Transcript-StubvShip 2-14-13 SJM Ruling 1

7/29/2019 Transcript-StubvShip 2-14-13 SJM Ruling 1

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIAFOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, dba 1MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE 1HOME COMMUNITY, 1Plaintiff, 1

)vs ) Case No. UDDS12041301BONNIE SHIPLEY, )1Defendant. 1I

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGSBEFORE HON. DONALD R. ALVAREZ, JUDGE

DEPARTMENT S-32SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIAThursday, February 14, 2013

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: HART, KING & COLDRENBY: ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, JR.Attorney at Law200 Sandpointe, 4th FloorSanta Ana, California 92707

For the Defendant: NANCY DUFFY MCCARRONAttorney at Law950 Roble LaneSanta Barbara, California 93103

Reported by: VICTORIA E. VILLEGAS, CSR NO. 9843Official Reporter


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SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013A.M. SESSION

DEPARTMENT S-32 HON. DONALD R. ALVAREZ, JUDGEAPPEARANCES:

HART, KING & COLDREN, BY ROBERT G.WILLIAMSON, JR., Attorney at Law, forthe Plaintiff; NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON,Attorney at Law, for the Defendant.

(Victoria E. Villegas, Official Reporter, CSR No. 9843.)-000-

THE COURT: Stubblefield versus Shipley.Could I have everybody's appearance, please?MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Good morning, your Honor.

Robert Williamson appearing for the plaintiff and movingparty.

MS. MCCARRON: Nancy Duffy McCarron for the

defendant and also the moving party on these joint summaryjudgment motions.

THE COURT: Okay. This was here before. There wassome argument before. The Court has considered that.

Does anybody have anything more from either sidethat they want to add not in your papers?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. If Imay.

There were several documents filed by the defendant,just got them a couple days ago, entitled "SupplementalDeclaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron," "SupplementalDeclaration of Bonnie Shipley," and what was called a - - I


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believe titled nObjections and a Motion to Strike Errata."And if I could address those briefly, your Honor, because wedidn't obviously have time to file a response to that. And inlight of this Court's admonition of not filing paperwork onthis until - - I mean after January 31st, we didn't. But,briefly, on the document entitled "Objection and Notice" - - or"Motion to Strike Errata," there's no notice of motion, nosupporting authorities. There's a lot of argument. It'sobjectionable on several grounds. There's no authentication.There's no foundation, no showing of personal knowledge,speculation, and unfounded accusations. As to thedeclarations, we have evidentiary objections. And if itplease the Court, I can either read them into the record as tothe supplemental declarations of Shipley and McCarron or - -

THE COURT: You mean that was just filed?MR. WILLIAMSON: They haven't been filed. Their

declarations were filed, I believe - - I mean I received them acouple days ago, but - -THE COURT: I didn't think we were going to get

anymore filings on this.MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, I didn't think so either but

what occurred is that on the - - first, we filed an errata toMr. Freeman's declaration that was filed in support of theplaintiff's motion for summary judgment because there was apage missing from Mr. Freeman's declaration that was cited inour nonstatutory separate statement. And I think it wasparagraphs eight through 14 were missing so we filed an erratawith a missing page which precipitated all this other


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paperwork by the defendant.THE COURT: I thought I was pretty clear that you

didn't need to have any additional filings in connection withthis but - -

MR. WILLIAMSON: That's correct, your Honor. Exceptthe errata. Mr. Freeman's declaration had been filed onJanuary 22nd, and we just weren't aware that there was a pagemissing.

THE COURT: Okay.MR. WILLIAMSON: And so we filed the missing page.THE COURT: Okay.MR. WILLIAMSON: So if I could submit to save time

the written evidentiary objections to the supplementaldeclarations. Or, as I said, I could read those into therecord.

THE COURT: Well, why don't you submit them.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Okay.MS. MCCARRON: Your Honor, I'm going to object to

this because they were sent three days ago. Counsel has forthe last seven months, every time there's a hearing, has comeinto this court at 2:00 or 3:00 in the afternoon and filed 500pages and has no problem filing 900 pages with an ex partenotice. Counsel - - I served it three days ago. He had plentyof time to get those objections and do them on the record.

THE COURT: If there was - - if everything was filedto an errata, why - - I'm a little bit confused why there needsto be a whole lot of paperwork filed in connection with anerrata that is just making a correction to something that's


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already been filed.MS. MCCARRON: Did you read my objections, your

Honor?THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I've got a whole ton of

stuff here.MS. MCCARRON: Okay. Well, you ordered that no more

papers be filed. Okay. And they didn't care about your orderbecause they know there's not going to be any negativeconsequences. So the next day they came in and they filed anerrata. And now they're sliding in an extra piece of papersaying, oh, by the way, guys, this was missing. And thiswhole entire page is a completely new version of he said shesaid, what went on with the encounter on August 2nd betweenShipley and Marvin that has never been offered before in sevenmonths. And it's this whole new version that he would likeyou to believe that happened. That's why he waited till after

the hearing so that you could read it right while you weregoing to do your ruling as the last thing.

And my - - and obviously we had a right to objectbecause these were a whole page of a purported version that wehad no opportunity to object to or do anything because theyweren't put in until after the last hearing. And when I sawthem I knew right away it was a fraud on the Court because theoriginal declaration was paginated, as Word does when itprints a document, one, two, three, and Marvin had signed it.The new one coming in with the missing page is paginated one,two, three, three. Well, that jumps out as a third gradercould figure out that one. Because if that page had been


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included in the original declaration that was presented to thewitness on January 21st, that signature would have ended up onpage four, not page three.

THE COURT: Okay.MS. MCCARRON: That's - - that's my point. And

that's why we had to object because we have a due processright to get our objections on the record. And, you know, itreally doesn't matter, your Honor, because this whole versionof he said she said, it's completely irrelevant to the summaryjudgment motion because, as you know, only material facts - -and counsel said at the last hearing, you remember, it's onthe transcript, he said the facts are not in dispute. And Isaid the facts are not in dispute. There's no material factshere in dispute. So all this side stuff that's put in here todistract you, to confuse, to start a fire over here so you'retrying to put that out and not concentrating. We would like

to have a ruling today on summary judgment.THE COURT: You're going to get one.MS. MCCARRON: Good. Thank you, your Honor.MR. WILLIAMSON: If I may?THE COURT: Everybody through?MR. WILLIAMSON: For the record, your Honor, there's

only been one version of Mr. Freeman's declaration. There'snever been any other declaration filed by Mr. Freeman.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We've got some requestsfor judicial notice by the plaintiff. The Court will grantthe request for judicial notice regarding the filing of thecomplaint, that's Exhibit "Au, s well as the judicial


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admissions contained in the defendant's answer, that's Exhibit"B;" the defendant's declaration, Exhibit " D l " and defensecounsel's declaration, Exhibit "E."

With regard to the legislative history of AB 556 andCivil Code 798.75, the Court - - those - - the legislativehistory is an official record. I don't know that - - I guess Ican take judicial notice of that if it's needed. Peopleroutinely cite to the legislative record in certain types ofcases where there's some ambiguity. I think that's therequest for judicial notice, Exhibits "F1I through I1L. "

There's a request to - - Exhibit "C , " to takejudicial notice of a printout in California Department ofHousing and Community Development. 1'11 deny that. I don'tthink it's certified, at least not that I saw. So Exhibit "C1'I would deny request for judicial notice.

And there's also a request to take judicial noticeof the tax assessor's records. And those documents I thinkare attached to the - - to a previous request for judicialnotice in a previous motion. 1'11 deny the request as to thetax records and copies of checks. Those documents are notcertified and there's insufficient foundation for that.

MS. MCCARRON: Excuse me, your Honor. It wascertified. The tax assessor, that's the way they do it. Theyput two blue stamps on the top. So it was certified.

THE COURT: Well, okay. And let's see. The otherthing is we have - - Court's intended is to deny the requestfor judicial notice of plaintiff's discovery responses. Thedefendant does not specify which request for admissions she's


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seeking judicial notice of. So it's ambiguous so I would denyit. And that's for that.

And then I will note with respect to defendant'sobjections, my intention is to overrule those objections.There's - - there was some indication or reference toevidentiary objections that were with the opposition to theprior summary judgment motion which was denied withoutprejudice on various procedural grounds. And the objectionsare not determinative of the outcome for the ruling on both ofthese cross motions for summary judgment. And so at leastpreliminarily that's where I'm at with all of the - - thoseitems.

MR. WILLIAMSON: A - -THE COURT: The Court - - yes?MR. WILLIAMSON: May I speak to Exhibit "C," your

Honor, the registration information from the CaliforniaDepartment of Housing and Community Development? That is anofficial record. And unless there's some issue about itsauthenticity or integrity, I believe a certified copy of thatrecord is not necessary.

THE COURT: Well - -MR. WILLIAMSON: It can be secondary evidence of the

official record. And those records are readily accessibleonline any way.

THE COURT: I know but online doesn't make itcorrect and accurate. The Court - - without authentication orlack of official certification, the Court can't take judicialnotice of that, or will not. And the Court will note that the


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Court should not take judicial notice of documents thatcontain unauthenticated statements with no indication ofauthor, custodian, date, creation, purpose, reliability orveracity, Hartwell Corporation v. Superior Court 27 Cal.4th256 at 279.- That takes me then to the substance of the crossmotions for summary judgment. And here - - and this will beprobably for the benefit - - maybe for the benefit of bothcounsel.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Can I be seated, your Honor?THE COURT: Sure.Ms. McCarron, if you'd like to be seated.MS. MCCARRON: Thank you.THE COURT: The plaintiff argues that the

legislative history shows that the eviction procedure underCivil Code 798.75(c) is not governed by the rules pertaining

to - - to a forcible detainer under Civil Code 1160 and 1172.The Court will note by the Senate Housing and Urban AffairsCommittee record as it pertains to Civil Code 798.75(c), itprovides for a summary eviction procedure and I quote, "Thisbill would provide that such persons could be consideredunlawful occupants and subject to the summary evictionprocedures applicable to other landlord-tenant relationships."And that's Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committee AB 556,May 11, 1987. As noted by the Assembly Judiciary Committee,the terms "forcible detaineru was removed as it only pertainedto occupants holding possession contrary to the previousoccupants. Assembly Judicial (sic) Committee, Republican


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Analysis, April 20, 1987. Implicit in the statement is thatthe eviction process was not meant to be limited to only thosecircumstances covered by Civil Code 1160.

In the Court's view, the language of the statute andthe legislative notes show that the summary eviction processauthorized by the Civil Code 798.75(c) is defined by CivilCode 1160 and 1172. And the Court will note here as well thateven though the - - there was some argument last time regardingthe plaintiff can't prove forcible detainer, the Court willnote here, making an observation, the complaint cites CivilCode Section 798.75 as the basis for the action. Even thoughthe caption on the complaint labels the action as one for aforcible detainer, the citation in the body of the complaintis Civil Code Section 798.75. In this view, the Court doesnot see how this position in the complaint is totallyinconsistent with what is being argued in the summaryj dgment

The Court will note further, erroneous or confusinglabels attached by the pleader are to be ignored if thecomplaint pleads facts which would entitle the plaintiff torelief. It is not what a paper is named but what it is thatfixes its character. That's Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s,.-Cariss, C-a-r-i-s-s, 24 Cal.App.4th - - excuse me - - 224Cal.App.3d 905. That was a case in the context of a demurrer.I'll just make that observation.

The Court has also considered the argument that theplaintiff is citing to - - or defense argument that plaintiffis only citing to subdivision (c) and (d) of Civil Code 798.75


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which is not entirely accurate. According to the defendant,subdivisions (a) and (b) make it clear that Civil Code 798.75only applies in circumstances where ownership is transferred.The Court has considered and looked at those sections.However, it does not appear to the Court that Civil Code798.75 applies only in the event of an escrow sale or transferagreement involving a mobile home located in a park. Theoperative subdivision at issue, Civil Code 798.75(c), is notlimited in its application, only in the escrow, sale ortransfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of amobile home has no right of tenancy and is not otherwiseentitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter.That's Civil Code 798.75(c). This chapter refers to chapter2.5 which is the Mobilehome Residence Law and includes suchprovisions as Civil Code 798.34 as applying to guests atmobile homes.

The Court has considered as well defense argumentthat there's a non-waivable right to have a guest under CivilCode 798.34(b). The Court has considered - - well, also CivilCode 798.34(a). The Court has looked at that section andconsidered that. However, as noted in Matthew Bender,California Real Estate Law, Section 8 Practice, the guest is,however, required to comply with all park rules andregulations. That's Matthew Bender, California Real EstateLaw & Practice Section 155.40. It seems to the Court that aguest of the defendant here - - Ms. McCarron, I should say,must still follow the park rules, including age restrictions.That Is Civil Code 798.34 b)


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The Court has considered as well the case of Otanez,0-t-a-n-e-z, . Blue Skies Mobile Home Park, and it looks likeit's 1 Cal.App.4th 1521 for the proposition that an owner neednot occupy the mobile home full time to qualify as a resident.Court has considered that. That action pertained to a mobiletenant against the owner for a violation of 798.3(a) (sic),prohibiting termination of utility service. I've consideredthat as well. And the Court will note here that the holdingin Otanez is based on the application of Civil Code 79 - -excuse me - - 789.3(a) and the rationale behind that statuteit's not based on Civil Code 798.75 or the language containedin the Community Guidelines. I think Civil Code 789.3(a) isnot a part of the Chapter 2.5, the Mobilehome Residence Law,so the Court does not view the Otanez case as controllingunder these facts.

I lay that as a legal framework and groundwork forthe benefit of both counsel, but that takes me to where I'm atnow with regard to both of the cross motions for summaryjudgment as follows: The Court believes it's - - and I'vetaken fairly extensive notes with this so I'm making it asclear as I can. It is undisputed that the defendant is underthe age of 55 and occupies Ms. McCarronls mobile home. That'sundisputed fact four and eight. Mountain's CommunityGuidelines for residency require that at least one occupant ofa mobile home is a registered owner of the mobile home, hassigned a lease with Mountain for a space to become ahomeowner, and is age 55 or over. All other residents must beage 40 or over. If a prospective sublessee or permanent guest


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is under 55, but over age 40, the qualified age 55 homeownerat all times must regularly occupy the mobile home.Undisputed fact three. Even assuming that defendant is aguest, Civil Code 798.34(b) requires that all guests shallcomply with the provisions of the rules and regulations of themobile home park.

The question here then is whether or not there was atriable issue of fact as to whether Ms. McCarron regularlyoccupies the mobile home as required under section ten of herlease. Plaintiff has provided evidence that during the pastsix months Ms. McCarron stayed in the mobile home at space 333for two or three days at a time and sometimes and at times foran entire week. That is undisputed fact number nine.Defendant has provided Ms. McCarronls testimony that over thelast six months she's been there at least one third of thetime

In the Court's view, then, I think there is atriable issue as to whether or not Ms. McCarron regularlyoccupied the mobile home as required under the rules. So Ithink we have a triable issue and that applies to both motionsfor summary judgment. And I don't see that we have from thedefense side a sufficient showing has been made to meet theburden. My intended, as a result, is to deny both motionsbased on undisputed facts one through 15, and defendant'sundisputed facts one through four, and the supporting evidencethereto. That is the Court's intended with regard to that.

That leaves us then with we have a further hearingFebruary 27th on two motions to compel. And my intention


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there is to rule on those motions. And I'm going to set atrial date and that's where we'll be. So the next hearingwe'll have then will be February 27th at 8:30 here. That'salready been set. So I guess that's - - would be - - yes?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. May I beheard on the one issue on the - - on the Court's ruling withregard to whether there's a material factual issue with regardto whether Ms. McCarron regularly occupies the mobile home?

All the evidence that was submitted in that regardwas from the defendant or from Ms. McCarron. Each in theirdeclaration, they each said "maybe there two or three times aweek." "Maybe sometimes I stay a week." Other evidence thatwas put in were from Ms. McCarronls deposition where she said,I admit, I am in Santa Barbara a lot. I'm in Santa Barbaramore since 2010. Also, there was evidence undisputed put inof Ms. McCarronls testimony in her failed civil harassmentaction that said she was occupying the home for a week withher husband and Ms. Shipley. Which takes it completely out of798 . 34 (b) because she is now living alone.

But, in any event, it's clear and I think theinference - - it's a permissible inference to be drawn from theCourt that being in the mobile home two or three times a week,using it as a second residence which she does appear - - she'sadmitted that in other pleadings, that that is not regularlyoccupying the mobile home. That is consistent with the leaseprovision Clause Ten or the Community Guidelines which areincorporated in the lease.

I would urge the Court to perhaps take another look


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and say is there really a material issue of fact on that?Because we're not disputing for purposes of this motion thatMs. McCarron is there once in awhile, sometimes even staysthere for a week, but that doesn't comport with herobligations under the lease or the Community Guidelines. AndI think that's underscored, your Honor, by the CommunityGuideline, I believe it's Section 5 ( g ) which we cited. Itsays that if the guests - - if the homeowner/person who signedthe lease is not going to be there at all times, then a guestcannot occupy the mobile home. That provision is very, veryclear. And here we have admissions from the defendant andfrom Ms. McCarron that Ms. McCarron is not there all the timeas contemplated by the rules and the lease. So I would urgethe Court to perhaps take a second look at the CommunityGuidelines in Section 5 and especially 5(g).

THE COURT: Okay.MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.THE COURT: Okay.MS. MCCARRON: May I be heard on that, your Honor?THE COURT: I just think it's a disputed fact. I

think it's a disputed fact as to the regular - - as to the - -the frequency or duration of Ms. McCarronrs presence there.And I just think it's a triable issue. So I just think it'sdisputed. I think there's a triable issue.

MS. MCCARRON: Your Honor, I'd like to be heard onthat because you did not address the issue. And I notice thatyou're quoting the little - - those little happy buzz words,permanent guest, and all of those that were created.


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THE COURT: I was just reading from the rules.MS. MCCARRON: You are reading from the new rules.

Guess what? I didn't agree to those new rules. They putthose rules in in 2010, and those rules were made up by theirattorney with specific intent to - - to evict me. And that'snot the rules that I signed when I came on in 2000. And Icited the case and it's Rancho San Bern- - - I'll find it ifyou give me a minute. It's in my papers. There's a case andI have cited it in every paper for seven months now. It'sOjai. It was the park in Ojai. And the court - - it was thesame identical situation, the facts were identical. The womanwas living in the mobile home park for many years, and she meta boyfriend. And she moved to Las Vegas with him, and theycame back and forth to visit all the time. They paid theutilities, kept up the gardening, and when she tried to put afriend in, then they said no.

And the point is what the Court said is that youcannot make a new rule that is unconstitutional in that it'sex post facto in that it changes the whole concept of theagreement that the person made way back ten or 15 years agowhen they moved in. You cannot make new rules that make youable to evict them based on the new rule because that was notnegotiated when they moved in.

When I moved in in '05 there was no little happywords about permanent guests and all of that. And - - and Iknow that they put these new rules in in 2010. And I knowthat under the statute they go into effect. If you sign them,you agree to them. I did not. If you don't sign, they go in


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effect in six months.However, in the statute it says that those rules

must be reasonable. And the whole input - - import of thatcase - - and it was exactly on that same issue, about the rulesbeing changed, and the Court said you cannot change a rule,and in that case what it was was a sublease. They saidthere's no subleasing. And - - and - - and the Court said nobecause when she signed the lease way back ten or 15 years agowhen she first moved in, there was not this prohibitionagainst sublease. And although you can make this prohibitionto new residents that will agree to it when they move in, youcannot apply it to this lady who lived there many years agothat did not contemplate such a rigid rule was going to beapplied to her at some point in the future.

And that's exactly what happened here. When I movedin in '05, I specifically asked Betsy who was the boss, whowas the manager at the time, I said if I get a boyfriend orsomebody, am I going to be stopped from having the boyfriendmove in? She said no. As a matter of fact, my boyfriendstays overnight all the time. He's always here. And you areallowed to have a guest.

Now, when I signed that lease, had I known that, youknow, 15 years - - or eight years later they were going to hirea law firm that was going to come up with a new set of rulesto drive everybody out so that no one can have a girlfriend, aboyfriend, a sister, an aunt, a mother, they have to livealone like a prisoner so that they'll just walk out and turnover the mobile home and give it to them. Um, I - - if I had


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contemplated that when I moved, I would never have signed thatlease in 205.

THE COURT: All we are talking about is summaryjudgment and unlawful detainer. I think there's triableissues. And all I'm going to do is we're going to move itforward and we'll set a trial date. Okay. So that's - - we'lllet a jury decide who they want to believe.

MS. MCCARRON: But, your Honor, what about thepurchaser issue?

THE COURT: SO - -MS. MCCARRON: The purchaser issue, the purchaser

issue. The code only applies to a purchaser.THE COURT: I went through that already. I went

through that in my analysis. You might have missed it. It isnot confined to a purchase transfer situation, is not, as Iread it. So I was very clear. And I took painstaking time tobe very clear about that subject. Okay.

So what I'm going to do is we're going to go aheadand confirm the current date of February 27th on the discoveryissues. Then I'll be setting a trial date from there and wecan have a jury decide the case.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Very well. Thank you, your Honor.THE COURT: We will be in recess.MS. MCCARRON: Your Honor, one more thing. I had

talked about the last time when you postponed this two weeks,I said, you know, that I thought maybe we would be out of hereand I would not have to work on - - because this - - thismotion, this is only part of it. This is the most recent


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amended (indicating). It's about maybe a foot high and I haveto be able to get my objections and everything and do thisopposition. And now it's already February 24th - - I mean, I'msorry - - it's February 14th and this motion is going to beheard on the 27th. So I would like to ask that we have somekind of a continuance on that to give me an opportunity now tohave to do all this work. I mean, it's going to be a lot ofhours of works.

THE COURT: I thought everybody agreed to the date.MS. MCCARRON: No, no. At the last hearing, if you

recall, because you were supposed to rule on it then, and Ibrought that up as an issue. I said, your Honor, you know, Iwant to avoid having to spend all this time - - this motion isa foot high - - having to do all this work to object to it.And you said you would deal with it at the time when we cameback here. That's what the transcript, if you look it up,

it'll say that. I specifically remember. And you said, well,we'll deal with that when you come back, and 1'11 give youplenty of time to get your opposition in. Well, that's notplenty of time. That's only a 14, 24, 13 days away.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor?THE COURT: Okay.MR. WILLIAMSON: This Court - -MS. MCCARRON: And - -THE BAILIFF: One at a time, Counsel.MS. MCCARRON: Okay.MR. WILLIAMSON: This Court on January 10th found

that the motion to compel didn't - - had procedural defects.


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Court ordered that amended motions be filed and be filed percode. Had to be filed on January 24th which it was, andcounsel was to respond per the code. And this is a summaryproceeding and ordinarily you would have five days. But theCourt generously had granted normal, normal time within whichto respond.

THE COURT: Well, I think that's adequate time - -MR. WILLIAMSON: More than that.THE COURT: More than adequate time to respond with

a hearing not till the 27th.MR. WILLIAMSON: Yeah.THE COURT: So I'll go ahead, keep it there for now.

And we just need to have these ruled on and have the matter - -have the matter tried. So - -

MR. WILLIAMSON: Very well.MS. MCCARRON: That is another thing I'd like to

object to, your Honor, because basically what they are doingis they're asking in this order, okay, for a seconddeposition. They're asking you to order us to all have to goback all the way down now to Santa Ana and, you know, I'm noteven a party to this litigation. And neither is Steve Allen.And, you know, we're being - - and that - - and that - - andthat's why it was revoked because the order Judge Schneidermade was way off the wall. It ordered us to go all the way toSanta Ana when we all know that depositions have to be takenwithin 75 miles of a person's residence. And now he is askingyou to go against the rules. We all know that a person's onlyallowed to have one deposition. He's not just asking you to


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make us order certain questions. He's saying order certainquestions and have a follow-up to those questions and orderall these people to have to drive all the way back down now toSanta Ana. Okay.

THE COURT: I don't - -MS. MCCARRON: That's - -THE COURT: I don't recall - -MS. MCCARRON: That's a four-hour drive for me, your

Honor.THE COURT: I don't recall the specifics of the

discovery motion. I am not focused on that right at themoment because I have been dealing with this - - these crossmotions for summary judgment. So - -

MS. MCCARRON: Okay.THE COURT: - - whatever merits the discovery motions

have or don't have, I will deal with those appropriately on

the 27th.MS. MCCARRON: Okay. One more thing, your Honor.

At the time that he first noticed - - at the time when we werearguing about this over in Judge Schneider's court, I wassaying, hey, that's four hours away. We know what the ruleis. You have to do it within 75 miles. And Mr. Williamsonhere argued, oh, no, Ms. Duffy, because your residence is hereat 4040 Piedmont Drive, and 4040 Piedmont Drive is less than75 hours (sic), and this is your residence.

Do you see how he wears two hats?THE COURT: Okay.MS. MCCARRON: He's trying to get out on summary


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judgment by saying it's not my residence, my real residence isSanta Barbara. And yet he was able to tweak Judge Schneiderinto ordering me to drive to Santa (sic) based on the factthat 4040 Piedmont is my residence. Now, what is it, yourHonor? What is my residence? Why is the Court deciding myresidence is 4040 Piedmont when it orders me to appear at adeposition? And yet it's saying now we have an issue of factof where is her residence?

THE COURT: I haven't - -MS. MCCARRON: It's a conflict.THE COURT: I haven't made any orders. And I don't

know. I have no idea about that.MS. MCCARRON: But - - but the Court is, your Honor.

And this taking of two positions, judicial estoppel precludesthis. They gained an advantage by having me have to drive allthe way to Santa Ana for a deposition when I wasn't even a

party. There was no jurisdiction over me.THE COURT: I'm satisfied that judicial estoppel

doesn't apply in this particular circumstance at this point.I'll deal with the issues in the discovery motion, the meritsor lack of merits when I have had the chance to go back andreacquaint myself with those motions.

MS. MCCARRON: Okay. And also what do I respond tobecause I got served with an amended version here? And then Ihave another version that's twice that high, the originalversion. Am I supposed to be - -

THE COURT: There should have only been the originalmotions that were filed. I don't know what else we are


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talking about.MS. MCCARRON: Last time he gave me an amended - -

says amended, I'm reading it right here, amended supplementalstatement, amended supplemental - -

THE COURT: I think that's because - -MS. MCCARRON: Amended supplemental notice.THE COURT: I think that's because there were

procedural infirmities that existed in the original motion andI said I will give the plaintiff time to correct those - -those deficiencies, and then I would give you an adequateopportunity once those are corrected to respond appropriately.Interpose whatever objections you think are appropriate.

MS. MCCARRON: Okay. So am I responding to theamended - -

THE COURT: Those - - I'm assuming those are the onesthat the Court allowed the plaintiff to file to correct the

procedural deficiency that existed in the original motion.MS. MCCARRON: Okay. So we're not going to have the

case where he says, well, she loses on this because we had itin the first motion and she didn't deal with that issue?

THE COURT: These are part of the original motion.Whatever motion is there, including the corrections, will bedealt with at the time of the hearing.

Okay. We'll be in recess.MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.(Proceedings in the above-entitled matterwere concluded.)

--000--


24/24

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIAFOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

--000--STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, dba )MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE 1HOME COMMUNITY, 1

Plaintiff, 11vs ) Case No. UDDS12041301BONNIE SHIPLEY, ) REPORTER'S) CERTIFICATE

Defendant. ))

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )) ss.COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO )

I, VICTORIA E. VILLEGAS, CSR, Official Reporter ofthe Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, dohereby certify that foregoing pages, 1 through 22, to the bestof my knowledge and belief, comprise a full, true and

correct computer-aided transcript of the proceedings taken inthe matter of the above-entitled cause held on Thursday,February 14, 2013.

Dated at San Bernardino, California, this 19th dayof February, 2013.

-1 CSROfficial Reporter, CSR NO .w9843

Transcript-StubvShip 2-14-13 SJM Ruling 1

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Transcript of Transcript-StubvShip 2-14-13 SJM Ruling 1