Transformation - Air Force Associationsecure.afa.org/media/scripts/grant.pdf · 2003. 5. 22. ·...

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Transformation and the Joint Air Component

Transcript of Transformation - Air Force Associationsecure.afa.org/media/scripts/grant.pdf · 2003. 5. 22. ·...

  • Transformationand the Joint Air Component

    Transformationand the Joint Air Component

  • Airpower Transformed WarfareAirpower Transformed Warfare

  • For the 21st Century…For the 21st Century…• QDR 2001 “…the

    evolution of combat capabilities that provide revolutionary or asymmetric advantages to our forces.” –

    • “The challenges the nation faces do not loom in the distant future, but are here now.”

    • “President Bush: “…our security will require transforming the military…”

  • New technologies often go into combat

    on fighters first

    Fighter Transformation?Fighter Transformation?• Fighters have a track record of

    transformation• Fighters remain necessary for

    current and future missions– To protect joint forces in the air, on

    the ground and at sea– To strike targets with precision and

    persistence– To work with bombers, UAVs, etc.

    • To fight together with allies • To ensure a force structure big

    enough to meet challenges around the globe and at home

    • To adapt to new roles

  • The Importance of Being FlexibleThe Importance of Being FlexibleFlexVJ-MUPC3ElecIADSIndusLeadersLOCsPOL

    43%43%

    Allied Force aim points, 1999

    Allied Force aim points, 1999

    Serb Army Tank

  • USAF Combat Controller with Northern Alliance

    Enduring Freedom, 2001-2:80%+ “Flex” TargetsEnduring Freedom, 2001-2:80%+ “Flex” Targets

    The Importance of Being Flexible

    83%83%

  • F/A-18EF F/A-18EF

    548548

    UCAVUCAV????

    F-35F-35 ~3000~3000

    20082008

    20102010

    20052005

    F-22F-22333333

    20002000

    • DPG asks: “What is the best investment balance to assure US dominance in strike and air superiority?”

    Joint Airpower TransformationJoint Airpower Transformation

  • 1997 Matrix: Old Strategy1997 Matrix: Old Strategy• Fighter modernization for

    joint air component is circa 1997

    • Predates September 11 and Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle

    • Platform-focused• Hedges new operational

    concepts with traditional degree of service mission overlap

    – Unique capabilities embedded

    Inventory Reduction

    Major Theater Wars

    Platforms Service Roles and Missions

  • A New MatrixA New Matrix1-4-2-11-4-2-1

    Near-TermThreats

    Homeland Security +

    Expeditionary Operations

    BattlespaceFusion

    Joint and Coalition

    Operations

    • Deals with threats emerging now

    • Prioritizes both homeland security and expeditionary operations

    • Evaluates most stressing case for each

    • Rates platforms for their ability to advance information dominance

    • Assumes joint and coalition operations

    – Seamless air component

  • Transforming Air Dominance

    Transforming Air Dominance

  • Transformation RequirementsTransformation Requirements

    Transformation requires a joint strategy to:• Increase survivability• Create a shared battlespace network• Streamline the force and make it more

    supportable• Pioneer new operational concepts – from

    time-critical targeting to the merger of sensors and shooters

    • Meet needs of homeland security andexpeditionary operations

    • DPG asks: “What is the best investment balance to assure US dominance in strike and air superiority?”

    • DPG asks: “What is the best investment balance to assure US dominance in strike and air superiority?”

  • F-22 and the Joint Air ComponentF-22 and the Joint Air Component• Fight and win the joint

    campaign• Provide critical new

    capabilities for homeland security

    • Assure access in heavily defended expeditionary

    operations• Build the path to a

    survivable network for battlespace fusion

    integrating sensors and shooters

  • AmmoTargetsAmmoTargets

    EW/GCI Targets

    EW/GCI Targets

    POLTargets

    POLTargets

    Campaign Against key targets…With F-15sCampaign Against key targets…With F-15s

    • 30-Day MRC • SWA 2010 Scenario• Thunder Model• Joint Forces

    • 30-Day MRC • SWA 2010 Scenario• Thunder Model• Joint Forces

    Total Interdiction

    Targets

    Total Interdiction

    Targets

  • 82%more82%more

    AmmoTargetsAmmoTargets

    EW/GCI Targets

    EW/GCI Targets

    POLTargets

    POLTargets

    160%more160%more

    68%more68%more

    Campaign Against key targets…With F-22sCampaign Against key targets…With F-22s

    • 30-Day MRC • SWA 2010 Scenario• Thunder Model• Joint Forces

    • 30-Day MRC • SWA 2010 Scenario• Thunder Model• Joint Forces

    123%more123%more

    Total Interdiction

    Targets

    Total Interdiction

    Targets

  • 100%

    90%

    80%

    70%

    60%

    50%

    40%

    30%

    20%

    10%

    0%

    Limited CampaignLimited Campaign

    0 1 2 3 4 65 7 8

    F-22 (Block 3/4)

    Days

    Legacy Forces

    Swift DefeatSwift Defeat

    Source: LMCO

    80%80%

    25%25%

    • F-22 completes 80% in 6 Days

    • Legacy Forces complete only 25%

    • F-22 completes 80% in 6 Days

    • Legacy Forces complete only 25%

  • From F-15 to F-22From F-15 to F-22•F-15C: Air superiority

    •No Combat Losses

    •F-15E: Longer range strike; real-time strike

    What the F-15 Provides

    What the F-15 Provides

    What the F-15 Cannot ProvideWhat the F-15 Cannot Provide

    •Survivability–Stealth–Supercruise–SEAD

    •Logistics– Deployable– Supportable

    Combination of Transformation Ingredients

    •Battlespace Fusion– Combine information from multiples sources

    •Mission network– IFDL tactics in heavily defended airspace

    • Integrated Sensors– Radar, electronic intelligence, target discrimination

  • Payoff of SupercruisePayoff of Supercruise

    1

    23

    4

    Signature0.9MSpeed

    10

    9

    8

    7

    6

    5

    4

    3

    2

    1

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better)

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better)

    SAMsSAMs

    Current Fighter

    • Altitude: 40,000 ft• EADSIM

  • Payoff of SupercruisePayoff of Supercruise

    12

    3

    4

    Signature0.9MSpeed

    10

    9

    8

    7

    6

    5

    4

    3

    2

    1

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better)

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better) SAMsSAMs

    1.3M

    Current Fighter

    F-35

    F-22

    • Only F-22 has the supercruise edge (not F-35)• Altitude: 40,000 ft• EADSIM

  • Payoff of SupercruisePayoff of Supercruise

    12

    3

    4

    Signature0.9M

    1.7M

    Speed

    10

    9

    8

    7

    6

    5

    4

    3

    2

    1

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better)

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better) SAMsSAMs

    1.3M

    Current Fighter

    F-35

    F-22

    • Only F-22 has the supercruise edge (not F-35)• Altitude: 40,000 ft• EADSIM

  • Payoff of SupercruisePayoff of Supercruise

    1 2 3 4Signature0.9M

    1.7M

    Speed

    12

    3

    4

    Signature0.9M

    1.7M

    Speed

    10987654321

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better)

    Relative Loss Rate(Lower is Better) SAMsSAMs FightersFighters

    1.3M

    1.3M

    Current Fighter

    Current Fighter10987654321

    • Only F-22 has the supercruise edge (not F-35)• Vital against SAMS and fighters

  • Homeland SecurityHomeland Security• Homeland security is the

    first priority of national security

    – Over 300 fighters airborne after September 11

    • Counter-air and cruise missile capabilities will be a cornerstone of air dominance at home

    “America is no longer protected by vast oceans.” – Pres. Bush, State of the

    Union, Jan 02

    “America is no longer protected by vast oceans.” – Pres. Bush, State of the

    Union, Jan 02

  • Evolving ThreatEvolving Threat

    BallisticMissilesBallisticMissiles

    Military AircraftMilitary Aircraft

    Cruise MissilesCruise Missiles

    AirlinersCommercialCharters

    AirlinersCommercialCharters

    General AviationGeneral Aviation

    Ultra LightsUAVsUltra LightsUAVs

    BalloonsBlimpsBalloonsBlimps

    “By the end of the decade, land attack cruise missiles could pose a serious threat not only to our deployed forces, but possibly even the US mainland.”– CIADirector Tenet, March 02

    “By the end of the decade, land attack cruise missiles could pose a serious threat not only to our deployed forces, but possibly even the US mainland.”– CIADirector Tenet, March 02

    Prior FocusPrior Focus

    12.9 min462 kts100nmApache

    32.4 min462 kts250nmScalp

    Time to Impact

    Sea level Speed

    RangeSystem

    New FocusNew Focus

  • Flat Dash Intercept RadiusFlat Dash Intercept Radius

    Scalp: 250nm Scalp: 250nm

    110 nm @ Mach 1.5110 nm @ Mach 1.5 F-15C: Intercept Fails

    F-15C: Intercept Fails

    218 nm @ Mach 1.5218 nm @ Mach 1.5

    15.1 min15.1 min

    32.4 min32.4 min

    7.6 min7.6 min

  • Flat Dash Intercept RadiusFlat Dash Intercept Radius

    F-15C: Intercept Fails

    F-15C: Intercept Fails

    150 nm150 nm

    Apache: 100nm Apache: 100nm

    12.9 min12.9 min

    150 nm150 nm

    10.4 min10.4 min16.5 min16.5 min

  • Air Sovereignty Alert: Suspicious Aircraft Visual IdentificationAir Sovereignty Alert: Suspicious Aircraft Visual Identification

    150 nm

    150 nm

    10.4 min

    16.5 min

    • F-22 can position for VID in two-thirds the time• Arrive on scene with fuel to spare• F-22 can position for VID in two-thirds the time• Arrive on scene with fuel to spare

    • Response times are critical to air sovereignty

    • Tragically, the Sept 11 hijackings of AA 11 and UA 175 took only 45 minutes time of flight

  • 2

    2,1

    1,2

    3

    2

    2

    1

    1

    1

    1

    2

    111

    12

    12

    22,1

    2 2

    1

    21

    21

    2

    3

    1,1

    2

    2

    2

    3 1 1

    2

    2

    2

    1

    2

    2

    1

    22

    221 1

    22

    1,1

    2,121 1,2

    1

    12 1

    2,1 2

    111

    Critical InfrastructureCritical Infrastructure

    Operating Nuclear Reactor at that Site

    All Reactor(s) at this site have been shut down but nuclear materials are still present

    Reactor(s) have been fully decommissioned

    Suspended Reactor Site

    Flight Paths Unknown at Launch

  • Operating Nuclear Reactor at that Site

    All Reactor(s) at this site have been shut down but nuclear materials are still present

    Reactor(s) have been fully decommissioned

    Suspended Reactor Site

    Critical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power PlantsCritical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power Plants

    2

    2,1

    1,2

    3

    2

    2

    1

    1

    1

    1

    2

    111

    12

    12

    22,1

    2 2

    1

    21

    21

    2

    3

    1,1

    2

    2

    2

    3 1 1

    2

    2

    2

    1

    2

    2

    1

    22

    221 1

    22

    1,1

    2,121 1,2

    1

    12 1

    2,1 2

    111• CAP= 2 F-15s; 110

    nm radius; 4 hour on-station• 12 F-15s/CAP/24/7• 28 CAPS

    • CAP= 2 F-15s; 110 nm radius; 4 hour on-station• 12 F-15s/CAP/24/7• 28 CAPS

    336 F-15s7

    8

    13

  • Operating Nuclear Reactor at that Site

    All Reactor(s) at this site have been shut down but nuclear materials are still present

    Reactor(s) have been fully decommissioned

    Suspended Reactor Site

    Critical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power PlantsCritical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power Plants

    2

    2,1

    1,2

    3

    2

    2

    1

    1

    1

    1

    2

    111

    12

    12

    22,1

    2 2

    1

    21

    21

    2

    3

    1,1

    2

    2

    2

    3 1 1

    2

    2

    2

    1

    2

    2

    1

    22

    221 1

    22

    1,1

    2,121 1,2

    1

    12 1

    2,1 2

    111

    3

    4

    7

    • CAP= 2 F-22s; 218 nm radius; 4 hour on-station• 12 F-22s/CAP/24/7• 14 CAPS

    • CAP= 2 F-22s; 218 nm radius; 4 hour on-station• 12 F-22s/CAP/24/7• 14 CAPS

    168 F-22s

  • • Aircraft or next generation cruise missiles with WMD warheads will jeopardize deployed joint forces

    • F-22 required for intercept

    • Protect ports, cities, bases, people

    493 nm443 s+ 50 @ 1.5

    F-22 Intercept RadiusF-22 Intercept Radius

    ubsonic

    300 nm250 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

  • 493 nm443 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    300 nm250 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    2020: All Azimuth Threat2020: All Azimuth Threat• By 2020,

    cruise missiles will threaten overseas bases from multiple axes of attack

    • F-22 needed for coverage

    • By 2020, cruise missiles will threaten overseas bases from multiple axes of attack

    • F-22 needed for coverage

  • Peer CompetitorPeer Competitor50Su-30

    Su-27

    J-8a/e

    OtherAirToAir

    OtherAirTo

    Gnd

    200

    250

    700

    1500

    2700Fighters

    • F-22s provide air cover and lethal SEAD for B-2 strike

    • F-22s provide air cover and lethal SEAD for B-2 strike

    300 nm250 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    493 nm443 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    • PRC: 250+ advanced fighters (Su-27 and Su-30 with AA-12 missiles)

    • Volume of fighter and SAM coverage; blue fighters run out of missiles

    • PRC: 250+ advanced fighters (Su-27 and Su-30 with AA-12 missiles)

    • Volume of fighter and SAM coverage; blue fighters run out of missiles

  • Peer Competitor: B-2 EscortPeer Competitor: B-2 Escort50Su-30

    Su-27

    J-8a/e

    OtherAirToAir

    OtherAirTo

    Gnd

    200

    250

    700

    1500

    2700Fighters

    • F-22s provide air cover and lethal SEAD for B-2 strike

    • F-22s provide air cover and lethal SEAD for B-2 strike

    300 nm250 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    493 nm443 subsonic + 50 @ 1.5

    1.0

    9Relative

    Aim-points Hit by

    B-2

    NoF-22

    With F-22 Escort

    B-2: 9x

    More

  • F-22 Penetrating C4ISRF-22 Penetrating C4ISR

  • Today’s NetworkToday’s Network

    • ACE• CAOC• ACE• CAOC

    StealthStealthStrikeStrike

    Air ControlAir Control

    Compass Call

    • Commjammers •EA-6B • F-16CJ HARM Shooter

    DefenseDefense

    BattleManagersBattleManagers

    • AWACS• Rivet Joint• ABCCC

    Command and ControlCommand and Control

    Tankers andAirliftTankers andAirlift

    SensorsSensors • Satellites• Recce• UAVs• FACs

    SEADSEAD

  • Today’s NetworkToday’s Network

    • ACE• CAOC• ACE• CAOC

    StealthStealthStrikeStrike

    Air ControlAir Control

    Compass Call

    • Commjammers •EA-6B • F-16CJ HARM Shooter

    DefenseDefense

    BattleManagersBattleManagers

    • AWACS• Rivet Joint• ABCCC

    Command and ControlCommand and Control

    Tankers andAirliftTankers andAirlift

    SensorsSensors • Satellites• Recce• UAVs• FACs

    SEADSEAD

    “Never build an airplane that’s single purpose ever again” -- SecAF Roche

    “Never build an airplane that’s single purpose ever again” -- SecAF Roche

    Vietnam-era design

    Vietnam-era design

    LDHD forceLDHD force

  • F-22 Integrated Avionics

    SU27080/3135.6 FT

    SU27080/3135.6 FT

    1.3M1305Vc

    E

    N S

    40

    20

    100415T 49.0

    +2o-4o

    Displays

    F-22 Integrated Avionics

    Radar

    Passive RFSensors Controls &

    Displays

    Communications,Navigation,

    Identification (CNI)

    Electro-Optical(MLD) Sensors

    CommonFiber OpticInterfaces Common IntegratedProcessors (CIPs)

    High Speed (Optical) Data Bus

    Mass Memory &Data Transfer Unit

    (DTU)

  • Battlespace FusionBattlespace Fusion• In Flight Datalink fuses

    and displays data– Low Probability of

    Intercept (LPI) radar

    • Creates fighter “local area network”– Secure and Stealthy– Line of sight– Low probability of

    exploitation

  • NetworkNetwork

    ISR

    IFDL Net

    • F-22 IFDL forms tactical network reaching into heavily defended airspace

    • Job one: ISR sweep to characterize battlespace

    • F-22 IFDL forms tactical network reaching into heavily defended airspace

    • Job one: ISR sweep to characterize battlespace

  • NetworkNetwork

    JDAM Strike

    Red Cruise Missile

    Red Fighter

    ISR

    IFDL Net

    • F-22s evaluate battlespaceand pass shot decision information

    • Counter red cruise missiles and fighters

    • JDAM on coordinates

    • F-22s evaluate battlespaceand pass shot decision information

    • Counter red cruise missiles and fighters

    • JDAM on coordinates

  • NetworkNetwork

    JDAM Strike

    Red Cruise Missile

    Red Fighter

    SEAD

    ISR

    IFDL Net

    • F-22s attack SAM sites

    • F-22s attack SAM sites

    SEAD

  • NetworkNetwork

    JDAM Strike

    Red Cruise Missile

    Red Fighter

    SEAD

    ISR

    IFDL Net

    • Battlespacenetwork permits flexible mission tactics

    • Enhanced support for other platforms

    • Architecture for future F-35, UAVs

    • Battlespacenetwork permits flexible mission tactics

    • Enhanced support for other platforms

    • Architecture for future F-35, UAVs

    SEAD

  • Battlespace Fusion: Building BlockBattlespace Fusion: Building Block• F-22 is first platform with

    survivable, advanced sensor integration

    • Building block of pre-2010 network

    • F-22 serves as fielded prototype for experimentation and tactical development of wider air combat network

    • Without robust F-22, penetrating battlespace fusion is not possible

    • Distributed• Multi-role• Collaborative• Survivable

  • How Many F-22s?How Many F-22s?

  • F-22 Tasking: Future?F-22 Tasking: Future?

    • Scenario 2• 144 F-22s

    – 6 AEFs @ 24 PAA

    • CONR Homeland Security

    • 168 CAP fighters

    • Alert (AK/HI)

    24 168 96

    144

    Decisive defeat

    • Scenario 1• 96 F-22s

    – 4 AEFs @ 24 PAA

    Swift defeat

    ~432 Combat-coded air dominance fighters

  • How Many F-22s?How Many F-22s?

    13+503260240382

    2.06+122601204807621.55654590360560

    0.8 (20 acft)2++6026512023390.4 (15 acft)1+211529115180

    Squadrons per AEF (24 acft)

    WingsTest and Attrition

    Backup Inventory

    TrainingCombat Coded

    Total Buy

    • SECAF: May look at buying 500

    • ACC/XP: Requirement is 2.0 squadrons per AEF

    • AF/XOR: 1 squadron per AEF is “bare bones”; preferred is 1.5 squadrons per AEF

    • QDR 97 said: “This decision will provide 3 wings of this stealth air supremacy platform”

    ~500~500~762~762~560~560~380~380

    514611Active

    98126Guard

    612736Total

    PAIInventoryF-15sAll F-15s

    todayAll F-15s

    today

  • F-22 Tasking: Future?F-22 Tasking: Future?

    • Scenario 2• 144 F-22s

    – 6 AEFs @ 24 PAA

    • CONR Homeland Security

    • 168 CAP fighters

    • Alert (AK/HI)

    24

    ~432 Combat-coded air dominance fighters

    168 96

    144

    Decisive defeat

    • Scenario 1• 96 F-22s

    – 4 AEFs @ 24 PAA

    Swift defeat

  • The Importance of Being Flexible

    Average: Every 1.7

    Years

    Average: Every 1.7

    Years

    USAF Combat Controller with Northern Alliance

    19891989 19911991 19951995 19961996 19981998 19991999 20012001 2011201120052005

    DeliberateForce

    Desert StormAllied Force

    EnduringFreedom

    B-2 IOC B-2 Combat

    Irbil

    ?Desert Fox

    PanamaF-22 IOC

    • Frequent operations• Most advanced systems

    employed heavily

    F-35 IOC

  • F-22 technology development and risk reduction flow to F-35

    Advanced LO Materials and Manufacturing

    Radar

    F119/F120 Engine Development

    Integrated avionics

    Concept development: Networked air combat

    F-22 and F-35: PartnershipF-22 and F-35: Partnership

    Unique F-22 Capabilities

    F-35 System Development

  • “We think we have a truly transformational system here.” -- General Jumper, July 2002

    Airpower Transformed WarfareFor the 21st Century…Fighter Transformation?The Importance of Being FlexibleJoint Airpower Transformation1997 Matrix: Old StrategyA New MatrixTransforming Air DominanceTransformation RequirementsF-22 and the Joint Air ComponentCampaign Against key targets…With F-15sCampaign Against key targets…With F-22sFrom F-15 to F-22Payoff of SupercruisePayoff of SupercruisePayoff of SupercruisePayoff of SupercruiseHomeland SecurityEvolving ThreatFlat Dash Intercept RadiusFlat Dash Intercept RadiusAir Sovereignty Alert: Suspicious Aircraft Visual IdentificationCritical InfrastructureCritical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power PlantsCritical Infrastructure: Nuclear Power PlantsF-22 Intercept Radius2020: All Azimuth ThreatPeer CompetitorPeer Competitor: B-2 EscortF-22 Penetrating C4ISRToday’s NetworkToday’s NetworkF-22 Integrated AvionicsBattlespace FusionNetworkNetworkNetworkNetworkBattlespace Fusion: Building BlockHow Many F-22s?F-22 Tasking: Future?How Many F-22s?F-22 Tasking: Future?The Importance of Being FlexibleF-22 and F-35: Partnership