothe1959UnlawfulOrganizationsActreflectedtheofficialconstructionofAfricannationalists'actions:
[theyhave]assembledmeetingsorgatheringsofignorantandunwarypersons,whereatinviolentandthreateninglanguage,thespeakershavewilfullymisrepresentedfacts,sownseedsofdiscordandracialhostility,exciteddisaffectiontowardsestablishedauthority,urgedcivildisobedienceandpassiveresistancetothelaw.
AformerseniorofficialintheNativeAffairsDepartmentreflectedthatblacks"werehappyandcontent,otherwisetheywouldhaverisenuplongbeforetheydid.Theywererousedbyagitatorswhotoldthemthestorythatthewhiteshadtakenthebestland."71Butmanywerefarfrom"content";72oneofficialcommissionconcludedthatthegovernmenthad
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68.ReprintedinAfricanDailyNews(Salisbury),26February1959.69.SeeEshmaelMlambo,Rhodesia:TheStruggleforaBirthright(London:Hurst,1972),p.128;Dissent(Salisbury),26March1959.BeforetheMauMaudisturbancesinKenya,ruraladministratorssimilarlyequatedoppositionwithsubversion(seeBruceBerman,"BureaucracyandIncumbentViolence:ColonialAdministrationandtheOriginsofthe'MauMau'EmergencyinKenya,"BritishJournalofPoliticalScience6[April1976]:166).70.Mlambo,Rhodesia,p.127.71.Interviewwithauthor,8June1983.Asurveyin1965foundthatwhitesbelievedthenationalistslackedwidespreadsupport(StephenHintz,"ThePoliticalTransformationofRhodesia,19581965,"AfricanStudiesReview15(1972):182).72.J.VanVelsen,"TrendsinAfricanNationalisminSouthernRhodesia,"KroniekvanAfrika4(June1964):149.
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"generallyunderestimated"African"politicalconsciousnessandawarenessofhumanrights."73
Ifin1959theprevailingtendencywithintheexecutivewastodenytheexistenceofblackdiscontent,aminorityreformistfactionheldopposingviews,whichgraduallywonsupportinCabinet(includingthatoftheprimeminister,SirEdgarWhitehead).ModeratesincludedtheMinisterofLabour,whoreflectedonhisposition:
InagreeingtotheprincipleofthedeclarationofemergencyandsecuritylegislationImadeitveryclearthatmybeliefwasthatthiscouldnotprovideasolutionfortherealgrievancesanddisabilitiesofAfricans.Itcouldneversubstitutefororavoidnecessaryreforms.Therewererealgrievanceswhichhadtoberemediedinthequickestpossibletime.74
After1959theGovernmentoftheUnitedFederalparty(UFP)embracedtheideaofgrantingminorconcessionstomoderateAfricansremovingtheso-calledpinpricksofpettydiscrimination.75
TheAfricanNationalCongresssoughtmoresubstantialchanges,butlesssweepingthantheGovernmentbelieved.Itsplatformadvocatedracialcooperation,therightofallto"permanentcitizenship"inthecountry,and"equalityofopportunityineverysphere,"butitstoppedfarshortofdemandinglandredistribution,majorityrule,orindependencefromBritain.
Blackdiscontenthadbeengrowingintheruralareaslargelybecauseofthedisruptiveimpactofthe1951LandHusbandryAct.ItwasdesignedtoimprovetheruraleconomyintheAfricanreserves,whichexperiencedthepressureofagrowingpopulationwithinfixedareas,butitsprovisionsviolatedtraditionalpractices.76Ratherthanexpandthesizeofthereserves,theactlimitedcattlegrazinginspecifiedareasandprovidedforthede-stockingofAfricanherds;itallowedofficialstodictatepatternsofcultivationandcropgrowingandtofixdwellingsiteson
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73.[RobinsonCommission]GovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,ReportoftheCommissionAppointedtoInquireintoandReportonAdministrativeandJudicialFunctionsintheNativeAffairsandDistrictCourtsDepartments,C.S.R.22-1961,Salisbury,20May1961,V.L.Robinson,Chair,p.30.74.Correspondencewithauthor,30January1984.75.TochannelAfricanopinion,NADpamphletslabeledextremistsas"liabletodragpeopledown,tobringtroubletothem,evendeathorinjury,"butmoderateswerecalm,constructive,andableto"reasonthingsoutintelligently,withintheframeworkofconstitutionallawandregulations."Rhodesiawas"fullofmoderates"whohadachievedprogress,honor,andrespect(NADFORMBroadsheetno.4,NativeAffairsDepartment,February1959).76.WilliamBarber,"ThePoliticalEconomyofCentralAfrica'sExperimentwithInter-RacialPartnership,"CanadianJournalofEconomicsandPoliticalScience25,no.3(August1959):32435.
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farmland;itprohibitedcultivatingorgrazingwithoutapermitandimposedcompulsorylaboronunemployedruralAfricans.Implementationoftheactmeantthedepletionofhighlyvaluedherds,reductionofthelandundercultivation,andtheforceduprootingoffamiliesandentirevillages.
GeorgeNyandorooftheANCcalledtheact''thebestrecruiterCongresseverhad,"77andtheANCcapitalizedonpeasants'grievancesoverthemeasure.Taskedwithimplementingtheact,theNativeAffairsDepartmentwasacutelyawareofblacks'resentmentandtheerosionofitsauthority,whichtwo1961commissionsofinquirydocumented.78Theprimeministerunderstoodtheseriousnessoftheproblemandfeared"thedevelopmentoftheLandHusbandryActandindeedthewholeadministrationofthenativeareaswouldbreakdown."79
DiscontentwithsocioeconomicconditionswasgrowingamongurbanAfricansaswell.Arecessionin19571958hitblackshard;risingunemploymentandinadequatetownshiphousingcontributedtotheirsenseofdeprivationandprovidedready-madeissuesforANCorganizers.
TheexistenceofAfricangrievancesandnascentpoliticizationinthelate1950showeverunnervingtotheauthoritiesposednoseriousthreattopublicorderornationalsecurity.EventheDirectorofAfricanAdministrationforBulawayo,E.H.Ashton,challengedtheGovernment'sline,"TheBulawayodetaineesweregenerallyresponsiblepeople,whodidnotfallintothecategoryof'rabblerousers'describedbytheSecretaryforNativeAffairs."80Anotherauthorityremarked,"WhathashappenedissimplythatAfricannationalismhasbecomealotmorenoisy...butitisstillnotbackedbyanythingmoresubstantialthanpo-
77.QuotedinPatrickO'Meara,Rhodesia:RacialConflictorCoexistence?
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(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1975),p.100.78.TheRobinsonCommissionunderscoredthe"extremeoppositionandbitterresentmentcentredontheNativeDepartment,whichhascometoberegardedastheauthorof,andinstrumentfor,alloppressivelegislation"(p.30).TheBrownCommission(alsoof1961)foundthattheNativeCommissioner"tendstobecomeregardedasthelocalsymbolofarestrictiveifnot'oppressive'WhiteGovernment,andthereforeunavoidablythetargetofmountingresentment"([BrownCommission]GovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,ReportoftheMangwendeReserveCommissionofInquiry,1961,JamesS.Brown,Chairman,para.107).A1968surveyfoundthatmostAfricansobeyeddistrictcommissionersonly"reluctantly"andoutof"fear"(A.K.H.Weinrich,BlackandWhiteElitesinRuralRhodesia[Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1973],pp.54,58).79.SouthernRhodesia,AssemblyDebates,vol.42,26February1959,col.2018(hereafter,AssemblyDebates).80.CityofBulawayo,ReportoftheDirectorofAfricanAdministrationfor19581959(Bulawayo:RhodesianPrinters,1959),p.72.
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liticalaspirationsalone....Whyletitfrightenus?"81Organizedpoliticalviolencewasnotimminent,andmostANCmemberswerehardlysubversives.82TheANChadrathermodestgoals,fewresources,andarudimentaryorganization.Althoughblackgrievanceswereintensifyingduringthisperiod,officialcontrolspreventedthemovementfromdevelopingintoaforcetobereckonedwith.Thus,aspredictedbytheresourcemobilizationschoolofsocialmovements,Africanresistanceremainedafledglingmovement.83
Thesecuritypanicof1959theofficialoverreactiontoperceivedthreatsisbestexplainedwithinaframeworkthatcentersontheoverridingconcernsandinterestsoftherulingUnitedFederalparty.Itwasunderpressurefromseveralsectorsofwhitesociety,includingitsownMPsandpartyloyalists,apressthathadbeenclamoringformonthsforharshactionagainst"subversives,"andthepoliticallyimportantwhitefarmingcommunity.
MostdisturbingtotheUFPGovernmentwasthepossiblelossofsupportamongawhiteelectoratefairlyevenlysplitinitssupportfortherulingpartyandtheoppositionDominionparty(DP).ThewhitesupremacistDPhadbeenattackingtheGovernmentforninemonthsbeforethecrackdown.84Whilesupportingtheemergency,theDPfaultedtheGovernmentfornotactingsoonerorgoingfurthertoquashAfricannationalism,andforhavingcreatedtheprobleminthefirstplacethroughappeasementofAfricans.ToDPsupporters,liketheircounterpartsincontemporarySouthAfrica,reformsthatmightresultinevenlimitedAfricanadvancementwereanathema.Theopposition'sclamorforanironfistpolicyhelpedconvincetheregimetodeclaretheemergency;asthegeneralelectionof1962neared,thispressurebecameincreasinglysalient.
Theconcernsofthewhiteelectoratewereabundantlyexpressedinlocalnewspaperreportsandletterstotheeditorfrom1958to1960
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thatIexamined.Theirviewswerealsoreflectedina1958surveyoffivehundredwhitesthatdocumentedtheirmistrustofAfricannationalism,be-
81.SirRoyWelensky,primeministeroftheCentralAfricanFederation(ofwhichRhodesiawasamember),RhodesiaHerald,27January1959.82.ClydeSanger,CentralAfricanEmergency(London:Heinemann,1960),p.256;PhilipMason,YearofDecision:RhodesiaandNyasalandin1960(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1960),p.218;GuyClutton-Brock,"The1959'Emergency'inSouthernRhodesia,"inNewDeal,ed.LeysandPratt,p.161.83.JohnMcCarthyandMayerZald,"ResourceMobilizationandSocialMovements,"AmericanJournalofSociology82,no.6(May1977):121241;Tilly,Mobilization.84.AssemblyDebates,vol.43,14August1959,col.1559.
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liefthatAfricanpoliticalmobilizationwasinspiredbyoutsideagitatorsratherthananaturaloutgrowthofinternalconditions,viewoftheANCasarealsecuritythreat,concernthatwhitesshouldhavefirearms,andsupportfortightpolicesurveillanceoverAfricanmeetings.85
Onepivotalconstituencywasthatofwhitefarmers.Terrifiedthattheymightlosetheirland,commercialfarmerscriticizedtheregime's"reluctance"totakefirmactionagainstunrulyblackswhowere"troubling"Africanfarmworkers.DrawinglessonsfromKenya'sMauMaudisorders,theywarnedthat"itisthefarmingandwholeruralcommunitywhichalwayshasinAfricareceivedthefirstshockofviolence."86
ContinentaleventsprovidedabackdropforthestirringsofRhodesianblacks.Inthelate1950s,nationalistmovementsweresweepingthroughotherAfricancolonies;inmany,independenceseemedimminent.LuridpresscoverageofoutbreaksofblackviolenceelsewhereinAfricasuperimposedexternaldevelopmentsontheRhodesiansituation.87GrislydescriptionsofeventscontributedtofearsinwhitecirclesthatRhodesianblackswouldbeencouragedtorebel.SuchademonstrationeffectwasanticipatedduringtheMauMaurebellioninKenyaandsignsofthatcountry'simpendingindependence,thecivilwarinAlgeria,andtheviolenceagainstwhitesintheBelgianCongoandFrenchCongoinearly1959.88TheeffectofsensationalizedreportsoftheseeventswastodeepenwhiteRhodesians'fearsofmurder,rape,andexpulsionintheeventofablackrevoltorthetransferofpowertotheblackmajority.89Inthislargercontext,thefutureofwhitesupremacyinRhodesiaseemedtodependontheimpositionofmuchtightercontrolsontheblackpopulation.
Closertohome,violencehadbrokenoutinNyasaland,andtensions
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wererisinginNorthernRhodesiaasblacksdemandedindependence.(NorthernRhodesia,Nyasaland,andSouthernRhodesiahadformed
85.RogersandFrantz,RacialThemes,pp.25963.86.Editorial,RhodesianFarmer,6December1957;ibid.,13December1957.87.SimilarpanicstoriesintheSouthAfricanpressareexaminedinPierreHugo,"TowardsDarknessandDeath:RacialDemonologyinSouthAfrica,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies26,no.4(December1988).88.In1960,oneindignantoppositionMPpaintedallAfricanswiththesamebrush:"TheAfrican...isinterestedinexterminatingtheEuropeananditisnogoodanybodygettingupandsayingthattheSouthernRhodesiannativeisdifferent....TheSouthernRhodesiannative,theCongonative,theMauMauterroristsofKenya,themassacreplotAfricanofNyasaland,thepetrolburningtypesofNorthernRhodesiaandtheritualmurderersofBasutoland,theyareallthesame"(WynnStarling,AssemblyDebates,vol.45,19July1960,col.359).89.TheRhodesianprimeministerstated,"WehadthemoraloftheMauMautroubleverymuchinmind"(SundayMail(Salisbury),22March1959).
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theCentralAfricanFederationin1953.)SouthernRhodesiansecurityforceshadbeensentintoNyasalandinFebruarytohelpquelldisturbances.Intheregime'sview,thisexternaloperationrequiredthetighteningofscrewsathome.LordMalvern(formerprimeministerofRhodesiaandthefederation)stated,"ItwasdecidedthattheSouthernRhodesianAfricanCongressmustbeputbehindwiresothattheycouldnotcreateadiversionandpreventthesendingofnecessarypolicetoNyasaland."90
DisturbanceswithinthefederationthusprecipitatedtheintroductionofemergencyruleinRhodesia.Theprimeministeradmittedthat"thereisarealemergencynotinSouthernRhodesiaatthemoment,butintheFederation."91ThesecuritycrackdowninRhodesiawaslargelyapreemptivestrikeagainstfurthernationalistorganizingofblacksandagainstpotentialAfricanunrest.92Disorderseemedlikelybecauseofthesinisterconstructionauthoritiesplacedonbothcontinentalpressuresanddomesticblackpolitics.Suchlinkageofexternalandinternalthreatsiscommonindeeplydividedsocieties.93
TheembryonicchallengefromRhodesianblackswasonlyonefactorcontributingtothedeclarationofthestateofemergency.TheWhiteheadregime'spoliticalinterestsalsoplayedarole:itattemptedtogainpoliticalcapitalamongthewhiteelectorate,stealthethunderoftheoppositionparty,andthussecureitsincumbency.TheGovernmentsoughtinonestroketounderminetheANCtotheleft,curryfavorwithDPloyaliststotheright,andretainthesupportofitsownconstituentsinthemiddle.Alreadyevidentin1959,theseinterestsgrewincreasinglysalientasthe1962electionapproached.
NormalizingEmergencyRule
Theemergencyepisodeprovedcounterproductiveinseveralrespects.Itruinedtheprospectsforgenuineracialpartnership,madeheroesoutofthedetainees,andalienatedmoderateAfricansfromthe
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Government.94Todeflatethecrisisatmosphereofthestateofemergencyandyetpre-
90.GreatBritain,HouseofLords,Debates,24March1959,col.258.91.AssemblyDebates,vol.42,26February1959,col.2049;emphasisadded.92.Berman'sstate-centeredanalysisoftheMauMauemergencyinKenyasimilarlynotes,"TheEmergency,inreality,wasapreemptiveattackcarriedoutbytheincumbentcolonialauthoritiesagainstasignificantsegmentoftheAfricanpoliticalleadershipofKenyaanditssupporters"("Bureaucracy,"p.170).93.DavidBrown,"CrisisandEthnicity:LegitimacyinPluralSocieties,"ThirdWorldQuarterly7,no.4(October1985):989.94.Mlambo,Rhodesia,p.133;Ranger,Crisis,p.34.
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serveitssweepingpowersasinsuranceagainstthefuture,theregimesoughttonormalizetheexceptionalmeasuresbyincorporatingtheminstatutelaw.95Thusinstitutionalized,theofficialemergencycametoanend.
The1959UnlawfulOrganizationsAct(UOA)wasnovelinthatitoutlawedcertainorganizations.TheactproscribedtheAfricanNationalCongressandprovidedforthebanningofadditionalorganizationsiftheiractivitiesweredeemed"likely"todisturbpublicorder,"prejudice"thetranquilityofthenation,endanger"constitutionalgovernment,"or"promotefeelingsofillwillorhostility''betweentheraces.Furthermore,theUOAoutlawedanyorganizationthatwas"controlledbyoraffiliatedtoorparticipatesintheactivitiesorpromotestheobjectsorpropagatestheopinionsofanyorganizationoutsidethecolony"(emphasisadded).Theexecutive'sbanningofanorganizationwas"notopentoquestioninanycourtoflaw,"andtheburdenofprovingthatonewasnotamemberofabannedorganizationfellontheaccused.Attendanceatameetingorpossessionofbooks,writings,accounts,documents,banners,orinsignia"relatingtoanunlawfulorganization"wereprimafacieevidenceofmembership"untilthecontraryisproved."Prosecutionofsuchoffensescouldbeheldincamera.Finally,theactprovidedforthecompleteindemnificationofpoliceandcivilservantsforactionsconnectedwithenforcingthemeasure.Between1960and1965,1,610Africanswereprosecutedand1,002convictedunderthislaw.96
ThePreventiveDetentionAct(PDA)wasintroducedtocontinuethedetentionofANCmemberswhohadbeenarrestedandheldwithoutchargeduringthestateofemergency.97Duringparliamentarydebateonthebill,theprimeministerarguedthatthenationalistdetaineeshadmadea"mockery"ofthelaw,hadstirredupruraldiscontent,andhadestablishedconnectionswiththoseoutsidethecountrywhowere
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intenton"bringingaboutacompletechange"inAfrica.Headmittedthattheseactivitieswerenot"inanywaycontrarytotheoldlaws"unlessviolencecouldbeprovedhencetheneedforthePDA.98
Theactauthorizedthedetentionofpersons"concerned,""associated,"or"supporting""anyoftheactivitiesofanyorganizationwhich
95.Codificationofemergencypowersafteracrisisisfairlycommonamongauthoritarianregimes(seeAnthonyMathewsandR.C.Albino,"ThePermanenceoftheTemporary,"SouthAfricanLawJournal83[1966]:1643).96.Bowman,PoliticsinRhodesia,p.60.97.MinisterofJusticeandInternalAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.42,20March1959,col.2687.98.AssemblyDebates,vol.42,20March1959,cols.273844.
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ledtothepresentstateofemergency"andpersonsconsidered"potentiallydangeroustopublicsafetyorpublicorder."Thedecisionastowhetherindividualswere"potentiallydangerous"waslefttothegovernor,whichinpracticemeanttheMinisterofJusticeandInternalAffairs.
Lesttheactgivetheappearanceofcompletelyuncheckedexecutivepower,itestablishedaReviewTribunalcomposedofajudge,amagistrate,andaNativeCommissionertoreviewannuallythecaseofeachdetaineeandrecommendreleaseorcontinueddetention.Tribunalproceedingswereheldincamera;deliberationsdependedheavilyontheevidenceofthepoliceSpecialBranch;andtheministerwasnotobligedtofollowthetribunal'srecommendations.Thetribunalrarelyadvisedthereleaseofdetainees,anditslackofobjectivitywasreflectedinitsgeneralreportontheemergencyanddetentionexerciseof1959,whichcompletelywhitewashedtheregime'sactions.99
Athirdmeasure,theNativeAffairsAmendmentAct,wasintroducedin1959toprohibitany"native"frommakingstatementsoractinginaway"likelytounderminetheauthority"of,orbringinto"disrepute,"governmentalofficials,chiefs,orheadmen.Theactabolishedmeetingsoftwelveormore"natives"withoutthepermissionoftheNativeCommissioner.Hence,theruralareasbecamemuchlessaccessibletoblacknationalistorganizers.
InJanuary1960theNationalDemocraticparty(NDP)emergedoutoftheruinsoftheANC.Itsgoalsincludeduniversaladultsuffrage,higherwages,improvementsinAfricanhousingandeducation,andabolitionoftheLandApportionmentActandtheLandHusbandryAct.LiketheANC,theNDPhadarudimentaryorganization,limitedresources,andnoaccesstothepress;manyofitswould-beleadersremainedbehindbars.Giventhefar-reachingsecurityrestrictionspassedin1959,theparty'sactivitieswereboundwithintight
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parameters.Organizinginruralareaswasvirtuallyimpossible.Inurbanareas,however,itwasattractinguptotenthousandpeopletoitsrallies,andbymid-1961ithadovertwohundredfiftythousanddues-payingmembers.100
Intendedtoparalyzeblackoppositionandpreventpoliticalviolence,thestateofemergencyprovedaself-fulfillingprophecy.Staterepressiondeepenedblackalienationfromtheregimeandsuggestedtosomethat
99.ReviewTribunal,PreventiveDetention(TemporaryProvisions)Act1959,GeneralReport,PresentedtotheLegislativeAssembly,C.S.R.27(Salisbury,Rhodesia,1959),T.Beadle,President.100.Mlambo,Rhodesia,p.140;DavisM'Gabe,"Rhodesia'sAfricanMajority,"AfricanReport(February1967):19.
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peacefulpoliticalorganizingwasadeadend.Withtheblackleadershipindetention,thepoliticalvacuumwasfilledbythemoremilitantlyinclined.AsinKenyaduringMauMau,violenceinRhodesia"derivedfromtheconditionsoftheEmergencyitself."101InJulyandOctober1960large-scaledemonstrationsandriotingbrokeoutinblacktownships.Duringoneriot,thepolicekilledelevenAfricans.Therioterswereselective:they"destroyedeverythingthathadanythingtodowiththecentralorlocalgovernment."102
Inreactiontothedisordersandtotheoutcryofashockedsettlercommunity,theGovernmentintroducedmorecomprehensivelegislation:the1960LawandOrder(Maintenance)Act(LOMA)andtheEmergencyPowersAct(EPA).LOMAbannedpublications;criminalized"subversivestatements"and"intimidation,"whichitdefinedbroadly;restrictedpersonswithouttrialtodesignatedareas;empoweredpolicetosearchandarrestwithoutawarrant;andsummarilyprohibitedmeetings.Itoutlawedthepublishingof"falsenews,"boycotting,creating"disaffection"inthepoliceforce,andusingorencouragingviolence,sabotage,andterrorism.
TheEmergencyPowersActenabledtheMinisterofJusticetomake"necessaryorexpedient"regulationsforpublicorder,safety,peace,andthemaintenanceofany"essentialservice."Itprovidedregulationsforsummaryarrest,detention,andrestriction.Italsogavetheexecutivepowertosuspendormodify"anylaw"tomakewayforemergencyregulations.
Althoughcouchedinrace-neutrallanguage,LOMAandEPAwereappliedalmostentirelytoAfricans.Veryfewwhitesweresympathetictothenationalistcause,andtherightsandlibertiesofthewhitepopulationwerelargelyunaffected.Blackswerearrested,detained,orrestricted;politicalmeetingsonSundaysandholidayswereproscribed(in1961,1,028AfricanswerearrestedforviolationsofLOMA,and
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1,084in1962).103TheNDPwasbannedinDecember1961anditssuccessor,theZimbabweAfricanPeople'sUnion(ZAPU),wasoutlawedinSeptember1962.Bytheseactionstheregimehopedtocurryfavoramongthewhiteelectorateasanationalelectionapproached.104
101.CarlRosbergandJohnNottingham,TheMythofMauMau(NewYork:Praeger,1966),p.277.102.FrancisNehwati,"TheSocialandCommunalBackgroundto'Zhii':TheAfricanRiotsinBulawayo,SouthernRhodesiain1960,"AfricanAffairs69(July1970):252.103.Bowman,PoliticsinRhodesia,p.60.104.ChengetaiZvobgo,"SouthernRhodesiaunderEdgarWhitehead:19581962,"JournalofSouthernAfricanAffairs2,no.4(October1977):489.
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Theeventsof1959through1962helpedtofortifytheinstitutionalpowerofRhodesia'sinternalsecurityagencies.ThenewsecuritylegislationgreatlyexpandedthearbitrarypowersofofficialsintheNativeAffairsDepartment,theMinistryofJusticeandInternalAffairs,andthepoliceforce;justastheirmanpowerandfinancialresourcesweresubstantiallyenhanced.105Newpolicestationswereerectedinblacktownships;theSpecialBranchofthepolicewasestablishedinDecember1960toprovideintelligenceonnationalistsathomeandon"sinister"forceselsewhereinAfrica.106Inlate1962,apowerfulMinistryofLawandOrderwascreated,withresponsibilityforthepolice.Thisnewdepartmentspecificallyconcernedwithlawandorderwasdesignedbothtoexpandcontroloverblacksand,onceagain,togiveanalarmedwhiteelectorateasensethattheGovernmentwasbeingfirm.107
AsincontemporarySouthAfrica,officialsdescribedrepressivemeasuresinRhodesiaasnecessarytoestablishabedrockofstabilityuponwhichasuperstructureofreformcouldbebuilt.TheUFPregimegraduallycametotheviewthatitoughttobalancerepressionwithapackageofconcessionstoAfricansashock-absorbereffect.ItaimedconcessionsmainlyatthemoderateAfrican"majority"andrepressionattheextremist"fringe,"inordertodriveawedgebetweenthetwogroupsandweakentheirpotentialforbroadbasedpoliticalresistance.ImprovementstookplaceinAfricaneducation,wages,andamenities;plansweremadetodispensewithsome"pettyapartheid"regulationstheregimeconsideredsuperfluoustomaintainingwhitesupremacy.Therepealofcertainkindsofracialdiscriminationstoppedfarshortofforcedintegration,asWhiteheadmadeclearin1959:"Wewillnotlegislatetoforcepeopletointegratewhodonotwanttoandwewillnotforcepeopletomeetsociallyiftheydonotwantto."108
Theuseofboththecarrotandstickreflectedgrowingdisagreementatthecommandingheightsofthesecuritysector,someofwhoseelites
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calledalmostexclusivelyforreforms,someforundilutedrepression,andothersforamixtureofthetwo.PolicechiefsandtheSecretaryofNativeAffairspushedstronglywithinCabinetforrepressivesolutions,whileothersliketheMinistersofJusticeandLabourtookamore"en-
105.GovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,EstimatesofExpenditure(Salisbury:GovernmentPrinter,19591962).106."TheSpecialBranch,"FightingForcesofRhodesia,no.2(August1975):13.107.Author'sinterviewwithformerminister,26May1983;correspondencebetweenformerMinisterofLabourandtheauthor,30January1984.108.AssemblyDebates,2October1959,col.1457.
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lightened"view.109AsoneministerintheWhiteheadCabinetlaterconfided,conflictwithintheCabinetandtherulingpartyoverthebalancebetweenreformandrepression"wasasplitwhichbecamedeeperastheyearswentby.Thegreatertheattempttoreform,thegreaterthereaction."110Despitetheincreasedlegalpowersgiventothepolice,Justice,andNativeAffairs,hard-linefactionswithintheseagenciesremainedfrustratedbytheCabinet'sapparentweaknessincurbingunrest.AsignificantnumberofstatepersonnelwerecovertsupportersoftheDominionpartyanditshard-lineprogram.The19591962periodwassignificant,therefore,notonlyforthegrowingblackunrestbutalsofortheunprecedenteddiscordwithinthestateoverbothsecuritypolicyandreformoftheracialorder.
BreakdownandRestorationofSettlerCohesion
Theincreasingstrainwithinthestateoverspecificformsofrepressionandreformandoverthepropermixtureofthetwocoincidedwithabacklashwithinthedominantcasteandheightenedprotestamongtheblackmajority.Reformsfueledwhiteanxietyandopposition;repressionfurtheralienatedAfricanopinion.OfmostconsequenceforthefutureoftheWhiteheadregimewasitsdiminishingcredibilitywithinasettlerpopulationthathadnevergivenitsleadersamandatetoopen,evenslightly,thewindowofsocialandpoliticalopportunitytoAfricans.
SeriouselectoralcompetitionamongsettlerpartieswasrareinRhodesia.TheonlyperiodinRhodesianhistorywhenawhiteoppositionpartyhadanyappreciableimpactonsecuritylegislationwasthatof1958through1962.DuringthoseyearstheUnitedFederalpartyheldaslimmajorityinParliamentandprecarioussupportamongtheelectorate.Unlikecontestsbothearlierandlater,thestrugglesoversecuritypolicyfrom1958through1962weresignificantpreciselybecausetheDominionpartypresentedaseriouschallengetothe
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UFP'sincumbency.TheDP,nottheAfricannationalists,hadthecapacitytobringtherulingpartydown.ChampionofundilutedwhitedominationandthefiercerepressionofAfricanopposition,theDPsoughttomakepoliticalcapitaloutoftheUFP's"weakness"bystirringthepotofwhitefears.AccordingtoaministerintheWhiteheadCabinet,inthefieldoflawandorder,theDominionparty"influencedtheUFPquiteabit."111
109.FormerMinisterofLabour,correspondencewithauthor,30January1984.110.Correspondencewithauthor,28May1984.111.Interview,26May1983.
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In1959PrimeMinisterWhiteheadboastedthat99percentofthewhitesand85percentoftheblackssupportedhisadministration112agrossexaggerationatthetime,andtheUFP'slegitimacyinbothquartershadallbutcollapsedby1962.
TheGovernment'snewsecuritymeasuresdidnotassuagethewhiteelectorate,disturbedbothbytheregime'sinadequateuseoftheironfistanditsexperimentwithconciliationandgradualAfricanadvancement.StaunchadvocatesofsettlersupremacyconsideredWhitehead'sreformstreasonous:forexample,planstoextendthefranchise,appointAfricanCabinetministersandincreasethenumberofAfricanMPs,removepettyapartheidrestrictions,andrepealthecornerstoneLandApportionmentAct.113InOctober1962theprimeministermadethemistakeoftellingtheUnitedNations'TrusteeshipCommitteethatAfricans"willhaveamajority[inParliament]withinfifteenyears."Althoughthepremierdidnotmeanmajorityrule,hispredictionwastoomuchforthesettlercommunitytobear.114A1958surveyrevealedthatwhitesbelievedthefranchisewasalreadytoogeneroustowardAfricans,and86.5percentopposedrepealoftheLandApportionmentAct.115
Onebarometerofwhitemorale,migrationrates,registeredthefallingconfidenceintheGovernment:in1956thecountryhadeleventhousandimmigrants;in1961,ithadtwothousandemigrants.ButtheextentofwhiteconcernwasmostclearlyevidencedintheDecember1962electionwhentheDP'sheir,thewhitesupremacistRhodesianFront(RF),wonasurprisevictoryovertheUFP.
The1962electionwasthefirstinwhichawhiterulingpartysoughttobroadenitsbasebyenlistingAfricansupport.Itfailed.Ofthe10,632registeredAfricanvoters(afractionofvoting-ageblacks),only2,577voted.116Inacontextofincreasingracialpolarization,AfricanswithheldsupportfromaGovernmentthathadarrestedtheirleaders,
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bannedthreeoftheirpoliticalparties,andattemptedtobreaktheirspirits.Theuseofthestickhadcanceledoutthedesiredeffectofthecarrot.Similarly,thewhiteelectoratewasnotpreparedtoendorseaGovernment
112.AssemblyDebates,vol.42,24March1959,col.3167.113.See"SouthernRhodesiaPolarized:FalloftheUnitedFederalParty,"RoundTable53,no.210(March1963):13766;andSamuelSpeck,"TheGapWidensinSouthernRhodesia,"AfricaReport8,no.1(January1963):1013.114.Bowman,PoliticsinRhodesia,p.35.115.RogersandFrantz,RacialThemes.116.Inelectionsfrom1962to1977,lessthan0.3percentofAfricansofvotingagewereabletovotebecauseofqualificationsonproperty,income,andeducation(AnthonyLemon,"ElectoralMachineryandVotingPatternsinRhodesia,19621977,"AfricanAffairs77[October1978]:51130).
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thatseemedreadytocapitulatetoblackpressures.Intheelection,theAfricanboycottcombinedwithashiftofwhitevoterstotheRFtodefeattheUFP.TheRhodesianFrontwon56.5percentofthetotalvoteand35seats;theUnitedFederalpartyreceived26.
Whitehead'spredecessor,GarfieldTodd,wasremovedinaCabinetrevoltin1958forhisownslightlyreformistgestures,whichhiscolleaguesconsideredaltogetherpremature.ButWhitehead'sCabinetcouldnotbringitselftodoitsownhousecleaningwhenheembarkedonamoreseriousreformprogramthananythingToddhadcontemplated.Itwasthuslefttothesettlerelectoratetopurgethisdeviatingregime.Theresultofthe1962electionwasconvincingproofthatarulingpartycouldattempttoreformthissettlerstateonlyatitsperil.AmajorityofwhiteRhodesianswassimplynotpreparedtoallowpoliticalleaderstomodernizestateinstitutionsandpromoteseriousracialconciliation.Theyear1962canthusberegardedasa"pointofnoreturn"inRhodesia,onethatsoundlyrejectedanaccommodationistsolutionandsharpenedracialpolarization.117TheRFvictorysignaledadramaticreturntothetraditionalRhodesianpattern,inwhich"powertendstogravitatetowardsthosewhoareleastreadyforchange."118
ThecomingtopoweroftheRhodesianFrontunderPremierWinstonFieldhadasalutaryeffectonsettlerunityandstatecohesion,whichhadsotroubledtheWhiteheadGovernment.InRhodesia,thetransferofpowertoanultrarightistsettlerGovernmenthelpedtoeasestrainswithinthestatewellintothe1970s.(ItdidnothavethiseffectinNorthernIreland,discussedinChapter5.)Reunified,theRhodesianstatewasbetterabletodefendthecauseofsettlerdomination,whichincreasedthewhites'confidenceinthecountry.Thebalanceofpowerwithinthestateshiftedinfavorofthehawks;moderateelitesfromtheoldregimewerepurged,converted,orignoredmuchasoccurredinSouthAfricaaftertheNationalparty'svictoryovertheUnitedpartyin
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1948.Inbothcasestheformerrulingpartylostallinfluenceonsecuritypolicy,ceasedtoofferaviablepoliticalalternative,andgraduallyfadedfromthescene.
IttooktimeforthenewregimetosubdueAfricanunrest.InAugust1963severalleadingnationalistsbrokewiththebannedZAPUtoformaneworganization,theZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion(ZANU).BetweenAugust1963andAugust1964,widespreadviolencebetween
117.Kuper,ThePity.118.Leys,EuropeanPolitics,p.36.
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ZAPUandZANUsupportersoccurredinAfricantownships.By1965thisinternecinerivalryhadabatedwithinthecountry(butcontinuedbetweentheexiledwingsofeachparty),anddomesticpoliticalviolencehaddeclined.
Inlinewiththenewregime'sbreakwithmultiracialism,itmadelittleattempttocushionrepressionthroughreforms.TheGovernmentmadefulluseoftheinheritedrepressivemachineryandintroducedamendmentstomakethelegislationevenmoresevere;italsocreatedanimportantnewsecurityagencyin1963,theCentralIntelligenceOrganization(CIO).CIObecameresponsibleforgatheringexternalintelligence(andthepoliceSpecialBranchthenfocusedondomesticmatters).TheneedforaspecialintelligenceagencywasgrowingwiththepossibilitythattheregimemightsoonunilaterallydeclareindependencefromBritain,andtheinternationalfalloutthatthismightcreate.119
UnilateralIndependence
TheCentralAfricanFederationcametoanendin1963,afteradecadeoflife.ThefederationhadbeenanattempttoshieldNorthernRhodesiaandNyasalandfromBritishinterferencebyincorporatingthemunderSouthernRhodesia'sprotectiveumbrella,butitleftopenthepossibilitythatLondonwouldunilaterallygrantindependencetotheblackmajorityinallthreeterritories.TheendofthefederationmeantthatRhodesiahadsuccessfullyshedonemorelayerofLondon'sformalauthorityoverthecolony.RegardingBritainwithsuspicionafterits"sell-out"ofKenya'ssettlers,Rhodesia'swhitesrealizedthatwithoutfullindependencefromthehomecountrytheywouldhavenoguaranteeagainstasimilarfate.AlthoughBritishofficialshadseemedratherindifferenttothecycleofunrestandrepressioninRhodesiaafter1959,thelingeringpossibilitythatthemetropolemightinterveneagainsttheinterestsofthesettlerscaused
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tremendousanxietywithinthewhitecommunity.ConsiderthiscandidcommuniquéfromPrimeMinisterFieldtoaBritishSecretaryofState:
solongasthelastremaininglinksremainandtheimpressionpersiststhattheUnitedKingdomhastherighttointerfereinourinternalaffairsthereisthedangerofaseriesofseriousincidentsofdisorder[amongblacks]beingen-
119.Author'sinterviewwithformerCIOofficial,30May1983;theFederalIntelligenceSecurityBureauoperatedintheCentralAfricanFederation,underBritishauspices.
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couragedfromoutsideinordertocompelsuchinterventionbytheBritishGovernment.120
Field'sCabinetcolleagues,however,judgedhimtooweaktogiveBritainanultimatumonindependence.HeresignedinApril1964andwassucceededbyIanSmith,anardentadvocateofunconditionalindependence.Inthe1965election,Smithreceivedhismandatetopursueindependencevigorouslyandifnecessaryillegallyandunilaterally.TheRhodesianFrontswept79.3percentofthevote(upfrom56.5percentin1962),anditsvictoryconfirmedthattheoldUFPnowtheRhodesiapartywasaspentforce.
RefusingtograntRhodesiaunconditionalindependence,theBritishGovernmentstipulatedsixpreconditions:(1)unimpededprogresstowardmajorityrule;(2)guaranteesagainstretrogressiveamendmentofthe1961constitution;(3)immediateimprovementinAfricans'politicalstatus;(4)progresstowardendingracialdiscrimination;(5)evidencethatindependencewasacceptabletotheentireRhodesianpopulation;and(6)formalprohibitionsagainstracialoppressioneitherbytheminorityorthemajority.Thesettlersrespondedtotheseconditionswithalitanyofnoes.Theyweremostpreparedtoresistthefirstprinciple:majorityrulewastothemaeuphemismfora"racialistblackdictatorship,"whichwouldbesuicidalforwhitepowerandprosperityandwoulderode"civilizedstandards"inthecountry.
TheimpassebetweenthetwogovernmentshadlastedmorethanayearwhenSmithannouncedhiscountry'sUnilateralDeclarationofIndependenceinNovember1965.BritishPrimeMinisterHaroldWilsonimmediatelydenouncedUDIasan"actofrebellionagainsttheCrown"andpredictedthattheillegalactionwouldbeshort-lived.BritishofficialstookquitesometimetorealizethatRhodesiawasnolongerwithintheirsphereofinfluenceandthattheCrown'sauthorityoverRhodesiawas,inlargemeasure,aconstitutionalfiction.The
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homecountryhadnomilitaryorcivilservicepersonnelinthecountry,onlyanimpotentgovernor;itwasinnopositiontointervenewithforce.121Whitehalleventuallyconvincedtheinternationalcommunitytoapplyeconomicsanc-
120.WinstonField,lettertoR.A.Butler,BritishSecretaryofState,29March1963,reprintedinCentralAfricanOffice,CorrespondenceBetweenHerMajesty'sGovernmentandtheGovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,Cmnd.2000(London:HMSO,April1963).121.TheuseofforceagainstRhodesiawasunpopularathome(wheretheLabourGovernmenthadabaremajorityofoneintheCommons);itwentagainstthepolicyof"consensualdecolonization,"presentedlogisticaldifficulties,wasopposedbyBritain'smilitarychiefs,andwouldhaveviolatedthe"kithandkin"tiesbetweenthetwocountries(seeRobertC.Good'sexcellentdiscussion,U.D.I.:TheInternationalPoliticsoftheRhodesianRebellion[London:FaberandFaber,1973],pp.5564).
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tionsanddiplomaticisolationtobringRhodesiatoitssenses.Whenthisfailed,Britainmadeseveralattemptsatanegotiatedsolution.Yet,asneitherpartywouldcompromiseonbasicprinciples,thediscussionscametonaught.ItbecameincreasinglyclearthattheRhodesiansettlerstatewasimmunetometropolitanleverage.
OneweekpriortoUDI,theRhodesianFrontregimedeclaredastateofemergency:ithasbeenineffecteversince.ThetimingofthedeclarationclearlyanticipatedtheconstitutionalcrisisbetweenBritainandRhodesiaandthepossibilitythatblacksmightlaunchaninsurrectionagainsttheregime.Theydidnot,butalreadyin1964ZANUandZAPUresolvedtopursueanarmedstruggleagainsttheregimefromexileinZambia.Rhodesia'ssecurityforcesswiftlycrushedtheirfirstattemptsatguerrillainfiltrationin1966,andthecampaignremainedineffectiveuntil1972.
Althoughthecountrywaspeacefulinthelater1960s,Rhodesiaretainedthestateofemergencyandusedthesecurityarsenaltoharassandsubdueblackpoliticalopponents,notsimplythosefewinvolvedincrimeandviolence.Almostalltheprincipalnationalistleadersoftheearly1960slanguishedindetention,restriction,orexileforseveralyears.122Thelackofleaders,organization,andresourcestochallengetheregimemadethisatimeofdisarrayandfrustrationinthenationalistmovement.
Thesettlerswereinadifferentmoodaltogether.TherebellionagainstBritainandresultantinternationalisolationcementedthesettlers'politicalandideologicalunity.ThewhitesstoodsolidlybehindtheGovernmentanditscommitmenttoresistsocialandpoliticalchange.Inthegeneralelectionsof1970and1977,theRhodesianFrontwon77.8percentand86.4percentofthevote.Settlersalsobroadlyacceptedtheneedforseveresecuritypowers.Inonesmall1971survey,88percentofthewhitesquestionedapprovedoftheregime's
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handlingofsecurity;only3percentdisapproved.123
Conclusion
Thepillarsofsettlerrulehadweatheredseveralstorms.BritainandtheinternationalcommunityhadfailedtoaffecttheRhodesiansituation;
122.Thenewordersfordetentionandrestrictiondeclinedsteadilyfrom650and1,670respectivelyin1964to0and14byNovember1969.123.MorrisHirsch,ADecadeofCrisis:TenYearsofRhodesianFrontRule(Salisbury:PeterDearlove,1973),p.151.
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settlersolidarityhadbeenrestored;peacefulblackoppositionhadbeenquietedandarmedstruggleseemedfutile.
Whenamaverickregimetamperedwithabsolutistsettlerrule,itsuccumbedtoabacklashconsistentwiththepredictionthatstatepowerwould''gravitatetowardsthosewho[were]leastreadyforchange."124Hard-linesettlerssawthemostmodestconcessionstothenativesasthreateningthesacredpillarsofsettlerrule.
NotallsettlercasteshavedisplayedthepoliticalintransigenceoftheRhodesians.TheArabeliteinZanzibartriedanotherstrategyinthe1950s:
topreserveitspositionbygainingtheacceptanceandpoliticalsupportoftheAfricanmajority.ThismethodwasfundamentallydifferentfromtheusualtechniqueofdominantracialminoritieswhichhaveattemptedtoretainpowerbycoercivemeanselsewhereinAfrica....TheAraboligarchyofZanzibaractivelysoughttobringabouttheintroductionofarepresentativeparliamentarysystembasedonuniversalsuffrage,andtieditspoliticalfuturetotheideaofgainingsufficient[African]electoralsupporttowinamajorityofconstituencies.125
ButZanzibar'sexperimentwithgradualnativeincorporationwasmotivatedbythesameunderlyingconcernasRhodesia'sUDI:topreemptaBritishmovetograntindependencetotheblackmajority.
WhenClaphamwrotethat"LiberiaisnotasortofblackRhodesia,"hehadinmindtheLiberianregime'seffortsduringthefinaldecadesofsettlerruletowinthecomplianceoftheindigenousAfricanpopulationthroughpartialsocialassimilationandpoliticalincorporation.126Inthelate1960sand1970sLiberiaextendedthefranchisetoAfricans,relaxedcoercivesanctions,andsetinmotiona"UnificationPolicy."127ThesegenuineeffortsataccommodationwentfurtherthananythingRhodesiacontemplated,buttheywereneverthelessdesignedtostreamline,notdissolve,settlerrule.
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Liebenownotesthat"themorethecentralbastionsofsettlerprivilegewerethreatened,thetightertherestrictionsimposeduponsignificantentryoftribalpersonsintotheupperechelons"ofthe
124.Leys,EuropeanPolitics,p.36.125.MichaelLofchie,"ThePluralSocietyofZanzibar,"inPluralisminAfrica,ed.L.KuperandM.Smith(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1971),p.309andMichaelLofchie,Zanzibar:BackgroundtoRevolution(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1965).126.ChristopherClapham,"Liberia,"inWestAfricanStates,ed.J.Dunn(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),p.122.127.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheEvolutionofPrivilege(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1969).
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stateandeconomicorder.128Atthetimeofthecoupd'étatin1980,settlersstilldominatedtheCabinet;theTrueWhigparty,undertightsettlercontrol,hadheldpowerforafullcentury;andthenativemajoritystillhadlittleinfluenceonstatepolicy.
ThatsettlerrulecametoanabruptandviolentendinZanzibarin1964andLiberiain1980illustratesthedifficultiesinherentinareformistsolutiontosettlerdomination.ContemporaryTaiwanmayprovethatincrementaldemocratizationandliberalizationisindeedanalternativetoprotractedsettlerrule.Butmostsettlerpopulationswillnotendorsethekindsofchangesthatwouldsatisfynativeinterests,justasnativesarenormallyunwillingtorestcontentwiththemodestconcessionsoffered.Unwillingtoreformthemselvesoutofpower,enlightenedmodernizingregimesoftenwalkatightropebetweenirreconcilablesettlerandnativedemands.ThisdelicatebalancingactiscurrentlyoccupyingSouthAfrica.
NorthernIrelandandRhodesiansettlersheldsteadfasttotheirpowerandprivilegeascommunaldivisionsdeepenedandinstabilitygrewinthe1960sand1970s.Inthosedecades,theymobilizedthefullforceoftheirrespectivesecuritysystemstodefendsettlersupremacy.Ultimately,therepressiveapparatusprovedunequaltothetask,asthenexttwochaptersshow.
128.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheQuestforDemocracy(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1987),p.6.
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Chapter4Rhodesia:GuerrillaWarandPoliticalSettlement,19721980Duringthe1960s,Rhodesia'sblacknationalistleadersfailedtobuildamovementcapableofchallengingsettlerrule.Thesporadicarmedincursionsthatpunctuatedthelatterhalfofthe1960salsoprovedfutile:insurgentsengagedvastlysuperiorsecurityforcesbutwerepoorlytrainedandorganized;theymadelittleefforttocreateabaseofsupportamongruralpeasantsandsufferedinfiltrationbyRhodesianintelligenceoperatives.
Thepicturechangeddramaticallyinthe1970s.By1973successfulguerrillaattackshadbeguntoshakethefoundationsofsettlerrule.Therepressivesystemthathadsmotheredblackmobilizationinthe1960swasmobilizingtodefendthesettlerstateandsocialorder.Rhodesiaexperiencedinthe1970swhatSouthAfricafearstoday:a"totalonslaught,"includinginternationalpoliticalandeconomicsanctionsandfull-scaledomesticinsurgency.Yetforseveralyearsthewhiteregimeweatheredinternationalpressuresandthecostsoftheescalatingguerrillawar.
ThischapterexaminesseveraldevelopmentsintheRhodesianstateandsocietyduringtheturbulent1970s.First,protractedunrestandarmedinsurgencyhadanempoweringeffectonthesecurityestablishment.Asthreatstothestatemounted,thesecuritysectorgrewintoaLeviathanbranch;itsagenciesweregalvanizedwithinfusionsofmaterialresources,personnel,andlegalandextralegalpowers;securityforceswererelievedofallsemblanceofaccountability.Second,themetropoleremained,untiltheendofthedecade,aspectatorwithoutleverageover
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thissettlerstatedespiteitsoccasionalattemptstobrokerapoliticalsettlement.Third,underthemosttryingcircumstances,thebesiegedwhitesettlercommunityshowedremarkablesolidarityinsupportoftheRhodesianFrontregimenotwithstandingchronicconflictswithinthestateitself.Despitetheregime'ssuccessinmaintainingsettlercohesionandkeepingthemetropoleatbay,itwasultimatelyunabletodefeattheguerrillaarmies.Bytheendofthedecade,thewar'sgrowingcostsledtheGovernmenttosearchforapoliticalsolutionthatculminatedinthetransferofpowertoapopularlyelectedblackregimein1980.
TheRhodesiancaseshowsthatallthreeconditionsforstablesettlerrulearevital.Twoconditionssettlersolidarityandthecountry'sinsulationfrommetropolitaninterferencecontinuedtobesatisfied,butthethirdeffectivecontroloverthenativepopulationcouldnotbe.Inshatteringthispillar,blackinsurgencymadethestate'sbreakdowninevitable.Yetforseveralyearstheothertwopillarsremainedsufficientlystrongtomaintainunstablesettlerrule.SettlerrulecollapsedmuchmorerapidlyinNorthernIreland(1969to1972)asaresultofthesimultaneouscrumblingofallthreepillars.
Insurgencyafter1972
Theoccasionalguerrillaincursionsofthelate1960swerelaunchedfromZambia,acrosstheZambeziRiver,whichwasflankedbyinhospitableterrain.By1972developmentsinsideMozambiquecreatedfurtheropportunitiesforRhodesia'sguerrillas.TheFrontfortheLiberationofMozambique(FRELIMO)hadforcedthePortuguesetowithdrawfromTeteprovince,whichbordersnortheasternRhodesia.FRELIMOagreedtoallowZANU'smilitarywing,ZANLA(ZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy),tooperatewithinTeteandeventuallytoopenupasecondfrontforthewarinRhodesia.InDecember1972,thefirstincursionsfromTeteresultedinthekilling
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ofwhitefarmers;bymid-1973ZANLAhadestablisheditselfinnortheasternRhodesia.
In1974thefortunesoftheZANLAguerrillasbrightened:amilitarycoupinPortugalinApril1974precipitateditscompletewithdrawalfromMozambiquein1975.Almostimmediately,guerrillasanctuariesappearedalongthevasteasternborderafrontierimpossiblefortheRhodesianstosecure.ByJanuary1976,severalthousandZANLAguerrillaswereencampedinMozambique,fromwhichtheymadeincreasinglyfrequentsortiesintoRhodesia.
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Thewarintensifieddramaticallyafter1976,asofficialstatisticsreflected.Between1972and1976,215membersofthesecurityforcesand1,917insurgentsdied;in1977alone,thecasualtieswere197securitypersonneland1,774rebels.(Officialfigurestendedtounderreportcasualtiesofthesecurityforcesandinflatethoseoftheinsurgents.)Thenumberofguerrillasoperatinginsidethecountrywasanothergaugeofthetemperatureofthewar.Theofficial(conservative)estimateof700inearly1976grewto10,000byearly1979themajorityweremembersofZANLA(thewartimeroleofZIPRA,theZimbabwePeople'sRevolutionaryArmy,wasmuchlesssubstantial).1Theexodusofwhitesisanotherindex:in1971thecountryhad9,403whiteimmigrants;in1976,7,072residentsleft,andin1978,13,709.Whiteflightaffectedthemoraleoftheremainingsettlersanddrainedscarcehumanandfinancialresourcesfromthewareffort.
Learningfromoneoftheirpreviousmistakes,therebelsattemptedtopoliticizeandconvertruralpeopletothecause.Theysolicitedtheactivesupportofvillagechiefs,headmen,andspiritmediumsalongtheeasternborder;withvillagers,theyaimedatunderminingtheauthorityoftheregimeandcapitalizingonpeasants'grievancesoverland.Butthetwingoalsofraisingconsciousnessandcultivatingpopularsupportwerehardtorealizewithoutfullyliberatedzones,whereinsurgentforcescouldoperateunabated(ashadoccurredinMozambiqueandGuinea-Bissau).2TheRhodesianwarmachinehadalongreach,andthewhitefarmingstrongholdsweredistributedthroughoutthecountryside,scatteringinsurgentoperationsandpreventingrebelsfromgainingasecurefootholdinparticularareas.
Thoughextensive,Rhodesia'smilitarycapacitieswereneverasformidableasPretoria's,anditsterrainpermittedgreaterclandestineactivitythantheSouthAfrican.TheRhodesianinsurgentsthushadopportunitiesfortheirguerrillacampaignthattheAfricanNational
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CongressofSouthAfricalacks.YetRhodesia'sinsurgentshadtwoweaknesses:theywerefragmentedintoZANLAandZIPRA,oftenantagonisticguerrilla
1.ZIPRA'sforces(whichwerelinkedtoZAPU)remainedinZambiaformuchofthewarbutfoughtmoreonthewesternfrontinthelate1970s.2.MartinGregory,"Zimbabwe1980:PoliticisationthroughArmedStruggleandElectoralMobilisation,"JournalofCommonwealthandComparativePolitics19,no.1(March1981):6394;LewisGannandThomasH.Henriksen,TheStruggleforZimbabwe(NewYork:Praeger,1981),pp.66,119;PaulL.MoorcraftandPeterMcLaughlin,Chimurenga:TheWarinRhodesia(Marshalltown,SouthAfrica:SigmaandCollins,1982),p.90;ThomasHenriksen,"People'sWarinAngola,Mozambique,andGuinea-Bissau,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies14,no.3(September1976):37799.
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armies,andhadfewlinkstourbanmovementsorundergroundcells,unliketheANC.3
Thelinchpinofasuccessfulruralinsurgencyisoftensaidtobethecultivationofciviliansupport,throughpersuasionandpoliticization.Asoneobservermaintains,civiliansupport"cannotbeobtainedatgunpoint."4Yettheuseofnakedforcetoachievecivilians'complianceisnotuncommonvarying,ofcourse,acrosstimeandplace,inseverity,andineffects.5
ThesmallbodyofliteratureontheRhodesianinsurrectiondisagreesontheextenttowhichtheguerrillaarmiesusedcoercion.Someanalystssaylittleaboutthedarksideoftheinsurgents'campaignandpresentaromanticizedviewoftheliberationforces,describingtheirsupportamongruralblacksasvoluntary,natural,andunproblematic.6Ranger,forinstance,leavestheimpressionthatZANLAcadresrathereasilycapitalizedonandintensifiedpeasants'discontentoverlossofland:thepeasants'nationalistconsciousness"washighlyconducivetomobilizationforguerrillawar."7Rarelydotheseworksaddressguerrillaviolence,anditseemstohavehadnoeffectonpeasantsupport:"Evenifparticularguerrillabandsbehavedbrutally...peasantscontinuedtobackguerrillawarinprinciple."8
Otheraccountscenteronthedifficultiesofwinningpopularsupportandtherebels'useofforcetoelicitcompliancefromuncooperativepeasants.Sitholestates,"Thecommandistnatureofmobilizationandpoliticizationunderclandestinecircumstancesgaverisetothepoliticsofintimidationandfear."9KrigerdrawsconclusionsfromfieldworkinonedistrictinZimbabwe:
3.ZANUandZAPU,thepoliticalwingsofZANLAandZIPRA,respectively,mergedin1976intothePatrioticFront,atenuousalliance.4.EqbalAhmad,"RevolutionaryWarfareandCounterinsurgency,"inNationalLiberation,ed.N.MillerandR.Aya(NewYork:FreePress,1971),
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p.159.5.TedRobertGurr,WhyMenRebel(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1970),chap.8;NathanLeitesandCharlesWolf,RebellionandAuthority:AnAnalyticEssayonInsurgentConflicts(SantaMonica:RAND,1969).6.TerenceRanger,PeasantConsciousnessandGuerrillaWarinZimbabwe(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985);DavidMartinandPhyllisJohnson,TheStruggleforZimbabwe(London:FaberandFaber,1981);JulieFrederikse,NoneButOurselves:Massesrs.MediaintheMakingofZimbabwe(Harare:ZimbabwePublishingHouse,1982).7.Ranger,PeasantConsciousness,p.24.8.TerenceRanger,"BanditsandGuerrillas:TheCaseofZimbabwe,"inBanditry,Rebellion,andSocialProtestinAfrica,ed.D.Crummey(London,1986),p.386.9.MasipulaSithole,"Zimbabwe:InSearchofaStableDemocracy,"inDemocracyinDevelopingCountries,vol.2,Africa,ed.Diamond,Linz,andLipset(Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner,1988),248.
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TheZANU-PForganizationssetupbytheguerrillasrequiredguerrillaviolenceandforcetofunction.Consequently,Irejecttheconceptofsustainedpopularsupportorvoluntarycooperationbetweenguerrillasandpeasantsorlocalelites.[The]guerrillainabilitytoestablish"liberatedzones"madeitinevitablethatmobilizationwouldrequireongoingviolence....Peasantswereunlikelytobeenthusiasticsupportersoveranextendedperiod.10
Thisstarkcoercionthesissimplyinvertsthatofpersuasion.Drawingontheempiricalfindingsfrombothapproaches,wemayconcludethatneithercoercionnorpersuasionwas"inevitable"inmobilizingpeasants'cooperationinspecificinstancesortheirsustainedsupportforarmedstruggle.Thereisnologicalreasonwhytheabsenceofliberatedzonesmadeviolencenecessary;itsimplymadetheinsurgents'taskofcultivatingpeasants'supportmorechallenging.Likewise,thereisnologicalreasonwhypeasants'supportfortheguerrillacauseshouldbeautomatic;ithadtobewonandmaintained.Amorebalancedaccountseemsappropriate.
Atfirst,Rhodesia'sguerrillasattemptedtogainthepoliticalsympathiesofruralcivilians.Whenthisfailed,they,likerebelselsewhere,werenotaversetometingoutroughjustice.ForvillagerssuspectedofsellingouttotheRhodesianauthoritiesorthosewhorefusedaidtoguerrillaunitsfromfearofreprisalbythesecurityforces,insurgentsresortedtointimidationandviolence(threats,beating,rape,mutilation,andkilling).Inshort,asinotherruralinsurgencies,theguerrillasusedavarietyoftacticstogainvillagers'cooperation,andthebalancebetweencoercionandpersuasionvariedovertimeandplace.
Counterinsurgencyafter1972
Intheearly1970sRhodesia'sintelligenceservicegrewincreasinglyconcernedaboutguerrillaadvancesinneighboringMozambiqueand
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alertedtheCabinettothedireconsequencesofaPortuguesedefeatnextdoor.AtopofficialattheCIOlamentedthatthesewarningswentunheeded:
ThePortugueseexperienceinGuinea,Angola,andMozambiquewasverycloselystudiedandIbelievealltheappropriatelessonswerepassedtoCabinetwhosememberssufferedfroma"Portugueseblindspot,"whichtooknearlyeightyearstoclearupandwasthentoolateforclearvision.Why?IsupposebecauseIanSmith'sGovernmentwasgettingamuchmoreencourag-
10.NormaKriger,"TheZimbabweanWarofLiberation:StruggleswithintheStruggle,"JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies14,no.2(January1988):306,313.
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ingaccountoutofitsemissariestoLisbonandelsewhere,andthereweretoomanypoliticiansinsideRhodesia...whobelievedthatjustasthePortuguesehadbeeninAfricaforfourcenturies,sowoulditcontinue.Inconsequence,CIOwarningsonthissubjectprobablycutlessicethanonanyother.11
InthefallofMozambiqueandAngolain19741975somewhiteRhodesianssawhandwritingonthewallandbelievedtheGovernmentshouldstrikeapoliticaldealwiththeblackmajoritywhilewhiteswerestillahead.PrimeMinisterIanSmithwaspreparedtodonothingofthesort.Herevealedhisviewinabroadcasttothenationin1976:
WeshallbeurgedbysomepeopletoheedthelessonsofMozambiqueandAngolaandtosurrendernowinordertoavoidchaosandstrife...IsaytothesepeoplethatifweweretosurrenderthereinsofGovernmentnothingwouldbemorecertainthantheinevitabilityofcivilwarbetweenblacksandwhitesinRhodesia....Thefundamentaldifference[betweenRhodesiaandthePortuguesecolonies]isthatinRhodesiathereisnometropolitangovernmenttosurrenderonourbehalf.Wemadecertainofthatwhenweassumedourindependencetenyearsago.12
Inadditiontoitsautonomyfromthemetropole,Rhodesiahadmilitaryforcesfarsuperiortotheinsurgents'.Theregimehadaboutfortyfivethousandsecurityforces,ofwhichitcouldfieldtwenty-fivethousandatanytimewithoutseriouslydisruptingtheeconomyandadministration.13Thesecuritysystemreceivedincreasinglygenerousallocations,anindexofboththeintensificationoftheconflictandthesteadyascendancyofthesecurityapparatuswithinthesettlerstate.From19711972to19761977thebudgetfortheMinistryofInternalAffairs(previouslytheDepartmentofNativeAffairs)skyrocketedfrom(Rhodesian)R$9.7milliontoR$42million;thatfortheMinistryofLawandOrder(includingpolice)jumpedfromR$17.5milliontoR$50million;andexpenditurefortheMinistryofDefensegrewfromR$20milliontoR$98.7million.14In1976,defenseexpenditure
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consumed25percentofthetotalbudget;by1979,itwas47percent.VitaltotheRhodesianwareconomyweremassiveinfusionsofSouthAfricanaid,which
11.Correspondencewithauthor,2May1984.12.Transcriptofbroadcast,DepartmentofInformationpressstatement,Salisbury,6February1976.13.GannandHenriksen,Struggle,p.65.TheRhodesiansecurityforceswerenothinwhiteline;blackswere40percentofthe15,000armypersonneland60percentoftheBSAP;theyalsoworkedintheDepartmentofInternalAffairs.Fewblacksdesertedorweredisloyaltothewhiteregime;they(liketheirSouthAfricancounterparts)enlistedprimarilyforeconomicreasons.14.GovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,EstimatesofExpenditure(Salisbury:GovernmentPrinter,19711972and19761977).
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accountedforroughly50percentofRhodesia'sdefensecostsafter1976.15
Asthewargrewmoreregionalized,Rhodesiaresortedtofrequentcross-borderairstrikesagainstenemytargetsandagainsttheinfrastructuresofMozambiqueandZambiaaswell.Roads,bridges,communicationDines,anddevelopmentprojectswerepulverized,costingthehostnationsdearly.Rhodesiaalsoengagedincovertactioninothercountries,includingassassinationofnationalistleadersinZambia,Mozambique,andBotswana.16
Cross-borderattacksoccurredinpartbecausewhitecitizensandmilitaryofficerspressedforexternaloperations.Suchattacksalsodemonstratedtheregime'srefusaltorecognizethattheconflicthaddomesticroots,justaspoliticalelitesinthe1960sdeniedthatAfricannationalismhadinternalsources.Thestandardofficialline,thatblackdiscontentandpoliticalviolencewerecausedbyoutside"agitators,"wasconsistentwiththepolicyofcross-bordermilitarystrikesandalsoexplainedtheregime'sreluctancetoconsiderdomesticreforms.Privately,someelitesincludingRhodesia'sintelligenceservicescontestedofficialdogma,tonoavail.AseniorCIOofficerdescribedthesituation:
ThemilitaryincreaseditsexternalraidsintoMozambique.ButtheCIObelieved...wemustwinthewarinsidethecountry....Counterinsurgencywas80percentpoliticaland20percentmilitary.ButforthatyouneedagovernmentthatwillactpoliticallyandourGovernmentgotbeyondthis.17
Preferringamilitaryvictory,theRhodesianFrontGovernmentsteadfastlyrefusedtoattendtothepoliticalcausesofthewar:
Themilitary,supportedbythepoliticians,believedmoreandmorethattheanti-terroristwarcouldbewonbystrikingatterroristbasesasfaroutsidethecountryaspossible;andCIO/Policebelievedthatthewarwouldbelost
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unlesswecouldstoprecruitingwithinthecountry,andtowardstheendbeingabletoprovethatwewerenotwinningif1,000"terrorists"(mostlyuntrainedrecruits)werekilledeachmonthbeyondourborders,whentherecruitingratewas2,0003,000amonth,andeachmonththereweremorearmedterroristswithinthecountry.Butwehadtoconcedetheimpossibilityofconvincingpoliticians,andsomeothers,thatrecruitingwasproceedingattheratede-
15.AnthonyR.Wilkinson,"TheImpactoftheWar,"JournalofCommonwealthandComparativePolitics18,no.1(March1980):115;MartinGregory,"Rhodesia:FromLusakatoLancasterHouse,"TheWorldToday36,no.1(January1980):1718.Duringthe1970sSouthAfricabecameincreasinglyadefactometropole,givingRhodesiacriticalmaterialsupportand,towardtheend,puttingdecisivepoliticalpressureontheSmithregime.16.RonReidDaly,SelousScouts:TopSecretWar(Alberton,SouthAfrica:Galago,1982).17.Interviewwithauthor,30May1983.
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scribed,becausethissignifiedthattheirpoliticalpolicieshadfailedwhen,ofcourse,theyhad.18
Severalobservershavecommentedonthe"ingenuity,""flexibility,"''efficiency,"and"tacticalbrilliance"oftheRhodesiansecurityforces;19othershavenotedtheirsuccessinproducingguerrillacasualtieswhilekeepingmilitarycasualties"low."20Evansclaimsthat"whiletheRhodesiansecurityforceshadwoneverybattle,theRhodesianpoliticianshadlostthewar."21Thisclaimneglectsthemilitary'sownroleinunderminingthewareffort.Althoughtheofficiallinewasthatwinningblackheartsandmindswasabsolutelyvitaltooverallsuccess,militarypracticesroutinelycontradictedthatobjective;lower-levelcommandersandsoldierspreferredinsurgentcasualtiestociviliansupport.22Andsomeelitescandidlyadmittedthatahearts-and-mindsapproachwaseventuallyforsaken.23TheMinistryofInternalAffairsinsistedthatblacksweretooprimitivetoappreciatesuchappealsandonly"respectedforce."Inpractice,therefore,amilitarysolutionremainedthehallmarkofRhodesia'scounterinsurgencystrategythroughoutthewar.24
Ifthiswasthefavoredapproach,therewerethoseinsidetheexecutivewhoappealedforsensitivitytoAfricans'heartsandminds.Someseniormilitaryofficersfavoredthisstrategy,asdidcertainintelligenceeliteswhoarguedforapolicytoaddressblackgrievances,minimizeruthlessandcounterproductivemilitarypractices,andbeginpoliticalnegotiationswithblackleaders.AccordingtoonerankingSpecialBranchofficer,thebranchwas"advocatingdialoguewiththenationalists,versusa
18.CIOofficer,correspondencewithauthor,2May1984.KenFlowersupportsandelaboratesthesepoints(ServingSecretly:AnIntelligenceChiefonRecord,RhodesiaintoZimbabwe:1964to1981[London:JohnMurray,1987]).Recruits(someabductedorpress-ganged),camefromRhodesianvillages,fromurbanareaswithhighAfricanunemployment
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(exacerbatedbytheworldrecessionof19731974),andfromrefugeecampsinZambiaandMozambique.19.JamesBruton,"CounterinsurgencyinRhodesia,"MilitaryReview59,no.3(March1979):2739;MikeEvans,FightingAgainstChimurenga:AnAnalysisofCounterinsurgencyinRhodesia(Salisbury:HistoricalAssociationofZimbabwe,1981).20.GannandHenriksen,Struggle,p.66.21.Evans,Fighting,p.24.22.J.K.Cilliers,Counter-lnsurgencyinRhodesia(London:CroomHelm,1985),pp.146,148.23.MinisterofCombinedOperations,AssemblyDebates,vol.98,11August1978,col.1724.Bythetimemartiallawwasinstituted,anothernoted,"heartsandmindshadlessadherenceinCabinet"(formerofficialinMinistryofLawandOrder,interviewwithauthor,3June1983).24.IanBeckett,"TheRhodesianArmy:CounterInsurgency19721979,"inArmedForcesandCounterInsurgency,ed.I.BeckettandJ.Pimlott(NewYork:St.Martins,1985);J.K.Cilliers,CounterInsurgencyinRhodesia(London:CroomHelm,1985).
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purelymilitaryapproach,asfarbackas1963."25SensitizedtothelessonsoffailedcounterinsurgencyeffortsinMozambique,Angola,andelsewhere,theCIOconsistentlypressedforapoliticalsettlementinitsreportstoCabinet.Theintelligencedirectorinsistedthatbythemid1970sRhodesiawasneitherwinningthewarnorcontainingthethreat,andthatthesecuritysituationwasincreasinglydesperate.TheQuarterlyThreatAssessmentofJuly1977isacaseinpoint:
Nosuccessfulresultcanbeattainedbypurelymilitarymeans.Itisnowmorevitalthanevertoarriveatanearlypoliticalsettlementbeforethepointofnoreturnbeyondwhichitwillbeimpossibletoachieveanyviablepoliticalormilitary/politicalsolution.26
By1978theCIOheldthatRhodesiahadreachedthepointofnoreturn.Butitsadvicehadlittleimpactonarulingpartydeterminedatanycosttomaintainitsgriponstatepower,andwhosewhiteconstituencyadamantlyopposedblackmajorityrule.
TheRhodesianstatedidnotrelyoncoercionalonetopreservesettlerdomination.Itwagedamultifacetedpropagandawarwithpamphlets,films,newspaperstories,andposters,directedatbothwhitesandblacks.27Myanalysisofasampleofthismaterialshowedthatitsmessagesconcentratedontheatrocitiescommittedbytherebels(includingthekillingofmissionariesandthemutilatingofpeasants),thespecterofcommunism,andtheinevitable"degeneration"ofindependentblackAfricannationsallofwhichstoodasanobjectlessoninstarkcontrasttotheachievementsofwhiteruleandthesecurityforces'glorifieddefenseofthestateagainsttheenemiesofWesternChristiancivilizationinsouthernAfrica.
Theregime'spropagandaandcensorshippaidhighdividendsamongthewhiteelectorateinasmuchastheysystematicallydistortedthepoliticalrootsoftheconflictanddeprivedwhitesofinformationonatrocitiesbythemilitary.Exploitingwhites'anxietiesandresonating
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withtheirsupremacistorientation,officialthoughtcontrolreinforcedsettlercohesion,minimizedprotestbywhitecivicinstitutions,andpreventedthegrowthofaprogressivewhitealternativetotheincumbentregime.
Thepropagandamachineregisteredmuchlesssuccesswithintheblackpopulation,asofficialsinvolvedlateradmitted.28Grosslyoutoftouchwithpeasants'concerns,thepropagandadisseminatedbyPsycho-
25.Interviewwithauthor,24June1983.26.QuarterlyThreatAssessment,reproducedinFlower,ServingSecretly,p.310.27.Frederikse,NoneButOurselves.28.Ibid.
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logicalOperationsunitsmadelightofthegrievancesoftheblackcommunityandoftencontradictedtheirexperiences;itprofferedacrudecaricatureoftheguerrillasandabenevolentpictureofthesecurityforcesthatmilitarybrutalityroutinelyundermined.AtypicalarticleappearedintheGovernmentInformationServicespaper,theAfricanTimes,afteranearlyrebelattack:"Letusthankthespiritsofourancestorswhowatchoverusthatagood,strongRhodesianGovernmentmadesurethatsuchbloated,cruel,andgreedyliarsnevercametopower,andneverwill."29SuchexhortationdidnothingtoshoreupthelegitimacyofwhiteruleamongthemajorityofblackRhodesians.Oneclassifiedarmyassessmentrevealedthatinsomeruralareas"thecivilianpopulationistotallyalienatedagainsttheGovernment."30
Giventheabidinginterestoftheregimeinpreservingminorityruleandwhites'controlofthebestagriculturalland,itisquestionablewhetheranyhearts-and-mindsprogramcouldhaveregisteredsuccess.Thepropagandafailedtotakeblackgrievancesseriously,drivenasitwasbytheofficialinsistencethatgenuinegrievancesdidnotexistbutwereinsteadmanufacturedbyoutsideagitators.Blacks'discontentoverunequallanddistribution,racialdiscrimination,thelackofopportunitiesforeconomicadvancement,andundilutedsettlerrulewasnotacceptedasgenuine.Insteadwhitestookprideintheracialharmonyprevailinginthecountry.AsIanSmithtoldme,"WehadthehappiestblacksintheworldhereinRhodesia,whichwasbasedonthefactthatweweren'taUKcolony.Thiswasourhome,andwewereconcernedtoensuregoodracerelations."Blackswhoparticipatedintheliberationwarweredupedby"CommunistRussianexploitationofgrievances;ithadnothingtodowithracerelations."31
Onlyinthelate1970sdidtheregimebegintodilutesettlerrulebyincorporatingmoderateAfricansintothestateandbyremovingsomeformsof"unnecessarydiscrimination."Yet,likethePretoriaregime
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today,itfailedtowinpopularapprovalthroughitsbelatedreformistefforts.Theywerewidelyperceivedastoolittleandtoolate;andtheconcernwithreformswasaltogethersecondarytorepression.Tellingly,theMinisterofInformation,whowasresponsibleforoverseeingpropaganda,statedafterthewar,"Iwantedtostepuptheuseofthebayonet.That'sthemosteffectivepropagandathebayonet."32Theregimewas
29.AfricanTimes(Salisbury),30November1966.30.QuotedinCilliers,Counter-Insurgency,p.99.31.Interviewwithauthor,29June1983.32.QuotedinFrederikse,NoneButOurselves,p.126.
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obsessedwith"killrates,"anditsideologicalcampaigndidlittletobuildpeasantsupportforcounterinsurgency.Force,toquoteGramsci,was"predominatingexcessivelyoverconsent,"andthisimbalancesentlegionsofblacksovertotheguerrillaside.33
InnovationsinRepression
Therelianceonmilitaryrepressionandneglectofcivilians'heartsandmindswasmostpronouncedintheeasterncountryside,theprincipaltheaterofthewar.Bothsidesjudgedthatcontrolovertheruralpopulationwasvitaland,asusualinaguerrillawar,thecivilianssufferedmost.Torture,beatings,massarrest,rape,andexecutionwerecommonplaceinthewarzone.Stateelitesrepeatedlyjustifiedharshnessinextinguishingruralsupportfortheinsurgentsandpersuadingvillagerstoassistthesecurityforces;civilianneutralitywasunacceptable:"ItisnogoodforpeopletoclosetheireyesandsaytothemselvesthisisbetweentheterroristsandtheGovernment."34Oneministerwentastepfurther:"Whensomebodydeliberatelyrefrainsfromreportingterrorists,orindeedassistsaterroristinanyway,thenheorsheisinfactaterrorist."35
Thelegalpowersavailabletosecurityagenciesgrewdramaticallyduringthewar.TheLawandOrder(Maintenance)Actwasamendedin1973toprovidethepenaltyofdeathforaidingguerrillasorfailingtoreporttheirpresence,forundergoing,recruiting,orencouragingotherstoundergoguerrillatraining,andforactsof"terrorismorsabotage.""Assisting"or"failingtoreport"rebelunitsbecameacrimeonaparwithguerrillaactivityitself;incourtcases,intimidationandfearofreprisalswereflatlyrejectedasextenuatingcircumstances.36InApril1975,theGovernmentissuedanedictthatexecutionsforsuchoffenseswouldbecarriedoutinsecret,andthatrelativeswouldbeinformedonlyiftheyinquiredafterthefact.
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RegulationsissuedundertheEmergencyPowersActinJanuary1973empoweredprovincialcommissionerstoimposecollectivefines(ofcash,livestock,property)uponentirevillagessuspectedofassistingguerrillas;
33.AntonioGramsci,SelectionsfromthePrisonNotebooks(NewYork:International,1971),p.80n.34.MinisterofLawandOrder,RhodesiaHerald(Salisbury),28July1973.35.MinisterofCombinedOperations,AssemblyDebates,vol.98,11August1978,col.1720.36.SeeGeoffFeltoe,"HeartsandMinds:APolicyofCounter-Intimidation,"RhodesianLawJournal16(April1976):4763.
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thevillagersinquestionhadnobenefitoftrialorappeal.Collectivefines(usuallytheseizureofpreciouscattle)weredestinedtopunishinnocentpeople,astheMinisterofInternalAffairsstated:"Theimpositionofcollectivefinesmustnecessarilyinvolvepeoplewhomight...beinnocent,but...theyarealllivinginacommunalsocietyandmustbeartheresponsibilityforthelackofco-operationinthe[counter-]terroristexercise."37OfficialsclaimedthatcollectivepunishmentwasconsistentwithAfricantradition,whichdeemphasizedindividualculpability.OneSecretaryofInternalAffairsrefutedthisview:"IsaidIdisagreedwithcollectivefinestotally,sincetheywouldpunishtheinnocent....ItwasafallaciousargumentthatcollectivepunishmentwasrootedinAfricantradition."38InFebruary1974,newemergencyregulationsgavelocalofficialsauthoritytoconfiscateordestroycrops,stock,andpropertyofpossibleusetoguerrillas;tocompelresidentsofanareatobuildandmaintainbridges,roads,dams,andfences;andtoresettlevillagersenmasseinto"protectedvillages"(PVs).
Bytheendofthewar,oversevenhundredthousandpeasantshadbeenforciblyuprootedandrelocatedintoseveralhundredPVs.ARhodesianArmyidea,PVsweredesignedtodriveawedgebetweenpeasantsandinsurgents,thusisolatingthelatterfromtheirsupportivesocialbaseinthecountryside.Agovernmentalnewspaperattemptedtoconvinceblacksthatprotectedvillageswere"havensofpeace,wherework,study,andplaycanbecarriedoninanatmosphereoftranquilityandorder."39YetmostPVsevidencedmiserablelivingconditionsandtyrannicalcontrolbymembersoftheGuardForce.Notsurprisingly,villagerscametolookontheguerrillasastheirliberatorsfromtheseprisoncamps.40AninternalreportbytheCatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeacefoundthatconditionsinthePVsproduced"agreatintensificationofpoliticalawareness"and"resistance"amongtheaffectedvillagers.41Inadditiontodeepening
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popularalienationfromthestate,theresettlementprogramfailedtostemthetideofinsurgency,muchasthealdeamentoresettlementprogramsfailedinAngolaandMozambique.42Sometop
37.AssemblyDebates,vol.83,30March1973,col.1173.38.Interviewwithauthor,7June1983.39.AfricanTimes,9August1978.40.A.K.H.Weinrich,"StrategicResettlementinRhodesia,"JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies3,no.2(April1977):221.41.CatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeace,"ReportonChiwesheT.T.L."[TribalTrustLand],Salisbury,26August1974,p.14.42.GeraldBender,"TheLimitsofCounterinsurgency:AnAfricanCase,"ComparativePolitics4,no.3(April1972):33160;BrendanJundanian,"ResettlementPrograms:CounterinsurgencyinMozambique,"ComparativePolitics6,no.4(July1974):540.
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officialsatCIOandInternalAffairshadbeenopposedtoPVsbecauseoftheexpectedcounterproductiveimpact.OneSecretaryofInternalAffairsexplainedafterthewar,"PVsweredefinitelyforcedonInternalAffairs.TheArmyhadastonewallcaseforthis(Malaya)andInternalAffairscouldn'trefutethemilitary'sarguments."43Rhodesia,unlikeMalaya,nevercoupleditsprogramwithaseriousefforttowinpopularsupportfromresettledvillagersoraddressedtheirsocioeconomicneeds.
Inaddition,curfewswereimposed,minefieldscreated,and"free-fire"or"nogo"areasdeclaredalongtheborderwithMozambiqueinanattempttoforgeacordonsanitaireinareasvulnerabletoinsurgentpenetration.Anypersonviolatingcurfewsorcaughtinside"nogo"zoneswasfairgametothesecurityforces.Whenquestionedabouttheshootingofcurfewviolators,theMinisterofDefense,P.K.vanderByl,replied,"AsfarasIamconcerned,themorecurfewbreakersthatareshotthebetter,andthesooneritisrealizedeverywherethebetter."44BetweenDecember1972and31July1978,officialfigureslisted322Africancurfewviolatorskilledbysecurityforces.Thecurfewsandthecordonfailed,however,topreventinfiltration.
Anadditional263Africandeadwereofficiallylistedaspersons"caughtinthecrossfire,"andanother645deadwerelabeled"collaborators"withtheguerrillas.45AccordingtotheformerCIOdirector,thesecategorieswerefrequentlyusedtocoveruptheextralegalmurderofvillagers.46Generally,theauthoritiestookacallousstancetowardciviliancasualties,whichtheyconsidered"anormaloperationalhazard."47Theuseoflethalforceagainstcivilianswasonemeanswherebytheregimebelieveditcouldstrikefearintotheruralpopulationandthusdenysuccortoinsurgents.AstheauthoritiesandwhitecivilianscontinuallyinsistednotonlyinRhodesiabutthroughoutcolonialAfrica"Africansrespectforce."Onerankingsecurityofficialnotedthat''Africansrespondedtothethreat
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ofviolence;itwaseitherusortheterrorists'threats."48
Asthetemperatureofthewarrose,thebeleagueredregimefounditincreasinglyimportanttoremovealllegalstricturesonthesecurityforces'operations.Prosecutionofmembersofthesecurityforcesforabusesmightbeembarrassingtothegovernmentanddemoralizingfor
43.Interview,7June1983;Flower,ServingSecretly,pp.12223.44.AssemblyDebates,vol.90,31July1975,col.1706.45.DepartmentofInformation,TerroristCasualties,Salisbury,1August1978.46.Flower,ServingSecretly,p.205.47.MinistryofDefensespokesman,RhodesiaHerald,15June1974.48.Author'sinterviewwithformerMinistryofLawandOrderofficial,3June1983.
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securitypersonnel.UsinglanguageidenticaltoSouthAfrica'sDefenseAct,Rhodesia's1975IndemnityandCompensationActexoneratedthesecurityforcesforactsdone"ingoodfaithforthesuppressionofterrorism""Terrorism"and"goodfaith"wereelasticconditions,whosesatisfactiontheministerdeterminedcasebycase.49Inpractice,theactpermittedcarteblanche.Wantonkilling,burningofhutsandfields,beating,collectivepunishment,anddestructionoflivestockbecamecommonplaceasthewarescalated.Policeandsoldiersroutinelyusedtorture,includingelectricshockandimmersioninwater.
Onthoserelativelyrareoccasionswhenthebehaviorofthesecurityforceswascriticizedinpublic,theauthoritiespromptlyattemptedtodiscredittheaccusers.TypicalwasthecaseofablackMPwhopresentedamotionintheAssemblyinMarch1974,requestingacommissionofinquiryintoallegedincidentsofbeating,propertydestruction,andkillingbythemilitary.AnoutragedMinisterofLawandOrdercastigatedtheMPforhisinsidiousattempttospread"alarmanddespondency"(whichwasacrimeunderthesecuritylaw)andnotedthatitwaspartofthe"communistcode"to"derogatetheforcesoflawandorder."Hedemandedthattheauthorofthemotionapologizeforinsultingtheintegrityofthesecurityforces.50TheMinisterofDefensedescribedsuchcriticismas"vulgarandobscene,'an"abuseoftheprivileges"ofParliament,andaddedthatthearmycommanderwould''shudder"tothinkofaninquiryintomilitaryabuses.51Giventheincidenceofmilitarybrutality,onecanunderstandwhyarmychiefsmightshudderifatrocitieswerebroughttolight.
Oneorganizationattemptedtodojustthat.Beginningin1973,theCatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeacemadeaseriesoffruitlessrepresentationstotheprimeminister,theMinisterofLawandOrder,andtheMinisterofInternalAffairsoverthesecurityforces'brutality.
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WhenitcalledforanimpartialinquiryinApril1974,itwaspilloriedandaccusedoftryingtoadvancetheguerrillacauseandofprovokingaconfrontationbetweenchurchandstate.52Inthenextfewyearsthecommissionpublishedaseriesofreportsdocumentingstaterepression,including"deliberateuseofillegalandinhumane"interrogationprocedures,"grossdisregardforthelifeandproperty"ofruralAfricans,
49.SeeGeoffFeltoe,"LegalizingIllegalities"RhodesianLawJournal15,no.2(October1975):16776.50.AssemblyDebates,vol.86,27March1974,cols.36771.51.Ibid.,cols.44853.52.IanLinden,TheCatholicChurchandtheStruggleforZimbabwe(London:Longman,1980).
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andassaults"whichnoappealtomilitaryurgencyornationalinterestcouldjustify"53Denouncedfor"spreadingalarmanddespondency,"eachcommissionreportwaspromptlybannedbytheauthorities.
Asatrocitiesbythesecurityforcesmounted,theCatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeacesteppedupitsprotests.Itspublicoppositiononlymadetheauthoritiesmorebelligerentandrecalcitrant.Thecommission'sofficeswerebuggedandperiodicallyraided;someofitsleadersweredetainedordeported.TheMinisterofLawandOrderlabeledthecommissiona"subversiveorganization,"butneverbanneditassuch.54TheRhodesianFront'sidentificationofdissentwithtreacherywasconsistentwiththeapproachofpreviousrulingpartiesand,asChapter6shows,remainsintegraltothepoliticalcultureofindependentZimbabwe.
Forallitseffortstoneutralizepoliticaldissentandchecktheadvanceoftheguerrillaforces,theregimewasoperatingundergrowingduressby1978.Thearsenalofmilitaryfirepowerandlegalrepressionwasprovinginadequate.Foryears,sectionsofthewhitecommunityhadseenmartiallawasapanacea,yettheGovernmentandthesecuritychiefswerenoteagertodeclareit.Thepolicebelieveditwouldstrengthenthemilitaryattheexpenseofthepolice.55Themilitaryalreadyenjoyedcarteblancheinthewarzoneanddidnotrelishtheaddedcivilresponsibilitiesofmartiallaw,whichincludedadministeringmartialcourts.TheCabinetalsowasreluctanttointroducemartiallaw,sinceitwouldconcedethatRhodesiawasindirestraitsandmightboostthemoraleoftheenemy.
Why,then,wasmartiallawannouncedinSeptember1978?TheRhodesianFront'sfrustrationwiththedeterioratingsecuritysituationinteractedwiththewhitecommunity'sgrowingoutcrytomakemoredrasticmeasuresseemattractive.AseniorofficialatCIOunderscoredthesefactors:
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Theimplementationofmartiallawwasopposedconsistentlybyallcommanders.Noonebelievedthiswasnecessary,sincetheemergencylegislationwasallpowerful.Butmartiallawsuitedthepoliticians,tomakethemappeardeterminedtopeople.Martiallawwasn'tgoingtoachievetheobjectiveofwinningthewar,buthowcanyouexplainthistoapublicthatdoesn'tunderstand?56
53.CatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeace,TheManintheMiddle:Torture,ResettlementandEviction(Salisbury:CCJP,1975),pp.3,16;CatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeace,CivilWarinRhodesia(London:CatholicInstituteforInternationalRelations,1976).54.AssemblyDebates,vol.97,5October1977,col.686.55.Author'sinterviewwithformerMinistryofLawandOrderofficial,6May1983.56.Interviewwithauthor,30May1983.
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AformerMinisterofLawandOrderhighlightedtheconcernsofthebesiegedwhitefarmingcommunity:
Martiallawwasamorale-boostingmove.Themilitary[chiefs]constantlysaid,"Wedon'tneedmartiallawbecausewehaveenoughpowers."...Ateverysinglemeetingwithfarmerswhichwewenttoandtheywerefrequentthefarmersstronglywantedmartiallawintroduced,andtheydidn'tlikethemilitary'sexcusesfornotinvokingit.Farmersthoughtwewerepussy-footingaround.Itwasreallythatpressurefromfarmerswhichledtoit....Thecourtsweren'treallyinterferingwiththesecurityforcespriortomartiallaw,buttheaveragesoldierfeltinhibitedbythepossibilityofcourtscrutiny.Somartiallawdidallowthesecurityforcestoactmorefreelywithoutanyinterference.57
Martiallawormartiallicenserelievedthesecurityforcesofallsemblanceofaccountability.Butitsneteffectcoupledwiththeprotectedvillages,thesummaryshootingofcurfewbreakers,collectivefines,indemnificationofsecuritypersonnel,andthe"free-fire"practicein"nogo"areaswascounterproductiveinthelongterm.Thesemeasuresweredestinedtodeepenthegulfbetweenpeasantsandthestateandwidenthestreamofrecruitsenlistingwiththeinsurgents.
SettlerSolidarityandMilitaryAscendancy
Anessentialconditionforstablesettlerruleisthecohesionofthesettlercommunity.Between1963and1978,theRhodesianFrontGovernmentenjoyedever-growingsupportamongthewhiteelectorate.Itwon77.8percentofthevoteinthe1970electionand86.4percentin1977.PoliticalpartiestotheleftoftheRFremainedmarginalandofferedthesettiersnorealpoliticalalternative.Thefewpocketsofwhiteliberalismthatexistedintheearly1960s(thepress,legalandacademiccommunities,moderatepoliticalparties)grewsilentduringthe1970s.58Onlychurchleadersconsistentlyfought
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draconiansecuritymeasuresandpublicizedmilitaryatrocities;theirprotestsgrewasthewarproceededbuthadnoappreciableimpactonsecuritypolicy.
Theregime'sfailuretowinthewargeneratedpressurefromthefarrightfortheuseofgreaterforceagainstthecountry'sfoes.AsincontemporarySouthAfrica,hard-linewhitesinRhodesia(e.g.,theRhodesianActionparty,whitecommercialfarmers)foughtwhattheyper-
57.Interviewwithauthor,6May1983.58.SeeIanHancock,WhiteLiberals,Moderates,andRadicalsinRhodesia,19531980(NewYork:St.Martins,1984).
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ceivedas"wateringdown"ofRhodesianFrontprinciples(thoseofundilutedwhitepoliticalpowerandrigidsegregation)and"pussy-footing"inthewareffort,evendemandingthatthegovernmentresignandtransferpowertothemilitary.Theminorityonthefarright,however,wasinnopositiontoreplaythe1962electoralcoup.Althoughincreasinglyconcernedoverthedeterioratingsecuritysituation,thewhiteelectoratedidnotdeserttheRF.The"relativelymonolithiccharacterofwhiteRhodesia"thuscontrastswiththeSouthAfricanscene,wherethesettlersareconsiderablymorefragmentedandwherepartiesonthefarrighthavediminishedtheelectoralbaseoftherulingNationalparty.59
TheRF'ssteadfastwhitesupportwaslargelyafunctionofthe"laagereffect"ofprotractedthreats(economicsanctions,guerrillaattacks,diplomaticisolation)onthesmallwhitecommunity.GeorgSimmelobservedthatitisrathercommonforgroupsolidaritytoincreaseinthefaceofexternalattacks,butitisnotinevitable.60WhereasinRhodesiainthe1970sthegrowingthreatsunifiedthedominantcaste,inUlster(seeChapter5)theincreasingdisorderof1969to1972irreparablyfracturedthesettlerblocandledBritaintoterminatesettlerrule.
ContemporarySouthAfrica,likeIsrael,presentsadifferentpattern:SouthAfricaisfreeofmetropolitaninterferencebuttroubledbydeepeningcleavagesbetweenEnglishandAfrikanersettlersand,ofgreaterpoliticalsignificance,withinAfrikanerranks.The"laager"modelthereforeappliesbettertoRhodesiathantoSouthAfrica.NotonlyisSouthAfrica'ssettlercommunitysplitethnicallyandpolitically,butcivilsocietyalsoprovidessignificantdebateanddissent.Despitegovernmentalrestrictions,democraticoppositionfromthechurches,tradeunions,universities,voluntaryassociations,andthemediaisstrongerandmoresustainedthaniteverwasinRhodesia(althoughithasasyetexertedlittleleverageonthePretoria
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regime).Reflectingboththeimpressivesolidarityofwhitesandthedisorganizationofurbanblacks,Rhodesia'scivicinstitutionsremainedratherdormantthroughoutthe1970s.
SettlersolidarityandautonomyfromthemetropolefacilitatedthesteadyfortificationoftheRhodesiansecurityapparatus.UnlikeothersettlerpopulationscontainingsizablefactionsatoddswiththeregimeinUlster,SouthAfrica,andIsraelRhodesiansettlerssawlittledisjunctionduringthewarbetweentheirownpoliticalandsecurityinterests
59.KennethGood,"SettlerColonialisminRhodesia,"AfricanAffairs73(January1974):22.60.GeorgSimmel,ConflictandtheWebofGroup-Affiliations(Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1955).
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andthoseoftheGovernment.61Moreover,independentofthemetropole,theRhodesianFrontregimecouldignoreBritishcallsforreformsandapoliticalsettlement.Duringthecrisisof1969to1972inNorthernIreland,Britainclashedwiththesettlerregimeasitattemptedtorebuildsecurityorgans.SuchconflictgavetheimpressionofaUnionistregimeweakandtoosusceptibletoBritishdemandsforreformwhichacceleratedsplitswithinthesettlercaste.
ThetoleranceofrepressivemeasureswithinRhodesiansocietyaccompaniedthesteadyerosionofchecksandbalanceswithinthestate.Strippedofmostoftheirpowersoverthesecuritysystem,theAssemblyandSenaterituallyendorsedtheproposalsoftheCabinet.Thejustificationof"nationalinterest"alonewassufficienttoconvincemostMPs.OneformerpresidentoftheSenateexplainedthelogictomein1984:"Itmustberememberedthatthecountrywasatwarandtoopen'NationalInterest'todebatecouldpossiblynotbeinthe'NationalInterest'!"62WhenaskedaboutParliament'sroleinscrutinizingsecuritymeasuresduringthewar,aformerSpeakeroftheAssemblyrespondedcandidly:"TheRhodesianParliamentofthedaywasaprettytameaffair.IcouldneverhavedreamedoftakinganyactiontocurbtheExecutiveandwouldcertainlyhaverubber-stampedtheproposalsofthePM."63Parliamentarydebateonsecuritypolicy,legislation,andpracticeswasstrictlycircumscribedbytheSpeaker,whoserulingsdisallowedanydiscussionoftheprosandconsofspecificemergencyregulations,theunderlyingcausesandnecessityofthestateofemergency,andallegationsofatrocitiesbythemilitary.64MyexaminationoftherelevantparliamentarydebatesfoundthatanyonewhoquestionedsuchmeasuresoractionsofthesecurityforceswasridiculedbyministersandotherMPsandaccusedofsupportingtheinsurgentcause.65
Withoneexception,Parliamentgrewincreasinglymarginaltodecisionmakingonsecuritymatters.ThisexceptionwastheSenate
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LegalCommittee,formedin1970toreviewspecificlegislationthatcontravenedRhodesia'sDeclarationofRights.ThefullSenateroutinelyoverrodeitsadversereportsonspecificsecuritymeasuresbecausethe
61.MorrisHirsch,ADecadeofCrisis:TenYearsofRhodesianFrontRule(Salisbury:Dearlove,1973).62.Correspondencewithauthor,26March1984.63.Correspondencewithauthor,12March1984.64.AssemblyDebates,vol.67,25April1967,col.145.65.See,forinstance,thecommentsoftheMinisterofLawandOrder,AssemblyDebates,vol.84,21June1973,col.222andAssemblyDebates,vol.87,20June1974,cols.15152.
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"nationalinterest"demandedit.Atbest,theSenateLegalCommitteefunctionedtodelaybutnotwithholdlegislativeendorsementoffarreachingmeasures.
ThemarginalizationofParliamentcoincidedwiththatofthejudiciary.Duringthe1970s,Rhodesiancourtsbecameincreasinglysubservienttotheexecutive.66Apparentlyunsurethatjudgeswouldconsistentlyruleinthedesiredmanner,theGovernmentsoughttoexpungejudicialauthorityoversecuritymatters.The1969constitutionremovedthecourts'jurisdictionoverlegislationinviolationoftheDeclarationofRights,aftertheWhaleyCommissionreportedthatitwas"inadvisabletoinvolvethejudiciaryinpoliticalcontroversy"bygivingitpowerstoreviewlegislationand"bettertoplacerelianceupontheself-restraintofthelegislature"67Inaddition,theregimefrequentlyuseditspowerofpreventivedetentionincasesitcouldnothopetoproveincourt.68Security-relatedcasesthatdidgotocourtoftencarriedminimumormandatorysentences,bypassingthetraditionaldiscretionofthejudges.Evenunderthesecircumstancesthejudgesmighthavedonemoretodefendindividualliberties,astheirexceptionaldecisionsinfavorofindividuals'rightssuggest.
Thejudicialprocesswasbesetbychronicdelayandoverloadofcasesasthewarintensified.Tospeeddecisionsandreducetheburdenontheordinarycourts,SpecialCourtswerecreatedinMay1976toprocesscapturedinsurgentsandvillagersimplicatedinsecurityoffenses.HearingsinSpecialCourtswereheldatshortnoticeandconcludedquickly.
EvenmorereminiscentoftheStarChamberweretheSpecialCourtsMartialestablishedundermartiallawin1978.Runbythesecurityforcesandheldincamera,theypermittedneitherlegalrepresentationnorappealtoordinarycourtsandcouldimposesentencesofgreaterseveritythantheciviliancourts.
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Theprogressiveconcentrationofstateauthorityintheexecutivebranchcoincidedwithchangesinsidethatbranch:themostimportantwasashiftfromciviliantomilitarypreeminence.Asinmanyothernationsfacingsecuritythreats,thepoliticalinfluence,authority,and
66.AmnestyInternational,Rhodesia/Zimbabwe(London:AmnestyInternational,1976),p.5.67.GovernmentofRhodesia,ReportoftheConstitutionalCommission(Salisbury:GovernmentPrinter,April1968),W.R.Whaley,Chair,pp.131,133.68.TheDetainees'ReviewTribunalsurvived,torubber-stampexecutivedecisions;from1971to1972,forinstance,thetribunalreviewed255casesbutrecommendedreleaseinonlytwocases.Throughoutthe1970sitsmeagerannualbudgetwasunderR$5,000(EstimatesofExpenditure).
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resourcesoftheRhodesianmilitarygrewtremendously.Itgainedascendancyoverthepoliceincounterinsurgencyandovercivilianagencies(e.g.,InternalAffairs)thatwereinvolvedinsecurityaffairs.
Thecenterofdecisionmakingonsecuritymattersshiftedin1976fromtheSecurityCounciltoaWarCouncilandinMarch1977toanewcoordinatingorgan:theMinistryofCombinedOperations(Com-Ops).69Headedbyacivilianminister,Com-Opswasrunbyitsmilitarycommander,GeneralPeterWalls,whobecamethedefactosupremointhesecuritysystem.Thesteadymilitarizationofdecisionmakingreacheditspeakin19781979duringthebriefpremiershipofBishopAbelMuzorewa(discussedatgreaterlengthbelow).Muzorewaandhisblackministerswereexcludedfromcontroloverthesecuritycoreofthestate.Thecountrywas"essentiallyrunbyamilitaryregimeoverwhichthereisnopoliticalcontrol";70"theRhodesianmilitaryhadbeguntoactasastatewithinastate)."71
Theascendancyofthemilitarydidnot,however,completelyeclipseciviliandepartmentsoreliminatejurisdictionalstrugglesbetweenagencies.Com-Opswassetuptocoordinatethecivilianandmilitarydimensionsofthewareffort,butitwaspreoccupiedwithimmediateandroutinemattersratherthaninterorganizationalcoordinationandlongtermstrategicplanning.72ThusrivalriesremainedendemictorelationsbetweentheCIO,InternalAffairs,police,LawandOrder,ForeignAffairs,SpecialBranch,andthevariousmilitaryforces.
Despiteasharedcommitmenttowinningthewarandmaintainingwhitesettlersupremacy,"eachministrytookadifferentviewbothofthethreatitselfandanycountermeasurestobetaken)."73Governmentministersrepeatedlydefinedthethreatsintermsof"blackbarbarism"versus"whitecivilization"insouthernAfricaandthespecterofthe"Redperil,"muchasPretoria'sofficialsnowwarnoftheCommunistthreattoSouthAfrica.AcontraryviewwasheldbyRhodesia's
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intelligenceagencies,expressedbytheCIOdirector:
FormanyyearsnowtheconsensusofopinioninCIOandSpecialBranchhadbeenthatitwasmoreimportanttoaccommodateAfricannationalismthantoover-concernourselveswiththecommunistthreat....[Yet]thepoliticians
69.Evans,Fighting,pp.9,11;MartinandJohnson,Struggle,p.289.70.Anti-ApartheidMovement,Fire-ForceExposed:TheRhodesianSecurityForcesandTheirRoleinDefendingWhiteSupremacy(London:Anti-ApartheidMovement,1979),p.3.71.MoorcraftandMcLaughlin,Chimurenga,p.232.72.Beckett,"RhodesianArmy,"p.171.73.Cilliers,CounterInsurgency,p.66;Flower,ServingSecretly.
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werestillpromotingthebeliefthatcommunismwasthegreatestthreat,whereasthe[Intelligence]professionalsmaintained...thatcommunistcountrieswerenomorelikelytointerfereintheRhodesianissuethanBritainorotherWesterncountries.74
Needlesstosay,theaccommodationistargumentsoftheintelligencechiefsfellondeafCabinetears.
Bitterjurisdictionalstrugglesalsohamperedintelligencegathering.CIO,ArmyIntelligence,theSelousScouts,InternalAffairs,andtheSpecialBrancheachconsideredtheintelligencecollectedbyotheragenciestobeinferiortoitsownandinsistedthatcompetingagencieswereimperilingitsinformersandunderminingsources.75AformerSecretaryofInternalAffairsrecountedsuchfrictiontome:
ItoldDistrictCommissionersnottoprovidethepolicewithanyinformationonwhoourinformantswere,becausethepolicewouldblowit.Duetothepolice,ourgoodinformerswereknockedoffassell-outs.Thepolicewereangryaboutnotgettingnames....TheGovernmentsuppressedintelligencecomingfromthefieldandbelievedthetopintelligenceadvisors....Iconflictedwith[CIODirector]Flower.HeoftenusedtosaythatIwasinterferingwithhisprerogativeandhisfield[and]encroachingonhisturf.IsaidIcouldn'tcareless.Internalintelligencewaspartofmyjob.76
TheSpecialBranchandCIOheldadiametricallyopposedview.ConsidertheremarksofaseniorSpecialBranchofficer:
ThetaskoftheSpecialBranchwastogatherintelligence,buttheshortageofmanpowerledtoarelianceonInternalAffairs.ThequalityofintelligencecomingfromInternalAffairswasverypoor.ThesubordinateAfricanstaffresponsibleforsendingintelligencetotheDistrictCommissionertendedtoreportwhatwasrequiredbyDistrictCommissioners.DCswouldn'tlistentoadvicefromtheSpecialBranch,becauseitwastheirownterritory....InternalAffairswouldsayweweretellingthemlies,andtheywantedtooperateintheirownareas.DCs
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wouldn'tbelievethatAfricanshadgunsuntilrealcontactsoccurred.Theydidn'tknowhowtoruninformers.Theywouldblowoursources.77
Infact,noagencyappearedideallysuitedtoconductintelligencegatheringinwar-tornRhodesia.TheSpecialBranch,CIO,andInternalAffairs
74.Flower,ServingSecretly,pp.213,138.75.SeeReidDaly,SelousScouts;Flower,ServingSecretly,p.219;andmy"ContinuitiesinthePoliticsofStateSecurityinZimbabwe,"inThePoliticalEconomyofZimbabwe,ed.M.Schatzberg(NewYork:Praeger,1984),pp.11112.76.Interview,7June1983.77.Interview,24June1983.
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wereorganizedtocollectintelligenceunderpeacetimeconditions,andthemilitaryhadchronicandseriousproblemsinthisfield.78
TheRhodesianarmedforcesremainedloyalandreliable;theguerrillasnevercapturedacityorestablishedliberatedzonesinsidethecountry.Yettheintensifyingconflictraisedthematerialcostsofmaintainingwhiteruleandfueleddissensionwithinthestate;personalanimosities,substantivedisagreementsoverpolicyanditsimplementation,andorganizationalturfbattlesinterferedwiththestate'scapacitytowinthewar.Thesetensionsneverthelesstookplacewithinacontextofbroadagreementonbasicgoals,eclipsingthepositionofthosefeweliteswhofavoredaccommodationwiththeblackmajority.Intrastatefrictionwasthereforenotofsufficientmagnitudeseriouslytounderminethesurvivalofwhitesettlerrule.Escalatingruralinsurgencyplayedthedecisiverole,ultimatelyforcingtheregimetoacceptanegotiatedsettlementin1979.
TransitiontoMajorityRule
In1966theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilpassedmandatoryeconomicsanctionsagainsttheRhodesianregime,treatedittodiplomaticisolation,andannouncedthattheinternationalcommunitywouldendorseonlyasettlementthatprovidedformajorityrule.ToriditselfofitsRhodesianalbatross,Londonalsoattemptedseveraldiplomaticinitiativesguidedbytheprinciplethatlegalindependencerequiredfreeelectionsandmajorityrule.Rhodesiansettlerswerepreparedtoconcedenothingofthesort,andBritainhadnoleverageagainstthisintransigence.
Astheguerrillawargatheredsteaminthemid-1970s,London'ssearchforapeacefulsolutiongrew.WesternnationsfearedthatthewarwouldspreadperhapsinvolvingCubanorSovietinterventiononthesideoftheguerrillasandincreasedSouthAfricaninvolvementon
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behalfofRhodesia.(TheguerrillaforceswerealreadyreceivingmaterialaidandtrainingfromtheSovietUnion,EasternEurope,China,andNorthKorea.)Anegotiatedsolutionmightpreemptanyfurtherinternationalizationandradicalizationofthestruggle.AsBritishForeignSecretaryAnthonyCroslandwarnedinaspeechtoNATOministers:"IftheissueweresettledonthebattlefielditwouldseriouslylessenthechancesofbringingaboutamoderateregimeinRhodesiaandwouldopenthewayformoreradicalsolutionsandexternalinterventiononthepartofoth-
78.Cilliers,Counter-Insurgency,pp.220ff.;ReidDaly,SelousScouts,p.588.
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ers."79Nevertheless,someBritishofficialsadvisedagainstbecomingstuckintheRhodesianquagmire.Accordingtooneaccount,"In1976theCabinet'sinstinctwas[to]staywellclearofRhodesia,whichseveralMinistersregardedasanotherpotentiallydebilitatingNorthernIrelandcrisisforBritain."80YettheCrowncontinuedtomakeoccasionaloverturestowardanegotiatedresolutionoftheproblem.
OuranalysisofthetransitionalperiodcentersonRhodesia'ssecurityapparatus.Howdidthecontestantsforpowerviewrepressivelawsandinstitutions?Werereformsofthesestructureseverontheagendaduringnegotiationsonthefutureofthecountry?
ThepositionoftheSmithGovernmentduringsuccessivenegotiationswasthatsettlercontroloverthesecuritysystemwasinviolate.InameetingbetweenSmith,SouthAfricanPremierJohnVorster,andUnitedStatesSecretaryofStateHenryKissingerinPretoriaon19September1976,Smithfinallyagreedtoaccepttheprincipleofeventualmajorityrule.ButhewasadamantthattheCabinetportfoliosofLawandOrderandofDefenseremaininwhitehandsandthatthewhitecommandersofthesecurityforcesretaintheirposts.AccordingtothenotesonthismeetingrecordedbytheCIOdirector,Kissingeragreedthatthetwosecurityministersshouldbewhite.81
Foryears,blackleadershadbeencallingforchangesintheinternalsecurityapparatus,andtheleadersofZANUandZAPUhadfrequentlybrandedRhodesia'ssecurityapparatus"despotic"and"fascist."Asearlyas1963,ZANU'spolicyplatformdeclared:"ZANUshallrepealtheUnlawfulOrganizationsAct,theLawandOrderMaintenanceAct...andallotherrepressivelawsenactedbythewhiteminoritySettlerGovernments."82In1976BishopAbelMuzorewa,theleaderofthereconstitutedAfricanNationalCongress,condemnedthe"crudeandbrutalmethods"oftheRhodesianpolice,adding:''ThepeopleofZimbabwewouldbescaredtodeathifthesemethods
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continuedaftertheirliberation.Policereformishighamongourpriorities."83Proposalsforsweepingliberalizationalsocamefrominternationalsources.ThesummitofCommonwealthleadersinJune1977adoptedaresolutioncallingfor"notonlytheremovaloftheillegalSmithregimebutalsothedismantlingofitsapparatusofrepressioninordertopavethewayforthe
79.Times(London),10December1976.80.MartinandJohnson,Struggle,p.256.81.NotesonmeetingreprintedinFlower,ServingSecretly,p.303.82.ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion,"DeclarationofPolicy,"21August1963.83.U.S.NewsandWorldReport,6December1976,p.35.
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creationofpoliceandarmedforceswhichwouldberesponsibletotheneedsofthepeopleofZimbabwe."84
Asthespiralingcostsofthewarapproacheduntenablelevels,theSmithregimeenteredintoanInternalSettlementinMarch1978withblackleadersunattachedtotheguerrillaforces.ThenewtransitionalGovernmentconsistedofanuneasycoalitionofSmithandthreeblackmoderates,BishopAbelMuzorewa,NdabaningiSithole,andChiefJeremiahChirau,inanExecutiveCouncil.AnewconstitutionwasdraftedbyRhodesianFrontofficialsandapprovedbythewhiteelectorateinareferendum.Undertheconstitution,twenty-eightseatsinthehundred-memberAssemblywerereservedforwhitesforatleasttenyears,whichgavethemvetopoweroverchangesintheconstitution.Whitepersonnelwouldalsoremainincontrolofthepolice,military,civilservice,andjudiciaryforadecade:andwhite-ownedlandwouldnotbeexpropriated.85Clearly,thispower-sharingarrangementmeantonlythatSmithhadconcededanendtoexclusivesettlerruleandretainedwhitecontroloverthestate'score.Tellingly,SmithprivatelyreferredtotheExecutiveCouncilasa"facade"obscuringtherealityofwhitepoliticalpower.86Muzorewaandtheotherblackministersexercisednominalauthority;theywereexcludedfromtheWarCouncilandfromanyroleinmilitarydecisionmaking.87Farfrombeingamodelofsettler-nativeaccommodation,theExecutiveCouncilwasrackedbymutualdistrust,conflicts,andsecretplottingofwhitemembersagainstblack.88
AsadeparturefromrigidRhodesianFrontrule,thenewregimetriedtowinAfricansupportbydispensingconcessions.InFebruary1979itenactedlegislationrepealingpettyapartheiddiscriminationineducation,housing,health,andpublicfacilities;italsorescindedthecontentiousLandTenureAct.ElectionswereheldunderthenewconstitutioninApril1979,ostensiblytoaffirmthattheneworderwasbasedonmajorityrule.OnlythosepartiesthathadacceptedSmith's
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constitutionalplanwereallowedontheballot;ZANUandZAPUremainedbanned.Muzorewa'sUnitedAfricanNationalCouncil(UANC)wonfifty-oneof
84.QuotedinMartinandJohnson,Struggle,p.269.85.Theconstitutioncreatedcommissionsofpublicservice,judicialservice,policeservice,anddefenseforcesservice;qualificationsforcommissionmembershipeffectivelysealedwhitecontrol(RobertJ.Alperin,"TheDistributionofPowerandthe(June1979)ZimbabweRhodesiaConstitution,"JournalofSouthernAfricanAffairs5,no.1[January1980]:4154).86.Flower,ServingSecretly,p.211.87.Cilliers,Counter-Insurgency,p.72.88.Flower,ServingSecretly,pp.207,212.
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theseventy-twoseatsreservedforAfricansandon31May1979,hebecametheprimeministerofZimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Markingnoradicaldeparturefromthepast,thenewregimewasunabletowininternationalordomesticlegitimacy.Theinsurgentssawinthesettlementbotharusetoperpetuatesettlerdominationandasignoftheregime'sincreasingdesperation.Farfromcreatingtheconditionsforpeace,theinternalsettlementgalvanizedtheguerrillacampaign.DespiteMuzorewa'searliercriticismofthesecurityapparatus,hisGovernmentcontinueditspredecessor'sbloodycampaignagainstcivilians,puttingtherepressivelegislationandsecurityagenciestomaximumuse.Newareasofthecountryfellundermartiallaw,andsecurityexpendituremushroomed.Defensespendingaloneabsorbed47percentofthetotalbudgetin19781979.
By1979,theGovernment'spositionhaddeterioratedandtheguerrillaspenetratedfurtherintothecountry.Ofthosekilledduringthewar,one-thirddiedin1979alone.Bytheendoftheyear,nearlyallthecountrywasundermartiallaw;ruraladministrationhadbrokendowninmanyareas;theeconomywasbankrupt;andthewarhadreachedastalemate.Theregimewasnotonthevergeofcollapsebutwasneitherdefeatingnorcontainingtheinsurgents.Still,thebalanceofforcesdidnotaugurwellforadecisivemilitaryvictorybyeitherside.
Finallythetimeseemedpropitiousforalastingsettlement.SouthAfrica,whichputpressureontheRhodesians,supportedanegotiatedsolution,asdidMozambiqueandZambia,whichputpressureontheinsurgents(partlytoendtheRhodesianmilitaryattackstheywereexperiencing).ThenewConservativeGovernmentofMargaretThatcher(electedon3May1979)desperatelywantedtorecognizetheZimbabwe-RhodesiaGovernmentbutfoundthisactionpoliticallyimpossibleinthefaceofinternationalopposition.Thatcherreluctantly
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announcedanall-partyconferenceatLancasterHouseinLondoninSeptember1979toaddressthreecentralissues:acease-fire,freeelections,andanewconstitution.RepresentativesofZANUandZAPU,theGovernmentofZimbabwe-Rhodesia,andtheBritishGovernmentattendedtheconference.Withalloftheprincipalsinvolved,thisconferenceseemedtopresentauniqueopportunityforapoliticalsolutionthatmightperhapsincludeplanstoreformthecountry'scoerciveorder.Evenatthislatedate,however,theMuzorewa-Smithregimebelieveditcouldmaintainsettlercontroloverthesecurityagencies.Presentattheconferencetoprotecttheirorganizationalinterestswerethecountry'shighestsecurityofficials:thePoliceCommissioner,CommanderoftheArmy,Secretary
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forLawandOrder,AirVice-Marshall,andtheDirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceOrganization.TheMuzorewa-SmithdelegationinsistedthatRhodesiansecurityforcesandotherstateagenciesremainfullyintactuntilindependence.
AtLancasterHouse,thePatrioticFrontofZANUandZAPUcalledforreformsofinternalsecurityagenciesbutnotbasicstructuralchanges.89OneZANUofficialclaimedthattheZANUandZAPUrepresentativesatLancasterHousein1979"wereallopposedtoentrustinganyfutureGovernmentofZimbabwewiththekindofdictatorialpowerswhichtheirformeroppressorshadwielded."90YettheparamountconcernofthePatrioticFrontwasnotthestatutoryandinstitutionalfoundationsoftherepressiveorder,butthequestionofwhowouldcontrolthesecurityforcesduringtheelectionofanewgovernment.91TheoverridingfearinRhodesia,asmorerecentlyinNamibia,wasthatthesecurityforceswouldsubvertfreeandfairelections.Structuralchangeinthesecuritysectorwouldbelefttothenewregime.
TheLancasteraccorddidnottouchthemostvitalbranchoftheRhodesianstate:"Thepre-independenceperiodshouldnotbeconcernedwiththeremodellingoftheinstitutionsofgovernment."92Existinglawswouldalsobeleftintact:"ItwillbefortheParliamenttobechoseninfreeelectionstodecidewhichlawsshallbecontinuedandwhichshallbechanged."93LordSoames,theinterimgovernorofRhodesia,praised"thehumanityandefficiencywhichresidesinthesystemofgovernmentofwhichZimbabweistheheir''(referringapparentlytotheWestminstermodel),asystembasedon"law,order,justiceandimpartialadministration."94
Thestatusquowastoremaininotherareasvitaltosettlerinterests:thenewconstitution(1)providedfordisproportionatewhiterepresenta-
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89.MartinandJohnson,Struggle,p.273.SeealsotheearlierAnglo-Americanproposals,Rhodesia:ProposalsforaSettlement,Cmnd.6919(London:HMSO,September1977).90.SimbiMubako,addresstotheNationalAffairsAssociationofZimbabwe,reprintedasagovernmentalpressstatement,23May1980.91.SeethePatrioticFront'ssubmissionstotheconference:LancasterHouseConferencePapers,"PatrioticFrontProposals,"CC(79)16,18September1979,and"PatrioticFrontResponsetoBritishProposalsforZimbabwe,'CC(79)23,8October1979.92.GovernmentofSouthernRhodesia,ReportoftheConstitutionalConference,LancasterHouse,September-December1979,Cmnd.7802(London:HMSO,1980),para.2.93.Ibid.,para.15.ThetripartiteagreementonsouthwesternAfricabetweenAngola,Cuba,andSouthAfrica,signed22December1988,givesanelectedconstituentassemblyinNamibiapowertodraftanewconstitution.94.LordSoames,"FromRhodesiatoZimbabwe,"InternationalAffairs56(Summer1980):418.
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tioninParliamentforsevenyearsafterindependence(4percentofthepopulation,whitesreceived20percentofAssemblyseatsand25percentofSenateseats);(2)includedadeclarationofrightsthatineffectinstitutionalizedamultipartysystemfortenyears;and(3)stipulatedthatlandcouldbepurchasedonlywhenthepropertyowneragreed.WhiteswerethusgreatlyoverrepresentedinParliamentandtheirlandwasprotectedagainstexpropriation.AnadditionalassurancetothesettlerswastheamnestydeclaredbytheinterimBritishgovernorinDecember1979,whichprohibitedlegalproceedingsagainstanyonepreviouslyinvolvedinthewar.95Thoseguiltyofatrocitiesoneithersidewerethusabsolved.
IndicativeofBritain'sdominantroleinthenegotiatedtransition,thefinaldraftoftheacceptedconstitutionwasessentiallyacarboncopyoftheoriginalForeignOfficeproposals.96InsharpcontrasttothereformistinitiativesmadeduringtheUlstercrisisof19691972,theBritishGovernment'sactionsatLancasterHousehadadecidedlyconservativeeffectonexistingsecuritystructures.DuringthemonthsprecedingtheMarch1980election,someCommonwealthnationsandAmnestyInternationalcalledonthegovernortorepealthesecuritylawsandreleaseallpersonsdetainedunderemergencypowers;butBritishofficialsheldsteadfasttotheircommitmentnottotamperwithexistingsecurityarrangements.London'sprincipalaimsweretopreventtheconflictfrombecominginternationalized,torestorestabilityinsouthernAfrica,toreopenZimbabwe'seconomiclinestotheWest,toinstallamoderategovernmentbasedonmajorityrule,andthentodisengagefromthecountryasquicklyaspossible.97Theparticularsoftheaccordwereofmuchlessconcern.Britain'sprioritieshelptoexplainthereluctancetotacklereforms,ataskthatcouldbelefttothecomingmajoritariangovernmentastheLancasteragreementstated.WhenLondonassumedcontroloverthestateinUlsterin1972,nosuchalternativegovernmentwaswaiting;hencethe
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Britishthemselveshadtobeginthetaskofinstitutionalreform.
Otherpracticalconsiderationsmilitatedagainstthemetropole'sinvolvementinmodernizingRhodesia'srepressiveorder.TheForeignOfficewasconvincedthatthesettlerdelegationatLancasterwouldreject
95.AmnestyOrdinance1979(3/79).96.SeeLancasterHouseConferencePapers,"IndependenceConstitution,"CC(79)4,12September1979and"BritishGovernmentProposalsforIndependenceConstitution,"CC(79)19,3October1979.97.Gregory,"Rhodesia,"p.84.TheseaimswerealmostidenticaltoBritain'sobjectivestwentyyearsearlierduringtheLancasterHouseconferenceonKenya.
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anyplanforthesweepingtransformationofstateinstitutions.Thethree-monthintervalbetweenthesigningoftheagreementandtheelectionsforthenewgovernmentalsoseemedtodisallowanyrestructuringofsecurityagencies,althoughlegislationmighthavebeenrepealed.Inaddition,prematuretamperingwithsecurityarrangementsmightunderminelawandorderduringtheunstabletransitionalperiod.98AndtheCrownwasaversetobecominginvolvedinanotherexperimentwithstatebuilding;NorthernIrelandwasenoughofaproblem.TheBritishdelegation,therefore,hadadequatereasonstotreadlightlyonthestatutoryandinstitutionalterrain.99
Whatabouttheotherdelegations?BothZANUandZAPUwereconfidentthattheywouldwintheproposedelectionand,asnotedabove,didnotinsistonchangesinsecuritystructuresattheconference.TheMuzorewa-Smithcoalitionbelievedthattheincumbentregimewouldretainpower,thatexistingsecurityagencieswouldremainintact,andthatwhitecontrolovertheseagencieswouldcontinuefortheforeseeablefuture.100Fortheirpart,thesettlersinRhodesiahopedthattheLancasteraccordwouldendthedevastatingwarandinternationaleconomicsanctionsandpreservetheoldorderasmuchaspossible.TheyexpectedthatavictorybyMuzorewa'sUANCwouldmakecontinued,albeitdiluted,whitesupremacymorepalatabletotheblackpopulation.
TheLancastertalksweresuccessfulinpartbecauseeachdelegationtheincumbentregime,ZANU,andZAPUwasconvincedthatitspartywouldwintheproposedelection.Hadtherebeenrealdoubtintheranksofoneofthedelegations,theentiresettlementwouldhavebeendoomed.Thisexpectationalsohelpstoexplainthelackofconcernwithexistingsecuritylegislationandinstitutions.Believingthatitalonewouldinheritthepoliticalkingdom,nodomesticpartyhadanincentivetodemandchange.Inaddition,each
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contenderexpectedthatthelosingpartieswouldhavedifficultyacceptingelectoraldefeat;inthisscenario,afterthetransferofpowertherepressivemachinerymightproveessen-
98.Only850soldiersoftheCommonwealthMonitoringForcewerestationedinZimbabwebeforetheelection,tooverseethereturnofguerrillasanddefusetensions(seethearticlebytheforce'sdeputycommander,J.H.Learmont,"ReflectionsfromRhodesia,'RoyalUnitedServicesInstituteJournal125,no.4[December1980]:4755).99.SeemyarticlecomparingdecolonizationinZimbabweandMozambique("InSearchofRegimeSecurity:ZimbabwesinceIndependence,'JournalofModernAfricanStudies22,no.4[December1984]).OnNamibiaandZimbabweseeDavidGordon("ConflictResolutioninSouthernAfrica:WhyNamibiaIsNotAnotherZimbabwe,"Issue12,no.34[Fall-Winter1982]:3745).100.JeffreyDavidow,APeaceinSouthernAfrica:TheLancasterHouseConferenceonRhodesia(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1984),p.70.
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tialtosubduepoliticalfoes,consolidatethenewgovernment'sposition,andmaintainorder.
Takingalmosteveryonebycompletesurprise,ZANUwonadecisivevictoryintheMarchelection62.9percentofthevoteandfifty-sevenoftheeightyblackseatsinthenewAssembly.TheelectionresultssentshockwavesthroughthewhitecommunitybutnoviolentbacklashliketherampageofPortuguesesettlersinMozambiqueatindependencein1975.Zimbabwe'sindependencewasfinallyproclaimedon18April1980andanewZANUregimeinstalled.
Thisparticulartransitionawayfromsettlerruleconditionedtheneworderinseveralrespects.First,thelegacyofthewarshapedthenewstateelite'spoliticalcultureandregardforopponents.TheauthoritarianandcommandistpracticesoftheguerrillaforcesdidnotwitherawayonceZANUassumedstatepower,andtheexperienceoffightingalong,bitterwarmadethenewelitehighlysuspiciousofenemies.Second,thenewregimeinheritedtherepressiveapparatusofthesettlerstateitsagencies,legalpowers,andmanyofitspersonnel.Third,ZANU'selectoralvictoryleftpoliticallymarginaltwoblackpoliticalparties,ZAPUandUANC,thathadbeenkeyactorsduringthetransition.Theyenteredtheneworderdecidedlydisgruntledovertheelectoraloutcome.Fourth,Rhodesiansettlerswereabletoputtheirstamponthenewconstitution,includingreservedwhiteseatsinParliament,amultipartysystem,andlandsecurity.
ButunlikemanyothertransitionsawayfromauthoritarianruleincludingthatinNorthernIrelandinZimbabwethepowerstructureoftheoldeliterapidlybecamearelicofthepast:thesettlercommunityhaslittlepoliticalroleintheneworder.Thisfactisparticularlyremarkablesincethewhitecommunityretainsitseconomicdominance,whichdoesnottranslateintoleverageonextraeconomicmatters.
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Theliteratureontransitionstodemocracysuggeststhatthedisplacementofaformerauthoritarianeliteisapreconditionforgenuinedemocratization.Thismaybenecessary,butbynomeanssufficient,forliberalizationofstructuresoflawandorder,asexemplifiedinpostsettlerZimbabwe.OtherkeyvariablesremaintobeexaminedinChapter6.
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Chapter5NorthernIreland:BreakdownofSettlerRule,19691972From1921untilthelate1960s,theBritishmetropoletooklittleinterestinNorthernIreland'sinternalaffairs,muchastheAmericanfederalgovernmentearlierturnedablindeyetoracialdominationintheAmericanSouth.InUlsterasintheAmericanSouthduringthe1960s,ittookwidespreaddisorderandviolencetoconvincethemetropolitangovernmenttoreconsideritscomfortableisolationismandassertitsauthorityoverthedominantregionalcaste,insupportoftheminority.
Alreadyinthemid-1960stheBritishcurtainofsilenceregardingNorthernIrelandwasbeginningtolift.QuestionswerebeingraisedbyLabourMPswho
wereconcernedwiththeverygreatincreaseinfinancialassistancefromtheWestminsterExchequertoUlster,andwithoutconstitutionalreformandmoreliberalpoliciesitwasbecomingmoredifficulttojustifytoMPs,andtosomemembersofourCabinet,thelargesumswewerebeingaskedtovote.1
(WestminstersubsidizedtheUlsterbudget$240millionin1968toimprovesocialservices.)
LabourpoliticianspreviouslyhadbeenashesitantastheConservativestoquestionarrangementsinUlster,butthe1964BritishelectionbroughtinanumberofprogressiveLabourandLiberalMPswhowerereadytoopendebateonNorthernIreland.InApril1965theyformedtheCampaignforDemocracyinUlster,toinvestigateallegationsofdis-
1.HaroldWilson,TheLabourGovernment:19641970(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,andMichaelJoseph,1971),p.270.
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crimination,proposechangesinUlster'selectorallawstoconformwiththoseinBritain,andextendtheRaceRelationsBilltoNorthernIreland.2AttemptingtoinitiatedebateontheseissuesintheHouseofCommons,theseMPswererepeatedlyruledoutoforderonthegroundsthatsuchmattersweretheproperconcernofStormontalone.UnsuccessfulinParliament,thecampaignneverthelessdrewtheattentionofBritishelitestocommunalinequalitiesinUlster.Bythelate1960stheLabourGovernmentitselfbegantopressforreforms.
Earlierinthedecade,ararechangeoccurredatthetopoftheUlsterGovernment.In1963TerenceO'Neillbecamethefourthprimeministeroftheprovince.Likehispredecessors,hewasamemberoftheOrangeOrderandsharedthestandardProtestantprejudicesagainstCatholic"Fenians"and"papists."Buthewasalsothefirstmoderatepremier,preparedtoconsiderlimitedreformsinthesettlerorderthatwerepartlydrivenbyanawarenessofthecountry'seconomicexigencies.Onlythroughgreatereconomicplanningandinfusionsofforeigncapitalcouldthedecayingindustrialstructurebemodernizedandtheeconomicdeclineofthelate1950sreversed.Economicmodernizationwaslinked,hebelieved,toreformsinthetreatmentoftheCatholicminority.3HecultivatedcontactswithmoderatesamongCatholicsvisitingCatholicschools,meetingwithpriestsanddisplayedlesstoleranceforProtestantextremism.O'NeillwasalsomoreamenablethanhispredecessorstodétentewithUlster'sirredentistsouthernneighbor;in1965heheldanunprecedentedmeetingwiththeprimeministeroftheRepublicofIreland,SeanLemass.
Largelycosmetic,O'Neill'sinitialgesturesaffectedneitherthesocioeconomicpositionofCatholicsnorUlster'ssectariansecuritysystem.4Buthisearlyyearsinofficewereimportantbecauseheembodiedthepromiseofmeaningfulreform,withoutdelivering.LiketheeffortsofWhiteheadinRhodesiaandBothainSouthAfrica,
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O'Neill'sreformeffortsmobilizedandradicalizedthesubordinatepopulationandprecipi-
2.VincentE.Feeney,"WestminsterandtheEarlyCivilRightsStruggleinNorthernIreland,"Eire-Ireland11,no.4(1976):340.Thepropertyqualificationforvotinginmunicipalelectionswasabolishedonthemainlandin1947butremainedineffectinUlster,whereaboutone-quarterofthoseeligibletovoteinWestminsterelectionswereineligibletovoteinlocalelections(RichardRose,GoverningWithoutConsensus:AnIrishPerspective[Boston:Beacon,1971],p.441).3.KevinKelley,TheLongestWar:NorthernIrelandandtheIRA(Westport,Conn.:LawrenceHill,1982),p.79.O'NeillwassuccessfulinattractingseveralmultinationalcorporationstoUlster(MichaelFarrell,NorthernIreland:TheOrangeState[London:Pluto,1976],p.229).4.SeePaulBewandHenryPatterson,TheBritishStateandtheUlsterCrisis:FromWilsontoThatcher(London:Verso,1985),pp.15,17.
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tatedbitteroppositionwithintheranksofthedominantcastetotheprimeminister's"deviations."
Eversincethe1920stheCatholicminorityhadbeenpoliticallyinactiveandacquiescenttothestatusquo.Whileharboringgrievances,itwasnotreadytosupportarmedstruggleagainstthestate.ThefailedrevoltoftheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)from1956to1962wastheexceptionthatprovedtherule,sinceitcouldnotattractCatholicsupport.Inthemid-1960s,however,Catholicsbegantopushfortheredressofgrievances.DissatisfiedwiththepoorrecordofCatholicpoliticalparties(theNationalistpartyandtheNorthernIrelandLabourparty)insecuringminorityrights,CatholicsbegantobuildneworganizationsasO'Neillcatalyzedtheirrisingexpectations.TheCampaignforSocialJustice,formedin1964,andtheNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociation,in1967,launchedacivilrightsmovementinspiredinpartbyitsAmericancounterpart.5
Theseweremoderate,middle-classorganizationsseekingequalrightsandsocialintegration.TheCampaignforSocialJusticefocusedonsocioeconomicdiscrimination.TheNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociationdisputedgerrymanderedelectoralboundariesandpropertyqualificationsinlocalgovernmentalelections;itcalledforantidiscriminationlegislation,amechanismtohandlecitizens'complaintsagainstgovernmentaldepartments,impartialallocationofpublichousing,disbandingoftheUlsterSpecialConstabulary,andrepealoftheSpecialPowersAct.Significantastheywere,thesedemandshardlychallengedfundamentalpoliticalandconstitutionalstructures.Missingfromtheoriginalagendaweresomeofthemostdivisiveissues:theconstitutionalstatusoftheprovince,theUnionistmonopolyofpower,theexistenceoftheborder,andBritishclaimsofsovereigntyovertheprovince.Onlylaterdidmilitantgroupsenterthecivilrightsmovementwithmoreradical,nationalistaims(suchasabolishingtheborder);theIRAresurfacedinDecember1969to
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defendCatholicsagainstProtestantassailantsbutdidnotengageinkillinguntil1971.6
Initially,thecivilrightsmovementhadgreaterimpactinantagonizingtheProtestantcommunitythanatextractingreformsfromStormontorWestminster.Loyalistsdefinedthecivilrightsgroupsasafrontforthe
5.ForacomparisonoftheAmericanSouthandUlster,seeRichardRose,"OnthePrioritiesofCitizenshipintheDeepSouthandNorthernIreland,"JournalofPolitics38,no.2(May1976):24791.6.StephenW.Beach,"SocialMovementRadicalization:TheCaseofthePeople'sDemocracyinNorthernIreland,"SociologicalQuarterly18(Summer1977):30518.
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IRAandtheirprotestmarchesasanaffronttoProtestantsupremacy.7Atthesametime,CatholicprotestsaddedfueltopopularProtestantoutrageover"O'Neillism,"orofficialappeasement.ProtestantsbrandedO'NeillandthereformistwingofhisGovernmentas"theenemywithin"andtheapparentdriftofexecutivepolicyasathreattoundilutedsettlersupremacyandtheexistenceoftheProtestantstate.8Thethreatswerenotjustpolitical:reformsinthesocioeconomicorderwereanathematoworking-classProtestants,whofearedcompetitionfromCatholicsforjobsandhousing.Protestantssurveyedin19661967rejectedthelegitimacyofCatholicgrievances;only18percentthoughtCatholicswere"treatedunfairly."Incontrast,74percentofCatholicsbelievedtheminorityhadsufferedunfairtreatmentand55percentsupportedprotestsagainstdiscrimination.Sincethesettlersdidnotperceivethattheminoritywastreatedunfairly,theysawnoneedtoendorsemechanismstoensurefairness.Only23percentofProtestantsfeltthegovernmentshouldpassalawmakingitillegaltorefuseajoborhousingtoCatholicsbecauseoftheirreligion.9Ratherpaternalistically,O'Neilllamentedthisfailuretoappreciatethebenefitsofsocioeconomicconcessions:
ItisfrightfullyhardtoexplaintoProtestantsthatifyougiveRomanCatholicsagoodjobandagoodhousetheywilllivelikeProtestants....ButifaRomanCatholicisjoblessandlivesinthemostghastlyhovel,hewillreareighteenchildrenonNationalAssistance.10
Catholicmobilizationandtheregime'sperceivedkid-glovesresponseenragedProtestantextremists,who(liketheirwhitecounterpartsintheAmericanSouthandSouthAfrica)launchedacountermovementtoblockallconcessionstotheminority.CivilrightsdemonstrationsandmarchesmetProtestantcounterdemonstrationsandendedinseveralviolentclashesandsavagepoliceattacks.ThefirstbloodyencounterinLondonderryon5October1968convincedLondontopressforimmediatereforms.Thesecondmajorincidentoccurredon4
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January1969at
7.PatrickBishopandEamonnMallie,TheProvisionalIRA(London:Heinemann,1987),p.52.TheScarmanTribunalfoundthattheIRAhadnotplannedororganizedthe1969disturbancesandthatitsinvolvementwas"slight"([ScarmanTribunal]ViolenceandCivilDisturbancesin1969:ReportofaTribunalofInquiry,Cmnd.566[Belfast:HMSO,1972],p.16).8.Kelley,LongestWar,p.94.9.Rose,Governing,pp.481,484,497.Strikinglysimilar,asurveyofIsraeliJewsnotedthat75.2percentwerereservedaboutoropposedalawthatwouldpunishdiscriminationagainstArabsinjobsandhousing(SammySmooha,"JewishandArabEthnocentrisminIsrael,"EthnicandRacialStudies10,no.1[January1987]:14).10.QuotedinFarrell,OrangeState,p.256.
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Burntolletbridge,whencivilrightsmarcherswereambushedbyagroupofLoyalists,includingoff-dutymembersoftheUlsterSpecialConstabulary.Laterthatday,thepolicestormedtheCatholicBogsidedistrictinLondonderryandwentonarampage.OnsubsequentoccasionsLoyalistmobs,withpolicesupport,invadedCatholicenclavesinBelfastandengagedinarsonandshooting.Catholicriotingbrokeoutlaterin1969,riotingthatseemedtotheGovernmentaltogethersinister;anewpremierclaimedthattherioterssought"tooverthrowaGovernmentdemocraticallyelectedbyalargemajority."11TheScarmanTribunal'sinvestigationoftheriotsinthesummerof1969flatlyrefutedthiscontention:"TherewasnoplottooverthrowtheGovernmentortomountanarmedinsurrection."12ThetribunalfoundtheRoyalUlsterConstabularyseriouslyatfaultduringsixmajorincidents.
ThebacklashamongProtestantcitizenshadsympathizerswithinStormontandtheCabinet.O'Neillencounteredstiffoppositiontoreformsfromanumberofhard-lineProtestantpoliticians,andtheUnionistbackbenchatStormontstagedseveralabortiverevoltsagainsthim.Themoststridenthard-linerintheCabinetwasthechiefofthesecuritysystem,MinisterofHomeAffairsWilliamCraig.Craigdescribedthecivilrightsmovementasa"bogus"frontforviolenceandsubversionandarguedthatreformswereaseriousmistake.(TheCameronCommission,examiningthecausesoftheviolenceof19681969,concludedotherwise:themovement'sgrievanceshada"substantialfoundationinfact.")13CraigappearedtocondoneviolencebyLoyalistsand(alongRhodesianlines)publiclyfloatedtheideaofaunilateraldeclarationofindependencefromBritain;forthishewasdismissedbyO'Neill.
WhenHaroldWilsonremarkedtoO'Neillthat"NorthernIrelandisratherlikeRhodesia"O'Neillresponded,"Maybeitis,butIdonotintendtobetheGarfieldToddofNorthernIreland."14(Toddhad
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succumbedtoaCabinetrevoltagainsthisreformistmovesin1958.)Ironically,O'Neillsufferedthesamefate.InUlsterasinRhodesia,
11.JamesChichester-Clark,quotedbytheScarmanTribunal,p.10.12.ScarmanTribunal,p.10.13.TheCameronCommissionidentifiedcausesoftheviolenceof19681969;theymirroredthegrievancesofthecivilrightsmovement(housingdiscrimination,electoralgerrymandering,theUSC,theSpecialPowersAct)andincludedProtestantfearsofthreatstoUnionists'controlofthestate([CameronCommission]DisturbancesinNorthernIreland,Cmnd.532[Belfast:HMSO,September1969],LordCameron,Chair).14.TerenceO'Neill,TheAutobiographyofTerenceO'Neill(London:RupertHart-Davis,1972),p.83.
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powertended"togravitatetowardsthosewho[were]leastreadyforchange."15
O'Neill'sresignationinApril1969wasbutthemoststrikingsymptomoftherapidlyerodingUnionistcohesion.ThefragmentationofthestateandthecorrespondingdivisionswithintheProtestantcommunitywereatleastasseriousasthemobilizationwithinCatholiccirclesatthetime.ThedebatesinCabinetandParliamentrevolvedaroundthedirectiontheregimeshouldtake:towardlimitedconcessionsandinstitutionalreform,orbacktotraditionalsectarianism.Inbothscenariosthevitalinterestsofthesettlercommunitywouldstand;nothingwouldalterthestatusoftheborderortheUnionist-dominatedstate.Thedebatecenteredonhowbesttosafeguardtheseinterests.AsinRhodesiaintheearly1960s,theenlightenedUnionistfactioncouldnotprevailovertheabsolutists:theargumentsforrenovatedsettlerrulewerelostonacasteconvincedthattheminoritywouldexploitanyconcessionsasasteppingstonetoaunitedIreland.Inturn,LoyalistintransigencesuggestedtoCatholicforcesthatthesettlerstatewasbeyondredemption:powerfulProtestantforcesseemedreadytofightanyhintofpoliticalmodernizationunderthetraditionalbattlecry,NoSurrender!
Rosearguesthata"minoritycannotfragmentitsopponentsbyitsownefforts."16ThecivilrightsmovementdidnotbyitselfprecipitateUnionistfragmentation,asiscommonlyassumed.17OnlyaftertheUnionistmonolithhadbeguntoshowcracksdidthemobilizationofsubordinateforcesgatherimpetus.O'Neill'smodernistinnovationsandthebriefeclipseoftraditionalhard-linepolicyraisedCatholicexpectationsandprovokedaright-wingProtestantbacklashinsideandoutsidethestate.UnionistdivisionsopenedspaceforCatholicprotestandgavetheirdemandsincreasingsalience.
IncontrasttoRhodesiawheretheRhodesianFront'svictoryoverthe
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WhiteheadGovernmentin1962easedfrictionswithinthestate,reunifiedthesettlercommunity,andstifledblackunrest,thereplacementofO'NeillacceleratedbothstatefragmentationandthemobilizationofProtestantandCatholicmilitants.Thesecontrastingoutcomescanbeexplainedinpartbythedifferentialroleofthemetropole.InRhodesia,aswehaveseen,thelackofsustainedpressurefromBritainfrustrated
15.ColinLeys,EuropeanPoliticsinSouthernRhodesia(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1959),p.36.16.Rose,"Priorities,"p.266.17.MichaelMacDonald,ChildrenofWrath:PoliticalViolenceinNorthernIreland(NewYork:Blackwell,1986),pp.7677.
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blackexpectationsandremovedonepotentialsourceofsettlerfragmentation.Britain'sinvolvementinUlsterhelpedtocrystallizegrievances,raiseexpectations,andsparkprotestsamongCatholics.Itshowedthatthesettlerstate'sauthorityinUlsterwasnotabsolute.Anditoutragedahard-linesectionoftheProtestantcommunity,alreadyhorrifiedatthespecterofCatholicmobilizationandtheUnionistregime'sapparentsurrendertoBritishandCatholicdemands.Thechangingbalanceofforcesproducedafull-scalecrisisofauthorityandorderthatledtoBritishrulein1972.
Labour'sAbortiveReforms
DespiteNorthernIreland'sgrowingunrest,themetropole'spolicyofleastinterferencewasparamount.Althoughin1969HaroldWilsonhadcondemnedthe''nearlyfiftyyearsof...unimaginativeinertiaandrepressionofsuccessive,unchallengedand...unchallengeableUlsterUnionistGovernments,"theLabourGovernmentwasreluctanttointervene.18TheHomeSecretary,JamesCallaghan,revealed:"TheadvicethatcametomefromallsideswasonnoaccounttogetsuckedintotheIrishbog."19Anotherminister,RoyJenkins,toldtheCabinet:"IfthereisonethingIhavelearnt,itisthattheEnglishcannotrunIreland."20Callaghan'sConservativesuccessorasHomeSecretary,ReginaldMaudling,tookanevenmorepessimisticview:"Irealizedthevirtualhopelessnessofanyattemptbyreasontobringpeaceandreconciliationtothissufferingandtorturedpeople."21
Labourpolicyfrom1968to1970centeredonencouragingtheUnionistGovernmenttoacceptareformprogramwithoutreplacingestablishedpoliticalinstitutions.Callaghanwasquiteexplicit:
Asnoreliablealternativeinstrumentofgovernmentexisted,itseemedtometobebettertowintheagreementoftheUlsterUnioniststowhatwasnecessarythantousethepowerofParliamenttodismissthem.IhadnoconfidencethatiftheUlsterUnionistGovernmentwerereplacedBritish
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interventionwouldmakethesituationbetterinthelongrun.ThesearequicksandsfortheBritish.22
18.Wilson,Labour,p.692.19.JamesCallaghan,AHouseDivided:TheDilemmaofNorthernIreland(London:Collins,1973),p.15.20.QuotedinSundayTimesInsightTeam[hereafterInsight],NorthernIreland:AReportontheConflict(NewYork:Vintage,1972),p.105.21.ReginaldMaudling,Memoirs(London:SidgwickandJackson,1978),p.180.22.Callaghan,HouseDivided,pp.2425.
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InCabinet,CallaghanandDenisHealeyexpressedtheviewthat"ourwholeinterestistoworkthroughtheProtestantgovernment.TheProtestantsarethemajorityandwecan'taffordtoalienatethem."23LondonbelievedthatStormontcouldbecomeabeaconofreformdespiteitspastrecordandthatWestminsterwouldnotneedtosuspendtheregimeorlegislateoveritshead.ForWilson,"OnlyspeedyreformcouldavertirresistiblepressuresforlegislationatWestminster...interveninginIrishaffairs;noneofuswantedthat."24TheCabinet'sdesiretoavoidlegislativeinterventioninUlsterwascritical,sincetherewasnomechanismformetropolitanjudicialinterventionlikethatoftheAmericanfederalcourtsduringthecivilrightsmovement.
London'soverridingconcernwastoavoidtakingdirectpoliticalcontroloftheprovince.Britishpolicy,oneministernoted,"amountedtodoinganythingwhichwouldavoiddirectrule."25Accordingly,theLabourGovernmentsimultaneouslyurgedreformsontheUnionistGovernmentandreassuredit.TheaimsweretosalvageStormont'scredibilityasthelegitimatecenterofauthority,restore"asenseofself-confidenceintheUlsterUnionistCabinet,"andfortifythecoercivecapacitiesoftheregime(e.g.,withtheBritisharmyin1969).26
Thisfaithin,andpracticalrelianceon,theUnionistregimewasitselfattheheartoftheproblem.AlreadyinSeptember1969,theCameronCommission'sreport,DisturbancesinNorthernIreland,hadlinkedunresttotheUnionistparty'spermanentmonopolyofstatepower,whichhadmadeit"insensitive"tocriticismandpressuresforreform.27HadtheBritishGovernmentitselfbeenmoresensitivetothepoliticalclimateinNorthernIrelandandthestrengthofUnionistresolvetodefendtheexistingorder,itmighthaveshownlessoptimismaboutthepossibilitiesforfunnelingreformsthroughestablishedpoliticalinstitutions.Thisstrategywasdestinedto
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backfireinacontextwhereascendantsupremacistforcesdefinedreformsasunwarrantedanddeservingoffierceresistance.28
ThisdidnotmeanthatnothingchangedinUlster.EvenlimitedBritishinterventionwasasharpdeparturefromthepastandStormont-
23.FormerBritishMinisterRichardCrossman,quotedinGeoffreyBell,TroublesomeBusiness:TheLabourPartyandtheIrishQuestion(London:Pluto,1982),p.108.24.Wilson,Labour,p.672.25.QuotedinInsight,p.103.26.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.70.27.CameronCommission,p.12.28.MaryHolland,"LessonsofDirectRule,"NewStatesman(London),23March1973,p.401.
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Westminsterrelationsalteredsignificantly.InLondonanewNorthernIrelanddepartmentintheHomeOfficewasformed,whichgavetheprovinceahigherprofile.JointUlster-Englishworkingbodieswerecreatedtosortoutvariousproblems.Commissionsofinquirywereestablishedtomakerecommendationsoncontroversialissues.AMinistryofCommunityRelationswascreatedtofosterintercommunalharmony.Anduniversaladultsuffragewasintroducedinlocalcouncilelections.By1971alltheoriginaldemandsofthecivilrightsmovementhadbeenmet,exceptrepealoftheSpecialPowersAct.
Securityarrangementswerealsoaffectedbymetropolitanintervention.Between1969and1972,responsibilityforinternalsecurityinNorthernIrelandwassharedbetweentheUnionistandBritishGovernments.In1971,aJointSecurityCommittee(JSC)wascreatedtocoordinatesecurity,withrepresentativesfrombothstates:theBritisharmycommander,theChiefConstable,theUnionistpremierandtwootherministers,andaBritishGovernmentrepresentative.Committeemembershaddifferentoutlooksandmotivatinginterestsbutsharedacommitmenttorestabilizingtheprovince.29
ThenewBritishvoiceinsecuritydecisionmakingdidnotguaranteestructuralinnovations;liberalizationdependedonacomplexsetofconsiderations:
desiredchangesinsecurityinstitutionswouldbebalancedagainstBritain'sforemostinterestinmaintainingpoliticalstabilityandcombatingviolence;
reformsweremostlikelytomaterializeiftheycouldbechanneledthroughtheUnionistGovernment,notunilaterallyimposedbythemetropole;
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reformswouldbepostponediftheyappearedtoraisethealreadytroublinglevelofright-wingpoliticalopposition(fromCabinetmembers,theUnionistbackbench,Loyalistextremistsoutsidetheparty,andtheregime'sown"atavisticgrassrootssupporters")30andunderminetheincumbentmoderateUnionistleaders.
29.TheprimeministerandhisCabinetcolleaguesneededtoassuageProtestantconstituentsanddissidentUnionistMPs;theChiefConstablestruggledwithpolicemorale,Catholicdistrustoftheforce,andthesensibilitiesoftheProtestantcommunity;theBritisharmycommanderneededsufficientmilitaryresourcestosuppressdisordersbutalsosoughttoreturnsecuritydutiestothepoliceandreducethearmy'spresenceintheprovince;theBritishrepresentativesoughttoensurereformsofsecuritystructureswithminimumBritishinvolvement(Rose,Governing,pp.17274).30.ThequotedphraseisHaroldWilson's(Labour,p.270).
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MorethoroughgoingchangeinpoliticalandsecurityarrangementswouldhaverequiredmoredirectBritishcontroloverthestatemachinery.Londonwasloathtotakethison.31
TheLabourGovernmentwasalsoreluctanttocommittroopstoactivedutyinNorthernIreland.32Callaghanpredictedthatprotracteddeploymentofsoldierswouldmakepoliticalintervention"inevitable"andthatthearmywouldbecometaintedbyitsassociationwiththeUnionistGovernment.33ButinAugust1969,asorderbrokedownandProtestantsattackedCatholicsectionsofBelfastandLondonderry,Britishtroopsweresentin.Londonhopedthatmilitaryinterventionwouldquicklyrestoreorderandobviatedirectpoliticalcontroloftheprovince.34
Theproblemofimpartiallymaintainingorderoftenarisesinthecourseofthird-partymilitaryinterventionsinsocietiestroubledbycommunalconflicts.Arecentcaseinpointinvolvesthepeace-keepingforceofIndiantroopsinSriLanka:intendedtoprotecttheTamilminorityfromtheSinhalesemajorityandfromlocalsecurityforces,itrapidlydegeneratedintoabrutaloccupationforceforTamilciviliansandinsurgents(theTigers).35
BritishtroopsinNorthernIrelandinitiallyassumedapeace-keepingrole,mediatingbetweenthetwolocalantagonists.Catholicswelcomedthesoldiers,whobroughtrelieffromtheattacksofLoyalistmobsandwhosepresenceseemedtoconfirmtheUnionistpoliticalsystem'sutterbankruptcy.Thehoneymoonlastedseveralmonths.Butthearmy'sofficial"dutiesinaidofthecivilpower"(i.e.,theUnionistGovernment)anditsroutineoperationsgraduallyearneditareputationofbiasinfavoroftheProtestantcommunity.IncreasinglythrustintohighlychargedconfrontationswithCatholicsandhavinglittlegraspoflegalniceties,BritishsoldiersactedwiththesameinsensitivitytowardciviliansthathaddiscreditedtheUnionistpolice
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forces:indiscriminateraidsonCatholicpremises,ruthlessresponsestodemonstrationsandpublicdisturbances,anddailystreetharassment.Thecumulativeeffectofthese
31.In1968CallaghanhaddrawnupcontingencyplanstotakeovertheNorthernIrelandGovernment(HouseDivided,p.23).32.ThreethousandBritishtroopswerealreadygarrisonedinUlsteronstandingmilitaryduties.33.Callaghan,HouseDivided,pp.21,27.34.BewandPatterson,TheBritishState,p.21.35.OverseventhousandSriLankancivilianshavediedinthefightingsince1983.LikeUlster'sCatholics,theTamilshaveexperienceddiscrimination(ineducation,employment,andlandsettlement)underSinhalesedominationsinceindependencein1948;amajorityofTamilssupporttheTigerguerrillas(seeWilliamMcGowan,"India'sQuagmireinSriLanka,"TheNation,25June1988,pp.89699).
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practiceswastofurtherradicalizeandalienateCatholicsfromtheUlsterandBritishgovernmentsalikeanddeepencommunalhostilities.
ThecommitmentofBritishtroopsrelievedtheintensepressuresonthepoliceandopenedanopportunityforreforms.TheRoyalUlsterConstabulary'sgrossmishandlingofitsresponsibilitiesforpublicorderandriotcontrolledtounprecedentedscrutinyfromthemetropoleandcondemnationorcallsfordismantlingtheforcefromCatholics.A1969inquirybyBritishofficersRobertMarkandDouglasOsmondcriticizedthepoorleadershipintheRUC,theexcessiveautonomyoftheInspectorGeneral,theoutdatedpoliceintelligencesystem,thefortressappearanceofRUCstations(forbiddingandinaccessibletothepublic),thelackofasystemforcomplaintsandapublicrelationsbranch,andtheRUC'sobsessionwiththeIRAtotheexclusionofProtestantmilitants.36(TheRUCclaimedthattheProtestantparamilitaryUlsterVolunteerForcedidnotexistandthatthepolicehad"norecordsonloyalists.")37
Laterin1969theHuntCommittee'sinvestigationofthepolicerecommended,interalia:dismantlingtheUlsterSpecialConstabulary(orB-Specials);greatlyincreasingRUCpersonnel;disarminganddemilitarizingthepolice;settingupaPoliceAuthoritytowhichtheInspectorGeneralwouldbeaccountable;introducingasystemforpubliccomplaints;enlistingCatholics;improvingtraininginriotcontrol;repealingmuchoftheSpecialPowersAct;andremovingcriminalprosecutionfrompolicejurisdiction.38
ThattheBritishGovernmentofficiallyacceptedtheseproposalsdidnotmeanthattheauthoritiesputthemimmediatelyintopractice.39ManyoftheHuntCommittee'srecommendationsweredelayed,diluted,orlaterreversed.Catholicscontinuedtoformasmallfractionofpolicerecruits;aseparatesystemofprosecutionwasdelayeduntil
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1972;andtheSPAwasrepealedonlyin1973.SensitivetoProtestantconcernsandconsiderationsofpolicemorale,theGovernmentbalancedthecommittee'sliberalizingrecommendationsbyanimmediateinfusionofpersonnelandmaterialresourcesintotheRUC.40
36.Callaghan,HouseDivided,pp.54ff.37.JohnMcGuffin,Internment(Tralee,Ireland:Anvil,1973),p.84.38.[HuntCommittee]ReportoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonPoliceinNorthernIreland,Cmnd.535(Belfast:HMSO,October,1969),LordHunt,Chair.39.CallaghanwashesitanttotakecontroloftheRUC,fearingitsreaction.Ifitrefusedtoserve,BritainhadinsufficientU.K.policeavailabletoreplaceit,andtheBritishPoliceFederationobjectedtoitsmembers'servingundertheUnionistMinisterofHomeAffairsandenforcingtheSpecialPowersAct(Callaghan,HouseDivided,pp.19,22).40.GillBoehringer,"BeyondHunt:APolicePolicyforNorthernIrelandoftheFuture,"SocialStudies2,no.3(1973):404.
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TheHuntreportneverthelesschallengedthesectarianstyleofpolicing.ItskeyrecommendationswerereceivedbitterlyintheProtestantcommunity,whoseantimodernistorientationtolawandorderheldfirmlythatreformsweredangeroustoProtestantsecurityandtantamounttoappeasementofCatholics.Unionistofficialswerepredictablyshockedbythereport.TheCabinetagreedtoabolishtheUSConlywhenCallaghanthreatenedthatWestminsterwouldlegislateoveritshead.41
ProtestantsviewedtheproposedabolitionoftheUSCandreformoftheRUCaspartofasell-outbyBritishofficials,whomtheyconsideredgullibletoCatholicpropagandaabouttheforcesoforder.ThepublicationofHunt'splanfordismantlingtheUSCwasgreetedwithtwodaysofProtestantriotingduringwhichsixteensoldierswerewoundedandonepoliceofficerkilled.ThiswasjustoneoccasionwhenProtestantlawlessnessinthedefenseofsettlerlawandorderwarnedtheBritishCabinetnottopushitsreformsinthesecurityspheretoofar.
InordertoreduceProtestantfuroroverthelossoftheUSC,twonewsecurityforceswerecreated,theUlsterDefenseRegiment(UDR)andtheRUCReserve(RUCR).Formedin1970,theUDRwastobearnoresemblancetothesectarianUSCandtooperateinsteadasanormalregimentresponsibletotheBritisharmycommander.Thecompositionoftheregimentunderminedthisgoal.42TheBritishMinisterofDefenseforAdministration,RoyHattersley,hadstatedin1969thattheUSCwas"composedofamajorityofmenwhohavegivengoodandhonourableservicetoNorthernIrelandandtheywillbewelcomeintothe[UDR]."43Becauseoftheirexperienceandknowledgeoflocalconditions(andalackofalternativerecruits),formerUSCofficerswereurgedtoapplytothenewforce.Some50percentofinitialrecruitswereUSCmenwhocontinuedtoembracedecidedlyUnionistvisionsoforder;thearmy'sscreeningprocedures
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werelooseenoughtoallowfiercelyanti-CatholicelementsintotheUDR.Overtheyears,anumberofUDRmenhavebeenlinkedtoillegalparamilitaryorganizations,andothershavebeenconvictedofcrimes,includingsectarianmurders.
TheHuntCommitteerecommendedthatthepoliceberelievedofparamilitaryduties,since"anypoliceforce,militaryinappearanceand
41.ArthurHezlet,The"B"Specials:AHistoryoftheUlsterSpecialConstabulary(London:TomStacey,1972),p.223.42.SeeDerekBrown,"InDefenseofUlster,"Fortnight,6February1976;EdMoloney,"TheUDR:NineYearsofKillingsandControversies,"Hibernia(Dublin),29March1979;BarryWhite,''TheUDR,"BelfastTelegraph,1April1980.43.IrishNews(Belfast),13November1969.
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equipment,islessacceptabletominorityandmoderateopinionthanifitisclearlycivilianincharacter."44InsidetheRoyalUlsterConstabularytherewassentimentinfavorofdemilitarizationanddisarming:in1969theCentralRepresentativeBodyoftheRUChadsentamemorandumtotheHuntCommitteeexpressinga"desiretoabandonallmilitaryaspectsofourpresentduties."45RUCconstablesweresplitonthequestionofarms:a1970pollfoundthat1,196opposedand1,085favoredretainingarms.46ChiefConstablesYoungandShillingtonfeltthatthearmyshouldbethesolearmedforceandthatdisarmingthepolicemightindeedhavepositiveeffects.Thepolicywasputintoeffectbrieflyin19701971;theChiefConstable'sreportfor1970stated,"RelievingthePoliceoftheirformerparamilitarydutieshastosomeextentreducedthetensionandhostilitywhichexistedinsomeareas."47
BritishplanstoenhancetheaccountabilityoftheRUCmetwithonlypartialsuccess.FollowingHunt'srecommendation,aPoliceAuthoritywascreatedinJune1970toimproveaccountabilityandthehandlingofcomplaintsallegingindisciplineandbrutality.Yettheauthorityspentmostofitstimeonrecruitment,budgetarymatters,andequipmentandbuildings;itdeferredthelargerpolicyissuesandthequestionofaccountability.48TheRUCandtheMinistryofHomeAffairsencouragedtheauthority'sreluctancetotakeanactiveroleinmajorpolicematters.Onereportonthepolicepointedto"theobduracyanddeterminationoftheseniorofficialsintheMinistryofHomeAffairs,tomanipulatethePoliceAuthorityandrenderitfutile....ThePoliceAuthoritywassimplyanotherdepartmentoftheMinistryofHomeAffairs."49The1970PoliceActstipulatedthattheauthority'smembersshouldrepresentthecommunityasawhole,yetmostofitsinitialseniorstaffcamedirectlyfromtheMinistryofHomeAffairsandfailedtoreflectminorityinterests.
TheChiefConstableretainedfullcontrolofoperationalmatterssuch
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asdeploymentandhandlingofspecificdisturbancesalthoughpoliticiansdidnotalwaysrespecttheseboundaries.AstheChiefConstablelaterrevealed,"Mybiggestdifficultywastotrytoconvincepoliti-
44.HuntCommittee,p.21.45."Ulster'sPoliceForceSpeaksOut,"TheNewsletter(Belfast),6September1969.46.PollbytheRepresentativeBodyoftheRUC,citedinRose(Governing,p.147).47.ChiefConstable,ChiefConstable'sAnnualReport(Belfast:PoliceAuthority,1970),p.1.48.PoliceAuthorityforNorthernIreland,TheFirstThreeYears(Belfast:PoliceAuthority,1973).49.CentralCitizensDefenseCommittee,NorthernIreland:TheBlackPaper:TheStoryofthePolice(Belfast:CCDC,1973),pp.23,24.
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ciansatStormontandfromBritainthattheyhadnoauthoritytointerferewithpoliceoperations.ItwasoftenverydifficulttoconvincetheUnionistpoliticiansofthis."50
Internalorganizationalchangesweremadetorationalizeandexpandpolicecapacities.In1970aCommunityRelationsBranchwasformedandthePressOfficeenlargedtoimprovepublicrelations;anOperationsDepartmentwassetuptocoordinateandoverseethepolicingofpublicdisorders,withaSecurityBranchspecializinginsecuritydutiesandpreventionofsabotage.
Littleprogressoccurredinpolicingduringthisperiod.TheRUCcontinuedtoactinavisiblypartisanmanner;51constableswererearmedin1971;overwhelminglyProtestant,itenforcedthecontroversialsecuritylawsoftheUnionistGovernmentwithlittleaccountability.Therearevariousexplanationsforthelackofmorefundamentalreforms,beyondorganizationalresistancetochange:London'sdesiretobolstertheincumbentUnionistregime;officialfearofaProtestantbacklashagainstsweepingreforms;andpoliticalviolence,particularlyfromtheIRA.
Theseconsiderationsconditionedthepossibilitiesforothersecurity-relatedreforms.RepealoftheSpecialPowersActwasonethatthecivilrightsmovementdemandedandtheHuntreportrecommendedexceptfora"fewessentialprovisions."52AnticipatingBritishpressuretoeliminateallspecialpowers,AttorneyGeneralBasilKellyproposedrepealofmostoftheSPA(retaininginternmentpowers).ButtheBritishHomeSecretaryrefused:theincreasingstreetviolenceandtheoverwhelmingLoyalistsupportfortheactmilitatedagainstrepeal.53
NotonlydidtheNorthernIrelandGovernmentretaintheSPA,itpassedadditionalsecuritylegislation:thePublicOrder(Amendment)Act,whichrestrictedprocessionsandservedtoprohibitcivilrights
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marcheswhileProtestantparadescontinuedunabated;thePreventionofIncitementtoHatredAct,whichoutlawedactsdesignedtostiruphatredorarousefearinasectionofthepublic;andnewregulationsundertheSPA.
Althoughmanyreformsproposedforthesecuritysystemwerelimitedorpostponedindefinitely,theyshookpopularProtestantconfidenceintheincumbentregimewhichthesettlersresentedforacceptingLon-
50.Interviewwithauthor,2August1984.51.AndrewBoyd,BrianFaulknerandtheCrisisofUlsterUnionism(Tralee:Anvil,1972),p.73.52.HuntCommittee,p.35.53.PeterKellnerandChristopherHitchens,Callaghan:TheRoadtoNumberTen(London:Cassell,1976),p.107;Insight,p.200.
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don'sdemandsandfracturedtherulingparty.WhileO'Neill'sinitialconcessionsandBritain'seffortsatreformdividedtheUnionistGovernmentfromitsProtestantsupporters,theyignitedCatholicdemandsforbroaderchanges.Thisuntenablesituationwasalleviatedbythe1970ConservativeelectoralvictoryinBritain,whichmarkedamorefavorablemetropolitanposturetowardtheUnionists.
ToryLaissez-Faire
BothLabour(19661970)andConservative(19701974)administrationsbacktrackedontheoriginalreformprogramintheireffortstopreventextremistsfromtopplingmoderateUnionistregimes.54CommontobothLabourandtheTorieswasafearthatUlstermightinstallanextremeright-wingregimeorthatapopularProtestantuprisingmighterupt,thusmakingBritain'spostureofreformbyremotecontroluntenable.HomeSecretaryCallaghanwrotethatthe"principalachievement"ofLabour'sinterventionwastoextend"Westminsterinfluence"withoutprovokinga"crisis''suchasarevoltbytheNorthernIrelandCabinet.55Labour'sgoalshadnecessarilyaffecteditscriticaldecisions.Asacaseinpoint,HaroldWilsonwantedtobanamarchbytheProtestantApprenticeBoysinAugust1969butgrantedpermissionforfearthatan"Orangebacklash"wouldsweepawaythe"insecure"Government.56ThemarchresultedintwodaysofseriousriotinginLondonderry.ByWilson'sadmission,theexistenceof"extremistright-wingpressure"remainedof"acuteconcern"totheLabourCabinetrightthroughtheelectionof1970whentheToriescametopower.57Theconcernwasnotlimitedtothepossibilityofaright-wingtakeoveroftheGovernmentbutincludedthatofamassiveProtestantrebellioninthestreets.ToryHomeSecretaryMaudlingwasspeakingforLabourandConservativeministersalikewhenhedeclaredthat"aProtestantbacklashwasthegreatdangerweallfeared."58AsChapter7shows,
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thethreatofamassiveProtestantrevoltremainsapowerfulconstraintonBritishpolicyinUlster.
BothLabouritesandConservatives,therefore,enteredintoamarriageofconveniencewithUnionistregimes,andtheprincipaldeterminantsof
54.TheUnionistpartywasbecoming"difficulttohandle"andpronetorebellionagainsttheleadership(BrianFaulkner,MemoirsofaStatesman[London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1978],p.87).55.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.99.56.Wilson,Labour,p.692.57.Ibid.,p.771.58.Maudling,Memoirs,p.184.
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Britishpolicyoutlinedabovecharacterizedbothadministrations.ButtheConservativevictoryin1970didsignalamoredetachedmetropolitanpostureandamoresympatheticapproachtotheUnionists.
TwospecialfactorsconditionedtheConservativeapproach.First,thetraditionalalliancebetweentheUnionistsandConservativesatWestminsterencouragedtheConservativestoyieldtoUnionistdemands;theconstructiveengagementofLabourgavewaytoamoreisolationistorientationonthepartoftheTories.AsO'Neill'ssuccessor,JamesChichester-Clark(19691971),remarkedtothiswriter,"TheTorieslikedtodistancethemselvesfromus"andasaresultinterstaterelationsbecame"morerelaxed."59TheessenceofthechangewascapturedbyformerBritishMinisterHattersley:
ItisnotsurprisingthatStormontprejudicesandopinionsnowfillthevacuumleftbyWhitehall'snegativeresponsetotheeventsofthepastyear.ThebalanceofpowerhasshiftedinBelfast....StormontrunsNorthernIrelandvirtuallyalone.60
FormerPrimeMinisterHaroldWilsonconcurred:"OneelementinagravelydeterioratingsituationisthegrowingappearanceofaBritishGovernmentdepartingfromitspositionofneutralityandacceptingastateofalliancewithasingleUlsterfaction."61
AlthoughHattersleyandWilsonmayhavehadpartisanmotivesfortheircritiques,theirconclusionsappearjustifiedinlightoftheHeathGovernment'sactions.HeathdisplayedlittleconcernwiththeUlstercrisis;62andHomeSecretaryReginaldMaudling"wascontinuallycounselingagainsttheneedforanyactionatall"63BothHeathandMaudlingexercisedlessguidancethantheirLabourpredecessorsovertheBritishofficialsstationedinNorthernIrelandandoverthelocalUnionistadministration.Bydefault,imperialinertiafrom1970to1972allowedpowertoreverttothesettlerelite.NorthernIreland
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Cabinetmembersdidnothesitatetoseizethisopportunityto"reasserttheirindependence,"especiallyunderthepremiershipofBrianFaulkner(19711972).64
59.Interviewwithauthor,14August1984.Chichester-ClarkisnowLordMoyola.60.RoyHattersley,"DoesMaudlingDancetoFaulkner'sTune?"Guardian,25August1971,p.10.61."WilsonWarnsHeath"NewYorkTimes,5September1971.62.MargaretLaing,EdwardHeath:PrimeMinister(London:SidgwickandJackson,1972),pp.221,224.63.HenryKelly,HowStormontFell(Dublin:GillandMacmillan,1972),p.132.64.Callaghan,HouseDivided,pp.177,96.
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Favoring"amorelaissez-faireapproachtosecuritymatters"theHeathGovernmentyieldedtoUnionistdemandsandtherebyhelpedtodecelerateLabour'sreformprogram.65ThegrowinginfluenceofNorthernIrelandofficialsoversecuritypolicywasreflectedinthebalanceofpowerinsidetheJointSecurityCommittee.66FrictionbetweenBritishandUlstermemberscontinued;67butthecommitteebecame,asFaulknerstatedinFebruary1972,increasinglyanarenawithinwhich"thevitalinterestsoftheUnionistsmustbeacknowledged."68
AsecondfactorconditioningtheConservativeapproachtothecrisiswastheintensifyingpoliticalviolencein1971.Thenumberofdeathsincreasedseventimesfrom1970to1971(climbingfrom25to174)andthenumberofreportedincidentsofshootingandbombingsoared(from383to3,271).ThisviolencefueledloyalistdemandsthattheUSCberevived(theUDRwasnotenough);thatmoreBritishtroopsbedeployed;thattheymakemoreliberaluseoftheirweapons;andthattheyoccupyCatholicenclavestorootoutinsurgents.69Demandstounleashthearmycoincidedwiththefirstdeathsofsoldiersin1971:43werekilled.Whitehalleventuallygaveintotheloyalistpressure;duringtheConservativeadministrationtheRUCwasrearmed,thearmyinvadedCatholicghettoes,amassiveinternmentexercisebegan(seebelow),andthemilitarypresenceincreasedtoanunprecedented22,000troops.ThepartialBritishcontroloverthearmyundertheLabourGovernment(fromtheMinistryofDefenseandarmygenerals)clearlyrelaxedundertheTories.Itwasnotmuchofanexaggerationtoclaim,asformerministerHattersleydid,thatundertheToriesthearmybecamean"instrumentoftheUnionisthegemony."70AlthoughthesettlersnolongermonopolizedthemachineryofstatecoercionandcertainlydidnotgeteveryinitiativetheywantedfromLondon,repressivepowerwasincreasinglymobilizedontheirbehalf.
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FormerPrimeMinisterWilsonhadtakentheviewthatreformwasnecessaryasashockabsorberforrepression:"Thereisnofutureinapolicybasedontherepressionofviolencealoneunlessthatisaccompa-
65.DerekBirrellandAlanMurie,PolicyandGovernmentinNorthernIreland:LessonsofDevolution(Dublin:GillandMacmillan,1980),p.68.66.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.144;Hattersley,"Faulkner'sTune?";BirrellandMurie,Devolution,p.68.67.FormerChiefConstable,interviewwithauthor,2August1984.68.QuotedinBoyd,Faulkner,p.74.69.SeeJohnWhale,"Ulster:TheSlidetowardDirectRule"SundayTimes,21March1971.70.Hattersley,"Faulkner'sTune?"
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niedbyanactiveorintensifiedsearchforapoliticalsolution."71AlthoughLabouriteshadheldthatreformswouldhelpdefuseCatholicunrestandthusallowWhitehalltominimizedirectBritishintervention,Toriesfavoredgreaterrepressionasameanstothesameend.TheConservativepartywantedCatholicmilitantsandtheIRAsuppressedatallcosts;itstronglyopposedtheuseofconcessionstomitigatetheproblem.72Insistingthat"concessions...merelyresultinclaimsformore,"HomeSecretaryMaudlingcautionedthat"aProtestantbacklash...couldsoeasilybesparkedoffbytheargumentthatthemoreconcessionsyoumadetotheCatholics,thelessresultyougotforthem."73
TheseviewsseemedtocontradictMaudling'sclaimthatTorypolicywas"adifficultbalancingact"betweenthedemandsoftheminorityandmajoritycommunities.74Infact,policymakingandimplementationweresharplyskewedinfavoroftheProtestantsidebetween19701972.MaudlingdescribedthelogicbehindtheConservativeCabinet'sthinking:
If...vigorousactionswerenottakenand,inparticular,ifitwereallegedthattheSecurityForceswouldliketodothesethingsbutwerebeingheldbackbythepoliticians,thentherewasalwaysthedangerofaviolentProtestantreaction,and...theProtestantscouldbejustasviolentastheCatholics,andtheywerefarmorenumerous.75
AviolentandmassiveProtestantrebellionwasdreadednotsimplyforthedomesticdamagethatwouldresultbutalsobecauseitwouldforcegreatermetropolitanmilitaryorpoliticalintervention,bothofwhichWhitehallstillhopedtolimit.Indeed,"thenecessityofavoidingaconfrontationwiththeProtestants,withitsimplicationofgreatermilitaryinvolvement,appearstohavebecomeby1970themajorinfluenceupongovernmentpolicy."76InordertominimizeitsinvolvementintheprovinceandplacatetheProtestants,theConservativeGovernmentwasdecidedlymorewillingthanLabourto
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approvevariousformsofrepression.
Themostspectacularactofmassrepressionwastheinternmentoperationthatbeganon9August1971.(Internmentwithouttrialallowed
71."WilsonWarnsHeath."72.Laing,Heath,p.220.73.Maudling,Memoirs,pp.183,184.74.Ibid.,p.182.75.Ibid.76.PaulBew,PeterGibbon,andHenryPatterson,TheStateinNorthernIreland:19211972(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1979),p.183;Rose,Governing,p.109.
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thedetentionofsuspectsonsuspicionalonewhereevidenceofwrongdoingwaslacking.)Intheinitialsweep342individualswerearrested,onlyafractionofwhomhadanyconnectiontotheIRA.Inthefirstsixmonthsofinternment,2,357peoplewerearrested,two-thirdsofwhomwere,accordingtoMcGuffin,"completelyinnocentmen"whowerereleasedafterinterrogation.77TheChiefConstablelaterreflectedonthisembarrassingfailurerate:"Onereasoninternmentwentwrongwasthatourinformationonwhoshouldbeinternedwasn'tuptodate."78Ironically,oneimportantby-productofthedetentionandinterrogationexercisewastoupdateandincreasethenumberofintelligencedossiersonmembersoftheminoritycommunity.
Awatershedinthecrisisoforderandauthority,internmentwashighlycounterproductive.(1)Itcausedasharpescalationofviolenceandintercommunaltension.(2)ItradicalizedandmobilizedCatholics,whostagedmassantiinternmentmarchesandrallies.(3)ItsimplementationbytheBritisharmydrovethefinalwedgebetweentheCatholiccommunityandboththeBritishandUnionistregimes.79CatholicsbelievedthattheConservativegovernmenthadcompletelyforsakenthemforthesettlercaste.(4)ItbroughttheIRAfloodsofnewrecruits.(5)Usedintothemid-1970sagainstindividualssuspectedofinvolvementintheIRA,detentionwithoutchargeortrialmadepoliticalprisonersofthesesuspects.InternmentthusenhancedthemoralstandingoftheIRA.
Internmentwasamilitaryoperationinpursuitofpoliticalaims,introducedagainsttheadviceofthepoliceandmilitarychiefs.80Faulkner'sCabinethadconvincedHeaththattheoperationwouldstrengthenitagainstbothCatholicoppositionandtheUnionistrightwing.FaulknerindeedtookadvantageofinternmenttoconsolidatehispowerinUnionistcirclesbutfailedtoshoreuptheregime'sauthority.81
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Generally,Faulknerplayedamoredictatorialroleinsecuritymattersthanhispredecessors.HerarelyconsultedtheentireCabinetonimportantsecuritymattersdespitefrequentrequestsfromministersforgreaterconsultation.82Hisabilitytodictatesecuritydecisionswasevidentinotherareas:
77.McGuffin,Internment,p.87.78.Interviewwithauthor,2August1984.79.KevinBoyle,TomHadden,andPaddyHillyard,LawandState:TheCaseofNorthernIreland(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1975),pp.145,147.80.McGuffin,Internment,p.86.81.81.Boyd,Faulkner,pp.69,81.82.DavidBleakley,Faulkner:ConflictandConsentinIrishPolitics(LondonandOxford:Mowbrays,1974),pp.83,9697.
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FromAugust1971toFebruary1972Faulknerwasgivenhishead,andarmy,nottosayMinistryofDefense,opinionwassystematicallyoverruled.ThiswascertainlythecasewithrespecttointernmentandthetolerationoftheUDA[theUlsterDefenseAssociation,aProtestantvigilantegroup],anditseemslikelyalsotohavebeenbehindthelooseningofUDRrecruitingstandardsandthereorganizationoftheforceonlocallines.83
ThattheUnionistGovernmentregainedmuchofitscontroloversecurityandpoliticalaffairsin1970didnotnecessarilytakethesteamoutofProtestantprotestsoversecuritypolicy.SupportwasgrowingforextremistleaderssuchasIanPaisley,whoforyearshadbeenfomentingpopularoutrageoverofficial"appeasement"ofCatholics;hewaselectedtoStormontandWestminsterin1970.ThePaisleyitesbecameathornintheCabinet'sfleshjustasright-wingwhitesinSouthAfricatroubledtheBotharegime.InNorthernIreland,therightwingleftitsmarkonsecuritypolicy,asPrimeMinisterChichester-Clarkremarked:
One-thirdoftheUnionistpartywereheadcases.TheywantedthesecurityforcessentintoCatholicareastoshootthem.Theyappliedpressuretodosomethingcrazyallthetime.Theextremistshadabigeffect;theypushedCabinetfurtherthanwenormallywouldhavegone.ThePaisleyitesalwayswereacontributingfactorineachsecuritysituation.Wewereconcernedwithourelectoralposition;somemoderateswereputoutbytherightwinginthe1970election.84
UnionistregimessimplycouldnolongertakeProtestantsupportforgranted,evenduringtheFaulknerregime.Themosthard-linepremierinyears,FaulknerinsistedonthemilitarydefeatoftheIRAandthesuspensionofpoliticalinitiatives;evenso,hisactionsdidnotsatisfythePaisleyites.85
HavinglosttheconfidenceofmanyProtestantsaswellascontrolovertheCatholics,thelastthreeUnionistregimesfaredonlymarginally
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betterinsatisfyingthethirdimperativeofsettlerrule,keepingthemetropoleatbay.RelievedatthelessintrusivestyleoftheToryGovernment,theUnioniststriedtoexpandtheirpoliticalautonomyandkeepLondon'smilitarysupport.UnionistsofallstripeswereanxiousoverthepossibilitythatthismilitarysupportmightleadtodirectBritishruleor,worse,tothedoomsdayscenarioofareunitedIreland.Buttheycould
83.Bew,Gibbon,andPatterson,TheStateinNorthernIreland,p.183.84.Interviewwithauthor,12August1984.85.Faulknerwrote:"IarguedthattoattemptsomeconstitutionalinnovationofamajornaturewhileIRAviolencecontinuedwouldbeseenassettingdemocracyasidetoappeasetheIRA....Politicalprogresswassimplynotpossibleinaclimateofterrorismandviolence"(Memoirs,pp.144,121).
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seenoalternativetoacceptingtheCrown'smilitaryaidwhileresistingpoliticalinterference,despitethelessonstheymighthavelearnedfromKenya'ssimilarexperienceduringtheMauMaudisturbances.
Inacruelreprise,thesamedynamicthathadpropelledO'Neilloutofofficeactedonhissuccessors.Tryastheymighttoshoreupstatepowerandreestablishorder,eachofthelastthreeUnionistpremierscouldnotstrikeabalancebetweenthecontradictorypressuresofProtestants,Catholics,andtheBritishGovernment.
Conclusion
ThelastthreeUnionistregimesreluctantlyacceptedcertainreforms(butresistedothers)inexchangeforcontinueddevolvedpower.Likemostothersettlerstates,theUnioniststateprovedreformableonlywithinnarrowbounds.Inasocietywithdeepcommunalcleavages,institutionalizedsettlerhegemony,andabitterhistoryofrepressionandresistance,theregimecouldnotsuddenlypromoteegalitarianpoliticalandsocialchangesandremakethesecuritysystem.NorthernIreland'ssettlergovernmentswerenotseriouslycommittedtothisenterprise,norwastheUnionistpopulationpreparedtoallowthemtopursueit.
Theconstraintsimposedonthestatebythesettlercommunityclashedwiththedemandsofthemetropole.Withinadequatecoerciveresources,eachUnionistregimeneededBritain'shelptomaintainorderbutfearedBritain'sresponsetothepalpablysectarianpracticestheProtestantsdemanded.ItcouldnotdefendsettlersupremacywiththeflexibilitythatRhodesiahadafter1965orthatfullyindependentsettlerstatessuchasSouthAfricaandIsraelhave.ThepreviouschaptershowedhowaRhodesianregimelefttoitsowndevicesfortifieditssecuritysystem;BritishinterventioninUlsterfrom1969to1972checkedasimilarexpansionisttendency.Metropolitan
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involvementhoweverlimitedsignaledadecisivebreakwithcustomaryBritish-Ulsterrelations.TheironyisthatthesettlerregimehadinvitedBritainintorestoreorderbut,muchtoProtestants'chagrin,themetropoleoversteppeditsassignedroleandintrudedinvitalmatterspreviouslymonopolizedbythesettlers.IftheConservativeGovernmentallowedUnionistCabinetsgreaterleewayfrom1970to1972thanitsLabourpredecessorhad,itcontinuedtointerfereindomesticaffairsinamannerthatultimatelyproveddisastrousforsettlerrule.Failingtosafeguarditsautonomyfromthemetropole,theUnioniststatemortgageditsfuture.
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YettheevidencepresentedinthischapterpointstotheresilienceofNorthernIreland'ssecurityapparatusastheCatholicsandtheBritishpressedforreforms.TheUnionistethos,relativeautonomy,andsectarianpracticesoftheRUCandtheHomeAffairsMinistrywereunaffectedbyBritain'sreforms.CriminalprosecutionsremainedinpolicehandsandtheSpecialPowersActsurvivedforuseinrepressiveexperimentssuchasinternment.TheBritisharmydevelopedareputationasanoccupationforceinCatholicareasandadefenderoftheUnioniststate.Despitesomeinstitutionalinnovations,themaintenanceoflawandordermeant,asinthepast,UnionistlawandProtestantorder.
Wehaveseenthatacomplexarrayofsettlerandmetropolitaninterestskepttheessentialfeaturesoftherepressiveorderintact.Moreover,withaUnionistregimeinofficeandreactionaryProtestantforcesincivilsociety,BritainlackedthecapacitytooverhaulstateinstitutionsandnormalizeUlster'saffairsbyremotecontrol.SeriousreconstructionofthesecuritysystemwouldhavemeantterminatingUnionistrule,somethingthemetropolewishedtoavoidatallcosts.Directmilitaryandpoliticalinterventionisrarelythepreferredoption.AsCallaghanexplained,"ThelessonsofCyprusdominatedallourmindsatthistime:howeasyitwastogetintosuchasituationandhowdifficulttogetout."86InUlster,reformsremainedaltogethersecondarytoBritain'sprimaryaim:restabilizationwithminimaldirectinvolvementintheprovince.
Themetropole'sposturewasshapedbyseveralsecondaryconsiderationsaswell:acommitmenttotheprincipleofself-determinationreflectedinthetrappingsofWestminstermajoritariandemocracy;anobligationtothosewhohadbeenloyaltotheCrown;87andtheconvictionthat"noreliablealternativeinstrumentofgovernmentexisted."88OnlylateinthedaydidtheBritishCabinet"cometolearnthattheWestminsterpatternofdemocracy,whichsuits
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ussowell,isnoteasilyexportable."89Analternativedemocraticarrangementwouldberequired.Consequently,powersharingreplacedmajorityruleasthecornerstoneofBritishconstitutionalengineeringinUlster.
London'srestrainedapproachtotheLoyalistpopulationwasalsoarguablyinfluencedbyitsfailuretohandleanothersettlerpopulation
86.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.60.87.The1949IrelandActaffirmedthattheobligationwouldnotbecut"withouttheconsentoftheParliamentofNorthernIreland";the1973NorthernIrelandConstitutionActreaffirmedit,grantingU.K.statustoUlsteruntilamajorityvoteexpressedotherwise.88.Callaghan,HouseDivided,p.24.89.Maudling,Memoirs,p.185.
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Rhodesia'swhitesandfearsofanotherunilateraldeclarationofindependence.Protestanthard-linerswereindeedthreateningthiscourseofaction,whichLondondidnotdismissasmeaninglessposturing.UnlikeRhodesia,aunilaterallyindependentUlsterwouldbeathornmuchclosertothemetropole'snervescreatingtensionsbetweenLondonandBelfastandwithDublin,perhapsprecipitatingDublin'sinterventiononbehalfoftheCatholicminority.
TheeventsinNorthernIrelandfrom1969to1972demonstratehowquicklyasettlerpoliticalsystemcancollapsewhenallthreepillarscrack.Metropolitaninterventionhoweverminimalistcatalyzedsettlerfragmentationandminoritymobilization.Eachdevelopment,inturn,contributedtopoliticalinstabilityandviolence:theBritisharmyservedroughjusticetoCatholics;militantProtestantsbrokefromthesettlerblocandengagedinsectarianviolence;andCatholicsreactedtobothgroupswithdefensiveviolence,whichlaterturnedoffensive.TheseinteractingprocessesunderminedtheauthorityandcredibilityofthreesuccessivesettlergovernmentsandopenedthewayfordirectBritishruleofthisdividedsociety.
Illustratingthemetropole'sevolutionfromanarbitertoaprincipalintheconflict,BritishtroopsfiredonCatholicdemonstrators,killingthirteen,onBloodySunday.ThisincidentinJanuary1972precipitatedtheannouncementofdirectruleinMarch.Inactingunilaterally,themetropoleconsultedneitherProtestantnorCatholicleaders.UnlikeZimbabwe'scase,NorthernIreland'stransitiontopostsettlerrulewasmadechieflyfromaboveandwithout,albeitwithCatholicsupport.Thepeculiaritiesofthistransitionconditionedstate-societyandintercommunalrelationsundertheneworder.Britishrulesince1972hashadmixedresults:itsdirectcontrolofthesecuritysectorfacilitatesliberalizationbutBritaincontributesbyitsverypresenceandactionstocommunalpolarizationandpoliticalviolencethat,inturn,limitthescopeofliberalization.Chapter7examines
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theseproblems.
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Chapter6Zimbabwe:One-PartyStateIndependenceDayon18April1980promisedgreatchangesinZimbabwe.Theyokeofsettlerrulehadfinallybeenthrownoff,Britain'scolonialclaimswithdrawn,andinternationallegitimacybestowedonthenation.Thepopularlyelectedgovernmentproclaimeditscommitmenttocreatearadicallynewstateandsocialorderbasedondemocracy,socialjustice,andracialequality.1Underthenewregimegreatprogresshasbeenmadeinredressingtheinequalitiesinherentintheoldracialorder,inuniversalizinghealthcare,education,employmentopportunities,and,ofcourse,thefranchise.
Thenewconstitutioninstitutionalizedcertainpoliticalforms(amultipartysystem,declarationofrights,reservedwhiteseatsinParliament)butgavetheneweliteopportunitiestoinitiatechangesinotherstatestructures,suchastherepressivemachinerythathadmaintainedthesettlereliteinpower.Duringthe1960sand1970s,blacknationalistsfrequentlycondemnedRhodesia'ssecuritylawsandinstitutions,andmanyhadpersonallyexperiencedtheironfistofthesettlerstate.Theyhadpromisedtodissolvethisapparatusoncetheygainedpower,alongwithothervestigesofsettlerdomination.
Anumberofcompetingperspectiveshaveaddressedtheimpactofaprotracted,successfulliberationstruggleonstatestructuresundertheneworder.Oneisthemobilizationthesis.FollowingFanon,severalana-
1.SomelegislationspecificallyregulatingAfricanshadbeenrepealedbetween1977and1979.
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lystshavedrawnadistinctionbetween''falsedecolonization"andgenuineliberationfromcolonialdomination.MostFrenchandBritishAfricancoloniesunderwentrelativelypeacefultransitionstoindependenceinthe1950sand1960s.Inmanycases,thechangingoftheguardhadlittleimpactonthedevelopmentofdemocraticinstitutions;thenewstatestructuresdisplayedremarkablecontinuitywiththeoldcolonialorder.SouthernAfricadidnotfollowthismodelofconsensualdecolonization;thesettlerandcolonialregimestherewerepreparedtoresistthewindsofchangesweepingthecontinentandhadnointentionofvoluntarilyrelinquishingtheircontrolfor"athousandyears,"inIanSmith'sprediction.ThisintransigenceforcedAfricanliberationmovementsundergroundandsetinmotionprotractedguerrillacampaigns.
SeveralAfricanistscholarsgreetedtheriseofarmedstruggleandpopularmobilizationinAngola,Mozambique,Namibia,andRhodesiawithclaimsthatitwouldlaythebasisforatrulydemocraticpostcolonialorder.Thelongcampaignsagainstwhiteruleseemedtocontaintheseedsofoppositiontoanysystemofinstitutionalizedrepressionundermajorityrule.ForDavidson,popularorganizationandthecreationofaninsurgent,shadow"state"inliberatedzonesduringthestruggleforindependenceinsouthernAfricameansthatthenewrulershave"noneedtotakeoveranyofthestructuresandinstitutionsofcolonialrule."2AccordingtoChabal,"successfulpeople'swarsusherintheestablishmentofstatesthelegitimacyandstructureofwhichowelittle,ifanything,totheircolonialpredecessors."3Theguerrillas'politicalbodieswillreplacetheoldstateapparatusandthelegacyofpopularactivismhasademocratizingeffectontheneworder.Chabalsuggeststhatmassmobilization"irrevocablydetermined"thecharacteroftheneworderinpostcolonialGuinea-Bissau.4Themobilizationthesis,inshort,assumesthattheexperienceofpopularrebellionwillremainsalient
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andsignificantlyaffectthepostcolonialpolity.Thisperspectivefailstoappreciatethatthevitalityofpopularforcesduringaninsurgencyoftenwanesafterliberationandthatprotractedguerrillawarshaverarelyresultedinnewdemocraticpolities.5
2.BasilDavidson,"ThePoliticsofArmedStruggle,"inSouthernAfrica:TheNewPoliticsofRevolution,B.Davidsonetal.(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1976),p.75.3.PatrickChabal,AmilcarCabral:RevolutionaryLeadershipandPeople'sWar(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983),p.218.4.Chabalquoteswithapprovalaleaderofthatcountry'sliberationmovement(ibid.,p.95).5.SamuelHuntington,"WillMoreCountriesBecomeDemocratic?"PoliticalScienceQuarterly99,no.2(Summer1984):213.
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Adiametricallyopposedargumentholdsthattheveryprocessofviolentanticolonialstrugglesohardensguerrillaforcesthattheyadoptanauthoritarianpoliticalcultureandrelyoncoercivetacticsinelicitingciviliancompliance.Thisinsurgentcultureofrepressionislikelytosurviveaftertheguerrillascapturestatepower,particularlyifitmesheswiththeoldregime'sauthoritarianpoliticalculture.Sitholearguesinthisvein:
TheliberationstrugglealsoleftasignificantmarkonZimbabwe'spoliticalculture.Thecommandistnatureofmobilizationandpoliticizationunderclandestinecircumstancesgaverisetothepoliticsofintimidationandfear.Opponentswereviewedinwarliketerms,asenemies,andtherefore,illegitimate.Theculturefromtheliberationstrugglewasintolerantandviolent.6
Thisheritagemayhaveconditionedtheformerguerrillaandnationalistleaderswhonowwieldstatepowerto"adopttacticsandattitudesthatmirrortheoppressors"whomtheyhadfoughtagainstandreplaced.7AsChapter4suggests,however,thepoliticalcultureoftheliberationstrugglehadtwodimensions:commandistanddemocratic.Since1980thepopulardemocraticaspecthasbeeneclipsedbytheauthoritarian,whichincludeswhatsomecallan"aloofness"or"elitism"onthepartofstatemanagers.8Citizensareroutinelyexhortedtoidentifywiththerulingpartyandtoendorsestatepoliciesafterthefact,buttheirpreferenceshavelittleimpactontheelite'sdecisionmakingregardingmajorpoliticalandsecurityissues.Mass"departicipation"iscommoninothernewlyindependentAfricanstatesbutespeciallystrikinginZimbabwe,giventheextensivepoliticizationofthepopulaceduringthewar.9InMozambique,bycontrast,stateleadersaresomewhatmoreinclinedtosolicitlocalinputtostatepolicies,althoughthecripplingguerrillawarhamperscommunicationbetweenstatemanagersandmasses.10
6.MasipulaSithole,"Zimbabwe:InSearchofaStableDemocracy,"in
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DemocracyinDevelopingCountries,vol.2,Africa,ed.L.Diamond,J.Linz,andS.Lipset(Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner,1988),p.248.7.DavidCaute,"MugabeMovestoOne-PartyRule"TheNation,22February1986,p.204.8.AndréAstrow,Zimbabwe:ARevolutionthatLostItsWay?(London:Zed,1983).AneditorialinMOTO(Gweru,Zimbabwe)inFebruary1983discerned"agrowinggapbetweenthepeopleandthepeople'sGovernment."9.RuthCollier,RegimesinTropicalAfrica(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1982),pp.14445;NelsonKasfir,TheShrinkingPoliticalArena(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1976).10.AllenIsaacmanandBarbaraIsaacman,Mozambique:FromColonialismtoRevolution(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1982).
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Athirdargumentappearsinoneversionofdependencytheory,whichreducesthepracticesofthepostsettlerstatetotheimperativesofinternationalcapital.AccordingtoMandaza,thenewstateinZimbabweisaconvenientinstrumentor"conduitthroughwhichtheimperialistforcesofinternationalfinancecapitalcancompromiseandcontrolthenewstate."Inordertothwarttheanticipatedoppositionofthemassestoimperialism,thepostsettlerstate,nowrunbyablackpetitbourgeoisie,"dependsontherepressiveapparatuswhichitinvariablyexpandsandstrengthens."11Thestate'sapparentlegitimacymasksthefactthat,inthefinalanalysis,itdependsontheinheritedrepressiveapparatustocontainthepopularunrestlatentinimperialisteconomicexploitation.Inthisreductionistaccount,theinterestsandpoliciesofthepostsettlerstatefollowonlythelogicofinternationalcapital;theyignorethespecialpoliticalinterestsofthenewpowereliteandallotherdomesticfactors.
Eachoftheseperspectivesportraysthelegacyofaliberationwarinaone-dimensionalfashion.OuranalysisofZimbabwerevealsamorecomplexreality.Thethesesofmobilization,authoritarianculture,andimperialismallfailtoconsiderkeyvariablesthatshapeoutcomesoftransitions.Onefactoristhestrengthandresiliencyofsurvivingstateinstitutions,whichmaysabotageplansforliberalization.Tillypointstotheconstraintsimposedbystateorgansafterarevolution:
Mostrevolutionaries...seizeastateapparatuswithoutthatlongpreparationofanorganizationalalternative.Inthosecases,thealready-accruedpowerofthestateaffectstheprobabilitythatfundamentalstructuralchangewillissuefromtherevolutionmuchmorestronglythandoestheextentofmobilizationduringtherevolutiond.12
Awelcomecorrectivetosocietallycenteredmodels,Tilly'sstatepowerthesisisincomplete;itdoesnotlinktheinertialtendenciesofinheritedstateorganizationstothegoalsandinterestsofthenewexecutiveandtothebalanceofforcesincivilsociety,whichmaybe
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weightedfororagainstmodernizationofstatestructures.Theseregimeandsocietalvariablesarecentraltoanyunderstandingoftheprospectsforchangeoncesettlerrulehasbeendislodged.
11.lbboMandaza,introductiontoZimbabwe:ThePoliticalEconomyofTransition,ed.IbboMandaza(Dakar:CODESRIA,1986),pp.1415;seealsohischapter,"TheStateandPoliticsinthePost-WhiteSettlerColonialSituation"inibid.12.CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution(Reading:Addison-Wesley,1978),p.222.
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ThetransferofpoliticalpowertoapopularlyelectedregimeinZimbabwedidnotinducelegalandinstitutionalreformsoftheinternalsecuritysystem.Instead,corepillarsofthenewregimeroseonthefoundationsoftheoldapatternmanyothernewlyindependentAfricannationsfollowedastheymarshaledexistingstatecapacitiesforauthoritarianpurposes.13NeitherthelongitudinalcontinuitiesbetweensettlerandpostsettlerrulenorthepartialconvergencewithotherAfricanpolitieswasinevitable,however,asthischaptershows.
AfterdescribingtheinstitutionalfoundationsofstatepowerinZimbabwe,thischapterappliesanexplanatorymodeltotheinherited,unreconstructedsecuritysystem.Ourfindingssuggestthattheperpetuationofthissystemresultsnotsimplyfromtheobjectivesecurityproblemsfacingthecountrybutfromfouradditionalfactors:(1)thepoliticalimpotenceoracquiescenceofgroupsincivilsociety;(2)theabsenceofademocraticpoliticalculture;(3)thebureaucraticinertiaandrepressiveproclivitiesofthesecurityestablishment;and(4)theregime'smobilizationofinstitutionalcapacitiestomeetspecialpoliticalobjectives.Thefirsttwofactorsreflectanabsenceofconstraintsonrepression;thelattertwoconstitutecompellingincentivesforrepressiveoutcomes.ThefindingsindicatethatthefourthfactorhasthemostpowerinaccountingforthelackofliberalizationinthesecuritysectorinZimbabwe.Chapter7willexplainNorthernIreland'sdistinctivesecuritypatterns,withadifferentconfigurationofthesevariables.
TheInternalSecuritySystem
ThecollapseofwhitesettlerrulewasinitselfaprofoundeventinZimbabwe.Thepoliticalsystemopened:outlawedpoliticalpartieswerelegalized,universalsuffrageannounced,proceduresforfreecompetitiveelectionsestablished,andcivilandpoliticalrightsextendedtotheblackmajority.Yetananalysiscenteredonthese
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changesmayobscureimportantpoliticalcontinuities.Formaldemocraticstructuresareperhapslesscentralindicatorsofthesubstanceofapoliticalorderthanthesharpnessofthestate'scuttingedge,itsstructuresofcoercivecontrol.Theliteratureondecolonizationhasoftenoverlookedthispoint.
13.Attheendof1987,sixAfricannationshadmilitaryregimes,thirty-fivehadonepartysystems,andtenhadmulti-partysystems.OnvariationsinauthoritarianruleinAfrica,seeR.Collier,Regimes;RhodaHoward,HumanRightsinCommonwealthAfrica(Totowa,N.J.:RowmanandLittlefield,1986);RobertH.JacksonandCarlG.Rosberg,PersonalRuleinBlackAfrica(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1982).
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ThereisabasiccontinuityinthecoreofstatepowerinRhodesiaandZimbabwe.TheessentialfeaturesofRhodesia'sinternalsecurityapparatusremain:itpossessestremendouspowerandinstitutionalautonomy,displaysapartisanbiasagainstopponentsoftheregime,andoperatesinaconsistentlyrepressivefashion.Inshort,thedevelopmentofinternalsecuritystructuresinZimbabwehasbeenacontinuousprocess,punctuatedbythetransferofpowertoapopularlyelectedgovernmentin1980.
Atthesametime,themomentofindependencesignaleditsofficiallegitimation.Theregimeproclaimsthatthesecuritybranchhasacquiredauniversalisticethos,anditappearstohavemoreextensivepopularsupport.14TheofficialdoctrineofnationalsecuritynowcitesdefenseofthemajoritarianorderasamoralbasisforZimbabwe'ssecurityinstitutionsandemergencypowers.Securityofthewhiteminorityhasgivenwaytosecurityofthemajority;thepoliceforceisfrequentlyreferredtoasa"people'spolice,"committedtoservingthemasses;thearmyispresentedasan"armyofthemajority"insteadofaninstrumentofdomination;andthestateofemergencythatonceprotectedwhitesupremacynow"comesfromthepeopleandisdirectedtoprotecttheirinterests."15AccordingtotheHomeAffairsminister,the"stateofemergencypromotesratherthandiminishesourfreedomandindependence";16theoppressiveviolenceoftheRhodesianstatehasbeenreplacedwiththenewregime's"transformativeviolence''in"theserviceofourpeople."17Inanutshell,theGovernmentusesthelanguageofmajoritariandemocracytojustifyrepressivecontrols.18
Zimbabwe'spoliticalleaderstakeaninstrumentalistviewoftheinheritedsecuritysystem.Securitylegislationandagenciesareseenasneutralinstrumentsthatareconvenientlyavailableandamenabletotheincumbentexecutive,whichmayusethemtofosterthe"transformationintoajust,egalitarian,wealthysociety."19The
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contrastwithofficialdiscourseand,tosomedegree,practiceinpostcolonialMozambique
14.Nosurveyofpublicattitudesonsecuritylawsandpracticesexists,butimpressionisticdatasuggestthatZimbabweisbuildinglegitimation.MyreviewofthemagazineoftheZimbabweRepublicPolice,Outpost,from1980to1987foundministerialcommentsurgingrecruitstodispelpublicmistrustandsuspicionofthepolice,whoseemtobeassociatedwiththeoldBritishSouthAfricanPolice.15.MinisterofHomeAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,col.627.16.MinisterofHomeAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.11,16January1985,col.1209.17.MinisterofHomeAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.6,19January1983,col.859.18.AlvesdocumentsasimilardisparityinBrazil(MariaAlves,StateandOppositioninMilitaryBrazil[Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1985],p.31).19.MinisterofHomeAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.7,13July1983,col.416.
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isstriking.20Forexample,Mozambique'sformerpresident,SamoraMachel,declared,"Thisstate,thispower,theselawsarenotneutraltechniquesorinstrumentswhichcanbeequallywellusedbytheenemy[thePortuguesecolonialregime]orbyus....Wecannotservethemassesbygoverningwithstatepowersdesignedtooppressthemasses."21Accordingtothisessentialistview,securityinstitutionsinheritedfromanauthoritarianregimearestructurallyandideologicallyinclinedtoactrepressively.
Iftheofficialraisond'êtreforZimbabwe'ssecuritysystemhaschangedsinceindependence,itsorganizationhaschangedlittle.Thesecurityapparatusremainslarge,powerful,andinsulated.DecisionmakingisdominatedbyaninnerCabinet;22itincludestheprimeminister(nowthepresident),MinisterofStateforSecurity,MinisterofStateforDefense,andMinisterofHomeAffairs.23They,alongwithtopsecurityofficers,constitutethecommandingheightsofthesecuritycore(seeFigure1).
Sinceindependencetherulingparty,theZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion(ZANU),hasheldthatitispoliticallysupreme.ZANU's1984congressestablishedaPolitburoandfivenewstandingcommitteesofaCentralCommittee,whosemandateistosuperviseandadministerministriesandsecuretheauthorityofthepartyovertheGovernment.Inlawandinpractice,however,ZANUissecondarytotheexecutivebranch:theCabinetdetermineswhetherandhowpartyresolutionsaretobeimplemented.PresidentRobertMugabehimselfadmittedatthe1988congressthatZANU'ssupremacyovertheGovernment"hasnotbeenachieved."24Supportingevidencecanbefoundinsomeofthemostimportantpolicydecisions:againstZANU'swishes,theCabinethasmovedveryslowlyinresettlingpeasantsonformerlywhite-ownedland;25theGovernmentdidnotabolishthereservedwhiteseatsinParlia-
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20.ThepressuresofthelonganddevastatingguerrillawarinMozambiquehelptoexplaintheemergenceofnewformsofauthoritarianismsinceindependence(seeWilliamFinnegan,"TheEmergency:II,"TheNewYorker,29May1989).21.Quotedinmyarticle,"InSearchofRegimeSecurity:ZimbabwesinceIndependence,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies22,no.4(December1984):555.22.EricMarsden,"Mugabein'Super-ZAPU'Clash,"SundayTimes,20March1983.Theexecutiveconsistsofapragmatictechnocraticfactionandaradicalpopulistone.Libbynotesthattechnocratshavetendedtodominatedecisionmaking,particularlyoneconomicissues(RonaldT.Libby,"DevelopmentalStrategiesandPoliticalDivisionswithintheZimbabweanState,"inThePoliticalEconomyofZimbabwe,ed.M.Schatzberg[Praeger:NewYork,1984]).23.InterviewwithMinisterofStateforSecurity,Commerce,April1983,p.4.24.QuotedinColinStonemanandLionelCliffe,Zimbabwe:Politics,Economics,andSociety(London:Pinter,1988),p.80.25.By1988only41,000familieshadbeenresettled,outofatargetfigureof162,000.
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Figure1.StructureoftheSecuritySystem(1987).
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mentbeforetheconstitutionallystipulateddateof1987;theGovernmenthaspostponeddeclaringaone-partystatedespitesustainedpartypressuresince1980.YetrelationsbetweenpartyandGovernmentelitesaregenerallyharmonious,partlybecauseZANU'sPolitburoandstandingcommitteescontainprominentministersanddeputyministers.26TheirpresencesuggeststhatthePolitburocombinesbothgroupsintoapowerelite;itsoverlappingmembershiphelpsminimizedisagreementintheupperechelons.Whentheseelitesconflictwithlower-levelZANUcadresoversecuritymatters,theGovernmentusuallyprevails.AformerMinisterofHomeAffairsdescribedatypicalexchange.
TherehavebeenpressuresfromthepartyfortheGovernmenttotakecertainlinesofsecurity,buttheGovernmenthasn'talwaysdoneso.TherehasbeentremendouspressuretobanZAPU[theZimbabweAfricanPeople'sUnion]andhaveaone-partystate.TheGovernmentsaiditwantedtofollowtherules....ManyinthepartythoughtNkomo[theZAPUleader]shouldbedetained,buttheGovernmentdidn'twantto.ItwasadifficultpositionfortheGovernmenttobein.27
FollowinginthefootstepsofotherAfricannations,ZimbabwehasprogressivelyAfricanizeditssecuritysystem,staffingitlargelywithmembersoftheShonaethnicgroup,whichislinkedtoZANU.Sinceindependencethenumberofwhitesinthepoliceforce,military,andintelligenceagencieshasdwindledtoahandful.MembersoftheNdebeleethnicgrouphavelittlebetterrepresentation.Theydonotreceivepromotiontotopranksinthepoliceandveryfewserveintheintelligenceservice.Themilitaryisroughlyone-thirdNdebele,butShonaofficersholdthecommandposts.28
Africanizationhashelpedtoovercomethepreviousracialconfigurationofthesecuritybranch.Butthischangingoftheguardhashadlittleimpactonthesystem'sstructure,organizationalinterestsandproclivities,resources,andmodusoperandi.Inotherpostcolonial
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states,Africanizationhasrarelyledtotheliberalizationofinstitutionsofcontrol.InZimbabwe,twospecialpersonnelfactorsarerelevant.Theblackpersonnelinthesecuritysectorcomeprimarilyfromtheranksofexguerrillaswhofoughtagainstthesettlerregimeor"rehabilitated"of-
26.Inthestate'sfirstyears,theCentralCommitteemetinfrequently;therewasa"tendencytodetermineissuesinCabinet"ratherthanriskdebateintheparty(AfricaConfidential,3March1982;ClairePalley,"WhatFutureforZimbabwe?"PoliticalQuarterly51,no.3[July1980]:294).Thegrowthofgreaterpartyinfluencehasbeenslow(interviewwithEdgarTekere,MOTO,July1984,p.5).27.Interviewwithauthor,10June1987.28.AfricaConfidential,27March1985,p.4.
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ficialswhoservedthatregime.Itisnotuncommonforstatepersonneltoremainafterapoliticaltransition;manytopelitesnowintheCIO,theMinistryofHomeAffairs,andthepoliceareblackswhobegantheircareersinthe1960sor1970s.They,likethefewremainingwhitesinthesedepartments,apparentlyseethemselvesasprofessionalspreparedtoserveanygovernment.Butneitherex-guerrillasnorofficialsfromtheoldregimetendtoshowspecialsensitivitytostandardsofhumanrights.Theex-combatantsarewar-hardened,andthesurvivingofficialsweretrainedunderanauthoritarianorder.TheGovernmentapparentlyseesthenewrecruitsdifferently,judgingbyacommentoftheHomeAffairsminister:"ex-combatants...areexcellentrecruitsbecausetheyalreadyhavemilitaryknowledgeandthenecessarypoliticalorientationtopoliceadynamicandchangingsociety."29
TheRhodesianMinistriesofLawandOrderandInternalAffairshavebeendismantled,withtheirsecurityfunctionsandpolicingtransferredtotheMinistryofHomeAffairs.30HomeAffairsoperatesinamannerreminiscentoftheMinistryofLawandOrderinpartbecauseitadministersmanyofthesamestatutes.OneformerrankingHomeAffairsofficialstated,"Intheoveralladministrationoflawandorderpolicy,Idon'tthinktherehasbeenagreatdealofchange."31
Sinceindependence,theministry'sbudgetallocationhasgrownsubstantially(seeTable2).Absorbingover90percentofthefunding,theZimbabweRepublicPoliceforcenumbersfifteenthousand,plusthreethousandinthePoliceSupportUnit.32Theformerparamilitaryroleoftheregularpolicehasbecomelessprominent,butthreeunitsdealwithinternalsecurity:thePoliceIntelligenceandSecurityInspectorate,thePoliceSupportUnit,andtheCriminalInvestigationDivision.PolicingfeaturessomeimportantcontinuitieswiththeRhodesianpast,asaformerrankingofficerintheministryemphasized:"Themachineryofthepoliceandtheirtraininggoeson
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muchasitdidinthepast.Trainingisverysimilarandpolicemethodsaremuchthesameastheywere."33Theyenforce,interalia,thesecuritylegislationinheritedfromtheoldregimewhichpartlyexplainswhytheforcehashaddifficultyover-
29.Speechdeliveredatseniorofficers'seminar,reprintedinOutpost,September-October1982,p.11.30."MinistryofHomeAffairs,"mimeo,D12/47a(c.1984),p.1.31.Interviewwithauthor,2June1987.32.TheMilitaryBalance,19861987(London:InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,1986).Increasesinexpendituredonotnecessarilyindicatesinisterfortificationbutmaystemfromorganizationalrationalization;forthepolice,somefundingisforimprovedtrainingofpersonnel,butthebulkisforsalariesandallowances.33.FormerseniorHomeAffairsofficial,interview,2June1987.
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TABLE2SECURITYEXPENDITURES(inZ$millions)Expendituresa PercentageofTotal
AppropriationbHomeAffairsc
PoliceCIOdDefense HomeAffairse Defensef
197879 12.1 17.9197980 8.4 23.1198081 87.9 5.7 262.2 5.5 15.8198182 86.2 11.8 301.5 4.5 15.3198283 104.3 12.8 349.2 3.9 13.5198384 122.9 112 14.5 418.0 4.1 14.5198485 145.1 131 17.0 377.1 5.3 14.7198586 143.2 130 30.3 507.2 4.7 15.0198687 170.2 158.3 40.9 649.5 4.6 17.5198788(est.)
187.1 173.7 36.8 720.1
SOURCES:GovernmentofZimbabwe,EstimatesofExpenditure(Harare:GovernmentPrinter,annual);MinistryofFinance,EconomicPlanning,andDevelopment,Socio-EconomicReviewofZimbabwe19801985(Harare:GovernmentPrinter,1986);BulawayoChronicle,15April1987.aActualexpendituresincludesupplementarybudget,exceptfor198788,whichistheoriginalappropriationvotedbyParliament.bFiguresfororiginalappropriationbyParliament.cThebudgetallocatedtotheMinistryofHomeAffairsincludesthatforthepolice,whichthetabledisaggregates.dThebudgetfortheCentralIntelligenceOrganizationislistedintheGovernment'sEstimatesofExpenditureas"SpecialServices"underOfficeofthePrimeMinister.eFigurefor197879isforMinistryofLawandOrder.fFiguresfor197879and197980includefundingforCombinedOperations.
comingthepunic'ssuspicionandmistrustanddisassociatingitselffromtheoldBritishSouthAfricanPolice.34
Thereisevidencethatsomeprioritiesofthepolicehavebeen
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politicallyinfluencedbyofficialsoftherulingpartyandthattheforcehasbecomeincreasinglypoliticizedanddeferentialtoZANUofficials.35Partymembershipmaynotbearequirementforpromotionwithintheforce,butofficersareencouragedtobecomemembersandministerssometimesstresstheproperpoliticalroleoftheforce.OneMinisterofHomeAffairs,forexample,toldpoliceofficers:
34.Thepolicemagazine,Outpost,oftenreprintsofficialcomplaintsaboutthisproblem.35.ArnoldWoolley,"RecruitingforTrouble"PoliceReview,29August1986and5September1986.
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thepropositionthatapoliceforceisneutralandapoliticalmustbestoodonitshead....Noarmy,police,andjudiciaryare,orcanbe,apolitical....Politicizationofthepoliceforcewillenhancetheremovalofcolonialhangover[sic].36
Asuccessorissuedsimilarinstructions:"YoumustmakeeveryefforttobefullyinformedofthegovernmentpolicyandaboveallPartypolicy...andideologyinorderto...implementthatpolicy.37
Oneparticularlycontroversialarmofthepolice,underthedirectionoftheHomeAffairsminister,isthePoliceInternalSecurityandIntelligenceUnit.Itisexclusivelyconcernedwithinvestigatingandgatheringintelligenceontheactivitiesofinsurgentsandtheirciviliansupporters.38ThiseliteunitisknownforitsmistreatmentofsuspectsincustodyandharassmentofZAPUofficials.39
ThequalityofpolicingbyregularofficersinMatabelelandhasalsobeenaproblem.AccordingtoanAmnestyInternationalreportin1985,"ConditionsinpolicestationsinZimbabwearereportedtobegenerallypoor,withsevereovercrowding,poorfood,lackofbedding,andnoexercise.Prisonersarereportedtobebeaten[andtortured]bothbythepoliceandbyCIOinterrogators."40IncidentsofpolicetorturereportedlydeclinedaftertheappearanceofAmnesty'sreport,duetothecirculationthroughoutthepoliceofinstructionsforbiddingtorture;atthesametime,however,policepostsinMatabelelandwerefilledwithstronglyanti-ZAPUofficers.41
In1980theSpecialBranchofthepolicewasremovedfrompolicejurisdictionandfullyintegratedintotheCentralIntelligenceOrganization(CIO).TheCIOalsolostitsdirectaccesstotheprimeministerandisnowaccountabletotheMinisterofStateforSecurity.Mostimportant,theCIO'sbasicstructureandcriteriaforevaluatingthreatsandmakingpolicyrecommendationswerenotoverhauled.InitiallytheGovernment
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36.Speechdeliveredatseniorofficers'seminar,reprintedinOutpost,SeptemberOctober1982,pp.1011.37.SpeechbytheministerreprintedinOutpost,May-June1986,p.6.38.AssemblyDebates,vol.13,21August1986,cols.103536.39.AfricaConfidential,11December1985;DavidCaute,"MugabeMovestoOnePartyRule,"TheNation,22February1986,p.204.40.AmnestyInternational,DetentionwithoutTrialofPoliticalPrisonersinZimbabwe(London:AmnestyInternational,September1985),p.3;seealsoLawyersCommitteeforHumanRights,Zimbabwe:WagesofWar(NewYork:LawyersCommittee,1986),pp.89,109.41.AfricaWatch,Zimbabwe:ABreakwiththePast?(NewYork:AfricaWatch,1989),pp.19,41.
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envisionedsomechangeintheorganization;theseplansnevermaterialized,astheCIOdirectordisclosed:
WhenMunangagwa[theSecurityminister]askedmetostayinofficeforatleastthetwo-yearperioditwouldtaketoreconstructCIO,Iagreedbutmaintainedthattherewaslittleneedforchange....MunangagwalefttheprofessionalcontrolofCIOtome....ThismadeforverylittlechangeinIntelligencefunctioning,andasfarastherankandfileofCIOwereconcernedtherewasvirtuallynochangeinexecutiveoradministrativecontrol.42
Modificationsintheintelligenceapparatussinceindependencehavenotliberalizedit.PreviouslytheSpecialBranchwouldarrestandtheCIOwouldinterrogatesuspects;todayCIOoperativeshavebothpowersofarrestandinterrogationandoftenusethemwithdisregardfordueprocessoflaw.Sinceindependence,theagencyhasbeenlinkedtoscoresofincidentsoftorture,politicalkidnapping,andharshinterrogationpractices.ThetremendousautonomyandfreedomofactionthatitenjoyedundertheRhodesianstateremains.
TheCIO'sbudgetclimbedfromZ$5.7millionin19801981toanestimatedZ$38.3millionin19861987.43Parliamentdoesnotdebatethisfunding(asitdoesotherdepartmentalbudgets);questionsthatMPshaveraisedaboutitsallocationshavebeenruledoutoforderbytheSpeakeroftheAssembly.Moreover,itistheonlypartofthebudgetexemptfromauditingbytheComptrollerandAuditorGeneral.44ThequantumjumpintheCIO'sbudget,itsmergerwiththeSpecialBranch,anditsprominentroleininternalsecuritysuggestthattheagencymaybeevenmoreformidablethanundersettlerrule.45
Whataboutthemilitary?Foronething,itislargerthanthatofmostotherAfricanstates,partlybecauseitkeptmanyformerguerrillasinuniformafter1980.Asof1986,thearmynumbered41,000,theairforce1,000,andparamilitaryforces38,000.46Changeswithinthe
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armyhaveinvolvedAfricanizingtheforce;integratingpreviouslyhostile
42.KenFlower,ServingSecretly:AnIntelligenceChiefonRecord,London:JohnMurray,1987,p.272.Inlate1984acommissionwasformedtoadvisetheGovernmentonrecruitment,training,andintelligencesystems;itsrecommendationswereimplementedonlytoalimitedextent(AfricaConfidential,5September1984,p.8;formerCIOofficer,interviewwithauthor,17June1987).43.EstimatesofExpenditurelistsCIO'sbudgetunderSpecialServices,PrimeMinister'sOffice.44.AssemblyDebates,vol.12,1August1985,col.147.45.FrederickEhrenreich,"NationalSecurity,"inZimbabwe:ACountryStudy,ed.H.Nelson(Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1983),p.278.46.MilitaryBalance,19861987.Decidedlypro-ZANUgrass-roots"people'smilitias"(totalingtwentythousandmembers)haveformedandbeengivenparamilitarytrainingtodefendtheircommunitiesagainstsubversives.
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armedforcesanddismantlingthemorenotoriousunitsoftheoldregime(liketheSelousScoutsandtheSpecialAirServices);andretrainingtroopsbyaBritishadvisoryteam.
ThenominalintegrationofZANLA,ZIPRA,andtheRhodesianmilitaryforceshasnotproducedanethnicallyorraciallybalanceddefenseforce.ThemilitaryhasbeenAfricanizedandisnowdominatedbytheShonaethnicgroupandstaunchZANUloyalists.FormerRhodesianofricershaveresigned.Althoughroughlyone-thirdoftherankandfileisex-ZIPRA,thetoprankshavebeenpurgedofformerZIPRAmen(somehavebeenarrestedonchargesofsupportingantigovernmentinsurgents).Thecelebratedintegrationofthethreeantagonisticforceshas,therefore,beenmoreapparentthanreal.
TheretrainingoftroopsbytheBritishMilitaryAdvisoryandTrainingTeam(BMATT)hascenteredonconvertingaguerrillaforcewithaninsurgentideologyandmodusoperandiintoanapolitical,professionalforcewithconventionalcapabilities.However,theMugabeGovernmenthasmovedtopoliticizethemilitaryandtoensurethatitisrunbyZANUloyalists.TopmilitaryofficersaremembersofZANU'sPolitburoandCentralCommittee,helpingtomake"themilitaryahiddenarmoftheparty."47OneofthefewsolidstudiesofZimbabwe'smilitaryconcludesthatthetrendtowardprofessionalizationcannotcompetewiththattowardsectarianism:thereisa"constanttensionbetweenmilitaryprofessionalsandethnicpraetorians,"withthelatteractingas"aconstantbrakeonformalprofessionalism."AccordingtoEvans,"comprehensiveWestern-styleprofessionalizationofthearmedforcesisunlikelytooccur."48Inshort,themilitaryhasreplacedoneformofsectarianismwithanother,movingfromwhiteracialtoblackethniccommitments.Communalreorientation,notliberalization,hasoccurred.
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Defenseexpenditurehasmushroomedunderthenewregime,jumping28percentfrom19851986to19861987alone.Thearmyabsorbsapproximately80percentofthisallocation,withtheremaindergoingtotheMinistryofDefense,theairforce,andparamilitaryforces.49Zimbabwespendsaround5percentofitsgrossdomesticproductondefense(3.5percentistheaveragefordevelopingcountries).50Defenseexpenditureabsorbsagrowingproportionofthetotalbudget(seeTable2),and
47.MikeEvans,"Gukurahundi:TheDevelopmentoftheZimbabweDefenseForces19801987,"StrategicReviewforSouthernAfrica10,no.1(May1988):25.48.Ibid.,pp.3,30,1.49.EstimatesofExpenditure.50.MilitaryBalance;TheEconomist,21April1984,p.9.
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thedefenseproportionincreasinglyapproachesthatin1978and1979,attheheightoftheRhodesianwar.
Whereasthefirstbudget(19801981)emphasizedspendingfordevelopmentandsocialservices,subsequentonesdecreasedfundingforsocialprogramsandincreasedspendingforsecurity.Inflationandthecostofdemobilizingandsupportingthirty-fivethousandex-guerrillasfortwoyearshavecontributedtotherisingsecurityallocations.Morerecently,asignificantproportionofthedefensebudgetaround7percentin1987hasbeenmaintainingfromseventhousandtotenthousandtroopsinMozambiquetoprotectvitaltransportationlinesfromsabotagebyguerrillasfightingtheMozambicanGovernment.51Theoveralldefensebuildupsinceindependenceisofficiallydefendedintermsofongoingsecurityproblems;52butcritics,includingsomeofficials,contendthatactualsecurityrequirementsdonotwarrantthemagnitudeofspending.
OneinnovationintheareaoflawandorderisthecreationofYouthBrigadeslinkedtotherulingparty.Underthemantleofbuildingnationalunity,theparamilitarybrigadeshavebeeninvolvedinattacksonmembersofoppositionpoliticalparties,particularlyin1984and1985.Prosecutionshavebeenrare.53
Likeotherorganizations,statesecurityagencieshaveavestedinterestinsurvival,ifnotexpansion.Aninternalsecuritysysteminheritedfromasettlerstateisstructurallyconducivetorepressiveoutcomes.Equallyimportantmaybearegime'sencouragement,forpoliticalorotherreasons,oftheseessentialistinstitutionaltendencies.ThejunctureofindependenceinZimbabweprovidedauniqueopportunityforthesystem'soverhaul,whichthenewregimedidnotseize.Insteaditfortifiedtheseagencieswithmaterialresources,personnel,andlegalpowers;itleftthemonlynominallyaccountable;itrepeatedlypraisedtheactivitiesofthesecurityforces;anditassignedthemmissions
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likelytoproducerepressiveoutcomes.Thefollowingsectionsexaminethelegal,intrastate,andsocietalfactorsfavoringrepressiveoutcomesandtheelectiveaffinitybetweentherepressiveproclivitiesofthesecuritysectorandthenewregime'spoliticalagenda.
RepressiveLegislation
Chapters3and4tracedthedevelopmentinRhodesiaofabatteryofstatutes,usedfirsttopreemptorcurtailnationalistpoliticalopposition
51.WashingtonPost,nationalweeklyed.,11January1988.52.MinisterofFinance,AssemblyDebates,vol.13,31July1986,col.659.53.LawyersCommittee,Zimbabwe,p.54.
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andthentocombatguerrillaforces.Duringthestruggleforindependence,Rhodesia'sAfricanleaderscondemnedthesedraconianmeasuresandpromisedtorepealthemoncethesettlerstatehaddissolved.Sinceindependence,someofthesemeasureshavebeenremoved.MartiallawandthesystemofSpecialCourtswereabolishedin1980,andcertainemergencyregulations(suchasthosepermittingcollectivepunishmentandprotectedvillages)havebeenwithdrawn.YetmostofRhodesia'ssecuritylegislationhasbeenretained.54Theavailabilityofsuchsweepingpowerstendstoencouragerepressivesolutionstopoliticalandsocialproblems.
Thestateofemergencyhasbeenineffectcontinuouslysince1965.Oneofitsmajorprovisionsisexecutivedetention.Undersection17oftheEmergencyPowersRegulationstheHomeAffairsministermayordertheindefinitedetentionofanyoneifhebelievesittobe''expedientintheinterestsofpublicsafetyorpublicorder."Section21empowersthepoliceandCIOtodetainindividualsforuptothirtydaysonthesamegroundsasundersection17,andsection53allowsthepolicetodetainanyoneforuptothirtydaystofacilitateaninvestigation.Anyoneheldundersection17isentitledtoareviewofthegroundsfordetentionwithinthirtydaysbytheDetainees'ReviewTribunal(discussedinthenextsection).Theannualnumberofpersonsindetentionhasnotbeendisclosed,but1,334personsweredetainedfromJanuary1982toJuly1983,mostforshortperiods;considerablyfewerweredetainedafter1986.55
UndertheEmergencyPowersAct,thestatemayissueregulationsthatsuspendormodify"anylaw";from1980to1986itamended14statutesbyexecutivedecree.From1980to1985,itintroduced103newregulations.56Manyoftheregulationsbearnorelationtoemergencyrequirements:forexample,familyplanning,changesofcities'names,controlofgoods,services,andprices,staterevenue,andlaborregulations.Relianceonsuchdecreesisnotonlyexpedientbut
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familiarjustifiedbyprecedentssetundersettlerrule,asoneministerargued:"Formanyyears,bothbeforeandsinceindependence,therefore,GovernmentshaveusedtheEmergencyPowersActtodealwithsituationsthatdonotin-
54.Someofthefollowingdiscussiondrawsonmychapter,"ContinuitiesinthePoliticsofStateSecurityinZimbabwe,"inThePoliticalEconomyofZimbabwe,ed.M.Schatzberg(NewYork:Praeger,1984),andonmyarticle,"RegimeSecurity."SeealsoJanRaath,"TheEternalEmergency,"TheTimes,18July1986.55.JohnHatchard,"EmergencyPowersinZimbabwe,"ms.,DepartmentofLaw,UniversityofZimbabwe,1986,p.14;seealsohis"DetentionWithoutTrialandConstitutionalSafeguardsinZimbabwe,"JournalofAfricanLaw29,no.1(Spring1985):3858.56.Hatchard,"EmergencyPowers,"p.8.
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volvepublicsecurity."Headdedthat"whenthisGovernmentusestheEmergencyPowersActinsimilarsituations,itisdoingnomorethanfollowingtheexampleshownbyitspredecessors."57
Thestateofemergencypermitsnominalparliamentarycontroloverthepromulgationofexecutivedecrees.AnewregulationmustbelaidbeforetheAssembly"assoonasmaybe"afterbeingmade,andtheAssemblycanannulitwithintwenty-eightdays.ThisproceduremeansthatimportantregulationsneednotbediscussedinParliamentorjustifiedbytheexecutive;manysuchmeasureshaveescapedbothlegislativeandpublicdebate.
Since1980,theCabinethasbeenthesceneofdebateovercontinuingthestateofemergency,buttheconsensusisthatterminatingitwouldbepremature.58Variousjustificationshavebeenadvanceddomesticinsurgency,needsofasocialistsociety,spilloverfromtheguerrillawarinMozambiquebutacontinuingthreatfromSouthAfricahasbeenaconsistentpartoftheofficialrationale.TheMinisterofHomeAffairsunderscoredthelatter:"UntiltheSouthAfricansituationisresolved,thestateofemergencyforthiscountryshouldremain."59
Onedangerofaprotractedstateofemergencyisthatitwillbeacceptedas"normal";anotheristhatitwillbeinstitutionalizedinstatutelaw.60IntheeventthattheEPAisrepealed,legislationnowexiststofillthevacuum.ThePresidentialPowersActof1986allowsthepresidenttoissueemergencydecreestodealwith"situationsthathavearisenorarelikelytoariseandthatrequiretobedealtwithasamatterofurgency."(SuchregulationsmaybeamendedorrevokedbytheAssembly.)Thisact,ineffect,enablestheincorporationofemergencyregulationsintotheordinarylaw.Tellingly,oneministernotedthattheactallowsfora"ministateofemergency."61
TheLawandOrder(Maintenance)Actof1960continuestogivetheexecutiveenormouspowerstoharassopponentsandcriminalize
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politicalactivity.Similarly,theUnlawfulOrganizationsActof1959remainsonthebooks,providingforthebanningoforganizationsdeemed
57.MinisterofJustice,LegalandParliamentaryAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.12,22January1986,col.1476.58.Author'sinterviewswithtopGovernmentofficials,June1987.59.AssemblyDebates,12July1988,col.114.60.ClintonRossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship:CrisisGovernmentintheModernDemocracies(NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandWorld,1948).61.MinisterofJustice,LegalandParliamentaryAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.12,24January1986,col.1527.
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"likely"todisturbpublicorder,publicsafety,ordefense.Fromtimetotimeauthoritieshavefloatedthepossibilityofproscribingoppositionparties,butnonehavebeenbannedsince1980.
Althoughthe1975IndemnityandCompensationActwhichgavecarteblanchetoofficialsacting"ingoodfaith"tosuppressterrorismwasrepealedin1980,newemergencyregulationsrevivedtheindemnityforthesecurityforcesinJuly1982andextendedittotheCIOinlate1983.InAugust1984,however,theSupremeCourtruledtheseregulationsincontraventionoftheDeclarationofRights.62Thisimportantrulingdiscouragedfewabusesatthetime,inpartbecausetheGovernment"madelittleefforttoinformrankandfileofficersofthedecisionanditsimplications."63
TheAbsenceofAccountability
Huntingtonarguesthat"fragileAfricanstates"requireaconcentrationofpowertomaintainorderthat"excessive"libertyandthediffusionofpoweraredangeroustopoliticalstability.64Thisformulationignoresotherpotentialconsequences:thearbitraryuseofconcentratedpowermayitselfbehighlydestabilizingandcounterproductive.AsKesselmanwrites,"politicalorderindevelopingcountriesisprobablyjeopardizedmorebythoseinpositionsofauthoritythanbysocialmobilizationfrombelow."65Structuresofaccountabilitywithinthestateareabsolutelyessentialtopreventorredressexecutiveabusesofpowerand,hence,toensuredemocraticstability.
Parliament
ThesteadyconcentrationofstatepowerintheexecutivebranchhasimpairedthelegislatureinmostAfricanstates.66InpostcolonialKenyaandTanzania,forexample,Parliamentisprincipallyadebatingforum,allowingmemberstoventilategrievancesanddiscussorcriticizeproposed
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62.Grangerv.MinisterofState,judgmentno.S.C.83/84,17August1984.63.LawyersCommittee,Zimbabwe,p.101.64.Headds,"ItisinMoscowandPekingandnotWashingtonthatthislessonistobelearned"(SamuelHuntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties[NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1968],p.137).65.MarkKesselman,"OrderorMovement:TheLiteratureofPoliticalDevelopmentasIdeology,"WorldPolitics26(October1973):148.66.SeetheexcellentreviewbyNewellStultz,"ParliamentsinFormerBritishBlackAfrica,"JournalofDevelopingAreas2(July1968):47994.
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legislationandexistingpolicies.MPsreacttobillsbutdonotinitiatelegislation;theymodifyfewbillsduringparliamentarydebatesandhesitatetomake(orarediscouragedfrommaking)statementsthatembarrasstheGovernment.67TheneteffectisthatmanyMPsinAfricanlegislaturescontributelittletodebatesandconsistentlydefertothewishesoftheexecutive.
InZimbabwe,thesweepingexecutiveprerogativepermittedunderthesecuritylegislationandthestateofemergencyhelptomarginalizeParliament.Proceduraldevicescurbparliamentarydebateonsecuritymatters.TheSpeakeroftheAssemblyandthepresidentoftheSenatehavefrequentlylimitedeventhemostinnocuousquestionsandcommentsregardingsecuritymatters.Ministersareoftenunresponsivetosuchqueries,routinelyinvokingtheblanketnotionsof"nationalinterest"and"statesecurity"toavoidcomment.Persistentquestionershavehadtheirpatriotismcalledintoquestionbyministersandotherlegislators.OntherareoccasionwhenmembersofParliamenthavedemandedgreateraccountabilityoftheexecutiveonsecuritymatters,theirmotiveshavebeensimilarlyimpugned.A1984motionbyZAPUandtheRepublicanFrontthatParliamentestablishaselectcommitteetoinvestigatesecurityproblemsinMatabelelandwasdefeatedongroundsthatParliamentwasnotsuitedtodealwithsecurityissuesandthatthemotionwasnothingbutaneffortbytheoppositionpartiesto"besmirchGovernment."68
Theneedforthestateofemergencyistreatedasself-evident,astheMinisterofHomeAffairsproclaimed:
Clearlywearenotgoingtodefendthestateofemergency.Itisthestateofemergencywhichisgoingtodefendus.Unlesswewanttostartchangingthemeaningofwords,astateofemergencyissomethingthathasinitselfthereasonsforitsexistence.Anemergencydoesnotaskfordiscussionbutforaction.69
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Takingtheminister'sadvice,MPshavefaithfullyrenewedthestateofemergencyatsix-monthintervalssince1980.Parliament'sroleinsecuritymattershasbeen,inshort,torubber-stampexecutivepolicy.ItsonlydistinctionfromthesupineRhodesianParliament,andanimpor-
67.HelgeKjekshus,"ParliamentinaOne-PartyState:TheBungeofTanzania,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies12,no.1(March1974):1943;NewellStultz,"ParliamentinaTutelaryDemocracy:ARecentCaseofKenya,"JournalofPolitics31,no.1(February1969):95118.68.MinisterofJustice,Legal,andParliamentaryAffairs,Herald(Harare,Zimbabwe),20July1984.69.AssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,col.623.
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tantone,isthatitnolongerreflectstheinterestsofatinyminorityofthepopulation.
OnesurvivalfromthepastistheSenateLegalCommittee,whichtestslegislationagainsttheDeclarationofRightsintheconstitution.From1980to1985,thecommitteeruledthatsevenemergencyregulationswereincontraventionofthedeclarationandthateightwerenot.Afterconsultationswithgovernmentallegalofficers,onlytworegulationswererevoked.70Clearly,thecommittee'simpactonsecuritymeasureshasbeenminimalasitwasintheRhodesianSenate.
TheJudiciary
IfParliamenthasamarginalroleinthevitalareaofstatesecurity,thejudiciaryisconsiderablymoreactiveinthisfieldthaninRhodesia.Thecourtsareindependentoftheexecutive,andjudgeshavemanifestedacommitmenttoconductfairtrialsandsafeguardtherightsofsuspects.MuchtotheGovernment'scredit,ithasnotattemptedtopackthebenchwithpoliticalappointeestiedtotherulingparty.IndividualinfractionsoftheDeclarationofRightscannowbebroughtbeforethecourts.AlthoughthecontinuingstateofemergencyhassuspendedimportantsafeguardsintheDeclarationofRights,insecuritycasesthecourtshaveruledagainsttheexecutive.Notonlyhavetheyacquittedanumberofprominentindividualsaccusedofsecurityoffenses,theyhavereacheddecisionsthathavemadeslightinroadsintotheemergencylaws.TheSupremeCourt's1984decisioninvalidatingtheindemnityregulationsforthesecurityforcesisonecaseinpoint.Yetbothindefendingpersonsaccusedofsecurityoffensesandinrulingontheconstitutionalityofsecuritymeasures,thejudicialsystempresentsaverylimitedcheckonexecutiveabusesofpower.71
Althoughithassecuredanumberofconvictionsonsecuritycharges,
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theGovernmenthasfailedinseveralcriticaltrials(e.g.,ofoppositionpoliticiansandseniormilitaryofficers).Thesedefeatshaveresultedfrompoorprosecution,denialoflegalrepresentationtotheaccused,insufficientevidence,spuriouscharges,andthediscoveryofforcedconfessions(followingthreatsandtorture).Ina1984case,HighCourtJusticeTonySmithcastigatedtheCIOforrepeatedlydenyingtheaccusedinse-
70.Hatchard,"EmergencyPowers."71.Zimbabwe'scourtsseemmorevibrantthanthoseinmanyotherAfricanstates(seeStevenPfeiffer,"TheRoleoftheJudiciaryintheConstitutionalSystemsofEastAfrica,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies16,no.1[1978]:3366).
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curitycasesaccesstolegalrepresentation:"ThiscourttakesaveryseriousviewofsuchdeliberatefloutingoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionbytheCIOofficers."72Othersimilarlycriticalcommentshavebeenissuedbythebench.
Onseveraloccasions,theexecutive'sirritationwithjudicialdecisionshasresultedinfiercepublicattacksontheloyaltyandintegrityofthecourts.TheharshestattackwasissuedbytheMinisterofHomeAffairson13July1982:
Themannerinwhichourlawcourtsdispensejusticeisgravelyfrustratingandunderminingtheworkoflaw-enforcementagencieslikethepolice.Thesecurityofthestateissacrificedonthealtarofindividualliberties.Peoplewhoareengagedinactivitiesdesignedtothreatenthewelfareandsecurityofthestateareeitherfreedbythecourtsorgooffverylightly....ItappearsthatthecourtsaresowingseedsofarevoltagainstthegovernmentandencouragingthesuddengrowthofthedissidentelementinMatabeleland....Recalcitrantandreactionarymembersoftheso-calledBenchstillremainmasqueradingunderourhardwonindependenceasdispensersofjusticeor,shallIsay,injusticebyhandingdownpervertedpiecesofjudgmentwhichsmackofsubvertingthepeople'sgovernment....Stateddifferently,whatistheuseofhavinggoodlaws,goodlawenforcementagenciesandbadlawcourtswhichcouldbeconstruedascomprisingahostileBench?73
Decisionsinsecuritycasesunfavorabletotheregimehavebeeninterpretedbysomeintheexecutiveassymptomaticofalackofconcernforstatesecurityor,worse,supportforarmeddissidence.Thejudiciaryhasbeenaccusedofharboringafundamentaldisloyaltytothe"people'sgovernment,"acolonialmentality,a"classbias,"andusingdoublestandards.74Morecommonhavebeencomplaintsthatthecourtshavereleased"guilty"defendantsonlegal"technicalities"orprocedural"errors.''75Oneministersummarizedtheproblembynotingthatthecourtsare"notintunewiththepresentgovernment."76Inreferencetothewaywardcourts,hedeclared,"Untilsuchtimeas
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wehaveallthemachineryofstateactinginconcertforthesame...objectives,itmustbeneces-
72.JusticeSmith,quotedinJohnHatchard,"TheRighttoLegalRepresentationMustBeUpheld,"MOTO,December1984-January1985,p.23.73.AssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,cols.63034.74.MinisterofHomeAffairs,quotedintheTimes,9September1983andHerald,16February1983.75.Somelessinfluentialministershavebeenstaunchdefendersoftheindependenceofthejudiciary(AfricaConfidential,17July1985,p.2).76.MinisterofHomeAffairs,ChristianScienceMonitor,2September1983.
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sarytoadoptextrememeasuresforthepreservationofthesecurityofthestate."77
Thedeviationsofthecourtsinsecuritycaseshavebeenusedtoexcuseexecutivereversalsofjudicialverdicts,suchastheMinisterofHomeAffairs'immediateredetentionofpersonsacquittedinmajorsecuritycases.Underemergencyregulationsthecourtsmaynotchallengesummaryredetention,whichhasbeenjustifiedongroundsthat"GovernmenthasmorefactsthantheCourtandsomefactsderivefromoursecuritysourcesandintelligencesources."78TheGovernment'spoorrecordinsecuritycasesdealingwithprominentpoliticalopponents(asdistinctfrominsurgents)seemstohaveencourageduseofdetentionwithouttrial.79Severalopponentslanguishedindetentionforperiodsaslongasfouryears.80
ADetainees'ReviewTribunal(undertheHomeAffairsministry)reviewsdetentionorderseverysixmonths.ThisbodyisreminiscentinseveralrespectsofitsRhodesiancounterpartcreatedin1959:ithasmeagerresources,nopermanentstaff,operatesataslowpace,meetsincamera,andisnot"boundbytherulesofevidenceorprocedureapplicabletoanylegalproceedings."81Whereastheprosecutioninordinarycriminalproceedingsmustproveacasebeyondareasonabledoubt,thetribunal'stestisthatthedetainingauthorityproveitscaseonthebroader"balanceofprobabilities."Thetribunalformulatesitsuniquerulesandprocedures,whichmayvaryaccordingtothe"peculiaritiesofeachcase."82Itadmitsawiderangeofevidenceinformationfromsourcesthatcannotberevealed,hearsayevidenceindeterminingwhetheradetaineeisathreattostatesecurity.
77.AssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,col.633;emphasisadded.Mugabehasmadesimilarstatements(Herald,27December1983).Inaspeechaffirmingthestate'sdesireforcompleteunity,theMinisterofStateforPoliticalAffairscalledforpositionsinthecivilservicetobe"filledbyzealousmembersoftherulingParty"sothat"theParty,theGovernment,
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andthecivilservicewouldbeonething,pursuingthesameobjectives"(DepartmentofInformationpressstatement,Harare,29August1984).78.PrimeMinister,AssemblyDebates,vol.7,13July1983,col.395.79.SeeAssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,col.631,and"CourtintheMiddle,"MOTO,June1983.80.InDecember1986,theMinisterofHomeAffairsstatedthatthirty-onepersonswereindetention(BulawayoChronicle,5December1986).81.EmergencyPowersRegulations(StatutoryInstrument458/83),section31(4).Thetribunal'ssmallannualbudgethasvariedfromZ$1,000toZ$8,000(EstimatesofExpenditure),similartoitsallocationsundertheRhodesianstate.82.EvansandHartleburyv.ChairmanoftheReviewTribunalandMinisterofHomeAffairs,H.C.2562/3/84,12December1984,JusticeGibson.
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Inmostcasesthetribunalhasconcludedthatdetentionordersarejustified.Thetribunal'sdecisionsarenotbinding,however,ontheMinisterofHomeAffairs.Before1985,theministercompliedwiththetribunal'srecommendations,butsincethenhehasincreasinglyoverriddentheboard.Clearlythisbodyconstitutesaratherlimitedcheckonabusesofexecutivepower.
Noofficial,independentoversightbodiesroutinelymonitorthesecurityorgansorhavepowertoinvestigatepubliccomplaintsinthisarea.Inthecourts,however,anumberofsecurityofficialshaveappearedonchargesofbeating,torture,rape,ormurder.Independentreportsonhumanrightsconcludedthat"manypoliticalkillingsfrom19821985havenotbeenformallyinvestigatedandareunlikelytobe,"andthatnoprogresshasbeenmadeinlocatingthosewhodisappearedduringthemid1980s.83
TheevidencethusindicatesthatthewholesaleabsenceofchecksandbalancesonexecutivepowerthatcharacterizedtheRhodesianstatealsotypifiestheneworder.Itsfewmechanismsofaccountabilityarenoteffective.
CivilSocietyatBay
Pressuresfromsocialinstitutionsandvoluntaryassociationsmayreducethescopeofstatepowerandpromotecivicaccountability.Anetworkofdynamic,democraticallyorientedgroupshasbeeninstrumentalinfrustratingorcontainingauthoritarianisminsomeAfricannations,likeNigeriaandGhana.84Amongthosegroupsarehumanrightsorganizations,thechurches,themassmedia,thelegalcommunity,tradeunions,professionalassociations,studentgroups,andbusinessorganizations.
OnewriterdiscernsinZimbabwea"robustlypluralistic"civicorder,whichisrootedinthepast:"Intheeventofaone-partystatein
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Zimbabwe,otherformsofpluralismwouldassumedegreesofpoliticalimportancereminiscentofintellectual,religious,andtradeunionoppositiontowhitesupremacyinRhodesia."85Chapters3and4demonstratedthatnoneoftheseinstitutionssustainedactiveresistancetowhitesupremacyinRhodesia.Nowtheirpostureis"reminiscent"of
83.DepartmentofState,CountryReportsonHumanRightsPracticesfor1986andCountryReportsonHumanRightsPracticesfor1988(Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1987and1989);AfricaWatch,Zimbabwe.84.SeethechaptersbyLarryDiamondandNaomiChazaninDemocracyinDevelopingCountries,ed.Diamond,Linz,andLipset.85.RichardSklar,"RedsandRights:Zimbabwe'sExperiment,"Issue14(1985):31.
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Rhodesia'straditionofacquiescence.InZimbabwetheylacktheresources,thewill,ortheinterorganizationalalliancestochallengeabusesofstatepower.86Thegovernment-controlledmediapracticeselfcensorship,haverarelytakenacriticalstandonsecurityissues,andarepro-ZANUintheirnewscoverageandeditorials;87laborisstrictlycontrolledbytheregime;88theintelligentsiahastakenalowprofile;thebusinesscommunityandwhitecommercialfarmershavegenerallysupportedtheregime'ssecuritypolicy;andthehandfulofvoluntaryassociationswithanabidinginterestinhumanrightshavehadlittleimpact.UnlikeitscounterpartinNorthernIreland,Zimbabwe'ssettlerpopulationhasbecomerelativelymarginalonissuesofinternalsecuritybuttheviewsofwhitesdovary.Inruralareasvulnerabletoinsurgentattackswhiteresidentshavesupportedexceptionalsecuritymeasures;settlersmostcloselyassociatedwiththeoldRhodesianFronthaveopposedsuchmeasures,includingthestateofemergency,asunnecessary.Theviewsoftheblackpopulationaredifficulttogauge,absentpublicopinionsurveys.Theelectorate'ssupportfortherulingpartyinthe1985electioncannotbeusedtoinferlevelsofsupportforparticularpolicies.Butitdoesappearthatpublicsupportfortheregime'ssecuritypoliciesisconsiderablystrongerthaninwhite-ruledRhodesia,insofarasthepopulationperceivesthatthesecuritysystemactsinitsinterests.
Inshort,pressuregroupsrarelyorganizearoundissuesoflawandorderinZimbabwe.Neitherurbanelitesnorgrass-rootsorganizationshaveconsistentlypressedforliberalizationandinsteadtendtodefertoofficialinterpretationsofsecurityrequirements.Therareexpressionsofdissentandorganizedprotestsbystudents,workers,andpoliticalpartieshavebeenequatedwithsubversionandpunished.89
Ifurbangroupsareatomizedandquiescent,whatoftheruralareas?Themobilizationthesisdiscussedatthebeginningofthechapteras-
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86.OnotherAfricannations,seeJeanFrançoisBayart,"CivilSocietyinAfrica,"inPoliticalDominationinAfrica,ed.P.Chabal(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986).87.OccasionalcriticismsofsecuritypracticeshaveappearedintheBulawayoChronicle,theFinancialGazette,andMOTO.88.SeeLloydSachikonye,"State,Capital,andTradeUnions,"inTransition,ed.I.Mandaza;andMinistryofLabour,ManpowerPlanning,andSocialWelfare,LabourandEconomy,reportoftheNationalTradeUnionsSurvey(Harare:GovernmentPrinter,1984);seealsotherestrictiveLaborRelationsActof1985,no.16.89.In1988and1989universitystudentsprotestinggovernmentalandpartycorruptionandauthoritarianismclashedwithpolice;theMinisterofHomeAffairsaccusedthestudentsandfacultyof"underminingthestate"and"subversion"(BulawayoChronicle,14October1988).AftertheOctober1989confrontationtheUniversityofZimbabwewasclosedindefinitely.
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sumesthatpopularactivisminthecountrysideduringasuccessfulguerrillastrugglewillcontinueunderanewregime.Zimbabwe'spoliticalinheritance,accordingtoCliffe,is"agenerationthathasbeenvigorouslyinvolvedinpoliticsandorganizing,hasundergoneextensivepoliticaleducationandhasbecomeusedtochallengingauthorityandtomakingthingshappen."90HoweveraccuratelyitdescribesruralareastowardtheendoftheRhodesianwar,thisstatementhasadecidedlyhollowringincontemporaryZimbabwe,mainlybecausetheregimehaslargelydeactivatedandmarginalizedthoseforcessinceindependence.91ThecontrastwithNorthernIrelandcouldnotbegreater:almostinertinZimbabwe,civilsocietyisvibrantinNorthernIreland(asChapter7shows).
Sinceindependence,onehumanrightsbodyhasconsistentlyopposedrepressivepractices:theCatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeace,whichisaffiliatedwiththeCatholicBishops'Conference.Originallyworkingbehindthescenesinthe1970s,thecommissionpublicizeditsfindingswhenitfailedtogetresultsthroughprivaterepresentationstoministers.TodaythecommissionsupportstheGovernmentanddescribesitsapproachasprivateconstructiveengagementwiththeauthorities.
Afterthecommissionsentaseriesofconfidentialreportsonhumanrightsviolationstotheprimeminister,theGovernmentinvestigatedandtookcorrectiveactioninsomeparticularcasesofbeating,rape,torture,andkilling.92Indefendinghumanrights,thecommissionisundoubtedlythemostsuccessfulprivategroup.Yetittakesapiecemealapproachandhasrarelypressedforchangesintheagenciesresponsibleforrepressionorinthearsenalofsecuritylegislation.93Ithashadalimitedimpactoverallonhumanrightsinthecountry.
ReinforcingtheacquiescenttendenciesofZimbabwe'scivilsocietyisthecountry'sauthoritarianpoliticalculture,anchoredinninetyyears
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ofsettlerrule.94Longschooledinintolerance,thepopulationisinclinedtosuspectopponentsandtoequatedissentwithsubversionortreason.Thisculturallegacyfromtheoldregimemesheswiththeintolerantside
90.LionelCliffe,"Zimbabwe'sPoliticalInheritance,"inZimbabwe'sInheritance,ed.C.Stoneman(NewYork:St.Martins,1981),p.31.91.Astrow,LostItsWay?92.SundayMail,8June1986.93.Oneexceptionwasitscallin1982torepealregulationsindemnifyingthesecurityforces(SundayMail,25July1982).In1989,itcalledforanendtothestateofemergencyandcitedincreasingabusesbythepoliceandtheMinisterofHomeAffairs(FinancialGazette,4August1989).94.NeeraChandhoke,"TheProspectsforLiberalDemocracyinZimbabwe,"IndianPoliticalScienceReview17,no.1(January1983):5264.
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ofthepoliticalculturethatemergedoutoftheguerrillacampaignandwasimportedintothestatebythenewelite.95Inotherwords,themarriageofthedominantsettlerculturallegacywiththeinsurgentsubcultureinvitesauthoritarianoutcomesundertheneworder.
UnlikecontemporaryNorthernIrelandwheretheBritishGovernmenthassoughtalbeitunsuccessfullytonurtureamoreconsensualpoliticalculture,Zimbabwelacksacomparableforce.Itisnotsosurprising,therefore,thatmanyofthedemocraticvaluesandinstitutionsenshrinedintheconstitutionduringtheLancasterHousesettlementhavefailedtothriveintheexistingrelativelyauthoritarianmilieu.Insteadoftoleranceforopposition,dispositiontocompromise,supportforbasicpoliticalrights,andmutualtrustandaccommodationamongvariouspolitical,civic,andcommunalforces,ethnicdistrustandintoleranceofalloppositionhavetypifiedthefirstdecadeundertheneworder.
AsnotedinChapter1,revalorizinganinheritedpoliticalcultureandstrengtheningcivilsocietycanpromotetheprocessofdemocratizationandhelpcheckexecutivepowerandrepressionbythesecurityapparatus.YetinZimbabwethisapparatushasbeeninstrumentalinensuringthepassivityofcivicinstitutionssince1980.ThebalanceofpowerbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyinNorthernIrelandis,asweshallsee,radicallydifferent.
TheMagnitudeoftheSecurityProblem
ImmediatelyafterindependenceZimbabwe'sfuturewasuncertain,likethatofanycountryemergingfromtheruinsofaprotractedguerrillawar.Managingthefiftythousandex-guerrillasandfifteenthousandRhodesiansecurityforceswasadelicateundertaking.Wouldtheseforcesaccepttheneworderorengageinrecriminations?Whiteandblackpoliticalopponentsmightchallengethenewregime.Would
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thedisaffectedsegmentsofthewhiteandblackcommunitiesaccepttheirexclusionfrompower?96Finally,Pretoria'sresponsetoZANU'selectoralvictorywasofconcerntothefledglingstate.WouldSouthAfricaintervene,directlyorindirectly,tosubverttheneworder?
Acommonproblemfacedbygovernmentssucceedingauthoritarianregimesistheresidualpowerofformerpoliticalandsecurityelites;their
95.Sithole,"StableDemocracy,"p.248.96.Toeasethefearsofminoritygroups,theprimeministerannouncedareconciliationpolicy,whichincludedtheappointmentofwhiteandblackoppositionfigurestoCabinetposts.
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machinationsinmanynationshaveabortedthetransitiontodemocracy.Thisproblemmightbeparticularlyvexinginpostsettlersocietieswheresettlerswerelongaccustomedtospecialrightsandprivileges.AstrikingfeatureofindependentZimbabweisthepoliticaleclipseoftheoldsettlerelite;thecontrastwithNorthernIrelandcouldnotbesharper(seeChapter7).LiketheircounterpartsinpostcolonialKenya,Senegal,andZambia,Zimbabwe'swhiteshaveretainedtheireconomicprivilegesandameasureofeconomicleveragewhilelosingtheirpreviousmilitaryandpoliticalpower.97Mostoftheremainingwhitesseemreconciledtoblackmajorityruleandthedemiseofthecastesystem.Thelevelofracialtensionisremarkablylow,althoughasignificantnumberofwhitesdisapproveofspecificpolicies,continuetoharborprejudicialattitudestowardblacks,andtalklonginglyoftheLostCause.98AfewwhiteshavebeeninvolvedinspyingandsabotageforSouthAfrica,butgenerallythewhitecommunityhaspresentednothreattoZimbabwe'sGovernment.
Since1980theregimehashadtocontendwithavarietyofsecurityproblemsfrombothdomesticsourcesandtheneighboringSouthAfricangiant.TheincidentsincludeanexplosionatZANUpartyheadquarters,thediscoveryofarmscachedonthepropertyofarivalparty,anunsuccessfularmedattackontheprimeminister'sresidence,incursionsbySouthAfrican-sponsoredrebels,desertionsfromthearmybydisaffectedex-ZIPRAsoldiers,thedestructionofaircraftatThornhillbase,and,sinceJune1987,attacksinsideZimbabwebyrebelsfightingtheMozamhicanGovernment(whoareretaliatingagainstZimbabweforitsmilitaryaidtotheregimeinMozambique).99
TodestabilizeZimbabwe,SouthAfricahasusedeconomicandmilitarypressure,althoughitsinvolvementhasbeenminorincomparisontoitsdevastatingassaultsonAngolaanditsdestabilizationofMozam-
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97.MarshallMurphree,"WhitesinBlackAfrica,"EthnicandRacialStudies1,no.2(April1978):15474.Whites'economicpowerinZimbabwecomesfromtheircontrolofcapital,skills,andproductiveland.In1987,60percentoftheeconomyremainedinprivate,largelywhitehands,and34percentofallfarmlandwasownedbywhites(downfrom42percentatindependence);only10percentofthecountry'slarge-scalefarmersandaboutadozenofthetoptwohundredbusinessexecutiveswereblacks.98.Theseobservationsarebasedinpartontheauthor'sfieldresearchin19821983and1987andarticlesonZimbabwe'swhitesintheLosAngelesTimes,9September1985andtheWashingtonPost,nationalweeklyed.,7December1987;onthe"decliningsignificanceofrace"inZimbabwe,seeMarshallMurphree,"OddsOnZimbabwe,"Leadership5,no.5(1986):2428;cf.DavidCaute,UndertheSkin:TheDeathofWhiteRhodesia(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1983).99.OfficialfiguresoncasualtiesfromattacksinsideZimbabwebytheMozambiqueNationalResistancefromJune1987toApril1989:335civilianskilledand280wounded;22securitytroopskilledand44wounded;29insurgentskilled,5wounded,and45captured(WashingtonPost,5June1989).
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bique.TheregionalLeviathanhasinitiatedseveralcommandoattacksonofficesoftheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)inZimbabwe.ButitsattacksarealsodesignedtopunishtheMugabeGovernmentforitsstridentcriticismofapartheidanditsdemandsforinternationalsanctionsandmoregenerallytofomentinsecurityinthecountry.100PretoriahastrainedandarmedanunknownnumberofformerRhodesiansatbasesinthenorthernTransvaalandhassentsomeonsabotagemissionsintoZimbabwe.101ThemostspectacularincidentwasacommandoraidonanofficeoftheANCinHarareon19May1986.
Low-levelinsurgencytroubledthewesternregionofthecountry(Matabeleland)from1982to1988numerousincidentsofrape,murder,torture,beating,armedrobbery,kidnapping,andthedestructionofschools,buses,andstateproperty.Althoughtheinsurgents'actionsoftenappearedrandom,theirchoiceoftargetsseemeddesignedtopressuretheGovernmentathomeandembarrassitabroad.TheirvictimsincludedZANUpartyofficialsandmembers,Governmentofficials,whitefarmers,foreigntourists,andblackciviliansaccusedofsupportingtheregimeorinformingontheinsurgents.102
Reliablefiguresontheextentofrebelactivityaredifficulttocomeby.TheleadingsecurityofficialinZimbabweestimatedthatthenumberofinsurgentsoperatinginthecountrydroppedfromapproximatelythreehundredin1984tounderthirtybymid-1987.103Officialshavepresentedstatisticsontheincidenceofinsurgentattacksduringparliamentarydebatesinordertojustifyrenewalsofthestateofemergency;thesefigures(inTable3)shouldbetreatedcautiously,sinceneitherthesourcesnortheirmethodofcompilationhasbeendisclosed.
100.TheANCusesZimbabweasaroutetoinfiltrateSouthAfricabuthas
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nomilitarybasesinZimbabwe(StephenDavis,Apartheid'sRebels[NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1987]);seealsoJosephHanlon,BeggarYourNeighbors:ApartheidPowerinSouthernAfrica(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1986).101.RobertDaviesandDanO'Meara,"TotalStrategyinSouthernAfrica:AnAnalysisofSouthAfricanRegionalPolicysince1978,"JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies11(April1985):195.Zimbabwe'sSecurityministerstatedin1984thathalfofthefourhundredrebelscapturedintheprevioustwoyearsadmittedtohavingbeentrainedinSouthAfrica(Guardian,1August1984).102.AccordingtotheSecurityminister,insurgentskilled101ZANUmembersfrom1982throughOctober1985(Herald,3November1985).103.MinisterofStateforSecurity,WashingtonPost,23June1984;Herald,14May1987.Insurgentsinsidethecountryduring19821983wereestimatedtonumberclosetoonethousand(FrederickEhrenreich,"TheZimbabweDefenseForce:CapabilitiesandProblems"[PaperpresentedattheAfricanStudiesAssociationmeeting,NewOrleans,November1985],p.30);anestimatedeightthousandtotwenty-fivethousandMNRrebelshavebeenoperatinginMozambique.
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TABLE3INCIDENCEOFINSURGENTACTIVITY
KillingsRapesArmed
Robberies SightingsaContactsbInsurgentsKilled
InsurgentsCaptured
13July23Dec.1983 75 16 284 537 17524Dec.198320June1984
45 37 253 670 191 500(198284)
21June19843Jan1985
58 96 288 839 175
4Jan.5May1985 29 26 139 432 6119July198522Jan.1986
103 57 263 889 96 75(1985) 85(1985)
23Jan.15July1986 57 46 104 552 71 68(1986) 15(1986)20Jan.14July1987c
42 22 80 46(1987)
15July21Dec.1987 3522Dec.198712July1988
41
13July198823Jan.1989
93 4 32 40
25Jan.24July1989 80 22 34 14 3Total 658 304 1,465 3,993 783SOURCES:Figuresoninsurgentactivity,sightings,andcontacts(presentedbytheMinisterofHomeAffairsduringbiannualparliamentarydebatesonrenewalofthestateofemergency)inAssemblyDebates(Harare:GovernmentPrinter);figuresforinsurgentdeathsandcaptivesforOctober1982toOctober1984providedbytheMinisterofStateforSecurityinTheHerald,2October1984;for1985and1986bythepoliceinTheHerald,8January1987;andfor1987bytheMinisterofStateforSecurityinTheHerald,22December1987.
NOTE:Emptycellsreflectincompletesourcedata.aSightingofoneormoreinsurgentsbyciviliansorsecurityforces.bDirectmilitarycontactbetweeninsurgentsandsecurityforces.cFiguresnotavailablefor16July1986to19January1987.
Anyassessmentofsecuritythreatsmusttakeintoaccountthecoercive
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capacitiesofthepartiesinvolvedandthescopeofpopularsupportforthechallengersandtheauthorities.104InthefirsteightyearsafterZimbabwe'sindependence,insurgentsfailedtopenetratethroughoutthecountryorgarnerwidespreadsupport;theyhadlimitedmaterialresources,andthedestructionandcasualtiestheyinflictedwereminutecomparedtothoseinthefinalyearsoftheRhodesianwar(whenanav-
104.Onthebalancebetweenregimeandinsurgents'capacities,seeTedRobertGurr,WhyMenRebel(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1970),chaps.8and9.
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erageoffivehundreddeathsoccurredeverymonth).105Zimbabwehashardlyfacedacrisis"whichaffectsthewholepopulationandconstitutesathreattotheorganizedlifeofthecommunity,"astheHomeAffairsministerclaimedin1982.106Otherofficialshavefrequentlyechoedsuchalarmiststatements,whichstillothershavecontradicted.A1984reportbyZANU'sCentralCommitteedescribedinsurgencyasnothingmorethananirritantor"militarynuisance,"107Evenattheheightofdissidentattacksinearly1983theSecurityministerdismissedthemasmere"teethingproblems":"Thiscountryisalreadymorestablethanitwasbeforeindependence...therearenoproblems...nowwhichthreatenstatepower.''108Adifferentimpressionwaslefttwoyearslater(whenthesituationhadvisiblyimproved),astheMinisterofStateforDefensetoldParliament:
Ifweweretoreleasetothepublic[informationabout]everythingthathappensinallouroperationalareastherewouldbemorealarmanddespondencyamongZimbabweans,andtheywouldthinktheywerelivinginhell.Sowewanttokeepthesethingstoourselves.109
Governmentstatementshavethereforevacillatedbetweenassurancesofstabilityandtranquilityandattemptstoarousepublicawarenessandvigilanceregardingthenefariouselementsthreateningthenation.Thedisparityinofficialcommentsabouttheseverityofsecurityproblemsstemsfromtheregime'stwinaimsofjustifyingrepressivemeasuresandconvincingthepublicthattheauthoritiesareinfullcontrol.
Intellectuals,churchleaders,humanrightsbodies,andthepresshaveoccasionallyquestionedtheneedfordraconianmeasuresbutrarelyasincisivelyasintheSundayMail'seditorialof12May1985:
Thereisvisiblepeacealloverthecountry,eveninMatabeleland,despitedissidentsandbandits....Thedissidentsinthiscountryandtheirinsignificantnumberareafleabitecomparedwithinsurgentsandtheir
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activitiesinmanyothercountriesthatdealwiththembyothermeansthanastateofemergency....Inaddition,theunpleasantironyandcontradictionofagovernmentofformerfreedomfightersperpetuatingtheverystateofemergencythatwascontrivedandusedbyacolonialregimetofightagainstthem...mustbebroughttoanend.
105.AfricaContemporaryRecord,19821983,p.B879.106.AssemblyDebates,vol.5,13July1982,col.629.107.ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion,"CentralCommitteeReport,"presentedtotheparty'ssecondcongress,Harare,8August1984,p.10.108.Interview,Commerce,April1983,p.5.109.AssemblyDebates,vol.12,13August1985,col.434.
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TothislogictheGovernmentrespondedintwoways:theexistenceandtheuseofexceptionalpowershavebeenresponsibleforbringingtheinsurgentproblemundercontrol;andsuchpowersremainnecessarytoensurethattheinsurgents"donotbecomeassystematicallyorganizedasUNITA[inAngola]andtheMNR[inMozambique],"asMugabeputit.110ReminiscentoftheRhodesianera,theexecutiveusesbothincreasesanddecreasesintheincidenceofinsurgentactivitytojustifythecontinuanceofemergencypowers:anincreaseisasignaltointensifytheuseofthesepowersandadecreaseis"anindication"thatthesemeasures''havebeeneffective."111
ThePoliticsofSecurity
OnemajorthemeofthischapteristhatthesecurityproblemsfacingthecountrydidnotpreordainthestructureandoperationsofZimbabwe'scoercivemachinery.Infact,withoutprejudicingnationalsecurity,liberalizationinZimbabwecouldincludethefollowingchanges:
endingtheprotractedstateofemergency;
redraftingsecuritylegislation;
reorganizingthepolice,military,andintelligenceservice;
strengtheningParliamentandthejudiciaryandcreatingseparateoversightbodiestomonitorandensuregreateraccountabilityofthesecurityagencies.
Counteringthisargument,authoritiesadvanceahostofsecurityimperativesthatnecessitateunreconstructedcoerciveinstitutions,repressivelegislation,andthecontinuedstateofemergency.ThedominantexternalimperativeisdefenseofthecountryagainstSouthAfricanaggression.Governmentministersmaintainthatthesituation
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inZimbabwewillneverbenormaluntiltheSouthAfricanconflictisresolvedanditsthreattoZimbabweremoved.Tamperingwiththecoerciveorderwouldonlydeepenthecountry'svulnerabilitytoPretoria.Similarly,domesticconditionsservetojustifyexceptionalarrangements.Ifnotforthestateofemergency,aformerMinisterofHomeAffairstoldme,
110."Interview:RobertMugabe,"AfricaReport,January-February1986,p.75.111.MinisterofHomeAffairs,AssemblyDebates,vol.11,13November1984,col.696.
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"we'dbeforcedtoactillegally."112Analyzingtheinternalimperativesthesis:
AprematuredismantlingofthecoerciveinstrumentsoftheformerRhodesianstatewasill-advised.Suchastepwouldhavecreatedapowervacuumdeliciouslyattractivetothevariouscentersofpoweralreadyarmedtostepin.ThealternativetomaintainingtheinstrumentsoftheformerRhodesianstatewastocreatenewonesintheirplace.113
Thisargumenthasseveralpitfalls.ItassumesbutdoesnotdemonstratethatarmedgroupssuchasZIPRAguerrillasandRhodesiansecurityforceswereinfactpreparedto"stepin"andoverthrowthenewregime.Evenifthisassertionisvalidmakinga"prematuredismantling"ofrepressiveinstitutionsilladvisedattheoutsetofZANUruleitdoesnotaccountforthesubsequentpreservationandfortificationofthoseinstitutions.Finally,itfailstodistinguishastate'scoerciverequirements(fordomesticorderandstatesurvival)fromactsofrepressiondesignedtoachievevariousextrasecuritygoals.
Mycritiqueraiseslargeranalyticalissuesaswell.Frequentlyprofferedinnationswithacuteorchronicsecurityproblems,thesecurity-imperativesthesishasintoxicatingappeal.Securityexigenciesoftenappeartobeanindependentinfluenceon,orthedrivingforceof,stateaction.Thisformulaisunidimensionalanddeterministic.First,governmentsfacingcomparablesecuritythreatsmayrespondinmarkedlydifferentways.114Second,levelsofrepressiondonotnecessarilycorrelatewiththemagnitudeofsecurityproblemsandmayinsteadbeinverselyrelated.Cross-nationaldataonthefrequencyofeventsofinsurgencyandgovernmentalsanctionssuggestthatsuchinverserelationshipsarerathercommon.115Insomecasesthedisjunctionhasbeenespeciallywide.InStalinistRussia,forinstance,theepidemicofterrorduringtheGreatPurgeofthe1930soccurredasstabilityincreased.116Somesocietiesfacingamortal
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threattonationalsecurityhaverespondedlessrepressivelythanotherswherethethreatshavebeenmarkedlylessserious,asastudyoftwentyLatinAmericannationsfound.
112.Interview,10June1987.113.Sithole,"StableDemocracy,"p.240.114.SeetheanalysisofIsrael,SouthAfrica,andNorthernIrelandinAnthonyMathews,Freedom,StateSecurity,andtheRuleofLaw:DilemmasofApartheidSociety(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1986),chap.12.115.C.TaylorandD.Jodice,eds.,WorldHandbookofPoliticalandSociallndicators(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1983).116.CarlFriedrichandZbigniewBrzezinski,TotalitarianDictatorshipandAutocracy(NewYork:Praeger,1956),pp.137ff.
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Paraguay...wasoneoftheleastviolentnationsinLatinAmericaduringthefiftiesandsixtiesbutitwasalsothemostrepressive.Colombia,amongtheleastrepressive,wasoneofthemostviolentcountries.117
Thisdivergencesuggeststhatauthoritiesdealingwithsecurityproblemsorpoliticalchallengeshavevariousoptionsopentothem.Indealingwithpoliticalopponents,eliteshave"anumberofchoices,runningthegamutfromgenuinetolerationtototalsuppression.Thedecisionagainsttolerationandthe[favoring]ofrepressivemeasuresareamatterofchoice."118
Elites'assessmentsofthreatsanddecisionmakingoftenincludeconsiderationsthathavelittletodowithsecurityrequirementsperse.Extra-securityfactorsareoftendecisiveandincludethebureaucraticinterestsofthesecurityagencies,thepoliticalgoalsoftheexecutive,andtheelites'commitmenttohumanrights.119Aregimemayattempttoconvertrealorperceivedthreatsintoopportunities:itmayengagein"exaggerating,dramatizing,andeveninventing"problemsandthreatsinordertoenhanceitsauthority,generatesupportforpoliticalinitiatives,silencedissent,orlegitimatetherepressionofopponents.120Agraphicillustrationofthisdynamicisthepoliticalpurge.121
Clearly,aregimemayreappoliticaladvantagesfromimplementingpoliciesitascribestonationalsecurity.Thepresentdiscussioncentersonthematrixofofficialperceptions,interests,andgoalsthatshapedtheZimbabweregime'sreactionstoactualsecurityproblemsfrom1980to1988.
Guerrillamovementsarenotoriouslydifficultforstateelitestohandlebotheffectivelyandsensitively.Misperceptionoftherootsofrebellion,poorintelligence,andablindfaithinthewisdomofusingtheironfistoftencharacterizearegime'sreactions.Thestandardresponsetoarmedchallengesisbruteforce,denialthattheinsurgents
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havepopularsup-
117.ErnestDuffandJohnMcCamant,ViolenceandRepressioninLatinAmerica(NewYork:FreePress,1976),p.201.118.OttoKirchheimer,PoliticalJustice(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1961),p.419.119.SeeNicoleBall,SecurityandEconomyintheThirdWorld(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988),chap.2.120.DavidBrown,"SiegesandScapegoats:ThePoliticsofPluralisminGhanaandTogo,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies21,no.3(September1983):459.121.SeeWalterD.Connor,"TheManufactureofDeviance:TheCaseoftheSovietPurge,19361938,"AmericanSociologicalReview37(August1972):40313;RoyMedvedev,LetHistoryJudge(NewYork:Vintage,1973);SidneyGreenblatt,"CampaignsandtheManufactureofDevianceinChineseSociety,"inDevianceandSocialControlinChineseSociety,ed.A.Wilson,S.Greenblatt,andR.Wilson(NewYork:Praeger,1977).
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port,anddismissaloftheirgrievancesasunfoundedorascloakingulteriormotives.
InitiallyinZimbabwetherewassomedifferenceofopinioninofficialcirclesovertheproperresponsetotherebelsinMatabeleland:
Anumberof[Mugabe's]prominentcolleaguesarguedstronglyagainstusingthemilitaryinapunitiveway,andfavoring[sic]continuedattemptsatpoliticalconciliation....TheArmyleadershiparguedthecasetoputdowntheinsurrectioninMatabelelandbyallmeanspossible.122
Thearmyprevailed,apparentlywiththehelpofpressurefromZANUradicals.Thisresulted,accordingtoHodder-Williams,ina"conscious,CentralCommitteeapproved,policyofconfrontationinstrength."123PoliticalconcessionstoZAPUwereseenasunwarranted;124Mugabeflatlyannounced,"ThesolutioninMatabelelandisamilitaryone."125SomeZANUleadersdidcontinuetofavortheuseofthecarrottodealwithpoliticalopponentsandarmedinsurgents,butthehard-linersovershadowedthem.126Afterthecoerciveapproachof19821985hadsufficientlysubduedthepoliticaloppositioninMatabeleland,amoreconciliatoryapproachwaspursued,culminatinginthe1987unityaccord(discussedbelow).
Asinmanysocietiestroubledbyguerrillamovements,Zimbabwe'soppositionpartiesandtheirsupportersnottheinsurgentssufferedmostfromtheregime'scounterinsurgencycampaign.Atthepoliticalfringes,membersofBishopMuzorewa'sUnitedAfricanNationalCouncilandIanSmith'swhiteConservativeAlliancepartyweredetainedandharassedforalleged"subversiveactivity."127BothpartieswereaccusedoffomentingdissidenceandhavingsuspiciouslinkstoSouthAfrica.Increasinglymarginalized,theUANCwasdisbandedin1986andinSeptember1987Parliamentvotedlegally,undertheconstitutionto
122.AfricaContemporaryRecord,19821983,p.B886.
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123.RichardHodder-Williams,"ConflictinZimbabwe:TheMatabelelandProblem,"ConflictStudies,no.151(1983):19,17;seealsoAfricaConfidential,11December1985.124.MichaelClough,"WhitherZimbabwe?"CSISAfricaNotes,15November1983.125.TheObserver,15April1984;seealsohisremarksinParliament(AssemblyDebates,vol.7,13July1983,col.393).Ironically,IanSmithcriticizedtheZANUGovernmentfor"fallingintothesametrap"ashisregimedid:"TherealfaultwhichthisGovernmentismakingisthattheyaretryingtousemilitaryforcetosolveapoliticalproblem....Itdidnotworkbeforewhenweweretryingtosolveourproblem"(AssemblyDebates,vol.6,19January1983,col.872).126.StonemanandCliffe,Zimbabwe,p.86.127.UANCleaderBishopAbelMuzorewawasdetainedwithoutchargefortenmonthsin19831984andreleasedontherecommendationoftheDetainees'ReviewTribunal.
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abolishthetwentyreservedwhiteseats.Theirvotesoundedthedeathknelloforganizedwhiteoppositioninthecountryandleftonlyoneoppositionparty,ZAPU.
TheZimbabweAfricanPeople'sUnionwasZANU'straditionalrival.Thelongstandingbitterrelationsbetweenthetwopartiesstemmedpartlyfromethnicantagonisms.TheethniccornerstoneofZANUistheShona-speakingcommunity;ZAPUderivesitssupportlargelyfromtheNdebele.AfterZANU'sbreakawayfromZAPUin1963,violencefollowedfortwoyearsandflaredsporadicallyduringtheguerrillawarinthe1970s.ZAPUhaddifficultyacceptingitsdefeatinthe1980election;manywithinthepartybelievedZANUwonpowerunfairly.AnimositywasparticularlyacuteamongformerguerrillasoftheZimbabwePeople'sRevolutionaryArmy(ZIPRA),linkedtoZAPU.
SomeanalystsclaimthatthislonghistoryofinternecinebitternesssentencedZANUandZAPUtoaconfrontationafterindependence.128Yetconflictbetweenthetwopartieswasnotinevitable.Theirpoliticalorientationswerenotsubstantiallydifferent,andtheirdistinctethnicbasesbynomeansmadepoliticalrapprochementimpossible.MuchdependedonthewayinwhichtheregimeandZAPUinterpretedandhandledunfoldingevents.Immediatelyafterindependencein1980,MugabemovedtoincludeZAPUfiguresinhisCabinet,includingtheparty'sleader,JoshuaNkomo,whoacceptedthepostofMinisterofHomeAffairs.
TheinitialreconciliationwasshatteredbyaseriesofeventsthatraiseddoubtsaboutZAPU'spatriotismandcommitmenttonationalunity.First,armedclashesoccurredin1980and1981betweenformerguerrillasofZIPRAandZANLA(ZAPU'smilitarywing,theZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy).ApproximatelythreehundredformerZIPRAguerrillasdiedinoneencounterinFebruary
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1981inBulawayo.Second,bothZANLAandZIPRAloyalistshadhiddenarmsasaninsurancepolicyagainstthefuture;inFebruary1982armscacheswerediscoveredonZAPUproperty.Allegingthattheweaponswereintendedforacoup,theregimearrestedformerZIPRAmilitaryofficers,firedseveralZAPUCabinetministers,andconfiscatedZAPU-ownedproperties.AccordingtoEvans,theGovernment"stage-managed"thisincidentinordertofurther"ZANU'sdriveforsupremacy"inthemilitary:"thedecapitationoftheZAPU-ZIPRAleadershipintheGovernmentandtheZNA[Army]hadmuchmoreincommonwiththe
128.Sithole,"StableDemocracy."
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consolidationofShonaethnicdominationwithinthemilitary,thanwithZANUfearofaNdebelecoup."129
ThepunitivereactiontothearmsdiscoveryledfourthousandformerZIPRAmentodesertfromthearmyandsetthestagefortheMatabelelandconflict.ShortlyafteraseriesofguerrillaattacksinMatabelelandin1982,ZAPUwasaccusedofcreatingandcommandingthearmedresistance.TheMinisterofStateforDefensehadnodoubtsastotherebels'sponsor:"Dissidentsdonotoperateinavacuum;theyareex-ZIPRAandtheirpoliticalallegianceistoNkomo,andtheirpoliticalphilosophyisZAPU."Heelaborated:
Asystematicprogrammewaslaunched...toorganizeZAPUfollowersintoactivelysupportingpoliticallymotivatedactsofbanditryaimedatdisruptingciviladministrationandsabotagingdevelopmentprojectsandcreatingastateofarmedrevoltinthosepartsofZimbabwewhereZAPUhadsignificantpoliticalfollowers.130
Mostofficialstatementscharacterizedtheinsurgentsaspoliticallymotivated.AccordingtotheMinisterofHomeAffairs,"allbutafew"werepoliticallyinspiredandtheiractswere"aimedatfurtheringtheinterestsofZAPU."131Butthedissidentswerealsodescribedasantisocial,criminalmalcontents.Anofficialpublicationattemptedtodepoliticizetheproblem:"Theactscommittedareactsagainsthumanity,notagainstapoliticalenemy.Theperpetratorsarenotpoliticalweaponsnorevensoldiers.Theyarecriminalscommittingcriminalactsinalaw-abidingandconstitutionallylegitimatecountry."132ArevealingstatementbytheSecurityminister,however,threwallcharacterizationsintoquestion:"Itis,ofcourse,notpossibletoproperlydeterminethemotivationandloyaltiesofthemajority"ofdissidents.133Whetherornotitviewedtheinsurgentsaspoliticallymotivated,theGovernmentflatlyrejectedthelegitimacyoftheirgrievances.
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Despiteconsiderablespeculation,theorigins,supply,organization,andobjectivesoftheinsurgentsremainsomewhatobscure.Theirresourcesandexternalalliancespaledbycomparisonwithotherarmedmovementsintheregion(MNRinMozambique,UNITAinAngola,
129.Evans,"Gukurahundi"pp.13,14.Ithasbeenarguedthatthecachesweremade"notasabasisforacoupaimedatoverthrowingthegovernmentbutasaninsurancepolicyagainstthefuture"(Hodder-Williams,"Matabeleland,"p.9).130.Herald,4February1983,andSundayMail,10March1983.131.AssemblyDebates,vol.11,7May1985,col.1939.132.MinistryofInformation,Posts,andTelecommunications,AChronicleofDissidencyinZimbabwe(Harare:GovernmentPrinter,August1984),p.39.133.Herald,2February1984.
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ANCinSouthAfrica,SWAPOinNamibia).TheyoperatedinsmallbandsloyaltonohighcommandandweredividedoverthequestionofacceptingSouthAfricansupport.Withnosingleideologicalprogram,theyweremotivatedbyavarietyofaimsandgrievances.134Onewriterdescribesthearmedattacksasa"reflexreaction,notaconsciouspolicywithconsideredaims."135Themaindemandsmustbedistilledfromliteraturethesebandsdistributedinvillagesorleftatthesceneofattacksandfromcommentscapturedrebelsmadeduringinterrogationsandcourttrials.Amongtheirgrievancesweretheregime'sallegedretrenchmentfromsocialistgoals;governmentalfavoritismoftheShonaovertheNdebele;theaffluenceofwhitefarmersamidlandlesspeasants;andtheregime'srepressionofZAPU.Theirliteraturedeclared,"Zimbabweisstillnotfree"and"DownwithZANU,"andannouncedtheexistenceofa"secondliberationwar."GenerallythegrievancesrevolvedaroundpoliticalandeconomicproblemsalthoughtheinsurgentsalsotriedtomobilizeandexploitethnicresentmentagainsttheShona.Still,theserebelsmadenoconcertedattempttoorganizeorpoliticizethecivilianpopulation,whichhelpstoexplainwhytheyfrequentlyusedbruteforcetocompelvillagers'cooperation.
InApril1988theGovernmentofferedinsurgentsanamnestyoneresultoftheZANU-ZAPUunityaccordand113acceptedtheoffer.Interviewswithagroupof43formerrebelsconfirmedsomeofthegoalsanddemandsoutlinedabove.Inparttheyopposedtheregime'sethnicrepressioninMatabeleland,asoneinsurgentcommanderdeclared:"Wetooktothebushtoprotestthemurdersandharassmentofourpeoplebythe[ZANU]partyarmy."Anotherstated,"OuractionscameoutofseriouscrimescommittedbytheGovernment."136Othersdemandedlandandjobs,thereturnofconfiscatedZIPRAproperty,anendtoofficialcorruption,amorevigorousofficialcommitmenttotheliberationofSouthAfrica,thereleaseofcaptured
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insurgents,strongerMarxist-Leninistpolicies,andpensionsforallformerguerrillas.When64formerdissidentsthreatenedtoresumetheircampaigninJune1988,itwasbecausetheGovernmenthadfailedtomeettheirgrievances:thelackofemploymenttoppedthelist.Oneformercommanderinsisted,"Ifwearenotassuredofoursocio-economicdestiny,nothingwillstopus
134."BruisingtheDissidents,"MOTO,March1983.135.Hodder-Williams,"Matabeleland,"p.15.136.QuotedinAndrewMeldrum,"AnAmnestyforUnity,"AfricaReport,July-August1988,p.41,andTimes,1June1988.
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fromgoingbacktothebush."137(Approximately25,000formerZIPRAandZANLAguerrillaswereunemployedasofMarch1988.)138
AmongthetermsoftheamnestywasapardontomembersofthesecurityforcesandtoZANU'syouthwing,whohadbeensentencedorconvictedofcrimesandabusesofhumanrights;seventy-fivesecuritypersonnelandyouth-wingmilitantswerereleasedinJune1988.139GovernmentofficialstoldAfricaWatchthatsecurityforceshadtobepardonedinordertodefusediscontentintheirranks;butwhereasthedissidentswhoacceptedtheamnestyhadnotbeenchargedwithoffenses,mostofthesecurityforcememberswereservingsentencesforcrimes,somequiteserious.140Asimilarpardonwasnotextendedtothoseservingsentencesfordissident-relatedcrimes.
ThePacificationofZapu
Havinghadlittlesuccessagainsttheinsurgents,theZimbabweauthoritiesrespondedashavemanyothersconfrontingguerrillacampaigns.Theytargetedthoseallegedlygivingsuccortotherebels:theZAPUorganization,partyleaders,supporters,andinhabitantsofMatabeleland,theaffectedarea.ThefactthattheguerrillasoperatedinanareawhereZAPUenjoysoverwhelmingpopularsupportseemedtolendcredencetotheviewthatthepartywasinleaguewiththerebels.
PrimeMinisterMugabedeclaredthatZAPU,theUnitedAfricanNationalCouncil,andtheConservativeAlliance"yieldeddissidentmenwhohaveresortedtosubversioninordertooverthrowZANUanditsGovernment."141HeaccusedZAPUnotsimplyofgivingmoralsupporttothearmedinsurgentsbutalsooftrainingandfundingthem.Itissignificant,however,thattheonlytopZAPUofficial
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prosecutedbytheGovernment(forassistingdissidentsandplottingacoup),MPSydneyMalunga,wasacquittedinJuly1986(othertopZAPUofficialsarrestedanddetainedwithoutchargewereneverbroughttocourt).Insteadofprosecutingpartymembersforcrimes,theauthoritieschosetodisruptZAPU'spoliticalactivitiesandstifledissent.Thisrecordthrowsintoquestiontheregime'scontentionthattheZAPUleadershipwasinvolved
137.Herald,16June1988.138.Herald,21March1988.139.Times,IJuly1988.140.AfricaWatch,Zimbabwe,pp.22,25.141.RobertMugabe,speechtotheZANUWomen'sLeagueconference,15March1984(SpeechesandDocumentsoftheFirstZANU(PF)Women'sLeagueConference,Harare,1984).
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insubversiveactivities·Shils'sstudyofAsiaandAfricasuggeststhat"openoppositionpartiesinthenewstatesareseldomdangeroustotherulingparties,eitherinopenelectoralcampaignsorinparliamentaryvotingorinconspiratorialactivities."Insuppressingoppositionparties,whattheregime"reactsagainstismoreanimputedsubversiveintention...ratherthanafactualprobabilityofsubversion."142
OneministerarguedthatthearrestofsomeZAPUofficerswas"evidenceenoughtowarrantbanningtheparty";143otherofficialsthreatenedtobanZAPUonnumerousoccasions.MinistersbrandedZAPUa"dissidentorganization"anda"subversiveorganization,"equatingitwiththeSouthAfrican-sponsoredMNRinMozambiqueandUNITAinAngola.144Why,then,didtheGovernmentnotproscribeZAPU?ArankingCIOofficialstatedin1983:"ZAPUisbeingleftfreeuntilsomethingdrastichappens....BanningitnowcanonlyunitethepeopleinMatabeleland."145OneCabinetministergavemethisexplanationin1987:
Thebanningofanypartyhasnotbeenontheagenda.Banningisagainstthespiritoftheconstitution,therightofpoliticalassociation.InsteadwetookstrongmeasuresagainstZAPUleaders,puttingpressureonthepartyasawholeandpickingonindividuals.WehadgoodsecurityreasonsforbanningZAPUandlegallygoodgroundstodoit,butpoliticallyit'ssomethingwedidn'twanttodo.146
Inaddition,aformalbanwouldalmostcertainlyprovokeadomesticoutcryandinternationalprotestsandwouldperhapsincludeasuspensionofforeignaidandinvestmentinthecountry.Thatthebanningofapartymaybecounterproductivewasabundantlyevidencedinthe1960sand1970s.Shortofoutrightproscription,theGovernmentmadeeveryefforttoundermineZAPU'sabilitytofunctionasapoliticalparty.Ifsufficientlycrippled,ZAPUmightceaseitsoppositionandtheregimewouldavoidthepossiblefalloutfromaformalbanning.
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From1982to1986theGovernmentwagedacampaigntoundermineZAPU.OfficialharassmenttookvariousformsandoccasionallyprecipitatedfreelanceviolencebymilitantZANUsupporters,liketheYouthBrigades.ZAPUMPsandcitycouncillorsweredetainedormysteriouslydisappeared.ZAPUmeetingswereclosed,forcingmemberstomeetin
142.EdwardShils,"OppositionintheNewStatesofAsiaandAfrica,"inCenterandPeriphery:EssaysinMacrosociology(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1975),pp.42829,436.143.MinisterofMines,Herald,7March1983.144.Herald,19September1985;27Marchand19April1983;22September1987.145.CIOofficial,interviewwithauthor,29June1983.146.FormerMinisterofHomeAffairs,interviewwithauthor,10June1987.
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private.AlmosteverypartyofficewasatsomepointclosedbytheauthoritiesortorchedbyZANUmilitants.SeveralZAPU-linkedfirmswereclosedandZAPUpropertyconfiscatedwithoutcompensation.ZAPUmemberswereforcedtoattendZANUralliesandpurchaseZANUmembershipcards.
ThestrategyoflinkagetheauthoritiesusedtoassociateZAPUwiththeinsurgentsparallelsthe"destabilizationalliance"itallegedbetweenZAPUandtheSouthAfricanGovernment.147Bydramatizingtheallegedconnectionbetweeninternalandexternalthreats,theZimbabweanregime,likeitsRhodesianpredecessorandsomanyothers,soughttojustifyitstreatmentofdomesticelements.Oneanalystnotesthat"agreattemptationexistsforgovernmentstoinvokenationalsecurityintheirdefensebyidentifyingdomesticpoliticalopponentswiththepoliciesofsomeforeignstate."148AlthoughanumberofindividualssympathetictoZAPUhavereceivedtraining,arms,orotheraidfromwithinSouthAfrica,thedegreeofinvolvementbythePretoriaregimeitselfremainsobscure.ThePermanentSecretaryofHomeAffairshimselfmadethedistinction:"Idon'tknowwhetherthereisaconnectionbetweentheSouthAfricanauthoritiesanddissidents,buttheyarereceivingsupportfromwithinSouthAfrica....I'veneverseendirectproofthattheSouthAfricanGovernmentisfundingthem."149Moreover,nohardevidencehasbeenpresentedtoproveanypactbetweentheZAPUhierarchyandstrategistsinPretoria.TheCIOconcededin1983that"thereisnoconnectionbetweenZAPUasapartyandSouthAfrica";150nonehassincebeenestablished.YetministerspersistedinclaimingthatZAPU,SouthAfrica,andtheinsurgentshadforgedasinisteralliancebentonoverthrowingtheregime.
Foritspart,ZAPUrepeatedlyproclaimeditsinnocenceandcondemnedinsurgents'attacks.AlthoughsomedissidentsdefinedthemselvesasZAPU'svanguard,thisdidnotmeanthattheywere
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ZAPU'screation.Oneobserverarguesthatthe"dissidentswerenotanintrinsicpartofZAPU'sorganizationandstrategy,"151andanotherconcludes,"ItisplainthatthedissidentswerenotoperatingaspartofZAPU."152In
147.Herald,26February1983.148.BarryBuzan,People,States,andFear:TheNationalSecurityProbleminInternationalRelations(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1983),p.59.149.Interviewwithauthor,8June1987.150.CIOofficial,interviewwithauthor,29June1983;emphasisadded.151.Hodder-Williams,"Matabeleland,"p.20.152.TerenceRanger,"MatabelelandsincetheAmnesty,"AfricanAffairs88(April1989):165.
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fact,guerrillasharassed,beat,andkilledZAPUsupportersandlocalpartyofficers.153
SomesecurityofficialsprivatelyconcededthattheydidnotknowwhethertheZAPUhierarchygaveitsblessingtotheinsurgents;154someministersalsoraisedquestionsabouttheZAPU-dissidentlink.155Yetthedominantofficiallinepersisteduntiltheunitytalksbetweenthepartiesin1986.Tohelpexplainthenewinterpartyrapprochementoneministerquipped,''ZAPUnowrealizesthatdissidentactivitydoesn'tpay."156Aftertheunitytalksfellapartin1987,however,theregimeonceagainaccusedZAPUofsupportingthedissidents.TheallegedconnectionmaydependlessonhardevidencethanontheprevailingrelationsbetweenZANUandZAPU.
ZAPUalsoexperiencedviolentattacksbyZANUmilitantsliketheYouthBrigades.157Inthemonthsprecedingthe1985election,awaveofmassdemonstrationsbyZANUloyaliststookplace;theprotestersdemandedthatZAPUandUANCbebannedandNkomohanged,thataone-partystatebedeclaredimmediately,andthatallnon-ZANUcivilservantsbedismissed.ThedemonstrationsfrequentlyendedinvandalismordestructionofZAPUofficesandassaultsonZAPUsupportersandofficers,sometimeswhilethepolicestoodby.158ZANUzealotsalsoforcedtheiropponentstoattendZANUrallies,andZAPUsupportershaddifficultyobtainingpermitsfortheirownrallies.
ThreeyearsofviolenceandharassmentagainstZAPUhadacumulativecripplingeffectonitsabilitytoorganizeandcampaigninthe1985election.159ZAPUneverthelesswonallfifteenseatsinMatabeleland.Despiteitsownstrongshowingintheelection,therulingpartywassur-
153.OnehundredtoonehundredfiftyZAPUofficialshadbeenkilledbymid-1984,aswellassixty-eightZANUofficials(FrankG.Wisner,Senior
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DeputyAssistantSecretaryforAfricanAffairs,DepartmentofState,testimonyon24May1984beforetheHouseSubcommitteeonAfrica,inZimbabwe:FourYearsofIndependence[Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1984]p.27).154.CIOofficial,interviewwithauthor,June1983;PermanentSecretaryforHomeAffairs,interviewwithauthor,8June1987.155.TheMinisterofInformation,forinstance,madethesurprisingcommentinJanuary1984that"ZIPRAelementsarenolongerinthefieldasbandits.NorareNkomoandotherZAPUleadersinvolvedinthesecondphaseofterrorism"(SundayMail,29January1984).156.FormerMinisterofHomeAffairs,interviewwithauthor,10June1987.157.JimCasonandMikeFleshman,"Zimbabwe:ElectionCampaignTurnsBloody"AfricaNews,28January1985.158.Ibid.;MichelleFaul,"Mugabe'sElectionManeuvers,"AfricaReport30,no.1(January-February1985).159.InternationalHumanRightsLawGroup,Zimbabwe:Reportonthe1985GeneralElections(Washington,D.C.:IHRLG,1986).
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prisedandtroubledbytheremainingbedrockofregionalsupportforZAPU.AftertheelectionbothdisappearancesandarrestsofZAPUsupportersandofficialsaccelerated,whichencouragedafloodofdefectionstoZANU.Thecombinationofmobviolence,policearrests,andmassdefectionsgaveZAPUlittlechoicebuttoagreetounitytalkswithZANUinlate1985.AfterthetalksbrokedowninApril1987,allZAPUmeetingswerebannedandallitsofficesorderedclosed.Nowincompletedisarray,thepartywasforcedeithertoacceptamergerwithZANUonthelatter'stermsortovanishaltogetherfromthepoliticalscene.Itoptedfortheformer;thetwopartiesunitedinDecember1987.
RepressionintheCountryside
MatabelelandisoneofthepoorestregionsinZimbabwe,andeconomicconditionstherehavedeclinedmarkedlysinceindependence.Theregion'srateofunemploymentishigherthanthenationalrateof23percent;economicdevelopmentschemeshavebeenstalled;andpeasants'continuinghungerforlandanddiscontentovertheregime'sminimalistland-reformpoliciesareacute.160Theseconditions,coupledwiththeregime'sharassmentofZAPU,havealienatedtheregion'spopulationfromthecentralgovernment.
Insurgentstypicallydependonthelocalpopulationforfood,clothing,shelter,andinformation.InMatabelelandtherewasnaturallyvariationinthedegreetowhichNdebelevillagerscooperatedwithinsurgentsbychoiceorbyforce,andinhowtheydefinedoridentifiedwiththeinsurgentcause.Someciviliansdistinguished"good"from"bad"dissidents,buttherebels'reputationforindiscriminatebrutalityseemstohavediscreditedtheircampaignovertime.161Someofficialsflatlyclaimedthatvillagerswereeitherpotentialinsurgentsorvoluntarilyaideddissidents.Otherobserversmaintainedthatpopularsympathyfortherebelswaslow,andthatcivilianswereinterestedprimarilyin
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regionalpeaceanddevelopment.162EventheHomeAffairsministerconcludedin1987thatthemajorityofpeopleintheaffectedareasdidnot
160.SamMoyo,"TheLandQuestion,"inTransition,ed.Mandaza;NickDavies,"ZimbabweTornApartbyOldIssueofLand,'Guardian,24March1983;FredBarnes,"SearchandDestroy,"NewStatesman,18March1983;JulieFrederikse,"BloodFeudinZimbabwe,"TheProgressive,September1983,pp.3436;AfricaConfidential,5September1984.161.Ranger,"MatabelelandsincetheAmnesty."162.Barnes,"SearchandDestroy,"p.15;FinancialTimes,18May1982;StonemanandCliffe,Zimbabwe,p.47.
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supporttheguerrillas.163Yettheactionsofthesecurityforcesweredrivenbytheirpresumptionofthelocalpopulation'sguilt,rathercommonincounterinsurgencycampaigns.
Likemanyothercounterinsurgencyforcesoperatinginanethnicenclavewhosesupporttheylack,thesecurityforcesinMatabelelandfrom1982to1986treatedthecivilianpopulationroughly.Abusesbythesecurityforceswereoftendifficulttoverifybutfollowedaconsistentpattern;independentinvestigationsuncovered"incontrovertibleevidence"ofsecurityforces'involvementinatrocities.164ThearmyandCIOusedmassdetention,beatingandheavy-handedinterrogationofcivilians,theburningofvillagers'houses,arbitrarykilling,andrape.165AmnestyInternationalreportedthatmanydetaineeswereheldforlengthyperiodswithoutregardtolegalprocedures;italsofoundevidenceof"widespread"tortureofsuspects(e.g.,electricshockandsuffocationunderwater)bythepolice,CIO,andarmyfrom1982to1985.166In1989,aninvestigationbyAfricaWatchpointedtoa"cultureoftorture"withintheseagencies,particularlytheCIO.167
AccordingtotheInternationalCommissionofJurists,"over1,000people,mostlyunarmedcivilians,werekilledandmanymoretorturedandbeatenbythearmyinJanuaryandFebruary"of1983.168Otherestimatesnumberedcivilianskilledbetweentwothousandandthreethousand.169AccordingtoFatherHebronWilson,"somevillages...werealmostcompletelyannihilated."170Duringthisperiod,theauthoritieswereinundatedwithdetailedreportsofbrutalitybysecurityforcesfromeyewitnesses,woundedvictims,communityleaders,medicalpersonnel,
163.Herald,14September1987.164.ZimbabweCatholicBishops'Conferencestatement,Herald,30March1983;seealsothecitationsbelow.
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165.Onelocalpapercondemned"theincreasingincidenceofrapebysoldiersinuniformoutonoperation"(BulawayoChronicle,29March1984).166.AmnestyInternational,Detention;seealsoDavidCaute,"MugabeBrooksNoOpposition,"TheNation,31August1985,p.140;AfricaConfidential,11December1985.167.AfricaWatch,Zimbabwe,pp.13,4354.168.InternationalCommissionofJurists,"Zimbabwe,"ReviewoftheInternationalCommissionofJurists30(July1983):29.Thefigurewasbasedonreportsfromruralhospitals,missions,andschools.169.TheU.S.StateDepartment'sestimatewasmoreconservative:"OurEmbassyprovidestheinformedopinionthatbetween1,000and1,500peoplehavebeenkilledinMatabelelandoverthepastthreeyears.Inaddition,between4,000and6,000peoplehavebeenabusedinonewayoranother.Governmentsecurityforcesareprobablyresponsibleforthebulkofthesedepredations,withthedissidentsand/orbanditsculpablefortheremainder"(Wisner,DepartmentofState,Zimbabwe,p.20).170."Zimbabwe:5YearsLater,"transcriptof"60Minutes"broadcast,CBSTelevision,28April1985.
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teachers,missionaries,andotherindependentsources.Thecumulativeweightandconsistencyofthisevidencechallengedtheregime'sdenialsofculpability.ThereportoftheZimbabweCatholicBishops'Conferencestatedthattheregimehadembarkedona"reignofterror":
Methodswhichshouldbefirmandjusthavedegeneratedintobrutalityandatrocity....Violentreactionagainstdissidentactivityhas,toourcertainknowledge,broughtaboutthemaiminganddeathofhundredsandhundredsofinnocentpeoplewhowereneitherdissidentsnorcollaborators.Weareconvincedbyincontrovertibleevidencethatmanywantonatrocitieshavebeen,andarestillbeing,perpetrated....ItseemsthattheindemnityregulationsissuedinJuly1982mayhavegivencertainunitsofthesecurityforcestheimpressionthattheyareaboveandoutsidethelaw....Thefactspointtoareignofterrorcausedbywantonkillings,woundings,beatings,burnings,andrapings....Theinnocenthavenorecourseorredress,forfearofreprisals.171
Themilitarycampaignof19821983wasfollowedbyasecondsiegeoftheregionfromFebruarytoApril1984.FoodsupplieswerecutofftothefivehundredthousandresidentsofsouthernMatabeleland,andciviliansagainfellpreytomilitaryrepression.172Despitenumerousciviliancasualties,onereportrevealed,"therehavebeenpracticallynoguerrillaskilled."173
On2April1984,theCatholicBishops'ConferenceagainsenttoMugabeadetailedreportchroniclingarmyatrocities,whichcommented:"Commandersgavetheimpressionthatitisthepolicyofthearmytomakeallthepeopleintheareasufferbecauseofthedissidents."ItrecommendedthattheGovernmentbegin"seriousdialogue"withZAPUandotheroppositiongroups.174
Themilitary's"reignofterror"inMatabelelandborestrikingsimilaritiestotheruthlessoperationsoftheRhodesianforcesduringthe1970s.AsaninvestigationbytheLawyersCommitteeforHumanRightsconcluded,"theNdebeleshavebeensubjectedtoacampaign
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ofharassmentandrepressionthathasbeenscarcelydistinguishablefromthecounterinsurgencycampaignwagedbytheoldwhiteregime."175
Themainunitdeployedintheregionfrom1982to1984wasthecontroversialFifthBrigade;itwassupportedbytheSixthBrigade,thePoliceAnti-TerroristUnit,thecommandobattalion,andoperativesoftheCen-
171.Herald,30March1983.172.SundayTimes,8April1984.173.AfricaConfidential,11April1984,p.2.174.NewYorkTimes,16April1984.175.LawyersCommittee,Zimbabwe,p.2.
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tralIntelligenceOrganization.TheFifthBrigadewashighlypoliticizedandloyaltotheGovernment,poorlyled,andpalpablyanti-Ndebele.Civilians,evenpoliceofficers,andregularsoldiersvoicedcomplaintsaboutthebrutalexploitsoftheunit.EyewitnessestoatrocitiesimplicatedtheunitintestimonythattheperpetratorsspokeShonaandworethebrigade'sdistinctiveredberets.176Tellingly,Britishmilitaryinstructorsretrainedthediscreditedbrigadein1984;itwaswithdrawnfromMatabeleland,itscommandersreplaced,anditstroopstamed.
Likemanyothergovernmentsaroundtheworld,theMugaberegimeconsistentlydismissedgeneralcriticismofthesecurityforcesandreportsofspecificoutragesasthepropagandaofdisingenuouselements.TheprimeministercalledtheallegationsofAmnestyInternational"aheapofrubbish"andlabeledthehuman-rightsbody"AmnestyLiesInternational."177(Since1986AmnestyInternationalhasnotreceivedpermissiontooperateinZimbabwe.)InresponsetocriticismsfromtheCatholicBishops'Conference,theMinisterofInformationcalledthebishops'account"irresponsible,contrivedandpropagandistic"andtheprimeministerbrandedthebishops"sanctimoniousprelates"andZAPUagents.178AndtheMinisterofStateforDefenselabeledas"dissidents''thoseaccusingthearmyofcommittingatrocities.179ThesecommentsreflecttheGovernment'soverridingpresumptionofthesecurityforces'innocence.Mugabe'sstatementinParliamentin1983istelling:
Myknowledgeisthatanyonewhoisguiltyofanyirregularity,beittortureoranything,issubjecttocorrectionordisciplinebyhiscommanders....Incircumstancesinwhichwefindourselves,tempersriseinthepolicebecauseofthelonghourswhichtheywork.Theyfindthemselvesactingratherover-enthusiastically.Wemustsympathizewiththemratherthanbegintocriticizethem....WhatthecourtsregardastorturenowmightnothavebeentortureinthedaysofIanSmith...butbecausewearemore
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liberal,wehaveademocraticorder,anylittlescratch...isinterpretedastorture.Ithinkwemustfeelforthosewhosedutyitistogivemaximumsecuritytothenation.180
Topofficialshaverespondedtotheissueofciviliancasualtiesinthreeways:theyhavedeniedthesecurityforces'culpability,blamingthedissidentsinstead;theyhaveminimizedtheproblem(e.g.,"someinnocentciviliansgetsomebruising");181ortheyhavesuggestedthatcivilians
176.InternationalCommissionofJurists,"Zimbabwe."177.Herald,21November1985.178.Herald,30Marchand6April1983;16April1984.179.Herald,25April1984.180.AssemblyDebates,vol.7,13July1983,cols.39798.181.Herald,4February1983.
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werekilledin"thecrossfire"betweentherebelsandsecurityforces.TheseclaimsfitthelexiconthattheRhodesianstateusedtodenywrongdoingandmaskindiscriminateshooting.Rarely,however,haveofficialsspokenasbluntlyasMugabedidtoacrowdinMatabeleland:"Wehavetodealwiththisproblemruthlessly.Don'tcryifyourrelativesgetkilledintheprocess."182
InternalinquiriesbyofficialsinthesecurityforcesandHomeAffairsexoneratedsecuritypersonnelofwrongdoing.183OneindependentCommitteeofInquiryintoallegationsofatrocitiesbysecurityforceswasappointedbytheGovernment(inJune1983)andreceivedaconsiderableamountofevidencefromlocalpeople.184Itnevermadeitsfindingsorrecommendationspublicandappearstohavehadlittleimpactonsecuritypracticesorpolicy.
LiketheRhodesianFrontGovernmentbeforeit,theZANUregimeapparentlygavelittleconsiderationtothecounterproductiveeffectsofmilitaryrepressionindrivingawedgebetweenciviliansandthestateandcontributingtopoliticalinstability.MilitaryoperationsbroughtanatmosphereoffearandbitternesstoMatabelelandanddiscreditedtheregimethroughouttheregion.Onereportfoundthearmy"extremelyunpopular"andanotherdiscernedwidespreadpopular"disenchantment"withthecentralgovernment.185ZANU'sfailuretowinasingleseatintheregioninthe1985electionmaybeanotherindicatorofpopularalienationfromtheregime.
TheintensityandcharacterofstateviolenceinMatabelelandwerebynomeansconstantfrom1982to1987.Instead,cyclesofrepressionandrelaxationalternatedwithinthecontextofanoveralldeclineinviolationsofhumanrights.Eachyearafter1983registeredalowerincidenceofrepressionthanthepreviousyear,inpartthroughchanginglevelsofinvolvementbydifferentsecurityforces.Theblanketmilitaryviolenceof19821985gavewaytoamoreselective
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approachbypoliceandintelligenceoperativesin19861987;consequently,abuseswereattributedincreasinglytothepoliceandtheCIO.186
182.QuotedinAfricaContemporaryRecord,19821983,p.B882.183.Herald,21Mayand10April1984.184.SecretaryoftheCommitteeofInquiry,Herald,29March1984.185.AfricaConfidential,27March1985,p.5.TonyRich,"Zimbabwe:OnlyTeethingTroubles?"TheWorldToday39,no.12(December1983):501.Themilitarycampaignhad"theeffectofconsolidatingadividedprovinceintoasullenantagonismtothedominantpartyandthemajoritytribeassociatedwithit"(Hodder-Williams,"Matabeleland"p.20).186.DepartmentofState,CountryReportsonHumanRightsfor1988.
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EntrenchingOne-PartyRule
SeveralfactorshelptoaccountforrepressiveeventsinMatabelelandfrom1982to1988.Partoftheexplanationcentersonthecompositionandexperiencesofsecuritypersonnelassignedtotheregion.Inthiscategoryarethemilitary'sinfrequentdirectcontactwithinsurgents,whichledtosoldiers'vicariouspunishmentofvillagerswhoseemeduncooperative;thedeploymentofpoorlytrainedandundisciplinedunits;andtheintenseethnichostilitybetweenprimarilyShonamilitaryregimentsandNdebelecivilians.TheFifthBrigade,inparticular,seemedintentonconvincingNdebelevillagersoftheirethnicinferiority.Later,whenEnosNkalaservedasMinisterofHomeAffairs(mid-1985through1987),manyofthepolicepostsinMatabelelandwereassignedto"virulentlyanti-ZAPU"officers.187
Reinforcingthesespecificcontributingconditionsistheessentialistfactor,documentedearlierinthechapter.Inherentsystemiccharacteristicsanilliberalethos,traditional(Rhodesian)decision-makingprocesses,thelackofaccountabilityfosterrepressiveoutcomesinZimbabwe.
AnotherpartoftheexplanationhastodowiththeactivitiesandsignalscomingfromGovernmentministers.TheseelitesdonotappeartohaveorchestratedviolenceperseagainstZAPUsupportersandcivilians;thesecurityforcesandZANUmilitantsactedwithconsiderableautonomyintheirencounterswithcivilians.ButtheregimewasintentondestroyingZAPU,asmanifestedinthewavesofharassmentvisitedontheparty:ralliesbanned,officesclosed,leadersarrested.Inaddition,ministersandtopofficialsintheCIO,police,andarmytookfewstepstostoptheviolence.Instead,CabinetmembersconsistentlyblamedZAPUandtheinsurgentsforcasualties,praisedthe"sterling"workofsecurityforces,refusedtotaketheinitiativeinholdingsecuritypersonnelaccountable,andreacted
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bitterlytoanypublicaccusationsofofficiallysponsoredrepression.Inaddition,theGovernmentconsistentlyencouragedthesecurityagenciestofollowahardlineindealingwithpoliticalopponents.Thisencouragementmayneitherexplainparticularincidentsandwavesofstateviolencenorsuggestthattopofficialsweredirectlyresponsibleforspecificabusesofpowerbyrank-and-filepersonnel,buttheregimeundoubtedlycreatedaclimatethatseemedtocondoneuseoftheironfist.
187.AfricaWatch,Zimbabwe,p.41.
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Thelargerthesisisthatlawandorderhasbeenpursuedsinceindependenceinamannerconsistentwith,albeitnotreducibleto(becauseofgenuineconcernswithstabilityandorder),ZANU'scentralpoliticalobjectives.TherepressiveapproachtotheMatabelelandproblemhadapurposivedimension,a"conscious...policyofconfrontationinstrength"wherebytheGovernmentseizedongenuinesecurityproblemsandtransformedthemintoopportunities.188Oneanalystconcludesthatthemilitary's"brutalactionsseemedsufficientlypurposefultoindicateanintentiontocripple,ifnotdestroy,ZAPU'spoliticalinfrastructureinMatabeleland."189Muchofthesecurityprogramthereforecanbeexplainedbytherulingparty'sgranddesign:todominatethepoliticallandscapebysubduingtheopposition.Thelinchpinofthatgranddesignwasthecreationofaone-partyZANUstate.
Unilateralimpositionofone-partyrulewouldhaveviolatedtheconstitutionalclauseguaranteeingfreedomofassociation,includingtherighttoformandbelongtopoliticalparties.Undertheconstitution(sect.51),thisprovisionwasalterablepriorto1990onlywiththeconsentofallonehundredMPs,andtheGovernmentwaiteduntil1987tobegintolaytheformalgroundworkfortheone-partysystem.
BeginninginOctober1985ZANUandZAPUheldaseriesoftenmeetings,withaviewtowardunification.Finallyon22December1987thetwopartiesmergedunderthebannerofZANU.On31December,MugabebecametheexecutivepresidentofthecountryandNkomowasappointedaseniorministerwithoutportfolio.Zimbabwebecamethethirty-fifthAfricannationtoembracetheone-partymodel,leavingtenmultipartystatesremainingonthecontinent.
Justasmultipartysystemsarenotnecessarilydemocraticinpractice,aone-partystateisnotnecessarilydespotic.Thereiscross-nationalvariationinone-partyregimes,alongacontinuumfromdictatorialto
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relativelyopensystems.Inherentlyrestrictivetosomedegree,theycanbestructuredtoallowfortherepresentationofvariousinterestsandpopularparticipation.LikeotherAfricannations,theZimbabweGovernmentmaintainsthatone-partyrulewillbeanunqualifiedblessing:itwillpromotegenuinedemocracy,accordwithZimbabwe'straditionalvalues,fosterpoliticalstabilityandnationalunity,andunderminesubversiveforces.ThetextoftheunityagreementproclaimsthatthemergerofZANUandZAPUwillpromote"nationalunity,politicalstability,
188.Hodder-Williams,"Matabeleland"p.17.189.Rich,"OnlyTeethingTroubles?"p.501.
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peace,lawandorder,socialandeconomicdevelopment."190One-partyrulehasgenerallyfailedtoproducethesebenefitselsewhereinpostcolonialAfrica.191HowdidtheZANUGovernmentenvisageitsone-partysystem?
AnarticleoffaithinZimbabwe'srulingcirclesisthattheone-partystatewillpromotenationalethnicintegrationratherthanfactionalism,whichamultipartysystemallegedlyfosters,particularlywherepoliticalpartieshaveethnic,racial,ortribalbases.YettherecordshowsthatAfricanone-partysystemshaveperformedpoorlyinmanagingcommunaldivisionsandpromotingnationalunity.192
Newnationscommonlydefinedissentasseditionandcriticismofthegovernmentasanattackonthenation,rejectingtheconceptofloyaloppositionpartiesasacontradictioninterms.193Amultipartysystemdoesgivetheoppositionapublicforumwithinwhichtochallengegovernmentpolicyandembarrassexecutiveofficeholders.Intheirquestforpoliticalunanimity,manyAfricanrulingpartiesareacutelysensitivetosuchcriticism.From1980to1987theZANUGovernmentdealtwithpoliticaloppositionintwoways:belittlingitasunimportantorexaggeratingitsdangerousness.Mugabeclaimedthatunderaone-partystate,"wewouldnothavethisuselessquibbling....Wewanttoavoidthatuselessexerciseofopposingforthesakeofopposing."194Hecalledinterpartyrivalry"anathematodemocracy";itreflects"thepoliticsofnegativism."195Evenmoretroubling,it"createsroomforamixtureofsubversives-cum-opportuniststoplanmoredisunityanddestabilizationinthevainhopethatonedaytheywillachievepower."196Oneministerstated,''ZANU...rulesthiscountry.Anyonewhochallengesthatisadissidentandshouldbedealtwith."197Ononeoccasiontheminister
190.Textofunityagreement,Herald,23December1987.191.S.E.Finer,"TheOne-PartyRegimesinAfrica,"Governmentand
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Opposition2,no.4(July-October1967):491509;W.ArthurLewis,PoliticsinWestAfrica(Toronto:OxfordUniversityPress,1965);Shils,"Opposition";AristideZolberg,CreatingPoliticalOrder:TheParty-StatesofWestAfrica(Chicago:RandMcNally,1966),p.36.SeealsoJamesColemanandCarlRosberg,eds.,PoliticalPartiesandNationalIntegrationinTropicalAfrica(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1964),pp.65580.192.Finer,"One-Party"193.DavidApter,"SomeReflectionsontheRoleofaPoliticalOppositioninNewNations;'ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory4,no.2(January1962):15468.ItwasafeatureofearlyUnitedStateshistory,especiallyundertheFederalistgovernment(SeymourMartinLipset,TheFirstNewNation:TheUnitedStatesinHistoricalandComparativePerspective[NewYork:Basic,1963],pp.39,43).194.InterviewwithRobertMugabe,MOTO,October1984.195.Mugabe,speechtoWomen'sConference;Times,7April1981.196.Mugabe,speechtoWomen'sConference.197.MinisterofHomeAffairs,ChristianScienceMonitor,2October1987.
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drewanexplicitconnectionbetweenoppositiontoone-partyruleandtheofficiallabelingofopponentsassubversives:"TheNdebeleswouldbenefitmorebyenteringintounitywithothertribesbecausetheywouldnolongerbebrandeddissidents."198
Hostilitytowardpoliticaloppositionmayinhibitanewnation'slong-termstability.Responsibleoppositionpartiesmayassumeapositiverole:theycanprovidevitalinformation,representsectionalinterests,formulatealternativepolicies,andthusserveasaunifying,notadivisive,force.Thesecorrectivefunctionsarelimitedwithinasingle-partyframe-work.
ZANUidentifiesitselfwith"themasses"andclaimsthat"thePartyandthepeoplehaveincreasinglybecomeone."199Mugabe'slogic:"Mypartyisinthemajority,so[theelectorate]wantsaone-partystate."200Yetone-partyrulemayhavelesspopularsupportthanGovernmentalpronouncementssuggest.Intheonlyrepresentativeopinionpolltakensinceindependenceadministeredduringthe1985election55.6percentfavoredand40percentopposedone-partyrule.201Amongthereasonspeoplecitedforopposingtheone-partystatewerefearsthatitwouldleadtoadictatorship(13percent)orbeundemocratic(16percent).Onemajorfindingisthatacoreofoppositiontoone-partyruleexistsamongtheGovernment'sownsupporters.Insomepartystrongholds,approximately30percentofZANUsupportersrejectedone-partyrule:31.5percentinMashonalandEast,29.3percentinMashonalandWest(seeTable4).Amoreimpressionistic1988accountfound''agreatlackofenthusiasmfortheone-partystate"thatreflected"ananxietyforthepowerofthestatetobeconstrained."202The1985pollalsohighlightedthedegreeofpoliticalpolarizationwithinZAPU'sregionalstronghold,Matabeleland,whereZAPUsupportersoverwhelminglyrejectedone-partyrule.OnealternativeafederalarrangementwherebyGovernmentwoulddelegatesomeregionalpowertoMatabelelandwasnever
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seriouslyentertainedsinceitmightunderminethepowerandauthorityofthecentralstate.
198.Herald,29November1985.199.ZANUPartyCongress,Resolutions,August1984.AsShilscomments,"innocountryintheworldarepartyandpeopleone"("Opposition,"p.429).200.Mugabe,MOTO,October1984.201.1985Zimbabweelectionsurvey,conductedbyMasipulaSithole,DepartmentofPoliticalandAdministrativeStudies,UniversityofZimbabwe,1985.202.TerenceRanger,"MatabelelandNow,"Britain-ZimbabweSocietynewsletter,5October1988,p.9.
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TABLE4PUBLICATTITUDES,BYPARTYAFFILIATION(inpercentages)
Question:WouldyouwanttoseeZimbabwebecomeaone-partystate?
ZAPUSupporters
ZANUSupporters
Yes No Yes NoMatabelelandSouth
15.8 84.2 90.0 10.0
MatabelelandNorth
25.9 74.1 87.3 12.7
MashonalandEasta
5.9 94.1 68.5 31.5
MashonalandWesta
0 100 70.7 29.3
Question:Areyoubetterofftodaythanyouwerefiveyearsago?
ZAPUSupporters
ZANUSupporters
Yes No Yes NoMatabelelandSouth
35.0 65.0 96.0 4.0
MatabelelandNorth
47.2 58.2 96.2 3.8
SOURCE:1985ZimbabweelectionsurveybyMasipulaSithole,DepartmentofPoliticalandAdministrativeStudies,UniversityofZimbabwe;usedbypermissionofProfessorSithole.N=1,209aTheverylownumbersofZAPUsupporterspolledintheZANUstrongholdsofMashonalandseemtohaveskewedthesefindings.
Giventheregime'scomfortablemarginofsupportinthe
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countryreflectedintwonationalelectoralvictorieswhydiditseeaone-partysystemasapanacea,asnothinglessthanZANU's"religion"?203Adejureone-partystatewillallowtheGovernmenttomonopolizepoliticalpowerbyright,withnochallengerstoquestionZANU'sperformanceasapoliticalparty.
Amoreimportantconsiderationhastodowiththequestionoflong-termrule.Dahlarguesthatdemocracymayrequireasystemof"mutualguarantees"tocompetingpartiesthattheywillnotbeannihilatedintheeventofelectoraldefeat.204Losinganelectioncanmeanaregime'sfinallossofpowerifitssuccessorisnotitselfpreparedtoyieldifitlosesacompetitiveelection.Replacementbyelectoralmeanshas,infact,rarelyoccurredinpostcolonialAfrica.
Howeversecure,ZANU'spositionasrulingpartywasnotpermanentunderthemultipartyorder.Inthelongrun,ZANUmightdepleteits
203.Mugabe,AssemblyDebates,vol.10,11July1984,col.248.204.RobertDahl,Polyarchy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1971).
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reservoirofpoliticalcapitalamongurbanandruralconstituents:ifsocioeconomicproblems(suchasgrowingunemployment,risingpricesforbasiccommodities,discontentamongtheurbanworkingclass)intensifiedorifkeyGovernmentpledges(e.g.,forlandreformandresettlementprograms)werenotredeemed,orforotherreasons(elitecorruption,officials'detachmentorunresponsivenesstopopularconcerns).205Thedissolutionofthemultipartysystemremovesonceandforallthepossibilityoffutureelectoraldefeat.LikeothernewnationsandmostindependentAfricanstates,ZimbabwehasembracedtheonepartysystemasavehicleforpermanentZANUrule.206ThesecurityapparatushasbeenmobilizedtodemonstratethefutilityofoppositiontoZANU'smonopolyonstatepower.
DoestheintegrationofZANUandZAPUusherina"newera"inthecountry?Oneobserveranswersintheaffirmative,contendingthatthechange"promisesdramaticreliefforthenation"andcreatesa"radicallyalteredpoliticalscene"inthecountry.207Anotherclaimsthat"unityandamnestyinMatabelelandhaveinauguratedanewera;asecond'miracle'ofreconciliationtomatchthatwiththewhitesin1980.''208Suchpredictionsmaybepremature.Whethertheaccordwillbethebasisofafragilecoalitionofelitesoralastingconsociationalsettlement,itdoesnotpresentacleanbreakwiththepastasmuchasitreflectsthelogicalculminationofpoliticaldevelopmentssinceindependence.TheformalunityofZANUandZAPUdoesnotappreciablyalterthepreviousbalanceofpower,butinremovingakeychallengertoZANUitreaffirmsZANU'ssupremacy.
ThemannerinwhichonepartystatesinAfricahavecomeintobeingseemstohaveaffectedtheirpoliticalstability.AstudybyCollierfoundonepartyAfricanstatesimposedbyforce(bybanningoppositionpartiesorprohibitingopponentsfromcontestingelections)tobelessstableandmoresusceptibletomilitarycoupsthanthosewhoseonepartysystemswerebasedonelectoralvictoriesorthe
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mergerofparties.209Other
205.Astrowcitessimilarreasonsfortheattractivenessofonepartyrule(LostItsWay?p.182).206.ZANU'selitesseemlessattachedtousingtheirpositionsformaterialadvantagesthaniscommonelsewhereinAfrica;in1989,however,severalprominentCabinetministersresignedindisgraceafterapanelfoundthemguiltyofmisusingtheirofficesforpersonalgain("CorruptionInquiryCondemnsSixHarareMinisters,"Times,14April1989).OnthedominantAfricanpatternofusingpowerforpersonalenrichment,seeShils,"Opposition";R.Collier,Regimes;Howard,HumanRights.207.JanRaath,"UnityPactRaisesHopesforPeaceinMatabeleland,"Times,24December1987.208.Ranger,"MatabelelandsincetheAmnesty,"p.173.209.R.Collier,Regimes,pp.100104.
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analystsmaintainthatelite"pacts"or"settlements"mayfosterstabledemocracies.210Havingtraveledthisroutewiththe1987unityaccord,Zimbabwemightbeexpectedtohaveastablepoliticalfuture.Yetgenuineelitesettlementsrequire"theconsensualunificationofpreviouslydisunifiedelites,"andinZimbabwethisconsensusisprecarious.211BeforeZANUandZAPUunited,aleadingministerstated:"WebelievethateverythingisrightinZANU...and,therefore,weseenoneedforconcessions,compromise,andaccommodation"212ZANUmadefewconcessionsindeedinthefinalagreement.Thefactthatthemergerresultednotfromtheforceofargumentbutfromtheargumentofforcemaycontinuetocolorpoliticsundertheone-partystate.MuchwilldependontheextentofgenuinedemocraticparticipationwithinthepartyandthedegreetowhichformerZAPUleadersandsupportersaresatisfiedwiththeirroleinthepoliticalprocess.213ItispossiblethatthewitheringawayofZAPUwilllessenthepressureforinternalsolidaritywithinZANU,asSimmelwouldpredict,andopenawindowofopportunityforinternaldemocraticdebate.214
ThoserefusingtojoinZANUmayfinddissentdangerous.Whenaskedin1984whetherthosewhodisagreedwiththepartyonfundamentalissuescouldparticipateinpolitics,Mugaberesponded:"Theycanstandout.Wedon'tsaythateverybodywillbecompelledorcoercedintojoiningtherulingparty."Yetheadded,"Thosepeoplewhostandout...certainlywillnotbefriendsofZimbabweorinkeepingwiththegeneralspiritofthemoment."215Theseincorrigibleopponentsmightalsofindtheiractivitiescurtailedbytheregime.Acaseinpointistherecentlyformed(May1989)ZimbabweUnityMovement.Criticalofgovernmentcorruptionandrepressionandsurprisinglypopular,thenewpartyimmediatelyhaditsralliesbanned;severalofitsmemberswerede-
210.Elitesettlementsare"rareeventsinwhichwarringnationalelite
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factionssuddenlyanddeliberatelyreorganizetheirrelationsbynegotiatingcompromisesontheirmostbasicdisagreements"(MichaelG.BurtonandJohnHigley,"EliteSettlements,"AmericanSociologicalReview52,no.3[June1987]:295).211.JohnHigleyandMichaelG.Burton,"TheEliteVariableinDemocraticTransitionsandBreakdowns,"AmericanSociologicalReview54,no.1(February1989):29.212.HerbertUshewokunze,"YestoUnity,NotoConcessions,"SundayMail,19January1986.213.Inearly1989thepressreported"anapparentapathy"towardpartyintegrationinMatabeleland(Herald,10January1989).214.GeorgSimmel,ConflictandtheWebofGroup-Affiliations(Glencoe,Ill.:FreePress,1955),pp.9198.215.Mugabe,MOTO,October1984,p.10.
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tainedwithoutchargein1989;andthepartyhasrepeatedlybeenaccusedofbeingSouthAfrica'spawn.216
Conclusion
Itisimportanttoappreciatethatsince1980Zimbabwehasexperiencedsignificantinternalandexternalproblems.Butthestructureandpracticeoflawandorderinthecountryhavealogicthatissomewhatindependentofactualsecurityrequirements;thelattershouldnotbeviewedasunmediated"determinants"ofofficialpolicy.EquallyimportantinexplainingthefortificationoftheinheritedsecurityapparatusinpostsettlerZimbabwearetwointeractingphenomena:thelackofconstraintson,andthepresenceofcompellingincentivesfor,staterepression.Theabsenceofconstraintsisreflectedinthecountry'slackofadeeplyrooteddemocraticpoliticalcultureandtheatomizationofcivilsociety.Incentivesfortheuseofrepressionincludethesecuritysector'sproclivitytowardrepressivepracticesthatpoliticaleliteshavemobilizedagainstZANU'srivals.Themastervariableinourexplanatorymodelistheregime'sinterestsandcapacities.Muchdepends,therefore,onhowanewregimeapproachestheexistingpoliticalculture(doesittrytorevalorizetheculture?);howithandlesthepowerandorganizationalinclinationsofthesecurityestablishment(doesitattempttocurbrepressivepracticesandoverhaulstructures?);andhowitrespondstodemocraticpressureswithincivilsociety(doesitinvite,facilitate,orsuppresssuchactivity?).
Zimbabwe'spoliticalcultureofferslittlescopefordemocraticpracticesandreconstitutionofthesecurityapparatus.Reminiscentofthesettlerorder,therelationshipbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyinZimbabwehasbeenhighlyasymmetrical.Civicinstitutionsremaininert,lackingthecommitmentandtheresources(popularsupport,accesstothemedia,allianceswithotherelites)toinfluenceofficial
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policieson
216.BeforeheformedtheZimbabweUnityMovementinMay1989,EdgarTekerehadbeensecretarygeneralofZANU,whichexpelledhiminOctober1988afterheaccusedpartyleadersofimposingarepressivedictatorshiponthecountry.Anoutspokenandpopularpoliticalfigure,Tekerehadalsocriticizedthe"rottenleadership"intheGovernmentandZANUandtheregime'ssteadycentralizationofpower.Hecalledone-partyrulecorrupt,inefficient,andnepotisticandcriticizedexecutiveinterferencewiththejudiciary(BulawayoChronicle,15July1988;Guardian,24October1988;Times,11August1988;MOTO,August-September1988).InMarch1989theGovernmentinstructedtheBulawayoChroniclenottopublishaninterviewwithTekereonhisintenttocampaignagainstZANUona"cleanadministration"platform(Times,18March1989).
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lawandorder.Occasionalpublicprotestsanddissentbyworkers,students,andchurchgroupshavebeenswiftlyquashedbytheauthorities.
Acharacteristicproblemfacingapostauthoritarianregimeisthatofneutralizingorcontainingthepowerofoldregimeprotagonists.ModernLatinAmericanhistoryispunctuatedbyattemptsofsuchloyaliststounderminedemocratizationandplansforinstitutionalliberalization.InZimbabwebycontrast,theeliminationofthesettlers'politicalandmilitarypowerwasremarkablysmoothandrapid.Consequentlythewhitescanneitherforcenorresistchange.Theirpoliticalmarginalizationremovesoneobstacletodemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentbutbynomeansguaranteesit.ThecaseofZimbabwethusconfirmsalargerargument:thatthedisplacementofaformerauthoritarianeliteisnotasufficientconditionforgenuinedemocratizationorliberalizationofasecuritysystem.
TheevidencepresentedinthischapterindicatesthattheessentialistviewthatZimbabwe'ssecurityorgansfunctionaccordingtoaninnerdynamicthatinvitesrepressiveoutcomesshouldbebalancedbyfactorsofexternaldemand.Itistruethatwar-hardenedcoerciveinstitutionsoftenproveparticularlyresilienttochange,andthattheirtransformationrequiresdeterminationandresourcefulnessonthepartofnewstatemanagers.InZimbabwetheseeliteshavedonetheopposite:theyhavegalvanizedthesecuritysector,withlegalandextralegalpowers,generousmaterialresources,andinsulationfromeffectiveaccountability.Convincedthattheinheritedsystemispartofthesolutiontopoliticalandsecurityproblems,theZimbabweGovernmenthassystematicallyfortifiedit.Thereis,inotherwords,anelectiveaffinitybetweentheinstitutionalpredispositionsofthesecurityestablishmentandthegoalsofthenewregime.Thetwofactorspositivelyinteract:theregime'splantocrushorganizedpoliticaloppositiontoZANUconstitutesthedrivingforcebehindits
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activationofthesecurityapparatusinheritedfromtheRhodesianstate.
AuthoritarianandrepressivepracticeswerenotinevitableinindependentZimbabwe.Hadthepoliticalobjectivesoftherulingpartybeendifferentorthedeterminationandorganizationofdemocraticsocialforcesstronger,therepressivepracticesofthesecurityagenciesmighthavebeencurbedandtheprocessofinstitutionalmodernizationbegun.
Sinceindependence,Zimbabwehasexperiencedunevenpoliticaldevelopment.Ontheonehand,thestateisnolongerorganizedaroundthesectarianinterestsofasmallminority.Thefranchisehasbeenuniversalized,proceduresforfreeelectionsintroduced,andcivilandpoliti-
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calrightsextendedtoall.Thenewregimehasformallyembracedtheinterestsoftheblackmajority,whichsettlerrulehadignoredforninetyyears.AndtheZANUregimeenjoysamuchbroaderbaseofsupportthanitspredecessor.
Ontheotherhand,theprotectionofminorityrightshasnothadahighpriorityundertheneworder.Consequently,thegrowthofnationalidentityandsupportfortheregimeamongmembersoftheNdebeleethnicgrouphavestalled.Thecoercivecuttingedgeoftheoldregimeremains,anditsoperationshavehadanadverseimpactonnationbuilding,politicalstability,andsubstantivedemocratization.217InbothRhodesiaandZimbabwe,thepolice,military,andintelligenceforceshavebeenkeyactorsindeepeningcommunalcleavagesracialinRhodesia,ethnicinZimbabwe.Majorityrulemaythereforecoexistwithrepressivesecurityinstitutionsbothofwhichminoritygroupsmayexperienceascontributingtoatyrannyofthemajority.Lijphart,forone,singlesout"Zimbabwe'smajoritariansystemastheunderlyingcauseofitscivilstrife,"butourfindingssuggestadditionalfactorsthatarecentral.218
ThenextchapterdemonstratestheutilityofourmodelinexplainingthepartialliberalizationofNorthernIreland'ssecuritysystemunderBritishrule.
217.DavidCaute,"Zimbabwe:GrimMarchtoaLossofLiberty,"Times,6May1986.218.ArendLijphart,Power-SharinginSouthAfrica(Berkeley:InstituteofInternationalStudies,1985),p.21.
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Chapter7NorthernIrelandunderBritishRuleBy1972thethreepillarsofsettlerruleinNorthernIrelandhadcollapsed.TheBritishmetropolehadconcludedthattheUnionistGovernment'sgriponstatepowerandhandlingofmattersoflawandorderwerealtogetherdivisiveanddestabilizing.ThesettlerregimewaspresidingoveracrisisofauthorityamongProtestantsandCatholicsalike.Politicalviolenceandpublicdisorderhadrisensharply,andcoerciveresourceswerestretchedtothebreakingpoint.UnrestofthismagnitudehadnotoccurredinNorthernIrelandsincethestormybirthofthestatein1921.
AlthoughLondonhadusedthethreatofdirectruletotemperearlierUnionistrecalcitrance,itviewedthisoptionasthelastresort.Facedwithasteadilydeterioratingsecuritysituationandpressurefromarmychiefs,theBritishCabinetdecidedon22March1972toassumefullcontroloflawandorder.1Stormontfoundthisactionunacceptable;inPrimeMinisterBrianFaulkner'swords,itwouldirreparablyunderminetheGovernment's"powers,authorityandstanding...withoutjustification"andwouldgivetheimpressionthat"violencedoespay."Refusingtosharepowerwiththemetropole,theUnionistCabinetabruptlyresignedandLondonassumedfullpoliticalcontroloverthetroubledprovince.DirectrulewasnotenvisagedasafinalsolutiontotheUlsterproblembutasatemporaryexpedientawaitingamorelastingpolitical
1.PeterJenkins,"Ulster:AKindofVictory,"Guardian,17January1972.
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settlement.Itremainsinplacetodayandapoliticalsolutiontotheconflictappearsmoreelusivethanever.2
IfCatholicsinitiallysawdirectruleasapartialvictoryovertheUnionists,ProtestantssawitasanactofbetrayalandappeasementtoUlster'senemies.OnMarch27,Faulknerbitterlydeclared,"NorthernIrelandisnotacoconutcolony";3theHomeAffairsministeraccusedBritainofusingdoublestandards:"MajorityruleinRhodesia,minorityruleinUlster."4EventhoughLondonneverentertainedthenotionofminorityruleinUlster,ithadbeguntoreassesstheappropriatenessofWestminster-stylemajoritarianismtothisdividedsociety.By1973itconsideredthat"theExecutiveitselfcannolongerbesolelybaseduponanysingleparty,ifthatpartydrawsitssupport...virtuallyentirelyfromonlyonesectionofadividedcommunity."5Inanutshell,"simplemajorityrulewould(asinthepast)leavetheminorityinperpetualandineffectualopposition."6
TheadventofdirectruleseemedtoofferanunprecedentedopportunitytobreakwhatHaroldWilsoncalled"fiftyyearsofunimaginativeinertiaandrepression"underUnionistrule;in1972directruleitselfsignaledthemostsignificantchangeinpoliticalandsecuritystructuressincepartition.Inonesweep,LondondissolvedtheNorthernIrelandexecutive,suspendedtheStormontParliament,andassumedfullcontroloversecurity.Settlerrulecametoanabruptend.
InreferencetotheProtestants'intractabilityandresidualinfluence,aneditorialintheLondonSundayTimesof10April1988observed,"TheharshfactisthatUlsterisa'settler'problem."YetfewstudieshaveexaminedNorthernIrelandwithinthesettler/postsettlerparadigm.7
InsharpcontrasttoZimbabwe,postsettlerNorthernIrelandhasfeaturedsignificantbutpartialliberalizationofthesettler-createdinternalsecurityapparatus.Thismodernizationwithinlimitscanbeunderstood
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2.Anattemptatpowersharinginterrupteddirectruleforfivemonthsin1974butsetoffamassivestrikebyProtestantworkersandparamilitarygroups(seeRobertFisk,ThePointofNoReturn:TheStrikeWhichBroketheBritishinUlster[London:AndreDeutsch,1975]).3.BrianFaulkner,MemoirsofaStatesman(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1978),p.157.4.Newsletter,25March1972.5.NorthernIreland:ConstitutionalProposals,Cmnd.5259(London:HMSO,1973),p.13.6.NorthernIreland:AFrameworkforDevolution,Cmnd.8541(London:HMSO,1982),p.5.7.AnotherstudythatanalyzesNorthernIrelandasasettlerstatehighlightscontinuitiesandunfortunatelyignoresimportantchangesunderBritishrule(MichaelMacDonald,ChildrenofWrath:PoliticalViolenceinNorthernIreland[NewYork:Blackwell,1986]).
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withthehelpofourexplanatorymodel,whichhighlights(1)thevaluesembeddedinthepoliticalculture;(2)theinterestsanddemandsofmajorforcesincivilsociety;(3)theindependentpowerandorganizationalpredilectionsofsecurityagencies;and(4)thecommitmentsandcapacitiesofthenewregime.AsinZimbabwe,thefourthfactorhasthegreatestpowerinexplainingthecharacteranddegreeofliberalizationinUlster,butthefirstandsecondvariablesarealsocrucial.Ulster'spolarizedpoliticalcultureandintensecommunalloyaltiesandrivalriespresentmajorobstaclestodemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentandthebuildingofuniversalisticinstitutions.Throughoutcivilsociety,opposingProtestantandCatholicforcesareextremelyactive(unlikethesituationinZimbabwe);theirdemandsonthestateoftenneutralizeoneanother,maintainingthestatusquoandretardingpoliticalprogressandcommunalaccommodation.
ThisraisestheissueofthebasicdimensionsofUlster'sdividedsocialorder.HistoricallydeepcleavagesbetweenProtestantsandCatholicsaresustainedtodaybystructuresofdifferentialcommunalsocializationandinstitutionalinsulation:highdegreesofcommunalendogamy;residential,educational,andrecreationalsegregation;sectariansocializationinthefamilyandneighborhood;conflictsbetweencommunally-rootedchurchesandpoliticalparties;frequentprovocative,triumphalistmarchesthatcelebrateancientvictoriesofonesideovertheother;andviolencebyRepublicanandLoyalistinsurgentsandthesecurityforces.8
Althoughthesedivisionsaresufficientlydeeptojustifytheuseofthetermcommunallydividedsociety,theyshouldnotbeexaggeratedorconsideredabsolute.First,classisanimportantqualifyingvariable.Divisionsaresharpestbetweenworking-classCatholicsandProtestants,moremutedwithinthemiddleclass.Second,NorthernIrelandislessthoroughlydividedthansocietieswithahistoryofminoritydominationorthosewhereextremeeconomicexploitationor
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fidelitytoacasteetiquetteininterpersonalrelationstypifiesintercommunalrelations.YetUlster'sdivisionsaresufficienttosustainmutuallyexclusivepoliticalaspirationsandfears,intercommunalhostilities,andtwodecadesofpoliticalviolence.Communalcleavagesmareffortstocreateintegrativeinstitutionsandvalues.(Oneofthefewnonsectarianbodies,theAllianceparty,hasthesupportofonly5to10percentoftheelectorate.)TheuncompromisingcharacterofUlsterpoliticssubjectsCatholicand
8.SeeJohnWhyte,"HowIstheBoundaryMaintainedbetweentheTwoCommunitiesinNorthernIreland?"EthnicandRacialStudies9,no.2(April1986):21934.
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Protestantleaderswhoseekaccommodationtoexcommunicationfromtheirhostcommunity.
ViewsontheorganizationandoperationofNorthernIreland'ssecurityinstitutionsareintimatelyconnectedtocommunallyentrenchedpoliticalpositionsandaspirations.Security,likepolitics,tendstobeazero-summatter.Whatonesidedemandsorsupports,theotherrejects;concessionstoonesideriskalienatingtheother.FormostCatholicsliberalizationhasnotgonefarenoughtoattractenthusiasticsupport(therearestilltoomanyincidentsofrepression);formostProtestants,reformshavealreadygonemuchtoofar(demonstrablyundermininglawandorder).Inthishighlychargedpolity,changesinsecurityarrangementsaloneareunlikelytohavemuchpositiveimpactonnationbuilding.
BritishRule:EnlightenedColonialism?
AtleastthreealternativeviewshavebeenadvancedregardingtheBritishstate'soverallobjectivesincontemporaryNorthernIreland.ThefirstportraysBritishruleasaclassiccaseofimperialistdomination.ThisisthepositionoftheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)anditspoliticalwing,SinnFein.
ViolenceinIrelandhasitsrootsintheconquestofIrelandbyBritain.Theconquesthaslastedthroughseveralstagesformanycenturiesand...ithasusedviolence,coercion,sectarianism,andterrorismasitsmethodsandhashadpowerasitsobjective.9
ThisargumentbytheleaderofSinnFeinistakenasaxiomaticinsomescholarlywritingaswell.Farrell,forexample,flatlyassertsthat"sinceBritainwasandisanimperialistpoweritisevidentthattheexistenceofthe[NorthernIreland]statelethasservedtheinterestsofimperialism"10Thelogicbehindtheseclaimsissuspect;theCrown'shistoricalpoliticalsubjugationandeconomicexploitationofIreland
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doesnotautomaticallycharacterizethecontemporaryperiod.TodaythecostsofcontinuedBritishrulefaroutweighanybenefitstothemetropole.SomefourhundredBritishsoldiershavebeenkilledinUlstersince1971;theprov-
9.GerryAdams,ThePoliticsofIrishFreedom(Dingle,Ireland:Brandon,1986),p.62.10.MichaelFarrell,"NorthernIreland:AnAnti-ImperialistStruggle,"inTheSocialistRegister,ed.R.MilibandandJ.Saville(London:MerlinPress,1977),p.72;D.R.O'ConnorLysaght,"BritishImperialisminIreland,"inIreland:DividedNation,DividedClass,ed.A.MorganandB.Purdie(London:InkLinks,1980);AlfredMcClungLee,"Imperialism,Class,andNorthernIreland'sCivilWar,"CrimeandSocialJustice,no.8(Fall-Winter1977).
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inceisapoliticalliability,aninternationalembarrassment,andaneconomicdrainforBritain;11itofferslittlecompensationinreturn(e.g.,cheaplabor,amarketforexports,counterinsurgencylessons).12
AsecondperspectivedepictsBritishruleasaninstrumentorguardianofProtestantinterests,consistentlyfavoringtheirconstitutionalpreferences,socioeconomicsupremacy,anddemandsforsectariancontrolofCatholics.NorthernIreland'sSocialDemocraticandLabourparty(SDLP)maintainsthat"theBritishgovernment'sroleinNorthernIrelandisnotas'honestbroker'or'peacemaker,'butasacrutchfortheloyalistmajority."13SinnFeinholdsasimilarposition.14Farrellarguedin1976thatBritainwas"fastbecomingtheservantoftheUlsterLoyalists."15TenyearslaterMacDonaldclaimsthat"BritaintacitlyandactivelybacksProtestantdomination....ForonceBritainallowsProtestantstoblockunification[withtheIrishRepublic]itendsuppreservingProtestanthegemony."16ThisargumentmistakenlyequatesthemaintenanceofpartitionthecoreProtestantdemandwithinternalhegemonyandsupremacyoverCatholics.MacDonaldalsoinsiststhattheProtestants"manipulate"and"useBritaintoupholdtheirdominationoverCatholics'';17hepresentsnoevidenceofeithermanipulationordomination.Inhisview,thetransferofpowerin1972simplymarkedatransitionfromindirecttodirectBritishsupportforProtestantdomination:"Sixty-fiveyearsafterNorthernIrelandwascreatedand17yearsafteriteruptedinviolence,Britishpolicyremainsmuchthesameasalways:itmaintainsProtestanthegemonymilitarily,politically,andeconomically."TheonlydifferenceisthatBritainisnow"activelyanddirectly"involvedin"maintainingastatusquobiasedinfavorofProtes-
11.Britain's19891990subventiontoUlsterthedifferencebetweenpublicspendingandrevenuesraisedintaxesandlevieswasover£1.6billion.12.AndersBoserup,"ContradictionsandStrugglesinNorthernIreland,"in
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TheSocialistRegister,ed.R.MilibandandJ.Saville(London:MerlinPress,1972).Oncounterinsurgencylessons,seeCarolAckroyd,KarenMargolis,JonathanRosenhead,andTimShallice,TheTechnologyofPoliticalControl(London:Pluto,1980).13.SocialDemocraticandLabourParty,"Justice"inNorthernIreland(Belfast:SDLP,1985),p.9.Sincethe1985Anglo-IrishAgreement(discussedbelow)theSDLPhasmodifieditsviews,seeingBritainasmoreneutral,andstatedthatBritain'sonlyinterestinIrelandwastoseethat"violenceorthethreatofviolenceshallnotsucceed"(quotedin"TheNationalistDivide,"BelfastTelegraph,5September1988).14.Adams,Freedom,p.89.15.MichaelFarrell,NorthernIreland:TheOrangeState(London:PlutoPress,1976),p.331.16.MacDonald,ChildrenofWrath,pp.102,150.17.Ibid.,pp.121,150.
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tants."Disregardingtheevidence(discussedbelow),MacDonaldcontendsthattheBritishGovernmenthas"entertainedbutrarelyimplementedreforms."18
AfinalapproachseesBritainasathirdpartyactingasaneutralumpire,arbitratingbetweenandseekingtheconsentofbothsides,balancingtheirdivergentinterestsinthedecision-makingprocess,andimpartiallymaintainingorder.Notsurprisingly,thisistheofficialpositionoftheBritishGovernment.OneformerBritishSecretaryofStateforUlsterdeclaredthat"thesecurityforcesarenottheretoprotectsomeProtestantascendancyorcolonialrule,butthebasicrighttoliveinpeace";19otherministersconsistentlycharacterizeBritishruleasmediatingbetweenthe"tribalism"ofProtestantandCatholicforces.Thisperspectiveneglectsthreeimportantconsiderations:theBritishGovernment'spivotalroleindeterminingUlster'sconstitutionalstatus;theextenttowhichitsspecificactionsandpresenceinUlsterfuelcommunalhostilities,howeverunwittingly;anditslackofmoralauthorityandleverageovertheprincipalantagonists,basedpartlyonthepublicperceptionthatofficialpoliciesconsistentlyfavoroneside.
NoneoftheseperspectivessatisfactorilycapturestherealityofBritishinterventionincontemporaryNorthernIreland.Thefirsttwofallvictimtothefallacyofhistoricalcontinuity:theassumptionthathistoricalpatternsaccuratelycharacterizecontemporaryarrangements,whenthefactscontradictthiscontinuity.Notwithstandingtheobjectionsoftheprecedingparagraph,thethirdapproachprovidesthebestpointofdepartureforthepresentinvestigation.ContemporaryBritishruleinUlsterapproximatesanenlightenedcolonialism,insofarasthemetropolehasimposeditsruleonUlsterinaratherdictatorial(colonial)fashionwiththe(enlightened)goalofpromotingdemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentandliberalizingtheapparatusofcontrol.ComparedtopostsettlerZimbabweandLiberia,Ulsterhas
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hadasignificantmeasureofsuccessinitsmodernizationunderBritishtutelage.
TheargumentthatBritishrulehascontributedtosystemicreformaswellasoverallprogressinhumanrightsinNorthernIrelandshouldnotbeexaggerated.First,theprocesshasnotbeenuniform:someagencieshaveonlyslightlyimprovedandothersappeartohaveregressed.Second,thecoercivesystemhasbeenfortified:itreceivesfargreaterre-
18.Ibid.,p.149.19.DouglasHurd,quotedin"ReportsonNIPolicyDismissedbyHurd,"IrishTimes(Dublin),4April1985.
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sourcesandcommandsamoreformidabletechnologyofsurveillanceandcontrolthanundersettlerrule.Third,practicefrequentlydepartsfromtheidealofneutrality.Inanumberofareasdiscussedbelow,theroutineoperationsofthesecurityandcriminaljusticesystemsviolatethelogicofliberalization.Finally,themaintenanceoflawandorderisconfoundedbyenduringsocietalproblems:politicalprogressandeconomicdevelopmenthavebeenstalledfordecadesandworking-classpeopleespeciallyCatholicsstillexperiencehighlevelsofsocioeconomicdeprivation.
ColonialRule
ThemostsignificantchangesinUlster'spoliticalinstitutionsoccurredatthemomentsettlerrulewasterminated.Since1972theBritishGovernmenthashadresponsibilityforNorthernIreland'sexecutiveandlegislativefunctions(exceptforthepower-sharingexecutiveof1974).InpracticeLondondevolvesconsiderableresponsibilitytotheadjunctadministrationattheNorthernIrelandOffice(NIO)inBelfast.TheNIOformulatespolicyunderthegeneralguidanceofWestminsterandWhitehall;itcoordinatesthestate'sadministrativedepartments(someinherited,somenew)andisresponsibleforsecuritypolicy,criminallawandprocedure,thejudiciary,prisons,police,andpublicprosecutions.AttheNIO,aSecretaryofStateforNorthernIrelandandthreejuniorministers(allBritish)performthedutiesofformerUnionistministers,assistedbycivilservantsfrombothNorthernIrelandandBritain.20AlthoughtheBritishForeignOfficeandtheMinistryofDefenseareinvolvedinUlsterandhaveasubstantialvoiceinCabinetdecisionsregardingtheprovincetheNIOistheprimusinterpares.21
Inpractice,theNIOislargelyfreefromparliamentaryscrutiny.LegislationatWestminsterconcerningUlstertakestheformofOrders-inCouncilpresentedtoParliamentforitsapproval(butnot
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amendment).22
20.Approximatelytwo-thirdsofNIOcivilservantscomefromBritainandthebalancefromUlster,althoughsomedepartmentsatNIO,likethePoliceDivision,areentirelyfromNorthernIreland(NIOofficial,interviewwithauthor,17July1986).AsofJanuary1985,13percentofthecivilservantsatNIOwereCatholic,comparedto33percentfortheNorthernIrelandcivilserviceasawhole(BelfastTelegraph,22July1986,p.4).21.JohnS.Ditch,"DirectRuleandNorthernIrelandAdministration,"Administration25,no.3(Autumn1977):336;EdwardMoxon-Browne,Nation,Class,andCreedinNorthernIreland(Aldershot:Gower,1983),p.47.22.OneSecretaryofStatejustifiedOrders-in-Councilonthegroundsthatlegislationbyconventionalbillswouldplace"anintolerableburdenonParliament"(GreatBritain,HouseofCommonsDebates,vol.19,5March1982,col.250).
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ThissystemallowsNorthernIrelandMPsnoeffectiveroleinthelegislationaffectingtheprovince.23
LikeParliament,successiveBritishCabinetsgivelowprioritytoNorthernIreland'saffairsunlesssomecrisisdemandsimmediateattention.24OneformerSecretaryofStateforUlster,MerlynRees,concluded:"ExceptintimesofcrisisNorthernIrelanddoesnotloomlargein[Cabinet]considerations....Inpractice,theresponsibilityfallsalmostcompletelytotheSecretaryofStatealliedcloselywiththeSecretaryofStateforDefense."25
DecisionmakingonmostsecuritymattersisconfinedtotheSecretaryofState,theChiefConstable,andthearmycommander,whomeetmonthlyinaSecurityandPolicyCommittee.SincethesigningoftheAnglo-IrishAgreementon15November1985,theGovernmentoftheRepublicofIrelandhashadanunusualconsultativeroleinpolicydiscussionsinthenorth;26intheirInter-GovernmentalConferencemeetingsIrishandBritishofficialsdiscussmattersoflawandorder,includingpolicing,thecourts,andcross-bordercooperationonsecurity.AlthoughtheGovernmentisundernoobligationtoaccepttheRepublicofIreland'sspecificrecommendations,theagreementhasaddedanimportantelementtothecalculusonsecurityissues.
Directruleineffectinstalledasystemofcolonialruleanactofrecolonizationunprecedentedintwentieth-centurysettlersocieties.27ThenewregimeinNorthernIreland,unlikethatinZimbabwe,hasnorootsincivilsocietyandhasprecariousauthorityatbest.Asinothercolonial
23.PaulMaguire,"ParliamentandtheDirectRuleofNorthernIreland,"IrishJurist10(Summer1975):88.24.G.Bell,TroublesomeBusiness,p.106.25.BelfastTelegraph,12March1980.
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26.UnabletosecureasettlementwithinUlster,theBritishGovernmentsoughtexternalsupportforitspositionintheprovince;theAnglo-IrishAgreementappearstohavelessenedinternationalpressureonBritain(AdrianGuelke,"ThePoliticalImpasseinSouthAfricaandNorthernIreland"[PaperpresentedattheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationmeeting,Washington,D.C.,September1988]).27.TheBritishGovernmentseesdirectruleasneithercolonialnorundemocratic;itdefinestheprovinceasanintegralpartoftheUnitedKingdom.NorthernIrelandsendsseventeenMPstoWestminster;theSecretaryofStateandhisjuniorministersareelected(albeitnotbyUlster'scitizens).YetNorthernIrelandhasacquiredtheessentialfeaturesofacolonyoran"internalcolony,"whichHechterdefinesasaregionpoliticallydominatedandmateriallyexploitedbythecoreregionbuthavinggreateradministrative-legalintegration,formalcitizenshipandrights,andgeographicalcontiguitywiththecorethanaconventionalcolony(MichaelHechter,InternalColonialism:TheCelticFringeinBritishNationalDevelopment,15361966[Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1975],p.349).ThesecriteriaseemtofitUlster,exceptthatthecorenolongerexploitseconomicallybutinsteadmateriallysupportstheprovince.
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states,theBritishadministrationissuperimposedonsocietyandinstitutionallydetachedfromlocalsocialforces.Thisdetachmentrendersthelocalacceptabilityofregime-initiatedchangesproblematic.
Althoughthe1973NorthernIrelandConstitutionActandvariousofficialpronouncementsaffirmtheprincipleofself-determination,theGovernmenthasnarrowlyconstruedthepledgeasrespectingthedesireofthemajoritytoremainwithinorexittheUnitedKingdom.Inthemeantime,fewformalchannelsexistfordemocraticparticipation.AlocalbutpurelyadvisoryNorthernIrelandAssemblyexistedfrom1982to1986;NorthernIrelandsends17MPstotheBritishHouseofCommons(whichhas635members);andUlster'scitizenselecttheirowncitycouncillors.DevolvingcontrolovernationalaffairstolocalactorsLondonseesasprematureandapttodegenerateintoatyrannyoftheProtestantmajorityorincessantaltercationsbetweenProtestantandCatholicleaders.
Symptomaticofthedomesticpoliticalvacuum,severalmajorpolicyshiftshavebeenimposedfromLondonwithlittleornoinputfrominterestedlocalforces.Onesuchchangewasthe"Ulsterization"ofsecurityin1976(discussedbelow),whichputthepoliceinthefrontlineofcounterinsurgency.AnotheristheAnglo-Irishaccord,whichisdesignedtopromotetheinterestsofbothsides.Indrawinguptheagreement,LondonandDublinconsultedtheSocialDemocraticandLabourpartybutneitheroftheUnionistparties;duringthreeyearsofoperationtheInterGovernmentalConferencehasallowednodirectinvolvementbylocalparties.
ThelackofdemocracyisacommongrievanceacrossthespectrumofpoliticalopinioninUlster,althoughthereislittleconsensusonthepreferreddirectionofdemocraticdevelopment.ProtestantsandCatholicsequallyandalmostunanimouslyopposethecontinuationof
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directBritishrule.BothsidesviewtheBritishadministrationasmorallybankrupt;theirestrangementaffectstheregime'seffortstobuildnewpoliticalinstitutions.Atthesametime,theconstitutionaloptionsreceivingthestrongestsupportfromonesidemeetalmostunanimousoppositionfromtheother(seeTable5).ProtestantsflatlyrejectaunitedorfederalIrelandandjointBritish-Irishsovereignty;Catholicsdismissindependence,fullintegrationintotheUnitedKingdom,andmajorityrule.Itisnoteworthy,however,thatonlyasmallproportionofProtestantscontinuetheirallegiancetotheprincipleofmajorityrule.MostProtestantsrealizethatLondonwouldnotcountenanceareturntothissystem.Even
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TABLE5PREFERREDFORMOFGOVERNMENT(inpercentages)Catholics
1988a 1988b 1987 1986 1982 1974CompleteintegrationwiththeU.K. 5 9 12 5.7 11 6UnitedIreland 22 25 22 21.5 38 16Directrule 3 2 7 6.0 N/A 8Powersharing 35 31 36 27.8 31 55Jointauthority,LondonandDublin 11 12 N/A 16.9 N/A N/AMajorityrule 2 1 2 2.4 1 1Independence 3 4 9 5.3 2 1FederalIreland 2 7 N/A 5.0 13 7Don'tknow 13 10 11 9.7 4 7SOURCES:1988a:CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,5October1988;1988b:CoopersandLybrandpoll,reprintedinFortnight,no.261(April1988);CoopersandLybrandpoll,UlsterTelevisionPoliticalOpinionPoll,1987;CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,15January1986;NOPMarketResearchpoll,NorthernIreland(Belfast:UlsterTelevision,February1982);NOPMarketResearchpoll,1974,citedinRichardRose,IanMcAllister,andPeterMair,IsThereaConcurringMajorityaboutNorthernIreland?,22(Glasgow:UniversityofStrathclyde,1978),p.19.NOTES:
N/A=notasked.1974poll:firstpreferencefor"NorthernIreland'sfuture"(N=979).1982poll:theonepoliticalchangerespondentwould"personallyprefer"(N=998,667Protestant,331Catholic).1986poll:"bestformofgovernmentoverthenextfiveyears"(N=2,004,57%Protestant,39%Catholic).1987poll:"bestformofgovernmentforNorthernIreland''(N=1,059,632Protestant,427Catholic).1988polls:"bestformofgovernmentforNorthernIreland"(1988a,N=1,100).InconsistenciesinwhetherNsareprovidedorbrokendownbyreligionreflectdiscrepanciesinthedatasources.
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theparamilitaryProtestantorganization,theUlsterDefenseAssociation,recognizesthat"majorityruleindeeplydividedsocieties"is"profoundlyundemocratic."28OntheCatholicside,despitethecommonclaimthataunitedIrelandisa"natural"aspirationofCatholics,onlyabout25percentconsideritthebestpoliticalscenario.
Whetherthereisconsensusonanalternativetodirectruledependsonthequestionposed.Whenaskedin1988iftheyagreedinprinciplewiththenotionofpowersharingbetweenUlster'spoliticalparties,76percentofCatholicsand62percentofProtestantssaidyes.29Yetthisapprovalismoreshallowthanitappears.Ontheissueofthe"best"formofgovernment,powersharingreceivesmuchlesscross-communitysupport,asTable5shows.ItisstillthemostpopularoptionforCatholics.ForProtestants,powersharingrankslowerbecausetheybelievefullintegrationwiththeUnitedKingdomwouldbestprotecttheirinterestsorbecausetheyseepowersharingasameanswherebyCatholicscouldsubvertthestatefromwithin.
EnlightenedRule
London'scentralobjectivesinNorthernIrelandareasfollows.30Relativestabilityorthecontainmentofdisorderwithinmanageableboundsisthechiefimmediatepriority.Institutionaltransferandculturalconvergencewiththemetropolearemorelong-termgoalsandmeanswherebyapermanentsettlementmightbereached.Theendresultwouldbeapoliticalorderbasedonpowersharingamongmoderateleadersofthemajorityandminority,impartialadministration,andthegrowthofaccommodationistvalues;andasystemoflawandorderthatispoliticallyneutral,acceptabletobothcommunities,andcommittedtotheidealofjustice.Oncetheseconditionshavebeenfulfilled,BritainclaimsthatitwillleaveNorthernIrelandonceandforall.Inshort,London'sgranddesignis
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toremakeUlsterinconformitywithBritishpoliticalnormstotheextentthatthisreconstructionispossibleinadividedso-
28.UlsterDefenseAssociation,CommonSense(Belfast:UlsterPoliticalResearchCenter,1987),p.1.29.CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,5October1988.Thirty-ninepercentofCatholicsand37percentofProtestantsthoughtthepartiesinvolvedshouldhavethepowertomakelaws;23percentofCatholicsand43percentofProtestantsthoughttheyshouldonlyadministerlawscreatedbyWestminster.30.Theaimsmotivatinggovernmentelites'policiesandactionsaredifficulttodocumentbutmaybeinferredfromofficialpledgesandprograms,andfromrelativelyconsistentpatternsofaction.
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ciety.31Thequalificationiscrucial,sinceUlster'sdividedsocialorderisaprincipalimpedimenttopoliticaldevelopmentandreformofthesystemoflawandorder.
Inthemeantime,theBritishadministrationattemptstogoverntheprovincewithoutbecomingtarnishedbyidentificationwitheitherside.Henceitplacesapremiumonstateautonomy,particularlyininternalsecurityaffairs:divorcedfrompartisaninterestsandmanagingpoliticaldisputesfromaboveratherthanbecominganarenaofstrugglebetweencontendingsocialforces.LiketheclassicBonapartiststate,theBritishadministrationstandsaboveandeven"againstcivilsociety."WhileattemptingtoelicitconsentfromProtestantsandCatholicsforitspoliticalinnovations,theregimehasdistanceditselffromthosegroups.Thispostureisbothcolonialandenlightened:colonialbecausetheregimedictatespolicieswithoutconsultinglocalforces,enlightenedbecausethisdetachedrulehelpstoshieldtheregimefromsectarianinfluences.
ParametersofPoliticalViolence
Since1976,thenumberofincidentsandfatalitiesresultingfrompoliticalviolencehasremainedwellbelowthelevelof1971through1976(seeTable6).Judgingbytheseindicators,thesecuritysituationhasimprovedconsiderablysincethefinalyearsofsettlerruleandthefirstyearsofBritishrule.Yetpoliticalviolencecontinuestodominatecommunalrelationsandpoliticallifeintheprovince.
Qualitativechangesinpoliticalviolencearealsoevident.First,thesectarianattacksbyProtestantorCatholicmobsintheearly1970sdeclinedsharplyafterthemid-1970s,withacorrespondingreductionintheproportionofcivilianfatalities:from74percentofthosekilledin19721977to59percentin19821987.Second,theIRAbecamemoreselectiveinitstargets,attackingagreaterproportionofsecurity
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personnel.Between1972and1976,24percentofallthosekilledweremembersofthesecurityforces;between1984and1988,thefigurehadrisento40percent.
Table7liststhedeathscausedbypoliticalviolencefrom1969through1988.Republicaninsurgentshavebeenresponsiblefor57.6percentofalldeaths,Loyalistinsurgents24.8percent,andthesecurity
31.FullintegrationwiththeU.K.mightpromotethoroughgoingmodernization,butBritainopposesthissolutionbecauseofitsexpectedpoliticalcosts.ActingasaneutralmodernizerwhilepressingUlsterizationallowsLondontodistanceitselffromtheUlsterimbroglio.
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TABLE6THESECURITYSITUATION,196919881969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
FatalitiesRUC 1 2 11 14 10 12 7 13 8 4 9 3 13 8 9RUCReserve 3 3 3 4 10 6 6 5 6 8 4 9Army 43 103 58 28 14 14 15 14 38 8 10 21 5UDR 5 26 8 7 6 15 14 7 10 9 13 7 10Civiliansa 12 23 115 321 171 166 216 245 69 50 51 50 57 57 44
Total 13 25 174 467 250 216 247 297 112 81 113 76 101 97 77
TerroristincidentsShooting 213 1756 10,628 5018 3206 1805 1908 1081 755 728 642 1142 547 424Bombsb 8 170 1515 1853 1520 1113 635 1192 535 633 564 400 529 332 367
Incendiaries 270 56 239 608 115 60 2 49 36 43Total 8 383 3271 12,481 6538 4589 2496 3339 2224 1503 1352 1044 1720 915 834
FindsWeapons 324 717 1264 1595 1260 825 837 590 400 301 203 398 321 199Explosives(tons) 0.4 2.6 27.4 31.6 23.7 9.9 16.9 2.7 3.5 0.9 0.8 3.4 2.3 1.7
TerroristschargedAlloffenses 531 1414 1362 1197 1276 1308 843 670 550 918 686 613
SOURCE:ChiefConstable,ChiefConstable'sAnnualReport(Belfast:PoliceAuthority,1988).aIncludessuspectedterrorists.Forabreakdownofcivilianandinsurgentfatalities,seeTable7.bIncludesdevicesdefused.
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TABLE7DEATHSFROMPOLITICALVIOLENCE,19691988Fatalities Agents
SecurityForces
NationalistParamilitantsa
LoyalistParamilitants
Others+Unidentified
Securityforces 13 823 10 4Nationalistparamilitants 123 144 18 8Loyalistparamilitants 12 18 36 3Catholiccivilians 148 170 492 73Protestantcivilians 25 371 107 63Unknownreligion 5 21 11 1Prisonofficers 0 23 2 0Total 326 1,570 676 152Percentageofalldeathscausedbythisagency
12.0 57.6 24.8 5.6
Percentageofciviliandeathscausedbythisagency
11.8 38.7 40.5 9.1
Civiliandeathsaspercentageofdeathsbythisagency
54.6 37.3 90.5 90.1
SOURCE:IrishInformationPartnership,reprintedinFortnight,no.270(February1989).aForparamilitants(usedinthesource)thisstudyconsistentlyusestheterminsurgents.
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forces12percent.RepublicansandLoyalistshavebeenresponsibleforroughlyequalnumbersofcivilianfatalities,38.7percentand40.5percentrespectively;thesecurityforceswereresponsiblefor11.8percent.However,civiliancasualtiescausedbyRepublicaninsurgentsoftenappearaccidental;membersofthesecurityforcesaretheirmaintargets(52.4percentofdeathscausedbyRepublicans).LoyalistinsurgentshavemoreintentionallytrainedtheirsightsonCatholiccivilians(72.8percentofdeathscausedbyLoyalists),ofteninrevengeforRepublicanattacksonsecuritypersonnel.AccordingtoMcKeown,from1969to1980mostofthecivilianskilledbythesecurityforces"wereatthetimeofdeathengagedintotallylegitimateactivities."32ButthesameverdictappliestocivilianskilledbyCatholicandProtestantinsurgents.
TheSecurityForces
OneofthefewgrowthindustriesinNorthernIrelandisthatoflawandorder,withexpendituresskyrocketingsincethebeginningofBritishrule.NetexpenditureontheRoyalUlsterConstabularyjumpedfrom£15.8millionin19711972to£361millionin19871988;theproportionofpublicspendingcommittedtopolicinggrewfrom2.5percentto6.5percentfrom1971to1985.33Thisgrowthcamelargelyfrompayincreasesforofficers,moresophisticatedpoliceequipment,andtheconstructionandfortificationofpolicestations.TheextracostofmaintainingtheBritisharmyinUlster(abovethecostofstationingitinEurope)was£14millionin19711972and£143millionin19821983.34Between1969and1982theindirecteconomicanddirectexchequercostsofUlster'sviolencetotaled£8.9billion,including£4.2billioninextrasecuritycostsalone.35
TheBritishArmy
From1969to1976,theBritisharmywasintheforefrontofthe
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internalsecurityenterprise.ItservedasthedefactopoliceforceinCatholic
32.MichaelMcKeown,"Chronicles:ARegisterofNorthernIreland'sCasualties,19691980,"CraneBag4,no.2(19801981):3.33.ExpenditurefiguresprovidedbyRUCHeadquarters,Belfast;proportionscitedinJohnBrewer,AdrianGuelke,IanHume,EdwardMoxon-Browne,andRickWilford,ThePolice,PublicOrder,andtheState(NewYork:St.Martin's,1988),p.58.34.NewIrelandForum,TheCostofViolenceArisingfromtheNorthernIrelandCrisissince1969(Dublin:GovernmentStationaryOffice,1983),p.10.35.Ibid.,pp.10,2526.Thesefiguresdonotincludethecostofpoliticaladministrationoftheprovince.
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working-classareas,patrollingstreets,searchinghouses,controllingdemonstrationsandriots,andimplementinginternment.ThepolicefocusedprimarilyonthesaferProtestantareas,wheretheyinvestigatedspecificoffensesandbroughtsuspectstocourt.ThisdifferentialdeploymentinthetwocommunitiesproducedwhatBoyle,Hadden,andHillyardcalla"militarysecurity"approachinCatholicareasanda"policeprosecution"approachinProtestantareas.36
UndertheBritishConservativeGovernmentof19701974,amilitaryvictoryoverRepublicaninsurgencywasassumedtobepossible,andsoldiersweregivenarelativelyfreehandtodealwithsuspectedtroublemakersanduncooperativecitizens.37Soldiers'frustrationwiththesecuritysituationencouragedindiscriminateviolence,andharassmentofthecivilianpopulationbecameafeatureofeverydaylifeduringstreetchecks,interrogations,raids,andgeneralhousesearches.Inthewordsofaformerofficer,thearmydidnot"havehang-upsaboutusingforceofthemostviciouskindwheneverpossible,"andciviliansoftensupplied"theexcuseforabitofphysicalintimidation."38Burton'sfieldstudyofBelfastduringthemid-1970sgraphicallyillustratesthetraumaticrepercussionsofCatholicencounterswithaggressiveBritishsoldiers.39
Internmentwithouttrialofpoliticalsuspects,whichbeganin1971asmainlyanarmyoperation,wasacostlymistake.ItthrewintoquestiontheGovernment'sfidelitytotheruleoflawandwasaboontotheIRA,whichportrayeditsdetainedmembersaspoliticalprisonerssufferingsummarypunishment.Forthesereasons,theGardinerCommitteerecommendedin1975thephasingoutofinternmentandof"specialcategory"privilegesforconvictedpoliticaloffenders,aswellasafundamentalreappraisalofsecuritypolicy.40TheLabourGovernment(19741979)recognizedthefailureofinternmentandabandonedtheviewthatterrorismcouldbedefeatedbymilitarymeans.Ithopedinsteadthatconspicuousrelianceonthelawwithits
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presumed"higher
36.KevinBoyle,TomHadden,andPaddyHillyard,LawandState:TheCaseofNorthernIreland(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1975),pp.4247.37.PaddyHillyard,"LawandOrder,"inNorthernIreland:BackgroundtotheConflict,ed.J.Darby(Belfast:Blackstaff,1983),p.43.Otherobserversnoteda"continualsuper-impositionbythesecurityforcesof'executivejustice'whendecisionsofthecourtsdispleasedthem"(Boyle,Hadden,andHillyard,LawandState,p.135).38.A.F.N.Clarke,Contact(London:SeckerandWarburg,1983),pp.5354.39.FrankBurton,ThePoliticsofLegitimacy:StrugglesinaBelfastCommunity(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1978),pp.106,87.40.[GardinerCommittee]ReportofaCommitteetoConsider,intheContextofCivilLibertiesandHumanRights,MeasurestoDealwithTerrorisminNorthernIreland,Cmnd.5847(London:HMSO,January1975),LordGardiner,Chair.
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authority"mightsucceedwheremilitarypowerhadfailedandmightdiminishbothdomesticandinternationalcriticismofBritishrule.41Oneministerwrote,"IamcertainthatinourregulardealingswiththeUnitedStates...tobeabletosayweweredoingit[maintainingorder]withinthelawwasofinestimablevalue."42Later,ConservativeSecretaryofStateHumphreyAtkins(19791981)affirmed:"Theaimistodefeattheterroristbyuseofthelaw.Generallyitmeansacceptingthelawofcivilizedcountries."43
Thelargerpolicyreorientation(after1976)consistedof"Ulsterization"and"criminalization,"whosebroadobjectivesweretonormalizeandlegitimizethesystemofcontrolandtodepoliticizeUlster'sviolence.44UnderUlsterization,BritishtroopsgraduallydisengagedwhilethelocalRUCandUDRmobilizedtofilltheresultingsecurityvacuum.Replacingthearmy'ssummaryinternmentofsuspects,thepoliceinvestigatedgreaternumbersofpoliticaloffenses,whichthecourtsadjudicated.Insurgentviolencewasofficiallyshornofitspoliticaldimensionanddefinedasstrictlycriminalactivity.Inprisonconvictedterroristsweretreatedlikeordinaryprisoners.(Tenmendiedduringthehungerstrikeof1981attheMazeprisoninwhichRepublicanprisonersdemandedasetofprivilegesinaccordancewiththeirpoliticalstatus.ThestrikeextractednoconcessionsfromtheThatcherGovernmentbutrevivedwaningpopularsupportfortheIRA,ledtoriotinginresponsetothedeaths,andproducedanupsurgeincasualtiesfrompoliticalviolencefortheyear.)
Criminalizationreferstotheuseofthecriminallawandcriminaljusticesystemtodepoliticizeanddelegitimateinsurgentactivity.InUlster,criminalizationisdilutedbytheauthorities'relianceonemergencymeasurestoarrestandchargeinsurgents,whoaretriedinspecialnon-juryDiplockcourtsasterroristsratherthanordinarysuspects.Balbus'sstudyofghettoriotsintheUnitedStatesinthe
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1960sassumesthatcriminalizationwillbesuccessful:it"tendstodepoliticizetheconsciousnessoftheparticipants"and"delegitimatetheirclaimsandgrievances."45
41.MikeTomlinson,"ReformingRepression,"inNorthernIreland:BetweenCivilRightsandCivilWar,ed.L.O'Dowd,B.Rolston,andM.Tomlinson(London:CSE,1980),p.191.42.WilliamvanStraubenzee,"InternationalLawandInternationalTerrorism,"inTenYearsofTerrorism,ed.J.Shaw(London:RoyalUnitedServicesInstituteforDefenseStudies,1979),p.157.43.BelfastTelegraph,26September1979.44.SeeTomlinson,"ReformingRepression."45.IsaacBalbus,TheDialecticsofLegalRepression:BlackRebelsbeforetheAmericanCriminalCourts(NewBrunswick,N.J.:Transaction,1977),p.13.
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NorthernIrelanddoesnotconformtothesepredictions,atleastnotinCatholicworking-classareas.Anditisdoubtfulthatstrictuseofordinarycriminallawsandcourtsasopposedtoexceptionaloneswouldhavethepredictedeffect.Catholicworking-classareasarenotsoamenabletoofficialconstructionsofreality.A1978pollfoundthat34.3percentofCatholicsdisagreedwiththestatementthattheIRAismadeupof"criminalsandmurderers";46.3percentthoughtthattheIRAconsistsof"patriotsandidealists";57percentsaidthattheauthoritiesshould"stoptreatingpeopleconvictedofcrimeswhichtheyclaimwerepoliticallymotivated,asordinaryprisoners"46
Ulsterizationhasnotspelledtheendofmilitaryactivitiesbutratheraprogressivereductionintheirscale.Thestrengthofarmyforcesfellfrom22,000in1972to10,123byMay1988,whilethestrengthoflocallyrecruitedforcesUDRandRUCrosefrom15,000to19,237duringthesameperiod.TheremainingtroopshaveconcentratedinareaswhereRepublicaninsurgentsaremostactiveorwherecriminalinvestigationsaredifficult(thesouthernborder,WestBelfast).Outsidethesehotspotsthearmyhasrevertedtoitsconventionalroleofaidingthecivilpowerandprovidingsupporttothepolice,asneeded.Atthesametimethearmyhasincreaseditsinvolvementinsurveillanceandcovertoperations,47whichincludeattacksbytheeliteSpecialAirServices(SAS)onsuspectedinsurgents.48Between1976and1988theSASwasresponsibleforkilling23Republicaninsurgents,someofwhomwerearmedandonactive-servicemissionsatthetime.49
Thenarrowingscopeofarmyoperationsafter1976resultedinacorrespondingreductioninmilitaryviolencetowardcivilians.Comparedtothepublicclamorovermilitarybrutalityfrom1969to1976,criticismofthearmyhasbecomemoremuted;astheUDRandtheRUChavegrownprominentinthesecurityfield,Catholiccomplaintshavecenteredontheseforces.Still,34percentof
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Catholicsand5percentofProtestantsin1979wantedthearmywithdrawn.50
46.EdwardMoxon-Browne,"TheWaterandtheFish:PublicOpinionandtheProvisionalIRAinNorthernIreland,"Terrorism5,no.12(1981):4172.47.Incidentsofarmyinvolvementinkidnapping,assassination,deaththreats,andsabotagearedescribedbyformerArmyIntelligenceOfficerFredHolroydinDuncanCampbell,"VictimsoftheDirtyWar,"NewStatesman,4,11,and18May1984.48.TheSASwasdeployedin1976apparentlytoplacatetheProtestantcommunity:"Whenthemurderofanumberofloyalistsbroughtindignationtotheboilingpoint,itwasasapoliticaldevicethattheSASwassenttoUlster"(TonyGeraghty,WhoDaresWins:TheStoryoftheSAS[London:Fontana,1981],p.182).49.Times,1September1988.Suchshoot-to-killoperationsbytheSAShavegeneratedlesscontroversythansimilaractionsbytheRUC'sSpecialBranch.50.OpinionResearchCentrepoll,NewSociety,6September1979.
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TheUlsterDefenseRegiment
Thisregimentnowprovidesthefirstlineofmilitarysupportforthepolicein85percentoftheprovince.Althoughtheregiment'sabsolutestrengthhasdeclinedalongwiththatoftheregulararmy,itsproportionofthetotalmilitarypresencegrewfrom30percentin1972to42percentin1986.EachbattalionservesunderaregularBritisharmycommandingofficer,buttheforcehasmoreautonomyfromcentralcontrolthanothermilitaryregiments.
TheUDRisover97percentProtestant;CatholicsaredissuadedfromjoiningbythreatsfromtheIRAandbypopularperceptionoftheregimentasasectarianreincarnationoftheUlsterSpecialConstabulary.(Approximately50percentofitsinitialrecruitswereformermembersoftheUSC.)Inarecentpoll,89percentofCatholicswereopposedtoanyextensionoftheunit'srole.51TheSocialDemocraticandLabourparty,predominantlyCatholic,considersthattheUDR"hasbyfartheworstrecordforserioussectariancrimesofanyRegimentpresentlyinservicewiththeBritishArmedForces"52AnumberofUDRpersonnelhaveengagedinfree-lanceviolence,apparentlyoutoffrustrationwithlegalrestrictionsoncounterinsurgencymethodsoroutofsectarianmotives.From1970to1985,seventeenUDRsoldierswereconvictedofmurderormanslaughterandninety-nineofassault;otherswerechargedorconvictedofarmedrobbery,weaponsoffenses,bombing,intimidationandattacksonCatholics,kidnapping,andmembershipintheillegalUlsterVolunteerForce(aProtestantvigilantegroup).53AnunknownnumberbelongtothelegalbutsectarianUlsterDefenseAssociation.Onlyasmallfractionofthe32,000full-timeandpart-timesoldierswhohavepassedthroughtheUDRhavebeeninvolvedincrimes,buttheproportionappearstobehigherthanthatforregularBritishtroopsandtheRUC.54
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TheGovernmentmaintainsthattheregimenthasbeenmoldedalongBritishmilitarylinesandthattopainttheUDRasasectarianforceisunfair.55Ithasrejectedpressuretodismantletheforcefortworeasons:
51.UlsterMarketingSurveyspoll,BBCSpotlightReport:AnOpinionPoll(BritishBroadcastingCorporation,May1985).52.SocialDemocraticandLabourParty,"Security,"SubmissiontotheSecretaryofState'sConferencein1980,Belfast,p.2.53.ForalistofoffensescommittedbyUDRpersonnelfrom1972through1985,seeIrishInformationPartnership,Agenda:1985(London:IIP,1986).54.HugoArnold,"Crime,Ulsterization,andtheFutureoftheUDR,"Fortnight,no.226(1985).55."UDRBackedinSecretMoDFile,"BelfastTelegraph,27March1986;DefenseWhitePaper,citedin"BoostforUDR,"BelfastTelegraph,12May1986.
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theexpectedbacklashfromLoyalists,whoseetheUDRasabsolutelyessentialtothestabilityoftheprovince;andthevacuumleftbythedepartureofseveralthousandUDRsoldiersthatregulararmytroopswouldhavetofill,thusreversingthisdimensionofUlsterization.
TheRoyalUlsterConstabulary
Initially,theBritisharmyopposedUlsterizationbecauseitwouldrequirethepolicetotaketheleadinthesecurityfield(whichthemilitaryconsideredpremature)andbecauseitwouldplacefrustratingrestraintsonarmyoperations.56Likewise,thepolicewerereluctanttoassumeprimaryresponsibilityforsecurityorundergomilitarization.Alreadyin1973thechairofthePoliceFederation,BasilStanage,cited''asimmeringfearexpressedthroughoutourranksthatwearebeing...manipulatedintoasecurityforcepositionagain.Iampersuadedthatthisshouldneverbepermitted."57Aftermorethanadecadeof"policeprimacy,"thefederationstillviewspolicemilitarizationandinvolvementincounterinsurgencyoperationsas"distinctlyunnatural."58Inearly1986,thechairofthefederation,AlanWright,createdastirwhenhequestionedofficialpolicy:"Fightingaguerrillawarisnotajobforanordinarypoliceofficer:itisajobofthemilitary."Laterheadded,"Theprimacyofthepoliceisonethinganditissomethingthatwehavedoneverysuccessfully....Allwearesayingisdon'ttreatuslikesoldiers,"and"TheGovernmentisbeingtotallyunrealisticinitspolicyofputtingtheemphasisofsecurityontothepolice."59Suchcommentsreflectconstables'frustrationswiththeirsecurityresponsibilities,whichhaveincreasedtheirpotentiallyconfrontationalencounterswithcitizensandunderminedlegitimacyamongaffectedsectionsofthepublic.Thesedutiesalsoputthepoliceatgreatrisk.Withover260officerskilledand7,000injuredsince1969,theRUCsuffersthehighestcasualtyrateofanypoliceforceintheworld.60
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EvenasthePoliceFederationcomplainsabouttheRUC'ssecurityrole,itpressesformoreextensivepowers;bothexistingexceptional
56.DesmondHamill,PigintheMiddle:TheArmyinNorthernIreland,19691984(London:Methuen,1985),chaps.7,8.57."AddressbytheChairmantotheAnnualConference,"ConstabularyGazette(October1973):7.58.Editorial,PoliceBeat,January1981.59.Editorial,PoliceBeat,January1986;IrishTimes,5February1986;BelfastTelegraph,24January1986.60.BelfastTelegraph,20January1983;IrishTimes,24June1985.
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powersandpolicepressureformoreextensiveonesclearlymilitateagainstliberalization.ButthelogicinRUCcirclesappearstobethat,untilNorthernIrelandbecomesstableandtranquil,thepolicewillrequirespecialmeasurestodealwithunrestandpoliticalviolence.Policeforcesthroughouttheworldfrequentlyseekbroaderpowers;inUlster,theuseofexceptionalpowersdeepensCatholicalienationandisreadilyexploitablebyinsurgentgroupswhoprofitbypromotingapolice-stateimageoftheprovince.
Changesinpolicingsincetheearly1970shavebeenmixedincludingelementsofbothmilitarizationandliberalizationreflectingthecontradictorymandatesimposedonthepolice.Since1976theRUChasassumedthepreeminentroleininternalsecurity,whichhasdrivenitssteadymilitarizationandtechnologicaldevelopment.Giventhegradualnarrowingofthearmy'srole,thismilitarizationhasarisenmorebydefaultthanbydesign.TodaytheRUChasspecializedantiterroristsquads,operatesacomplexcomputersurveillancesystem,anduseshighlyadvancedequipment.Allmembersoftheforcereceiveparamilitaryandriottraining.Generallyspeaking,theresponsetoriotshasbecomemoregraduatedandrestrained,butincidentsofgrossoverreactionandbrutalitycontinuetohaunttheforce.
Plasticbulletsarefrequentlyusedtocontrolpublicdisturbances,andaredescribedassaferthanalternativetechniques.From1970to1989approximately110,000plasticandrubber(nowdiscontinued)bulletswerefiredbythepoliceandarmy,resultingineighteendeathsandhundredsofinjuriestoprotestersandbystanders.Thisrecordofcasualtiesmayappearmildincontrasttothatinothersocietieswhereplasticorrubberbulletsareastapleofriotcontrol.InlittlemorethanayearaftertheArabinsurrectioninIsrael'soccupiedterritoriesbeganinDecember1987,approximatelyfiftyPalestinianshadbeenkilledbyplasticbulletsfiredbyIsraelisoldiers.61Theuseofplasticbulletsin
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NorthernIrelandneverthelesssparksanoutcryaftereachfatalityanddeepenspublicresentmentofthepolice.
Covertoperationsandsurveillanceabsorbasubstantialproportionofpolicetimeandresources.62MobileSupportUnitswereformedin19811982forrapid-strikeoperationsandsurveillance.BoththeSupportUnitsandtheRUCSpecialBranchhavebeeninvolvedincontroversialincidents,includingthesummaryshootingofsuspectedinsurgents.
61.BernardTrainor,"IsraeliTroopsProveNewcomerstoRiotControl,"NewYorkTimes,19February1989.62.Hillyard,"LawandOrder,"p.46.
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ThekillingofsixunarmedmenbytheSpecialBranchinseparateincidentsin1982wasinvestigatedbyJohnStalker,attherequestoftheGovernment.Hisfindings:eliteunitshadan"inclination"toshootsuspectswithoutattemptingtomakearrests;evidenceofofficialcover-upsofthecircumstancessurroundingsuchshootings;alackofaccountabilityintheSpecialBranch;dubiouscross-bordersurveillanceoperations;mishandlingofevidenceincasesofpoliceshooting;abuseoftheOfficialSecretsActtoshroudcasesofpoliceperjury;andfaultymonitoringoftheRUCbytheInspectorateofConstabularyattheHomeOffice.Amongmorethanfortyrecommendations,hisunpublishedinterimreportcalledformorevigorousinvestigationofshootingsbythepolice,detailedguidelinesforofficersengagedincross-borderoperationsintheIrishRepublic,greatercontroloverthehandlingofinformants,andreconsiderationoftheuseofagentsprovocateurstoensnaresuspects.63
InFebruary1988theBritishAttorneyGeneralstatedthatnationalsecurityconsiderationsdisallowedcriminalprosecutionoftheofficersimplicatedinStalker'sinquiryaswellaspublicationofhisreport.ThePoliceAuthorityannouncedthatnodisciplinaryproceedingswouldbetakenagainsttheChiefConstableandtwoseniorofficers.Twentysergeantsandconstablesweresubjectedtodisciplinaryhearings,incamera,forbreachesofRUCregulations.AfteronlytwodaysofhearingsinMarch1989,eighteenmenwerereprimandedandonecautioned;onecasewasdismissed.(Reprimandsandcautionsaretheleastserioussanctionsadisciplinaryboardcanimpose.)
ThisdarksideofpolicinginNorthernIrelandcoexistswithimportantprogressivedevelopments,whichcanbemeasuredbyexaminationoftheRUC'sideology,impartiality,andaccountability.AsanintegralpartoftheUnionistsettlerstate,theoldRUCwasapatentlysectarianforce.Thissectarianorientationhasbeenreducedsubstantially,asreflectedinofficialinstructions,organizationalideology,andpolice
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practices.Seniorofficerschampionaprofessionalethoswithintheforceandfiercelyresistpoliticalinterferencefromoutsidegroups,jealouslyguardingtheirindependencefromUlster'spoliticiansandGovernmentofficials.Theemphasisfromaboveonimpartiallawenforcementseemstohavepermeatedtheforce.TheRUCrankandfile,nolessthantheupper
63.JohnStalker,TheStalkerAffair(NewYork:Viking,1988).Seealso"BigChangesWereSoughtbyStalker,"Times,21June1986;"Stalker:40MenFaceCharges,"SundayTimes,20July1986.AfterobstructionfromSpecialBranchofficersandtheChiefConstablethroughouthisinquiry,Stalkerwasremovedfromtheinvestigationshortlybeforehewastofinish,apparentlybecauseitwaslikelytoembarrasstheRUCasawholeandtheChiefConstableinparticular.
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echelon,haveembracedimpartialandapoliticalideals.Notsurprisingly,thisclaimtoindependencehasbeenquestionedbyinterestedpartieswhobelievethattheRUCeitherisbiasedorshouldbemorepliable.
Thenewofficialmissionofthepoliceisitselfasignificantadvanceonthesectarianorientationoftheoldforce.Theofficialideology,however,doesnotmeetwithunanimousapprovalthroughouttheforce,nordoesitautomaticallytranslateintopractice.Somelong-servingofficershavestrongUnionistsympathies,accordingtoonegovernmentalreport.64Policeworkparticularlythatinvolvinginternalsecurityproblems,publicdisturbances,andpatrollinginneighborhoodsmosthostiletothepoliceislikelytoinvolvesomemeasureofbiasandtacitinstructionsthatdisregardformalnormsofminimumforceandimpartiality.
Atthesametime,itisclearthatsomelargerpatternsofpolicingpracticehaveimprovedunderdirectrule.BothseniorofficersandthePoliceFederationhavegonetogreatlengthstodistancethemselvesfrompressuregroupsandpoliticalparties,intheireffortstoavoidtheimpressionofcommunalfavoritism.Moreover,RUCconstableshavedemonstrated,particularlysincethemid-1980s,awillingnesstopursuebothCatholicandProtestantpoliticaloffenders.65Aconfidentialreportin1986byHerMajesty'sInspectorateofConstabularyconcludedthattheRUCcouldbecountedontodealimpartiallywithProtestantsandCatholics.66AndtheindependentKilbrandonInquiryfoundthattheRUC"hasbecomeadisciplinedandprofessionalforcewhichhasbeenincreasinglyeven-handedinitseffortstoeradicateterrorismbyparamilitaryforcesbothRepublicanandLoyalist."67ThewillingnesstopursueLoyalistsuspectsissupportedbyfiguresonRepublicansandLoyalistschargedwithmurder,attemptedmurder,andexplosivesoffenses;intheirrespectivelevelsofinsurgentactivityfrom1981to1988muchhigherfor
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RepublicansthanLoyalistsasignificantlyhigherproportion
64.ReportbyHerMajesty'sInspectorateofConstabulary,citedinChrisRyder,"RUCWillToetheLineonUlster,SaysReport,"SundayTimes,6April1986,p.2.65.TheRUC'sfirsthighlyvisibleoperationagainstProtestantoffenderscamein1977whenitcontrolledaten-dayLoyaliststrikeagainsttheGovernment'salleged"soft"treatmentoftheIRA;thepolicedismantledover700barricadesandcharged124personswithoffenses.66.Ryder,"RUCWillToetheLine."67.[KilbrandonInquiry]NorthernIreland:ReportofanIndependentInquiry(London:BritishIrishAssociation,November1984),p.39,LordKilbrandon,Chair;seealsomyarticle,"PolicingNorthernIrelandToday,"PoliticalQuarterly58,no.1(January-March1987):8896.
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ofLoyaliststhanRepublicanswerechargedwithoffenses.68ThesefindingsreflectinparttheProtestantcommunity'sgreaterwillingnesstoprovideinformationtothepoliceonitsLoyalistoffendersbutalsoshowspolicedeterminationtopursuethesecases.
IncreasinglyimpartiallawenforcementwithotherprogressivechangesinpolicinghasnotgreatlyenhancedCatholics'confidenceintheRUC.Itistheworking-classCatholicpopulationthatremainsmostalienatedfromthepolicebecauseoflingeringdeep-rootedhistoricalantipathytowardtheforceasanarmofUnionistdomination;theRUCperiodicallyengagesinprovocativeandcontroversialactivities;thepolicearetaintedbytheirconnectiontootherdiscreditedagenciesofthecriminaljusticesystemandthestateasawhole.Howeverimpartialtheenforcementofthelawandtreatmentofsuspects,theydonottranslateintopublicacceptanceofthepoliceifthelaworthestatelackslegitimacy.SuchistheperceptionofasubstantialsectionoftheminoritycommunityaswellasasectionoftheProtestantpopulation.Atthesametime,manyCatholicsseemtohaveahigheropinionoftheRUCthanCatholicpoliticalleadersclaim.In1985,38percentofCatholicsapprovedanincreaseinthesizeoftheRUC;47percentbelievedthepoliceoperatedinafairorveryfairmanner.69
Ontheonehand,theRUChasmadeclearprogresssincetheadventofBritishrule.Officersarebettertrained,moreimpartialandaccountable,lesspoliticallydriven,andmoresensitivetotheirpivotalpositioninthisdividedsociety.Ontheotherhand,furtherliberalizationislimitedbythefactthattheforceremainsalmosttotallyProtestant,militarized,heavilyarmed,andmiredinthesecuritybusiness.IncidentsofpolicerepressionarethelogicalresultoftheRUC'spositiononthecuttingedgeofthecounterinsurgencyeffort.Thetenuouscombinationofliberalizationandmilitarizationcreatescontradictoryimperativesforpolicinginasocietytornbydeepcommunalhostilitiesandarmedinsurgency.Progresswillbearrested
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aslongastheRUCretainsitsmilitarized
68.From1986through1988,forexample,theChiefConstablereported47murdersattributedtoLoyalistsand40Loyalistschargedwithmurder;172murderswereattributedtoRepublicansand23Republicanschargedwithmurder(ChiefConstable,ChiefConstable'sAnnualReport[Belfast:PoliceAuthority,1988],pp.6061).69.Thesefindingsarereported,alongwithProtestantviews,inTables8and9laterinthechapter.InpublicopinionsurveysinEnglandandUlster,73percentofEnglishrespondentsfoundthepolice"approachable"comparedto51percentofUlsterrespondents,whowerealsomuchlesslikelytocontactthepoliceinhypotheticalsituations(BritishBroadcastingCorporation,"YouandYours:AttitudestowardsthePolice,"September1987).
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styleandissaddledwithprimaryresponsibilityforinternalsecurity.70Thereappearstobenopoliticallyacceptablealternativetothisstateofaffairs(e.g.,areversiontomilitaryprimacy)underpresentcircumstances.
SecurityLegislation
From1969to1972littlereformofrepressivelawtookplace.Infact,thecorpusofsuchlegislationexpanded.Onlyin1973wasthecornerstoneofsettlersecuritylaw,theSpecialPowersAct,finallyabolished.Yettheactwasquicklyreplacedwiththe1973EmergencyProvisionsAct(EPA)andthe1974PreventionofTerrorismAct(PTA).71Passedinthewakeoftheworstyearofpoliticalviolenceintheprovince(1972),theEPAappliessolelytoNorthernIreland.TheabruptenactmentofthePTAinonedaywasprecipitatedbythebombingofaBirminghampubinNovember1974thatlefttwenty-onepersonsdead.
Ostensiblytemporarymeasures,theseactshavebeenrenewedannuallyandbiannuallybyWestminster,oftenwithlittledebate.72Theofficialrationaleforthelawsistheirabsolutenecessitytoprotectthepublic;theexclusionofUlster'sinsurgencyfrommainlandBritain;andtheneedforanalternativetotherestrictionstheordinarycriminallawplacesonthecounterinsurgencyeffort.73Thatthescopeofthesecuritylawsmightexceedtheprovince'srequirementswasacknowledgedbyaformerSecretaryofState:"Iknowalsothatthereisasortofinertiaaboutthesematters.Itiseasiertocontinuetoshelterbehindthesepowersthantodetermineatacertainpointthattheyaredispensable."74
InsomerespectstheEPAandPTAarereminiscentoftheSpecialPowersAct:
70.Foranelaborationofthisargument,seemyarticle,"Policinga
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DividedSociety:ObstaclestoNormalizationinNorthernIreland,"SocialProblems33,no.1(October1985).71.TheEPAwasamendedin1975,1978,and1987;thePTAwasamendedin1976and1984.72.BipartisansupportfortheactsfinallyendedinMarch1983whentheLabourpartyvotedagainstrenewalofthePTA(whichaLabourGovernmenthadintroducedin1974).Labour's1983electionmanifestocalledforrepealofthePTAandreformoftheDiplockcourts.InJuly1984LabourvotedagainsttheEPAforthefirsttimeonthegroundsthatnecessaryamendmentshadnotbeenmade.73.OnthecontentoftherelevantCommonsdebates,seeMatthewLippman,"TheAbrogationofDomesticHumanRights:NorthernIrelandandtheRuleofBritishLaw,"inTerrorisminEurope,ed.Y.AlexanderandK.Myers(London:CroomHelm,1982).74.HumphreyAtkins,GreatBritain,HouseofCommons,Debates,vol.995,10December1980,col.1030.
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theyabolishjurytrialsinsecuritycases,placetheburdenofproofontheaccusedforpossessionoffirearmsorexplosives,andmakebailvirtuallyimpossibletoobtain;
extendpowersofwarrantlesssearch,seizure,arrest,anddetentionbythearmy(foruptofourhours)andbythepolice(foruptosevendays),andallowsecurityforcestostopandquestionanyindividualbelievedtobeconnectedwith"terroristincidents";
proscribeorganizations"connectedwithterrorism"andprohibitmembershipin,recruitmentfor,andsupportofsuchorganizations;
authorizetheBritishHomeSecretaryandtheNorthernIrelandSecretaryofStatetoexcludeindividualsfromBritainandUlsteriftheyare"satisfied"thatthepersonisormaybecomeconnectedtoterrorism.
Untilitwasamendedin1987,theEPAdidnotrequireofficerstohave"reasonablesuspicion"thatanoffensehadbeencommittedtojustifyarrest,search,orseizure;meresuspicionwassufficient;constablesandsoldiersdidnothavetojustifytheirdecisions.AsColonelRobinEveleghrevealed,"ThevastmajorityofthosearrestedbytheArmyinNorthernIrelandwerearrestedwithoutbeingsuspectedofanythingexceptinthemostgeneralsense."75Thiscarteblancheallowedauthoritiestodetain,interrogate,andreleasewithoutchargeabout50,000individualssince1973.(TheproportionatenumberoftheUnitedStates'populationwouldbe6.8million.)
TheRUCandarmyroutinelyusearrestandinterrogationtoharasssuspects,gatherintelligence,anddevelopinformers.76Between1978and1986only13.7percentofthosearrestedundertheEPAwerechargedwithanoffense(inBritain,80to90percentofpersonsarrestedinordinarycriminalcasesarecharged).Theother86.3percentwereinterrogatedandreleased.Astudyofdetentionsin1980
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foundthatinterrogatorssoughtinformationaboutdetainees'movements,politicalsympathies,associates,andfamilies;only28percentoftheseindividualswerequestionedaboutaspecificoffense.77Thestudyconcludesthatthepowersofarrestandinterrogationareuseddeliberatelyfor"intelligencegathering,surveillance,andharassment":interrogationisdesignedtogeneratedossiersonindividualsandtodeterthemfrom
75.RobinEvelegh,Peace-KeepinginaDemocraticSociety:TheLessonsofNorthernIreland(Montreal:McGill-QueensUniversityPress,1978),p.120.76.Thelastpurposeiscitedinibid.,p.75.77.DermotWalsh,TheUseandAbuseofEmergencyLegislationinNorthernIreland(London:CobdenTrust,1983),pp.33,69.
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supportingradicalpoliticalcauses.78TheimportanceofdetentionandinterrogationisevidentintheRUC'sgrowinguseoftheseven-daypowerunderthePTAinsteadofthethree-daypowerundertheEPA.79Thelengthierdetentions"allowthepolicetoexercisegreaterpressureonsuspectstoconfessorcooperate"80
NorthernIrelanddiffersfrompostsettlerZimbabweandLiberiainthatpeacefulpoliticaloppositionisnotbrandedsubversiveandsuppressed.EvengroupswithconnectionstoinsurgentorganizationsandthusontheborderlineofviolenceSinnFein,UlsterDefenseAssociationarelegal,albeitfrequentlyharassedbytheauthorities.Groupswithanincontrovertiblerecordofviolence,however,areproscribedunderthesecuritylegislation;theyincludetheIrishRepublicanArmy,IrishNationalLiberationArmy,UlsterVolunteerForce,andUlsterFreedomFighters.TheEPAallowsthepolicetoarrestanyonesuspectedofmembershiporgeneral"involvement"withproscribedorganizations.81
UndertheEPA,thecasestriedinspecialDiplockcourtsarethoseof"scheduledoffenses"connectedtopoliticalcrimes;onejudgepresideswithoutajury.From1980throughMarch1989,93percentofthe5,774defendantstriedinthesecourtswereconvicted(82percenthadenteredguiltypleas,upfrom56percentin1973).(ConfessionsadmittedasevidenceinDiplockcourtsneednotbecorroboratedbyotherevidence.)82Ofthecaseswheredefendantspleadednotguilty,39percentwereacquitted,downfrom57percentin1973.83Thedecliningacquittalratemayindicatea"hardening"ofthejudgesinvolved,whohearmany
78.Walsh,UseandAbuse,p.39;cf.KevinBoyle,TomHadden,andPaddyHillyard,TenYearsOninNorthernIreland:TheLegalControlofPoliticalViolence(London:CobdenTrust,1980).79.Theseven-daypowerwasusedin7percentofthearrestsunderthetwo
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actsin1979,andapproximately50percentin1984.80.StevenGreer,TomHadden,andMartinO'Hagan,"ArrestandScreening,"Fortnight,18February1985,p.6.81.Byinfringingfreedomofassociationandexpression,thebanningoforganizationsarguablygoesfurtherthannecessarytocontroltheundesirableactivitiesofthemembersofthesegroups(seeCommitteeontheAdministrationofJustice,EmergencyLaws:SuggestionsforReforminNorthernIreland,pamphletno.5[Belfast:CAJ,September1983],p.10).TheBritishGovernmenthasequivocatedontheissueofproscribingorganizations;in1974itliftedthebanonSinnFeinandtheUlsterVolunteerForce,andcountenancedtheviewthatindividualoffenderswouldbepursuedinsteadoforganizations(seethestatementbySecretaryofStateMerlynRees,HouseofCommons,Debates,vol.871,4April1974,col.1476).82.ArecentreviewoftheEPArecommendedthatconfessionsbetape-recordedtoensuretheirvoluntarycharacter([BakerReport]ReviewoftheOperationoftheNorthernIreland(EmergencyProvisions)Act1978,Cmnd.9222[London:HMSO,April1984],SirGeorgeBaker,Chair).83.NIOfigures,citedinBelfastTelegraph,1November1989;1973figuresarefromWalsh,UseandAbuse,p.94.
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similarcaseswithoutthecheckofafreshjurytoevaluateeachone.Thisarrangementincreasesthechancesthattheaccusedwillbewrongfullyconvicted.
DespitethefactthatDiplockcourtsshownosystematicreligiousbiasinthedecisionsrendered,theyremainhighlycontroversialamongCatholicsandseemtohaveaffectedthestandingofthelegalsystemasawhole(seeTable9).84ItiswidelybelievedthatpublicconfidencecouldberestoredonlyiftheDiplockcourtswerereformedorabolished.
Arelativelyrecentexperimentinthesecourtswasthe"supergrass"system,whichreliedontheuncorroboratedtestimonyofinformerstoconvictindividualsaccusedofpoliticaloffenses.From1981to1983,450peoplewerearrestedandchargedwithterrorist-relatedoffensesontheevidenceof18Republicanand7Loyalistsupergrasses.Thepolicegrantedimmunitytoabouthalfofthesupergrassesinreturnfortheirtestimony,andseveralreceivedgenerousmonetarypaymentsaswell.85AnindependentinvestigationbyLordGiffordconcludedthattheuseofuncorroboratedevidencehadledinsomecasestotheconvictionofinnocentpersons.86Thesupergrasssystemwasabandonedattheendof1986aftertheacquittalofanumberofdefendantsongroundsoftheinformers'lackofcredibility.
PersonsarrestedunderthePTAhavenorightofhabeascorpus,arenotinformedofthechargesagainstthem,andhavenorighttoremainsilentortoappealdecisions.Abridgingthestandardrighttofreedomofmovementwithinone'scountry,exclusionordersbanishsuspectedterroristsfromonepartoftheUnitedKingdomtoanother(mostexclusionsarefrommainlandBritaintoUlster).InBritainfrom1974to1986,6,246weredetainedunderthePTA,ofwhom4.5percentreceivedexclusionordersand8.5percentwerechargedwithanoffense.Ofthe7,627detentionsinUlsterbetweentheendof1974
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andJuly1987,31individualsweregivenexclusionordersand2,462(32percent)werechargedwithanoffense.
TheShackletonReportonthePTAexcuseditslowrateofexclusionsandchargesbycelebrating"thepreventativenatureofthelegislationinitswidestaspects."87Anotherofficialjustificationforexclusionisthatit
84.Boyle,Hadden,andHillyard,TenYearsOn,p.86.85.SecretaryofState,IrishTimes,27February1985.86.TonyGifford,Supergrasses:TheUseofAccompliceEvidenceinNorthernIreland(London:CobdenTrust,1984),p.34.87.[ShackletonReport]ReviewofthePreventionofTerrorism(TemporaryProvisions)Acts,Cmnd.7324(London:HMSO,August1978),LordShackleton,Chair.
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isnecessarywhenchargescannotbebroughtagainstthosesuspectedofplanningactsofterrorisminBritain.88
Somehaveobjectedtotheprincipleofexclusionorinternalexile,notingthatthisspecialtreatmentbeliestheofficialpositionthatUlsterisanintegralpartoftheUnitedKingdom.Othersconsideritsimplyunnecessary:theauthoritiesissuedexclusionorders(fromBritaintoUlster)againstonlyfourteenpersonsin1983,twoin1984,andfourin1985,suggestingthatitwas"nolongerofanygreatsignificanceinthepreventionofterrorism."89ButtheacthasbeenusedtoinduceinformationfrompersonswithIrishbackgroundsand"toseverelylimittheactivitiesoflegitimategroupscampaigningonIrishissuesinmainlandBritain."90
ThepowerscontainedintheexistingsecuritylegislationconstitutesomeimprovementintermsofhumanrightsandtheruleoflawovertheSpecialPowersActoftheUnioniststate.Thecurrentlegislationnolongerdefendsasystemofsectarianpowerandprivilege.InmarkedcontrasttotheregimeinZimbabwe,theBritishGovernmenthasshownawillingnesstodropcertainprovisionsofthesecuritylawasaresultofpressurefromoppositionpartiesatWestminsterorofrecommendationsfromindependentreviewcommissions.Butseveralotherprovisionsarguablyoverstepwhatcircumstancesintheprovincewarrant.Intheareaoflegislation,theneteffectofBritishruleislimitedliberalization.Thesamediagnosisappliestothesystemofaccountability.
MechanismsofAccountability
InasmuchasexecutivedepartmentsinUlsterarenowanswerabletoWestminster,formalBritishinvolvementisanimprovementontheoldsettlerstate.Butapartfromcrises,theBritishCabinetassignslowprioritytoNorthernIreland,andWestminstershowslittleinterestintheproblem:Parliament'sreviewofthesecuritylawshasrarelybeen
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morethanperfunctory.
88.PennySmith,"EmergencyLawsandthePreventionofTerrorismActs,"inSecuringtheState,ed.P.HillyardandP.Squires,EuropeanGroupfortheStudyofDevianceandSocialControl,WorkingPapersinEuropeanCriminology,no.3(1982),p.222.SeealsoCatherineScorerandPatriciaHewitt,ThePreventionofTerrorismAct:TheCaseforRepeal(London:NationalCouncilforCivilLiberties,1981).89.Times,8December1988.90.StandingAdvisoryCommissiononHumanRights,AnnualReportfor19841985(Belfast:HMSO,1985),p.23.
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OneabortiveexperimentinlocaldemocracyandaccountabilitywastheNorthernIrelandAssembly,whichoperatedfrom1982to1986.Althoughithadanarrowadvisoryrole,theGovernmentacceptedapproximately75percentofitsrecommendations.91Intheareaofsecurity,however,despiteitsfrequentandimpassioneddebates,theAssemblyhadlittleinfluence.ASecurityandHomeAffairsCommitteewaslimitedtomakingrecommendationsandventilatinglocalconcernsoversecurityproblems;itwasgenerallydisregardedbytheGovernment,asaNIOofficialconfided:''WeregardtheCommitteeassomethingthathastobequieteddownratherthansomethingthathastobetakenseriously."92BoycottedbytheSDLPandSinnFeinandsometimesthesceneofunrulyUnionisttheatricsoverunmetdemands,theAssemblywasdissolvedinJune1986bytheBritishCabinetamidprotestsfromtheUnionistparties.
Inthefieldofcriminalprosecution,anewofficeofDirectorofPublicProsecutions(DPP)wasestablishedin1972,followingrecommendationsoftheHuntCommitteeandthereportofaworkingpartyonpublicprosecutions.Accordingtooneformerminister,theDPP'sofficewasdesignedsothatitwould"notbeopentothesameallegationsofbias"thatwereleveledattheprevioussystemofpoliceprosecution.93TheDPPisresponsiblefortheprosecutionofallcasesofseriouscrimeinwhichthepolicehavedecidedtopreferchargesanddetermineswhethercomplaintsagainstpolicejustifycriminalcharges.Inhisfirstandprimaryresponsibility,theDPPhasproventobeavaluablecorrectiveinbringingaboutmoreimpartialtreatmentofLoyalistandRepublicansuspects.94
TheDPP'sroleinimprovingpoliceaccountabilityislessclear,sincehisdecisionstopreferchargesagainstofficersdependmainlyonpriorpoliceinvestigation.TheDPPhasprosecutedfewofficersaccusedofmisconductandhasconsistentlyrefusedtodisclosethereasonsbehindhisdecisions.YettheDPP'sinvolvementdoesintroducea
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checkintotheoldsystemunderwhichpoliceinvestigatedthemselves.
Theresponseofthepolicetocitizens'complaintshasbeenachronicprobleminNorthernIreland.Thedifferencebetweenthenumberof
91.SecretaryofStateTomKing,GreatBritain,HouseofCommons,Debates,vol.99,19June1986,col.1202.Cf.BrigidHadfield,"TheNorthernIrelandAssembly,"PublicLaw(Winter1983):55057,andNorthernIrelandAssembly,LocalDemocracyatWork(Belfast:HMSO,1984).AlmostalltheAssembly'ssittingmemberswereUnionists;fourteenSDLPandfiveSinnFeinmembersboycottedtheAssemblyfromitsinception.92.NIOofficial,LawandOrderDivision,interviewwithauthor,16August1984.93.LordWindlesham,MinisterofStateatNIO,IrishTimes,2May1972.94.Boyle,Hadden,andHillyard,TenYearsOn,p.68;Fortnight,September1983.
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complaintsregisteredandthosethataresubstantiatedbythepoliceauthoritieshasbeenhighbutrelativelyconstantfrom1982through1988.In1985,forexample,51complaintsweresubstantiatedoutofatotalof3,237complaintsregistered(1,349complaintswerewithdrawnornotproceededwith).95AnunknownproportionofthecomplaintsregisteredeveryyearconsistsofattemptsbyRepublicanstounderminepublicconfidenceintheforceortieuppoliceresources,buttheBennettCommitteeofInquiryfoundthatsuchmaliciousmotives"canscarcelyaccountforthevolumeofcomplaints"registered.96Changesovertimeinthenumberofcomplaintsregisteredmayreflect,interalia,fluctuationsincomplaint-provokingconductbyofficers,butoneindependentbodyconcluded,"Noclearexplanationhasemerged."97
Attemptingtobuildpublicconfidence,aPoliceComplaintsBoardwascreatedinJune1977tooverseecomplaintsofdisciplinary(notcriminal)breachesbyofficers.Between1977and1981,theboardreceivedatotalof2,895complaints.Inonly21cases(0.7percent)diditdisagreewiththedecisionoftheDeputyChiefConstablenottopreferdisciplinarycharges.ContinuingpublicdissatisfactionoverthehandlingofcomplaintsledtothereplacementofthePoliceComplaintsBoardinFebruary1988withanIndependentCommissionforPoliceComplaints,whichhasanenhancedroleininvestigatingcases.
Asubstantialnumberofcomplaintsregisteredinthe1970sstemmedfromallegationsofassaultunderpolicecustodyandmistreatmentduringinterrogations.Thisproblemwasthefocusofseveralofficialinvestigations.TheComptonCommissionconcludedthat"physicalilltreatment"hadoccurredduringprolongedpolicequestioning.98Hooding,noisetreatment,threatsofviolence,andforcedstandingforprolongedperiodswereamongthetechniquesusedtoextractinformationorconfessions.From1976to1979,illtreatmentof
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suspectsinpolicecustodywasapparentlytoleratedbypolicechiefsandtopgovernment
95.ChiefConstable,AnnualReport(1985);onthecomplaintssystem,seemyarticle,"AccountabilityandComplaintsagainstthePoliceinNorthernIreland,"PoliceStudies9,no.2(Summer1986):99109;forEngland,seeStevenBoxandKenRussell,"ThePoliticsofDiscreditability:DisarmingComplaintsagainstthePolice,"SociologicalReview23,no.2(May1975):31546.96.[BennettCommittee]ReportoftheCommitteeofInquiryintoPoliceInterrogationProceduresinNortbernIreland,Cmnd.7497(London:HMSO,March1979),JudgeBennett,Chair;p.112.97.PoliceComplaintsBoard,AnnualReportfor1985,p.3.98.[ComptonCommission]ReportoftheEnquiryintoAllegationsagainsttheSecurityForcesofPhysicalBrutalityinNorthernIrelandArisingoutofEventsonthe9thAugust1971,Cmnd.4823(London:HMSO,November1971),SirEdmundCompton,Chair.
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officials;theyhadreceivedevidenceofbrutalityfromphysiciansandothers.99NIOministersandpolicemanagersinsistedthatdetainees'woundswereself-inflicted,andthatallegationsofbrutalitywerepartoftheIRA'spropagandawar.Independentinvestigationsfoundotherwise.In1978theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsruledthattheuseofcertaininterrogationtechniquesinUlsterconstituted"inhumananddegradingpunishment";100AmnestyInternationalconcludedthat"maltreatmentofsuspectedterroristsbytheRUChastakenplacewithsufficientfrequencytowarranttheestablishmentofapublicinquirytoinvestigateit."101AsubsequentinvestigationbytheBennettCommitteeconfirmedthatsuspectshadsustainednon-self-inflictedinjuriesinpolicecustody.102Aftertheimplementationofmostofthecommittee'srecommendationsincludingtelevisionmonitoringofinterrogationsallegationsofmistreatmentincustodydiminishedconsiderably.
Insettingsoutsidetheinterrogationroom,however,allegationsofpoliceassaultremainhigh.In1980,33.1percentofthetotalcomplaintsdealtwithbytheauthoritiesallegedassault(comparedto19.6percentinEnglandandWales);in1984thefigurewas27.0percentforNorthernIreland(19.2percentinEnglandandWales).103
AnotherformalmechanismofaccountabilityisthePoliceAuthority(createdin1970).ThisbodyisundoubtedlyanadvanceovertheUnionistsystemwheretheMinistryofHomeAffairswasresponsibleforpolicing.Itspurviewmightbeexpectedtoincludetheuseofundercoverspecialistpoliceunits,thedischargeofweapons,andpubliccomplaints.Butneithercontroversialincidentsnorthecausesofrecurrentpolicingproblemshavebeenitsmajorconcern;ithasfocusedinsteadontechnicalandorganizationalmatters.104Theauthorityhasthepower,whichitrarelyexercises,torequestreportsonpolicingissuesfromtheChiefConstableandcanevencallforhisresignation.Onthoserareoccasionswhenithaspressedforgreater
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powerssuchasitsrequestin1976toattendsecuritymeetingsattheNIOithasbeenrefused.
99.PeterTaylor,BeatingtheTerrorists(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1980).100.EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,CaseofIrelandagainsttheUnitedKingdom:Judgment,Strasbourg,January1978,p.82.101.AmnestyInternational,ReportofanAmnestyInternationalMissiontoNorthernIreland(London:AmnestyInternational,June1978),p.70.102.BennettCommittee.103.StandingAdvisoryCommission,19841985,p.69.104.OnthereluctanceofEnglishpoliceauthoritiestoexertcontroloverpoliceactivities,seeM.Brogden,"APoliceAuthority:TheDenialofConflict,"SociologicalReview25,no.2(May1977):32549.
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Theauthoritymaintainsthat"NorthernIrelandhasoneofthebestpoliceforcesintheworld."105Withthisassessmentandwithitshighlydeferentialapproachtothepolice,theauthorityhasunderstandablyhaddifficultyconvincingthepublicthatitisaneffectiveindependentcheckontheperformanceoftheRUC.106Abodymorerepresentativeoftheentirecommunity,activelydevisingpolicingpoliciesandpriorities,andworkingtoidentifyandsolvecontinuingproblemsmightenhancetheRUC'simageandaccountability.107
TheStandingAdvisoryCommissiononHumanRights(SACHR)wascreatedin1973toinvestigateareasinwhichreligiousorpoliticaldiscriminationexistedandrecommendchangestotheSecretaryofState.Itsconsistentinterestinhumanrightsandimpartialorientationhavemadeitsomethingofa"counterweighttosectarianforces."108SACHR'softencriticalAnnualReportshaveconcerned,interalia,controversialaspectsofsecuritylegislation,complaintsagainstthepolice,theuseoffirearmsbysecurityforces,proceduresforpoliceinterrogation,andaproposedbillofrights.SACHRhasadvocatedchangesinlegislationandinstitutionalpracticesbearingonhumanrightsandhasconsistentlycounseledagainstpolicychangesthatmightfurthererodepublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjustice.Undernoobligationtoacceptandimplementthecommission'srecommendations,theGovernmenthasacceptedsomeandrejectedothersovertheyears.Governmentalrefusalsorlongdelaysinredressingproblemsusuallyincludeexplanationsofinconvenienttimingorcompetinglegislativeprioritiesreasoningthatthecommissiondoesnotaccept.
Otherindependentbodies,suchastheCommitteeontheAdministrationofJustice(CAJ)andtheNationalCouncilforCivilLiberties(NCCL),haveissuedreportscriticalofthesecuritylaws,thesystemforhandlingcomplaints,plasticbullets,andfatalitiescaused
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bythepolice.Judgingbyofficialpractices,thesereportshavehadatbestamodestimpact.Severalmajorcommissionshaveexaminedinstitutionalpracticesandsecuritylaws.Theirreportsledtonewmechanismsofaccountability,butthechangeshavestoppedshortofmajorreforms.109Commis-
105.PoliceAuthorityforNorthernIreland,ReportontheWorkofthePoliceAuthorityforNorthernIreland:19701981(Belfast:PoliceAuthority,1982),p.6.106.SeeStandingAdvisoryCommission,19841985,p.29.107.SeeCommitteeontheAdministrationofJustice,PoliceAccountabilityinNorthernIreland(Belfast:CAJ,1988).108.PaulMaguire,"TheStandingAdvisoryCommissiononHumanRights,"NorthernIrelandLegalQuarterly32,no.1(Spring1981):53.
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sionsofinquiryhave,forexample,notquestionedtheneedforemergencylegislation,theUlsterDefenseRegiment,andtheDiplockcourts.
Thejudiciaryoffersapotentialcheckonabusesasitadjudicatescasesallegingcriminalconductonthepartofthesecurityforces;butthecourts'recordincontrollingsuchmisconducthasbeenlessthanimpressive.Ofthetwenty-twomembersofthesecurityforcesprosecutedforkillingswhileonduty,twohavebeenconvicted;onereceivedasuspendedsentence,andtheotherservedtwoyearsofhislifesentence.
AsasignatorytotheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandothercovenants,theBritishGovernmentacceptstheprincipleofinternationaljudicialreviewofhumanrights.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasheardcasesregardingviolationsofhumanrightsinUlster,anditsadversedecisionshavegeneratedmodestimprovements.Londonhassometimesderogatedfromthecourt'srulings.In1988theEuropeanCourtruledthattheseven-daydetentionpowerundertheEPAwasexcessive,buttheThatcherGovernmentoptednottocomplywiththeverdict.
AnotherinternationaloversightbodyistheInter-GovernmentalConferenceestablishedundertheAnglo-IrishAgreementofNovember1985,withtheDublinGovernmentactingonbehalfoftheCatholicminority.LawandorderissueshavefeaturedprominentlyindiscussionsbetweenBritishandIrishrepresentatives.Thusfar,theBritishGovernmenthasrespondedfavorablytosomeIrishproposals,forinstance,Dublin'sobjectiontoreintroducinginternmentwithouttrial.Incontrast,suggestionstoreformDiplockcourtsintroducingjuriesorreplacingasinglejudgewiththreeortodisbandtheUDRwereflatlyrejectedbytheBritishauthorities.
Theprecedingdiscussionhasfocusedprimarilyonmechanismsof
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oversightwithinthestate.Thequestionofcivicaccountabilitywherebystateagenciesrespondtorepresentativesofleadingsocialinstitutionsisaseparateissue.Itisespeciallyproblematicindeeplydividedsocieties:abodycommittedtodemocraticaccountabilitymightfinditselftornbytheconflictingdemandsofadividedpublicandthuswhollyineffective.Ideally,oversightagencieswouldbemaximallydepo-
109.SeethereportsoftheGardinerCommittee(1975),theBennettCommittee(1979),andtheBakerCommission(1984);seealsoGavinDrewry,"JudgesandPoliticalInquiries:HarnessingaMyth,"PoliticalStudies23,no.1(March1975):61;Boyle,Hadden,andHillyard,LawandState,pp.12630.
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liticizedandcomposedofresponsiblemembersofthecommunity;butinNorthernIrelandenticingsuchpersonstoserveonbodieslikethePoliceAuthorityhasproveddifficult,eitherbecauseinsurgentorganizationshaveissuedthreatstomembersorbecausepotentialmembersconsidersuchagenciestobeillegitimateorcosmetic.
Onbalance,thestructureofaccountabilitythathasbeenbuiltsince1972isacleardeparturefromthesettlerera,butadditionalcheckswouldenhancetheoverallaccountabilityofthesecuritysector.Thecourts,independentcommissions,andoversightbodieshavenotadequatelyscrutinizedsomeofthemostcontroversialactivitiesofthesecurityforces.Moreover,whenhumanrightsorganizationsandotherbodieshavequestionedpracticessuchastheuseofplasticbulletsandtheso-calledshoot-to-killtactic,correctiveactionbytheauthoritieshasbeendifficulttodiscern.
ObstaclestoFurtherLiberalization
Britain'sexperiencefrom1969to1972indicatedthefutilityofattemptingbyremotecontroltoreshapeUlster'sinstitutions.Directinvolvementsincethenhasgiventhemetropolegreaterleverage,withsignificantresults.NorthernIrelandisoneofthefewcontemporarycommunallydividedsocietieswhereamodernizingregimehasrevampedimportantelementsofthesecuritysystem.Theremainderofthischapterusesourexplanatorymodeltoassesstheconstraintsonfurtherliberalization.
TheauthoritiesinNorthernIrelandhaveadvancedthefamiliarsecurity-imperativesthesis.Theyinsistthatpoliticalinstabilityandarmedinsurgencyhavemadeextraordinarysecurityprecautionsadirenecessity.AsoneRUCspokespersontoldme,"Furtherprogress[i.e.,policereform]dependsonthelevelofviolence."110Theofficialviewisthatanyfurtherrelaxationofcontrolswouldcreateavacuuminvitinganupsurgeinpoliticalviolence;everyviolentincident,
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howeverisolated,dramatizesandjustifiestheneedforexceptionalmeasures.
TheexistenceofprotractedpoliticalviolenceisclearlyanimportantpartoftheexplanationforprevailinginstitutionalarrangementsinNorthernIreland.Yet,asouranalysisofpostsettlerZimbabwesuggested,politicalviolencealoneisnotasufficientexplanation.OthersocialandpoliticalvariablesconditionUlster'ssecuritysystemand
110.Interviewwithauthor,3August1984.
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contributetochangesaswellascontinuitiesinitsstructure,ethos,andoperations.
ASectarianPoliticalCulture
Atthemacrolevel,democraticpoliticaldevelopmentandliberalizationofasecuritysystemrequireacongruencebetweenasociety'snormativeandinstitutionalorders.Pragerstatesthecaseinnewlyindependentnations:
theconstructionofnewinstitutionalstructuresfollowingindependencealwaysstand[s]inrelationtotheprevailingculturalorientationsofthesociety.Thechallengeofmodernizationistoestablishcomplementaritybetweenthoseorientationsandmoderninstitutionalforms.Normativecommitmentssetthelimitsforinstitutionaldevelopment.111
BritishreconstructioninUlsterrequiresbothinstitutionaltransferandculturalconvergencewiththemetropole.Ofcourse,itisfareasiertoremodelinstitutionsthantoreconstituteaculturalorderparticularlyonesplitalongcommunallines.BritainhashadmodestsuccessinUlsterinarranginginstitutionaltransferand,predictably,lessprogressingraftingnormsofuniversalityandjusticeontothesociopoliticalorderandnurturingtranscommunalsolidarity.Thefactthatthenewregimeisanadjunctofanexistingliberaldemocracymayseemtofavorliberalization(incontrasttoZimbabweandLiberia,wherethenewregimeslackstrongcommitmentstodemocraticnorms),butmuchdependsonthedegreeofsocietalreceptivity.Itoftenappearsthatthisdividedsocietyis"hermeticallysealedfromBritishpoliticallifeandtraditions"112Ulster'straditionalcommunalallegiancesandculturalorientationsclashwithnew,moderninstitutions;thisdisjunctionlimitsthelegitimationofthoseinstitutions.
Becauseofitssettlerheritage,Ulster'spolarizedpoliticalcultureisdeficientinnormsofmutualtrust,toleranceforopposition,willingnesstocompromiseonkeyissues,andasharedsenseof
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nationalidentity.Extremeviewsflourish,mutualdistrustamongorganizedCatholicandProtestantforcesisthenorm,andcompromiseequalsbetrayalofone'sside.Overarchingbondsofsolidarityareweak;atraditionofzero-sumpoliticsisstrongandparochialismisvalued;thecross-sectionalpublic
111.JeffreyPrager,BuildingDemocracyinIreland(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986),p.5.112.PaulArthur,"RulesofDisengagement,"Times,28October1988.
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supportnecessarytosustainmoderninstitutionsisprecarious.Surveydataandin-depthinterviewsdocumentsignificantlevelsofreligiousintoleranceaswellaspoliticalpolarization.113
Likesomeotherdeeplydividedsocieties,theantagonisticcommunitiesinNorthernIrelandarenotimpressedbytheregime'sattemptstobuildauniversalisticandautonomousstate.Thoughsometimespledgingnominalsupportfortheseideals,bothsides(butparticularlytheLoyalists)holdmoreparticularisticandinstrumentalistviewsofstatepower.Theyinvokethelanguageofdemocracyonbehalfoftheircommunalpreferences:majoritarianismforProtestants,minorityrightsormajoritarianisminanall-IrelandcontextforCatholics.Similarly,theytendtofavorsecurityarrangementsthatappeartoadvancetheirpartisaninterests.114
OntheCatholicside,theSocialDemocraticandLabourpartyroutinelylobbiesforanimpartialandaccountablesecuritysystem,notreversediscriminationagainstProtestants.Yetitssupportforliberalizationissomewhatambiguousandconditional.First,itsdemandsunderstandablyaddressproblemsthatinflameCatholicsensitivitiesbutignoreProtestantconcerns.Second,ithasgivenatbestmutedsupportandmoreoftenvirulentcriticismtospecificinstitutionalreforms,whichitlabelscosmetic.InCatholicquarters,thereareelectoralrisksinlendingsupporttosecurityandcriminaljusticeinstitutions;SinnFeinisalwaysanxioustoportraytheSDLPashavingsoldouttotheBritish.(SinnFeinbrandsallreformsassubtleformsofrepression.)Third,the
113.InterviewswithpoliticalelitescanbefoundinPadriagO'Malley,TheUncivilWars:IrelandToday(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1983);seealsoJohnConroy,BelfastDiary(Boston:Beacon,1987);andSallyBelfrage,LivingwithWar:ABelfastYear(NewYork:Penguin,1987).Inthemid-1960sonly39percentofProtestantsandCatholicsthoughtthat"mostpeoplecanbetrusted";62percentbelievedthatthepreachingof"false"
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religiousdoctrinesshouldnotbeallowed(RichardRose,GoverningwithoutConsensus:AnIrishPerspective[Boston:Beacon,1971],p.498).114.IllustratingthispointisthepartialerosionofLoyalistsupportforthesecurityforcesaftertheAnglo-IrishAgreement;oftheProtestantspolled,33.6percentthoughttheagreementwouldbringareductionofconfidenceinthesecurityforces;11.6percentexpectedanincrease,and46.2percentanticipatednoeffect(CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,15January1986).Anothersurveyfoundthat27percentofProtestantsbelievedtheagreementwouldlowerpublicconfidenceinthecourts;7percentthoughtitwouldraiseconfidence;and53percentexpectednoeffect(UlsterMarketingSurveys,BBCSpotlight/Newsnight:PublicOpinionofAnglo-IrishAgreement[BritishBroadcastingCorporation,January1986],p.15).In1988,86percentofProtestants(and70percentofCatholics)believedithadnotimprovedthesecuritysituation;76percentofProtestants(and58percentofCatholics)sawnopositiveeffectontheadministrationofjustice;55percentofProtestants(and34percentofCatholics)saidithadnotincreasedcooperationbetweentheRUCandtheIrishpolice,orGarda(CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegrapb,4October1988).
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SDLPcontinuestoconditionsupportfortheinstitutionsoflawandorderonapoliticalsolutiontotheconflict.TheSDLPleader,JohnHume,putitbluntly:"Wewillonlyhavetotalunequivocalidentificationwiththeinstitutionsoflawandorderwhenthereisagreementamongthepeopleasawholeastohowwearegoverned."115FortheSDLP,apoliticalsolutionspellsaunitedIrelandanathematoProtestants.
Protestantpoliticalforcestendtoseelawandstatepowerasinstrumentstoadvancemajorityinterests.Theyare,likemostsettlercastes,antimodernistswhoopposetheelevationofcoerciveinstitutionsabovecommunaldemands.TheUnionistshavefoughtvirtuallyeverychangeinthedirectionofliberalizationfromlegalreformsandjudicialimpartialitytopoliceaccountability.Onoccasion,thisoppositionhasmanifesteditselfinstreetproteststhathaveturnedintofull-scaleriotsandattacksontheforcesoforder,throwingintoquestionthecelebratedLoyalistfondnessforlawandorder.
Agreatdealofcriticismhascenteredonpolicing,whichoneDemocraticUnionistparty(DUP)leaderquestioned:
Theremustcomeatimewhentheconscienceofeachpoliceofficermustoverrulethebrainwashing...thatprofessionalismmustoverruleconscienceoneveryoccasion.AtpresentthereappearstobeanattitudewithintheRUCthatofficers...mustcarryontheirtaskinaprofessionalmanner.116
Acolleaguewarned:"Theindividualpolicemanisgoingtohavetochoosewhoheisloyaltohispaymaster[theBritishGovernment]orthe[Protestant]communitywhichhassupportedhimforsolong."117
SomeProtestantleadersareunabashedabouttheirpreferenceforsecuritystructuresthatdiscriminateagainstCatholicoffenders.OneOfficialUnionistparty(OUP)leader,HaroldMcCusker,questionedtheprincipleofimpartiallawenforcementandinsistedthatthepolice
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shouldinsteaddistinguishbetweenoffenders"whoupholdtheConstitutionandthosewhowouldsubvertit."118SomehaveplacedasinisterconstructiononsecuritypoliciesthattreatsuchLoyalistsonaparwithCatholicpoliticaloffenders.Similarly,othersseeaworldofdifferencebetweentheannualProtestantandCatholicparades.ConsiderthecommentofaDUPmember:
115.QuotedinConorCruiseO'Brien,lettertotheeditor,Times,20May1989.116.AlanKane,NorthernIrelandAssembly,Debates,vol.19,19March1986,p.231.117.DUPpressofficer,SammyWilson,quotedinIrishTimes,16July1985.118.BelfastTelegraph,12July1985.
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WhatistheLoyalistdemonstrating?HeisdemonstratinghisloyaltytolawandorderandtoBritishruleinthiscountry.WhatareRepublicanparadesdemonstrating?Theyaredemonstratingtheirsupportformurder,terrorism,andtheoverthrowofthestate.119
UtteredataparticularlytraumatictimeforProtestantswhentheRUCwasbanningorreroutingLoyalistparadesthattraditionallytraveledthroughCatholicneighborhoodstheseparticularviewsmaynotbeuniversallypopularamongProtestants.Buttheycertainlyreflectawidespreadantimodernistorientationtoinstitutionsoflawandorder.OneseniormemberoftheOUPremarked:"Thefactthattheyare'ourpolice'isinscribedontheProtestantmind."120
NorthernIreland'spoliticalculturecontainsstrongparticularisticvalues,despitetheformalsupportProtestantandCatholicleaderssometimespledgetouniversalisticanddemocraticideals.Theculturalmilieudoesnotprecludeinstitutionalprogressastherecordofpartialreconstructionattestsbutitmakesfuturechangemoreproblematic.
APolarizedCivilSociety
Inadditiontoinsurgencyandthepartisanpoliticalculture,twootherinterrelatedfactorsconditionNorthernIreland'ssecuritysystem:theinterestsandcapacitiesofCatholicandProtestantpoliticalforcesandcivicinstitutionsandthoseoftheBritishregime.121AftersurveyingCatholicandProtestantattitudesonlawandorderissuesandtherelativepoweroforganizedforcesoneachside,Iassesstheirimpactontheregime.
Catholicviews.
UnderBritishrule,Catholicpreferencesarecentraltothedebateoverfundamentalpoliticalandconstitutionalquestions.Catholiccivicbodiesthechurch,media,voluntaryassociationsandpoliticalpartiesactivelyexpressgrievancesanddemandsonpublicpolicies,and
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nowheremoreintenselythanonmattersoflawandorder.
Theattitudinaldatapresentedbelowshouldbetreatedcautiously;thesensitivityofsomeofthequestionsmayproduceresponsesthatexaggeratedisapprovalofillegalactivitiesandradicalorganizations.Butit
119.NorthernIrelandAssembly,Debates,vol.15,1May1985,p.252.120.QuotedinFortnight,no.239(19May1986),p.5.121.Thefollowingdiscussionextendsargumentsinmyarticle,"ContestedOrder:TheStruggleoverBritishSecurityPolicyinNorthernIreland,"ComparativePolitics19,no.3(April1987):28198.
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isclearthatCatholicviewsonsecuritymattersarelessuniformthanconventionalaccountssuggest.Surveyshavefoundthat55.5percentofCatholicsthinktheauthoritiesshouldtakeatougherlinewiththeIRA;12241percentsaythatBritain'sfirstshort-termpriorityshouldbetoreducethelevelofviolence;123and86percentdisapproveoftheuseofviolenceforpoliticalends.124ThecriticalmassofloyalIRAsupportersshouldbedistinguishedfromthosewhosimplytoleratetheinsurgents,thosewhooccasionallysupportspecificactionsoftheIRAbutcondemnothers,andthosewhohavebeenintimidatedintocompliancewithIRAdemands.125CatholicsupportforRepublicaninsurgencyistaxedperiodicallybyattacksthathavegoneawry(Republicaninsurgentswereresponsibleforthedeathsof170Catholicciviliansfrom1969to1988)andbythepunishment(likekneecappings)theIRAadministerstosuspectedinformers.126ThatthestatelackslegitimacyamongCatholics,andthatIRAblundersareoftenfollowedbycontroversialsecurityforceoperations,helptoreinforcetoleranceforIRAactivity.
Anotherpictureemergesfromabreakdownofattitudesalongpartylines.FouroutoffiveSDLPvotersrejecttheuseofpoliticalviolence,andthesameproportionbelievethatSinnFeinshouldabandonthearmedstruggle.Bycontrast,fouroutoffiveSinnFeinvoterssupportpoliticalviolence,andtwooutofthreesupportthearmedstruggle.127ItisnoteworthythatoftheSinnFeinsupportersoneoutofthreebelievesthepartyshouldterminatethearmedstruggle,astapleoftheparty'sstrategy.ThesefindingsdocumentimportantintracommunaldifferencesonkeyquestionsfacingtheCatholicpopulation.ManyCatholicsharbornegativeviewsofSinnFein;inarecentpollonly14percentofCatholicsexpressedstaunchsupportforSinnFein,53percentsaidtheyhadneversympathizedwiththeparty,and28percentindicatedthattheirviewswereaffectedbymoreimmediateeventsinvolvingtheIRA.128Actualvotingresults,however,suggest
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thatSinnFeinenjoysthesupportofasizeableminorityofCatholics.Inthe1983generalelection,SinnFein
122.Moxon-Browne,Nation,Class,p.58.123.OpinionResearchCentrepoll,NewSociety,6September1979.Thirty-twopercentthoughtthefirstpriorityshouldbeapoliticalsolution.124.MarketandOpinionResearchInternational[MORI]Poll,June1981.125.PatrickBishopandEamonnMallie,TheProvisionalIRA(London:Heinemann,1987),pp.227-28.126.SeeTable7aboveand''AnUlsterTownMournsWomanKilledbyI.R.A.,"NewYorkTimes,16April1989.127.CynthiaIrvinandEddieMoxon-Browne,"NotManyFloatingVotersHere,"Fortnight,no.273(May1989):78.128.CoopersandLybrandpoll,Fortnight,no.261(April1988):8.
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TABLE8ATTITUDESTOWARDSECURITYMEASURES,1985(inpercentages)ProtestantsinAgreement
CatholicsinAgreement
IncreasesizeofRUC 90 38Increaseundercoverintelligenceoperations
90 25
ExtendroleofUDR 76 11Imposedeathpenaltyforterroristsconvictedofmurder
69 20
Reintroduceinternmentforterroristsuspects
51 12
UsejointRUC-IrishPoliceborderpatrols
81 61
Useshoot-to-killpolicyforterroristsuspects
61 7
Continuesupergrassinformersystem 26 6SOURCE:UlsterMarketingSurveyspoll,BBCSpotlightReport:AnOpinionPoll(BritishBroadcastingCorporation,May1985).NOTE:"Don'tknow"responsesrangedfrom3to8percent.N=1,008
won43percentandtheSDLP57percentoftheCatholic,nationalistvote;in1987SinnFein'ssharedroppedto35percent.Ina1988survey,40percentofCatholicssaidthatSinnFeinshouldnotbeallowedtofieldcandidatesinthe1989citycouncilelections.129
CatholicswhodisapproveofSinnFein/IRAandpoliticalviolencedonotnecessarilysupportsecuritypoliciesorspecificinstitutions.A1982pollfoundthat60percentofCatholicsdisapprovedofthegovernment'sgeneralhandlingofsecuritywhile33percentapproved.130ThereiswidespreadCatholicdiscontentwithmanyexistingandproposedsecuritymeasures(seeTables8,9,and10),andamajoritybelievesthatthepoliceandthelegalsystemoperateunfairly.TheseattitudescontrastsharplywithProtestantviewsand
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suggestthattheorgansoflawandorderremain"institutionsofdiscord"today.131
129.CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,4October1988.130.NOPpoll,"PoliticalAttitudesinNorthernIreland,"UlsterTelevision,February1982,p.6.131.Rose,Governing.
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TABLE9ATTITUDESONLAWANDORDER,1985(inpercentages)ProtestantsCatholics
Policearefair 96 47Policeareunfair 4 53Legalsystemdispensesjusticefairly 89 36Legalsystemdispensesjusticeunfairly 9 57Securityforcesarepoliticallyrestricted 92 39Useofplasticbulletsduringriotsisacceptable 86 9Useofplasticbulletsduringriotsisunacceptable 8 87Deathpenaltyforterroristmurderersisappropriate 74 21Deathpenaltyforterroristmurderersisinappropriate 18 71Uncorroborated"supergrass"evidenceshouldnotbeadmissibleincourt
46 81
Uncorroborated"supergrass"evidenceshouldbeadmissibleincourt
35 10
SOURCE:NorthernIrelandConsumerPanelpoll,BelfastTelegraph,6February1985.N=955
TheIRA,SinnFein,andtheirsupporterstakeapredictablyhostileviewofNorthernIreland'slegalsystemandsecurityarrangements,includingthereformsimplementedsincetheadventofBritishrule.Intheirview,theexistingstateis"unreformable";thecreationofnewinstitutionsoflawandorderwillbepossibleonlyaftertheBritishwithdraw.Inthemeantime,theIRAandSinnFeinfeargenuinereformsanddependonstaterepressiontofuelthefiresofCatholicdiscontentandsupportfortheRepublicanmovement.Bycontrast,theSDLPanditssupportersadvocateimmediatereformsinthesecuritysystem:thattheUDRbedisbanded,theDiplockcourtsabolished,theEmergencyProvisionsActandPreventionofTerrorismActwithdrawn,andthepolicerestructured.132
132.TheSDLPhasnoturgedCatholicstojointheRUC,hasbeenambivalentoncooperatingwiththepoliceagainstpoliticalviolence,and
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hasrefusedtogiveunconditionalsupporttotheforce.
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TABLE10ATTITUDESTOWARDSECURITYMEASURES,1988(inpercentages)Protestants Catholics
ApproveDisapproveApproveDisapproveInternmentinNorthernIreland 67 26 10 84InternmentinbothNorthernIrelandandtheIrishRepublic
71 23 11 83
Removalofsuspect'srighttosilence 69 26 18 70ExtraditionofterroristsuspectsfromtheRepublictoNorthernIreland
97 2 49 42
Sealingoftheborder 68 24 11 83Endofhalf-remissionofsentenceforterroristprisoners
75 23 31 61
Requirementthatcitycouncillorspubliclyrenounceviolencebeforetakingoffice
94 5 70 23
SOURCE:MarketingResearchConsultancypoll,BelfastTelegraph,9September1988.N=1,000
ItmightbeexpectedthatmoderateCatholicswouldbethefirsttosupportliberalizingchanges.ButtheSDLPanditssupportershavegivenatbestqualified,conditionalsupporttoreformsbecausetheydefinethechangesasinsufficient,orbecauseofperceivedmiscarriagesofjustice,orbecauseenthusiasticsupportforreformsmightputtheSDLPatanelectoraldisadvantagevis-à-visSinnFein.Moreover,abrasivesecurityoperationsdisproportionatelyaffectCatholics,creatingtheimpressionthattheentiresecurityenterpriseisone-sided.Thelackofsupportfordirectrule,coupledwiththelackofpoliticalprogress,alsocolorsreformsimposedbytheBritishstate.Asnotedearlier,Catholicsupportforreformsofsecurityandcriminaljusticestructuresisunlikelytobeenthusiasticifsuchchangesdonotproceedinconjunctionwithprogressonthepoliticalfront.
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Inthemeantime,groupsrepresentingCatholicinterests(thechurch,SDLP)andseveralindependenthumanrightsorganizationshavelobbiedformajorreformsinthelaw,police,courts,andspecificsecuritymeasures.Generally,thegovernmentalresponsehasbeenunfavorable.OneofficialattheNIOinsistedthatitis"farcicaltosuggestthatoursecuritypolicyisdeterminedbytheminority."133Still,theregimehastendedtoavoidintroducingmeasureslikelytopromptawidespreadCatholicoutcry,disorders,orinternationalprotests,asindeedoccurredintheearly1970safterseveralmisguidedsecurityexperiments.OnemeasurethatwouldbelikelytoinflametheCatholicminoritytoviolentresistanceisthereintroductionofinternmentwithouttrial;severalBritishofficialshaveopposeditonpreciselythesegrounds.
ArelativelyrecentinnovationdesignedtogiveCatholicsaformalvoiceindecisionmakingthroughrepresentativesfromtheIrishRepublicistheInter-GovernmentalConferenceestablishedundertheAnglo-Irishaccord,whereinIrishofficialshavepressedforseveralliberalizingreforms.Inthefirstfouryears(19861989),mostofDublin'srecommendationscametonaught.
Protestantviews.
SignificantproportionsofCatholics(36percent)andProtestants(22percent)believethatterrorismcannotbedefeatedinUlster(seeTable11).Oftheremainder,CatholicsplacegreaterweightonpoliticalsolutionswhereasProtestantsfavorsecuritymeasures.AsubstantialcoreofProtestants(29percent)believethatsecuritymeasuresalonearetheanswer,andmanyothersseesecurityasthecuttingedgeofastrategysupportedbyapoliticaloffering(e.g.,powersharing).ManyProtestantsappreciatethatrelianceonforcealonewillnotdefeattheIRA.Forty-fourpercentofProtestantsand38percentofCatholicsthoughtthatacombinationofsecurityandpoliticalmeasureswasthe
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solution.(Thecrucialunaddressedquestionisthemeaningof"politicalmeasures"toeachcommunity.)
Thesurveydatapresentedinthetablesaboveshowthat,withfewexceptionsanddespiteintracommunaldifferences,thesecuritymeasuresthatCatholicsdenounceasdraconianandunacceptable,Protestantsoverwhelminglyapplaud.AsaruleProtestantsfavoranymeasurethatmayhelptosubduetheIRAanditsciviliansupporters.Supportfordrasticsecuritymeasuresdoesnot,however,translateintoapprovaloftheGovernment'soverallperformanceinsecurity.Onesurveyfoundthat
133.NIOofficial,LawandOrderDivision,interviewwithauthor,3August1984.
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TABLE11ATTITUDESONDEFEATINGTERRORISM,1988(inpercentages)Question:BywhatmeasuresdoyoubelieveterrorisminNorthernIrelandismost
likelytobedefeated?SecurityMeasures
PoliticalMeasures
CombinationofMeasures
CannotBeDefeated
Don'tKnow Total
Protestants 29 3 44 22 2 100Catholics 4 19 38 36 3 100SOURCE:CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,4October1988.N=1,000
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50percentofProtestantsdisapprovedofthehandlingofsecurity,while44percentapproved.134ThemainreasonsforthisdisapprovalhavebeenarticulatedbyUnionistleaders:theycomplainthatanalienpowertakessecuritydecisionsandimposesprogramswithouttheconsentofthemajorityinUlster;thatitdoesnotexertsecuritypowerstothefullestextentagainstCatholicculpritsbutusesthemincreasinglyagainstProtestantprotestersandpoliticaloffenders.
MostProtestantswouldquestiontheclaimthattheexistingsecuritysystemservestheirinterests,whichismadeinonemodelofBritishrulepresentedatthebeginningofthischapter.TheybelieveinsteadthatBritishsecuritypolicyandroutinepracticespandertotheminoritypopulation,holdthesecurityforcesonashortleash,andallowinsurgentstorunamok.Inonepoll(Table9),92percentofProtestantsthoughtthatthesecurityforceswererestrictedbypoliticalpolicies.IanPaisley'sDemocraticUnionistpartyhasgonesofarastoaccuseBritainofhaving"avestedinterestinnotdefeatingtheterrorismthat,ifpermittedtosucceed,woulddeliveritoftheProvinceitseekstoditch."135
ThetwoUnionistpoliticalpartieshaveaggressivelyandceaselesslycampaignedforgreateraccesstosecurityelites,fortificationofcoerciveagencies,morevigorousenforcementofexistinglaws,andahostofmorerepressivemeasures.AsevidencedbythewealthoftheLoyalists'unmetdemands,thispressurehashadlittledirectimpactonspecificsecurityarrangements.SuccessismostlikelywhentheirdemandscoincidewithamajorIRAattack;eventhentheofficialresponsemilitaryreinforcements,forexample,orblanketsearch-and-seizureoperationsinCatholicareasisdismissedasterriblyinadequate.TheUnionistleaderssometimesexaggeratetheirimpotence,however.AformerOUPGeneralSecretarystated,"We'vehadnosuccessininfluencingBritainonsecurity."136IanPaisleyinsistedthat"nothingIcandointhisParliament[Westminster]isgoingtobringabouta
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securitysituationinNorthernIrelandthatwillgiveameasureofsafetytomypeople."137Hisparty'ssecuritymanifestolaments,"Wemustbetheonlycountrywherethosewhoareferventlypro-securityforcesandwhooftenpaytheultimatepriceforgivingsuchsupport,havetheirloyaltyrepaidbytheGovernmentdistancingitselffromthem."138
134.NOPpoll,"PoliticalAttitudes,"p.6.135.DemocraticUnionistParty,AWartoBeWon(Belfast:DUP,1984),p.26.136.Interviewwithauthor,8August1984.137.Newsletter,17November1981.138.DemocraticUnionistParty,WartobeWon,p.37.
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AnofficialattheNorthernIrelandOfficeseemedtoagree:
TheUnionistshaveverylittleinfluenceonsecuritypolicy.ItispoliticallynecessaryfortheSecretaryofStatetodampendowntheoutrageoftheProtestantcommunityaftermajorterroristattacks,likesendingintheSpearheadBattalion.Basically,weputupwithUnionistpressuresonsecurity.Securitypolicyissettled.139
Inmostinstances,theGovernmenthasindeedsimplytoleratedormadecosmeticresponsestoUnionistclamor.AnotherNIOofficialindicatedthedangerofacceptingtheUnionistprogram:"TheUnionistdemandsonsecurityareuniquelydesignedtomakeaviolentsituationworse."140
YettheProtestants'poorrecordinshapingspecificsecurityarrangementsdoesnotmeanthattheireffortshavebeenfruitless;theirunrelentingpressurehashadamoregeneralizeddeterrenteffect.141OfutmostconcerntostateofficialsistheProtestantcommunity'scapacityforarmedrevoltandstreetdisturbances.Thispotentialforresistanceoccasionallyrealizedcircumscribesthekindsofreformsthestatemightplaceontheagenda.142ChangesthatmightleadtoaviolentandprotractedLoyalistrebellionincludedismantlingtheUDR,demilitarizingtheRUC,orrepealingtheemergencylegislation.
JustsuchabacklashfollowedthesigningofthecontroversialAngloIrishAgreementinNovember1985.LoyalistsseeDublin'sadvisoryroleasawhollyunacceptableintrusionintoNorthernIreland'ssovereignaffairsandbelieveitisapoorlydisguisedfirststeptowardthedreadedreunificationofIreland.143During1986and1987Loyalistsexpressedtheirindignationinacampaignofmassdefiancethatincludedseveralhugedemonstrationsandstrikes;theboycottingoflocalgovernmentalbodies;violentdashesbetweenprotestersandthepolice;theformationofanUlsterResistanceMovementtoopposetheagreement;sectarianassaultsonCatholics;andattacksonRUC
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officers,theirhomes,andfamiliesfortheallegedpoliceroleinupholdingtheagreement.(Inthisperiod,550attacksonpoliceofficers'homesoccurredand140police
139.NIOofficial,LawandOrderDivision,interviewwithauthor,3August1984.140.NIOofficial,PoliticalAffairsDivision,interviewwithauthor,3August1984.141.Walsharguesthatrepressivepracticescontinuetodayprimarilybecauseof"theimplacableresistanceoftheUnionistmajoritytoreforminthisfield"(UseandAbuse,p.122).142.Cf.Fisk,NoReturn,pp.23138.Thisillustrates"non-decisionmaking"discussedinPeterBachrachandMortonS.Baratz,PowerandPoverty(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970).143.In1988,threeyearsafterthesigningoftheagreement,62percentofProtestantswere"justasopposed"toitandanadditional17percentwere"lessinfavor"(CoopersandLybrandpoll,BelfastTelegraph,4October1988).
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familieswereforcedtorelocate.)144Thisorganizedresistancedissipatedinlate1987,butitservesasagraphicreminderoftheresponsethestatemayprovokebypolicyshiftsunacceptabletoProtestants.
Inthefirstfouryearsafteritsannouncement,theAnglo-IrishAgreementonlyexacerbatedtheconflict:communalpolarizationandpoliticalviolenceincreased;thegulfwidenedbetweentheProtestantmajorityandtheBritishregime;theCatholicminorityremainsalienatedfromthestate;andtheobjectiveofpoliticalreconciliationhasbeenstymiedbyProtestants'refusaltocooperateandtheirinsistenceontheterminationoftheagreement.Failingtoachievepoliticalprogress,theInter-GovernmentalConferencehasbydefaultfocusedonsecuritymattersresultinginincreasedcooperationbetweenLondonandDublinbutnomaterialimprovementsinsecurity.
BritishCapacities
EarlierinthechapterIoutlinedtheBritishGovernment'slong-terminterestsinUlsteranditsgoalsforpoliticaldevelopmentandreconstructionofthesecuritysystem.Theseinterestsandgoalsaregenerallyfavorabletodemocratizationandliberalization.Oneself-imposedcommitment,however,hasunintendedconsequencesthatlimitBritain'sabilitytopressforwardwithliberalization:the1976decisiontoUlsterizetheconflict,graduallydisengagingandretrenchingBritishtroopsandgivinglocalagenciesprominence(RUC,UDR,theDiplockcourts).Byremovingthemilitaryfromthefrontlineofcounterinsurgencyandsaddlingcriminaljusticeagencieswithresponsibilityforinternalsecurityaswellasconventionalcrimecontrol,Britishofficialsineffectdisallowedcertainkindsofreformintheseagencies.Thus,Ulsterizingtheconflictsignificantlyhampersfurtherliberalizationofthepoliceandcourts.Onealternative,theresumptionofmilitaryprimacyininternalsecurity,wouldcontradict
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thelogicofUlsterization,whichhasbipartisansupportinBritishpoliticalcircles.
DiametricallyopposedtoUlsterizationistheoptionoffullintegrationoftheprovinceintotheUnitedKingdom.Thisscenariomightofferthebesthopeforliberalization,insofarasitwouldbringanendtoconstitutionaluncertaintyandfosterprovincialconvergencewiththemetropole.ButintegrationisunacceptabletoCatholics,doesnotappealtoamajorityofProtestants(seeTable5),andisunpopularintheUnited
144.Times,19September1988.
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Kingdom.IntegrationwouldentailfullandpermanentBritishinvolvementintheprovinceevenallowingforsomedevolvedpowerasinScotlandwhichwouldviolatethepremiumLondonplacesonachievinganinternalsettlementanddisengagingfromUlster.
Importantenvironmentalconstraintsalsohinderliberalizationanddemocratization.AlthoughBritainhasmadesignificantprogress,itscapacitytodriveliberalizationmuchfurtherisconditionedbycountervailingcommunalforces.OnecriticaldifferencebetweenthepostsettlerregimeinNorthernIrelandanditscounterpartinZimbabweisthattheformerisanadjunctofaliberaldemocracy.Thiscircumstancemayseempropitiousfordemocraticpoliticaldevelopment,butatutelaryregimemustbeabletomarshalbroad-basedindigenoussupportsomethingchronicallyelusiveincontemporaryUlster.TheBritishGovernmentcannotdependontheconsent,letalonetheactivesupport,oftheCatholicminorityortheProtestantmajority.Thesystemofdirectruleandmanyoftheregime'spoliciesalienategroupsonbothsides.145Britain'sverypresenceinNorthernIrelandistheraisond'êtreoftheRepublicanmovementandamajorobjectionforLoyalistswhodemanddevolvedgovernment.
TheBritishGovernmentdoesnotmakehistoryinUlsterjustasitpleases.ProtestantsandCatholicsalikehavesomecapacitynotonlytoderailapoliticalsettlementbutalsotothwartunacceptableinnovationsinthesecurityfield.LabourMPCliveSoleycapturesthispoint:"NeitherUnionistsnorRepublicanshavepositivepower.Theyonlyhavenegativepower,theabilitytodigin,toresist,todestroy."146Catholicshaveinthepastreactedtorepressivemeasuresinwaysthatraisethepoliticalandsecuritycostsofintroducingnewones;butofgreatersalienceistheProtestantcapacitytofrustrateliberalizingchanges.Shouldsecuritypolicytiptoofarinanydirection,itmightupsetthefragilebalanceofforcesandcauseafull-
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scalecrisis.Inadditiontotheroutinepressuresofpoliticalpartiesandcivicinstitutions(churches,thepress)associatedwitheachside,thepossibilityofmassmobilizationandincreasingviolence,occasionallymanifest,helpssettheouterlimitsontheregime'spoliticalandsecuritypolicies.InZimbabwe,aswehaveseen,theforcesofcivilsocietyhaveshownnocomparablepowerofresistance.
145.RichardRose,NorthernIreland:ATimeofChoice(London:Macmillan,1976),pp.28,140.146.CliveSoley,"Britain'sDutytoMakeClearHerIntentions,"Fortnight,June1984,p.9;IrishTimes,17August1984.
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NeithersideappearstoappreciatetheconstraintsunderwhichtheBritishGovernmentrulesNorthernIrelandandinsteadassumesthattheregimehasthecapacitytoprevailagainsttheothersideorunilaterallytoresolvetheproblem.147London'sleverageislargelyfictionalinlightofCatholics'andProtestants'determinationtoboycottanyinnovationtheyperceivetoviolatetheirpoliticalinterests,aspirations,anddeeplyfeltcommunalidentities.Thissocialmilieuisthereforeunreceptivetoradicalinitiatives.Infact,anysecuritypolicy,whetherimpartialorfavoringonecommunity,islikelytoantagonizeeitherorbothgroupstoagreaterorlesserdegree.
IfProtestantsandCatholicshavedegreesofnegativepower,thesamemaybesaidforthestate.BalancedbetweenactualorpotentialProtestantandCatholicpressuresandlackingcredibilityinbothcommunities,Britishpowerislargelyreducedtolimitingthedamageandmaintainingasemblanceoforder.Thesearemanifestationsofnegativepower.Thestate'smilitary,administrative,andeconomicassetsdonottranslateintodecisivepoliticalleverageoverentrencheddomesticforces.NorthernIrelandillustratestheargumentthatastatemaybeautonomousfromcivilsocietybutalsoratherineffectiveinpursuingitslong-termgoals.Thisineffectivenessderiveslargelyfromitsveryautonomy,itslackofadomesticbaseofsupportforpolicyinitiatives.
Sincethemid-1970s,BritishofficialshavetakenthepositionthatsecuritymeasuresalonewillnotendUlster'spoliticalviolence.Acorollaryprincipleisthatofavoidingthetemptationtooverreacttospectacularincidentsofpoliticalviolence,inlightofthepossiblecounterproductiveimpact(whichtheGovernmenthasoftenunderestimatedinitssecuritymeasures).Acknowledgingtheneedtoaddresstheunderlyingpoliticalcauses,officialsneverthelessseeapoliticalsolutionasremote.Boldpolicyinitiativesthusyieldbydefaulttopoliticaldriftandcontainmentofthesecurityproblem.148
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TheparamountaimistokeeptheconflictwithinmanageableboundsinUlsterandawayfrommainlandBritain.SuccessiveBritishCabinetshavefearedthatUlster'sstreetdisorders,politicalradicalization,andpolarizationmighthaveademonstrationeffectontherestoftheUnitedKingdom.InthewordsofaformerarmycommanderinNorthernIreland,thepriceofanyrelaxa-
147.BewandPatterson,UlsterCrisis,p.96.148.LiamO'Dowd,BillRolston,andMikeTomlinson,''FromLabourtotheTories:TheIdeologyofContainmentinNorthernIreland,"CapitalandClass18(Winter1982):68;[GloverReport]"NorthernIreland:FutureTerroristTrends,"15December1978(inRogerFaligot,Britain'sMilitaryStrategyinIreland[London:Zed,1983],p.226).
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tioninthesecurityeffortwouldbenothingshortof"anastyoverspillindoors,"contaminatingmainlandBritain.149
TheincompatiblecommunaloutlooksdiscussedaboveexplainwhytheGovernmentisnotpreparedtodevolvecontroloversecuritypolicyandinstitutionstodomesticparties.ThetransferofsecuritypowerstothemajoritywouldalmostcertainlymeanareturntosectarianmaintenanceoforderandProtestantdomination.Sharedresponsibilityforsecurityamongleadersofbothsidesisalsounlikely,giventheirdiametricallyopposedvisionsoflawandorder.
Incontrast,Britishelitespainttheirpositionassupremelyenlightened.OneNIOofficialarguedthat"securitypolicyistheoneelementthatiscriticizedbyallsides,whichshowswearenotinfluencedbyanyoneside."150Notonlyisthestatementanonsequitur,itsuggestsacompletelyneutralapproach;theGovernmenthassometimesrespondedfavorablytocommunalpressures.Alsomisleadingistheclaimthat"securitypolicyisdeterminedbyanentirelyBritishperspective."151Theimplicationthatpolicydevelopsinavacuumignorestheenvironmentalconstraintsdiscussedabove.
ThesepointsbearontwoofthethreebroadperspectivesonBritishrulediscussedatthebeginningofthechapter.OurfindingschallengethedepictionofthemetropoleasaguardianofLoyalistinterests.Particularlyonsecurityquestions,contemporaryBritishruleisnosimplepropfororinstrumentofLoyalistsupremacy.WeretheGovernmentaservantoftheLoyalists,itwouldnotgeneratesuchunrelentingandbitterLoyalistoppositionto"lenient"securitymeasures,norwoulditinstructstateagenciestotreatRepublicanandLoyalistoffenderseven-handedly.
OneNIOofficialunderscoredthe"fundamentaldisputebetweentheSecretaryofStateandtheUnionistsoversecurity."152Initsidealsofuniversalisticmaintenanceoforderandrestraineduseofforce,the
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GovernmentindeedseemsworldsapartfromtheUnionists.Andyetthesecurityprogramhasnothadaneutralimpactonthisdividedsociety.First,thereisboundtobesomeinstitutionalinertiainthiscasefavoringtheProtestantmajorityinanyefforttomodernizestateagencies,althoughithasbeencheckedmorevigorouslyinUlsterthaninZim-
149.GeneralSirJohnHackett,"ContainingtheExplosiveMixture,"Hibernia,9August1979.150.NIOPoliticalAffairsofficial,interviewwithauthor,16August1984.151.Ibid.;emphasisadded.152.Ibid.
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babwe.Second,sincetheprincipalchallengetothestatecomesfromRepublicanforcesrootedinCatholicworking-classareas,securityoperationshaveconcentratedinthoseareas,wheretheydailydisruptsociallifeandoffendpopularsensibilitiesquitedisproportionatelytoanythingexperiencedinProtestantworking-classareas.
DespiteProtestants'dissatisfactionoverspecificsecurityarrangements,theeffectsofthesecurityenterprisearegenerallycompatiblewithacoreLoyalistdemand.SecurityispursuedwithinacontextthattakesforgrantedtheconstitutionalstatusofNorthernIrelandaspartoftheUnitedKingdomaslongasthemajoritysodesires.ImpartialmaintenanceoforderisthusnotinconsistentwithasecuritypolicywhoseneteffectistofavorLoyalistoverCatholicconstitutionalpreferences.
Conclusion
Since1972,thetrajectoryofchangeinlawandorderarrangementshasbeenuneven:theeliminationofsomesectarianstructures,modernizationofothers,andretrogressioninstillothers.BritishruleincontemporaryNorthernIrelandhasmadesignificantdeparturesfromtherecordoftheUnionistsettlerstate.Abolishedwiththesettler-dominatedexecutiveandparliamentweresomeofthemostsectarianinstitutions(e.g.,MinistryofHomeAffairs);otherswerepartiallyreformed(e.g.,RoyalUlsterConstabulary).Moreover,metropolitaninterventionhasproducednotonlyorganizationalimprovementsbutalsosystemicchangesintherelationsbetweenvariousagencies(includingoversightbodies)andtheethoscultivatedinthecommandingheightsofthesystem(NorthernIrelandOffice).Thesesystemicchangeshavebroughtgreaterinternalaccountability,diffuseduniversalisticnorms,andreducedtheincidenceofrepressiveevents.In1972,thepoliceandmilitarykilledseventy-fourpeople;in1988,seven.153Inthecoerciveorder,theneteffectofBritishruleis
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thepartialliberalizationoftheinternalsecuritysystemandarelaxationofrepression.
Theextentofliberalizationshouldnotbeexaggerated,however.TheadventofbodiesresponsibleforensuringaccountabilityisasignificantimprovementontheUnionistsystem,buttheycouldbefurtherempowered.Innocentcivilianscontinuetoexperienceroughjusticefromthesecurityandcriminaljusticeagencies;thepolicingofmarchesandriotsis
153.Theyearsbetween1972and1988sawasteepdeclineindeathscausedbythesecurityforces.
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oftenruthlessandbloody.TheDiplockcourts,UlsterDefenseRegiment,andundercoverunitsoftheSASandtheRUCSpecialBranchhaveengagedincontroversialactivitiesofsufficientmagnitudetocontaminatetheimageoftheentiresecurityenterprise.
Securityagencieshavebeeninthevanguardinfrustratingprogressivechangesinmanytransitionalsocieties.InNorthernIrelandthesecuritybranchvigorouslyresistedtheoriginalreformsbutsubsequentlybecamemorecompliant.Thepolice,courts,andmilitarycontinuetoadvocatetheretentionofexceptionalpowers,buttheseagenciesplayarelativelymodestroletodayinblockingliberalization.Otherfactorshaveagreaterimpact.
NorthernIrelandexemplifiesthespecialproblemsconfrontinganexternalregimecommittedtoreconstructingasettlerpowerstructureandasectariansecuritysystembutfetteredinitscapacitytodoso.Theresponseofcommunalforcesmayhaveimportanteffectsonthetransformationofstateinstitutions.Thereareobstaclestostructuralchangeinapostsettlerpolitywheretheregimehoversabovesocietywithlittlemoralauthorityandwhereantagonisticsocialforcescansabotagemajorpoliticalandsecurityinitiatives.ProtestantandCatholicforcesaresufficientlypowerfultoblockthepoliticalprojectsoftheirantagonistsbutunabletoimposetheirown.Bydefault,thesituationhasbecomeoneofpoliticalimpasseandcontainmentofthesecurityproblem.Theseconstraints,coupledwithcontinuingpoliticalviolenceandthepolicyofUlsterization,circumscribetheprocessofliberalization.
Finally,thepartialmodernizationofthesecurityenterprisehashadnoappreciableimpactonnationbuildinginNorthernIreland.ThecitizensofNorthernIreland,nolesstodaythaninthepast,havenosinglenationalidentityorcommonpoliticalculture.Theterritorycontinuestohosttwonations,advancingirreconcilablesolutionsto
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theproblem.Itseemsplausibletoconcludethattheimpactofreformedsecurityinstitutionsonnationbuildinginadividedsocietywillbelimitedunlessliberalizationproceedsinconjunctionwithpoliticalprogress.SincepoliticsandsecurityaresointertwinedinNorthernIreland,communalattitudestoward,andexperienceof,securityarrangementsareconfoundedwithpoliticalfearsandaspirations.ThehistoryofdirectruleistestimonytothedifficultiesinherentinworkingtoalleviatethepoliticalfearsandtosatisfytheaspirationsofProtestantsandCatholicsalike.
Asalternativeroutesawayfromsettlerrule,thecasesofZimbabweandNorthernIrelandillustratelargerthemes.Zimbabwedemonstratesthatformaldemocratizationofapolitymayproceedwithoutanover-
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hauloftheinheritedsecuritysystem.NorthernIrelandshowstheopposite:formaldemocratizationisnotanecessaryconditionforsignificantliberalizationofsecuritystructures.Theseoutcomessuggestotherconclusions:genuinesubstantivedemocratizationinZimbabwewillremaintenuousuntiltheinstitutionsofcontrolarerebuilt;moreextensiveliberalizationofsecurityarrangementsinUlsterseemscontingentonpoliticalprogressandcommunalreconciliation.NorthernIrelandillustratesboththeprospectsandlimitsofinstitutionbuildinginadeeplydividedsocietygovernedbyaregimeimposedfromwithout.
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ConclusionTransformingSettlerStatesNorthernIrelandandZimbabweexemplifytwowaysinwhichsettlerpoliticalsystemsmaybreakdown,possiblefatesthatmayawaitsettlercastesaftertheirregimesaredislodgedfrompower,anddivergentoutcomesforstatesecuritystructuresoncesettlerruleends.Ourexplanatorymodelhelpstoaccountfortheseradicallydifferentoutcomesandshouldapplytootherpostsettlersocieties.
TheBreakdownofSettlerRule
ThedemiseofProtestantruleinNorthernIrelandandofwhiteruleinRhodesiaillustratestheimportanceofmaintainingthesettlerstate'sautonomyfrommetropolitaninterference,controloverthenativepopulation,andsettlersolidarityonfundamentalprinciplesandthemeanstodefendthem.
SettlersinRhodesiaandNorthernIrelandgrewuneasywhenincumbentregimesbegantoexperimentwithnativeaccommodation.PrimeMinistersSirEdgarWhiteheadandTerenceO'Neillmadeunprecedentedconciliatorygesturestowardtheirrespectivesubordinatepopulations.ForRhodesianblacksandUlsterCatholics,thereformssparkedarevolutionofrisingexpectationsthatcouldnot,alas,besatisfiedbyregimesdependentonright-wingsettlersforsurvivalinoffice.ThemajorityoftheRhodesianandUlstersettlerswerenotpreparedtocountenanceevenalimitedreformistsolution,convincedthatconcessionswouldinspiremoreradicaldemandsfromthenativesandthatre-
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formsviolatedtheircherishedvaluesandthestate'sraisond'être.Eachregime'sexperimentwithreform,therefore,quicklydepletedthereservoirofconsentwithinthedominantcaste.InsomeothersettlerstatesLiberiabefore1980,contemporaryTaiwan,andevenSouthAfricamodernizingeliteshavehadsomewhatmoresuccessinmobilizingsettlersupportforconcessions,butnotwithoutresistancefromreactionaryforces.
BoththeO'NeillandWhiteheadGovernmentsrepresentedrelativelyenlightenedsectionsoftherespectivesettlercastes.Paradoxically,theseregimeswereattemptingnottodismantlebuttostrengthenandrefinesettlerdominationbypartiallyaccommodatingandhenceplacatingthenativecaste.Hegemonicorascendantsettlerfactions,however,couldseenoadvantagesinstreamlinedsettlerrule.Eachmaverickgovernment'sdisturbanceoftraditionalpoliticalnormsanditsinnovationsinintercommunalrelationsprovokedintenseresistancefromtheultraconservativeelementsofthedominantcommunityaswellashard-lineelementsinthestate,whoseconfidenceintherulingelitehadirreversiblyshattered.TheyaccusedbothWhiteheadandO'NeillofforsakingthesacrosanctprincipleofsettlersupremacybyencouragingaccommodationhoweverlimitedwithblacksorCatholics.Concessionsofanykindweredefinedasapreludetothespecterof"blackdomination"inRhodesiaand"Romerule"or"Catholicdomination"inareunitedIreland.Inbothsocieties,thependulumswungback"towardsthosewho[were]leastreadyforchange";andeachmoderateregimesuccumbedtoanabsolutistandrecalcitrantone.1Inboth,theformerenlightenedstatemanagersandtheirsupporterslackedtheresourcesandthewilltoopposetheretrogradedirectionofthenewregime.Afterattemptingtostageelectoralcomebacks,themodernistsgrewincreasinglymarginalizedandfinallyvanishedfromthepoliticalscene.OurtwocasesthussupportLeoKuper'sthesisthatthe"failureofreformism''isapowerfultendency,
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ifnota"law,"insettlerstates.2
InUlster,theremovalofTerenceO'NeillandtheinstallationofamoreconservativeUnionistGovernmentfurthermobilizedandradicalizedthesubordinatepopulation.BritishandCatholicpressurescombinedtofragmentandgenerateaviolentbacklashamongProtestantsandacrisisfortheregime.O'Neill'ssuccessor,JamesChichester-Clark,
1.ColinLeys,EuropeanPoliticsinSouthernRhodesia(Oxford:Clarendon,1959),p.36.2.LeoKuper,ThePityofItAll:PolarizationofRacialandEthnicRelations(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1977).
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lastedslightlymorethanayearandgavewaytothemorehard-lineBrianFaulkner.AlthoughtheConservativeGovernmentinLondonallowedthesettlersgreaterleewayfrom1970to1972thanhadthepreviousLabourGovernment,themetropole'scontinuedinterferenceindomesticaffairsproveddisastrousfortheUnioniststate.Thelastthreesettlerregimeshadlittlelatitudeindecisionmaking.EachhadsimultaneouslytoplaytotheBritishgallery,appeaseright-wingcritics,andappearsensitivetothedemandsoftheCatholicminority.Theescalationofmassstreetprotestsandpoliticalviolence,policeandmilitarybrutality,andthedisarrayofthreesuccessiveUnionistcabinetscreatedafull-scalecrisisoforderandstabilitybyearly1972.RealizingthatUnionistrulewasnolongertenable,Londonassumeddirectcontrolofthestatemachinery.
ComparedtoRhodesiafrom1958through1962,Ulsterexperiencedmorewidespreadmobilizationofthesubordinatepopulation;theoverstretchedsecuritysystemwaslessabletocurtailpopularprotestandsectarianviolence;anddivisionswithinthesettlercommunitygrewdeeperandlessamenabletoresolution.InRhodesia,thesecuritysystemwasabletosuppressAfricannationalisminthe1960s,andanewsettlergovernmentwasremarkablysuccessfulinreunifyingthesettlercaste.
Immediatelyafteritsinstallationin1962,theRhodesianFrontrenegedontheconcessionsgrantedbyitspredecessor.Theintransigenceofthesettlersoverevenminoradjustmentsintheapartheidsystemcrystallizedin1965whenIanSmithdefiantlyannouncedRhodesia'sUnilateralDeclarationofIndependence(UDI)fromBritain.TheblackmajoritysawUDIasthefinalnailinthecoffinfortheiraspirations.HithertoblackshadlookedtoBritaintoredresstheirgrievances,butmetropolitanimpotenceandthesettlerstate'ssweepinglegalrestrictionsonpeacefuloppositiondrovetheircampaignundergroundandledtoaprotractedarmedstruggle.
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Effectiveautonomyfromthemetropoleisanessentialconditionforstablesettlerrule.Britain'sdistinctiverelationstoRhodesiaandUlsterhelpedshapethetrajectoryofchangeineach.InneithercasedidtheCrownrelishthethoughtofdirectintervention.AsaformerBritishHomeSecretary,JamesCallaghan,wrotewithUlsterandCyprusinmind,"howeasyitwastogetintosuchasituationandhowdifficulttogetout."3Theidealscenarioforthemetropoletheleastcostlyorentanglingwastoorchestratepoliticalchangebyremotecontrol.
3.JamesCallaghan,AHouseDivided:TheDilemmaofNorthernIreland(London:Collins,1973),p.60.
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HenceitapplieddiplomaticandeconomicpressureontherebelRhodesianregimeandperseveredforthreeyearsinitseffortstowringreformsoutoftheUnionistregimes.
IftheBritishGovernmentsoughttoavoiddirectpoliticalandmilitaryinterventioninRhodesiaandNorthernIreland,itscapacitytointervenewasradicallydifferentineachsetting.Aspart(howeverambiguous)oftheUnitedKingdom,NorthernIrelandwassusceptibletoBritishinterventionpolitically,geographically,militarily,andeconomically;Rhodesiawasnot.Rhodesia'sunilateralcuttingoftiestoBritainin1965gavethesettlerspreciselytheroomformaneuverthattheirUlstercounterpartslacked.IttooktheCrownquitesometimetorealizethatRhodesiawasauniquelyincorrigiblecolonyoverwhichmetropolitanjurisdictionandleveragewerefictions.Unlikeothercolonieswithsettlerpopulations(Kenya,Zambia,Zanzibar),RhodesiawasalmostentirelyoutsideLondon'ssphereofinfluence.Thatitwithstoodfifteenyearsofeconomicsanctionsanddiplomaticpressureswasameasureofitsinsulationfromotherinternationalactorsaswell.
ItissignificantthatanUlsterUnionistregimeitselfrequestedmetropolitanmilitaryassistancein1969torestorepublicorder.Thesettlerregimeattemptedtoforgeanalliancewiththesetroopsthat,asinAlgeriainthe1950s,wasnosubstituteforabsolutecontroloverthemilitary.Britain'smilitarysupporthadahighprice,asKenya'ssettlerslearnedaftertheMauMaucrisis.WithmilitaryandadministrativepersonnelstationedinUlster,Britainrealizedthefollyofworkingthroughestablishedinstitutionsandtheneedforentirelynewarrangements.(Ithadnosuch"hands-on"experienceinRhodesiabefore1979.)
ThejuridicalbasisforBritishinterventioninNorthernIrelandwasrelativelyclear(whereasinRhodesiametropolitanauthoritywas
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problematic,particularlyafterUDIin1965).London'sresidualsovereigntyoverNorthernIreland(aspartoftheUnitedKingdom)meantthatitrequirednoconstitutionalengineeringornegotiatedsettlementbeforeestablishingdirectrule.UnlikeRhodesiain1979,Ulsterhadnoviablealternativegovernmentwaitinginthewings.EachofthelastthreeUnionistregimeshaddiminishingauthority,andadomesticalternativetoUnionistruleforexample,powersharingwasnotyetontheagenda.Theabsenceofaninternalsolutionandthepoorthree-yearrecordoffilteringreformsthroughProtestantregimessuggestedthattransformingthissettlerstatewouldrequiredirectmetropolitanengineering.
InZimbabwe,bycontrast,Londonhadstrongincentivestotreadlightlyontheexistingpoliticalandsecuritysystem.Inadditiontothe
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considerationsoutlinedaboveandgivenBritain'sentanglementinUlster,themetropolehesitatedtoembarkonastate-buildingexperimentinZimbabwe,whichmightturnintoanotherlong-termimbroglio.4Britain'schiefconcernwastoarriveatasettlementandriditselfoftheRhodesianburden;thesubstanceofthesettlementwassecondaryprovideditincludeprovisionforfreeelections.
Ourfindingsshowthateachpillarofsettlerruleisabsolutelyvitaltostatesurvival.WhenoneconditionfailsasinRhodesiawiththesharpriseofnativeinsurgencyduringthe1970ssettlerruleisdoomed.However,thefactthatRhodesiacontinuedtoenjoyhighlevelsofsettlersolidarityandautonomyfromthemetropoledelayedtheinevitablecollapseofthesettlerstateforthegreaterpartofadecade.WhenallthreepillarscrackasinNorthernIrelandfrom1969to1972dissolutionofthesettlerorderislikelytoaccelerate.InUlster,thestatefellapartratherquicklyundermetropolitanpoliticalpressureandmilitaryintervention,theunravelingofsettlerunity,andtheactivationofthesubordinatepopulation.
ExplainingPostsettlerOutcomes
Regimetransitionsprovidearareopportunitynotoftenseizedforrebuildingsecuritystructuresandforstudyingthesourcesofcontinuityandchange.Focusingonthecreationofformaldemocraticprocedures(e.g.,universalsuffrage)ortheinaugurationofcivilianrule,muchoftheliteratureoncontemporarytransitionstodemocracyhasneglectedthepivotalroleofsecurityagenciesindeterminingtheprospectsforandlimitsofmeaningfuldemocraticdevelopment.5Howeverdesirableinitsownright,democraticformalismisneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionforchangeinrepressivestatestructures.Infact,formaldemocratizationmayimpede,invite,orhavenoeffectonrepressiveoutcomes.Majoritariandemocracyincommunallydividedsocietieshas
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4.Inthemid-1970stheBritishCabinethopedto"staywellclearofRhodesia,whichseveralMinistersregardedasanotherpotentiallydebilitatingNorthernIrelandcrisisforBritain"(DavidMartinandPhyllisJohnson,TheStruggleforZimbabwe[London:FaberandFaber,1981],p.256).5.Somerecentmajorworksontransitionsfromauthoritarianismgiveinadequateweighttothesecuritysector,e.g.,GuillermoO'Donnell,PhilippeSchmitter,andLawrenceWhitehead,eds.,TransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1986);LarryDiamond,JuanLinz,andSeymourMartinLipset,eds.,DemocracyinDevelopingCountries(Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner,1988).StudiesthatpaydueattentiontothisbranchareMariaAlves,StateandOppositioninMilitaryBrazil(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1985);AlfredStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics:BrazilandtheSouthernCone(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988).
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oftenproventobeaeuphemismforthetyrannyofthemajoritywhichgivesshortshrifttominorityrightsanddeniestheminoritymeaningfulpoliticalparticipation.Formaldemocratizationmaythereforebeassociatedwithanincreaseinrepression.Lijphart'sconclusion,thatindividedsocieties"majorityruleisnotonlyundemocraticbutalsodangerous,"producing"majoritydictatorshipandcivilstrife,"isillustratedinNorthernIrelandfrom1921to1972andinZimbabwesinceindependence,wheretheWestminstersystemhascontributedtoauthoritariantreatmentofminoritycommunities.6Inversely,thereplacementofamajoritarianorderwithaformofdictatorialrulemayhavepositiveeffectsoninstitutionalliberalization.InUlstersince1972,Britishrulehascontributedtothepartialremodelingofsecuritystructuresandanimprovedobservanceofhumanrights.Thesecuritysystemhasbecomemoreaccountable,lesssectarian,andmoreimpartialinitsroutineoperationscountertowhatmighthavebeenexpectedfromanessentiallycolonialsystemofrule.
SinceindependenceinZimbabwe,thestatehaslargelyconfinedchangesinitscoercivecoretoAfricanizingpersonnelandinstillingadoctrinethatcelebratestheroleofthesecuritysysteminupholdingmajorityruleinsteadofwhitesupremacy.Thisofficialethoshowevermuchitisactualizedmarksacleardeparturefromtheideologicalmissionoftherepressiveapparatusundersettlerrule.Yetlittlestructuralliberalizationhasoccurred,whichcontributestorepressiveoutcomesunderthenewregime.
PostsettlerNorthernIrelandandZimbabwehavebeentroubledbyprotractedcommunalunrestandpoliticalviolence;thesefactorshavehadapronouncedimpactoneachregime'sresponsesaswellastheprospectsforinstitutionaltransformation.Butproblemsoforderandsecurityarenottheonlycriticalvariables.Althoughtheveryconceptofnationalsecurityisambiguousandattemptstomeasuresecurity
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problemsareproblematic,cross-nationalvariationinofficialassessmentsandresponsessuggeststhatthreatsalonedonotindependentlydetermineorfullyexplainstateresponses.7Interveningbetweenapparent
6.ArendLijphart,Democracies(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1984),pp.22,23.Individedsocieties,democraticpowersharingmightbepreferabletomajorityrulebutdifficulttoinstitutionalizeinextremelypolarizedcaseslikeNorthernIreland's,wheredecisionmakingmightbehamperedbyincessantfriction.7.Forcross-nationallongitudinaldataondisjunctionsbetweenthefrequencyofinsurgenteventsandgovernmentalsanction,seeC.TaylorandD.Jodice,eds.,WorldHandbookofPoliticalandSocialIndicators(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1983);ErnestDuffandJohnMcCamant,ViolenceandRepressioninLatinAmerica(NewYork:FreePress,1976).
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threatsandofficialreactions,elites'assessmentsanddecisionmakingmaybeconfoundedwithconsiderationsquiteunrelatedtonationalsecurity.Amongthedecisiveextrasecuritymotivesforarepressiveenterprisemaybepurgesofpoliticalrivals,drivestoexpandasecurityagency'spowerorjurisdiction,elites'aggrandizement,effortstoconsolidateracialorethnicdomination,andprogramsoffundamentalsocietalrestructuring.8Onlyaperspectivethatgivesdueweighttoaregime'sunderlyingaims,immediatepriorities,andinterpretationsofrealitycanfullyaccountforitssecuritypoliciesandpractices.
Chapters6and7demonstratedtheexplanatorypowerofafourdimensionalmodelofsecuritysystemoutcomesinNorthernIrelandandZimbabwe.First,apoliticalculturethatcelebratesdemocraticvaluesislikelytofosterdemocraticpracticesonceanauthoritarianregimehasbeenreplaced,asvariouscontemporaryLatinAmericansocietiesattest.Sinceademocratictraditionischaracteristicallyweakorabsentfromthepoliticallandscapeinsettlersystems,itisnotsurprisingthatevenanincipientdemocraticpoliticalcultureisdifficulttodetectinpostsettlerZimbabweandUlster.ThecontiguityofNorthernIrelandtotherestoftheUnitedKingdomperhapsmakesdemocraticvaluesmoresalientasmetropolitanidealsinUlsterthaninZimbabwe,butrarelyhaveUlster'spolarizedforcesshownagenuinelastingcommitmenttosuchideals.Instead,bothsidesinvokethelanguageofdemocracyonbehalfoftheirnarrowcommunaldemands:majoritarianismforProtestants,theprotectionofminorityrightsormajoritarianisminareunitedIrelandforCatholics.
Thepowerandorientationofexistingsecurityagenciesisasecondimportantvariable.Thesecurityestablishmentisamodelexampleofthestandardbureaucratictendencytowardsurvival,expansion,andresistancetoexternallygeneratedreform.9Ifallelseremainsconstant,
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8.SupportingevidenceontheroleofextrasecurityfactorsindecisionstouserepressioncanbefoundinAlves,StateandOpposition;CynthiaEnloe,EthnicSoldiers:StateSecurityinDividedSocieties(Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1980);RobertGoldstein,PoliticalRepressioninModernAmerica(Cambridge,Mass.:Schenkman,1978);DavidBrown,"SiegesandScapegoats:ThePoliticsofPluralisminGhanaandTogo,"JournalofModernAfricanStudies21,no.3(September1983);RichardM.Freeland,TheTrumanDoctrineandtheOriginsofMcCarthyism:ForeignPolicy,DomesticPolitics,andInternalSecurity,19461948(NewYork:Knopf,1972);AthanTheoharis,"TheRhetoricofPolitics:ForeignPolicy,InternalSecurity,andDomesticPoliticsintheTrumanEra,19451950,"inPoliticsandPoliciesoftheTrumanAdministration,ed.B.Bernstein(Chicago:Quadrangle,1970);BarryBuzan,People,States,andFear:TheNationalSecurityProbleminInternationalRelations(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1983).9.KennethGrundy,TheMilitarizationofSouthAfricanPolitics(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1986),p.109.
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securityagencieswithoriginsinasettlerstatewillinclinetowardrepressionunderpostsettlerrule.Thedecisivefactoristhenewregime'sapproachtotheseinstitutionalproclivities.WehaveseenthattheZimbabweGovernmenthasgalvanizedandmobilizedinheritedinstitutionsinawaythatinvitesroughjustice.Theelectiveaffinitybetweentheorientationsofsecurityorgansandtheregime'sgrandpoliticaldesignsuggestsastrongpositiveinteractionbetweenthetwofactorsthatmilitatesagainstliberalization.Bycontrast,theBritishGovernmentinUlsterhasattemptedtoarrestorminimizetherepressivepotentialofthesecuritysectorbyabolishingsomeagencies,reformingothers,andestablishingmechanismsofaccountability.Althoughthepoliceandcourtscontinuetopressforexceptionalpowersandprocedures,theagenciesinvolvedininternalsecuritytodayplayarelativelyminorroleinfrustratingtheprocessofliberalizationcontrastedtotheiractiveresistanceduringthefinalyearsofUnionistrule.
Athirdfactoraffectingsecuritysystemsistheroleoftheleadingforcesincivilsociety.Civicinstitutionsandsocialmovementswithastrongcommitmenttojusticeanddemocracymaysuccessfullypressforhumanrightsandsystemicchanges.Others,liketheoldregime'sloyalists,vigilantes,ordeathsquads,maybechampionsofnakedrepression.IncontemporaryZimbabwethesectorsofcivilsocietyhavebeenratherinactiveandatomized;inNorthernIrelandtheoppositeisthecase.YetthefactthatcivilsocietyinUlsterispluralreflectingratherthantranscendingtheinterestsoftheantagonisticcommunalenclavesandcontainingprogressiveaswellasantimodernistforcesmeansthatdemandsonthegovernmentareuneven,bothdiscouragingandinvitinggreaterrepression.TheBritishGovernmenthasfromtimetotimerespondedfavorablytocommunaldemandsbuttypicallyrejectssuchpressuresinfavorofthestatusquo.
TheNewRegime
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Thisstudysuggeststhatthedecisivefactoraffectingthefateofasecuritysystemisabinaryvariable:theinterestsandcapacitiesofthepostsettlerregime.Totransformasectariansecurityenterprise,aregimemusthavebothabidinginterestandcapacitytorendersecurityorgansaccountable,impartial,andsensitivetoidealsofjusticeandhumanrights.WehaveseenthattheGovernmentofZimbabwehasthecapacitytoremaketheinheritedsecuritysystembutlittlecompellinginterestindoingso.Conversely,theBritishGovernmenthasdemonstratedaninterestinfur-
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therliberalizingUlster'ssecuritysystembuthasonlylimitedcapacitytodoso.
Theunderlyinginterestsandobjectivesofstateelitesmaybeinferredfromregularitiesinofficialpoliciesandprogramsandpatternsofaction.Needlesstosay,ourtwopostsettlerregimessharewithothersthegenericinterestsindomesticorderandnationalsecurity.Theyalsoseemcommittedtodestroyingthevestigesoftheinvidioussettlersystemandbuildingafundamentallynewsocialorder.However,therearemajordifferencesbetweenthepostsettlerpolitiesenvisionedbyeachnewregimeand,hence,intheinterestsdrivingtheirpolicies.TheparamountpoliticalobjectiveoftheZimbabweGovernmentistocementitspowerthroughthevehicleofaone-partystate.ThemultipartysystembequeathedtothenewnationundertheLancasterHouseconstitutiongaveoppositionpartiesanarenaforpoliticalactivityandheldoutthepossibilityofreplacingtheZANUGovernment.Theelectoralorderthuscontradictedtherulingparty'sgranddesign.Viewingtheinheritedsecuritysystemaspartofthesolutiontoitspoliticalandethnicproblems,theregimefortifiedthisbranchandusedittoneutralizeoppositionpartiesandthusfacilitatetheinstallationofitsone-partysystem.Thecontinuityofthecoerciveapparatusstandsout,evenasitsofficialraisond'êtrehasshiftedfromthedefenseofsettlerdominationtotheprotectionofmajorityinterests.
ThegranddesignofthepostsettlerregimeinNorthernIrelanddiffersradicallyfromtheZimbabwemodel.LondonseekstocreateinUlsterastablepoliticalorderbasedontheconsentandparticipationofCatholicsandProtestantsalikeandademilitarized,impartial,communallyrepresentative,andaccountablesystemoflawandorder.Viewingthesettlersecuritysystemaspartoftheproblem,theBritishGovernmentmovedtoreformitattheoutsetofdirectrule.Chapter7showedthatsomeprogresshasbeenmadeinthedirectionof
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institutionalliberalization.
Aregime'sobjectivesdependfortheirrealizationonitscapacities,whichhavetwodimensions.First,theregimemusthavesufficientresourcestopursuegoals,includingskillsinleadership,financialleverage,andtheallegianceofstatepersonnel.Itmustbeabletoelicitthecomplianceofsecurityagencieswithinternalreforms,externalaccountability,andperhapswiththeirowndismantling.Theregimemustbeabletorearrangetherelationsbetweenthecoreandtheremainderofthestate,reducingtheautonomyofthesecuritysectorandempoweringthosebranchesmoststronglycommittedtohumanrights.Manynewregimeshaveclearlylackedthispoweraltogether,butthoseinNorthernIreland
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andZimbabweseemtohavetherequisiteintrastatecapacitytoinitiatechanges.TheGovernmentinNorthernIrelandhasregisteredsomesuccessinthisarea,althoughsomeofitsownpoliciessuchasUlsterizationhavemilitatedagainstcertainkindsofreform;theGovernmentinZimbabwehasnotexertedsignificantintrastateleveragetopromoteliberalization.
Thesecondaspectoftheregime'scapacityinvolvesenvironmentalincentivesandconstraints.Socialforceshaveassumedverydifferentrolesinthetwocountries.InZimbabwe,asinmanyotherindependentAfricannations,civilsocietyisfragmentedandweakvis-à-visthestate.10Politicalpartiesandcivicgroupsthemedia,labor,business,intellectuals,churcheshavelimitedresources,weakalliances,orinsufficientattachmenttohumanrightsnorms.Hence,theyhaveregisteredlittle,ifany,positiveimpactonsecuritypolicy.Whencivicforceshavemusteredpublicprotests,theyhavebeenlabeledsubversiveandsanctioned;theveryexistenceofgroupswithpreferencesopposedtothoseoftheincumbentregimeappearstoviolatetheofficialquestfornationalunityandpoliticalconformity.InZimbabwestate-societyrelationsarethereforehighlyasymmetricalinfavorofthestate,whichgivestheregimegreatlatitudetopursueitspoliticalagenda.
UnlikeZimbabwe'sacquiescentcivicorder,thatinNorthernIrelandteemswithoppositionallife.IfasmallminoritylikeRhodesia'swhitesmaycometoacceptthehopelessnessofresistancetochange,asubstantialmajorityismuchmoredifficulttoconvince.UlsterProtestantshavedemonstratedacapacityforresistancedespitetheirlossofformalstatepower.WhentheThatcherGovernmentannouncedamajorinitiativeintheAnglo-IrishAgreementof1985,forexample,itprecipitatedaserioussustainedcampaignofProtestantresistance,whichabatedwhentheaccordappearedtohavechangedlittle.Withthestrengthofnumbersandtheforceofarms,Protestants
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seempreparedtofightanyfuturerelaxationinthestruggleagainstRepublicaninsurgentsandanyunwelcomepoliticalinitiativesbytheBritishauthorities.Fortheirpart,theCatholicshavesomecapacitytoraisethepoliticalcostsofintensifiedrepression.Theimperfectequilibriumofthesecountervailingpressuressustainsthecoerciveandpoliticalstatusquo.Theireffectonstatesecuritypolicyisindirect:anticipatingapossiblebacklashfromonesideor
10.JeanFrançoisBayart,"CivilSocietyinAfrica,"inPoliticalDominationinAfrica,ed.P.Chabal(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986);Diamond,Linz,andLipset,eds.,DemocracyinDevelopingCountries;NelsonKasfir,TheShrinkingPoliticalArena(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1976).
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theother,theregimealterslittle.AstheregimestrugglestoholdProtestantsandCatholicsincheck,sotheseopposedforcesholdtheregimeincheck.
Sinceneitheramilitarynorpoliticalsolutionseemspossible,successiveadministrationshaveembracedthestrategyofleastresistance:containment.Inshort,theregimeexerciseslargelynegativepower,limitingthedamagefrommassresistanceandpoliticalviolenceandpreventingitsspreadtotheBritishmainland.
ThecaseofUlsterillustratesboththeprospectsandlimitsofchangeinasocietywhereanexternalregimeiscommittedtocomprehensivemodernizationofpoliticalandsecuritystructuresbutisconstrainedinitscapacitytodosobyintractableandcontradictorydomesticforces.Likeothercolonialstates,theBritishregimeisatoncemoreautonomousandweakerthanthe(Unionist)settlerstate,sinceithasnobaseofdomesticsupportforitsprograms.ProtestantsandCatholicsmayhavesomeinfluenceoverchangeinsecuritystructuresbutcannotinstitutionalizetheirpreferences.Thecommunalpolaritiesofcivilsocietyneutralizeeachside'spotentialimpactonstatepolicy.Inthiscontext,therelationshipbetweenthestateandsocialforcesconsistsofafragilebalanceinfavorofthestatusquo.
Ourperspectivehasimportantimplicationsforstudiesofothersettlerandpostsettlersocietiesaswellasthose,likeHaiti,thePhilippines,Nicaragua,andEasternEurope,grapplingwithadifferentauthoritarianlegacy.Thefateoftheirsecuritysystemscanarguablybetracedtosomedifferentialconfigurationofourfourvariables.
SettlerrulecametoanabruptendinLiberiainApril1980,asaresultofamilitarycoupledbySamuelDoe.Therecordofpostsettlerrulethereisoneofrigidauthoritarianismandwidespreadrepression.LikeitsZimbabweancounterpart,theDoeGovernmentisconsolidatingonepartyrulewithhelpfromtheinheritedsecurityapparatus.But
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unliketheZimbabwean,theLiberianregimelacksbroadpopularsupportandcannotconvincinglyinvokethecauseofmajorityruletolegitimatethedictatorship.11ThoughLiberiancivilsocietyappearssubstantiallymoredevelopedandactiveinchallengingstateauthoritarianismthanZimbabwe's,theimpactofthisoppositionwasatbestminimalduringthefirstdecadeoftheDoeregime.12
11.J.GusLiebenow,Liberia:TheQuestforDemocracy(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1987);LawyersCommitteeforHumanRights,Liberia:APromiseBetrayed(NewYork:LCHR,1986).12.EvidenceforthevibrancyofLiberiancivilsocietycanbefoundinmonthlyreportsofthejournalWestAfrica.
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SettlercontroloftheNamibianstatemachinerywasconditionedbythedirectmilitaryandadministrativeinvolvementofSouthAfricanfunctionaries,whichlimitedwhitesettlers'leverageduringthe1988negotiatedsettlement.Theindependenceagreementcontainsnoreferencetoexistingsecuritylawsoragenciesor,forthatmatter,toraciallydiscriminatorylaws.13ButaproclamationsignedbytheSouthAfricanpresidenton6June1989repealedseveraldiscriminatorystatutesaswellasthreesecuritylaws.14Membersofthecounterinsurgencypoliceforce,Koevoet,whileofficiallydisbanded,continuetooperate(in1989)asasectarianforcesympathetictowhitesettlerinterests.15ThenewgovernmentwillconfrontchoicesregardingthesecurityapparatussimilartothoseZANUfacedinZimbabweafterindependence.
InTaiwancommunaldivisionshavebeensoftenedbydecadesofassimilation;democraticallyorientedsocialinstitutionsareactive;andtheregimehasbeguntodemocratizethepolityallofwhichaugurwellforfuturepoliticaldevelopmentandperhapsforoverhauloftheinternalsecurityapparatus.Nevertheless,itremainstobeseenifthissofteningofauthoritarianrulewillcontinueunabatedorifforcesofresistancewillbeabletoderailareformistsolution.16
AnalysisofothercasesSouthAfricaandIsrael'soccupiedterritorieswillhavetoawaittheinstallationofapostsettlerregime.
Thelargersignificanceofthisstudyfortheprospectsofdemocraticpoliticaldevelopmentinpostsettlersocietiesbearsrepeating.Aflourishingdemocracyrequiresmorethanformalparticipatoryprocedures,progressivelegislation,orchangesinspecificcoerciveorganizations.Itrequiresreconstitutedorganizationalculturesandchangesinthestructureofrelationsbetweenstatesectors.Democraticgainsmaybefragileandreversibleintheabsenceofsystemicliberalization,whichentailstheinstitutionalizationofnormsbasedon
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rationalizedauthority,justice,anduniversalismaswellastheempowermentofbranchescommittedtothesenorms.Thissweepingoverhaulisnorecipeforstatesuicide:inter-
13.UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,AgreementsforPeaceinSouthwesternAfrica,selecteddoc.no.32,December1988.14.ThethreelawsrescindedweretheInternalSecurityActof1950,thePublicSafetyActof1953,andtheUnlawfulOrganizationsActof1960(WilliamClaiborne,''AmnestySetforNamibianGuerillas,"WashingtonPost,7June1989).15.WilliamClaiborne,"AllegedPoliceIntimidationThreatensNamibiaElectionProcess,"WashingtonPost,19June1989;ChristopherWren,"NamibiaPolice,RebelHunters,PrepareforDullerDutywithIndependence,"NewYorkTimes,15January1989.16.EdwinWinckler,"InstitutionalizationandParticipationonTaiwan:FromHardtoSoftAuthoritarianism"ChinaQuarterly,no.99(September1984):48199;MarcJ.Cohen,TaiwanattheCrossroads(Washington,D.C.:AsiaResourceCenter,1988).
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nalsecuritycanbemaintainedinafashionthatrespectsidealsofjusticeandhumanrights.Liberalizationofasecuritysystemcan,infact,enhanceorderbyreducingarbitraryandrepressiveoutcomesthatmaygeneratepopularalienation,unrest,andpoliticalviolence.
Thoroughgoingtransformationofastate'scoerciveorderisrare,butchangesinthisdirectionaswellasbasiccontinuitiescanbestbeunderstood,Isuggest,withthehelpoftheexplanatorymodeladvancedhere.
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Page257
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Nonet,Philippe,andPhilipSelznick.LawandSocietyinTransition.NewYork:HarperandRow,1978.
Nordlinger,Eric.OntheAutonomyoftheDemocraticState.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1981.
NorthernIrelandAssembly.Debates.Belfast:HMSO.
NorthernIrelandHouseofCommons.Debates.Belfast:HMSO.
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O'Donnell,Guillermo.ModernizationandBureaucraticAuthoritarianism.2ded.Berkeley:InstituteofInternationalStudiesPress,1979.
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O'Malley,Padraig.TheUncivilWars:IrelandToday.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1983.
O'Meara,Patrick.Rhodesia:RacialConflictorCoexistence?Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1975.
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ParliamentofRhodesia[SouthernRhodesia].Assembly.Debates.Salisbury:GovernmentPrinter.
ParliamentofZimbabwe.Assembly.Debates.Harare:GovernmentPrinter.
Prager,Jeffrey.BuildingDemocracyinIreland.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986.
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.PeasantConsciousnessandGuerrillaWarinZimbabwe.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985.
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.NorthernIreland:ATimeofChoice.London:Macmillan,1976.
Rossiter,Clinton.ConstitutionalDictatorship:CrisisGovernmentintheModernDemocracies.NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandWorld,1948.
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Page267
Zolberg,Aristide.CreatingPoliticalOrder:TheParty-StatesofWestAfrica.Chicago:RandMcNally,1966.
SelectedPeriodicals
AfricanTimes,Salisbury,Rhodesia.
BelfastTelegraph,Belfast,NorthernIreland.
BulawayoChronicle,Bulawayo,Zimbabwe.
FinancialGazette,Harare,Zimbabwe.
TheGuardian,LondonandManchester.
TheHerald,Harare.
IrishNews,Belfast.
IrishTimes,Dublin.
MOTO,Gweru,Zimbabwe.
Newsletter,Belfast.
TheObserver,London.
RhodesiaHerald,Salisbury.
SundayMail,Harare.
SundayTimes,London.
TheTimes,London.
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Page269
Index
A
Africa:growthofblacknationalismin,68-69;
one-partystatesin,184-85
AfricanNationalCongress(ANC):membersarrestedanddetained,63-64,66,69-70;
outlawed,70;
programof,67,104;
inRhodesia,64,66,68,69;
inSouthAfrica,84,170;
supportfor,64,66;
inZimbabwe,161
AfricanTimes(propagandanewspaper),91
AfricaWatch,171
Algeria:civilwarin,68;
failureofsettlerrulein,38;
Franceabandons,38;
working-classsettlersin,50
AmericanColonizationSociety,39
AmnestyInternational,108,145,176;
bannedfromZimbabwe,178;
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onNorthernIreland,221
Anglo-IrishAgreementof1985,197,198,223,233;
Protestantresistanceto,236-37,253
Anglo-IrishWar(1919-21),44
Angola:failedcounterinsurgencyin,90;
failedresettlementprogramin,93;
guerrillawarfarein,86-87,135,164,169;
SouthAfricaanddestabilizationof,160,172
Apartheid:inRhodesia,54-55,73,75,91,98,105,246;
inSouthAfrica,54,161
Ashton,E.H.,66
Atkins,Humphrey,206
Australia:displacementofnativepopulationin,25
Authoritarianregimes:commitmenttoliberalizationin,22-23;
contingenciesofchangein,16-17;
anddecolonization,136;
externalinterventionin,17;
politicalvariablesin,15-16;
securitysystemsin,1-2,5;
settlersocietiesin,29,33-34,52-53;
socialoppositionin,21-22;
transitiontodemocracies,1,12-19,22-23,34,110,135-37,142,
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159-60,188,248-51,256
B
Bates,Dawson:onCatholics,58
BelgianCongo,68
BennettCommitteeofInquiry:andpoliceaccountability,220,221
Botha,P.W.,112,130
Brazil,25,55-56
BritishMilitaryAdvisoryandTrainingTeam(BMATT):andZimbabwearmy,147,178
BritishSouthAfricaCompany(BSAC):andestablishmentofRhodesia,42-43;
Rhodesand,42
Brooke,Basil,57
BSAC.SeeBritishSouthAfricaCompany
C
Callaghan,James,118,122;
onNorthernIreland,57,117,125,132,246
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Page270
CameronCommission:DisturbancesinNorthernIreland,118
CampaignforDemocracyinUlster,111-12
CampaignforSocialJustice,113
Castesystem:andpoliticalsystem,32-33;
inRhodesia,54-55,160;
insettlersocieties,28,29-35,192;
variationsin,31-33
CatholicBishops'Conference(Zimbabwe),158,177,178
CatholicCommissionforJusticeandPeace(Rhodesia),93,95-96;
limitedsuccessof,inZimbabwe,158;
repressionof,96
CentralAfricanFederation:failureof,37,77;
nativeuprisingsin,68-69
Chichester-Clark,James,126,130,245
China:andRhodesia,103
Chirau,Jeremiah,105
Coercion,governmental.SeeStaterepression
Colonialism:andanticolonialmovements,134-37;
declineof,24,35-36,134-35.SeealsoDecolonization
Colonialsocieties:comparedwithsettlersocieties,25-26
Communallydividedsocieties,2,4,7,8-9,18-19;
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judicialsystemsin,52;
settlersocietiesas,4,30-31
ComptonCommission,220-21
Craig,James,57
Craig,William,115
Crosland,Anthony,103-4
Cuba:andRhodesia,103
Cyprus,132,246
D
Decolonization:andauthoritarianregimes,136;
andeconomicimperialism,137;
andFrance,135;
andGreatBritain,135;
theoriesof,134-37,138.SeealsoColonialism
Democracies:socialandeconomicfeaturesof,12-14,35;
transitionofauthoritarianregimesto,1,12-19,22-23,34,110,135-37,142,159-60,188,248-51,256
Democracies,liberal:securitysystemsin,4,5-6,8
Democracy:failureof,inLatinAmerica,13,20,188;
andprincipleofmajorityrule,48-49
DisturbancesinNorthernIreland(CameronCommission),118
Doe,Samuel,254
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E
Europe,Eastern,254
EuropeanCourtofHumanRights:Britishgovernmentignoresrulingof,223;
onNorthernIreland,221,223
Evelegh,Robin,215
F
Faulkner,Brian,126-27,129-30,246;
onBritishdirectrule,190-91
Field,Winston,76,77-78
France:abandonsAlgeria,38;
anddecolonization,135
FrenchCongo,68
FrontfortheLiberationofMozambique(FRELIMO),83
G
GardinerCommittee(1975):oninternmentinNorthernIreland,205
Ghana:socialandcivicinstitutionsin,156
GovernmentofIrelandActof1920,46,49
GreatBritain:conditionsforRhodesianindependence,78;
constraintsoninvolvementinNorthernIreland,237-39;
anddecolonization,135;
directruleofNorthernIreland,98,108-9,117,133,190-91,193-96,232,241,246;
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andestablishmentofRhodesia,42-43,48;
asfactorinNorthernIreland,19,41,45-46,57,61-62,99,108-9,111-12,117-23,125-28,131-33,246-48;
asfactorinRhodesia,77-79,82-83,98-99,107-9,116-17,246-48;
fearofProtestantuprisinginNorthernIreland,125,128;
imperialisminIreland,193;
andKenya,77;
andLancasteraccord(1979),106-9,252;
asneutralumpireinNorthernIreland,195-96,240;
andNorthernIreland'sinternalaffairs,47-48,99,132;
NorthernIreland'sproposedunilateralindependencefrom,115,133;
policyobjectivesof,inNorthernIreland,200-201,237-41,252;
andRhodesianindependence,77-79;
supportofpoliticalsettlementinNorthernIreland,237-38;
terminationofsettlerruleinNorthernIreland,98,108-9,117,131,190-91;
useoftroopsinNorthernIreland,118,120-21,127,133,204-7,208,215,237;
andZanzibar,80
GreatBritain.Army:costinNorthernIreland,204;
harassmentby,215-16;
inNorthernIreland,204-7,215;
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Page271
oppositionto"Ulsterization,"209;
andrepressioninNorthernIreland,205,207,208
GreatBritain.ColonialOffice:policies,36-37,39,44;
andRhodesia,44
GreatBritain.Conservativegovernment:andNorthernIreland,125-28,130-31,205,206,246
GreatBritain.ForeignOffice:andNorthernIreland,196;
andRhodesia,108
GreatBritain.HomeOffice:InspectorateofConstabulary,211,212;
andNorthernIreland,48,119,123,124
GreatBritain.LabourGovernment:andNorthernIreland,111-12,120,125-26,127-28,131,205-6,246
GreatBritain.MinistryofDefense:andNorthernIreland,196
GreatBritain.NorthernIrelandOffice(NIO).SeeNorthernIrelandOffice
GreatBritain.Parliament:lackofinterestinNorthernIreland,47-48,111,196-97,218-19;
NorthernIrelandConstitutionActof1973,198;
NorthernIrelandrepresentedin,197-98;
RaceRelationsBill,112
Guinea-Bissau:guerrillawarfarein,84,86,135
H
Haiti,254
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Hattersley,Roy,122;
onNorthernIreland,126,127
Healey,Denis,118
Heath,Edward,126-27,129
Herrenvolkdemocracy,33
Huggins,Godfrey:asprimeministerofRhodesia,44
Hume,John,227
HuntCommittee:investigationofNorthernIreland'spolice,121-23
I
India:useoftroopsinSriLanka,120
Indigenouspopulations:insettlerstates,25-27,30-31
Inter-GovernmentalConference,198,223,233,237
Internalsecuritysystems.SeeSecuritysystems
InternationalCommissionofJurists,176
Ireland:Britishimperialismin,193;
partitionof,45;
religiousdemographicsof,47
Ireland,Northern.SeeNorthernIreland
Ireland,Republicof:claimstoNorthernIrelandby,40,47,60,61,112,194;
consultativeroleinNorthernIreland,197
IrishFreeState:established,45
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IrishNationalLiberationArmy:outlawed,216
IrishRepublicanArmy(IRA),44,59,60,128,129,193,201,221,231;
abortedinsurgencyby,61,113;
Catholictoleranceof,229;
andcriminalization,207;
outlawed,216;
popularattitudeson,207,229;
resurgenceof,113,206
Israel:ascommunallydividedsociety,9,31,44,46,98;
established,39;
nationalsurvivalof,40;
politicalcultureof,28,33;
religioustensionin,44,46;
assettlersociety,25,26-27,35,98,131,255;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,35;
useofplasticbulletsin,210.SeealsoPalestine
J
Jenkins,Roy:onNorthernIreland,117
K
Kelly,Basil,124
Kenya,44,49,131;
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failureofsettlerrulein,36-37,38;
andGreatBritain,77;
MauMauuprisingin,37,68,72;
whiteeconomicdominancein,160
Kenya.Parliament:weaknessof,151-52
KilbrandonInquiry(1984),212
Kissinger,Henry,104
L
LatinAmerica:assimilationofnativepopulationin,25;
failureofdemocracyin,13,20,188,250;
staterepressionin,165-66
Lemass,Sean,112
Liberia:attemptedpoliticalreformin,80-81,195,245;
ascommunallydividedsociety,31-32;
coupd'étatin,81,254;
established,32,34,39-40;
lackofdemocratictraditionsin,225;
asone-partystate,254;
oppositionassubversionin,216;
politicalcultureof,28,34-35,49,254;
postsettlersocietyin,254;
securitysystemin,23;
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assettlersociety,24-25,26,34-35,49,62,80-81;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,254;
TrueWhigparty,28,50,81
M
McCusker,Harold,227
McGuffin,John:oninternment,129
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Page272
Machel,Samora,140
Malaya:resettlementprogramin,94
Malunga,Sydney,171
Malvern,Lord,69
Mark,Robert,121
Matabeleland(Zimbabwe):antigovernmentinsurgencyin,161,table162,163,167,169-70,171-73,175-79,180;
armyin,176-79,180;
CentralIntelligenceOrganizationin,177-78,179;
conditionsin,175;
electionsin,174-75,179;
governmentamnestyin,170-71;
PoliceAnti-TerroristUnitin,177-78,180;
securitysystemin,145,152,154,176-79,180;
staterepressionin,176-78,180-81;
tortureusedin,176;
ZAPUandantigovernmentinsurgencyin,171,173-74;
ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnionin,167-69,179
Maudling,Reginald:onNorthernIreland,125,128
MauMau,37,68,72,131,247
MazePrison:hungerstrikeat,206
Morris,Stanley,63-64
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Mozambique:failedcounterinsurgencyin,90;
failedresettlementprogramin,93;
failureofsettlerrulein,38,86;
andguerrillaoperationsinRhodesia,83,86;
guerrillawarfarein,135,136,148,150,164,169;
andnegotiatedpoliticalsettlementinRhodesia,106;
Portuguesewithdrawalfrom,38,83,86-87;
Rhodesianmilitarystrikesin,88,106;
securitysystemin,139-40;
SouthAfricaanddestabilizationof,160-61,172;
whitereactiontoindependencein,110;
Zimbabwemilitaryaidto,148,160
Mugabe,Robert,140,161,164,168,171,178,181;
oncriticismofatrocities,178;
onone-partystate,181,183,186
Muzorewa,Abel,101,104,105-7;
detained,167
N
Namibia:failureofsettlerrulein,39,107;
guerrillawarfarein,135,170;
Koevoet,255;
liberalizationofsecuritysystemin,255
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NationalCouncilforCivilLiberties(NCCL):inquiryinNorthernIreland,60;
andpoliceaccountability,222
Nationalsecurity:andthestate,2,6,165-66
Ndebele.SeeZimbabwe:ethnicdivisionsin
Nicaragua,254
Nigeria:socialandcivicinstitutionsin,156
Nkala,Enos,180
Nkomo,Joshua,168,169,174,181
NorthernIreland:attemptedpoliticalreformin,244-45;
Britisharmyin,204-7,208,215,237;
andBritishConservativeGovernment,125-28,130-31,205,206,246;
Britishdirectrulein,98,108-9,117,133,190-91,193-201,232,241,246;
BritishfearofProtestantuprisingin,125,128;
andBritishHomeOffice,48,119,123,124;
andBritishLabourGovernment,111-12,120,125-26,127-28,131,205-6,246;
Britishmilitaryrepressionin,205,207,208;
BritishParliament'slackofinterestin,47-48,111,196-97,218-19;
Britishpolicyobjectivesin,200-201,237-41,252;
Britishsupportforpoliticalsettlementin,237-38;
Britishtroopsin,118,120-21,127,133;
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Catholicpoliticalmobilizationin,113-16,129,133;
causesofconflictin,44;
causesofrepressionin,8;
classdivisionsin,192,196,207;
ascommunallydividedsociety,32,35,40-41,44,81,133,192-93,195-96,200-201,223-24,225-26,240,243;
comparedtoRhodesia,115-16,191,244-53;
constitutionalstatusof,40,113;
constraintsonBritishinvolvementin,237-39;
crisisofauthorityin,190-91;
economicmodernizationof,112;
electionsin,229-30;
electorallaws,112,113;
failedattemptatpoliticalreformin,33,41,108,112-13,114,116,117,121,123-25,131-33;
GreatBritainandinternalaffairsof,47-48,132;
GreatBritainasfactorin,19,41,45-46,57,61-62,111-12,117-23,125-28,131-33,246-48;
GreatBritainasneutralumpirein,195-96,240;
GreatBritainterminatessettlerrulein,98,108-9,117,131,190-91;
increasedaccountabilityin,218-24;
institutionalreformin,225-28;
judicialsystemin,52,215;
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lackofdemocracyin,198-200;
lackofdemocratictraditionsin,19,225,250;
Loyalistpopulationin,113-14,116,119,127,132,194,209,212-13,227,235-36,240-41;
"loyalty"in,47,52,60-61;
NationalCouncilforCivilLiberties'inquiryin,60;
negativepoliticalpowerin,238-39;
neutralityasbetrayalin,56;
politicalcultureof,29,33,40,44,51,159,192-93,
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Page273
225-28,238-39;
politicalviolencein,201-4,tables202-3;
popularattitudesonsecuritysystem,217,tables231-32;
populardisapprovalofviolencein,229-30;
practicalinternalautonomyof,40-41,46,132;
proposedformsofgovernment,198-200,table199;
proposedintegrationintotheUnitedKingdom,237-38;
proposedunilateralindependencefromGreatBritain,115,133;
ProtestantfearofIrishreunificationin,236;
ProtestantLoyalistvigilantismin,53,58,114-15,122,133;
Protestantmonopolyonpowerin,47-48,51,57-61,62,111-14,118,132-33,192-94;
religiousdivisionin,44,45-46,192-94,198,225-28;
representedinBritishParliament,197-98;
RepublicofIreland'sclaimsto,40,47,60,61,112,194;
RepublicofIreland'sconsultativerolein,197;
sectarianpoliticaldivisionin,226-28;
assettlersociety,24-25,26-27,35,40-41,49,60,62,98,114,116,122,126,157,190-91,211,225,241,254;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,22,35,158,228,238,253;
staterepressionofCatholicsin,46-47,48,53-54,58-60,113-15,127,128-30,210-13;
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Unionistoppositiontoliberalizationin,226-28;
working-classsettlersin,50
legislation:EmergencyProvisionsActof1973(EPA),214-15,231;
PoliceActof1970,123;
PreventionofIncitementtoHatredActof1970,124;
PreventionofTerrorismActof1974(PTA),214-15,217,231;
PublicOrder(Amendment)Actof1970,124;
SpecialPowersActof1922(SPA),56,58-60,113,119,121,124,132,214,218
securitysystem:2,12,20-21,41,46,52-53,81,127,132,138,201-4,table202,249-50;
andabridgmentofcivilrights,217-18;
attemptedliberalizationof,56,119,121-24,122-23,189,191-92,195,210,211-14,231-32,240-43,251;
Catholicattitudeson,228-33;
costof,204;
andcriminalization,206-7;
evolutionof,55,57-60;
HuntCommittee'sinvestigationof,121-23;
increasedaccountabilityof,222-24;
IndependentCommissionforPoliceComplaints,220;
instrnmentalistviewof,226;
andinternalbanishment,217-18;
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Loyalistoppositiontoliberalizationof,227-28;
andMinistryofHomeAffairs,57-58,123,132;
NorthernIrelandOfficeon,240-41;
obstaclestoliberalizationof,224-41;
PoliceAuthority,121,123-24,211,221-22,224;
PoliceComplaintsBoard,220;
PoliceFederation,209;
policeinterrogationtechniques,220-21;
andpoliceviolence,114,115;
andpowersofarrestanddetention,215-18;
Protestantattitudestoward,233-37;
andRoyalUlsterConstabulary,209-10;
sectarianandpoliticalattitudestoward,217,228-37,tables230-32&234;
sectariancharacterof,56,61-62,112,122,124,208-9,211-12;
andSpecialAirServices(SAS),207;
"Ulsterization"of,206-7,209,237;
Unionistdisapprovalof,235-36;
anduseofDiplockcourts,206,216-17,223,231,237;
anduseofinternment,59-60,128-30,205-6;
anduseof"supergrass"evidence,217
NorthernIreland.Allianceparty,192
NorthernIreland.CommitteeontheAdministrationofJustice(CAJ):
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andpoliceaccountability,222
NorthernIreland.DemocraticUnionistparty(DUP),227-28,235
NorthernIreland.DirectorofPublicProsecutions(DPP):andimpartiality,219;
andpoliceaccountability,219-20
NorthernIreland.JointSecurityCommittee(JSC),119,127
NorthernIreland.MinistryofCommunityRelations,119
NorthernIreland.MinistryofHomeAffairs,46,115,221,241;
powersof,59;
andsecuritysystem,57-58,123,132
NorthernIreland.Nationalistparty,113
NorthernIreland.NorthernIrelandLabourparty,113
NorthernIreland.OfficialUnionistparty(OUP),227-28,235
NorthernIreland.SocialDemocraticandLabourparty(SDLP),194,198,219;
electoralsupportof,229-30,232-33;
andsecuritysystemaccountability,226-27;
onUlsterDefenseRegiment,208
NorthernIreland.StandingAdvisoryCommissiononHumanRights(SACHR):andpoliceaccountability,222
NorthernIreland.StormontParliament,112,113,115,118-19,124,126,190;
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Page274
NorthernIreland.StormontParliment(continued)
ineffectualityof,52,60;
representationin,51-52,60
NorthernIreland.UnionistGovernment,28,45,46-47,48,116,117-19,120,122,125,241,245-46,247;
andclosetiestopolice,58;
divisionswithin,116,124-25;
failureof,116,130-31;
andProtestantmajorityrule,35,48-49,51,56-57,113;
andrelationswithBritishGovernment,125-26,131,132
NorthernIreland.Unionistparty:andNorthernIrelandAssembly,219
NorthernIrelandAssembly,198;
failureof,219;
SecurityandHomeAffairsCommittee,219;
Unionistpartyand,219
NorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociation,113
NorthernIrelandOffice(NIO),222,233;
PoliceDivision,196;
andpoliceinterrogationtechniques,221;
powersof,196-97,215;
andSecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland,197,215;
SecurityandPolicyCommittee,196-97;
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onsecuritysystem,240-41;
onUnionistpoliticalpressure,236
NorthernRhodesia,44;
failureofsettlerrulein,36-37.
SeealsoZambia
NorthKorea:andRhodesia,103
Nyandoro,George,66
Nyasaland(Malawi),68,77;
failureofsettlerrulein,36-37;
nativeuprisingsin,69
O
O'Neill,Terence,112,114,115,244-45;
resignationof,116
OrangeOrder,57,112
Osmond,Douglas,121
P
Paisley,Ian,235;
popularsupportfor,130
Palestine:warforindependencein,39.
SeealsoIsrael,39
Philippines,56,254
Pluralsociety:natureof,30-31
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Politicalsociology:state-centeredmodelof,2-3
Portugal:withdrawalfromMozambique,38,83,86-87
R
Rees,Merlyn,197
Rhodes,Cecil:andBritishSouthAfricaCompany,42
Rhodesia:apartheidin,54-55,73,75,91,98,105,246;
attemptedpoliticalreformin,244-45;
becomesself-governing,43-44,48;
andBritishColonialOffice,44;
Britishconditionsforindependenceof,78,103;
BritishSouthAfricaCompanyandestablishmentof,42-43;
castesystemin,54-55,160;
ascommunallydividedsociety,31,35,40,81,189;
comparedtoNorthernIreland,115-16,191,244-53;
concernsofwhiteelectoratein,67-68,74;
economicdeclinein,66;
economicsanctionsagainst,78-79,98,103,109;
electionsin,74-76,78,97-98,109-10;
emigrationfrom,75,84;
failedattemptatpoliticalreformin,33,41,50,75-76,91;
failureofsettlerrulein,41,42,83,110,134,189,244-45,248;
GreatBritainandestablishmentof,42-43,48;
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GreatBritainasfactorin,77-79,82-83,98-99,107-9,116-17,246-48;
growthofblacknationalismin,76-79,82,91;
independenceconstitutionandsettlercontrol,108-9,110;
judicialsystemin,52,62,71,100;
lackofexecutiveaccountabilityin,156;
lackofpopularsupportforMuzorewaGovernment,106;
militarydominationofGovernment,100-101;
militaryresourcesof,82-83,84,87-88;
nativepoliticalunrestin,55,63-67,70,71-77,79,81,82-83;
nativerebellionin,43;
newconstitutionof,105;
oppositionassubversionin,63-64,96;
politicalcultureof,29,40;
practicalinternalautonomyof,40-41,65;
renewedsolidarityofsettlersocietyin,76-77,83,90;
secrettrialsin,100;
assettlersociety,24-25,26,35,40-41,49,62,72,82-83,131,132-33,187,246,247;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,35,90;
SouthAfricaandestablishmentof,41,43;
stateofemergencyin,63-69,79;
staterepressionin,54,63-64,67,71-74,77,79,92-97,99,104;
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UnilateralDeclarationofIndependence(UDI),77,78-79,80,87,246,247;
working-classsettlersin,50.SeealsoZimbabwe
civilwar:churchesprotestGovernmentactions,97;
CIOadvocatespoliticalsettlement,89-90,101-2;
collectivepunishmentin,92-93,95,97,149;
costof,87-88,103,105,106;
counterinsurgency,
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Page275
86-90,92;
curfewandfree-firezones,94,97;
Governmentatrocities,94-98,99,108;
GuardForce,93;
guerrillacoercionofcivilians,85-86;
guerrillawarfare,62-63,68-69,79,82-85,87-89,92,106,135;
immunityofGovernmentforcesin,94-95,97;
InternalSettlementof1978,105-6;
Lancasteraccord(1979),106-9,159;
martiallaw,96-97,106;
militarystrikesinMozambiqueandZambia,88,106;
negotiatedpoliticalsettlement,103-10;
propagandain,90-91;
"protectedvillages"(PVs),93-94,149;
roleofblackpopularsupportin,85-86,89,91-92;
ruralpopulationin,84-86,92-94,95,103,106,158;
SelousScouts,102,147;
andSouthAfricanmilitaryaid,87-88,103;
SpecialBranchadvocatespoliticalsettlement,89-90;
supportforpoliticalsettlementof,87,89-90;
tortureusedin,95
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legislation:EmergencyPowersActof1960(EPA),72,92;
IndemnityandCompensationActof1975,95;
IndustrialReconciliationActof1934,54;
LandApportionmentActof1930,54,71,75;
LandHusbandryActof1951,65-66,71;
LandTenureAct,105;
LawandOrderMaintenanceActsof1960and1973(LOMA),72,92,104;
NativeAffairsAmendmentActof1959,71;
NativeRegistrationActof1936,54;
PreventiveDetentionActof1959(PDA),70-71;
UnlawfulOrganizationsActof1959(UOA),64,70,104
securitysystem:52-53,81,134;
BritishSouthAfricanPolice(BSAP),62,144;
CentralIntelligenceOrganization(CIO),77,86-87,96,101-2,107;
evolutionof,55,62-63,70-73;
increasedpowerandresourcesof,73-74,82,87-88,92-93,98-99;
andinternalfriction,101-3;
andMinistryofLawandOrder,73;
andNativeAffairsDepartment,62-63;
opposesmartiallaw,96-97;
proposedliberalizationof,104-5,107;
protectedunderindependenceconstitution,107-9;
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SpecialBranch,73,77,89,101,102;
whitecontrolof,104-9
Rhodesia.DeclarationofRights,99
Rhodesia.Detainees'ReviewTribunal,155
Rhodesia.Dominionparty(DP):popularsupportfor,74-75;
programof,67,69,74
Rhodesia.ExecutiveCouncil,105
Rhodesia.LegislativeCouncil,43
Rhodesia.MinistryofCombinedOperations,101
Rhodesia.MinistryofDefense:resourcesof,87;
whitecontrolof,104
Rhodesia.MinistryofForeignAffairs,101
Rhodesia.MinistryofInternalAffairs,89,93,95,101-2,143;
powerandresourcesof,71,87;
and"protectedvillages"(PVs),94
Rhodesia.MinistryofJustice:andnativepoliticalunrest,73-74;
powersof,62,71,72,74
Rhodesia.MinistryofLawandOrder,96,99,107,143;
established,73;
andimmunityofGovernmentforces,95;
resourcesof,87;
whitecontrolof,104
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Rhodesia.NationalDemocraticparty(NDP):established,71;
outlawed,72
Rhodesia.NativeAffairsDepartment(NAD),62-64,87;
andnativepoliticalunrest,66,73;
powersof,74;
andsecuritysystem,62-63
Rhodesia.Parliament:anddiscriminatorylegislation,54;
ineffectualityof,52,99,152-53;
marginalpowerof,44,100;
representationin,108,110
Rhodesia.PatrioticFront:andLancasteraccord(1979),107
Rhodesia.RhodesianActionparty,97
Rhodesia.RhodesianFront(RF),157,179,246;
anddissent,96;
andInternalSettlementof1978,105-6;
politicalblindnessof,88-89,90-91;
politicalconcessionsby,105-8;
popularsupportfor,75-76,78,83,90,97-98,116
Rhodesia.Rhodesiaparty,78
Rhodesia.UnitedFederalparty(UFP),65,67,73-76,78;
discordwithin,73-74;
popularsupportfor,75
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RoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC),46,58,206,207,224,228,236,241;
accountabilityof,222;
attemptedreformof,121-24,211-14;
budgetof,204;
casualityratein,209;
costof,204;
coverupofillegalactivitiesby,211;
criminalactivitiesby,208;
harassmentby,215-16;
investigationof,121;
MobileSupportUnits,210;
paramilitarycharacterof,123,209-10,214;
popularattitudestoward,213,tables230-31;
Protestant
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Page276
RoyalUlsterConstabulary(continued)
attackson,236-37;
sectariancharacterof,124,211-12;
securityactivitiesof,209-10;
SpecialBranch,210-11;
structureandpowerof,210;
temporarydisarmingof,123-24;
useofplasticbulletsby,210
RoyalUlsterConstabularyReserve(RUCR),122
S
ScarmanTribunal,115
Scotland:devolutionofpowerin,238
Securitysystems:attemptedliberalizationof,251-52,255-56;
inauthoritarianregimes,1-2,5;
autonomyof,4,5-6;
goalsof,6;
inliberaldemocracies,4,5-6,8;
preconditionsforliberalizationof,9-12,16-18,20-21,188;
repressivefeaturesof,3-4;
roleof,inthestate,3,7,10-11,55-56,165-67;
insettlersocieties,4,19-21
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Securitysystems,sectarian:communallypartisannatureof,4,8-9,53;
featuresof,4-5;
repressivenessof,4,7-8
Senegal:whiteeconomicdominancein,160
Settlersocieties:attemptedreformof,33-34,41;
asauthoritarianregimes,29,33-34,52-53,250-51;
capacityofnewregimein,18,22-23,24,250-54;
castesystemsin,28,29-35,192;
ascommunallydividedsocieties,4,30-31,248-49;
comparedwithcolonialsocieties,25-26;
conditionsofstabilityin,42,83,248;
distinguishingfeaturesof,24-29,36;
establishmentof,24-25;
failuresamong,35-39,41-42,82-83,86;
ideologicalcohesionofdominantcastein,28-29,49-51,97;
imperativeforautonomyin,26-27;
infrastructureof,25-26;
lackofdemocracyin,33-35,250;
politicalcultureof,18-19,28-29;
relationswithnativepopulationsin,24-25;
securitysystemsin,4,18,19-21;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,251;
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socialcontrolsovernativepopulationsin,27,30-31,49-55;
valuesofsocialandcivicinstitutionsin,18,21-22,35;
workingclassin,50
Shona.SeeZimbabwe:ethnicdivisionsin
SinnFein,219,226,231-32;
andBritishimperialisminIreland,193-94;
electoralsupportof,229-30;
harassmentof,216
Sithole,Ndabaningi,105
Smith,Ian,86,91,104,135,167,178,246;
andInternalSettlementof1978,105-6;
andRhodesianindependence,78,87
Smith,Tony,153
Soames,Lord,107
Soley,Clive,238
SouthAfrica,81;
AfricanNationalCongressin,84,170;
Afrikanerrevoltin,39;
apartheidin,54,161;
attemptedpoliticalreformin,245;
ascommunallydividedsociety,9,31,98,114;
anddestabilizationofAngola,160,172;
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anddestabilizationofMozambique,160-61,172;
andestablishmentofRhodesia,41,43;
guerrillawarfarein,170;
militaryaidtoRhodesiafrom,87-88,103;
militaryresourcesof,84,88;
andnegotiatedpoliticalsettlementinRhodesia,104,106;
politicalcultureof,28,91;
securitysystemof,5,11;
assettlersociety,24-25,26-27,49,98,131,255;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,35;
staterepressionin,54,73;
asthreattoZimbabwe,150,159-61,164,167,173;
warforindependencein,39;
working-classsettlersin,50
SouthAfrica.Nationalparty,28,76,98
SouthAfrica.Unitedparty,76
SouthernRhodesia.SeeRhodesia
SouthKorea,56
SovietUnion:andRhodesia,103;
securitysystemin,4;
Stalinistpurgesin,165
SriLanka:Indiantroopsin,120
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Stalker,John,211
Stanage,Basil,209
State:andnationalsecurity,2,6,165-66;
natureofthe,2-3;
purposeof,2;
roleofsecuritysysteminthe,3,7,10-11,55-56,165-67
Staterepression:natureof,2-3,7
SundayMail(newspaper):oninsurgencyinZimbabwe,163
SundayTimes(newspaper),191
T
Taiwan:attemptedpoliticalreformin,34,81,245;
ascommunallydividedsociety,44,255;
Kuomintang,28;
nationalsurvivalof,40;
securitysystemin,23;
assettlersociety,24-25,26-27,31,255
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Page277
Tanzania.Parliament:ineffectualityof,151
Thatcher,Margaret,106,206,223,253
Todd,Garfield,76,115
U
Ulster.SeeNorthernIreland
UlsterDefenseAssociation,198,208;
harassmentof,216
UlsterDefenseRegiment(UDR),127,206,207,223,231,236,237;
criminalactivitiesby,208;
sectariancharacterof,122,208;
sectarianrepressionby,208-9
UlsterFreedomFighters,216
UlsterResistanceMovement,236
UlsterSpecialConstabulary(USC),46,113,115,127,208;
abolished,121-22;
paramilitarycharacterof,56,58;
reputationof,58;
sectariancharacterof,122
UlsterUnionistCouncil,45-46
UlsterVolunteerForce,121,208,216
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil:andeconomicsanctionsagainstRhodesia,103
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UnitedNationsTrusteeshipCommittee,75
UnitedStates:civilrightsmovementin,114,118;
Congress,6;
displacementofnativepopulationin,25;
politicalcultureof,33;
racialviolencein,111;
securitysystemin,6;
andspecialcaseofLiberia,40
V
vanderByl,P.K.,94
Vorster,John,104
W
Walls,Peter,101
Watt,Samuel:onCatholics,58
Weber,Max,3,10
Whitehead,Edgar,65,69,73-74,76,112,116,244-45
Wilson,Harold:onNorthernIreland,115,117,118,125,127-28,191;
onRhodesianindependence,78
Wilson,Hebron,176
Wright,Alan,209
Z
Zambia:andguerrillaoperationsinRhodesia,79,83;
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andnegotiatedpoliticalsettlementinRhodesia,106;
Rhodesianmilitarystrikesin,88,106;
whiteeconomicdominancein,160.SeealsoNorthernRhodesia
Zanzibar,44,49;
attemptedpoliticalreformin,80;
failureofsettlerrulein,37;
andGreatBritain,80;
politicalcultureof,49;
revolutionin,81
Zimbabwe,133,197;
AfricanNationalCongressin,161;
AmnestyInternationalbannedfrom,178;
antigovernmentinsurgencyin,161-63,table162;
buildingone-partystatein,181-87,252;
ascommunallydividedsociety,41,189;
continuationofauthoritarianinstitutionsin,138,195;
electoralreformin,134,138,139;
espionageandsabotagein,160-61;
ethnicdivisionsin,142,168-70,175,177-78,180,183,189;
independenceconstitutionof,134;
independenceproclaimed(1980),110,134;
institutionalreformin,134-35;
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judicialreformin,149;
judicialsystem,153-55;
lackofdemocratictraditionsin,19,158-59,225;
lackofexecutiveaccountabilityin,151-56,187;
landreformin,140;
lowracialtensionin,160;
martiallawabolished,149;
militaryaidtoMozambique,148,160;
nationalsecurityin,166-67;
oppositionassubversionin,96,157,172,182-83,216;
politicalcultureof,96,110,136-37,158-59,187-88,192;
powerelitein,142;
recommendationsforpoliticalreformin,164;
resistancetoone-partystatein,183,table184;
ruralpopulationin,157-58;
socialandcivicinstitutionsin,21-22,156-59,187-88,238,253;
SouthAfricaasthreatto,150,159-61,164,167,173;
stateofemergencyin,139,149-50,152,153,157,161-62,164-65;
staterepressionin,139,145-46,165,176-79,180,187,188;
whiteeconomicdominancein,110,160;
whitepopulationof,110,157,160,188.SeealsoRhodesia
legislation:EmergencyPowersAct(EPA),149-50;
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EmergencyPowersRegulations,149;
andexecutivedecrees,149-50;
ExecutivePowersActof1986,150;
IndemnityandCompensationActof1975,151;
LawandOrderMaintenanceActof1960,150;
UnlawfulOrganizationsActof1959,150
securitysystem:2,11,20-21,41,63,134,159,218,224,243,250;
Africanizationof,142-43,249;
autonomyof,146;
CentralIntelligenceOrganization(CIO),143,145-46,151,
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Page278
Zimbabwe(continued)
153-54,173,180;
CentralIntelligenceOrganizationinMatabeleland,177-78,179;
costof,143-44,
table144,146;
inheritedfrompreviousregime,138-39,143,146,148,251;
instrumentalistviewof,139-40;
inMatabeleland,145,152,154,176-79,180;
andMinistryofHomeAffairs,139;
politicalaspectsof,164-71;
SpecialBranch,145-46;
structureandpowerof,table141,139-40,142-46,148;
andZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion,144-45,185
Zimbabwe.Army:Africanizationof,146-47;
andBritishMilitaryAdvisoryandTrainingTeam(BMATT),147,178;
costsof,table144,147-48;
ethnicsectariantrendin,147,169;
FifthBrigade,177-78,180;
lackofprofessionalismin,147;
inMatabeleland,176-79,180;
SixthBrigade,177;
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sizeandstructureof,146-47
Zimbabwe.ConservativeAllianceparty,167,171
Zimbabwe.DeclarationofRights,151,153
Zimbabwe.Detainees'ReviewTribunal,149;
andMinistryofHomeAffairs,155-56;
powersof,155-56
Zimbabwe.LegislativeAssembly,150
Zimbabwe.MinisterofStateforDefense,169;
andantigovernmentinsurgency,163;
oncriticismofatrocities,178
Zimbabwe.MinisterofStateforSecurity,140,145
Zimbabwe.MinistryofHomeAffairs,142-45,150,173,175,179,180;
andantigovernmentinsurgency,163;
andDetainees'ReviewTribunal,155-56;
andexecutivedetention,149;
judiciarycriticizedby,154-55;
andsecuritysystem,139;
andstateofemergency,152,164-65
Zimbabwe.MinistryofInformation:oncriticismofatrocities,178
Zimbabwe.Parliament:representationin,134,140-42,167-68,174
Zimbabwe.RepublicanFront,152
Zimbabwe.SupremeCourt,151;
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andHighCourtcriticizedbytheexecutive,154-55;
powersof,153-54
Zimbabwe.UnitedAfricanNationalCouncil(UANC),105-6,109,171;
harassmentof,167,171
Zimbabwe.ZimbabweUnityMovement(ZUM),186-87
ZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy(ZANLA),83-84,107,147,168;
coercionofciviliansby,85-86
ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion(ZANU),76-77,79,104,109-10,157,159,161,173,252,255;
andantigovernmentinsurgency,163;
CentralCommittee,140,147;
inMatabeleland,167-69,179;
outlawed,105;
Politburo,140-42,147;
popularsupportof,183;
andpressureforone-partystate,142,174,181-87,
table184;
asrulingparty,140-142,159,165,168,170,171,174-75,184,186-88;
andsecuritysystem,144-45,185;
YouthBrigades,148,172,174;
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ZimbabweAfricanPeople'sUnionmergerwith,172,175,181-82,185-86
ZimbabweAfricanPeople'sUnion(ZAPU),79,107,109-10,152;
andantigovernmentinsurgencyinMatabeleland,171,173-74;
attackedbyYouthBrigades,174;
divisionswithin,76-77;
harassmentof,145,171-75,180;
leadersarrested,171-72;
mergerwithZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion,172,175,181-82,185-86;
asoppositionparty,145,152,168,170,185;
andoppositiontoone-partystate,183;
outlawed,72,76,105;
popularsupportfor,174-175;
pressuretoban,142,151,171-72
ZimbabwePeople'sRevolutionaryArmy(ZIPRA),84,147,160,165,168-69,170
ZimbabweRepublicPolice:Anti-TerroristUnitinMatabeleland,177-78;
InternalSecurityandIntelligenceUnit,145;
PoliceSupportUnit,143;
politicalinfluenceon,144-45;
structureof,143-45
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