Trainees Report

8/8/2019 Trainees Report

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SUMMER TRAININGReport

Sumitted by:Amar Sood , 3rd semester, M. Planning, Dept of Urban Planning.

ABOUT GFDRGLOBAL FORUM FOR DISASTER REDUCTION (GFDR) is dedicated to the promotion of

sustainable disaster reduction through a synergy of knowledge and skills. It endeavours to be a

platform for collating knowledge and information and its dissemination to the society. The USP ofGFDR is the creation of a vital, extensive and comprehensive data base, updated constantly to

accelerate the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation towards sustainable development.

GFDR aims to create a pool of global knowledge, experience, practices and skills for application

at the local level. Hence the motto, global vision local action.

GFDRs core area of activities would include : providing consultancy regarding incorporation of

disaster management concepts in business plans and creation of a network of professionals to

provide specialized disaster information and training.

WORLD CONFERENCE ON DISASTER REDUCTIONThe First Ever International Conference on Disaster Reduction, focusing on corporate sectors

role and responsibility will be held in India with an objective to connect government agencies,

relief organizations and the corporate world.

The conference focuses on the crucial role the corporate sector could play in mitigating humansuffering wrought by disasters, by effectively collaborating with the government, international and

national relief organizations.


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While disaster reduction is a collective responsibility of the entire society, the corporate sector is

better placed to deal with it than others. The vibrant global corporate sector can play a vital role in

disaster reduction.

The conference will facilitate convergence of the best rains in disaster management from across

the world. Eminent experts with national and international exposure share their knowledge andexperience and present case studies to prove how the world is sitting pretty on a pile of disasters,

utterly unconcerned.

It will launch an exhaustive reference manual-cum-diary of Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) for Disaster Reduction. SOPs will draw from the vast knowledge of the key participants,

professional disaster managers on the latest technology and best practices available in the world

to meet the disasters.

Overall, the conference aims to create awareness about disasters, which come unannounced andhelp the people in their preparedness with the message that prevention is safer and cheaper than

firefighting and to make them proactive rather than reactive.


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CITY PLANNING AND DISASTERS

Role of Corporate Sec tor

1.0 URBAN PLANNING

Definition And Purview

Urban Planning or Town Planning can be defined as:

The art and science of ordering the use of land and the character and citing of buildings and communication

routes so as to secure the maximum practicable degree of economy, convenience and beauty. (Principles and

Practice of Town and Country Planning, Lewis Keeble, 1969).

Urban planning encourages the systematic development of a city. It is a system through which comprehensive

plans that guarantee people a healthy and cultural lifestyle, the rational use of the land and facilities, which form

the city's core, and the development of an orderly urban landscape can be effectively achieved. Specifically,

urban planning deals with, among other things, urbanization zones, zones to be urbanized in a regulatedfashion, land use in zoning areas, roads, parks, sewerage, other urban facilities, land readjustment projects,

urban renewal projects, other urban development enterprises, and district planning to make the best use of an

area's special characteristics in order to develop a favorable urban environment.

When planning for a city, the various dynamics of the city come into play that has to be considered, for they

demand space and infrastructure. These include the major activities of the cities such as trading, administration

etc, the economic centers of the city, and residential areas for the population of the city, physical and social

infrastructure required for the activities and the population and other such elements. Other considerations such

as sustainability, safety, aesthetics etc, are also taken into account.

1.1 RECENT TRENDS IN PLANNING

In an ever-evolving world, the needs of the society and its dynamics are also changing. Hence, the approach to

plan for such societies is also undergoing metamorphosis. Planning, in India, started with the five-year plans

initiated with the central government determining the direction of development. City level master plans first came

into being with the adopting of the Delhi Master Plan of 1962, the aegis of which can be traced to the Interim

General Plan of 1959.

The Master Plan approach was adopted from the British system of planning and basically deals with the spatial

aspects of the city in terms of a landuse plan. The master plans, if implemented properly and timely, are anexcellent tool to achieve planned development of cities and surrounding areas. Plagued with the inadequacies in

the approach and its implementation, newer ways of planning for the city are being adopted. One of them is the

City Development Strategy, which aims towards developing a financial implementation plan. In the overall

planning scenario, some paradigm changes have occurred:


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1. Prescriptive to Proactive planning Planning, from the its beginnings in the five-year plans, was being done

by the higher echelons of the bureaucracy prescribing the direction of growth and development with little or

no contact with the people who were to be affected. The lack of awareness hence, generated a sense of

distrust towards the intentions of the planners, which eventually, along with other factors, led to failure of

many plans. Today, the approach is more towards a participatory nature of planning where the community

and the private sector is involved from the inception to the implementation stage of a plan.2. Long term to Short term planning A major reason of failure of the master plans was the time taken for the

formulation of a master plan and the duration for which a plan was made. The data collection stage took

about 1-3 years, which made the data itself old, and the plan was made for upto 20 years, enough time for a

number of changes to occur to make the plan defunct. The approach has changed from making such long

duration plans to shorter duration plans of upto 5 years.

3. From Top down to Bottom-up approach This is a paradigm change in the planning process that has

occurred only very recently, although the seeds were sown from the first five-year plan. The focus of

planning has changed towards meeting distributional equity growth with justice and improvement in the

quality of life resulting in bottom-up approach. Decentralization, thus involves delegation of decision-makingpowers with corresponding devolution of resources. Decentralization thus helps in a balanced regional

development at one level, as well as helps in removing disparities between regions at the regional level.

Top-down planning, on the other hand, was creating imbalances between regions by concentrating

development in one region or concentrating development initiatives in one sector within a region.

Planning for an urban area hence involves a number of aspects, which are working in the city. It not only deals

with the actual infrastructure on ground, but also with the financial, institutional, administrative, legal and social

aspects.

1.2 CORPORATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT

Need for Participation

In planning of urban areas, policies are usually made by public bodies while shelter provision has substantial

contributions by the private sector through individual and corporate efforts. The public sector is focused on social

goals of equitable access to land, public health, education and environment whereas the private sector

developers have main goal of expedient urban development as a means of increasing returns on investment.

Furthermore, under the New Economic Policy of India directives based on principles of market economy,

funding from different government bodies to its subordinate organizations will gradually diminish. The only viable

alternative for public bodies is to foster an environment to help develop a more efficient, financially sustainablesystem for urban development with basic services.

Thus, under the model for Public-Private Partnership, the strengths of public and private sectors would

be combined so that each ones strength off-sets the weakness of the other to meet development requirements.


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Public Private Partnership models

A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public agency (central, state or local) and for-

profit corporation. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in

delivering a service or facility for the use of general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party

shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.

- Partnerships are means to increase the availability of financial, human and technical resources.

- The partnership involves mutual commitment for mutual benefits.

In this, role of public and private sector actors is clearly defined. This could be in form of public agencies

restricting their role by supply of land, provision of infrastructure, facilities and handling over the developed land

to private developers under stipulated terms and conditions and private sector on their part, providing requisite

on-site infrastructure along with development of built spaces for different uses. Public-Private partnership can

happen through varying degree of participation at various stages of plan preparation, implementation and

monitoring of the project. These partnership models can be described as follows:

(i) Build / Operate / Transfer (BOT) or Build / Transfer / Operate (BTO)

The private partner builds a facility to the specifications agreed to by the public agency, operates the facility for aspecified time period under a contract or franchise agreement with the agency, and then transfers the facility to

the agency at the end of the specified period of time. In most cases, the private partner will provide some, or an,

of the financing for the facility, so the length of the contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable the private

partner to realize a reasonable return on his investment through user charges.

At the end of the franchise period, the public partner can assume operating responsibility for the facility,

contract the operations to the original franchise holder, or award a new contract or franchise to a new private

partner. The BTO model is similar to the BOT model except that the transfer to the public owner takes place at

the time that construction is completed, rather than at the end of the franchise period.

(ii) Build Own Operate (BOO)

The contractor constructs and operates a facility without transferring ownership to the public sector. Legal title to

the facility remains n the private sector, and there is no obligation for the public sector to purchase the facility or

take title. A BOO transaction may qualify for a tax-exempt status as a service contract if all Internal Revenue

Code requirements are satisfied.

(iii) Buy Build Operate (BBO)

A BBO is a form of asset sale that includes a rehabilitation or expansion of an existing facility. The government

sells the asset to the private sector entity, which makes the improvements necessary to operate the facility in a

profitable manner.

(iv) Contract Services

(A). OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCEA public partner (central, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to

provide and/or maintain a specific service. Under the private operation and maintenance option, the public

partner retains ownership and overall management of the public facility or system.


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(B) OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT

A public partner (center, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to

operate, maintain, and manage a facility or system proving a service. Under this contract option, the public

partner retains ownership of the public facility or system, but the private party may invest its own capital in the

facility or system. Any private investment is carefully calculated in relation to its contributions to operational

efficiencies and savings over the term of contract. Generally, the longer the contract term, the greater theopportunity for increased private investment because there is no more time available in which to recoup any

investment and earn a reasonable return. Many local governments use this contractual partnership to provide

wastewater treatment services.

(v) Design Build (DB)

A DB is when the private partner provides both design and construction of a project to the public agency. This

type of partnership can reduce time, save money, provide stronger guarantees and allocate additional project

risk to the private sector. It also reduces conflict by having a single entity responsible to the public owner for the

design and construction. The public sector partner owns the assets and has the responsibility for the operation

and maintenance.(vi) Design Build Maintain (DBM)

A DBM is similar to DB except the maintenance of the facility for some period of time becomes the responsibility

of the private sector partner. The benefits are similar to the DB with maintenance risk being allocated to the

private sector partner and the guarantee expanded to include maintenance. The public sector partner owns and

operates the assets.

(vii) Design Build Operate (DBO)

A single contract is awarded for the design, construction, and operation of a capital improvement. Title to the

facility remains with the public sector unless the project is a design / build / operate / transfer or design / build /

own / operate project. The DBO method of contracting is contrary to the separated and sequential approach

ordinarily used in the United States by both public and private sectors. This method involves one contract for

design with an architect or engineer, followed by a different contract with a builder for project construction,

followed by the owners taking over the project and operating it.

A simple design build approach creates a single point of responsibility for design and construction and can

speed project completion by facilitating the overlap of the design and construction phases of the project. On a

public project, the operation phase is normally handled by the public sector under a separate operations and

maintenance agreement. Combining all three passes into a DBO approach maintains the continuity of private

sector involvement and can facilitate private sector financing of public projects supported by user fees

generated during the operations phase.

(viii) Lease / Develop / Operate (LDO) or Build / Develop / Operate (BDO)Under these partnerships arrangements, the private party leases or buys an existing facility from a public

agency; invests its own capital to renovate, modernize, and/or expand the facility; and then operates it under a

contract with the public agency. A number of different types of municipal transit facilities have been leased and

developed under LDO and BDO arrangements.


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(ix) Lease / Purchase

A lease / purchase is an installment purchase contract. Under this model, the private sector finances and builds

a new facility. The public agency makes scheduled lease payments to the private party. The public agency

accrues equity in the facility with each payment. At the end of the lease term, the public agency owns the facility

or purchases it at the cost of any remaining unpaid balance in the lease.

Under this agreement, the facility may be operated by either the public agency or the private developer duringthe term of the lease. Lease/purchase arrangements have been used by the General Services Administration for

building federal office buildings and by a number of states to build prisons and other correctional facilities.

(x) Turnkey

A public agency contracts with a private investor / vendor to design and build a complete facility in accordance

with specified performance standards and criteria agreed to between the agency and the vendor. The private

developer commits to build the facility for a fixed price and absorbs the construction risk of meeting that price

commitment. Generally, in a turnkey transaction, the private partners use fast-track construction techniques

(such as design-build) and are not bound by traditional public sector procurement regulations. This combination

often enables the private partner to complete the facility in significantly less time and for less cost that could beaccomplished under traditional construction techniques.

In a turnkey transaction, financing and ownership of the facility can rest with either the public or private partner.

For e.g. the public agency might provide the financing, with the attendant costs and risks. Alternatively, the

private party might provide the financing capital, generally in exchange for a long term contract to operate the

facility.

Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : India

Successful public-private partnership models are being followed worldwide today in various fields of Urban

Development. In many parts of the world, urban facilities like electricity and power, water supply, roads,

sanitation, etc are being run through contractual agreement between the public and the private enterprises. In

India, though, this concept has gain popularity in the recent past whereby various urban services like roads,

highways and electricity are being successfully implemented by the means of a public-private partnership model.

Flyway, Greater NOIDA

t and very successful example being the construction of the toll plaza near Greater NOIDA. DND Flyway grew o

bridge the growing population of Delhi with its neighbours across the Yamuna.

Today, 30% of Delhi's population lives in the Trans-Yamuna area and there was a need to build a major conn

facility between the areas growing on both sides of the Yamuna. The project has been supported by Indiainternational engineers, contractors, operators and investors. The Flyway, an outcome of innovative technic

financial engineering, has been built with due care for environmental concerns. The Noida Toll Bridge Compa

(NTBCL) has been promoted by Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd. (IL&FS) and New Okhla Ind

Development Authority (NOIDA), as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to develop, construct, operate and maint


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DND Flyway on a Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) basis.

2. Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (RUIDP)

Rajasthan is the largest state of the country (areawise). At the time of its formation the population of the state was

1.60 crores which has now increased to 3 times and has been recorded at 5.65 crores as per the 2001 census.

Out of this a population of 1.32 crores (23.38%) is residing in the urban areas ant the six major cities viz Ajmer,Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota & Udaipur having a combined population of 1.32 crores constitute nearly 40% of

Rajasthan's urban population.

Because of the rapid growth and urbanization, there has been an increased pressure on the urban infrastructure

facilities. Keeping this in view the Government of Rajasthan (GoR) has with the loan assistance from Asian

Development Bank (ADB), taken up Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Project (RUIDP) to provide

integrated quality infrastructural facilities in six divisional headquarters of the State. The GoR has formed RUIDP

and entrusted the works of the infrastructure development in the six cities to RUIDP.

This integrated urban development project, under which assistance is being given to the state of Rajasthan;

helps meet basic human needs by developing urban services for water supply and sanitation, solid waste andwaste water management, and slum and environmental improvements. The project also supports street

improvement and traffic management, and strengthens other civic services required to improve the quality and

safety of urban life. The project provides assistance towards capacity building and community participation at the

state and local levels to support the effective devolution of urban management, taking into account the importance

of good governance. In addition, assistance for Project implementation is provided.

Public participation and coordination is important in various works under the project especially for improvement of

slums, utilization of sewer lines, solid waste management, and reduction of non revenue water, proper

maintenance of assets created in project, cleanliness of places of historical importance and their conservation.

People's participation is ensured by involving NGOs and CBOs in all phases of the project cycle starting from

identification of works, implementation and monitoring. At the same time, full cooperation and support of various

public representatives and State and Central Government departments (e.g. PHED, PWD, IRRIGATION, JDA,

UITs, Dist. administration, FOREST Dept. etc.) has always helped in smooth implementation of activities of the

project.

The project involves high degree of private sector participation in form of the various technical consultants like

Louis Berger Inc., Tata Consulting Engineers, Consulting Engineering Services, Shah Technical Consultants Pvt.

Ltd.

3. Performance Based deferred payment structure (PBDPS)

Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Financing Corporation (KUIDFC) is also an urban developmentproject undertaken through a new type of public-private partnership model called the PBDPS. The system has the

following features :

Payments are made only for services that meet desired levels and only on demonstration of meeting

parameters.


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The premise for performance based contracting is to pay only for achieved performance and quality targets.

It involves procurement of service and not of works alone.

Entails transferring risks to private contractors.

Will require major reform in revenue generation and budgeting at ULB level.

The PBDPS model has the following advantages :

Designed to allow developers to utilise their own designs and methodologies to meet contracting agencysservice/performance targets, and to achieve appropriate performance quality levels.

The payments are typically spread over the life of the period of operations, though would be structured to

match developer/contractor to recover capital cost in first few years.

The annuity model of payments, successfully adopted by the National Highways of India (NHAI), in its road

expansion programme is one variant of PBDPS.

Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : Global

1. Water and Sanitation Services in Cartagena, Colombia

Facilitated by the recent legislation by the state of Cartegena opening the door to private sector participation, andspurred on by the worsening financial crisis of its wholly-owned company, the Empresa de Servicios Pblicos

Distritales de Cartagena, on 5 March 1994 the municipal council of Cartagena authorised the mayor to close

down the municipal water company and to establish a joint venture in partnership with a private company that had

a reputable experience in the delivery of water supply and sanitation. Following an international tender, the

Spanish water utility, Aguas de Barcelona (AGBAR), was selected as the private sector partner in the new public-

private partnership. Aguas de Cartagena (AGUACAR) was created on 30 December 1994 as a joint venture

between the Municipality of Cartagena and AGBAR. It was the first public-private partnership for the delivery of

basic public services to be created in Colombia.

There has been a noticeable improvement in the delivery of water and sanitation in Cartagena since the

introduction of private sector participation in 1995. When operations began there was a water deficit of 60,000m3

which caused periodic cutoffs in supply. AGUACAR soon eliminated this deficit by reducing the level of

unaccounted for water from 60 per cent in December 195 to 40 per cent by December 1999. The reliability of

water supply rose over the same period from 80 per cent to 99 per cent. AGUACAR carried out $30m in

investment during 1995-1999. Some 260 km of new pipeline was added to the network over the same period,

bringing the total to 700 km. Some 30,000 new connections were made, bringing the total to 95,000. Some

220,000m3 of water is now treated per day and water quality has markedly improved. The number of employees

was reduced from 494 to 262, bringing the employee/connection ratio down to an acceptable level of four

employees per 1,000 connections.


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Key lessons learnt :

The joint venture arrangement confuses the regulatory role of the public sector

The clarity of the regulatory role that the municipality normally exercises under the purchaser-provider split found

in most PPPs is dulled by the joint venture arrangement. This is because the municipality wear two hats. At one

and the same time it is the purchaser (as owner of the assets) and the provider (as a shareholder in the joint

venture).

The absence of a municipal career service calls into question the sustainability of PPPs

The lack of job security and constant rotation of senior and middle-ranking staff within the municipality produces a

structural imbalance within the PPP. The institutional memory of the partnership becomes embodied in the private

partner. This superior knowledge soon translates into a power imbalance within the PPP.

A public-private partnership can exist in the absence of municipal capacity

The Municipality of Cartagena lacks the minimal technical support in its negotiations within the joint venture. To all

intents and purpose it is a sleeping partner. However, by wilfully neglecting capacity building for its ownorganisation, the municipality is running the risk of very negative consequences for the long-term sustainability of

the partnership.

Co-ordination of activities by external regulatory bodies is necessary for municipal capacity building

The question of regulatory co-ordination emerges as a major issue of institutional change. A plethora of regulatory

and supervisory agencies exist for water supply and sanitation - Comisin de Regulacin de Agua Potable y

Saneamiento Bsico(CRA), Superintendencia de Servicios Pblicos(SSP), Contralora Nacionaland Contralora

Departamental. There is a problem of co-ordination, conflict of interest, and overlapping jurisdiction among them.

Furthermore these bodies do not co-ordinate their activities with the municipality, which in turn is required to carry

out its own audit, interventora, of the activities of AGUACAR.

Legal mechanisms for citizen participation are of little use if they are not implemented

Extensive national legislation exists in Colombia to promote citizen participation in local government. But in

Cartagena many of the plethora of institutional mechanisms for safeguarding transparency and defending the

rights of ordinary citizens exist only on paper. The municipality is required to establish a citizen watchdog

committee for monitoring basic public services, including water and sanitation, Comit de Desarrollo y Control

Social. It exists but appears not to function. The municipal-wide Master Plan for the development of the city, Plan

de Ordenamiento Territorial(POT) was drawn up without citizen participation, even though the procedural norms

require such consultation.Skills development in order to combat corruption among municipal authorities emerges as a major concern from

this case study. The anti-corruption strategy being actively pursued with the support of NGOs emphasises the

training of community leaders rather than of the municipal authorities themselves. When asked how the

municipality can be strengthened in its work in favour of the urban poor in the water and sanitation sector, almost


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all community leaders emphasised the need to eradicate political corruption, especially among municipal

councillors. A major task to ensure the success of public-private partnerships is for a massive training program for

community leaders (in the JALs and JACs) who liase between the municipality, AGUACAR and local citizens.

Without such training, community leaders remain very susceptible to manipulation by corrupt municipal

councillors, with deleterious efforts for the partnership as a whole. The same danger applies to the citizen

watchdog committees for monitoring public services.

2. Solid Waste Management partnership in Biratnagar, Nepal

The concept of private sector participation in the delivery of municipal services was introduced to the city of

Biratnagar in the 1997-98 in the solid waste sector. No other municipal public-private partnerships existed or

have been developed since. The partnership itself has progressed from a dubious arrangement on the verge of

collapse, to one where the operator has developed the confidence of the council for the services provided.

Notwithstanding this achievement the partnership is still vulnerable and the municipality has not taken any

significant steps to bring about a sustainable and viable arrangement.

Establishing a Solid Waste Management Partnership

A partnership for integrated solid waste management services in Biratnagar was first discussed in 1996 when an

international businessman proposed to the municipality that they enter a joint venture with his US-based

company, Americorp Environmental Services Incorporated (hereafter AES Inc). It is now known that he came to

Biratnagar Sub Municipal Corporation (hereafter referred to as the municipality) after the Kathmandu

Metropolitan City declined his proposal to establish a private-public partnership for the management of solid

waste in Kathmandu. In Biratnagar, he found a willing partner, a municipality keen to enhance their own

resources with those of the private sector and eager to delegate responsibility for solid waste services.

The means by which the municipality arrived at an agreement amongst themselves or with AES Inc. is not clear,

but in 1997 the proposal was accepted and a contract was finalised. The arrangement incorporated a joint

venture called BMC-Americorp Environmental Services Group (hereafter called Americorp) in which the

municipality was given, without investment or risk, a 10% share in the company. Decision-makers in the council

were attracted and convinced of the benefits a private sector partner could bring - not only in technology, skills

and financial resources but also that the partnership would become a profit making concern and bring additional

revenue into the council.


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Nature and Scope of agreement

Issue Contract Provision Comments

Parties to the

agreement Biratnagar Sub-MunicipalCorporation (the municipality)

Americorp Environmental

Services Group (AES Inc.) (the

operator)

AES Inc. supported theirproposal with a letter of

recommendation from the US

Embassy.

Ownership

A joint venture BMC-Americorp

in which the 90% ownership is

AES Inc. and 10% of the share

ownership is with theMunicipality

The landfill site and the

recycling plant are to remain in

the ownership of BMC-

Americorp for the life of the

facility.

Without any investment, the

municipality was given 10%

share in the BMC-Americorp

venture.

Duration

10 years

Objectives

and scope of

the

agreement

The provision of integrated solid

waste management services

including: storage, collection,

processing, recycling and reuse

and final disposal of household

waste including the design and

management of a sanitary

landfill.

Household level services are to

be provided to the entire

municipal area every 3rd day.

There is no specification of

method, standards of

cleanliness to be achieved,

or types of waste to be

collected.

The implication of the scope

of the agreement are that the

whole waste cycle would be

self sustaining after an initial

period (despite the lack of

sanctions available to the

private operator).


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Financial

requirements The private operator commits:

NRs. 121.5 million ($1.73m); a

modern safety tank suction

cleaning tanker; and computer

hardware and software for themunicipality for revenue

collection.

The municipality makes no

capital investment, but is

required to provide NRs. 2.5

million (approx. $36,000) per

annum for the first 2 years of the

contract to subsidise operatingcosts in the start-up period. The

cost to be decreased

proportionately over this period

as service charges are

collected. The rate of decrease

shall be mutually agreed upon.

The method and timing of the

municipal subsidy payments

is not specified.

Cost recovery

The municipality is responsible

for collection of the service

charge and penalties (at a

commission of 5%). Americorp

to provide assistance in a

computerised billing system.

The domestic service charge is

set at NRs. 20 per month (for

the collection of 2 containers)

plus the initial purchase of the

containers (NRs. 100).

Differential charging is providedfor various residences,

hotels/tea stalls and shops, and

government facilities.

This is the primary area of

revision between the contract

and the agreement being

implemented. The

municipality currently plays

no role in collection.


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Environmental

requirements,

Worker

Conditions,

and health

and safety

requirements

Not mentioned Although the objective states

that there will be no negative

impact on the environment,

no requirements are

specified in the contract. (e.g.

enclosing trucks or covering

loads). The contract is silent

on worker salaries and

conditions, and health and

safety requirements.

Rights of each

party Not mentioned

Renegotiation

Not mentioned

Risks

Not mentioned

Performance

measurement,

monitoring

The contract stipulates that a

monitoring and evaluation unit

will be established with the

membership of both partners.

There are no performance

standards specified in the

contract. No provision is

made for penalties for non-

performance. No

quantitative outputs aredefined (such as the amount

of waste to be collected).

Regulatory

requirements Municipality to request

exemptions on behalf of the

operator

Dispute

resolution and

arbitration

Problems shall be mutually

solved by the parties, and if not,

shall be solved in accordance

with the rules and regulations of

the Nepal Arbitration Act.


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Key Issues

The situation that has developed in Biratnagar over the last 3 years during the implementation of the partnership

arrangement is a complex one filled with uncommon practices. Yet despite this, the Mayor reports that the

majority of councillors are quite satisfied with the performance of the partnership - and that the council is in favour

of further private sector initiatives in service delivery. From an objective viewpoint however, there would appear

to be fundamental problems with this solid waste initiative that are not being addressed by municipal decision-

makers. Foremost among these is that the partnership, under the current terms, is unviable and unsustainable.

This view is largely supported by the operator.

While many aspects of the Biratnagar case are unusual and unlikely to be widely replicated, the very existence of

this PPP is instructive as it describes the sort of irregular partnerships that can develop. It therefore provides

important lessons for development professionals and municipal officials alike. A number of the key issues are

discussed further in this section.

Financial and Technical Viability

One of the key characteristics of the arrangement, and one that differs from the norm, is that the private sectorrole in municipal solid waste management in Biratnagar has not led to a convincing commercialisation of the

service. Typically, PSP is associated with improved commercial practices that include long term planning and

rectify municipal accounting systems and do not capture costs or present grants and transfers in a transparent

manner. However the partnership approach in Biratnagar has not led to strategic planning and budgeting for solid

waste services in the municipality; the sector has not been ring fenced, a process which would isolate all the

costs of the municipality providing solid waste services (including direct and indirect staff salaries, vehicles, repair,

leases, interest on loans etc); and it has not led to an informed examination of the potential sources of revenue

needed to support this improved level a service.

The lack of rigour on the municipal side is exacerbated by the less-than-commercial actions of the operator.

Currently the only reason the arrangement can continue is that the private partner is willing to underwrite the

costs of this loss making investment as part of a long term strategy to gain a stake in municipal environmental

services in Nepal. The private sector operation is somewhat misleading and unreplicable and incomparable with

other solid waste initiatives. The municipality does not appear to have taken on the importance of the sustainable

financial management of the operations, but has inadvertently supported the under-reporting of Americorp costs.

Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an understanding that solid waste management is rarely

a self-financing operation and that it generally requires some public investment or subsidy from the municipalities

own revenue sources. On the contrary, most actors in Biratnagar both private and public continue to makedecisions on the understanding that at some point in the future there is significant profit to be made in solid waste

activities.

The Biratnagar case also illustrates the sort of inappropriate technical (and consequently financial) options that


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might be proposed by operators inexperienced in the specific needs of developing cities. The initial technical

scheme and its associated costs offered a contextually inappropriate and financially unviable proposition, there is

little question in hindsight that they were incongruous in the socio-economic context of Biratnagar. Based on

figures provided by the UN, Nepal appears to have one of the lowest rates of urban solid waste generation (at

0.50 kg/capita/day) and is only expected to increase to 0.60kg/capita/day by 2025. The high proportion of people

living below the poverty line and the low levels of waste produced by this group account for this figure. The wastegenerated per head in Biratnagar is therefore only 50% of that generated in urban Thailand. These figures are

consistent with the pattern of waste generation in relation to GNP per capita and consistent with small cities in

Latin America. Despite this, the operator suggested and the council accepted, a proposal relevant for waste

generation rates of highly developed cities.

One of the simple lessons of the Biratnagar case thus relates to the lack of viability of high technology proposals

and high levels of investment proposed at the outset. The lesson is then developed by the modifications that

have been necessary to bring capital inputs in line with local conditions. Modifications proposed or implemented

to date include the lower technology, lower cost options of: the landfill site: the original proposal fora sanitary landfill (lined, gas emission and leachate management

system) has been abandoned;

the vehicles: the original proposal for modern compactors has been replaced by simple tractor trailers.

the containers: The provision of 25 litre waste bin containers to all households has been reduced to smaller,

lower quality containers purchased at a lower cost but charged at the same rate.

Typically, in municipalities in low-income countries such as Nepal, expenditure on solid waste management is

predominately made up of collection and transportation costs and not on disposal. As a result costs are biased

toward the micro-level of service. Biratnagar is no exception, the practice of dumping waste free of charge has

continued into the contract to date and, at present, there is little to no cost associated with the disposal stage of

the service. The cost of disposal elsewhere in the region of $0.25 per capita per annum suggest that operational

costs are likely to increase significantly when the practice of dumping is ceased. It is likely therefore that solid

waste operations within the town will require significantly more subsidy or a different financial arrangement for the

partnership to continue once disposal costs are introduced.

At this stage however, the disposal stage is not being presented in this manner. The ambitious proposal of the

operator is to run a self sustaining compost plant and recycling operation on leased land. This includes the

construction of facilities and services for this purpose. However research by Blore shows that the most valuable

waste in South Asian cities is generally reclaimed at source and this limits the potential of recycling schemes.Picking over such waste is frequently considered to be a marginal economic activity.

The problems of franchising solid waste services


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Given the fact that the original entrepreneur had no intention of operating the service over any period of time, it is

hardly surprising to find that the contract proposed was favourable towards the municipality and that the

municipality is allocated very little risk. However, the agreement established in practice is far more onerous for

the operator than the initial contract envisaged. Not only does the private operator now have the responsibility for

collecting the tariffs for household collection services, by extension they take on the full risk of non-payment of

service charges. In terms of municipal solid waste management, this franchise arrangement is unusual and thisform of contract is rarely appropriate as it is generally very difficult for operators to collect fees from householders.

More commonly, the municipality pays the contractor/operator a fixed fee and the municipality recovers the cost

from user charges (often a cess or property tax) or general revenues (such as inter-governmental grants)

effectively creating a management form of contract.It is also not clear whether the municipality is aware that the

current system whereby the operator is responsible for collecting tariffs is considered unviable elsewhere, or

whether they are taking this approach to test the genuineness and capacity of the operator.

Another problem that has arisen for the operator is that the contract does not adequately specify the means and

processes which will ensure that operational charges are levied and paid by service users. The operator arguesthat it is vital that there is a means of addressing non-payment through sanctions and enforcement. The

municipality is also considering the introduction of a range of penalties and sanctions that might be imposed on

defaulters. This might include refusing users other municipal services (e.g. citizenship applications, business

licensing, land purchase, asset transfer and planning permission) unless payment for refuse collection is made.

The more significant proposal under discussion is for the municipality to integrate the waste collection charge into

the wider system of municipal tax collection without transferring the risk of non-payment to the municipality. The

municipality stresses that it needs more capacity to formulate appropriate penalties and enforce sanctions. They

argue that it is necessary for municipalities to have more autonomy to impose new penalties and fines and that

amendments to the Local Self-Governance Act are required to enable municipalities to act.

Tariffs and Collection

Neither the municipality nor the operator has demonstrated an understanding of the mechanics and implications

of tariff structures and the (substantial problems of) and mechanisms for effective cost recovery for slid waste

services. The simple tariff structure in place at present differentiates between domestic customers twice-weekly

service and commercial customers daily service but the level of the tariff is not commensurate with the service

provided. A simple comparative study indicates lower charges per household than other selected municipalities.

At NRs. 20 ($0.28) per month (1% of an average low-income household monthly income) the current tariff is one-third of a similar service provided by the Vientiane Municipality in Laos (which operates a cost-recovery approach)

and where the equivalent cost is $0.62 per month (2.5% of an average low-income household monthly income).

In India, tariffs for household collection are generally in the order of IRs. 20 ($0.45) per month in small cities and

IRs. 40 ($0.90) in large cities where the costs are higher and processes more commercialised.


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Contract preparation

The preparation and development of the contract in Biratnagar was not undertaken with the diligence and

thoroughness essential for private sector participation initiatives. The lack of feasibility studies or comparative

studies detailing the various options for the private sector role initially led to an inappropriate and unviableapproach and arrangement. The municipality simply reacted to the proposals placed before it by the entrepreneur

concerned who convinced officers and elected members that he possessed sufficient technical expertise and

could therefore propose optimal solutions. In the absence of sufficient technical information on solid waste

management the municipality was easily misled by the private party in the original contract negotiations as to

what kind of waste service would be practical, cost effective and feasible. At the same time there was inadequate

financial information on solid waste costs (although there was some data on area-wise expenditure) and a lack of

access to comparative costs of municipal solid waste management initiatives elsewhere.

This lack of a thorough financial appraisal meant that neither the municipality nor the operator undertook anyaffordability or willingness-to-pay studies which would support or challenge the viability of the overall proposal and

which would have enhanced their understanding of an appropriate tariff and collection system within the city.

During the contract preparation stage, there was no attempt to seek tenders to validate the proposal or to

introduce other mechanisms that would enhance transparency and accountability or ensure the financial

capability and soundness of the operator selected. Owing to the solicitous nature of the proposal (and the

recommendation rendered by the US Embassy), the municipality did not conduct standard contracting procedures

including financial checks and guarantees.

With respect to the contract, there was no consideration of a standard form of contract for PSP in municipal solid

waste management (available through international agencies), no effort was made to contact other municipalities

involved in such an initiative. Local legal counsel were consulted but unlike many PPP initiatives studied the

municipality did not obtain consultancy support or legal advice was sought during the contract preparation (or any

other) stage. The lack of preparation at an early stage is undoubtedly the root cause of the major problems which

arose in relation to the fraudulent representative and thence the unsustainable nature of the current arrangement.

Subsidies for waste operations

While a subsidy is specified under the contract agreement (NRs. 2.5 million annually for two years) the operator

has not been able to obtain the full municipal subsidy intended to help cover their operating costs in the initial

stages (to date the operator has only been paid 30%, ostensibly because collection services only cover 25% ofthe town. An obvious oversight is that the contract does not specify the terms and conditions upon which this

subsidy will be released. Inadequate specification of these conditions has meant that the municipality has been

able to withhold the full release of funds until the operator has reached all the target households. The private

contractor meanwhile argues that that the subsidy is required as the means to extend the service.


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Efficiency

There appears to be a general consensus that, despite the constraints, the private operator has been able to

perform more efficiently than the municipality. This can be attributed to more effective supervision of staff and

operations, the flexibility possible outside the public sector and the labour relations prevailing in the private sector.

Perhaps the most tangible and significant evidence of improved efficiency can be seen from a cost benefit

analysis of the street cleaning operations before and after private sector involvement. The contractor undertakesstreet cleaning in the core city at 20% less cost than the municipality, at the same time the quality of service is

reportedly higher and public satisfaction greater.

Efficiency has been significantly enhanced by delegating further responsibilities to the private operator. The

viability of the door-to-door collection scheme has been greatly enhanced by the operator assuming responsibility

other waste activities. This has enabled some economies of scale but even more importantly has led to an

integrated approach with one service (i.e. street sweeping) mutually supporting another (i.e. household

collection). The Mayor of Biratnagar suggests that further delegation is a more effective means to establish the

financial viability and future sustainability of the partnership. To this end, he proposes to extend further municipalmanagement contracts to the private operator for street sweeping, but sees this as a form of support which could

take the place of the contractual obligation to pay the agreed subsidy. While the private operator would welcome

additional contracts that intrinsically promote their household collection as well, they argue that the municipality

has a contractual obligation to pay this subsidy and that they took over the Americorp activity on that basis.

Failure to pay the subsidy is in their terms in breach of contract.

Lack of Capacity

The Biratnagar case demonstrates that the capacity of both the municipality and the operator has been

problematic. Neither the municipality nor the operator have had experience in managing an integrated solid waste

management programme. Both parties have had to learn from experience and to experiment with systems and

procedures. The main areas of capacity requirement have been concerned with contract formulation and

negotiation, technical analysis of waste management operations, financial analysis and management, integrated

waste management practices, public consultation processes, alternative waste management systems, role of

NGOs and CBOs and community participation in waste operations. These issues are discussed in detail in the

capacity section below.

Labour Issues

In most Hindu parts of South Asia, waste workers are drawn from a socially and economically marginalised caste.

In Biratnagar these castes form an identifiable part of the low-income community in the city. They live in an

inadequate and insanitary environment and work for low wages with little or no job security in conditions harmful

to their health. Typically, the solid waste sector absorbs some of the child labour in the city and Biratnagar is no

exception.

Labour issues can be argued from diverse viewpoints. On the one hand it is possible to argue that the gradual


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shift to private sector operations taking place in Biratnagar does little to benefit workers and that it has not

significantly improved the opportunities available to waste workers. For former municipal employees the operator

is said to provide the same terms and conditions as the public sector (except workers are supervised and

therefore do work their 7 hours) but for the remainder of the work force, employment is provided on a temporary

basis. Job insecurity therefore forms a key aspect of the workers lives. Temporary workers interviewed report

that they receive less pay than their colleagues on a permanent municipal arrangement, and argue that conditionsof work are better in the public sector.

From the operators perspective, one of the primary operational issues concerns labour. The operator stressed

that the lack of a work discipline and motivation creates

ongoing difficulties in achieving satisfactory performance. The operator argues that sweepers do not perform

their duties properly, are not reliable and are frequently given supplementary informal payments to keep

operations going. However, unlike the public sector which employs staff on a permanent basis (and the staff

seconded to work for Americorp), temporary staff can be penalised by retrenchment and the operator has used

this threat successfully to achieve better performance and changing attitudes. Both the private sector operator

and municipal officers argue that casual labourers work more efficiently than permanent labourers who are more

secure and complacent about work tasks and discipline.

The exact nature of employment conditions in relation to performance and to other sweepers was not possible

within the scope of this study, however it was clear that the private operator employer has not brought any socio-

economic benefit to these groups. However the flexibility within the private sector offers greater opportunity for

improvement in terms and conditions than does the public sector. In this regard there are many lessons in South

Asia for the operator to draw upon to improve incentives and work practices.

Scaling Up

Despite the achievements of the arrangement, the Mayor of Biratnagar argues that the current scope and contentof the partnership will be limited in the middle to long term. He argues that Americorp alone does not have the

resources and technical capacity to undertake all the waste-related activities required by the city. The current

Mayor, like his predecessor is ambitious and optimistic about the financial opportunities of the waste sector. He

envisages a situation where waste is treated as a resource: waste will not be allowed to leave the municipal

area, other waste will be imported and the income earning potential of waste as a commodity will be maximised.

The Mayors long term strategy is to develop a range of activities and involve a range of actors to address all

aspects of solid waste management. By its nature, this would involve a more complex set of partnerships, rather

than being reliant upon a single bi-lateral arrangement. These includes for instance:

an emphasis on private service providers appropriate to the task (e.g. community based organisations for

household collection and larger industrial enterprises for upstream recycling activities).

an emphasis on economies of scale. (e.g. upstream activities such as recycling and disposal could cover 2-3

towns in order to achieve economies of scale.

an emphasis on heavy waste such as iron, steel and other products which typically leave Biratnagar for use


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and recycling elsewhere.

However in relation to the existing service there is also some question over the capacity of the operator to

replicate the initiative and significantly increase the scale of the operation. In particular, the makeshift and ad hoc

nature of the operations and the personal attention paid to each facet of the operation by the General Manager,

suggests that significantly greater coverage and replication may not be sustainable without increasedsystematisation.

3. Private Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation services in Stutterheim, South Africa

Objectives of private sector involvement

At the time the partnership in Stutterheim was established, a primary goal of the city council was to streamline

municipal functions. The council at the time (particularly the Chair of the Public Works Committee) aimed to

redirect conventional forms of management to address the resource deficiencies of the council. To this end, thecouncil envisaged partnerships with actors outside the government and co-ordination with other municipal bodies.

Amongst other issues they sought to tackle the problems of small municipalities that can not sustain sufficient

technical capacity to run a properly skilled water and sanitation service. As the engineering department was

going through a difficult stage (beset by uncertainty in contracting practices), service was deteriorating, and a

partnership arrangement with the private sector for water and sanitation services solved both particular and

strategic problems. The objective of private sector participation was to buy in the technical skills needed to

improve the efficiency, management and delivery of water and sanitation services to the population of

Stutterheim. However, the objective at that time did not include capital investment, and the pre-democratic council

was only concerned with bulk supply to low-income areas. Decisions were set within the context of political

change in South Africa.

Establishing the Contract

In 1992, the council in power agreed to pursue private sector involvement in a range of municipal functions. In

order to initiate the process the council agreed to test the market and advertised nationally for expressions of

interest for the management of water and sanitation services in the town. In the early nineties there was little

direction for public-private partnerships in South Africa (nor was there any significant assistance available

internationally) and the process of preparation, tender and evaluation process was carried out with the same

methodology as that undertaken for the construction of civil works.

The council at the time was dominated by business acumen, the councillors were willing and able to identify gaps

in council skills and were then agreeable to the appointment of (and fees for) consultants to fill these gaps and

manage the formulation of a contract. However it should be noted that expertise in public-private partnerships

were not available in South Africa in 1993. As late as 1995, the WRC in their guidelines for private sector


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participation noted the complexity and nature of long term contracts makes it imperative for local authorities to

appoint a multi-disciplinary team of professional advisers It should be noted that very few firms in South Africa

have all the expertise that is likely to be required and the experts will have to be drawn from different firms. The

disciplines needed cover business and financial management, legal as well as engineering and technical fields.

The proposal for the form of contract was presented by WSSA in their tender. An investigation into alternative

contract types was not pursued. The contract was considered appropriate because it met the key technical,managerial and efficiency objectives of the council and did not include a significant investment component.

Partnership Arrangements

The partnership arrangement in Stutterheim is an affermage contract for 10 years. The affermage (or lease) form

of contract farms-outor contracts out to the private sector responsibility for providing management, operation and

maintenance. Unlike the management form of contract, the private operator must provide working capital, but

capital investments remain the responsibility of the authority.

The scope of the contract in Stutterheim includes the management, operation and maintenance of the water and

sewerage system, replacement of pipework due to normal wear and tear and record keeping. It also includes forcustomer management services as a future option. In addition, WSSA has an obligation for some rehabilitation

works on the existing system: to replace a fixed amount of pipework annually, to replace all meters (older than 7

years) by the 5th year of their contract and to replace any malfunctioning electro-mechanical equipment. Thus,

maintenance, replacement and ongoing repair are the responsibility of the Operator, while upgrading and

expansion is the responsibility of the Stutterheim Council.

Responsibilities and Coverage

WSSA Responsibility Municipal (STLC) Responsibility

Water

Primary Raw water supply and water

treatment from sources (4 sources)

to Stutterheim town, Mlungisi and

the semi-rural villages of the

Amatola District Council.

Upgrade and new infrastructure

Safety, maintenance and repair of dams and water

sources.

Bye law enforcement

Secondary Secondary distribution and

reticulation within Stutterheim town

area .

Pumping and secondary distribution network to and

within Mlungisi.

Tertiary Operation and maintenance ofneighbourhood level distribution

within Stutterheim town area

Operation and maintenance of neighbourhood levelnetwork distribution within Mlungisi area

Sanitation


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Operation and Maintenance of

sewerage network in Stutterheim

town.

Treatment of effluent for all areas.

Operation of conservancy tanker

services to all areas (including 80%

of the population of Mlungisi).

Operation and maintenance of sewerage network in

Mlungisi.

Provision of capital equipment for all tasks

(including new tankers for sanitation services);

Customer Services

WSSA is responsible for operation

and maintenance of meters and

technical complaints.

Stutterheim TLC is responsible for meter reading,

billing, collection and account complaints.

Conclusions

Stutterheim serves, potentially, as both teacher and student in Municipal Service Partnerships. As one of the

three early public-private partnerships in South Africa, Stutterheim can provide important feedback and lessonsfor peer learning. Conversely, it needs significant support at this time if it is to overcome the barriers hindering

efficiency improvements and pro-poor arrangements. The process of demarcation provides a potential turning

point for the contract and an opportunity for WSSA and the Stutterheim Council to build in the last years of the

contract an effective and sustainable partnership approach, convergent with the principles of reconstruction and

development. Stutterheim also serves, potentially, as a pilot for the development of linkages between Local

Economic Development and Municipal Service Partnerships in South Africa. It is up to the contract parties, the

supporting institutions and other parts of civil society to seize this opportunity and explore the possibilities that the

partnership may offer.

Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : India

Even though corporate sector participation is a relatively new concept in India, but the recent disasters which

struck various parts on India have seen a tremendous response from the private sector and community groups

who extended their hand towards the relief works. A few of such initiatives have been cited as follows :

1. Outbreak of Plague in Surat:

Just when plague was believed to have been wiped off from the face of the earth, the sudden resurgence of

bubonic plague in Beed district of Maharashtra and pneumonic plague cases in Surat city of Gujarat state, in

September-October 1994, took the central, state and local administration and health officials in the country by

surprise. It also caused a global concern. The casualities were a total of 146 presumptive (seropositive) cases

and 54 deaths considered as due to plague occurred between 19 September and 22 October 1994 (WHO

Report 1994).

The plague created widespread panic in the city and approximately 60 per cent of Surats population fled. It was

a severe blow not only to Surats economy which suffered a loss of several millions of rupees every day but also


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to the national economy because it affected industrial production, tourism, export, etc. Indias international image

suffered a severe blow. Some of the foreign airlines temporarily stopped their flights to and from India and some

countries banned the import of food grains from here and quarantined passengers from India for exhaustive

medical check ups.

As the local administration, in this case the SMC, was responsible for providing public health facilities to the

citizens, the public, media, researchers and health officials squarely blamed the local body not only for a grosslyinadequate response during plague but also for its general lack of performance. It was therefore considered

imperative, for the moment though, to call in for private sector involvement in order to control the spreading of

the disease. Therefore, the private initiative started on a temporary basis during the plague epidemic to cleanse

the filth and remove dead carcasses accumulated in the water logged areas, but looking at the performance the

participation was strengthened and regulated in the post-plague period. At present, privatisation initiatives are

limited to: i) hiring of private vehicles with driver for garbage collection ,ii) contracting out cleaning of certain

roads and iii) employing private sweepers for transporting municipal refuse from collection points to disposal

sites. Private contractors, at present, handle almost 40 per cent of the solid waste generated in the city

everyday. However, private contractors work under strict supervision of the municipal staff and penalties areimposed on them for not performing their assigned work.

The control of epidemic in the city and maintenance of sanitary and infrastructure facilities in the post-plague

period by the private sector enterprises has been one of the most quoted examples of public-private partnership

in urban areas. The level of services has improved to an extent that today Surat claims to be one of the cleanest

cities in the country.

2. Gujarat Earthquake

Gujarat Earthquake has been one of the best shows of mankind in the country. Not only did the government

agencies, but also the private sector enterprises, school and colleges, community groups and various NGOs in

their own ways; got together and made the seemingly wiped out cities after the disaster living. As per the private

sector initiatives, various engineering firms like the Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. and other contacting

companies had deployed heavy engineering equipment, skilled manpower and engineers to facilitate the efforts.

Besides, the entire cadre of its officers and employees donated a minimal days wage as a token of support.

Besides that, the top companies like Reliance and the Tata Group shed out large funds in order to carry out the

relief funds and also provided new facilities like the mobile hospital vans. Also, various other private sector

enterprises shed out huge funds which had made the relief and rehabilitation process a very successful one

giving life back to thousands who had lost both their shelter and livelihood.

Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : Global

1. Tsunami and Earthquake in Asia and Pacific region :

A devastating earthquake of 9.0 magnitude on the Richter' scale struck the area off Sumatra's northwestern

coast on December 26, 2004. The earthquake also caused the creation of tsunami waves that invaded the


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coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Thailand and Malaysia, and even east African countries have

been affected.

At least 295,000 people died in the disaster, with 1,500,000 displaced and over 500,000 homeless. (source:

IFRC, February 9)

Ericssion, which is a private sector enterprise, extended its help to the entire region struck by the disaster.

The help was in two ways: by restoring damaged telecommunications and by supporting humanitarianorganizations working with the recovery and rescue efforts. Ericsson also donated a complete mobile telephony

system to the Indonesian government. And a number of satellite phones, heavy-duty waterproof phones and

standard phones were given by Ericsson and Sony Ericsson to relief organizations, as well as a cash donation.

Local Ericsson companies in Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia have also initiated contributions, mainly in

donations and providing support for the telecommunications infrastructure. Ericsson Response has sent a

complete container-based GSM system to enable communications between different aid organizations, mobile

phones in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The aid has helped tremendously in getting back the communication routes

and helping the people who have been left homeless.

2. Earthquake in Luzon (Philippines) 1990 :

On July 16, 1990 an earthquake of a magnitude 7.2 on the ritcher scale hit Luzon in Phillipines causing

tremendous damage to life and property. There were 1,666 deaths, about 1,000 persons were reported missing

and over 3,000 were injured. Most casualties occurred in Baguio City and surroundings. The rainy season,

which began soon after the tremor, produced new casualties, some as the result of reactivation of earthquake

induced slides. Nearly 100,000 houses were damaged, 40% of them were completely destroyed. All these

happened in a wide area including Baguio, the coastal area south of San Fernando in La Union, along the

Lingayen Gulf and in the area between Dagupan and Tarlac where intense liquefaction occurred. Seven bridges

collapsed, eight others were seriously damaged and about 20 were affected by various types of lesser damage.

The road network of Central Luzon and the Baguio region was significantly damaged.

The business sector mobilized relief and rehabilitation resources. The resources mobilized went beyond

cash, medicine, blankets and old clothes. Corporate aircraft as well as ten-wheelers and communication facilities

were deployed free of charge. Search and rescue groups from among the mining companies were pressed into

service. Teams of psychiatrist-trained groups were organized to handle the psychosocial needs. In the

succeeding months, after an assessment of the economic and infrastructural damages, the private sector again

dug into its collective pocket to fund rehabilitation activities, including resettlement projects and programs to

rehabilitate livelihood, schools and other community l ifelines.

AUTHORS Amar Sood : [email protected]

Annu Talreja : [email protected]


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GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT

1.1 INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION

On 11 December 1987 at its 42nd session, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated the 1990's asthe International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The basic idea behind this proclamation of the

Decade was and still remains to be the unacceptable and rising levels of losses, which disasters continue to incur

on the one hand, and the existence, on the other hand, of a wealth of scientific and engineering know-how which

could be effectively used to reduce losses resulting from disasters.

The objective of the IDNDR is to reduce through concerted international action, especially in developing countries,

the loss of life, property damage and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters such as

earthquakes, windstorms, tsunamis, floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, grasshopper and locust

infestation, drought and desertification and other calamities of natural origin.

The General Assembly called on all governments to take appropriate measures and actions during the Decade,

and in particular to:

1) Formulate national disaster mitigation programs.

2) Take part in concerted international action to reduce the effects of natural disasters.

3) Establish, where appropriate, national IDNDR committees (in co-operation with the relevant scientific and

technological communities).

4) Encourage support from the public and private sectors.

5) Take measures to increase public awareness of risk and the value of preventative measures.

By 1994, over 150 countries had established national IDNDR focal points or committees, which included

representatives of governments, disaster 'professionals' and many non-government organizations. This

'networking' has facilitated the transfer of knowledge to those countries and communities most at risk. In addition,

much effort has been put into new scientific and engineering developments. Typical examples are work on

hazard-resistant structures (houses, factories, bridges, flyovers, etc.), and the development of electrical

measuring techniques to predict earthquakes.

IDNDR works through IDNDR National Committees and Focal Points which exist in 138 countries. The IDNDR

secretariat, located in Geneva, is part of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The IDNDR Scientific andTechnical Committee is an advisory body with experts in economics, social science, engineering, public health,

industry, geology, meteorology, etc. A UN inter-agency group works regularly with the IDNDR secretariat, as well

as a contact group of Geneva-based diplomatic missions.


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In 1994 an international conference was held in Yokohama to look at the IDNDR's initial progress and chart a

course for the remainder of the Decade. This brought many of the governments and other bodies active in the

field together for the first time. The conference demonstrated how much of the IDNDR's work was shifting from

'rapid-onset' disasters (for example, floods and landslides) to 'slow-onset' disasters (principally drought), more

complex multiple disasters involving a range of hazards and causes, and the social consequences of disasters.

1.2 WORLD CONFERENCE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION

The WCNDR was held at Yokohama between 23 to 27 May 1994. To make people aware of how much they can

do to make themselves safer from natural disasters, the United Nations launched the International Decade for

Natural Disaster Reduction. The World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was an important milestone in

IDNDR awareness-building process.

The conference was initiated with the background of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction and

other considerations:1. Recognizing the rapidly rising worldwide toll on human and economic losses due to natural disasters.

2. UN resolution to launch a far-reaching global undertaking for the 1990s to save human lives and reduce the

impact of natural disasters.

3. To adopt an integrated approach for disaster management in all its aspects and to initiate a process towards

a global culture of prevention.

4. Sustainable economic growth and sustainable development cannot be achieved in many countries without

adequate measures to reduce disaster losses, and that there are close linkages between disaster losses and

environmental degradation, as emphasized in Agenda 21 (Report of the United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, vol. I, Resolutions Adopted by the

Conference).

5. Reaffirming the Rio Declaration, which stresses the need for the international community to assist States

afflicted by natural disasters and other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects in the

environment of those states.

The conference adopted the Yokohama strategy and plan of action. The basic principles for the strategy were:

1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction policies

and measures.

2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster relief.

3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development policy andplanning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral and international levels.

4. The development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce and mitigate disasters is a top priority

area to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up activities to the Decade.


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5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommunications, including

broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and preparedness.

6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the local community

through the national government to the regional and international level.

7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development focused on

target groups, by appropriate education and training of the whole community.8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent, reduce and

mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an integral part of technical

cooperation.

9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty alleviation is

imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.

10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other national

assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should demonstrate strong political

determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of existing resources, including financial,

scientific and technological means, in the field of natural disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of thedeveloping countries, particularly the least developed countries.

Approaching the mid-point of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the World Conference has

identified, on the basis of national reports and technical discussions, the following main accomplishments and

failures:

1. Awareness of the potential benefits of disaster reduction is still limited to specialized circles and has not yet

been successfully communicated to all sectors of society, in particular policy makers and the general public.

This is due to a lack of attention for the issue, insufficient commitment and resources for promotional activities

at all levels.

2. Activities during the first years of the Decade in training, technical applications and research at local, national

and international levels and in regional cooperation, have had positive results in some regions in reducing

disaster losses.

3. These new efforts in the field of disaster reduction have not systematically been part of multilateral and

bilateral development policies.

4. Education and training programs and facilities for people professionally involved and the public at large have

not been sufficiently developed with a focus on ways and means to reduce disasters. Also the potential of the

information media, industry, scientific community and the private sector at large has not been sufficiently

mobilized.

5. A number of positive results have been achieved during the first five years of the Decade, although unevenlyand not in the concerted and systematic way.

6. The concept of the disaster reduction should be enlarged to cover natural and other disaster situations

including environmental and technological disasters and their interrelationship which can have a significant

impact on social, economic, cultural and environmental systems, in particular in developing countries.


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The Yokohama strategy and plan of action for natural disaster reduction calls for emphasis and implementation of

the following points:

A. Development of a global culture of prevention as an essential component of an integrated approach to

disaster reduction.

B. Adoption of a policy of self-reliance in each vulnerable country and community comprising capacity buildingas well as allocation and efficient use of resources.

C. Education and training in disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.

D. Development and strengthening of human resources and material capabilities and capacity of research and

development institutions for disaster reduction and mitigation.

E. Identification and networking of existing centres of excellence so as to enhance disaster prevention, reduction

and mitigation activities.

F. Improvement of awareness in vulnerable communities, through a more active and constructive role of the

media in respect of disaster reduction.

G. Effective national legislation and administrative action, higher priority at the political decision-making level.H. Making available the existing technology for broader application to disaster reduction.

I. Integration of the private sector in disaster reduction efforts through promotion of business opportunities.

The WCNDR was a consolidated beginning in the area of disaster reduction. The major challenges put forward by

the conference were the recognition of disaster management in the policies and planning of governments all over

the world. The other aspect emphasized by the conference was the inter-regional cooperation between states to

reduce vulnerability.

1.3 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION

The ISDR is the successor of the IDNDR. The mission of the IDNDR was to influence decisions and help in

creating long-term, pro-active disaster prevention strategies. The scope of the challenge was - and remains -

enormous, but during its ten-year life, the IDNDR succeeded in coordinating a new, global approach to improving

the resiliency of local communities.

As its name implied, the IDNDR officially came to an end in 1999. However, during its ten-year span of activities,

it achieved such important successes - especially in terms of forging vital links among the political, scientific and

technological communities - which the United Nations created a successor body to carry on its work. This new

body of coordinated action programs, with a small secretariat in Geneva, is ISDR. In January 2000, the General

Assembly established two mechanisms for the implementation of ISDR the Inter-Agency Secretariat and the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction.

Based on its invaluable experience and expertise built up over ten years, particularly in developing countries, the

ISDR is extremely well-placed to foster the multi-disciplinary and inter-sectoral relationships necessary to bring


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about the all-important shift from the mainly reactive mindset of today to the pro-active mindset of tomorrow,

where prevention and risk management are paramount. It has already established a global network of public,

private and local community partners with whom it is developing risk prevention strategies, integrating them into

long-term sustainable development plans. The ISDR has two overall objectives:

Enabling all communities to become resilient to the effects of natural, technological and environmental

hazards, reducing the compound risks they pose to social and economic vulnerabilities within modernsocieties; and

Proceeding from protection against hazards to the management of risk through the integra

Trainees Report

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