TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD · TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD ... results documented in...

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PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Engineering Standard Operations Rolling Stock MFST 830100-01 TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD Version: 1 Issued: June 2012 Owner: Standards Development Manager Approved By: Authorise For Use By: Ahmed Dwidar Standards Development Manager YS Au Chief Engineer

Transcript of TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD · TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD ... results documented in...

PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION

Engineering Standard Operations

Rolling Stock

MFST 830100-01

TRAIN MINIMUM IN-SERVICE STANDARD

Version: 1

Issued: June 2012

Owner: Standards Development Manager

Approved By: Authorise For Use By:

Ahmed Dwidar

Standards Development Manager

YS Au

Chief Engineer

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 2 of 19

Approval

Name Position Signature

Document Author Eddie Yeung

Rolling Stock Independent

Engineer

Victor So Fleet

Engineering Manger Document

Endorsers

Wayne Walsh GM Current Operations

Approving Manager Ahmed Dwidar

Standards Development

Manager

Authorised For Use YS Au Chief Engineer

Amendment Record

Approval Date Version Description

25/06/2012 1 Initial issue under MTM. Originally prepared by Graham Vallance Consultant – RMAus & Terry Lai MTR Support, 14/12/2010.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 3 of 19

Table of Contents

1 Scope and Purpose .....................................................................................................4

2 Abbreviation ................................................................................................................4

3 Definition......................................................................................................................5

4 References and Legislation ........................................................................................5

5 Responsibilities ...........................................................................................................5

6 Safety & Environmental ..............................................................................................5

7 Approach......................................................................................................................5

8 Minimum in In-Service Conditions .............................................................................7

9 Related Documents ...................................................................................................11

10 Appendix ....................................................................................................................12 List of Tables Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions............................................................................ 7

Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault – 1st Level ........................................................................... 12

Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level........................................................................... 13

Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level........................................................................... 14

Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level.............................................................................. 15

Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level.......................................................................... 16

Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level ......................................................................... 17

Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level ......................................................................... 18

Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level .......................................................................... 19

List of Figures Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling............................................................................ 6

Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development ......................................................... 6

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 4 of 19

1 Scope and Purpose

1.1 The purpose of this document is to set out the Minimum In-Service Standards for passenger train service safety. Failure to comply with specified requirements of these standards may increase the risks in passenger safety and safety of railway operation.

1.2 Minimum In-Service Standards consists of two parts:

i. Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance, and

ii. Minimum In-Service Conditions.

1.3 The “Fit-to-Run Conditions after Maintenance” are specified in RS Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP) and owned by General Manager – Rolling Stock. This document shall serve as a baseline against which the preventive maintenance for RS fleets shall be developed and reviewed.

1.4 This document only defines the minimum performance requirements for equipment on RS fleets operating in-service. The achievement of such requirements shall be maintained through condition-based, preventive and corrective maintenance activities carried out by RS Department.

1.5 This standard is applicable to the following passenger train types:

Comeng Train

X’Trapolis Train

Siemens Train

Hitachi Train

2 Abbreviation

BVIC Brake Valve Isolation Cock

C Comeng Train both Tread & Disc

CCTV Closed Circuit Television

CD Comeng Train Disc type

CT Comeng Train Tread type

DDU Driver's Displace Unit FSS Flinders Street Station

H Hitachi Train

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

MURL Melbourne Underground Rail Link

PA Personal Address

PEI Passenger Emergency Intercom

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

R1 RMAus Risk Level 1

R2 RMAus Risk Level 2

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 5 of 19

R3 RMAus Risk Level 3

R4 RMAus Risk Level 4

RS Rolling Stock

S Siemens Train

TMP Technical Maintenance Plan

VICERS Vigilance Control and Event Recorder System

X X’TrapolisTrain

3 Definition

Nil

4 References and Legislation

Nil

5 Responsibilities

Nil

6 Safety & Environmental

Nil

7 Approach

7.1 Risk based approach is adopted for the development of standards. The review results documented in the report “Functional Safety Risk Assessment to determine Minimum Requirements for Electric Trains’ prepared by RMAus is the basis for the development.

7.2 R1 & R2 hazards identified are classified as Critical Faults which are further divided into 2 levels depending on the fault handling requirements. A complete Critical Faults list is shown in Appendix A. The remaining hazards with risk ratings lower than R2 are classified as Non-Critical Faults. The approach for the fault classification is illustrated in the below flow chart. In principal, a train reported as having a Critical Fault shall be withdrawn from service. A Level 1 Critical Fault demands train withdrawal ASAP whilst a Level 2 Critical Fault (ie. Serious Fault as per Metro Train Operating Standard) allows a train to be withdrawn at the best opportunity to minimize interruption to train service.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 6 of 19

Figure 1: Fault Classification and Handling

7.3 Based on the Critical Fault List, the functional requirements of the equipment whose failure will lead to a Critical Fault then form the Minimum In-Service Condition requirements. The approach for the development of the Minimum In-Service Condition requirements is illustrated on below flow chart.

Figure 2: Minimum In-Service Standards Development

Risk Assessment Results

R1 or R2 Hazard?

A Single Independent Failure Event Resulting in R1 & R2 Hazard?

Non - Critical Fault

Critical Fault – 1st Level

Critical Fault – 2nd Level

Train Handling i.a.wService Pledge

Train Withdrawal from Service

Train Withdrawal in the Best Opportunity to MinimiseTrain Service Impact

Fault Classification

Fault Handling

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Operational Mitigation in Place?

Need to be removed from service i.a.w with Service Pledge?

Yes

No ASAP?

Yes

No

Train Maintenance Standards/ Specifications

List of Min Train Equipment Condition Requirements (Free from R1 & R2 hazards)

Minimum In-Service Standards

+• Train Exam Checklists• Major Eqt ( e.g Bogie & T/M Overhaul Specifications)

Fit - To- Run Condition After Maintenance

Minimum In Service Condition

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 7 of 19

8 Minimum in In-Service Conditions

8.1 Identified mitigations shall be applied when the minimum requirements of the in-service conditions stipulated in the below table cannot be met. Train handling shall follow the requirements for Level 1 or Level 2 Critical Fault accordingly.

Table 1: Minimum in In-Service Conditions

Component Equipment

Train Type (Note 1)

Min Requirements

Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met

Body & External Fittings

Saloon Windows

H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be correctly installed and fully secured with key rubbers and safety clamps.

Competent employee to protect the open area if there is any window glass missing.

Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers, underframe equipment

H,C,S,X All externally mounted equipment shall be in compliance with allowable train outline.

The train may proceed where damaged equipment can be secured to ensure it does not drag, threaten other equipment or in any way exceed allowable outline.

Drivers mirror / side windows

H,C,S,X All Driver's mirrors and windows shall provide clear rear view of train.

Driving Cab Windscreen

H,C,S,X Lead cab to be within operating standard.

Swept area of the windscreen wiper to be cleaned to provide sufficient view to permit safe operation of the train.

Brake

Air Brake

H,C,S,X (i) All Service brakes shall be fully functional with braking to each axle in compliance with each braking mode. (ii) All emergency brakes shall be fully functional with braking to each axle.

The train may proceed at reduced speed under bogie isolated conditions. Details will be provided once mutual agreement with TSV is achieved.

Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) and switch

C,H The Brake Valve Isolating Cock and Switch shall be fully functional.

Auto Park Brake Switch

C,H

Park Brake Switch -local

C,H

Park Brake Switch -train line

C,H, S

All Parking Brakes and operating equipment shall be fully functional.

Minimum number of operating Park Brake Cylinders must be 50% or greater to hold a fully loaded train in the suburban system.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 8 of 19

Component Equipment

Train Type (Note 1)

Min Requirements

Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met

Couplings

Scharfenberg C,X Dellner S Auto-coupler H Semi-permanent coupler

C,S,X

Transition coupler C,S,X

(i) All Automatic Couplers, semi-permanent couplers and Transition Couplers shall be fully mechanically, pneumatically and electrically functional. (ii) All train separation detection devices shall be fully functional.

Gangway & Safety chains

H,C At least one chain shall be securely and correctly connected and 2 handrails to be available.

Cable ties are available for Driver to effect temporary repair or Communication Doors are to be locked to prevent passengers using the walkway.

Communications

PA

H,C,S,X All PA communication equipment shall be fully functional to ensure correct and reliable operation.

PA of lead car must be operational.

Fixed Train Radio H,C,S,X Fixed Train Radio The train may proceed if the Driver has adequate communication via his mobile telephone and portable radio.

Saloon area intercom and emergency call button.

C,S,X 000 Stickers Regular PA announcements

Serious with a Priority shunt

Whistle H,C,S,X At least one whistle tone warning shall be functional.

Doors

Door control H,C,S,X (i) All Saloon Doors shall be fully functional. (ii) Door interlock circuits (Door closed and traction control circuits) shall be fully functional. (iii) Door obstacle detection shall be fully functional.

The train may proceed where the Driver can detect the fault and take steps to secure the doors or vacate the car. No more than 1 door per side per car to be inoperative.

Cab to Saloon Door C,S,X Cab to Saloon doors shall be operated properly.

The Cab to Saloon Door of the leading and unattended cabs must be able to lock. Or competent employee travelling to protect

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 9 of 19

Component Equipment

Train Type (Note 1)

Min Requirements

Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met

Cab Door C,S,X Cab Door of the leading cab shall be able to be operated properly. Cab Door of the unattended cabs must be able to be locked and secured.

For Siemens, withdraw the train if door loop is bypassed. For Comeng, the leading cab door may be fitted with door latch or dead bolts to Cab Door as redundant device provided that the Cab to Saloon Door is operative.

Cab Door H The Cab Door shall be open and close properly.

The driver shall secure the Cab Door at the leading and unattended cabs and withdraw the train from service.

Environmental Controls

HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters.

C,X .

When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all leading and trailing car air conditioning units shall be able to provide the required cooling requirements

The train may proceed where the Driver’s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations.

HVAC x2 heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters.

H

HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 1xCab heater.

S

When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all leading and trailing car air conditioning units shall be able to provide the required cooling requirements.

The train may proceed where the Driver’s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations.

HVAC heating, cooling for saloon.

C,S,X At least one air conditioning unit per car shall provide conditioned air flow.

Ventilation & Air filtering.

C,X

HVAC ventilation fans.

H,S

At least one air conditioning unit per car shall still provide fresh air flow.

Cab booster fan. C,X

Cab fan. S

When ambient temperature > 30 deg C, all cab fans shall be able to provide adequate air flow to the cabs.

The train may proceed where the Driver’s exposure to the hot cab does not exceed 1.5 hours. The driver shall carry a Thermos flask and drinks and cooled water shall be available at FSS and terminal stations

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 10 of 19

Component Equipment

Train Type (Note 1)

Min Requirements

Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met

Internal Fittings & Furnishings

Drivers blinds H,C,S,X The Blind shall be adjustable to the degree that driver can safely control train including the use of PPE.

Saloon Windows.

H,C,S,X All Saloon windows shall be correctly installed and fully secured with key rubbers and safety clamps.

Competent employee to protect the open area if there is any window glass missing.

Lighting

Headlights -Low & High beam

H,C,S,X At least one Headlight per side of the leading cab shall illuminate.

During daylight hours no headlights required. In MURL/Richmond tunnel a 50kph speed restriction is to be applied. During night hours no headlights required normal white marker lights are to be illuminated and speed must not exceed 50kph and 15 kph through sidings and stations.

Suspension

Secondary suspension. Coil with rubber element.

X All Primary and Secondary suspension components shall be intact and set at correct ride height.

The train may proceed at reduced speed (30kph) where the suspension height cannot be maintained.

Secondary suspension. 2x Airbags. Bump stops.

H,C,S, All Primary suspension components shall be intact. Air-bags shall be inflated and set at correct ride height

The train may proceed at reduced speed (30 kph and 80 kph for Siemens) where the suspension height cannot be maintained.

Traction

Gear case C All Gear cases shall be fully and correctly secured to the traction motor and axle.

Gear box/WN coupling

H,S, X The Gearbox and traction motor coupling shall be fully functional.

Traction cables & connections.

H,C All traction cables shall be fully insulated and secured.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 11 of 19

Component Equipment

Train Type (Note 1)

Min Requirements

Recommended Operational Control if Min Requirements cannot be met

Traction Control

Foot& Hand pilot valve

H,C,S,X All Safety devices such as Hand and Foot Pilot Valves and Control Governors shall be fully functional.

Either foot or hand pilot valve must be operative.

Master Controller H,C,S,X All Traction and control equipment shall be fully functional and comply with specified operational requirements

Wheels

Wheel Set H,C,X,S Wheels shall be fully functional and shall fully comply with the conditions specified in the relevant maintenance documentation

The train may proceed at reduced speed (40kmh) where wheel flats are detected in excess of 60mm long and/or 2mm deep, if the wheel still rotates and displaced metal is not attached to the tread.

Wheel Set

CT, Bogie mounted equipment in contact with wheel sets shall be fully functional.

The train may proceed at reduced speed (80kph) where defective brake rigging does not prevent the wheel from rotating.

Wheel Set

H,S,CD,X Wheel set mounted equipment shall be fully functional.

The train may proceed at reduced speed (80kph) where defective disc brake does not prevent the wheel from rotating.

Note: Train Type Abbreviations as per section 2

9 Related Documents

MFIS 970100-01 Functional Safety Risk Analysis for Electric Trains

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 12 of 19

10 Appendix

Appendix A – Critical Fault List of the New Risk Based Fault Classification System

Table 2: Comeng Critical Fault – 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Equipment

Critical Fault - 1st Level Description

1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train.

2 Brake Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) switch

Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually charge.

3 Body and External Fittings

Driving Cab Windscreen

Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility.

4 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled.

5 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to close when uncoupled.

6 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler

Fails to remain coupled.

7 Doors Door control Unable to close.

8 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status.

9 Traction Gear case Mechanical integrity.

10 Traction control

Foot& Hand pilot valve

Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative.

11 Traction control Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative.

12 Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/Over-heated. Skidded

wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep.

13 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 13 of 19

Table 3: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Equipment

Critical Fault - 1st Level Description

1 Body & External fittings Saloon Door Fails to close.

2 Body and External Fittings

Driving Cab Windscreen

Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility.

3 Couplings Scharfenburg Fails to remain coupled.

4 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler

Fails to remain coupled.

5 Couplings Gear box Mechanical integrity.

6 Doors Door control Unable to open/close.

7 Suspension Secondary

suspension. Coil with rubber element

Failure of secondary suspension. As well as excessive wheel loading and unloading.

8 Traction control

Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuits fail to maintain or break continuity of safety loop.

9 Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/Over-heated. Skidded

wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep.

10 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 14 of 19

Table 4: Siemens Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Equipment

Critical Fault - 1st Level Description

1 Body and External Fittings

Driving Cab Windscreen

Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility.

2 Couplings Dellner Fails to remain coupled.

3 Couplings Semi-permanent coupler

Fails to remain coupled.

4 Doors Saloon Fails to close.

5 Traction Gear box Mechanical integrity.

6 Traction control

Foot/Hand pilot valve The primary and secondary safety circuit fails to maintain or break continuity of safety loop.

7 Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged. Skidded wheel with flats

in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep.

8 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 15 of 19

Table 5: Hitachi Critical Fault - 1st Level

Item Sub-system description Component Equipment

Critical Fault - 1st Level Description

1 Brake Auto brake Fails to brake train.

2 Brake Brake Valve Isolation Cock (BVIC) switch

Fails to shut off: brake pipe will continually charge.

3 Body and External Fittings

Driving Cab Windscreen

Damaged, Scratched Graffiti reduction in visibility.

4 Couplings Auto-coupler Fails to remain coupled.

5 Doors Door control Unable to close.

6 Doors Door control Fails to indicate correct status.

7 Doors Saloon Fails to close.

8 Traction Gear box/WN

coupling Bearing Failure, Seizure, Collapse. Misalignment due to uncompensated wheel machining.

9 Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to hold brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative.

10 Traction control. Foot/Hand pilot valve Fails to release brake pipe pressure and secondary safety device inoperative.

11

Wheels Wheel Set Wheel damaged/overheated. Skidded wheel with flats in excess of 60mm long and /or 2mm deep.

12 Wheels Wheel Set Locked axle. Gearbox or Bearing failure. Lubrication failure. Hot axle box.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 16 of 19

Table 6: Comeng Critical Fault - 2nd Level Item Sub-system

description Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description

1 Brake VICERS Fails to provide secondary protection for driver incapacity.

2 Brake Park Brake Switch -local Fails to apply or release local park brake.

3 Brake Park Brake Switch -train line

Fails to apply train line park brake.

4 Brake Auto Park Brake Switch Fails to apply train line park brake.

5 Body & External fittings

Saloon Windows Glass missing fails to contain passengers. Equipment out of gauge.

6 Body & External fittings

Body & External fittings Equipment out of gauge.

7 Body & Ext fittings

Drivers mirror Fails to provide clear rear view of train.

8 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles.

9 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button.

10 Communications PA Unable to communicate to passengers in an emergency.

11 Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency.

12 Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom

and emergency call button. Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location.

13 Couplings Gangway & Safety chains Safety chains disconnected or missing. 14 Doors Door control Unable to release.

15 Environmental controls

HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters

Fail to condition the air.

16 Environmental controls

Ventilation & Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.

17 Environmental controls

Cab booster fan Fails to increase air flow into cab at ambient temperature >25C.

18 Internal fittings & furnishings

Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation.

19

Internal furnishing & fittings

Saloon Windows Window integrity not to be compromised as per L3-ROS-MAI-007 Fleet Maintenance Instruction Inspection of Train Windows.

20 Traction Traction cables & connections.

Fails to provide electrical insulation.

21 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off.

Potential overspeed leading to derailment.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 17 of 19

Table 7: Xtrapolis Critical Fault - 2nd Level

Item Sub-system description

Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description

1 Body & External fittings

Drivers mirror / side windows

Fails to provide clear rear view of train.

2

Body & External fittings

Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers

Fails to contain passengers. Equipment out of gauge. Or internal crack in window.

3 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles.

4 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button.

5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.

6 Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency.

7 Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom

and emergency call button Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location.

8 Environmental controls

HVAC heating, cooling for saloon

Fail to condition the air.

9 Environmental controls

HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heater

Fail to condition the air.

10 Environmental controls

Ventilation & Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.

11 Environmental controls

Cab booster fan. Fail to increase air flow into cab at ambient temperature >25C.

12 Internal fittings & furnishings

Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation.

13 Lighting Headlights -Low & High beam

Failure to illuminate.

14 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train.

Potential overspeed leading to derailment.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 18 of 19

Table 8: Siemens Critical Fault - 2nd Level

Item Sub-system description

Component Equipment Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description

1 Body & External fittings

Drivers mirror / side windows

Fails to provide clear rear view of train.

2

Body & External fittings

Windows, external panels, mirrors, handrails, steps, tread plate, equipment covers

Fails to contain passengers. Equipment out of gauge. Or internal crack in window.

3 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles.

4 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button.

5 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.

6 Communications DDU: PEI, CCTV Unable to communicate to passenger at any PEI location in an emergency.

7 Communications PEI. Saloon area intercom

and emergency call button. Unable to communicate to passenger in an emergency at individual PEI location.

8 Doors Door control Unable to open/close.

9 Environmental controls

HVAC heating, cooling for saloon.

Fail to condition the air.

10 Environmental controls

HVAC heating, cooling for cab. 1xCab heater.

Fail to condition the air.

11 Environmental controls

HVAC ventilation fans x 2 Failure to provide adequate fresh air.

12 Environmental controls

HVAC Air filtering Failure to provide adequate fresh air.

13 Internal fittings & furnishings

Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation.

14 Lighting Headlights -Low & High beam

Failure to illuminate.

15 Suspension Airbag Fails to sufficiently dampen vertical

vibration by under inflation.

16 Suspension Secondary suspension. 2x Airbags. Bump stops.

Potential wheel loading.

17 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power, brake or to shut off train.

Potential overspeed leading to derailment.

ENGINEERING STANDARD - OPERATIONS ROLLING STOCK MINIMUM IN-SERVICE

STANDARD MFST 830100-01

L1-CHE-STD-003 Version: 1 Effective from: 25th June 2012

Approving Manager: Chief Engineer Approval Date: 25/06/2012 Next Review Date: 25/03/2015 PRINTOUT MAY NOT BE UP-TO-DATE; REFER TO METRO INTRANET FOR THE LATEST VERSION Page 19 of 19

Table 9: Hitachi Critical - Fault - 2nd Level

Item Sub-system description Component Equipment

Critical Fault - 2nd Level Description

1 Body & External fittings Saloon Windows. Glass missing at the bottom windows with competent employee to protect the area.

2 Body & External fittings Body & External Fittings

Equipment out of gauge.

3 Body & External fittings Drivers mirror Fails to provide clear rear view of train.

4 Couplings Gangway & Safety chains

Safety chains disconnected or missing. Fall from train.

5 Communications Whistle Driver unable to sound warning to trackside pedestrians and vehicles.

6 Communications Fixed Train Radio Driver unable to contact train control using emergency call button.

7 Communications PA PA of lead car must be operational.

8 Brake Park Brake Switch -local

Fails to apply or release local park brake.

9 Brake Park Brake Switch -train line

Fails to apply or release train line park brake.

10 Brake Auto Park Brake Switch

Fails to apply or release train line park brake.

11 Doors Cab Door Fails to open.

12 Doors Door control Unable to release

13 Environmental controls HVAC x2 heating, cooling for cab. 2xCab heaters

Fail to condition the air.

14 Internal fittings & furnishings

Drivers blinds Fails to protect driver from glare and direct radiation.

15 Lighting Headlights -Low & High beam

Failure to illuminate.

16 Traction control Master Controller Fail to power train or to shut off.

17 Traction Traction cables & connections

Fails to provide electrical insulation.