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TRANSCENDENTAL ALIQUID

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Something (Aliquid) is a Transcendental

‘Something’ (aliquid in Latin, qualcosa in Italian, algo in Spanish)1 is one of the

transcendentals enumerated by St. Thomas Aquinas in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1: “If the mode of being is taken in the second way according to the relation of one being to another we find a two-fold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word something (aliquid), which implies, as it were, some other thing (aliud

quid). For, just as a being is said to be one (unum) insofar as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be something insofar as it is divided from others.”2

If transcendental ‘thing’ or res is being (ens) with an essential content, being (ens) with

an essence (essentia), and if transcendental unity or one (unum) is undivided being (ens) or being (ens) in its indivision, transcendental something (aliquid), understood in the more technical sense of being “another something” (aliud quid in Latin, altro che or qualcosa d’altro in Italian, otro ché in Spanish), is being (ens) as distinct and separate from other beings (entia).

As regards being (ens) in relation to others, we find that being (ens) in its distinction from

other beings (entia) can be said to be something (aliquid). We observe a multitude of beings (entia) around us and immediately we understand that each being (ens) differs from other beings

1 Studies on, or works on metaphysics giving attention to, transcendental something (aliquid): K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, pp. 50-52 ; H. R. SCHMITZ, Un transcendental méconnu, in Cahiers Jacques Maritain, no. 2, 1981, pp. 31-51 ; J. OWENS, An

Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1985, pp. 125-126 ; M. A. KRAPIEC, Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being, Peter Lang, New York, 1991, pp. 133-137 ; L. ELDERS, La

metafisica dell’essere di san Tommaso d’Aquino in una prospettiva storica: (I) L’essere comune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp. 109-112 ; P. W. ROSEMANN, Omne ens est aliquid. Introduction à la lecture du

‘système’ philosophique de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Éditions Peeters, Louvain and Paris, 1996 ; J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996 ; G. VENTIMIGLIA, Differenza e

contraddizione. Il problema dell’essere in Tommaso d’Aquino: esse, diversum, contradictio, Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1997 ; P. W. ROSEMANN, Aliquid: Ein vergessenes Transzendentale, in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), edited by J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer, Berlin and New York, 1998, pp. 529-537 ; E. TIEFENSEE, ‘Ens et aliquid convertuntur’ – oder: Sein ist immer anders. Ein möglicher Brückenschlag zwischen

der mittelalterlichen Seinsphilosophie und der spätmodernen ‘Philosophie der Differenz,’ in Prudentia und

Contemplatio. Ethik und Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Festschrift für Georg Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag), edited by J. Brachtendorf, Paderborn and Munich, 2002, pp. 170-195 ; B. MONDIN, La metafisica di S. Tommaso e i suoi

interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 146-149 and 463-466 ; T. MELENDO, Metafisica del concreto, Ed. Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2005, pp. 133-137 ; L. CLAVELL and M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 188-190 ; J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor

(ca. 1225) to Francisco Suarez, Brill, Leiden, 2012 ; J. A. MITCHELL, Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological

Foundation of the Transcendentals, “Alpha Omega,” 16.1 (2013), pp. 39-78. 2 De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1. “Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se ita dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum.”

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(entia). That rock next to my foot is not that dog next to the rock, and that mango tree on the side of the house is not the cat on the top of the roof of the house. The apple tree beside me is not that other apple tree beside it. And the hundreds of ants crawling up the mango tree are all different, individual beings (entia) separate and divided off from one another. This separation or division manifested in the distinction of one being (ens) from another being (ens) gives rise to transcendental something (aliquid) as aliud quid, which is none other than being (ens) in its division or separateness from other beings (entia).

Something (Aliquid) is a Transcendental Notion

Jan Aertsen definitely maintains that something (aliquid) is a transcendental notion,

writing, within the context of De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, the following: “…in the central text on the transcendentals, De Veritate, 1.1, ‘division’ is introduced as the first condition of the relational transcendentals. The order of one being to another can be secundum divisionem, and this is expressed by the name aliquid. Being is called aliquid insofar as it is divided from other things. The same phrase is used by Thomas in his description of the third step in the genesis of the primary notions: when we understand that this being is not that being, we apprehend that it is divided from the other. The similarity between the formulations is a strong indication that aliquid must be incorporated in Thomas’s sketch of the genesis of the primary notions. It expresses in a transcendental way the division of one being from another.

“Aliquid literally means ‘another quid.’ The quidditative aspect of a being is positively

expressed by the transcendental res. Every being is a ‘thing,’ for it has through its essence or quiddity a stable and determinate mode of being. Every determination includes a negation. This being is not that being; they are opposed, not as beings as such but insofar as they have determinate modes of being. Only if ‘being’ is considered as ‘thing’ can one being be formally divided from another being. Our conclusion is that the transition from the negation of being to the division in Thomas’s account of the primary notions is only comprehensible if the transcendentals res and aliquid are taken into consideration.”3

3 J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. 222-223. In his 2012 study, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, published by Brill in 2012, Aertsen observes the following concerning the connection between the notions of aliquid and multitudo in relation to some recent studies on St. Thomas thought on the transcendental aliquid: “Recent studies have underlined the importance of aliquid (in the sense of aliud quid) as a bridge towards the modern ‘philosophy of the difference.’(Cf. P. W. ROSEMANN, Omne

ens est aliquid. Introduction à la lecture du ‘système’ philosophique de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Éditions Peeters, Louvain and Paris, 1996 ; P. W. ROSEMANN, Aliquid: Ein vergessenes Transzendentale, in Was ist Philosophie im

Mittelalter? (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), edited by J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer, Berlin and New York, 1998, pp. 529-537 ; E. TIEFENSEE, ‘Ens et aliquid convertuntur’ – oder: Sein ist immer anders. Ein möglicher

Brückenschlag zwischen der mittelalterlichen Seinsphilosophie und der spätmodernen ‘Philosophie der Differenz,’ in Prudentia und Contemplatio. Ethik und Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Festschrift für Georg Wieland zum 65.

Geburtstag), edited by J. Brachtendorf, Paderborn and Munich, 2002, pp. 170-195). An interesting connection deserves our attention: ‘something’ belongs to the relational transcendentals and is described as the reverse side of the ‘one.’ Whereas unum expresses that being is undivided in itself – and therefore does not deny multiplicity, but division, – aliquid means that one being ‘is divided from others.’ One could consider aliquid as the concept of what is presupposed in the idea of relational transcendentals. The condition for the relationality is that there is something else (aliud), that is to say, a multitude of beings. The notion of aliquid is connected with the notion of multitudo, expressing that one thing is not another (De potentia, q. 9, a. 7: ‘Et sic (…) multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum.’ Cf. for this connection J. A. Aertsen, Medieval

Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. 222-223 and pp. 225-226). This connection may

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If Aersten stresses the roles of res, essence (essentia) and multitudo in transcendental aliquid, Tomás Melendo, on the other hand, in his Metafisica de lo concreto (Metafisica del

concreto), stresses the centrality of the act of being (esse) in the constituting of transcendental aliquid as aliud quid, which he describes as ‘alterità’: “Nello sviluppo delle implicazioni di questa dottrina è diventato comune riferire l’‘alterità’ di un ente all’essenza che lo costituisce, e che lo limita e distingue l’essere ricevuto in essa. Facendo un passo avanti sulla stessa linea, credo necessario far coincidere l’alterità di ogni esistente nello stesso atto di essere che lo costituisce. Infatti, come afferma in forma implicità Tommaso d’Aquino, ‘ogni realità è una ed ente in virtù di uno stesso principio’: cioè, il suo atto di essere; e aggiunge: ‘l’atto di essere di ogni cosa le è proprio ed è diverso dall’essere di qualsiasi altra cosa’; e, in maniera ancor più definitiva: ‘nelle creature, i soggetti si distinguono in base all’essere.’4

“Le conseguenze di questo spostamento di prospettiva sono notevoli. Per esempio, poiché

l’atto di essere proprio ed esclusivo di ogni ente è il fondamento della sua intrinseca distinzione, non si differenzieranno solo le realtà appartenenti a diverse specie, ma anche, in forma reciproca, i soggetti che le compongono. Inoltre – e questo è di straordinaria importanza –, l’autonoma distinzione di ogni ente verrà incrementata in base alla nobiltà del suo rispettivo atto di essere; e troveremo l’apice della differenziazione nelle persone, che, in senso strettamente radicale, non potranno mai essere considerate soltanto come un semplice esponente della loro specie e neppure potranno esserne subordinate. Infine, come già abbiamo visto, l’accertata superiorità dell’individuo personale lo farà diventare rigorosamente unico, irripetibile e incomparabile.”5

With the notion of transcendental something (aliquid), we are considering being (ens),

not in itself, either positively (with res) or negatively (with unum), but in relation to others in its distinction among other beings (entia). In view of the distinction among beings (entia) we can affirm that each of these beings (entia) is “something.” When we observe a multiplicity of beings (entia) around us we immediately understand that each being (ens) differs from all the rest. The separation or division manifested in the distinction of one being (ens) from another being (ens) gives rise to the transcendental mode, or attribute of being (ens) called something (aliquid as aliud quid). Contrary to Bittle’s position that something (aliquid) is nothing but a concept opposed to nothingness or non-entity, we affirm that something (aliquid), in its primary and most adequate sense, is “another something” (aliud quid), which is being (ens) as separate and divided from other beings (entia).

explain the notable fact that the term transcendens is used most frequently by Thomas with respect to the notion of ‘multitude.’”(J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, Brill, Leiden, 2012, p. 225). Giovanni Ventimiglia (b. 1964) has written extensively on the connection between aliquid and multitudo (G. VENTIMIGLIA, Differenza e contraddizione. Il problema dell’essere in Tommaso d’Aquino: esse, diversum,

contradictio, Vita e Pensiero, Milan, 1997). Brief descriptions of Ventimiglia’s views on the connection between aliquid and multitudo are found in: B. MONDIN, La metafisica di S. Tommaso e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 146-149 and 465-466 ; J. A. MITCHELL, Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the

Transcendentals, “Alpha Omega,” 16.1 (2013), pp. 39-78. 4 Tommaso d’Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 3, c (‘esse uniusquisque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei’); De spiritualibus creaturis, q. un., a. 9, ad 3 (‘unumquodque secundum idem est unum et ens’); In I librum Sententiarum, d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 (‘in creaturis supposita distincta sunt per esse’). 5 T. MELENDO, Metafisica del concreto, Ed. Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2005, p. 117.

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Is the transcendental notion of aliquid as aliud quid merely identical with the transcendental notion of one (unum)? No. Though indeed “another something” depends upon the notions of being (ens) and on unity (one or unum), it is not identical with transcendental unity (one or unum), nor with the notion of being (ens) for that matter; rather, instead of simply stating that being is that which is, and instead of simply stating the lack of internal division in a being (ens), which is what unity [one or unum] does, aliquid as aliud quid emphasizes one existing and undivided being’s distinction and separation from all other beings (entia). This one existing and undivided being (ens) is “another something” (aliquid as aliud quid) in relation to other beings (entia).

Whether Something (Aliquid) is Not Just a Transcendental Notion But Also a

Transcendental Property of Being (Ens)

Is something (aliquid) not just a transcendental notion but also a transcendental property

of being? Celestine Bittle states that there are five transcendental concepts apart from being: thing (res), something (aliquid), one (unum), true (verum), and good (bonum). But then he immediately adds that thing and something are synonymous with being, having no real differences of meaning between them as both thing and something merely signify the opposite of non-entity.6 So, for Bittle, there are only three transcendental properties or attributes of being: oneness, truth, and goodness.7 Something (aliquid) is not on his list of transcendental properties of being. But Bittle’s position that res and aliquid are simply synonymous with being (ens) is mistaken, for res and aliquid are not simply synonymous with being, but are both notionally distinct from being (the distinction being a minor virtual one), both ‘adding’ to the notion of being (ens). And res and aliquid do not merely signify the opposite of non-entity, as res is being (ens) with an essential content, being (ens) with an essence (essentia), the term res being taken from the essence (essentia), while the term ens is taken from esse. And aliquid as aliud quid is being (ens) as separate and divided from all other beings (entia). This is the primary and most adequate meaning of aliquid, although aliquid can also, in a secondary way, mean ‘something’ as opposed to absolute non-being or nothingness.

Like Bittle, Henri Renard also asserts that there are five transcendental concepts (res,

unum, aliquid, verum, and bonum), while also maintaining that there are only three properties, namely, unum, verum and bonum. Renard explains his position as follows: “If we consider carefully these five transcendental concepts, we shall become aware that the first, ‘the thing’ (res), is almost synonymous with ‘being.’ The only difference is that ‘the thing’ stresses the essence, while ‘being’ rather connotes the order to the ‘to be.’ Likewise, the third of these transcendental concepts, ‘something’ (aliquid), signifies really the same as ‘the one’ (unum); for, as a matter of fact, if a being is undivided in itself it is, therefore, ‘one’ (unum); and it follows that it must be distinct from any other and is, therefore, ‘something’ (aliquid). Hence, we must say that while there are five transcendental concepts besides the notion of ‘being,’ there can be only three properties of being. The reason is clear: A property, even in the broad sense in which we speak here of properties of ‘being,’ should be at least logically distinct from that of which it is said to be a property.”8

6 Cf. C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 131-132. 7 C. BITTLE, op. cit. , p. 132. 8 H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 171.

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However, in criticism of Renard’s position, one observes that he holds that for transcendental properties of being to be transcendental properties of being, they cannot simply be synonymous with being but must notionally ‘add’ to the notion of being (notions designating aspects belonging to being as being, notions expressing some properties which follow upon being in general, that is, properties belonging to all things, notions that make explicit the manners of being that are common [analogously] to all beings). However, Renard doesn’t mention that thing (res) is simply synonymous with being (as Bittle asserts), but he says that res is almost synonymous with being. Now if res is only “almost synonymous with being,” as Renard affirms, and not simply synonymous with being, then res, in fact, does ‘add’ notionally to the notion of being (ens): res is being (ens) with an essential content or is being (ens) with an essence (essence), while being (ens) is that which ‘is’ (the stress here with being [ens] is with the act of being [esse], the term being [ens] is taken from the act of being [esse], while res stresses essential content, stresses essence, the term res is taken from essentia). And, also against the position of Renard, the notion of aliquid as aliud quid is not “the same” as the notion of one (unum), which is being (ens) in its indivision or being (ens) as undivided; rather, aliquid as aliud

quid is being (ens) as separate and divided from other beings (entia). And since being (ens) is that which is, and aliquid as aliud quid is being (ens) as

separated and divided off from other beings (entia), therefore, against Renard’s position, we affirm that in the notion of aliquid as aliud quid (which is a notion different also from the notion of transcendental one or unum, as unum considers being in itself negatively, denying internal division, while aliquid as aliud quid considers being in relation to others in view of the distinction among beings), there is a notional ‘adding’ to the notion of being (ens).

Henry Koren, who calls aliquid “otherness” rather than ‘something,’ writes concerning

whether aliquid is a transcendental property of being, that considered as aliud quid or “some other thing,” ‘otherness’ (aliquid) cannot be considered to be a transcendental property of being, since it ‘flows’ immediately from the concept of unum and not immediately from ens: “‘Otherness,’ if it is taken in the sense of ‘not-nothing’ adds to being a comparison with the concept of non-being and thus is often considered to be a transcendental property. If, however, ‘otherness’ is taken in the sense of ‘some other thing,’ it is not a transcendental property; for it does not flow immediately from the concept of being but rather from the concept of ‘one,’ which means undivided in itself and divided from everything else.”9 But what Koren has done here with his description “‘one,’ which means undivided in itself and divided from everything else,” is that he has merely incorporated the description of transcendental aliquid as aliud quid, in the second half of his description, into his description of transcendental one (unum). But transcendental one (unum), states St. Thomas, “is the absence of internal division within a being.”10 Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo explain that “transcendental unity is nothing but the undividedness of a being. Through this notion, we add nothing real to things, but only the negation of internal division, that is, the undividedness which every being has of itself by virtue of its esse.”11 Therefore, against the position of Koren, we affirm that transcendental aliquid as aliud quid is notionally different from the notion of one (unum) and notionally ‘adds’ to the notion of being (ens): if being (ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est), and if one (unum) is being (ens) in its indivision, then

9 H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, p. 53. 10 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a.1. 11 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 142.

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notionally different from two preceding notions, aliquid as aliud quid (its primary and most adequate meaning), is being (ens) as separate and divided off from other beings (entia).

Also, in contrast to the position of Koren, it should be noted that though something

(aliquid) does not follow from a consideration of a being in itself, either positively, as is the case with thing (res), or negatively, as is the case with unity (one or unum), it follows from a consideration of a being (ens) in relation to other beings (entia) in view of the distinction among beings (entia).

Aliquid as aliud quid or “another something” is the primary meaning of transcendental

something (aliquid) as described in St. Thomas’s De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1., though in a secondary way aliquid means “something” as opposed to absolute non-being or nothingness. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: “‘Something’ (aliquid) is equivalent to ‘another something’ (aliud

quid), and expresses the property of being (ens) as being a thing that is distinct with respect to others, within the ambit of the multiplicity of created beings (entia): this man is other than that

man. “…In a certain sense, ‘something’ (aliquid) can also mean that being (ens) is perfectly

opposed to absolute non-being (nothingness). Thus, we say: ‘whereas we did not have anything before, now we do have something.’”12

While H. D. Gardeil, working on the list of transcendentals in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1,

definitely affirms that something (aliquid) is a transcendental notion, as regards whether something (aliquid) can be considered not just a transcendental notion but also a transcendental property of being, he has this to say: “As for ‘something,’ it can be interpreted in two ways. 12 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 149. The Italian version of this passage reads as follows: “…il termine qualcosa (aliquid) equivale ad altro che (aliud quid), ed esprime la proprietà dell’ente di essere una cosa distinta dalle altre, nell’ambito della molteplicità degli enti creati: quest’uomo è altro rispetto a quello. “…In un certo senso, ‘qualcosa’ significa anche che l’ente è il perfetto opposto del non-ente assoluto (il nulla): ‘questo è già qualcosa, prima non avevamo nulla’(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica, La Monnier, Florence, 1987, p. 130). The Spanish 1982 original reads: “…‘algo’ (aliquid) equivale a otro ché (aliud

quid), y expresa la característica del ente de ser una cosa distinta respecto a las demás, en el seno de la multiplicidad de los entes creados: este hombre es otro que aquél. “…En cierto sentido, ‘algo’ significa también que el ente es el opuesto perfecto del no-ente en absoluto (de la nada): ‘esto ya es algo, antes no teníamos nada’”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1982, p. 148). In the 2006 Metafisica book co-authored by Miguel Pérez de Laborda and Luis Clavell and published by EDUSC in Rome (which is a new and different book from the Metafisica manual of T. Alvira, L. Clavell, and T. Melendo), Luis Clavell, who authored the second half of the book (which comprises part three on the transcendentals and part four on causality), states: “Poiché ‘aliquid’ accentua la distinzione di un ente rispetto a ciò che non è esso, la sua traduzione più adeguata sembra essere ‘altro che’ o ‘qualcosa d’altro’ (aliud quid), ed esprime la proprietà dell’ente di essere diverso da tutti gli altri, nell’ambito dell’universo degli enti: quest’uomo è altro rispetto a quello… “Comunque, l’espressione aliquid si può usare in modi diversi. In un senso. Il termine ‘qualcosa’ può significare che l’ente è il perfetto opposto del non-ente assoluto (il nulla): ad esempio ‘questo che abbiamo ottenuto è già qualcosa, prima non avevamo nulla.’ Questo essere qualcosa invece di nulla si può esprimere anche con l’espressione ‘realtà.’ Nella conoscenza umana è frequente usare gli opposti per chiarire o sottolineare un concetto. Quindi il concetto interamente negativo di nulla potrebbe avere un carattere di sottolineatura della positività dell’essere, in modo tale che la nozione di aliquid potrebbe aggiungere qualcosa solo nel pensiero alla nozione di ente”(L. CLAVELL, Aliquid, in L. Clavell and M. Pérez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, p. 189).

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Either it denotes the opposition or distinction of one being to another, and then it may be regarded as a consequence of the unity of being; or it marks the opposition of being to nonbeing – namely, that being is something other than nonbeing –, in which case it expresses an original and primary aspect of being. Yet granted the authenticity of ‘thing’ and ‘something’ as transcendental properties of being, it is doubtful that they command the same philosophical interest as does the triad of the one, the true, the good, deservedly recognized as the classical three.”13

John F. Wippel, on the other hand, in his The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas

(2000), unambiguously affirms that, for Aquinas in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, aliquid as aliud quid is indeed a transcendental property of being,14 and Jason Mitchell, in his 2013 article, Aquinas on

the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Trascendentals, states that aliquid is a transcendental property of being as being (ens qua ens), a transcendental property of ens in

ordine ad aliud.15 Henri Grenier, who states that “the properties of being are called the transcendentals,”16

affirms that there are five transcendental properties of being (ens), namely: “thing, unity, otherness, truth, and goodness (res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum). Some scholastics claim that there are only four transcendentals: unity, otherness, truth, and goodness; and others claim that there are only three: unity, truth, and goodness. They maintain that thing, though it is one of the transcendentals, is synonymous with being, and therefore is not a property of being. Others hold the same opinion in regard to otherness. But we reply that all the transcendentals express a general mode of being which the term being does not express, and therefore they are properties of being. Hence, just as the transcendentals are five in number, so too are the properties of being five in number.”17

Unfortunately, Grenier fails to include beauty (pulchrum) in his list of transcendental

properties of being, that ‘forgotten transcendental’ which the scholarship of existential Thomists such as Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain (working on texts such as Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Divine Names [In Divinis Nominibus]) would bring back to focus in the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twenty-first century we find Battista Mondin afffirming in his 2002 book, La metafisica di San Tommaso d’Aquino e i suoi interpreti, that beauty (pulchrum) is indeed a transcendental property of being: “La bellezza è una proprietà transcendentale dell’essere, distinta dalla verità e dalla bontà; è presente universalmente ma si predica analogicamente, prima di Dio e poi delle creature.”18 13 H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St. Louis, 1967, pp. 125-126. 14 Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 192-194. 15 Cf. J. A. MITCHELL, Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcendentals, “Alpha Omega,” 16.1 (2013), pp. 39 and 78. 16 H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown, Canada, 1950, p. 32. 17 Ibid. 18 B. MONDIN, La metafisica di San Tommaso d’Aquino e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, p. 502: Mondin also states: “Il bello è definito come ciò da cui la conoscenza trae piacere. La bellezza è quindi in rapporto con la verità; essa si chiama splendore del vero (splendor veri), dal momento che si realizza nella chiarezza, nello splendore e nell’armonia delle parti o nella richezza interiore dell’essenza. Tuttavia la bellezza è collegata anche al

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Going back to transcendental something (aliquid), Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo rightly stress that aliquid (as well as as thing [res]) are transcendentals of finite beings and cannot be applied to God in the strict sense: “Thing and something are transcendentals as far as creatures are concerned (they apply to all of them), but they cannot be applied to God in the strict sense…‘Thing’ (res) does not express a property of being (ens) as such, but only the name which befits a being in view of the other constituent principle (essence) of every created thing. Consequently, strictly speaking, the notion ‘thing’ does not apply to God, who is Esse Subsistens Himself and whose act of being is not received in an essence.19 But, in the case of creatures, the name ‘thing’ gives greater stress (in comparison with the name ‘being’) to composition and limitation which essence puts on the act of being…

“…In a certain sense, the notion aliquid could be attributed to God. God is, in fact, the

‘Other’ par excellence, infinitely superior and transcendent to the world. However, the application of this term to God entails the danger of making man, or the world, as the absolute reference point, with God becoming something relative (since God would be called other in relation to the universe). The notion aliquid properly belongs to created being, where multiplicity holds sway…”20

bene. S. Tommaso chiama il bello una ‘specie del bene.’ Ma l’espressione species boni è intesa chiaramente nel senso che il bello aggiunge qualcosa al bene, vale a dire una particolare armonia con la mente che risulta dalla chiarezza e proporzione che sono propri delle cose. Il bello è collegato al vero dal momento che è subordinato alle facoltà conoscitive ed è collegato al bene in quanto soddisfa l’appetito. Il bello è di conseguenza quella proprietà dell’essere che nasce dalla combinazione del vero e del bene”(B. MONDIN, op. cit., p. 499). 19 This does not mean that God has no essence. It only means that in God, the divine essence does not limit the divine Esse; it is more proper to say that the essence of God is identical with His Esse (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4, c.). 20 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 134-135.