Tragic Moral Conflict and Endangered Species Recovery · 2. Two Utilitarian Senses of Wrongness 3....
Transcript of Tragic Moral Conflict and Endangered Species Recovery · 2. Two Utilitarian Senses of Wrongness 3....
Tragic Moral Conflict and Endangered Species Recovery
by
Rachel Lee Bryant
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy University of Toronto
© Copyright by Rachel Lee Bryant 2018
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TragicMoralConflictandEndangeredSpeciesRecoveryRachelLeeBryantDoctorofPhilosophy
DepartmentofPhilosophyUniversityofToronto
2018
Abstract
Giventhestateoftheartofconservation,andgiventherapiditywithwhichspeciesare
disappearingastheresultofhumaneconomicactivities,membersofthesocietiesthat
encourageandbenefitfromtheseactivities,andthatundertakethespeciesrecovery
process,oftenfaceaterriblechoice:either1)intensivelymanagespeciespopulationsand
ecologicalcommunitiesbykilling,harming,makingvulnerabletoharm,orcontrollingthe
mostimportantaspectsofthelivesofmanyindividualanimals;or2)allowentirespecies
togoextinct.Icallsituationsinwhichpeoplefacethiskindofchoicerecoverypredicaments.
Suchpredicamentsseemtobetragicmoralconflicts,orsituationsinwhichwhateverone
does—eventherightactthatisrightonthewhole—willbeseriouslywrong.
ThisdissertationexploreswhetherworkingfromwithinKant’sdeontology,Ross’s
deontology,orutilitarianismexcusesenvironmentalethicsforneglectingtheproblemof
tragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizerecoverypredicamentsastragicmoral
conflicts.Itasksthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatittakestoadmitthatthe
rightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatittakestoadmitthattheright
actcanbeseriouslywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretrecoverypredicamentsas
situationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?
Thedissertationarguesthat,foreachtheory,theanswertothefirsttwoquestionsis
yes.Noneofthetheoriesexcusesusforignoringtheproblemoftragicmoralconflict.For
bothRoss’sandKant’sdeontologies,theanswertothethirdquestionisalsoyes,butfor
utilitarianism,theanswerisindeterminate.Thismeansthatfromwithinutilitarianism,we
cannotsaywhetherarecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflict,butfromwithinthe
othertwotheorieswecansaythatitis.
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AcknowledgementsIttookmealongtimetowritethisdissertation,andtheprocesswassometimesquite
painful.Ultimately,itwasafulfillingexperience,inlargepartbecauseofthecareand
supportothersgaveme.
Mycommitteemembers—advisorsWayneSumnerandDenisWalsh,andreader
PaulThompson—patientlystuckwithmethroughmajorchangesindirectionandlong
silencesonmypart.Deniswentoutofhiswaytofostermypreviousworkinthe
philosophyofecology,andgenerouslystayedwithmeevenaftermyinterestsveered
sharplyintotheterritoryofethics.Wayne,wholivesinthisterritory,kindlysupportedme
asIfoundmyownpaththroughit.ThankstohisandDenis’sguidanceandsuggestions,the
workisimmeasurablybetterthanitwouldhavebeenotherwise.Bothofthemexpressed
beliefinmeevenwhenIdidnotbelieveinmyself.Ithankthemmostofallforthis.
IwasthrilledtohaveLoriGruenastheexternalexaminer,becauseIadmireher
work—bothasaphilosopherandanactivist—somuch.Hercarefulreadingofthe
dissertation,andherinsightfulquestionsandadvice,willbeinvaluabletomeasI
transformmyworkinthefuture.TomHurkawastheinternalexaminer.Ashealwaysdid
withmycoursepapers,Tomreadthedissertationattentivelyandthoroughly,asked
essentialquestionsaboutcoreissues,andgavemanyveryhelpfulsuggestions.
MargaretOpoku-Paregavekindandskillfulassistanceinalladministrativematters.
TimeIspentwithFarshidBaghai,TawrinBaker,GailFraser,LetitiaGrenier,
LaurencePacker,SuzanPoyraz,HelgaVarden,andShelleyWeinbergremindedmeover
andoveragainaboutwhatmatters.Conversationswitheachofthesefriendsabout
philosophy,writing,reading,animals,orconservationscienceandpracticenourishedmy
thinkingandwork.
Stellahasbeenmydogcompanionfornearlythirteenyears.Shetookmeofteninto
thewoods,anddoesnotcareatallaboutphilosophy.Bothofthesethingshelpedmestay
saneasIworkedonthisproject.Mysister,CourtneyBryant,cametomyrescue,andkept
melaughingandfeelingloved.IwishIhadnotwaiteduntilthelastminutetolearnwhata
goodeditorsheis.IfitwerenotforFarshidBaghai,IdonotthinkIwouldhavehadthe
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imagination,thecourage,orthespacetotransformmyworkfromamereintellectual
exerciseintosomethingrootedinpersonalmeaning.
Finally,Iamdeeplygratefultomyparents,NancyWilliamsBryantandMichael
Bryant,whoabidinglysupportedmeinmorewaysthanIcannumber,andwhoseloveI
willneverfathom.
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TableofContents
Acknowledgements
TableofContents
ChapterOne:TheRecoveryPredicamentandTragicMoralConflict
1.TheRecoveryPredicament
2.Remorse
3.MoralConflict
4.AskingtheTragicQuestion
5.TheChaptersAhead
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ChapterTwo:Ross’sDeontology
1.MoralConflict
2.TragicMoralConflict
3.RecoveryConflicts
4.Conclusion
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ChapterThree:Kant’sDeontology
1.Kant’sSystemofEthicalDuties
2.MoralConflictswithinKant’sEthics
3.IstheRecoveryPredicamentaTragicMoralConflict?
4.Conclusion
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ChapterFour:Utilitarianism
1.ThePrincipleofUtility
2.TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness
3.ThePossibilityofMoralConflictwithinUtilitarianism
4.TheRecoveryPredicamentisatLeastanEphemeralConflict
5.WhethertheRecoveryPredicamentisaPersistentConflictisIndeterminate
6.Conclusion
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Conclusion 133
Bibliography
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ChapterOne:TheRecoveryPredicamentandTragicMoralConflict
1. TheRecoveryPredicament
Thecaseoftheislandfox
Inthereports,sheisgivenanumberbutnotaname.Littleinformationisconveyedabout
SanMiguelIslandfox85619beforeshewasfirsttrappedin1998,butgoodguessesabout
keyelementsofhernarrativecanbecobbledtogetherfromthenaturalhistoryofUrocyon
littoralis,andfromtherecenthistoryoffoxesonSanMiguelandtheothernorthern
ChannelIslands.1
Shewouldhavebeenborninspring,inadenofhermother’schoosing.Ofallthe
sleepingandhidingplaceswithwhichshewasfamiliar,hermotherprobablywouldhave
pickedoutthesafestanddriestoneinwhichtodeliverandnurseherpups.Herfather
wouldhavebroughtfoodtothemthere,andhelpedhermothercarrytheyoungoutfrom
theden.Bothparentswouldhavechaperoned85619andhersiblingsaroundthepair’s
overlappinghomeranges,playedwiththem,protectedthemfromdanger,andshownthem
byexamplehowtohuntandforage.
Inherfirstautumnandwinter,85619mighteitherhaveremainedwithherfamily,
orhavewanderedawayfromtheirterritory,encounteringfoxesunknowntoher.Among
thesewouldhavebeenonessheoptedtoavoid,ortothreaten.Butperhapsonefox
appealedtoher,behavedcompatiblywithher.Thetwomighthavepairedup,initiatinga
partnershipthatwouldhavelasteduntiloneofthemdiedorelsewastrappedandtaken
away.
Whennottendingtoherownpups,85619probablypassedherdaysroamingher
territoryasshepleased.Sometimesshedefendeditsboundaryagainstfoxesinneighboring
territories,andsometimesshesurreptitiouslymatedwiththem.Sometimesshetook
1ThereportsaretheU.S.NationalParkService’sislandfoxcaptivebreedingandrecoveryreportsfor1999-2003:CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding1999-2000;CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2001;CoonanandRutzCaptiveBreeding2002Report;CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxRecoveryProgram2003AnnualReport.Forthenaturalhistoryofislandfoxes,seeCoonanetal.,DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox.TheChannelIslandsareanarchipelagointhePacificOcean,offthecoastofsouthernCalifornia.ThenorthernChannelIslandscompriseSanMiguel,SantaRosa,andSantaCruz.
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nourishmentfromvariousandabundantfoodsources;shehunteddeermice,larks,and
crickets,shestoleeggsandchicksfrombirds’nests,andatethesweetfruitsofmany
differentplants.Sometimessheplayedwithhermateorkin,andsometimestheygroomed
eachother.Sometimessherestedaloneunderasagebush,ortogetherwithherfamilyin
theshelterofaden.
Whenshewasstillyoung,manyoftheotherfoxesonSanMiguelIslandfellpreyto
goldeneagles,whobeganhuntingontheislandaroundthetimeshewaslikelytohavebeen
born.85619’sneighbors,siblings,parents,pups,ormatewereprobablyamongthe
depredated.Shealmostwas,too.Aneagleonceswoopeddownuponher,sinkinghistalons
deeplyintohertorso.Hetriedtoflyoffwithher,butsheescapedhisgripandsurvivedthe
injuriesitinflicted.Beneaththickfur,theskinandmusclesaboveherribsborepermanent
scars.
In1998,shewastrapped,temptedbyfoodplacedatthebackofametalboxnot
muchlargerthanherbody.Beforebeingreleased,herthroatwasencircledbyachunky
collarthatemittedaradiofrequency,enablingpeopletotrackhermovementsremotely.
Outofeightradio-collaredSanMiguelfoxes,shewasoneofonlytwowhomanagedtostay
alivelongerthantwelveweeks.
Overthecourseofjustthreemonthsintheautumnofthefollowingyear,every
otherremainingfoxonSanMiguelIslanddisappeared—thelastofherkin,thelastofher
neighbors.Only85619evadedthebaitedtrapsthattrickedalltheothers,maybehaving
learnedalessonwhenshewascollared.
Forfouryears,therewasnoonetoplaywith,tofightwith,togroomorbegroomed
by,tomatewith,ortocurlupwithinsleep.Sheremainedfreeandcompletelyalone,
despitenumerousattemptsbyhumanbeings,andpresumablybygoldeneagles,tocapture
her.
Shegrewoldinsolitude,andshestartedgettingsick.Bythefallof2003,85619’s
kidneysandheartwerediseased,herthyroidhadtumors,andparasiteshadweakenedher
colon.Herwilysuspicionoftrapswasfinallyovercomewhenpeopleusedanewtechnique
tocatchher:aleghold.
Theytookherawayfromherplaceanddepositedherina200ft2pen.(Herhome
rangehadprobablybeenaslightlylessthan13millionft2beforetheotherfoxes
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disappeared).2Twomonthslater,afterveterinariansdeterminedthattheillandagedfox
wasfittobreed,amalefoxwasbroughtintothesmallspacewithher.
85619wasnolongerinthehabitofinteractingwithotherfoxes.Thisonewasa
stranger.Hewasunacquaintedwiththewild,largerthanher,andmuchyounger.Unlike
matesinthewild,thetwohadnotchoseneachotherandcouldnotescapetheother’s
presence.Yetwinterwasapproachingandtherewasonlyoneenclosedshelterinthecage.
Thefoxeshadeithertoshareit,orfightoverit.And85619hadtocompeteforthefoodthat
appeareddaily.Shecouldnotacquireherownsustenance,sincetherewerenoanimalsto
hunt,noneststopilfer,nofruitstogather.
Perhapstheworstpartoflivinginthecagewasthattherewasnowheretogoto
avoidtheotherfox’saggression.Onemonthafterhearrivedinthepen,theotherfoxkilled
85619,breakingherlegandshakinghersoviolentlythatherbrainandkidneys
hemorrhaged.3
Whathappenedto85619isnotentirelyunusual.Like85619,everylastfoxonSan
MiguelIsland,everylastfoxonSantaRosaIsland,andatleastfifteenpercentofthefoxes
onSantaCruzIslandwerecapturedanddepositedincageslikehers—attheverylargest,
onehundredthofonepercentofthesizeoftheirhomeranges.Manyofthecaptivefoxes
(theonce-wildonesaswellastheircaptive-bornoffspring)wereinjuredrepeatedlyand
severelybytheirinescapablepenmates,andafewdiedastheresultofthoseinjuries.4
Notallcaptivepairingswereviolent,though.Somefoxesregularlyplayedwith,
groomed,andsleptwiththeirpenmates.However,thesefriendlypairingswereseveredif
theydidnotresultinlittersofpups.Thepup-lessfoxeswouldthenbeconfinedwith
2AccordingtoCoonanetal.,theaveragehomerangesizeofaSanMiguelIslandFoxis1.18km2,whichis12.7millionft2(DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox,39-40).
3Forinformationon85619’sautopsy,captureandstintincaptivity,seethesourceslistedinnote1.4Recordsofpairings,breeding,injuriesanddeathsoffoxescanbefoundintheNationalParkService’sislandfoxcaptivebreedingandrecoveryprogramannualreports:inadditiontothereportslistedinnote1,theseare:Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2004,andIslandFoxRecovery2005;CoonanandDenis,IslandFoxRecovery2006,andIslandFoxRecovery2007;Coonan,IslandFoxRecovery2008andIslandFoxRecovery2009;andCoonanandGuglielmino,IslandFoxRecovery2011.
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strangers,chosenforthemsolelyaccordingtoestimatesofthecontributiontheireventual
offspringwouldmaketothegeneticdiversityoftheirsubspecies.
Thestrangenessandstressofconfinementhindersislandfoxesfromparentingas
oftenandaswellastheydointhewild.Incaptivity,theysufferedanunusuallyhighrateof
latetermabortions,stillbirthsandneonataldeaths.Someofthesecanbeattributedto
disease.Onerainyspringtwoyearsafter85619’sdeath,therewerenodryplacestogo
withinthefoxes’tinyenclosures.Sleepinginperpetuallydampwoodenboxes,many
pregnantfoxesdevelopedmastitis.Thispainfulbacterialinfectionofthemammaryglands
canpreventadequatenursing.Leftuntreated,itcandevelopintosepticemia,asystem-wide
infection.Asaresultofmastitisandsubsequentsepticemia,somemothersandyoungpups
diedintheircages.
Happily,mostpupsbornincaptivitysurvived.Yettheyhadanevenhardertime
reproducingthantheirwild-bornparentsdid.Asjuvenilesandadults,theyweremore
likelytoseriouslyinjuretheirmates,andtoabandonorharmtheirpups.Thoughwildfox
fatherscontributemuchtothecareoftheirpups,ononeislandcaptivefathersposedsuch
athreattotheiryoungthattheysystematicallywereremovedfromtheirpensonce
parturitionwasimminent.5
Whiletheislandfoxeswereconfinedincages,andaftertheirrelease,otherwild
animalsontheirislandswerebeingexterminated.Everylastoneofthe425muledeerand
740elkonSantaRosaIslandwasshot,andthe5,036pigsonSantaCruzIslandwereall
killed,too.
Theprocessofdestroyingthepigscouldnothavebeenmorethoroughand
systematic.6First,theentireislandwaspartitionedintoninesectionsbyfencesthatpigs
couldnotbreech.Foruptofifteenmonths,eachofthe5,036pigsontheislandwasstuckin
theirsection,regardlessofwhetherpartoftheirsocialgrouporhomerangelayonthe
othersideofafence.
5ButthiswasonSantaCatalina,anislandinthesouthernChannelIslands,whichforthesakeofsimplicityI’mnotincludinginthisnarrative.There,foxeswerebroughtintocaptivitynotbecauseofhyperpredation(asontheNorthernChannelIslands),butbecausetheyweredyingfromdistemperatveryhighrates.6Parksetal.,“RapidEradication”detailsthemethodsusedtokillthepigs.
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Next,trapswerebaitedandset.Mostpigscaughtintrapswerekilled.Thefewthat
weretemporarilysparedwerefittedwithradiocollars,sterilizedandreleased.Thefemales
amongthemwerealsoinjectedwithachemicalthatinducessignsofestrous,sothatthey
wouldattractmalepigsforpurposesthatwillbecomeclearbelow.
Oncetrappingpigsbecameinefficient,peoplefoundandshotthemfromhelicopters.
Whennomorepigscouldbeseenreadilyfromtheair,peoplehuntedthemonfoot,using
dogstohelpfindandcornerthepigs.Afterthedogsceasedtofindthemeasily,peopleused
theradiosignalsfromthecollaredanimalstolocateandkillthelastgroupsofpigsonthe
island.
Alongwiththepigs,elk,anddeer,goldeneaglesalsowereremovedfromSantaRosa
andSantaCruzIslands.BecauseaU.S.federallawprohibitskillingeagles,theadultswere
trappedinnetsandtransportedtoAlaskaornorthernCalifornia.Chicksweretakenfrom
theirnestsontheChannelIslandsanddepositedinnestsonthemainland.Threeofthe31
adultsdiedafterbeingcapturedandbeforebeingreleased,andanothereaglediedalmost
immediatelyafterbeingreleased.7,8Itiscommonlyknownthattranslocatinganimals
substantiallyelevatestheirmortalityrates.
Asthegoldeneagleswerebeingtransportedfromtheislandstothemainland,bald
eagleswerebeingtransportedfromthemainlandtotheisland.Juvenilesborntocaptive
7Lattaetal.,CaptureandTranslocationofGoldenEagles,andCoonanandDenis,IslandFoxRecovery2006.SeealsoCoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding1999-2000,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2001,andIslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2002;Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2003,IslandFoxRecovery2004,andIslandFoxRecovery2005;Coonanetal.DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox;andUSFWS,DraftRecoveryPlan.8Sometimesthetotalnumberofadultsornearadultsisgivenastwenty-two.SeeUSFWS,DraftRecoveryPlan.
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parents(wholikelylivedunderconditionssimilartothecaptiveislandfoxes’9)were
broughttoSantaCruz.10
Meanwhile,captiveislandfoxeswerebeingfittedwithradiocollarsandreleased
backtothewild.OnSantaCruzandSantaRosa,highproportions(e.g.50%)ofthefirst
groupsofreleasedfoxeswerekilledbygoldeneagleswithinweeksofhavingbeenfreed.
Thiswasnotsurprising,asthesefoxeswerereleased“experimentally”beforetheavian
causeoftheirconspecifics’highmortalityrateshadbeenremoved.Amongthelater
releases,somefoxesdiedofemaciationshortlyaftertheyencounteredthewild-bornin
captivity,theywerenotaccustomedtoalimentingthemselves.Oneolderfoxwhowasnot
inshapetodefendaterritorywaskilledbyotherrecentlyreleasedfoxes.Anotherwas
strangledwhenhisradiocollargotstuckonthebranchofashrub.Allinallthough,once
theeagleswereremoved,mostreleasedfoxesfaredverywell.Theychosematesandfound
territories,andtheyrearedpupsmuchmoresuccessfullythantheyhadincaptivity.
Insummary,fromthetimethat85619wasleftaloneinthewildin1999,untilthe
lastoftheelkwereshotonSantaRosaIslandin2011thefollowingoccurred:thousandsof
animalswerekilled;scoresofothersweretakenfromtheirhomesandputinunfamiliar
placeswheretheirchancesofsurvivalwereprobablygreatlydiminished;andhundredsof
9Thecaptiveeagles’conditionsmightevenhavebeenworsethanthefoxes’.Foronething,captivebirdscan’tlocomotethewaytheyprobablymostwantto(exception:flightlessones).Also,atleastthreeotheraviancaptive-breedingprograms(PeregrineFalcon,HawaiianCrow,CaliforniaCondor)force(orforced)birdstoconceiveattimesandintervalsoverwhichtheyhave(orhad)nocontrol,andwhichdon’tmatchtheonestheyexhibitinthewild.Forinstance,throughrepeatedartificialinsemination,andbyremovingtheireggsassoonastheyarelaid,condorsweremadetoproducemanymoreclutchesperyearthantheywouldinthewild.Also,captivebirdsareoftenpreventedfromrearingtheirownyoung.Forexample,captivecondorchickswereoftenfedbypeoplewearingcondorpuppetsontheirhands,ratherthanbytheirparents,withwhominthewildtheywouldstayforacoupleofyearslearninghowtobeacondor.Hawaiiancrowchicksarealsosometimesraisedbypuppets,sotheirparentscanusealltheirenergymakingmoreeggs.Whentheywereendangered,peregrinefalconshatchedatcaptivebreedingfacilitieswereoften“raised”inthewildbypeople—suchasmyfriendLetitiaandme—whoprovidedfoodforthemandprotectedthemfrompredatorsbutdidnotinteractwiththemastheirparentswouldhave.Theirparentsweredeniedchick-rearingactivities,becauseraisingtheirownbroodswouldhavegotteninthewayofproducingasmanyeggsaspossible.Forexcellentdiscussionsofmanyoftheethicalissuesraisedbykeepinghumansandotheranimalsincaptivity,seeGruen(ed.),TheEthicsofCaptivity.10USFWSDraftRecoveryPlan,Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2005,andCoonanetal.,DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox.
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yetotherswereconfinedtostressfulsocialandphysicalconditionsthattheydidnot
choose,thatledto(sometimesfatal)diseaseandinjury,andwhichtheycouldnotoptto
leave.
Thisprogramiswidelyhailedasahugesuccessbecauseitpreventedtheextinction
ofthreecriticallyendangeredsubspeciesofUrocyonlittoralis(commonlycalledtheIsland
Fox),eachendemictooneofthethreenorthernChannelIslands:SanMiguel,SantaRosa,
andSantaCruz.11Everyelementoftheprogram—thekilling,thetranslocation,the
confinement—apparentlywasnecessaryforhinderinggoldeneaglesfromdepredatingthe
lastofthefoxes,andforgrowingtheshrunkenU.littoralispopulationstosizesthatwould
belikelytopersistagaininthewild.
Hereiswhy.Baldeaglesmostlyeatfoodfromtheocean,whilegoldeneagleseat
bothmarineandlandanimalsthesizeofislandfoxes.Therewasatimewhentheslightly
largerBaldEaglesnestingontheChannelIslandsrepelledprospectinggoldeneagles.But
afterMontroseChemicalCorporation,apesticidemanufacturer,begandumpingeffluent
intoMontroseBayin1940(theycontinueduntil1970),BaldEaglesingestedametabolite
ofDDTthroughtheirmarineprey,andaccumulateditintheirbodies.Asaresult,thebirds’
eggs’shellsgrewsothinthattheywouldbreaklongbeforethechicksdevelopinginside
werereadytohatch.Slowly,baldeaglesstoppedreproducingandeventuallydisappeared
fromtheChannelIslands.Goldeneaglesreplacedthem,andbeganbreedingtherebythe
endofthe1990s.Theyweresustainedbycopiouspigletsandfawns,theoffspringof
animalswhoseancestorshadbeenbroughttoSantaCruzandSantaRosabyfarmersand
huntersinthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,andbythecarcassesofelkleftto
rotbytrophyhunters.ThoughfoxesdidnotaccountforalargeportionofGoldeneagles’
diet,depredationnonethelesscausedthenumberoffoxestoplummet;between1994and
1999/2000,theestimatednumberonSanMiguelfellfrom450to15,onSantaRosait
droppedfrom1,780to15,andonSantaCruzfrom1,465to50or60.12Sofoxeswere
broughtintocaptivity,ungulatesweredestroyed,goldeneagleswereremoved,andbald
eagleswerere-introduced.
12Coonanetal.DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox,47.
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ThemethodsusedtopreventtheextinctionofUrocyonlittoralisarestandardinthe
appliedecologicalfieldsofconservationandecologicalrestoration.13Confiningwild
animalsinordertomanagetheirreproductionandtherebytheirsociallives(captive
breeding),movinganimalsfromplacestheyknowtoplaceswithwhichtheyhaveno
experienceornorecentexperience(re-introductionandtranslocation),andkillinganimals
perceivednottobelongwheretheylive(removalofso-calledinvasives)areconsidered
bestpracticesforstemmingextinctionsofendangeredanimalspecies.14,15Astherecovery
ofUrocyonlittoralisattests,whentheyareappliedmeticulously,themethodsworkwell.
Giventhestateoftheartofconservation,andgiventherapiditywithwhichspecies
andothertaxonomicgroupsaredisappearingastheresultofeconomicactivities,members
ofthesocietiesthatencourageandbenefitfromtheseactivities,andthatundertakethe
speciesrecoveryprocess,oftenfaceaterriblechoice.Wecaneither1)intensivelymanage
speciespopulationsandecologicalcommunitiesbykilling,harming,makingvulnerableto
harm,orcontrollingthemostimportantaspectsofthelivesofmanyindividualanimals,or
2)allowentirespeciesorothertaxonomicgroupstogoextinctbecauseofouractivities.
Iwillcallsituationsinwhichwefacethiskindofchoicerecoverypredicaments.In
them,thereissomethingdeeplytroublingabouteachofthecoursesofactionthatareopen
tous.Itseemsasthoughhoweverwerespondtothem,wewillhavecauseforprofound
regret,evenremorse.
13AfewexamplesotherNorthAmericanspeciesonwhichsomeorallofthesemethodshavebeenorarebeingusedincludeCaliforniacondor,Hawaiiancrow,Mexicanwolf,black-footedferret,VancouverIslandmarmot,whoopingcrane,andScripps’murrelet(formerlyknownasXantus’murrelet).Itwouldnotbeunreasonabletothinkthatpreventingtheextinctionofsomeofthesespeciessuchasthewhoopingcrane,theblackfootedferret,andtheHawaiiancrow,mightrequireperpetualmanagement.SeeRoman,Listed,Ch8.InNewZealand,thegovernment,conservationorganizations,andcitizenvolunteershaveundertakentokillhundredsofmillionsofmammals(whichdidnotexistontheislandsuntilhumansarrivedthereapproximately700yearsago)inordertopreventtheextinctionofmanyendemicbirdspecies.ForanintroductiontothisprojectseeKolbert,“TheBigKill.”14Habitatrestorationisalsooneofthebestpractices,butthiswasnotanissueintheU.littoraliscase,andIwillnotaddressithere.15Isometimesusetheterm“endangeredspecies”generically,toreferendangeredspecies,subspecies,populations,etc.
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2. RemorseRegretcomesindifferentforms,someofwhichBernardWilliamselaboratesin“Moral
Luck.”Theyallhaveincommonanattitudethatcanbeexpressedas“howmuchbetterifit
hadbeenotherwise.”Afewexamplesaredisappointment,sorrow,andgrief,whichareall
neutraltowardtheroleplayedbytheregrettorindoingorbringingaboutthatwhichthey
regret.Inthisgeneralsense,Mrs.RamsaycanregretthatlittleJames’hopesweredashed
whenatriptothelighthousewasputoff,whetherornotshetakesherselfashavinghad
anythingtodowiththepostponement.16Or,apersoncanregretthatotherswerehurtina
carcrashregardlessofwhethertheperson’sownactionsmadeanydifferencetothe
occurrenceorseverityoftheaccident.
However,ifaperson’sownactionsareimplicatedinthatwhichtheyregret,in
additiontoanattitudeof“howmuchbetterifithadbeenotherwise,”itwillalsobefitting
forthemtohaveanattitudeof“howmuchbetterifIhaddoneotherwise.”Williams
introducesthetermagentregrettodistinguishthisspeciesofregretfromregretingeneral.
Thatagentregretisanappropriateresponseforsomeonedoesnotentailthattheyare
responsible,letaloneculpablefortheregrettedstateofaffairs.Takeforanexample
Williams’truckdriver,whowasdrivingsafelybutcouldnotstophisvehicleintimetosave
achildwhodartedinfrontofit.Thedriverisrelatedtotheaccidentinadifferentwaythan
spectator-regrettors,becauseunlikethem,ifhehadtakenanalternatecourseofaction,the
regrettablestateofaffairscouldhavebeenaverted;althoughhehadnogoodreasonatthe
timetodoso,thedrivercouldhavechosenadifferentroute,leftafewminutesearlieror
later,ortakenthedayoff,andsurelythishauntshiminawayunexperiencedbyawitness
orsomeonewholearnsoftheincidentsecondhandandwhofeelsonly,thoughperhaps
deeply,regretsimplicitoraboutit.
Althoughweexpectthetruckdrivertoexperienceandtoexpressadifferenttypeof
regretthanawitnesswould,wedonot,Ithink,expecthimtoexperienceandexpress
remorse.Williamssayslittleaboutthisemotion,buthesuggestsitisaspeciesofagent
regret.Iwanttofollowandexpandonhissuggestion,drawingfromcontemporary
accountsofremorsetoconceiveofitasprofoundagentregretforseriouswrongdoing.One
16Thisexample,whichrunsthroughthesection,isdrawnfromVirginiaWoolf’sTotheLighthouse.
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elementthisconceptionofremorseshareswithmostothersisthattheagent’sregretted
actionisnotjustsomethingitwouldhavebeenbetternottohavedone.Itisawrong.
StevenTudorisamongthosewhoisconcernedtomarkoffagentregretforactions
whichinvolvewrongsfromthosewhichdonot.Hecharacterizesremorseas“thesuffering
acknowledgementofone’shavingwrongedtheOther,ofone’sresponsibilityfortheOther’s
suffering.”17OnTudor’saccount,anagentisresponsibleforanother’ssufferingifthereare
groundsforrequiringtheagenttoanswerforwhattheydid,groundsforboththemandus
tonotevadeitsmoralsignificance.Whatthesegroundsarewilldependonthemoral
theoryinplay,butonecandidateisthattheregrettedactwasdonewith“freewillplus
knowledgeofthenatureandlikelyresultsoftheaction,plusdesireorintentiontoachieve
suchresults,ortoperformtheactionregardlessofknownlikelyconsequencesetc.”18So
whilethetruckdriverintheexampleabovemightbeexpectedtoexpresshisregretina
differentwaythanaspectatordoes,heshouldbeneithercompellednorimpelledto
answerforwhathedid,whichisanotherwayofsayingthathedidnotdowrong.In
contrast,arecklessormurderousdriverwhocrashedintoapersonwouldhavetoanswer
forheractions—shewouldhavedonewrong.
Iftheonlythingthatmarksremorseasadistinctformofagentregretisthatwith
remorse,theregrettedactioniswrong,thenevenMr.Ramsaycouldappropriatelyfeel
remorseforhowharshlyhesquelchedhisson’shopeofsailingtothelighthouse,because
notonlydidthewayhepostponedthetriphurtJames,hewasresponsibleformakingsuch
apredictablyhurtfulpostponement;hewrongedJames.However,onmostphilosophical
conceptionsofremorseitwouldbeastretchtosaythatremorseiswarrantedbyMr.
Ramsayinthiscase.ThisisnotbecausehedidnotwrongfullyhurtJames,butbecausethe
wrongwasnotgraveenoughtomakesenseoftheprofoundkindofregretthatisremorse.
Letuscallagentregretforwrongdoingmoralregret.Thereisaspectrumofthiskind
ofemotion,ononeendofwhichliethelightestandmostephemeralpricksofconscious,
andontheotherliethedeeperandmoreenduringmoralregretstowhichremorserefers.
WhileremorsemaybeanintelligibleresponseonMr.Ramsay’sparttohisgeneralpattern
17Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,152.18Ibid.,141-2.
11
ofdistantandinsensitiveparenting,somethingclosertotheotherendofthemoralregret
spectrumwouldfithisuncaringpostponementofthelighthousetrip.
Invirtueofwhatisremorse,ratherthanalighterformofmoralregret,warranted
byanagent?Manyofthosewhotheorizeremorseconceiveitasmoralregretfor
wrongdoingwhichisbeyondrepair.AdamMorton,forinstance,describesremorseas
follows.“Inamodelcasesomeonehasbeenharmed,theharmisirreparable,andyoufeel
anappealfromtheharmedperson,whichwillnotleaveyoualone.Ifitisamodelcaseof
remorse,youhavedonewrongincausingtheharm.”19(emphasisadded)Similarly,Alan
Thomassaysthat“ithasbeenproposedasadistinctivemarkoftheemotionthatremorse
istypicallyfeltoverirremediableevil,adestructionofvaluethatcannotberemedied.”20
Thoughitdoesnotexactlytheorizeremorse,CharlesBaudelaire’spoem“L’Irréparable”
addressesitselftoRemorse,andlinksorevenidentifiesitwithTheIrreparable,which
“gnawswithhisaccurstteeth.”21
Awrongfulharmorlosscanbeirreparablewithoutbeingveryimportant,however.
ImaginethatyouthoughtlesslydiscardanobjecttowhichyouknowIattachsentimental
value,say,myfirstsubwaytransferaftermovingtothecitythatwouldbecomemyhome.
Thislosscannotberepaired—nothingintheworldcanreplacethatlittleslipofpaper.But
itisnotalossthatmattersverymuchtome.Thatyoucauseditnegligentlymightbewrong,
andmightwarrantsomekindofmoralregret,butsurelynottheterriblegnawingof
remorse.
Italsoseemsasthoughsomelosseswhicharebothreparableandrepairedare
nonethelessgraveenoughtowarrantremorseonthepartofthosewhowrongfullybring
themabout.Imaginethatbecauseyouaredrinkingcoffeeandconversingwhiledriving,
younoticetoolatethatyouhaveveeredtowardmeonmybicycle,andyouhitme,causing
bothofmyarmstobreak.Inresponsetothis,itwouldmakesenseforyoutofeelnotjust
anykindofmoralregret,butremorse.Importantly,itwouldmakesenseforyoutofeelthis
evenifinthelongrun,IamnotworseoffthanIwouldhavebeenhadtheaccidentnot
19Morton,EmotionandImagination,170.20Thomas,RemorseandReparation,130.21Baudelaire,FleursduMal.
12
occurred—saymyarmsbecamestrongerandmoreflexibleaftertheyheal,thatIam
neithertoofrightenednortoodistrustfultotakepleasureinroadridingagain,andthat
throughtherehabilitationprocessIdiscoverthejoyofswimming.Still,yournegligencewill
havesubstantiallydiminishedmanyimportantaspectsofmywell-beingforanappreciable
periodoftime,andthisisremorse-worthy.
Considerationssuchasthesesuggestthatwhenitcomestowrongdoing,seriousness
andirreparabilityarenotcoextensive,andthatthespectrumofmoralregretreflects
seriousnessratherthanirreparability.Thisisnottodenythatirreparabilitycan,and
probablyusuallydoes,addtotheseriousnessofawrong.
Iwanttosuggestthatremorseisappropriatewhenone’sactionhaswrongfully
broughtaboutorhasconstitutedalosstoafundamentalmoralvalue,andthelossis
significant.Whatcountsasafundamentalmoralvaluewilldependonthemoraltheoryone
holds.Amongthemanypossibilitiesarewelfare,dignity,relationsofcare,autonomy,and
sacredorotherwisecherishedobjectsorstates.
Whatcountsasasignificantlossofsuchvalues?Takingwell-beingtobethe
fundamentalvalue,Tudoridentifiessignificantharmsasthosewhichbringorkeep
someonebelowathresholdofmoderatewell-being,“whichismorethanmeresurvivalplus
minimumhealth,butlessthantheAristotelianidealofafullyflourishinglife.”22Remorse-
worthyactsarethereforeoneswhichwrongfullydepriveanotherofwhattheyneedto
meetthisthreshold.Inadiscussionofseriouswrongdoinginthepoliticalrealm,Martha
Nussbaumpositsthatthethresholdiscrossedbypoliciesthatmakesomeone“beara
burdenthatnocitizenshouldhavetobear.”23Shetakesthefundamentalvaluetobe
dignity,andholdsthattherearetencentralcapacitiesthatarebasictoit(amongtheseare
health,bodilyintegrity,sensesandimaginationandthought,emotions,practicalreason,
andaffiliation).Asocietycommitsseriousmoralwrongdoingwhenitallowsoneofits
memberstocarrytheburdenofanyoftheircentralcapacitiesfallingbelowacertainlimit.
Imentionthesestandardsforassessingwhetherawrongfullybroughtaboutlossis
significant,andthuswarrantsremorse,notinordertosettleonastandard,buttoillustrate
22Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,31.23Nussbaum“CostsofTragedy,”1019.
13
thatevenwhenweareequippedwithone,wewillsometimesbeunabletodetermine
whetheraparticularlossmeetsit.Whereisthelimitbelowwhichadeficitofemotional
capacityisaburdennooneshouldhavetobear?Atwhatpointbetweentheextremesof
meresurvivalplusminimumhealthandidealflourishingliesthe“moderatewell-being”
belowwhichonesufferssignificantharm?Thesevaguenessesdonotreflectaworrisome
lackofprecisioninthestandards.Instead,theyreflecttheactualvaguenessofthe
phenomenathestandardsaremeanttoidentify.TouseTudor’sphrase,thereisa“long
twilight”inwhichthesignificanceofaloss,andthustheseriousnessofwrongfullycausing
it,andthustheintelligibilityofremorseasaresponsetohavingwrongfullycausedit,will
beambiguous.24Yetattheextremesofthespectrum,significanceandinsignificance,
seriousnessandtriviality,intelligibleandexcessiveremorseshouldbeunambiguous.
Insummary,remorseisaspeciesofmoralregret,thatis,ofagentregretfor
wrongdoing;moralregretisaspeciesofagentregret,orregretthatone’sownactionwasa
causalfactorinbringingaboutsomethingregrettable;andagentregretisaspeciesof
regret,whichisabackward-lookingnegativeemotion,therootunpleasantnessofwhichis
theunchangeabilityofthepast,toparaphraseMorton.25
Thatanactoromissionwarrantsmoralregretimpliesthatitisinsomewaywrong.
Thatitwarrantsremorseimpliesthatitisinsomewayseriouslywrong.Ifrecovery
predicamentsaretroublingbecauseremorseiswarrantedbyallpossiblecoursesofaction
withinit,thentheyaresituationsoftragicmoralconflict.
3.MoralConflict
Amoralconflictoccurswhentwoormorejointlyimpossiblecoursesofactionareboth
morallycalledfor.Williamsisperhapsmoreresponsiblethananyoneforpullingthe
problemofconflictintotheambitofAnglo-Americanmoralphilosophy.“Bymoralconflict,”
24Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,31.25Ibid.,p.164.Iftheirreparabilitythatissupposedtomarkremorse-appropriatewrongsisunderstoodmerelyasunchangeability,ortheimpossibilityofundoingwhathasbeendone(ascontrastedwithrepairingit),thenallremorse-worthywrongswillbeirreparable.Butsowillallotherwrongs.Irreparabilitywillnotexplainremorse-worthiness.
14
Williamssays,“Imeanonlycasesinwhichthereisaconflictbetweentwomoral
judgementsthatamanisdisposedtomakerelevanttodecidingwhattodo.”26Hemakes
thismorespecificwhenhedescribestheoverlappingformsmoralconflictcantake.Inone
“itseemsthatIoughttodoeachoftwothings,butIcannotdoboth.”Intheother,
“somethingwhich(itseems)Ioughttodoinrespectofcertainofitsfeaturesalsohasother
featuresinrespectofwhich(itseems)Ioughtnottodoit.”27Soconflictsexhibitthis
structure:
XoughttodoA,andXoughttodoB,buts/hecannotdoboth.
Conflictsdonotnecessarilyposeinsolublepracticalpuzzles.Amongphilosophers
whotheorizeconflictandwhobelievethatitisnotalwaysillusory,mostthinkthatthereis
sometimes,orevenalways,arationalwaytodeterminewhichoftheclashingoughtstoact
against.28Whensuchadeterminationhasbeenmadeandactedupon,however,the
resolutionisnotalwayswithoutwhatWilliamscalls“aremainder.”Moralregretisa
responsetothisremainder,asareadesiretomakeamendsandamotivationtomanage
thingssothatsimilarpredicamentsdonotariseinthefuture.
Theremainder,oritsemotionalaccompaniment,indicatethattheoverridden
requirementhasnotbeeneliminateddespitebeingdecidedagainst.Thatis,itstillseems
wrongnottohavedoneA,evenwhenonehasdeterminedthattherequirementtodothe
incompossibleactBoverridesit.
LisaTessmancallsconflictsthatarenotresolvedwithoutaremaindermoral
dilemmas.Theyaresituations“inwhichthereisamoralrequirementtodoAandamoral
requirementtodoB,whereonecannotdobothAandB,andwhereneithermoral
requirementceasestobearequirementjustbecauseitconflictswithanotherrequirement,
26Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”170.27Ibid.,171.28Forexample,Brink,“MoralConflict”;Foot,“MoralRealism”;Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy”;StockerPluralandConflictingValues;Tessman,MoralFailure;andperhapsWilliams,“EthicalConsistency.”
15
evenifforthepurposesofaction-guidanceitisoverridden.”29Tosimplify,dilemmatic
conflictsexhibitthisstructure:
XoughttodoA,XoughttodoB,XcannotdobothAandB,andneitherrequirementis
eliminateduponbeingoverridden.
ForWilliams,evenlightweightrequirementscansurvivebeingoverridden;what
Tessmancallsdilemmascanbemundaneaswellastragic.Tessman,incontrast,believes
thatonlycertainkindsofparticularlyweightyrequirementssurvivearesolutiontoact
countertotheirdemands.Forher,dilemmasarealwaystragic.Bothwouldagreethatat
leastsomeconflictsinvolverequirementswhichnotonlyresistelimination,butwhichit
wouldbeseriouslywrongtoactagainst,eveniftheyhavebeenoverridden.Callthesetragic
conflicts.Theyhavethisstructure:
XoughttodoA,XoughttodoB,XcannotdobothAandB,actingagainsteither
requirementwouldbeseriouslywrong,andneitherrequirementiseliminateduponbeing
overridden.
Suchconflictscanbeexcruciatingevenforthosewhofeelcertaintheyareactingforthe
best.
Thecaseofthenorthernspottedowl
WildlifebiologistLowellDillerhasvoluntarilytakenonthejobofkillinghealthy,wild
barredowlsintheCaliforniaforestswheretheyhaverecentlybeguntothrive.Hefindsthe
task,whichhehasundertakenovereightytimes,“traumatic”andsays“IhateiteverytimeI
gooutanddoit.”30YetDillercontinuestolurethebirdsinwithrecordedcallsandthen
riddlethemwithshot,becausehebelieves—notwithoutgoodreason—thatnorthern
spottedowlsmightgoextinctifexpandingbarredowlpopulationsarenotconstrained.
29Tessman,MoralFailure,15.30Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57;Shogren,ToSaveThreatenedOwl.
16
Recallingthemostharrowingofdilemmas,Dillersaysthatforhim,“theissueoflethal
removalboilsdowntoasortof‘Sophie’sChoice.’Shootingabeautifulraptorthatis
remarkablyadaptableandfitforitsnewenvironmentseemsunpalatableandethically
wrong,butthechoicetodonothingisalsounpalatable,andIbelievealsoethically
wrong.”31Byresolutelyadvocatingkillingbarredowlsforthesakeofthespottedowl,
Dillerexpressescertaintythathehaschosentherighthornofthedilemma.Yetthatdoes
notextinguishtheforceoftherejectedoption:“Intellectually,Ibelievethatsomebarred
owlsneedtobelethallyremovedinanexperimentalcontext,butwhenfacedwiththe
realityofshootingone,itremainsaninternalstruggle.Almostfiveyearsafterthatfirst
shot,Istillgetanxiouspreparingtofire...”32
Dillerkillsbarredowlsaspartofanexperimenttodeterminewhetherremoving
themfromnorthernspottedowl(Strixcaurinaoccidentalis,NSO)habitatcouldhaltor
reversedeclinesinNSOpopulations.TheU.S.FishandWildlifeService’s(USFWS,the
agencyresponsibleforpreventingextinctionsundertheEndangeredSpeciesAct)hastaken
thedecisiontoinvestigatetheefficacyofmasskillingofbarredowlsasasortoflastresort
initsattempttorecovernorthernspottedowls.Ithascometothisbecausepeoplehave
latelydestroyedmuchoftheforestonwhichNSOdepend,andbecausebarredowlsseem
tobecompetingwithdwindlingnumbersofNSOsforwhatisleftofit.
Membersofthenorthernsubspeciesofthespottedowldwellinstructurally
complexforestsofthePacificNorthwest,fromsouthernmostBritishColumbiathroughthe
CascadeandCoastalmountainrangesofOregon,WashingtonandCaliforniaasfarsouthas
SanFranciscoBay.Fornesting,roosting,andforaging,theyrelyonforestswithamostly
closed,multi-levelcanopy,theoverstoryofwhichiscreatedbyverylargetrees.Beneath
thisumbrellaoffoliage,NSOsrequireplentyofopenspace,littleundergrowth,and
abundantdeadanddecadenttrees(onesthatarealivebuthaverottingcavitiesorbroken
tops).Itnormallytakes150to200hundredyearsforaforesttoreachthisstate,sospotted
31Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57.32Ibid.
17
owlsdependonoldgrowthandmatureforests.Moreover,theydependupongreat
uninterruptedtractsofit;theirknownterritorysizesrangefromabout4km2to125km2
andtheywillnottraversevasttreelessareas,suchasbays,humansettlements,or
expansiveclearcuts.33
Between1800and1990,anestimated60–88percentofNSOhabitatwaslost,
mostlytotimberharvesting.Whatremainedofitwashighlyfragmented.Fragmentation
isolatessmallsub-populationsofowls,andthwartsyoungerbirds’attemptstofindtheir
ownterritories—ariskyundertakingeveningoodconditions.Andthereisevidencethat
whenNSOsmustmakedowithbroken-uppatchesofsuitablehabitat,theiradultmortality
raterisessharply.34
Uponlosingalawsuitfiledbyenvironmentalorganizations,theUSFWSlistedthe
subspeciesasthreatenedin1990.Thedecisioncitedhabitatlossand“lackofadequate
regulatorymeasures”astheprimarycausesofthebirds’precariouscondition.Atthattime,
therewere2,000knownpairsofspottedowls,thoughtheactualnumberofbirdsmayhave
beenmorethantwicethat.35AtsitesinCaliforniaandOregonpopulationsweredeclining
atfiveand15percentperyear.36
Sincetheowlswerelisted,therateofhabitatlosshasslowedsignificantly,mostly
becauseacontroversialforestmanagementplan—putinplacebytheU.S.governmentin
partasaresponsetotheplightofNSOsandtheperceivedneedtocontinueloggingolder
forests—placedmuchoftheirremaininghabitatoff-limitsfromharvesting.YetNSO
populationscontinuetodecline.Intenoutofthe11geographicalprovincesinwhichNSOs
live,theirnumbershaveshrunkbyanaverageofaboutthreepercentperyearsincethe
forestmanagementplanwasimplementedin1994–6.37Insomeprovinces,thecumulative
33USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO,andRevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.34USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO.35Estimatingthetotalnumberofnocturnal,remotelylocatedNSOsismoredifficultthandeterminingratesofpopulationchange.36USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO.37USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.
18
lossovertheperiodsincethenamountstohalfofthepopulation,inothersitissomewhere
fromfiveto15percent.38Losseslikethesearenotsustainable.
Thoughongoinghabitatlossandthelingeringeffectsofpasthabitatdestruction
couldaccountforatleastpartofthecontinuingshrinkageofNSOpopulations,itisalso
thoughtthatescalatingcompetitionfrombarredowlsposesaseriousthreat.Barredowls
arerelativenewcomerstothePacificNorthwest.InWashington,forinstance,thefirst
sightingwasmadein1973.Sincethelate1980sorso,barredowlpopulationshavebeen
increasingsteadily.Now,notonlydoestheirrangecompletelyoverlapthatofthe
ecologicallysimilarbutmorefinickyNSO,barredowlsarealsousingtheolderforest
habitatonwhichNSOsdepend.TheyevenusetheverysamepartsoftheforestthatNSOs
do,andappeartobedoingsowithincreasedfrequency.AttheOregonandWashington
sitesElizabethKellyandhercolleaguesstudied,theproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhich
abarredowlhadbeendetectedwasrising.39
Bothowlspeciesareaggressivelyterritorial,andthereisreasontothinkthatbarred
owls,whoareslightlylargerthanNSOs,expelthelatterfromtheplacestheyhavesettled.It
mightoversimplifythesituationtoclaim,asWarrenCornwelldoes,that“Wherever[the
barredowl]turnsupinlargenumbers,spottedowlsstarttodisappear,”40buttheevidence
doespointinthatdirection.Forinstance,Kellyetal.foundthatoccupancyratesofNSO
territoriesdecreasedsignificantlyafterbarredowlsappearednearNSOactivitycenters
(placesNSOshaveusedfornesting,foragingetc.)41Similarly,ScottGremelobservedthatin
theNSOpairterritoriesinwhichnobarredowlsweredetected,NSOpairoccupancyrates
remainedstableovertime.Incontrast,oncebarredowlsweredetectedwithinterritories
theNSOpairsweremorelikelytoleave,nottobereplacedbyconspecifics.42Andaftera
38Ibid.39Kellyetal.,“AreBarredOwlsDisplacingSpottedOwls?”40Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”41Ibid.42Gremel,“DistributionandDemographyofNSOs.”ThisstudyalsofoundthatsomeofthedisplacedNSOsmovedtohigherelevations,wherehabitatwaslesssuitable.Forsmanetal.,PopulationDemographyofNSOsfoundthatdifferencesamonglargestudyareasintheproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhichbarredowlsweredetectednearNSOactivitycenterscouldpartiallyexplaindifferencesinNSOratesofdecline.Insimple
19
smallpilotexperimentinwhichthebarredowlsfoundinterritoriesvacatedbyNSOswere
killed,NSOsreturnedalmostimmediately.43
TheseandotherdataledtheUSFWStoconcludethat“Usinghabitatprotectionas
theonlyorprimarystrategyforrecoveringthenorthernspottedowlhasnotworkedinthe
pastandisnotlikelytoworkinthefuturebecause,withthebarredowlinvasion,reserves
arenotinandofthemselvescapableofconservingbreedingpopulationsofspottedowls..
.”44Ontopofprotectinghabitat,theServicereasoned,wemightneedtoremovebarred
owlsifwearetopreventtheextinctionofNSOs.Inits2011revisedrecoveryplanforthe
NSO,USFWSurgedthat“Giventherapidityandseverityoftheincreasingthreatfrom
barredowls,barredowlremovalshouldbeinitiatedassoonaspossibleintheformofwell-
designedremovalexperiments.”45
Theexperimentsbeganinthewinterof2014andwillconcludein2020.Overtheir
course,approximately3,600barredowlswillberemovedfromfourstudyareasinNSOs
habitat.Upto100ofthemwillbetakenintocaptivityorreleasedinunfamiliarplacesfar
fromNSOshabitat.Therestwillbeshotonsite.Iftheseexperimentsshowthatkilling
barredowlsincreasesNSOsiteoccupancyandimprovesNSOpopulationtrends,thenthe
USFWSwillconsideralarger-scale,longer-termpolicyofkillingbarredowlsaspartofits
efforttopreventtheextinctionofNSOs.46
Boththequestionofwhethertoperformthelethalexperiments,andthepossible
futurequestionofwhethertocontinuekillingbarredowlsindefinitelyandenmasse
exemplifytherecoveryconflict.EchoingDiller,BobSallinger,ConservationDirectorofThe
terms,areasinwhichNSOpopulationsweredecliningathigherratestendedtohaveagreaterproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhichbarredowlsweredetected.ThoughasfarasIcansee,Forsmanetal.’sdataisjustasconsistentwiththehypothesisthatbarredowlsreplacespottedowlsaftertheyleaveasitiswiththehypothesisthatbarredowlsdisplacethem.43USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.ThispilotexperimentwasLowellDiller’s.44USFWS,ExperimentalRemovalofBarredOwls,341-342.45USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO,III-65.46USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSOandFinalDecisionforBarredOwlRemoval.
20
AudubonSocietyofPortland,Oregonencapsulatestheproblemtheypresent:“Ontheone
hand,killingthousandsofowlsiscompletelyunacceptable.Ontheotherhand,the
extinctionofthespottedowliscompletelyunacceptable.”47Yetweinwhosenamethe
USFWSactsareboundtoberesponsibleforatleastoneoftheseunacceptableoutcomes.
4.AskingtheTragicQuestion
In“TheCostsofTragedy,”MarthaNussbaumdistinguishestwoquestionswemightask
ourselveswhenfacingdifficultchoices.The“obviousquestion”iswhatshallwedo?The
“tragicquestion”isisanyofthealternativesopentousfreefromseriousmoral
wrongdoing?48
Ihopetohavemadeitplausiblethattherecoverypredicamentpresentsuswitha
seriousmoralconflict.Itisatypeofsituationinwhichitatleastseemsasthoughthe
answertothetragicquestioncouldbeno.
Likeotherdomainsinappliedethics,environmentalethicsispronetoconcentrate
ontheobviousquestiontotheexclusionofthetragicquestion.49Toanextent,thisbiasis
understandable.Manyoftheproblemsaddressedbybiomedicalethics,agriculturalethics,
environmentalethics,etc.callurgentlyforpracticalsolutions.Facedwithnovel
circumstances,potentiallydireconsequences,andlimitsonthedurationofdeliberation,
arrivingefficientlyatawell-justifiedanswertothequestionof“whatshallwedo?”matters
immensely.
Itisnotallthatmatters,though.Itisalsoimportantforustoreachhonest
understandingsofourcircumstancesandactions.Ethically,thereismoretounderstand—
47Cornwall,“ThereWillbeBlood.”48Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy,”1006-1007.49ThisisnottosaythatenvironmentalethicsignoresthekindsofsituationsIhavecalledrecoverypredicaments.Environmentalethicsoftenaddressessuchsituations,andhasdonesoforalongtime(forexamples,seeRolston,DutiesandValues,141–143;Singer,“NotforHumansOnly;”Jamieson,EthicsandtheEnvironment,172-175).Itevensometimescallsthem“conflicts.”But“conflict”canbeusedtomeannomorethanadifficultproblem,orthatdifferentpartieshavepracticallyincompatibleideasaboutwhatshouldbedone.Evenwhenitcallsthemconflicts,environmentalethicsrarelyframesrecoverypredicamentsexplicitlyassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolvemoralwrongdoing.Andwhileitoccasionallyimpliesthatrecoverypredicamentsareconflictsinthissense(forexamples,seeBeckoff,“Preface,”andVucetichandNelson,“InfirmEthicalFoundations”),itdoesnotthematizethis.Thatis,itdoesnottreattherealityofmoralconflicts—inthewaythatIunderstandthem—asaproblemthatneedsoursteady,carefulattention.
21
moretoknow,andmoretofeel—aboutasituationthanwhattodofromwithinit.And
thereismoretounderstandaboutanactionthanwhetheritwastobedoneunderthe
circumstances.Forinstance,thatanactinflictsgraveharm,destroyssomethingofgreat
value,orseverelydamagesanimportantrelationshipmattersmorally,eveniftheanswer
totheobviousquestionisdoit.
Whentheactoneshouldperforminvolvesthesekindsofharmsorlosses,toadmit
thatindoingrightonealsodoeswrong,revealsamoredetailedunderstandingofoneself
andone’srelationstootherpeople,animals,orthingsthanmerelyknowingthatonedid
whatoneshouldhavedone,allthingsconsidered.Suchanunderstandingwouldbeworth
aimingfor,evenifitwerepracticallyimpotent.
Yetacknowledgingthewrongsthatonehasdoneorisboundtodoinsituationsof
tragicconflictcanbepracticallyinfluentialinwaysthatasingle-mindedfocusonwhatto
doisnot.First,itcanmotivatereparation.Fromthepointofviewatwhichtheobvious
questionputsus,wehavedifficultyseeingtheneedforreparationincasesinwhich
someonehasdonewhattheyultimatelyshouldhavedone.Butfromthepointofviewmade
possiblebythetragicquestion,wecanappreciatethatsometimes,amendsarecalledfor
evenwhentheallthingsconsideredrightactionhasbeentaken.50
Second,asNussbaumobserves,“torecognizetheexistenceofatragicdilemma,in
thosecaseswheretheanswertothetragicquestionis‘‘no,’’reinforcescommitmentsto
importantmoralvaluesthatshouldingeneralbeobserved.”51Toaskonlytheobvious
questionleadsustooverlookthepossibleremorse-worthinessofsomeaspectsofanall-
things-consideredrightact.Thisoverlookingcoulderodethedispositiontoregretsimilar
actions,tojudgethemwrong,andtorecoilfromdoingthemeveninthethoseless
problematiccircumstancesinwhichtheyareunequivocallynottobedone.
50Williams,“EthicalConsistency”makesthelinkbetweentragicconflictandaneedtomakeamends,andthoughhedoesnotdwellonthetragedyofmoralconflict,Ross,RightandGoodalsopointsoutthatreparationscanbecalledforevenwhentheoverallrightacthasbeenperformed.51Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy,”1017.
22
Finally,RuthMarcuspointsoutthatthepossibilityoftragicconflictsforces
reflectionontheconditionsthatbringthemabout,andmotivatesustochangethose
conditions.Shewrites:“Althoughdilemmasarenotsettledwithoutresidue,therecognition
oftheirrealityhasdynamicforce.Itmotivatesustoarrangeourlivesandinstitutionswith
aviewtoavoidingsuchconflicts.Itistheunderpinningofasecond-orderregulative
principle:thatasrationalagentswithsomecontrolofourlivesandinstitutions,weought
toconductourlivesandarrangeourinstitutionssoastominimizepredicamentsofmoral
conflict.”52Soevenifenvironmentalethicistscareonlyaboutwhatweshoulddo,thetragic
questionisimportantbecauseitcandisclosereasonsforactionthattheobviousquestion
obscures.Makingsenseoftherecoverypredicamentasatragicconflictgivesusallthe
morejustificationtostopdoingthethingsthatbringotherspeciestothebrinkof
extinction.Itrevealsasteepmoralcostofdoingtherightthingatthebrink.
Ithinkthesereasonsforaskingthetragicquestionareforceful.Thosewhowould
neglectthequestion,however,mightnotbemovedbythem.Theymightarguethatthe
reasonswouldhaveforceifitwerepossiblefortherightacttobewronginsomeway.But
itisnotpossible,becauseitviolatesdeonticlogic.Relyingontheagglomerationprinciple
(ifoneoughttodoonething,andoneoughttodoanother,thenoneoughttodoboth
things)andtheprinciplethatoughtimpliescan,deniersofconflictarguethatconflict
impliescontradiction,asfollows.
1. "X[O(X)àC(X)] Principlethatoughtimpliescan
2. "X&"Y{[O(X)&O(Y)]àO(X&Y)} Principleofagglomeration
3. O(A) 1stpremiseofconflict
4. O(B) 2ndpremiseofconflict
5. ~C(A&B) 3rdpremiseofconflict
6. O(A)&O(B) 3and4
7. O(A&B) 2and6
8. C(A&B) 1and7
52Marcus,“MoralDilemmas,”121.
23
5and8contradict.
Deniersofconflictwillclaimthattheabsurdity-makingflawliesinthepremisesofconflict;
atleastoneofthecompetingoughtsmustnotreallybeanoughtafterall.
Thisargumentissoundenough,whenalltheoughtswithininitindicatefinal
answerstotheobviousquestion.IfIaskmyselfwhatshallIdo?Imustanswerwithan
action,orasetofthem,whichitispossibleformetocomplete.Ifmyanswerincludes
somethingwhichIsimplycannotdo,thenitisnottherightkindofanswer,andIneedto
rethink.Whenoughtmeansthatwhichultimatelyistobedone—theactionwhichallthings
consideredisbest,orright,toperform—thenImustbemistakentothinkthatIoughttodo
A,andthatIoughttodoB,whenIcannotdoboth.Atleastoneoftheapparentoughtsisnot
agenuineought,inthissense.Thereisthusanimportantsenseinwhichitwouldnotbe
wrongtoviolateit.
Anethicaltheorydoesnotneedtodenythisinordertoacceptthepossibilityof
moralconflict.Butifitdoesnotdenyit,thenitneedstoacknowledgeadifferentsensein
whichanactcanbewrong,andsoanotherkindofoughtthanthatwhichattachestothe
answertotheobviousquestion.Unliketheobviousought,thisonewillresist
agglomeration,and/orwillnotimplycan.PhilosophersamongthoseDavidBrinkcalls
“friendsofdilemmas”havelongpointedouttheambiguousnessofought,anddistinguished
anoughtthatcannotconflictfromonethatcan.53Williamsdoesthisin“Ethical
Consistency”whenhewarnsagainst“...identifyingtheoughtthatoccursinstatementsof
moralprinciple,andthesortsofmoraljudgementsaboutparticularsituationsthatwehave
beenconsidering,withtheoughtthatoccursinthedeliberativequestion‘whatoughtIto
do?’andinanswerstothisquestion...”54TouseterminologyheintroducesinEthicsand
theLimitsofPhilosophy,thelatteroughtrepresentstheconclusionofapractical
53Brink,“MoralConflict,”222,237,246,247.Somefriendsofconflict,suchasMarcusinher“MoralDilemmas,”seemtoholdthatthereisonekindofought—theobviouskind—anditcanconflict.54Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”184.
24
deliberation.Theformerisaparticularlycompellingkindofmoralconsiderationwithin
thatdeliberation.55
PhilippaFootdrawsasimilardistinctiononebetweentype1andtype2ought
statements.Type2statements“tellustherightthingtodo,”whichis“thethingthatisbest
morallyspeaking,orspeakingfromwhateverotherpointofviewmaybeinquestion.Itis
impliedthatforoneforwhommoralconsiderationsarereasonstoacttherearebetter
moralreasonsfordoingthisactionthanfordoinganyother.”56Type1statementsidentify
acertainkindofmoralreasonfordoingsomething.Whileconflictsamongtype2oughtsdo
notmakesense,conflictsamongtype1oughts,andbetweentype1andtype2oughts,do.“I
canhavereasonnottodosomethingandyethavebetterreasontodoitthanIhavetodo
anythingelse.”57Thisdoesnotentailthattherightcourseofactioninvolvesbothdoingit
andnotdoingit(agglomeration),orthatitmustbepossibletobothdoitandnotdoit
(oughtimpliescan).
Inordertoremainopentothepossibilityofconflict,amoraltheorymustalsoallow
foratleastsomeoftheoughtsthatsignifyparticularlycompellingmoralconsiderationsto
remaininforcedespitepullingindifferentdirectionsfromtheconclusionaboutwhattodo,
allthingsconsidered.TouseTessman’slanguage,therequirementstheyexpressarenot
eliminateduponbeingoverriddenforthepurposeofactionguidance.Aconflict-friendly
theorycannotimplythatitisnecessarilyamistaketothinkthatanoughtpersistswhenit
cannotbeactedupon,orthatacourseofactionismorallyunacceptableeventhoughit
shouldbedone.Whenitisnotamistake,thentheactthatanswerstheobviousquestion
willbeinsomewaywrong,andthemoralregretfeltbythoseresponsibleforitwillbe
warranted.
Ifanethicaltheorylacksspaceforanoughtwhich1.doesnotgenerateavicious
contradictionwhenitclasheswithanotherought,and2.canremaininforceevenwhenitis
overridden,wecannotaskthetragicquestionfromwithinit.Wethereforecannotachieve
theinsightorthemotivationthatanswerstothequestioncanprovide.Suchatheory
55Williams,EthicsandLimitsofPhilosophy,174-196.56Foot,“MoralRealism,”385.57Ibid.ForFoot,obligationsareamongthemoralreasonsthataretype1oughts.
25
cannotaccountforthemoralexperienceofpeoplelikeLowellDiller,andtherestofuswho
aretornbytherecoverypredicament,withoutdismissingthatexperienceasimplying
confused,immature,orincompletemoralthinking.
5.TheChaptersAhead
BynowitshouldbeobviousthatIwantenvironmentalethicstobeabletoaskthetragic
question,andsotoremainopentotragicmoralconflict.ThisisnotastanceforwhichIcan
argueconclusively,thoughIhopetohaveshownitsappeal.Ialsohopetohaveidentified
theminimumthatatheoryneedsinordertoembraceseriousmoralconflict:itneedsto
accommodatethepossibilitythatthereisasenseinwhichrightacts—actsprescribedby
obviousoughts—canbewrong.Finally,Ihopetohaveshownthattherecovery
predicamentcanatleastappeartobesuchaconflict.
Thatenvironmentalethicsdoesnottendtoaskthetragicquestion—aboutthe
recoverypredicamentoraboutanythingelse—couldbebecausethekindsofnormative
theoriesitappliestohumaninteractionswiththerestofnaturecannotaccommodate
wrongsotherthanobviouswrongs.Thatis,ifanethicaltheorydoesnotadmitofawayfor
anactiontobewrongotherthanbynotbeingtheactionthatultimatelyistobedone,then
anenvironmentalethicbasedinthattheorywouldneverthinktoaskthetragicquestion.
Bothcriticsanddefendersofdominantdeontologicalandconsequentialistmoral
theorieshaveclaimedthatsuchtheoriesnegatethepossibilityofconflict.Amongthose
whomakesuchclaimsapprovingly,KantiansofteninterpretthedeclarationinThe
MetaphysicsofMoralsthat“acollisionofdutiesandobligationsisnotevenconceivable”
(6:224)asanegationofthepossibilityofmoralconflict.58W.D.Rossprofessesthathisnon-
Kantianformofdeontologyprovidesauniquesolutiontothe“casesofconscience”created
bymoralconflicts,andthatindoingsoitshowsconflicttobe“non-existent.”59Andsomeof
58E.g.Herman,“ObligationandPerformance;”Donagan,TheoryofMorality,ch.5,and“MoralDilemmas,”14-15,althoughDonagandoescarveoutanexceptiontothis(pleaseseetheconclusionofthisthesisfordetails).59Ross,RightandGood,18,andFoundationsofEthics,85.
26
themostprominenttextsofutilitarianismexplicitlypresentutilitarianismasofferingaway
toexplainandtoevadetheproblemofmoralconflict.60
Friendsofconflictmakesimilarclaims,butdosodisparagingly.Gathering
deontologicaltheoriessuchasImmanuelKant’sandW.D.Ross’sundertheumbrellaof
“morality,”Williamscomplainsthat“moralityresiststhenotionofamoralcost,inthesense
ofamoralwrongknowinglycommittedbyanagentwhoisdoingsomethingthatevenfrom
amoralpointofviewisbetter:inthatcase,theywillsay,thewrongcannotultimatelybe
wrong,thecostcannotreallybeacost.”61Healsofaultsutilitarianismforthis,asdoa
numberofthosewhohaveexpandeduponhisdefenseofconflict.62
ThechaptersaheadexplorewhetherworkingfromaKantian,Rossian,orutilitarian
normativetheoryprovidesenvironmentalethicswithanexcuseforavoidingtheproblem
oftragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizetherecoverypredicamentasatragic
moralconflict.Itdoesthisbyaskingthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatit
takestoadmitthateventherightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatit
takestoadmitthattherightactcanbetragicallywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretthe
recoverypredicamentasasituationinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?
60SeeSidgwick,MethodsofEthics,esp.1-14and423-459;andHare,MoralThinking,esp.chs.2and3.61Williams,“MoralLuck:APostscript,”246.NussbaumalsofaultsKant’sethicsforthis.SeeherFragilityofGoodness,31-32.62Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”175-6.TessmanandNussbaumimplicitlyfaultutilitarianismforthis,byfaultingconsequentialismandcost-benefitanalysis.SeeTessmanMoralFailure,21-24,andNussbaum“CostsofTragedy.”
27
ChapterTwo:Ross’sDeontology
1.MoralConflict
Onlyifatheoryhasroomformoralconflictingeneralisitworthascertainingwhetherit
hasroomfortragicmoralconflict.Inthissection,IarguethatW.D.Ross’sdeontologyhas
roomformoralconflictingeneral.Inthenextsection,Iarguethatitalsohasroomfor
tragicmoralconflict.Inthethirdsection,Ishowhowitcanmakesenseoftheislandfoxand
spottedowlpredicamentsastragicmoralconflicts.
1.1Twokindsofwrongdoing
Ross’sdeontologyadmitsoftwokindsofwrongdoing.Whilethesecondliesburiedwithin
thedetailsofthetheory,thefirstisanalyzedmorefullyandopenly.Itisthewrongthat
shadowstherighttowhichTheRightandtheGoodrefers,thewrongassociatedwithacting
againstone’sallthingsconsideredduty,orwithdefyingtheoughtthatattachestoMartha
Nussbaum’sobviousquestion,whichiswhatshallIdo?whenaskedfromamoralpointof
view.63WecanunderstandthiskindofwrongthroughunderstandingRoss’saccountof
whatmakesrightactsright.Attheheartofhisaccountliesthedoctrineofprimafacie
duties,whichRossdevelopsinTheRightandTheGood,thenclarifies,refines,andamends
inFoundationsofEthics.
Thefirstkindofwrongdoing:violatinganallthingsconsideredduty
Anintuitionistaboutmoralknowledge,Rosstakesbasicmoralprinciplestobeself-evident
featuresofthe“moralorder”whichis“partofthefundamentalnatureoftheuniverse.”64
Thepartsofthemoralordertowhichwehaveaccessviareflectionareourmultipleprima
facieduties.Theyincludethefollowing.1)Dutiesoffidelity,whichRossdescribesasduties
tokeepone’spromises,bothimplicitandexplicit.2)Dutiesofgratitude,whichobligateus
todogoodforthosewhohavebenefitedus.3)Dutiesofnon-maleficence,whichareduties
63Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy.”64Ross,RightandGood,29.
28
of“notinjuringothers,”orofrefrainingfromharm.654)Dutiestomaximizethegood.
Althoughheusuallytreatsdifferentgood-promotingdutiesasdistinct,Rossrecognizesthat
theyall“fallunderthegeneralprinciplethatweshouldproduceasmuchgoodaspossible.
Therearethreesuchduties:dutiesofbeneficence,ordutiestoimprovetheconditionof
others;dutiesofself-improvement,ordutiestoimproveone’sowncondition;anddutiesof
justice,ordutiestodistributehappinessinproportiontovirtue.5)Finally,thereareduties
ofreparation.“Restingonapreviouswrongfulact,”thesearedutiestomakeupfor
“wrongswehavedone,”orforthe“inflictionofinjuriesonothers.”66Rossresiststhe
philosophicalurgetosubsumethesediversedeonticprinciplesunderasingleone,arguing
thateachisbasic.Andwhilehedeniesthatthelistofprimafaciedutiescanbeshortened,
heremainsopentothepossibilitythatitcouldbeexpanded,sayingthatitis“correctasfar
asitgoes,thoughnotnecessarilycomplete.”67
Theprimafaciedutiesgroundtherightnessandwrongnessofvariouscharacteristics
oftheactsonecouldperforminconcretecircumstances.Forinstance,thefactthata
particularactwouldreturnabenefitwouldmakeit,inthatrespect,primafacieright.That
thesameactwouldalsoharmsomeonewouldmakeit,inthatrespect,primafaciewrong.
Whethertheactisactuallyrightoractuallywrongdependsonhowmuchitsprimafacie
rightnessoutweighsitsprimafaciewrongness,comparedtoalternativepracticableacts.
“Everyact,therefore,viewedinsomeaspects,willbeprimafacieright,andviewedinothers,primafaciewrong,andrightactswillbedistinguishedfromwrongactsonlyasbeingthosewhich,ofallthosepossiblefortheagentinthecircumstances,havethegreatestbalanceofprimafacierightness,inthoserespectsinwhichtheyareprimafacieright,overtheirprimafaciewrongness,inthoserespectsinwhichtheyareprimafaciewrong...”68
ForRoss,sayingthatanactisrightisusuallyequivalenttosaying“thisistheact
thatoughttobedone”or“thisactismorallyobligatory,”orthatitistheagent’sactual
65Ibid.,21.66Ibid.,41,32.67Ibid.,23.68Ibid.,41.
29
duty,dutyproper,dutysansphrase,or—touseatermthatpost-datesRoss—allthings
consideredduty.69TheoughtembeddedwithinitiswhatIhavecalledtheobvious
ought;theactitprescribesprovidesthefinalanswertoNussbaum’s‘obvious
question’.
ThoughRoss’srightisusuallyequivalenttoduty,itisnotalwaysso.Iftwo(or
more)possiblecoursesofactionwouldeachfulfillanagent’sprimafaciedutiestoa
greaterextentthananyothers—thatis,ifthereisatieforwhichcourseofactionhas
thegreatestbalanceofprimafacierightness—thenbothoftheactsareright,but
neitherisaduty,strictlyspeaking.Thedutyistodoeitherone.
ThisbringsustothefirstnotionofwrongnessatworkwithinRoss’sdeontology:
anactiswrongjustincaseitviolatestheagent’sallthingsconsideredduty,anditwilldo
soaslongasitfulfillstheirprimafaciedutiestoalesserextentthanatleastoneother
practicableact.
Itisnotpossibleforallofone’savailablecoursesofactiontoinvolve
wrongdoinginthissense.Inanysituationfacedbyanagent,therewillbeatleastone
courseofactionthatisnotworsethananother.Rosscanthusclaimthatonhistheory,
theproblemofconflictofdutiesismerely“apparent,”“non-existent,”and“unreal.”70
Primafaciedutiescancertainlyconflict,though.AccordingtoRoss,theynearlyalways
do.71Yetsuchconflictsare,inprinciple,completelyresolvableforthepurposeof
determiningone’sconflict-proofactualduty.
Isaythatconflictsamongprimafaciedutiesareresolvableinprinciplebecause
thereisnowaytoknowforsuretherelativestrengthsofthevariousprimafacieduties
atstakeinagivencircumstance.Theexplanationforthisisbothmetaphysical(asit
centersonthenatureofprimafacieduties),andepistemological(asitcentersonour
capacitytoknowthem).
69Ibid.,4,19,20.70Ross,Foundations,86.71Ross,RightandGood,41.
30
Themetaphysicalpartoftheexplanationisthatthevariouskindsofprimafacie
dutieshavedifferentweightsindifferentcircumstances.Rossthinksthatsomekinds
aretypicallystrongerthanothers,butnokindinevitablyprevailsoveranyotherkind.
Forinstance,althoughfidelitytendstobearmoreweightthanbeneficence,ina
concretesituationthedutytokeepacertainpromisecanbeweakerthanthedutyto
improvetheconditionofsomeoneinneed.ThisfeatureofRoss’stheory,togetherwith
thefactthathismoralprinciplesincludebothdutiestopromotethegoodandduties
thatconstrainthat,makespossiblewhathasrecentlycometobecalledmoderate
deontology,accordingtowhichtherearemoralconstraintsonpromotingthegood,
buttheseconstraintscanbeoverriddenifenoughgoodisatstake.
WhileRossbelievesthatwecanknowthebasiccontentofourprimafacieduties
withquasi-Cartesiancertainty,hedeniesthatwecanhavesuchknowledgeoftherelative
stringencyofthoseduties.Becauseouractualdutyinagivensituationisdeterminedbythe
relativestringenciesoftheprimafaciedutiesatstakeinthatsituation,wecannotknowfor
surewhethertheactthatwethinkisouractualdutyisinfactouractualduty.This
epistemologicaldifficultydoesnotaffecttheconclusionthatactualdutiescannever
conflict,butitdoesdenyussmugcertaintyaboutwhatouractualdutyis.
ThatRoss’sdeontologypreventsconflictsofallthingsconsidereddutiesdoes
notentailthatitpreventsconflictsofthesortinwhichIaminterested.Ifthetheory
incorporatesasecondkindofwrongdoing,andifitispossiblethatthiskindof
wrongdoingcaninfectone’sallthingsconsideredduty,thepossibilityremainsthat
onecanfindoneselfinasituationinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolve
wrongdoing.
IbelievethatRoss’sdeontologydoesincorporateasecondkindofwrongdoing.
Thoughitperformsrealworkwithinthetheory,itisnotgivenmuchdirectattention.
Maybethisisbecausespotlightingitwouldrevealthatthetheorydoesnotsolveallof
whatRosscallsthe“casesofconscience”inwhichwecanfindourselvesenmeshed.72
72Ibid.,18.
31
Thesecondkindofwrongdoing:violatingsomeone
Ross’saccountofprimafaciedutiesofreparationprovidesthechiefcluetothesecond
kindofwrongdoing.Rossdescribesthesedutiesas“restingonapreviouslywrongful
act”andsaysthatreparationsareowedfor“wrongsdone”(emphasesadded).73
Crucially,thewrongthattriggersreparationisnotthewrongthatdescribesactswhich
violateallthingsconsideredduties.
Multiplepiecesofevidencesupportthis.First,actsthatcallforreparationarenot
limitedtothosethatareallthingsconsideredwrong.Adutyofreparationcanbetriggered
bytheinfringementofaprimafaciedutyevenwhenfulfillingthatdutywouldconflictwith
doingone’sactualduty.Inacaseinwhichsomeone’sactualdutyrequiresthemtobreaka
promisetoonepersoninordertodeliveremergencyaidtoanother,Rosssaysthat
althoughitisallthingsconsideredright,breakingthepromisegivesrisetoadutytomake
uptothepromisee.74Healsosaysthatreparativedutiesemergefrom“theinflictionof
injuriesonothers,”whichispreciselywhattheprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence
prohibits.75Soifyouharmsomeoneelseasaninescapablepartofperformingyouractual
duty,thiscangenerateanewprimafaciedutytomakeamends.Sinceitcandescribeacts
whichbreachdutieswhichareonlyprimafacie,the“wrong”thattriggersreparation
cannotbe“allthingsconsideredwrong.”
Itcannotbeshorthandfor“primafaciewrong,”either.Ifitwere,Icouldnotclaim
thatRossreliesontwodistinctsensesofwrong;the“wrong”modifiedbyprimafacieis
wronginthefirstsense—aviolationofanallthingsconsideredduty.Tosaythatanactis
primafaciewrongistosaythatitisconditionallyallthingsconsideredwrong—itwouldbe
allthingsconsideredwrongintheabsenceofothermoralconsiderations.76Thoughthe
73Ibid.,21,42.74Ibid.,18.75Ibid.,27,21.76“Isuggest‘primafacieduty’or‘conditionalduty’asabriefwayofreferringtothecharacteristic(quitedistinctfromthatofbeingadutyproper)whichanacthas,invirtueofbeingofacertainkind(e.g.thekeepingofapromise),ofbeinganactwhichwouldbeadutyproperifitwerenotatthesametimeofanotherkindwhichismorallysignificant.”Ross,RightandGood,19.
32
kindsofactsthatcallforreparationareindeedprimafaciewrong,theymustalsobewrong
inanothersense,becausereparationdoesnotappeartobecalledforbybreachesofevery
kindofprimafacieduty.Rossmentionsitasarequiredresponseonlytobreachesof
fidelityandnon-maleficence.77Thesedifferfromtheotherdutiesonhislistinanimportant
way.Whereastobreachadutyofgratitude,beneficence,orself-improvementistonot
improvesomeone’scondition,andtobreachadutyofjusticeistonotimprovetheworldin
oneway,tobreachadutyofnon-maleficenceorfidelityistomistreatorviolatesomeone—
tomakethemworseoff,todeceivethem,toundermineorexploittheirtrust.78Because
onlythelatterrequirereparation,itcannotbethecasethatthesecondkindofwrongisno
morethantheprimafacieversionofthefirst.Thefirstkindofwrongisaviolationofanall
thingsconsideredduty.Thesecond,reparation-generatingkind,isaviolationofsomeone.
FurtherevidencethatRossreliesontwoconceptionsofwrongdoingcanbefoundin
thenuancesofhislanguage.Heconsistentlyusesdifferentwordstorefertoreparation-
generatingwrongdoing,ononehand,andprimafacieorallthingsconsideredwrongdoing
ontheother.Whenheistalkingaboutactsquaprimafaciewrongorquaallthings
consideredwrong,Rossalwaysusestheadjective“wrong.”Incontrast,hereservesthe
adjective“wrongful”andthenoun“wrong”foractsthatgeneratereparativeduties.
Ifanydoubtremainsaboutwhetherthesecondnotionisagenuinekindof
wrongdoing,itshouldbedispelledbythefactthatonRoss’sview,moralregretisan
appropriateresponsetoit.InTheRightandtheGood,Rossrepeatedlyreferstoanexample
77ThomasHurkaalsonotesthatonRoss’stheory,thewrongthattriggersreparationneednotbeallthingsconsideredwrong,andthatnotallprimafaciewrongstriggerreparation.SeeHurka,BritishEthicalTheorists,187.78Rosshimselfsaysthattheprimafaciedutiesthatdonotgeneratereparativedutieswhenbreachedhaveincommonanameliorativepurposeasopposedtoaprotectiveone:“Andwhenweconsidertheothermaintypesofduty—thedutiesofreparation,ofgratitude,ofjustice,ofbeneficence,ofself-improvement—wefindthatinthethoughtofanyofthesethereisinvolvedthethoughtthatwhatthedutifulactistheoriginationofiseitheranobjectivegoodorapleasure(orsourceofpleasure)forsomeoneelse.”Ross,RightandGood,162.Thattherearenoprimafaciedutiesthatspecificallyprohibitinjustice,ingratitude,orself-deteriorationalsoindicatesthatthedutiesofjustice,gratitude,andself-improvementareeachatypeofdutytopromotethegood,andsothedutyofnon-maleficenceprohibitsactinginoppositiontothem.Finally,Rossstatesthatthedutyofjustice,along“withbeneficenceandself-improvementcomesunderthegeneralprinciplethatweshouldproduceasmuchgoodaspossible.”RightandGood,27.Thedutyofgratitudealsorequiresustopromotethegood,butthegoodisthatofabenefactor,not“asmuchgoodaspossible.”
33
inwhichsomeonemustbreakapromise—andthusbreachaprimafaciedutyoffidelity—
inordertofulfillastrongerprimafaciedutytoprovideaid.Althoughprovidingaidistheall
thingsconsidereddutyinthiscase,Rosssaysthatbreakingthepromiseleadstheagentto
feelnotmereregretbutcompunction,andheimpliesthatthisistheappropriateemotional
response.79Compunctionis,andhistoricallyhasbeen,definedasakindofagentregretfor
sin,fault,orwrongdoing.ForittomakesenseinRoss’sexample,theactwhichisitsobject
mustinvolveactualwrongnessofsomesort.
1.2HowmoralconflictispossiblewithinRoss’sdeontology
Conflictoccurswhenwhateveronedoeswillinvolvewrongdoing.Ihopetohaveshown
thatinRoss’sview,onecandowrongintwodifferentways.Thefirstwayistoviolateanall
thingsconsideredduty.Thesecondwayistoviolatesomeone,byeitherharmingthemor
bybreakingapromise.Rossrulesoutconflictsinwhichonlythefirstkindofwrongdoingis
atstake;itisnotpossiblethatalloftheactsopentoonewillviolateanallthings
consideredduty.Anothersortofconflictremainspossible,though.Situationscanoccurin
whichwhatevercourseofactiononetakes,onewilldowrongeitherbyviolatinganall
thingsconsidereddutyorbyviolatingsomeone.Thiswillhappenwhenonecannotfulfill
one’sdutyproperwithoutbreachingareparation-generatingprimafaciedutyofnon-
maleficenceorfidelity.Ross’sdeontologyclearlyhasroomsuchconflicts,asisshownbyhis
exampleinwhichadutytoaidoutweighsadutytokeepapromise.
Iwanttopointoutasubsetofconflictsbetweenthefirstandsecondkindof
wrongdoing.Itcomprisesthosepredicamentsinwhichbothfulfillingone’sdutyproperand
takingthealternativecourse(s)ofactionwouldinvolveviolatingsomeone.Insuchcases,
oneisboundtocommitawrongofthesecondsort.Thiswillhappenwhenwhateverone
doeswillharmsomeone(e.g.youdiscoverthatyourbabyOrlandoisallergictoThelonius,
yourcat,andtheonlywaytoeaseOrlando’ssymptomsistosendTheloniusaway),when
onecannotkeepbothoftwo(ormore)promises(e.g.yousayyestoafriends’requestthat
youserveasattendantathiswedding“tobeheldinAustraliathefirstweekendinJuly,”
79Ross,RightandGood,18.
34
andtoanotherfriend’srequesttoserveasattendantatherweddingwhich“willtakeplace
inCanadaonthelastweekendinJune.”Notlongbeforetheevents,yourealizethatthelast
weekendinJuneisalsothefirstweekendinJuly,andyoucannotbepresentatboth),or
whenonecannotavoidharmingsomeonewithoutbreakingapromise(e.g.youpromise
yourfriendsthatyou’lltakecareoftheirdogCosmoforthemwhiletheyaretravelling
incommunicado.OncethefriendsaregoneandCosmoisinyourcare,yourealizethat
Orlandoisallergictohim).Insuchcases,committingeitherwrong—eventheonecalledfor
byanallthingsconsideredduty—shouldleavearemainderintheformofmoralregretand
responsibility.
1.3Awrinkle
IhavearguedthatthereisacleardistinctioninRoss’stheorybetweentwokindsof
wrongdoing—violatinganallthingsconsideredduty,andviolatingsomeonebybreachinga
primafaciedutyofnon-maleficenceorfidelity.Thoughthedistinctionhasbeenmoreor
lessneglected,mostnotablybyRosshimself,muchinthetheorypointstowardit.Theonly
thingthatsitsintensionwithitisRoss’sclaimtohavesolvedtheproblemofconflict
(thoughifweinterpretitasaclaimonlytohavesolvedtheproblemofconflictsofallthings
consideredduties,asIbelieveweshould,eventhisclaimisnotatoddswiththe
distinction).
Ihavenottakenuptheideathatbreachesofprimafaciedutiesotherthanthe
reparation-generatingones—letuscalltheseameliorativeprimafacieduties—canalso
involvewrongdoing,andsocancontributetomoralconflicts.Perhapsanargumentcould
bemadethattheydo,andthattheycan.SomeofwhatRosssaysaboutsuchduties
indicatesthatbreachingthemisnotmerelyconditionally,orprimafaciewrong.80However,
thecaseisnowherenearasclearasitisforthereparation-generatingprimafacieduties.
TotakeupapointBernardWilliamsmakes,Rossseemsto“wantitbothways”for
80Forinstance,hesaysthatthemoralsignificanceofaprimafaciedutyisnotmerelyapparent,evenwhenitcallsforanactionthatisinconsistentwithone’sallthingsconsideredduty.Healsousestheanalogyofphysicalforcetodescribewhyaprimafaciedutyhasatendencytobeanallthingsconsideredduty.Andhesaysthatnotcomplyingwithanoverriddenprimafaciedutywillleadto“compunction.”whichisaformofmoralregret.SeeRightandGood,20,28-29.
35
ameliorativeprimafacieduties;hebothascribesanddeniesoughtnesstothem.81Arguing
foronethingortheotherwouldrequireinterpretingawaytoomuchofwhatRosssaysfor
mycomfort.SoIwilllimitmyanalysistothetwokindsofwrongIcanconfidentlyattribute
toRosswithoutdistortingwhathehaswritten.
2.TragicMoralConflict
DotheconflictsallowedbyRoss’sdeontologyincludetragicones?Thatis,dotheyinclude
predicamentsinwhichtheinevitablewrongsareserious,andremorseisawarrantedform
ofmoralregretforcommittingthem?
AsIunderstandthem,remorseandseriouswrongdoingimplyeachother.Recall
thatremorsehastwofeaturesthattogetherdistinguishitfromotherformsofmoralregret.
First,itsobjectistheagent’sownseriouswrongdoing.Second,itliesatthestrongeror
moreprofoundendofthespectrumofmoralregret.Toshowthatagiventheoryhasroom
fortragicconflict,itshouldsufficetoshowthatthetheoryallowsthatonecanfindoneself
inasituationinwhichseriouswrongdoingisunavoidable.However,amoraltheorymight
callintoquestionthemutualentailmentofseriouswrongdoingandwarrantedremorse.So
itwillalsobehelpfultoshowthatthetheorydoesnotdenythatincasesinwhichserious
wrongdoingisinevitable,soiswarrantedremorse.
Inthissection,I’llarguefirstthatRoss’sdeontologyallowsfortheinevitabilityof
seriouswrongs.Then,Iwillarguethatinsuchcasesitallowsfortheinevitabilityof
warrantedremorse.
2.1Seriouswrongs
GiventhesensesofwrongdoingatworkinRoss’stheory,therearetwowaysinwhicha
conflictcanbetragic.Inthefirstway,theallthingsconsideredrightactisseriouslywrong
invirtueofseriouslyviolatingsomeone,andsoisthealternative.Inthesecondway,theall
thingsconsideredrightactisseriouslywronginvirtueofseriouslyviolatingsomeone,but
81Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”176.Seeespeciallyn.5.WilliamsmakesasimilarclaiminEthicsandLimitsofPhilosophy,176.
36
thealternativeisnotseriouslywronginvirtueofviolatingsomeone.Ratheritisseriously
wrongonlyinvirtueofseriouslyviolatingtheallthingsconsideredduty.82
Withoutagoodideaofwhichcourseofactionisallthingsconsideredright,we
cannothaveagoodideaofwhetheraconflictistragicinthesecondway.Butifboth(orall)
possiblecoursesofactionareseriouslywronginthesecondsense,thenevenwithout
havingagoodideaofwhichoneisallthingsconsideredright,theconflictistragic.83
BecausetheultimateaimofthischapteristodeterminewhetherRoss’sdeontologycan
accountforrecoverypredicamentsastragicconflicts,andbecauseitisbeyondthescopeof
thischaptertodecidewhichcourseofactioninarecoverypredicamentismorelikelytobe
allthingsconsideredright,Iwilllimitthefollowingdiscussionofseriouswrongdoingto
seriousbreachesofnon-maleficenceandfidelity.
Seriousbreachesofnon-maleficence
Thedutyofnon-maleficenceprohibitscausingharmtoanother.Toharmsomeone,on
Ross’sview,istobringbadthingsuponthem:“Iftherearethingsthatarebadin
themselves,”Rosssays,“weought,primafacie,nottobringthemuponothers;andonthis
factreststhedutyofnon-maleficence.”84
Rossdoesnotthoroughlyinvestigatewhatthingsarebad,soIwillcomeatthe
questionthroughhismoresystematicanalysisofwhatthingsaregood.“Good”forRoss
referstointrinsicvalue,whichisbornebysomethingiffitis“goodapartfromits
consequences,orwouldbegoodevenifitwerequitealone.”85Histestforthisisto
comparetwostatesoftheuniversewhichareidenticalineverywayexceptthatonehas
morethantheotherofthethingwhoseintrinsicvalueisinquestion.Ifweintuitthatthe
statewithmoreofthethingwouldbebetter,thenthismustbebecausethethingis“good
initself.”Applyinghistest,Rossconcludesthatfourthingsaregood:pleasure,virtue,
82E.g.theallthingsconsidereddutyseriouslybreachesanameliorativeduty,suchasthedutyofgratitude.83Wecanneverbecompletelysure,becauseRossdoesn’tthinkwecanbecertainabouttheofweights,andsooftheseriousness,ofduties.84Ross,RightandGood,26.85Ibid.,74.
37
knowledge,andtheapportionmentofpleasureinaccordancewithvirtue.Onebenefits
anotherbyincreasingtheirlotofanyofthefirstthree,withonecaveat:onlyinnocent
pleasures,oronesthatarenotundeserved,aregood.Thepleasureofamorallybadperson
isundeserved,andthereforelackspositivevalue.Similarly,pleasuresthatexpressbad
character—forinstancethepleasureamoralbeingmighttakeinsomeone’sundeserved
pain,orinthebreachofaduty—arenotgood.86
Rossstatesclearlythatundeservedpainisbad,andsotobringituponsomeoneis
toharmthem.87Givenhisaccountofwhatthingsaregood,Itakeitthatignoranceand
viciousnessarebad,aswellaspain.Thus,oneharmsanotherbycausingthemundeserved
pain,bymakingthemignorant,orbymakingthemvicious.Onecanalsoharmsomeoneby
deprivingthemofgoodstheyotherwisewouldhavehad.Rossindicatesasmuchwhenhe
citestheprohibitiononkillingasaparadigmaticexampleofadutyofnon-maleficence.88
Killingsomeonedoesnotnecessarilybringpain,viceorignoranceuponthem.Butintaking
awaytheirlife,itdeprivesthemofaconditionfor,orameansto,thingswhicharegood.So,
wecaninferthatdeprivinganotherofasourceorconditionofhappiness,virtue,or
knowledgebreachesadutyofnon-maleficenceevenifitdoesnotbringaboutanything
positivelybad.
Ourjudgementsabouttherelativeweightsofvariousprimafaciedutiescannotbe
betterthan“probableopinions,”accordingtoRoss.89Accordingly,wecansurmisethatwe
cannotbecertainofourjudgementsabouttheseriousnessofaharmordeprivation,either.
Butattheveryextremesoftrivialityandsignificance,surelywecancomeveryclose.
Whenkillingsomeoneharmsthem,theharmisusuallyveryserious,and
unquestionablyso.90Butdeathisnottheonlyunambiguouslyseriousharmthatcanbe
86Rossdoesnotofferatheoryofwhatpleasureis.Thatheequatesitwith“pleasantconsciousness,”“well-being,”and“happiness”(RightandGood,21,136,152)indicatesthathemeansbyitsomethingmorethanphysicalorsensualpleasure.87Ross,RightandGood,136-7.88Ibid.,23.89Ibid.,31.90Ifyoucareaboutsomeone,youwantwhatisbestforthem,fortheirownsake.Itseemstobeadeepandnotculturally-relativefeatureofcare,thatamongthethingsthatwewantmostforourcared-forsis(usually)that
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donetosomeone.Unfortunately,onecansuffersignificantphysical,psychological,or
emotionalinjuries,andonecanbedeprivedofwhatoneneedsinorderforone’slifeto
containanadequateamountofpleasure,knowledge,orvirtue.
Seriousbreachesoffidelity
Totheextentthatbreakingapromiseharmsthepromisee,itbreachesaprimafaciedutyof
non-maleficence,notfidelity.Ifdutiesoffidelityprotectthosetowhomweowethemina
uniqueway(astheyshoulddoifRoss’sprimafaciedutiesareirreducible),theymust
protectagainstsomethingotherthanharmorlossofwelfare.Rossdoesnotdiscussthis
explicitly,butItakeitthattheyprotectagainstdamagestothepromisee’strust.91Such
damagesareoftenslight,butsometimesserious.Sometimesthereisnothingthatcanbe
donesuchthatthevictimofabrokenpromisecanlatersaytrulythat“mytrustwasnot
significantlydiminishedbecauseofthepromise-breaking.”
InRoss’sexample,breakingapromisetomeetfora“trivialpurpose”isnotserious.
Thepromiseemightatfirsttakethepromiser,andpossiblypeopleingeneral,tobeless
reliablethantheyoriginallythought.Yetifthepromiserexplains,and/orapologizes,
and/ormeetstoachievethepurposelater,thenthepromisee’strustshouldbecompletely
restored.Otherkindsofpromisebreakingsignificantlyimpairorevendestroytrust.While
theydonotdie(or,thattheydonotdietoosoon);mostofusliveandloveasthoughdeathisnormallyagraveharmtotheonewhodies.Epicureanargumentsthat“deathisnothingtous,”couldleadonetoquestionthis.EpicurusandLucretiusmadethecasethatbecauseonedoesnotexistwhenoneisdead,onecannotsufferinanyway(Epicurus,“LettertoMenoeceus,”andLucretius,OntheNatureofThings).Theirargumentsshowthatdeathisnotapositiveharm.Itmightyetbeaharmofdeprivation.Thatis,ifdeathdeprivesyouofgoodsthatyouwouldotherwisehavehadinyourlife(morespecifically,ifitcausesyoutomissoutonmoregoodthanevil)thendeathcanharmyouevenifitdoesnotcauseyoutosuffer.Deprivationaccountsinvitethequestion:whendoestheharmofdeathoccur?Thereislittleagreementontheanswer.Forinstance,ThomasNagelholdsthattheharmistimeless,accordingtoFredFeldmanitoccurseternally,andBenBradleyarguesthatitoccursduringthoseperiodsafteryourdeathinwhichcontinuedlifewouldhavebeengoodforyou(Nagel,“Death,”Feldman,“SomePuzzles”,Bradley,“WhenisDeathBad?”).Eachoftheseanswerscanbemetaphysicallypuzzling,becauseoftheassumptionstheymakeaboutyourexistenceandaboutharmability.However,Idonotthinkthatthedifficultyofthesepuzzlesshoulddissuadeusfromtheverynaturalidea,whichwedivinethroughcaring,thatdeathoftenharmstheonewhodies.91ForsomeevidencethatthismightbeRoss’sview,seeFoundations,105,whereRosssaysthattheproblemwithbreakingapromisecomesdownnottoitseffectonutility,buttoa“breachoftrust.”
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itisnotalwaysclearwhetherabreachoftrustisseriousornot,themostseriousonesare
hardtodeny.Thesearebetrayals.92
AsIwilldiscussinthenextsubsection(Remorse),Rossavoidsexamplesof
situationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillcauseseriousharmorlossoftrust.Yetnothing
inhistheorysuggeststhatitwoulddeemsuchsituationsimpossible,andlittleimagination
isneededtoconjureexamplesofthem.Theliteratureonconflictbrimswithfictionalcases:
Aeschylus’sAgamemnonmusteitherkillandbetrayhisdaughter,orbetrayhistroopsand
exposethemtodeathandgraveinjury;WilliamStyron’sSophiemustbetrayandexposeto
seriousharmatleastoneofhertwochildren;intheBagavadGita,Agarjunamustkillsome
membersofhisfamily,orelsebetrayothers.93Non-fictionalreallifeoccasionallysupplies
examples,too.Whatcomesimmediatelytomindisthepredicamentofsoldierswhofind
themselvesincombatwitharmedchildren,andothercircumstancesinwhichkillingan
innocentthreatistheonlywaytosavethelifeofsomeoneforwhosewelfaretheagenthas
aspecialresponsibility.Whensituationssuchastheseoccur,fulfillingone’sallthings
considereddutywillinvolvecommittingatleastoneseriouswrong.AsRoss’stheorydoes
notdenythis,ithasroomfortragicmoralconflictaslongasitalsodoesnotdenythat
remorsecanbewarrantedbyeachofthepossiblecoursesofaction.
2.2Remorse
Ross’sdeontologyincludesdutiestorespondtoone’swrongfulbreachesofresponsibility
withreparatoryactions,butnodutiestorespondtoone’sactionsinemotionalways.
Despitedenyingthatpeoplecanbeobligatedtofeelonewayoranother,Rossdoesthink
thatmorallygoodpeoplewillhavecertainemotionalresponsestothemorallyrelevant
featuresoftheiractions.Someoftheseareprospective—forinstance,desirestoperform
theprimafacierightaspectsofanactandaversionstoperformingtheprimafaciewrong
ones.Othersareretrospective.Isremorseamongthem?
92Similarly,Stockersaysthatbetrayalsareamongthejustifiedviolationsthatmakeaconflictacaseofdirtyhands.PluralandConflictingValues,17-18.93TheseexamplesarebroughtintothephilosophicaldiscussionbyWilliamsin“EthicalConsistency;”NussbauminFragilityofGoodnessand“CostsofTragedy;”andStockerinPluralandConflictingValues.TheyaredrawnfromStyron,Sophie’sChoice;Aeschylus,Agamemnon;andVyasa,BagavadGita.
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Rosssayslittleaboutremorse.Histreatmentofitislimitedtoafewmentionsinthe
middleofadiscussionofdeterminisminFoundationsofEthics.Whathesaysthere
indicatesthathisconceptionofremorsediffersfromtheoneinwhichIaminterested.For
Ross,remorseisanappropriatereactionforanagenttohavetowardtheir“badaction.”94A
badaction,onRoss’sview,isonewhichhasbeenperformedoutofabadmotivation,anda
badmotivationisonethatisattractedtotheprimafaciewrongfeaturesoftheact,or
aversetotheprimafacierightones.Therightactcanbebad,andsowarrantremorse,ifthe
agentdoesitoutofadesiretocommitthebreachesitcontains,ratherthanadesireto
fulfilltheresponsibilitiesitfulfills.Withitsnegativeattentionfocusedonthequalityofthe
selfthatperformedtheaction,ratherthanonthewrongnessoftheact,Ross’sremorse
wouldbebettercalledshame.95
TheconceptionofremorseinwhichIaminterestedisdifferent,becauseittakes
remorsetobeanappropriatereactiontoone’sseriouswrongdoing,evenifthewrongdoing
wasnotdonefrombadmotivationsandwasnotexpressiveofabadcharacter.Rosscomes
closesttoaddressingmynotionofremorseinthepassageinwhichhediscussesbreakinga
promiseinordertofulfillastrongerdutytoprovideaid.There,hesaysthatbreakingthe
promise“leadsustofeelnotindeedshameorrepentance,butcertainlycompunctionfor
behavingaswedo...”96
AsImentionedabove,compunctiongenerallyreferstoaformofmoralregret,or
agentregretforwrongdoing.Manydictionarydefinitionsofcompunctionequateitwith
repentanceandremorse.YetRosscontrastscompunctionwithrepentance,sowemight
takehimtomeanbycompunctionsomethingweakerthanthat,andweakerthanremorse.
Itmightbea“prickofconscious,”oraslightmoraldiscomfortwhichdoesnotrisetothe
levelofanguish.
94Ross,Foundations,246.95Whileremorseandshamearebothretrospectivenegativeemotions,remorsefocusesontheone’sactionandontheplightofthevictim(s)ofthataction,whereasshame,“focusesonthemoralcharacterofthepersonfeelingtheemotion,”asAdamMortonputsit.SeeEmotionandImagination,160.96Ross,RightandGood,20.
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SomeprominentscholarsofRossseemtotakehisclaimaboutcompunctiontomean
thatthefailuretofulfillamerelyprimafacieduty—evenareparation-generatingone—can
neverwarrantmorethanaprickofconscious.97Remorsewouldbeanoverreactioninany
suchcircumstance.
Suchinterpretationsareopentoquestion.Toseewhy,letuslookattheparticular
exampletowhichRossreferswhenhemakesthecompunctionclaimonwhichtheyare
based.Inthepassageinwhichhemakestheclaim,Rossspeaksofbreakingapromiseto
onepersoninordertorelieveanother’sdistress,withoutgivingdetailsaboutthe
importanceofthepromiseorthedirenessofthedistress.Yetheisreferringtoanalready
runningexample,thedetailsofwhichhedescribedearlierinthechapterwhenheasked
readerstoimaginethat“Ihavepromisedtomeetafriendataparticulartimeforsome
trivialpurpose,”(emphasisadded)butcannotbothmakethemeetingandrelieveanother’s
distress.98
Itisnomistaketoconcludefromthecompunctionclaimthatitisappropriateforan
agenttofeelaprickofconscience,butnomore,uponbreakingatrivialpromiseasan
inevitablepartoffulfillingastrictduty.Areweentitledtomakethewiderinferencethatit
isnotappropriatetofeelanymorethanaprickofconsciencewhenfulfillingastrict
obligationinvolvesirreparablywrongingafriend,forinstancebybetrayingthem?
ThiswiderinferencewouldbeinconsistentwithRoss’spositiononthemoralvalue
ofmoralemotions.InFoundationsofEthics,hearguesthatamorallygoodpersonwillhave
negativeattitudestowardtheaspectsoftheiractionsthatgoagainsttheirresponsibilities
inproportiontotheweightsofthoseresponsibilities.Theseattitudescanbeprospective,or
retrospective.Rosscharacterizestheformerasaversionandthelatterasdissatisfaction.99
Ifcompunctionisthetypeofdissatisfactionwarrantedbyfailingtofulfillatrivialpromise
inthecourseofdoingtheoverallrightthing,thensomethingmuchstrongerthan
compunctionshouldbewarrantedbyfailingtofulfillamuchweightierresponsibility.This
97E.g.Stratton-Lake,“Introduction,”xxxvii.98Ross,RightandGood,18.99Ross,Foundations,291-310.
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suggeststhatremorse,whichisstrongerthancompunctionbutliesonthesamespectrum
(thatofmoralregret),mightbelegitimateinsomecases.ThatRossrulesitoutwhenit
comestobreakingatrivialpromisedoesnotprovethatherulesitoutwhenitcomesto
causingseriousdamagetothepromisee’strust.
Whetherpurposefullyornot,Rossavoidsanydiscussionofsituationsinwhich
performingone’sproperdutyinvolvesbreachingaveryweightyresponsibility,letalone
onethatprotectsagainstseriousviolation.Allofhisexampleseither1)stateoutrightthat
theoverriddenresponsibilitiesaretrivial(e.g.therunningexamplewehavebeen
discussing),2)steerthereadertowardthinkingofthemastrivial,ashedoeswhenhesays
that“theprobabilityisthatanyact,howeverrightitbe,willhaveadverseeffects(though
thesemaybeverytrivial)onsomeinnocentpeople,”100or3)obscuretheabsolute
seriousnessoftheresponsibilitiesatstakebyabstractingsofarfromthedetailsofthe
situationthatreaderscangleannomorethantherelativeweightsofthoseresponsibilities.
Forinstance,weknowthatfulfillingapromisetoAwouldproduce1,000unitsofgoodfor
him,whileanalternativecourseofactionwouldproduce1,001unitsofgoodforB,butwe
donotknowtheseriousnessofthepromise,includingwhetherbreakingitwouldresultin
asignificantlossoftrust.101Nordoweknowhowmuchwelfareoneunitofgood
represents.HisavoidanceoftheproblemofjustifiedbutseriouswrongsallowsRossto
remainsilentonwhetherornotremorse(asIconceiveit)iseveragoodmoralresponseto
thebreachofaresponsibilitythatconflictswithanallthingsconsideredduty.
Silenceisnotdenial.IhopetohaveshownthatitisperfectlyconsistentwithRoss’s
theorythatremorsecanbewarrantedonthepartofanagentwhohascommittedaserious
wrongasaninevitablepartofperformingtheirallthingsconsideredduty.Thisisbecause
1)accordingtoRoss’stheoryitclearlyisappropriateforanagenttofeelsomeformof
moralregretuponcommittingawrongfulact(evenajustifiedone);2)thedegreeof
appropriatemoralregretvarieswiththeseverityofthewrongcommitted;and3)although
Rossappearstodenythatprofoundmoralregretisawarrantedresponsefortrivialor
slightwrongs,hedoesnotdenythatthatisitwarrantedforseriousones.
100Ross,RightandGood,41.101Ibid.,34-35.
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Becauseitisconsistentwiththetheorythatallofanagent’spossiblecoursesof
actioncaninvolvecommittingseriouswrongs,andbecausethesewrongscanberemorse-
worthy,Ross’sdeontologyhasroomfortragicmoralconflict.Thenextquestionis:can
Ross’sdeontologymakesenseofrecoverypredicamentsastragicmoralconflicts?The
followingpartofthechaptertakesupthisquestion.
3.RecoveryConflicts
Atheorycanmakesenseofrecoverypredicamentsastragicconflictsaslongasitcan
characterizethemassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolveserious
wrongdoing.TherearetwowaystodowrongonRoss’sview:toviolateanallthings
consideredduty,ortoviolatesomeonebybreachingaprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence
orfidelity.Evenifwedonotknowwhichcourseofactioninarecoverypredicament
violatesanallthingsconsideredduty,wecanknowthatitpresentsatragicmoralconflict
aslongasbothcoursesofactionseriouslyviolatesomeone.
TofindoutwhetherRoss’sdeontologycaninterpretrecoverypredicamentsas
tragicmoralconflicts,Iwilltakethefollowingtwosteps.First,insection3.1,Iwill
investigatewhether,fromtheperspectiveofRoss’stheory,seriousdutiesofnon-
maleficenceareatstakeinthetworecoverypredicamentsthatareourexemplars—the
islandfoxpredicamentandthenorthernspottedowlpredicament.Insection3.2,Iwill
investigatewhetherthepredicamentsinvolveseriousdutiesoffidelity.
3.1Dutiesofnon-maleficenceatstakeinrecoverypredicaments
ThemostobviousplacetolookforRossiandutiesofnon-maleficenceinourpredicaments
isintheirrecoverycoursesofaction,inwhichmanyanimalsarehurt,intimately
controlled,orkilled.OnRoss’sview,canpeoplebeardutiesofnon-maleficencetoother
animals?
Non-maleficenceandotheranimals
“Iftherearethingsthatarebadinthemselvesweought,primafacie,nottobringthem
uponothers;andonthisfactreststhedutyofnon-maleficence,”writesRoss.Painisamong
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thethingsthatarebadinthemselves,onhisview.Bypain,hemeansunhappiness,or
unpleasantstatesofmind.Suchstatesarebadonlywhentheyareundeserved(e.g.
unconnectedtowrongdoingbytheonewhoexperiencesthepain),andnotexpressiveof
badcharacter(aswouldbepaintakeninanother’smeritedgoodfortune).Theseconditions
onthebadnessofpainentailthattocauseitisnotnecessarilytodowrong.Makinganother
humansufferdoesnotalwaysbreachaprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence;asmoral
beingswecanactinaccordancewithoragainstduty,andourmotivationscanbegoodor
bad.Yetbecausenon-moralbeingsdonothavethepossibilitiesofwrongactionandbad
character,theirpainisbadwithoutexception.Rossthinksthatanimalsotherthanhumans
arenon-moral,soanythingapersondoeswhichcausesthempainbreachesaprimafacie
dutyofnon-maleficence,andisthereforewronginthesecondsensearticulatedinsection
1.1(Twokindsofwrongdoing);evenifitdoesnotbreachanallthingsconsideredduty,it
violatessomeoneandsogeneratesadutyofreparationandwarrantsmoralregret.
Thislogiccanbeextendedtoharmsofdeprivation.AsIarguedinsection2.1
(Seriouswrongs),Rossseemstothinkthatoneharmsanothereitherbybringing
somethingbaduponthemorbydeprivingthemofsomethinggood.Justasthepainofother
animalsisalwaysbad,onRoss’sview,theirhappinessorpleasureisalwaysgood.Thus,
anyactionwhichdeprivesanotheranimalofhappinessharmsthem.Itthusbreachesa
primafaciedutyofnon-maleficence,asdoesanyactionwhichbringsthempain.
So,harmingotheranimals—byeithercausingthempainordeprivingthemof
happiness—constituteswrongdoing.Itwillconstituteseriouswrongdoingiftheharmis
significant.AlthoughonRoss’stheory,judgementsaboutthesignificanceofaharmcannot
bemorethanprobableopinions,andalthoughopinionsaboutthesignificanceofmany
harmswillnotbeveryprobableatall,Ithinkthatouropinionsabouttheworstoneswill
beasprobableasitispossibletobe.
Harmstootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament
Fordetailsontheislandfoxrecoverycase,seechapter1,section1.Muchofwhatoccurred
inthiscasecausedotheranimalspain.Forinstance,theprobablelonelinessof85619prior
tohercapture,thefearanddiscomfortshemighthavefeltduringherentrapment,andthe
intensephysicalpainassociatedwiththeattackthatkilledher;theanxietyexperiencedby
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themanyotherfoxeswhowereforcedtolivewithpen-matestheydidnotchooseandwith
whomtheydidnotgetalong;thephysicalpainoftheinjuriesinflictedbytheirmates;the
grieforconfusiontheymighthavefeltuponbeingseparatedfromtheirfriends,orupon
losingtheirpups;thefrustrationandboredomoflivinginaspaceonehundredthofone
percentofwhattheywereusedto;thediscomfortofsleepingincold,dampboxes;thepain
andsick-feelingofmastitis;thetraumaexperiencebyeaglesuponbeingcaptured;the
frustrationofbeingconfinedandunabletofly;theconfusionandanxietyassociatedwith
beingreleasedtoanentirelyunfamiliarplace,thesadnessoruneasinessofbeingseparated
fromtheirmateandyoung,andofneveragainholdingaterritory;forpigs,confusionand
perhapssadnessofbeingpennedintospaceswheretheywerehabituatedtoroamfreely;
thefearuponbeingcaughtintraps,anduponofbeingchasedbypeopleanddogs;andthe
terrorsomemighthavefeltduringtheepisodesinwhichtheywereshotenmassefrom
helicopters.
TheIslandfoxrecoverybroughtharmsofdeprivationuponanimals,aswell.102
Examplesoftheseincludetheprematuredeaths-by-killingof5,036pigs,740elk,and425
deer,aswellasthedeathsoffourgoldeneagleswhoexpiredafterbeingtrappedand
beforeorimmediatelyafterbeingtranslocated.
Clearly,recoveringtheislandfoxpopulationscausedmuchharm.Yetnotrecovering
them—takingtheextinctioncourseofaction—wouldalsohavecausedharm.Specifically,it
wouldhaveharmedmostofthe48capturedislandfoxes,whointheabsenceof
interventionwouldlikelyhavediedearlydeathsbyeagledepredation.
102Seenote90foradiscussionofdeathasaharmofdeprivation.Someclaimthatalthoughdeathcanbeaharmofdeprivationforhumanbeings,itcannotbeforotheranimals,becausetheylackthekindoffuture-orienteddesiresnecessaryfortheirwell-beingtobesetbackbydeath(e.g.Velleman,“Well-beingandTime”).Suchclaimsrelyonaconceptionofwelfareasdesire-satisfaction.Betterconceptionsofwelfarecharacterizeitassatisfactionwiththeconditionsofone’slife(seeSumner,Welfare,Happiness,andEthics),ofwhichevenabeingwhodoesnotanticipatetheirownfuture,andwhodoesnotconceiveofthemselvesashavingalife,canbedeprivedbydeath.Thisisnottosaythatotheranimalsdonotanticipatetheirownfutures.Perhapssome,suchascoral,donot.Butthereisgoodevidence(asifanyonewhohasspentanytimewithmammalsandbirdsneededit)thatmanyanimalsdoanticipatetheirownfutures(e.g.KabadayiandOsvath,“RavensFlexiblePanning”).ForstrongargumentsagainsttheclaimsofVellemanandothersthatdeathdoesnotdepriveanimalsofwelfare,seeBradley,“IsDeathBadforaCow?”
46
Moralresponsibilityforharmstootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament
Thatanimalswouldbeharmedundereachscenariointherecoverypredicamentdoesnot
entailthatthepredicamentisamoralconflict.Inorderforthepredicamenttobeaconflict,
itmustbethecasethatatleastoneoftheagentswhobearsmoralresponsibilityforthe
harmsofrecoverywouldhavebeenresponsiblefortheharmsofextinction,hadrecovery
notbeenundertaken;thesamemoralagent(s)whowrongedanimalsinrecoverywould
alsohavewrongedanimalsifrecoveryhadnotoccurred.
Whoisresponsiblefortheharmsofrecovery?Mostobviously,thepeopleonits
frontlines:thosewhokilledthepigs,elk,anddeer;thosewhocapturedfoxesandmade
thembreedincaptivity;andthosewhotranslocatedeagles.Yetthepeoplewhocharged
themwithdoingthesethingswouldalsoberesponsible,aswouldtheorganizations(e.g.
theNationalParkService,theNatureConservancy)undertheauspicesofwhichtheydid
them.Atthehighestlevel,theU.S.governmentwouldberesponsible,becauseitmandates
recoveryofendangeredspeciesaswellasbeingthemaininstitutionthatmanages
recovery.
Whowouldhavebeenresponsiblefortheharmsthatwouldhaveoccurredif
recoveryhadnotbeenundertaken?Becauseeagleswouldhavebeentheproximatecauses
oftheseharms,onemightattempttoarguethatnomoralagentswouldhavebeen
responsibleforthem.However,theharmstofoxesthatwouldoccurintheextinction
courseofactioncanstillbeattributabletohumanmoralagents.Adulthumanbeings,anda
corporationofthem(Montrose)wasresponsibleforthepresenceofDDTneartheChannel
Islands,andthusfortheextirpationofbaldeaglesfromtheisland,andthusforthe
presenceofgoldeneaglesthere,andthusforthegoldeneagles’depredationoffoxes.Not
protectingthefoxesfromeagledepredationwouldthereforeamountnotjusttoabreachof
adutyofbeneficence,butalsotoabreachofadutyofnon-maleficenceontheirpart.
Theproblemisthatthesetofmoralagentswhowereultimatelyresponsibleforthe
eagles’depredationoffoxesdoesnotseemtooverlapwiththesetthatwasresponsiblefor
theharmsofrecoveringfoxes.Noneofthepeopleonthefrontlineofrecovery,andnoneof
theinstitutionsinvolvedinrecovery,wereinvolvedinMontrose’sdumpingofDDT.And
becauseMontrosedumpeditillegally,throughmunicipalsewagelines,itwouldbetrickyto
arguethattheU.S.governmentwasresponsible.
47
Inwhatremainsofthissubsection,Iwillbrieflysketchanargumentfortheclaim
thattherearesomeagentswhocouldbemorallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmatstake
intheislandfoxrecoverypredicament.Inthefollowingsubsection,Iwillindicatehow
thoseagentsmightbreachdutiesofnon-maleficenceinbringingabout,orinfailingto
protectanimalsfrom,theharmsforwhichtheyareresponsible.Bothdiscussionsdolittle
morethangrazeissuesthatmeritmuchmoreattentionthanIcanaffordthemhere.Myaim
issimplytoshowthatitisnotimplausibletoholdthatintheislandfoxrecovery
predicament,thereareagentsforwhomallavailablecoursesofactionwillinvolve
wrongdoing.
Toseehowsomeofthosewhoaremorallyresponsiblefortheharmsofrecovery
mightalsobemorallyresponsiblefortheharmsofnotundertakingrecovery,letusstart
withthedistinctionbetweenbackward-lookingandforward-lookingmoral
responsibility.103Anagentbearsbackward-lookingresponsibilityforsomethinginvirtueof
havingbeencausallyresponsible(intherightway(s))forbringingitabout.Theybear
forward-lookingresponsibilityforsomethinginvirtueofbeingcharged(intheright
ways(s))withbringingitabout.104Thetwokindsofresponsibilityrelatetoeachotherina
numberofways.Onewayisthatbearingbackward-lookingresponsibilityforaharmgives
rise,onRoss’sview,toaforward-lookingresponsibilitytomakeamendsforit.Another
wayisthathavingaforward-lookingresponsibilityfordoingsomethingcangiverisetoa
backward-lookingresponsibilityfornothavingdoneit.Forthepurposesofthisargument,I
willcallthefirstkindofbackward-lookingresponsibilitysimplebackward-looking
responsibility,andthesecondkindcompoundbackward-lookingresponsibility.
Aswesawabove,noneoftheagentswhowouldbearsimplebackward-looking
responsibilityfortheharmsassociatedwithnotrecoveringtheislandfoxarethesameas
thosewhobearsimplebackward-lookingresponsibilityfortheharmsinvolvedin
103InFoundations,(85)Rosssaysthattheword“responsibility”captureswhathemeansbyprimafaciedutybetterthan“primafacieduty”does.104Forward-lookingdutiestostopormitigateharmsfitwellinRoss’stheoreticalframework.Rossemphasizesthataperson’smultipleprimafaciedutiesarisefromthevariouskindsofmorallysignificantrelationsinwhichtheystandtoothers(e.g.,RightandGood,19,22).Itonlymakessensetoassumethatamongsuchrelationsarethoseinwhichonepersonisresponsibleforprotecting(certainaspectsof)thewell-beingofanother,orofothers.
48
recoveringthem.However,ifthereareagentswhobearforward-lookingresponsibilityfor
preventingtheharmsassociatedwithextinction,theniftheydonotpreventthoseharms,
theymightbearcompoundbackward-lookingresponsibilityforthat.Ifamongthoseagents
responsibleforrecoveryharms,somealsohadforward-lookingresponsibilityfor
preventingtheharmsassociatedwithextinction,thentherearesomeagentswhowouldbe
morallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmatstakeintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament.
Itcouldbearguedthatthepeopleandinstitutionschargedwithpreventing
extinction,aswellastheU.S.governmentthatmandatesandmanagesrecovery,have
specialresponsibilitiestoprotectmembersofthosespeciesfromtheharmsassociated
withextinction.Thiscouldbethecaseevenifpreventingharmsisnotthemainreasonfor
preventingextinction.Inourcase,inordertopreventtheextinctionoftheislandfox,itwas
necessarytopreventthefoxesfromsufferingearlydeathsbyeagledepredation.Sincesuch
deathswouldharmthefoxes,itwasthereforenecessarytopreventthoseharms.
Therefore,preventingthemwaspartofwhatthosechargedwithpreventingextinction
wereresponsiblefordoing.105
Breachesofdutiesofnon-maleficencetootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament
Thenextquestionis,iftheanythosewhowerechargedwithpreventingextinctionhad
chosennottofulfilltheirforward-lookingresponsibilitytopreventharmstofoxes,would
thishavebreachedthedutyofnon-maleficence?Inotherwords,doesanyonewhobears
forwardlookingresponsibilitytoprotectfoxesfromtheharmsassociatedwithextinction
standinrelationtothemsuchthatnotprotectingthemwouldamounttoabreachofnon-
105Iwouldalsosaythatamongthosewhoaremorallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmsarethoseofusinwhosenameagovernmentundertakesrecovery,andwhoarealsoinpositionstoadvocatefororagainstit,orwhoparticipate,evenpassively,asbeneficiariesofthepolitical-economicsysteminwhichtherecoverypredicamentisgenerated.IrisMarionYoung’ssocialconnectionmodelofmoralresponsibilityhelpstomakesenseofthis.AsYoungwritesinher“ResponsibilityandSocialJustice,”“Thesocialconnectionmodelofresponsibilitysaysthatallagentswhocontributebytheiractionstothestructuralprocessesthatproduceinjusticehaveresponsibilitiestoworktoremedytheseinjustices.”Shecontraststhismodelwiththeliabilitymodelofresponsibility,whichislikewhatIhavecalledsimplebackward-lookingresponsibility.OnYoung’ssocialconnectionmodel,moralresponsibilityismoreforward-looking,issharedamongmembersofacommunityorgroup,andcanonlybefulfilledthroughcollectiveaction.BecauseofthecommunalnatureofmoralresponsibilityonYoung’smodel,itwouldbedifficultorimpossibletofitwithinRoss’sveryindividualisticethicaltheory(thankstoTomHurkaforpointingthisouttome),andsoIwillnottakeituphere.
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maleficence?Itmightbetemptingtothinkthatfailurestoprotectareonlyeverfailuresof
beneficence,notnon-maleficence.Toseethatthistemptationshouldnotbefollowed,
considerthefollowingexample.
Ioncedoveintothedeependofapublicswimmingpooltopulloutayoungboywho
wasstrugglingtokeephisheadabovethewater.HadIchosennottodivein,andhadthe
boyinhaledmuchwater(asallindicationswerethathewould),onemightthinkthatinnot
protectinghim,Iwouldhavefailedtofulfilla(particularlyurgent)dutyofbeneficence,but
notoneofnon-maleficence;afterall,Ididnotputtheboyinthedeepend,ortrickhiminto
goingthere.Thatthoughtmightbesound,hadIbeenjustanotherpool-goer.ButIwasa
lifeguard,andIwasonduty.Furthermore,Iwasgivingtheboyatesttodeterminewhether
hewouldbeallowedtoswiminthedeepend.Itwasmyjobtoprotecthimfromdrowning,
andheandhisparentshadentrustedmewithlookingoutforhimwhilehetooktheswim
test.BecauseIhadaspecialresponsibilitytoprotecthimfromdrowning,afailuretohave
donesowouldhaveamountedtoharminghim.Itwouldhavebeennotjustabreachofthe
dutyofbeneficence,butabreachofthedutyofnon-maleficence.
Similarly,Ithink,thefailuretofulfillaresponsibilitytoprotectfoxesfromtheharms
associatedwithextinctionwouldhaveamountedtoabreachofnon-maleficence,notjusta
missedopportunityforbeneficence.Inboththeswimmingpoolcaseandthefoxcase,
moralagentsareexplicitlychargedwithprotectingparticularothersfromparticularkinds
ofharms.IwaschargedwithprotectingpeopleatSchenleyPoolfromtheharmof
drowning,whilethoseinvolvedinislandfoxrecoverywerechargedwithprotecting
northernChannelIslandfoxesfromearlydeaths.Thesedutiesdifferfromthemorevague
andgeneraldutytohelpothersinneed,whichisthedutyofbeneficence.Iwouldhave
breachedthatif,whilevacationing,IhadoptednottodiveintoLakeChamplaintosavea
child,andtherecoveryworkerswouldhavebreachedithadtheynothelpedoutaninjured
skunktheyencounteredduringtheirfoxwork.Intheswimmingpoolandfoxcases,in
contrast,wehadspecial,formallybestowedresponsibilitiestohelporprotectinclearly
definedways,andsonothelpingorprotectinginthosewayswouldhavegonebeyond
failingtofulfilldutiesofbeneficence.
Ihopetohaveshownthatitisatleastplausiblethatthespecialresponsibilitiesthat
thoseinvolvedinrecoveryhadtopreventextinctionincludedresponsibilitiestoprevent
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theharmsassociatedwithextinction,andthatnotpreventingthoseharmswouldhave
amountedtobreachesofdutiesofnon-maleficence.Becausetheissuesraisedinshowing
thisdefinitivelyarevast(who,ifanyone,hadaspecialresponsibilitytoprotectislandfoxes
fromharm?whendoesfailuretoprotectamounttoabreachofnon-maleficence?),Ihave
notdonesohere.Still,Iwilltakeitthatintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,both
coursesofactioninvolvethesamemoralagentswrongingotheranimals.
Manyofthesewrongsareunquestionablyserious—theearlydeaths,thesuffering
associatedwithtranslocation,andsomeofthesufferingassociatedwithcaptivity.Thus,the
islandfoxrecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflictregardlessofwhetherdrivinga
populationtoextinctioncountsdirectlyasaseriousharm,orwhetherpeoplewouldbe
seriouslyharmedbyeithercourseofaction,orwhetherthereareseriousbreachesof
fidelityatstakeinthepredicament.
Intheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,bothcoursesofactioninvolvewronging
otheranimals.Manyofthesewrongsareunquestionablyserious—theearlydeaths,the
sufferingassociatedwithtranslocation,andsomeofthesufferingassociatedwithcaptivity.
Thus,theislandfoxrecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflictregardlessofwhether
drivingapopulationtoextinctioncountsdirectlyasaseriousharm,orwhetherpeople
wouldbeseriouslyharmedbyeithercourseofaction,orwhetherthereareserious
breachesoffidelityatstakeinthepredicament.
Breachesofnon-maleficencetootheranimalsinthenorthernspottedowlrecovery
predicament
Liketheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,thespottedowlrecoverypredicamentisonein
whichbothavailablecoursesofactioninvolveirreparablyharmingmanyindividual
animals.Fordetailsoftheowlrecoverypredicament,pleaserefertochapter1,section3.
Thispredicamentoccursaspeoplefacethechoiceofwhethertoattempttopreventthe
extinctionofnorthernspottedowlsbykillingbarredowls,whooutcompeteNSOsfor
habitat.Astherecoverycourseofactioninvolveskillingthousandsofhealthybarredowls,
itinvolvesthousandsofseriousbreachesofthedutyofnon-maleficence.
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Theextinctioncourseofactionwouldbringharmuponanimalsaswell.Ifbarred
owlsarenotremoved,thenpeoplewillresponsibleforsomenumberofnorthernspotted
owlslosingterritories.Theywillthuslosematesandwillnotraisechicks.Ithinkthatthese
losseswouldbeserious,althoughtheywouldnotbeasgreatasthelossesoflifeassociated
withthealternativecourseofaction.
Asinthefoxpredicament,therearesomeagentswhowouldbemorallyresponsible
forbothsetsofharms.Theagents(bothorganizationsandindividualpeople)chargedwith
killingbarredowlsareresponsiblefortheharmstheytherebybringupontheowls.
Becausetheseagentshavespecial,formallybestoweddutiestopreventNSOextinction,
whichnecessarilyinvolvespreventingNSOsfromlosingterritoriesandopportunitiesto
breed,theywouldalsoberesponsiblefortheharmsassociatedwiththoselossesifthe
extinctioncourseofactionweretaken.Asinthefoxcase,failingtofulfilleithersetof
responsibilitiescouldamounttoseriousbreachesofdutiesofnon-maleficence.Thus,
whatevertheydointhepredicament,theorganizationsandindividualschargedwith
recoveringNSOswillseriouslywrongowls.Unlikeinthefoxcasehowever,intheowlcase
theU.S.governmentwouldbeamongthoseagentswhofacethistragicmoralconflict.This
isbecauseinadditiontomandatingrecovery(andthustheharmsassociatedwithit),the
governmentwouldhavesimplebackward-lookingresponsibilityfortheharmsassociated
withextinction,sincetheclearcuttingofNSOhabitat(whichmadeNSOpopulationsso
vulnerabletocompetitionfrombarredowls)wasmadepossiblebyU.S.governmentpolicy.
Endofnewmaterial
Breachesofnon-maleficencetospeciesinrecoverypredicaments
TheconflictthatLowellDillerseemedtothinkhefacedwasnot,orwasnotprimarily,a
situationinwhichbothavailablecoursesofactionwouldwrongotheranimals(seechapter
1,section3).Dillerdescribedeachcourseofactionas“ethicallywrong,”butidentified
killingindividualanimalsasthesalientwrong-makingfeatureofonlyoneofthem:
recovery.Thesalientwrong-makingfeatureofthealternativewasthatitwouldentail
drivingasubspeciestoextinction.Similarly,onBobSallinger’scharacterizationofthe
conflict,killingthousandsofowlsiswhatmakesrecovery“completelyunacceptable,”but
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extinctioniswhatmakesrefrainingfromrecovery“completelyunacceptable.”106AndasI
characterizedthegeneralformofrecoveryconflictsintheintroductorychapter,theyare
situationsinwhichweeitherallowaspeciestogoextinctbecauseofhumanactivities,or
wekill,and/orharm,and/orintimatelycontrolindividualanimalsinordertoprevent
extinction.
MightdrivingspeciestoextinctioninitselfviolateaRossiandutyofnon-
maleficence?Thatis,doestheextinctioncourseofactionharmspecies?Rossdoesnot
addressdirectlythequestionofwhetherpeoplebeardutiesofnon-maleficencetospecies.
Buthispositiononwhatthingsaregoodandbad,andthereforehisviewofwhatcountsas
aharm,entailsthataspeciescanneitherbebenefitednorharmed.Tohaveaprimafacie
dutyofnon-maleficencetosomeoneorsomethingistobeararesponsibilitynottobring
uponthemthingswhicharebad,andasIarguedinsection2.1(Seriouswrongs),notto
deprivethemofthingswhicharegood.AccordingtoRoss’saxiology,noneofthethings
whicharegood(pleasure,virtue,knowledge,pleasuredistributedinaccordancewith
virtue)orbad(pain,ignorance,vice,pleasurenotdistributedinaccordancewithvirtue)
arethingswhichcanbebroughtuponanon-sentientthing.Suchathingthereforecannot
beharmed,andsomoralagentsbearnodutyofnon-maleficencetoit.
Inthecourseofarguingagainstthenotionthatwedonotbeardutiestoother
animals,Rosscomesascloseasheeverdoestoaddressingthequestionofwhetherwe
mightbeardutiestospecies.Heconsiders,andrejects,theideathatapersonmightbear
dutiesto“anhistorichouse”—whichlikeaspeciesisaprecious,butnotsentient,object.
Thoughwemightspeakasthoughapersonhasdutiestoahouse,Rosssays,suchdutiesare
“purelymetaphorical.Wemayinafancifulmoodthinkofanoblehouseasifitwerea
consciousbeinghavingfeelingswhichweareboundtorespect.Butwedonotreallythink
thatithasthem.”Incontrasttodutiesconcerningpeopleandotheranimals,duties
concerninghousesareneverdutiestothehousesthemselves:“Isupposethatthedutyof
theownerofanhistorichouseisessentiallyadutytohiscontemporariesandtoposterity..
106Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”
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.Ontheotherhand,ifwethinkweoughttobehaveinacertainwaytoanimals,itisoutof
considerationprimarilyfortheirfeelingsthatwethinkweoughttobehaveso.”107
Inrestinghisrejectionofthepossibilityofdutiestohousesontheirlackof
sentience,Rossincidentallyrejectsthepossibilityofdutiestospecies,aswell.Atthesame
time,heremindsusthatwemightowepeopledutiesofnon-maleficenceorfidelitywhich
wouldprimafacieprohibitusfromdrivingspeciestoextinction.Ifdrivingaspeciesto
extinctioncanseriouslyharmorbetrayhumanbeings,itwouldinvirtueofthisbewrong,
evenifitweretherightthingtodo,allthingsconsidered.
Breachesofnon-maleficencetopeopleinrecoverypredicaments
OnRoss’sview,therearetwowaystoharmsomeone.Oneistobringpain,ignorance,or
viciousnessuponthem.Theotheristodeprivethemofpleasure,knowledge,orvirtue.The
extinctionofaspeciessurelydeprivessomepeopleofpleasureandknowledgethatthey
otherwisewouldhavehad.Listsoftheinstrumentalvaluesofspecies,madeinattemptsto
justifyconservation,almostalwaysincludethepleasurepeopleexperienceupon
encounteringmembersofaspecies(theyusuallydonotpointouttheanxietythatalsocan
accompanysuchencounters),andtheknowledgeoftheirlifehistory,ecologicalrelations,
physiology,etc.thatwemightgainbystudyingthem.
Ifinditdifficulttoimaginethatwhenasinglespeciesgoesextinct,theconcomitant
lostopportunitiesforpleasureandknowledgeconstituteharmsthatareserious.Forthose
ofuswhoaresubjectedtotheselosses,Idonotthinkthatitwillultimatelybethecasethat
thingsturnedoutworseoverall,knowledge-orhappiness-wise.Wesurelywillhavehad
lesspleasurefromaparticularsource,andlessknowledgeaboutaparticularthing.But
neitherourlifetimewelfare,norourbodiesofknowledge,willbeappreciablylessthan
theyotherwisewouldhavebeen.
However,ifpeoplearedependentonaparticularspeciesfortheirlivesor
livelihoods,oriftheirsenseofmeaninginlifeistiedupwiththeirrelationstothatspecies
(e.g.perhapsreindeerforsomeSami,caribouforsomeInnu,northerncodforsome
Newfoundlandfishermenbeforethe1990s),theextinctionofthatspeciescouldseriously
107Ross,RightandGood,49.
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harmthem.Inourrecoverypredicaments,peopledidnotdependinthesewaysonisland
foxesornorthernspottedowls.
Tobesure,indecadespriortotheowlpredicament,itappearedtosomeasthough
protectingthehabitatnecessarytoconservetheowlwouldrequiredeprivingPacificnorth
westernloggersoftheirlivelihoods.Iftheywerecorrect(thatis,iftheloggerscouldnot
havebeencompensatedfortheirfinanciallosses),theninthatpredicament,therecovery
courseofactionwouldhaveirreparablyharmedtheloggers.Ourpredicamentisadifferent
one,though.Itoccursyearsafterthelogginghasbeencurtailed,atthepointatwhich
protectingthespottedowlrequireskillingbarredowls.Inthiscase,itdoesnotseemas
thoughanyseriousdutiesofnon-maleficencetopeopleareatstake.
3.2Dutiesoffidelityatstakeinrecoverypredicaments
Inthefoxandowlrecoverypredicaments,certainindividualsandgovernmentagencies
couldbearRossiandutiesoffidelitytotaketherecoverycourseofaction.Iftheywereto
taketheextinctioncourse,theywouldbreachthoseduties,andthusdomoralwrong.Itis
notclearwhethertheywoulddoseriousmoralwrong,however,becauseitisnotclear
whetherthosebreacheswouldbeserious.
Dutiesoffidelitybasedinlaw
Inourrecoverypredicaments,therearetwowaysthatagentscanacquireRossiandutiesof
fidelitytoundertakerecoverymeasures.Thefirstisbybeingbounddirectlybylawto
undertakethem.Thesecondisbybeingboundbycontractualorprofessionalobligationto
doso.
Ifanagentisboundbylawtotakethemeasuresessentialtorecovery,nottaking
thosemeasures—whichamountstotakingtheextinctioncourseofaction—would
constituteabreachoffidelity.ThisisbecauseonRoss’sview,violatingthelawcanentail
breakingapromise:“...thedutyofobeyingthelawsofone’scountryarises...partlyfrom
theimplicitpromisetoobeywhichseemstobeinvolvedinpermanentresidenceina
55
countrywhoselawsweknowweareexpectedtoobey;andstillmoreclearlyinvolvedwhen
weourselvesinvoketheprotectionofitslaws...”108
Here,Rosswritesofthepromisetofollowthelawasapromisemadebyan
individualperson.Itappearsthathethinksthatstatescanalsohavesuchdutiesoffidelity
tofollowlaws.ThisissuggestedbyhisdiscussionoflegalpunishmentinTheRightandthe
Good,duringwhichheconceivesofthelawasapromisebythestatetoindividualsandto
societyingeneral.109
Law-baseddutiesoffidelityandendangeredspeciesrecovery
BothofourexamplesoftherecoverypredicamentoccurintheU.S.Ifthereisalawthat
requiresanyonetotakethemeasuresthatarenecessaryforpreventingtheextinctionofa
speciesintheU.S.,itwouldbetheEndangeredSpeciesAct(1973,hereafterESA).
Recognizingthat“economicgrowthanddevelopmentuntemperedbyadequateconcern
andconservation”hasalreadydrivensomespeciestoextinctionandhasimperiledothers,
U.S.CongresspassedtheESAwiththeaimofconservingendangeredandthreatened
speciesandtheecosystemsonwhichtheydepend.110
ThemeansthattheESAtakestoachievethisendincludevariousprohibitionson
individualsandfederalagencies,andvariousrequirementsoftheSecretaryoftheInterior.
Specifically,thelaw1)prohibitsanyonefromtradinginmembersofendangeredspecies2)
prohibitsanyonefromharassing,pursuing,shooting,harming,killing,hunting,wounding
ordestroyingthehabitatofamemberofanendangeredspecies(amongtheexceptionsto
thisarepermitstopursueandtrapanimalsinordertorecovertheirspecies),3)prohibits
federaldepartmentsfromfunding,authorizingorcarryingout”actionsthatwould
“jeopardize”endangeredorthreatenedspecies,oralterhabitatcriticaltotheirrecovery;111
4)requirestheSecretaryoftheInteriortodothreethings:drawupalistofspeciesthat
108Ibid.,27.109Ibid.,63-4.11016U.S.C.,§1531.11116U.S.C.§1536.
56
meetthecriteriaforbeingendangeredorthreatened;foreachlistedspecies,drawupa
recoveryplanwhichmustinclude“suchsite-specificmanagementactionsasmaybe
necessarytoachievetheplan'sgoalfortheconservationandsurvivalofthespecies”;112
and,mostimportantly,toimplementtheplan.
Toviolateanyoftheseprohibitionsorrequirementsistoviolatethelaw.Soitwould
seemasthoughtheSecretarywouldviolatethelawiftheyfailedtoincludeinalisted
species’recoveryplananymanagementactionthattheydeemedtobenecessaryto
conservethespecies,oriftheyfailedtoundertakesuchactionsoncetheplanwasinplace.
Thisconclusionisslightlytroubledbythefactthataccordingtocaselaw,recovery
plansdonotcarrytheforceoflaw.MichaelDeIulisobservesthatwhentheSecretaryhas
beensuedfornotundertakingamanagementactionthatispartofarecoveryplan,orfor
undertakingonethatisnot,thecourtshaveroutinelysidedwiththeSecretaryratherthan
theplaintiffs.113Forinstance,in1985,theU.S.FishandWildlifeService(FWS,theagencyof
theDept.oftheInteriorusuallychargedwithcarryingouttheSecretary’sresponsibilities
visavisspeciesatrisk)decidedtobringallfiveorsixoftheremainingwildCalifornia
condorsintocaptivity,despitethefactthataccordingtothecondor’srecoveryplan,
maintainingbothcaptiveandwildpopulationswasessentialtothespecies’persistence.In
thatcase,asinothersimilarcases,thecourtheldthattheSecretarywasnotinviolationof
theESA.
ThecourtexplainedthatthiswasbecausetheFWShadgivenreasons—relatedto
thegoalofpreventingthespecies’extinction—fornotmaintainingawildpopulationof
condors.Inbrief,FWSopinedthatinlightofunexpectedlossesofandriskstothewild
birds,itwouldbemoreeffectivetobringallofthebirdsintocaptivitythantoleavesomeof
theminthewild,perhapstoperishthere.Thedivergencefromtherecoveryplanthuswas
not“arbitraryorcapricious”withrespecttoconservingthespecies.
ThecaselawshowsthattheSecretary,viatheiragencies,hasdiscretionwhenit
comestowhichmanagementactionsarenecessaryforpreventingextinction,andthatthey
canchangetheirjudgementaboutwhetheraparticularactionisnecessary.Thecaselaw
11216U.S.C.§1533.113DeIulis,“WhenSquirrelsFly.”
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hasnotdeterminedthattheSecretaryhasdiscretionaboutwhethertoimplementa
managementactionwhichtheydojudgetobenecessary.Boththeletterofthelawandthe
waythecourtshavejustifieddivergencefromplansgivegoodreasontothinkthatfailure
toimplementanecessarymeasurewouldamounttoaviolationoftheESAandthereforea
breachofadutyoffidelitytothepublicwhoserepresentativeswrotethelaw.
Law-baseddutiesoffidelityinthenorthernspottedowlrecoverypredicament
AccordingtotheRevisedRecoveryPlanforthenorthernspottedowl,theFWSisconvinced
thatspottedowlswillnotrecoveraslongastheyarecompetingforhabitatwithbarred
owls,andthat“giventherapidityandseverityoftheincreasingthreatfrombarredowls,
barredowlremovalshouldbeinitiatedassoonaspossibleintheformofwell-designed
removalexperiments.”114ItisreasonabletothinkthataslongasthisremainsFWS’s
position,failingtodotheremovalexperimentswillconstituteaviolationoflaw.Itwill
thereforeamounttoabreachoffidelityonthepartoftheFWS,oftheDepartmentof
InteriorofwhichFWSisanagency,andoftheSecretaryoftheInteriorwhoisultimately
responsibleforthedepartment.Theseagentsareamongthosewhobreachdutiesof
maleficencetobarredowlsbymandatingtheexperiments.
Law-baseddutiesoffidelityintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament
ThethreepopulationsinourrecoverypredicamentwerelistedunderESAasendangered
in2004,whentheyfacedfiftypercentchancesofgoingextinctwithinadecade.Buta
recoveryplanforthemwasnotpublisheduntil2015,yearsaftertheclosureofthecaptive
breedingprogram,theremovalofgoldeneagles,andthekillingofpigs,elkanddeer.Well
before2015,however,theNationalParkService(NPS),anagencyoftheDepartmentof
Interior,ledarecoveryteamof“publicagencyrepresentatives,landowners,conservancies,
zoologicalinstitutions,non-profits,andacademicsconcernedaboutconservationefforts
fortheislandfox.”Thisteamdeterminedwhichmanagementactionswerenecessaryto
conservethepopulationsandimplementedthoseactions.Theyjudgedthatthefox
populationswouldnotsurviveunlesstheywerebroughtintocaptivityandbredthere,
114USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO,III-65.
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unlessgoldeneagleswereremovedfromtheislands,andunlesstheferalpigsthat
attractedthoseeagleswerealsoremoved(thekillingofelkanddeer,thoughalsothought
essential,wasnotthegroup’sresponsibility).Thoughtheydeemedthesemeasurestobe
necessaryforrecovery,thiswasnotsetforthinanactualrecoveryplan,soitisnotclear
whethertheSecretaryoftheInteriorwouldhavebeeninviolationoftheESAhadtheNPS
anditspartnersnotstartedacaptivebreedingprogram,killedthepigs,orremovedthe
eagles.Therefore,itisnotclearwhethersuchomissionswouldcountasbreachesof
Rossiandutiesoffidelity.
Dutiesoffidelityatstakeinourowlrecoverypredicament,andpossiblyinthe
islandfoxpredicament,canexplainpartofwhatwouldmaketheextinctioncourseof
actionwrong,fromaRossianperspective.Itisanotherquestionwhethertheycanhelp
explainwhatmakesitseriously,ortragically,wrong.Forabreachofthedutyoffidelityto
beseriouslywrong,itmustbeserious.AsIstipulatedinsection2.1(Seriouswrongs),a
breachoffidelity,orpromise-breaking,isseriousifitsignificantlydiminishesthe
promisee’strust.SothebreachesoffidelitythattheSecretaryoftheInteriorwouldhave
committedhadtheFWSorNPSnotundertakenrecoverywouldhavebeenseriousifthey
wouldhavesignificantlydamagedthepublic’strustintheSecretary(orintheagencies
theyrepresent).
Itmightbethatatrendofsuchbreachescouldsignificantlydamagepublictrust.But
itishardertosaywhetheroneorafewsuchbreacheswoulddoso.
Dutiesoffidelitybasedincontract
Whilesomeagentsmightbebounddirectlybylawtoundertakethemanagementmeasures
inRecovery,othersmightbeboundbycontractualorprofessionalobligationtodoso.By
signingontoacertainjobdescription,orbyfulfillingacertaininstitutionalrole,some
employeesoftheFWSorNPS,forinstance,mightexplicitlyorimplicitlypromisetoleador
tohelpcarryoutthemanagementmeasuresnecessaryforRecovery.Whenthesemeasures
involvewrongingindividualanimals,theemployeeswouldfaceamoralconflictnotonly
becausewhatevertheydowillharmindividualanimals,butalsobecausetheywillbreacha
dutyoffidelitytotheiremployeriftheyrefusetotakethemeasures.
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Summary
Ross’sdeontologyhasroomtoacknowledgerecoverypredicamentsastragicmoral
conflicts,asbothofourcasesoftherecoverypredicamentshow.Inthem,eachcourseof
action—recoveryandextinction—involvesseriousmoralwrongdoingbecauseitbreaches
seriousdutiesofnon-maleficencebyirreparablyharmingindividualanimals.These
harms—andtheseriouswrongstheyconstitute—areattributabletothepeoplecharged
withcarryingoutrecovery,totheorganizationsandinstitutionsundertheauspicesof
whichtheydoit,andtothegovernmentthatmandatesit.
Acasecanalsobemadethattheextinctioncourseofactioninvolveswrongdoingof
adifferentsort.Hadtheextinctioncoursenotbeentaken,theFWS,perhapstheNPS,the
DepartmentoftheInteriorofwhichtheyareagencies,andthesecretarywhobears
responsibilityforthedepartmentwouldhavebreachedadutyoffidelitytothepublicby
violatingalawthatarguablyrequiresthemtotakethemanagementactionstheydeemto
benecessaryforpreventingtheextinctionofanimperiledspecies.Someemployeesofthe
department,orofotherorganizationsinvolvedinrecoveringspeciesatrisk,mightalso
havebreacheddutiesoffidelityhadtheyrefusedtoparticipateinthemanagement
measuresessentialtotherecoverycourseofaction.Itisnotclearwhetherthesebreaches
ofthedutyoffidelity,basedinlawsorcontractandlimitedtospecificpersonsorstate
agencies,wouldbeserious.Soitisnotclearwhethertheywouldconstituteseriousmoral
wrongdoing.However,theywouldsurelyaddweighttosomepeoples’primafaciedutiesto
takepartintherecoverycourseofaction.
4.Conclusion
Ross’sdeontologycanmakesenseofmoralconflictsbecauseithasroomforthenotions
thattoviolatesomeoneiswrongregardlessofwhetheritviolatesanallthingsconsidered
duty,thatseriousviolationsareseriouslywrong,andthattherearesituationsinwhich
whateveronedoesmightirreparablyviolatesomeone.Itcanmakesenseofrecovery
predicamentsastragicmoralconflictsbecauseinthem,itispossiblethateachofthe
possiblecoursesofactionmightseriouslyviolatesomeone.Inthefoxandowl
predicaments,forinstance,eachcourseofactionseriouslyviolatesmanysomeones.
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ChapterThree:Kant’sDeontology
Unlikesomelaterphilosophers,amongthemtheutilitarians,ImmanuelKantdoesnot
attendtoconflictinasustainedway.Soweneedtoexcavatetheaccountofconflictthatlies
buriedinKant’stexts.ThemostpromisingplacetobegindiggingisinTheMetaphysicsof
Morals,wheretheprincipleofpracticalreasonthatKanthadpreviouslyestablishedinthe
GroundworkandsecondCritiqueisworkedoutatalessabstractlevel,thatis,inawaythat
conceivesoftheprincipleasitisappliedtoitsobjects—humanbeings.Thisresultsina
systemofmorespecificethicaldutiesthatpeoplebeartothemselvesandtoothers.If
conflictcanbeaccommodatedanywhereinKant’smoraltheory,itwillbehere,where
multipledutiesaresupposedtonecessitateandconstrainthevariousendspeopleseekto
realizeinaction,inanempiricalworldinwhichthingsarenotnecessarilyasthey“ought”
tobe.
Friendsofconflictclaimthatthereisnopossibilityofmoralconflicttobefound
withinKant’sethicaltheory.AccordingtoBernardWilliams,forinstance,Kant’sethics
exemplifieswhathecalls“morality,”invirtueofconflatingpracticalnecessity,obligation,
andethicalconsiderations.Becausewithinmorality,allethicalconsiderationsboildownto
obligations,becauseobligationsexpresspracticalnecessity,andbecausewhatispractically
necessaryispracticable(oughtimpliescan),moralityhasnoroomforconflict:“morality
resiststhenotionofamoralcost,inthesenseofamoralwrongknowinglycommittedbyan
agentwhoisdoingsomethingthatevenfromamoralpointofviewisbetter:inthatcase,
theywillsay,thewrongcannotultimatelybewrong,thecostcannotreallybeacost.”115
Otherfriendsofconflict,suchasMarthaNussbaumandLisaTessman,similarlydiagnose
Kant’stheoryasincapableofacceptingthattherightactcanbesomehowwrong,andthus
asincapableofacceptingthepossibilityofconflict.TheyagreewithWilliamsthatthisisa
seriousflaw.116Inwhatfollows,IwillexplorewhetherandhowKant’sethicsmightactually
115Williams,“MoralLuck:APostscript,”246.SeealsoEthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy,ch.10.116Nussbaum,FragilityofGoodness,31-32;Tessman,MoralFailure,18-20.
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haveroomfortragicmoralconflict,andwhetheritcanregistertherecoverypredicament
asone.
1.Kant’sSystemofEthicalDuties
1.1Kant’sphilosophicalproject
IntheprefacetoTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantexplainsanddefendshisconceptionof
philosophy,whichconcernsreasoningeneral,notjustinitspracticaluse:“...since
consideredobjectively,therecanbeonlyonehumanreason,therecannotbemany
philosophies;inotherwords,therecanbeonlyonetruesystemofphilosophyfrom
principles...”Thesourceofthissystemis“theunityofthetrueprinciplewhichunifiesthe
wholeofphilosophyintoonesystem.”(MM6:207)117HowKantspellsoutthisprincipleisa
matterofdebate,butitspurpose,itwouldseem,istosecuretheintegrityoftheonehuman
reason—tokeepitunifiedandtoensureitsfreedomfromoutsideforces.
Kantseeshistaskasphilosopherashavingtwoparts.Thefirstistoworkoutthe
“trueprinciple”ineachofthedomainsorfieldsinwhichreasonoperates:nature,freedom,
andart.(CPJ5:198)Thisistheproject—undertakeninhisthreeCritiquesandinthe
GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals—ofdiscoveringtheprinciplesreasonderives
fromitselfindependentlyoftheobjectsaboutwhichwereason.Asoperationsofpure
theoreticalreason,purepracticalreason,andthereflectingpowerofjudgement,theydo
notdependonanythingempirical.
Afterthecriticalprojectcomesthemetaphysicaloneofapplyingthesepureapriori
principlestotheparticularkindsofobjectsorendsthatreasondealswithineachdomain
orfield.Theresultantsecondaryprincipleswillbenumerousandlessabstractthanthose
unearthedinthecriticalproject.Justastheaprioriprinciplesoftheoreticalreason,
practicalreason,andthereflectingpowerofjudgementhavetheirsourceinthe“true
principlewhichunifiesthewholeofreasonintoonesystem,”themultipleprinciplesspecial
toeachdomainorfieldofreasoncanbederivedfromthesupremeprincipleofthatdomain
117IrefertoKant’stextsusingthePrussianAcademypagination,precededbyabbreviationsofthetitlesinEnglish.Theabbreviationsare:GWGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals;LELecturesonEthics;MMTheMetaphysicsofMorals;CPJCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment;CPRCritiqueofPureReason;CPrRCritqueofPracticalReason;RReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason.
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orfield.Thespecialprinciplesarethusrelatedhierarchicallytothepureaprioriprinciple
ofreason,thoughtheircontentalsodependsontheempirical,aposterioricharacteristicsof
thekindsofobjectstowhichthatprincipleisapplied.
Inthepassageinwhichhedeclarestheonenessofreasoningeneral,Kantalso
affirmstheonenessofreasoninthemoralsphere“...themoralistrightlysaysthatthereis
onlyonevirtueandonedoctrineofvirtue,thatis,asinglesystemthatconnectsalldutiesof
virtuebyoneprinciple.”(MM6:207)Theprincipletowhichherefersistheoneworkedout
intheGroundworkandTheCritiqueofPracticalReason.Itistheprincipleofautonomy,in
thesenseofself-legislation;inthepracticalrealm,reason(orwill)maintainsitsintegrity
andfreedomfromoutsideforcesbysubmittingitselftolegislationthatitimposesonitself.
Thislegislationisthemorallaw.
Kantarticulatesthelawinatriadofformulations,eachofwhichexpressesthesingle
principleofmorality,orthecategoricalimperative,asviewedfromslightlydifferentangles.
Theformulationthatismostrelevantforthesubsequentmetaphysicalsystemofethical
dutiesisthefollowing:“Soactthatyouusehumanity,inyourownpersonaswellasinthe
personofanother,alwaysatthesametimeasanend,andnevermerelyasameans.”(GW
4:429)118By“humanity”Kantmeans“arationalnature,”orautonomyofwill.As“anendin
itself,”itisabletosetitsownend,ratherthanmerelytodeterminehowtorealizethisor
thatgivenend.Themorallawrequiresustomakethiscapacitytosetendsitselfan
unconditionalend.Aboveallelsewevalueandsetourselvestobringaboutthroughaction,
wemustvalueandsetourselvestobringaboutgood—orautonomous—willing.The
118Theformulaofhumanitycanbelinkedtotheuniversallawofnatureformulationintwoways.First,itisinvirtueoftheunconditionallyobligatoryendofhumanitythattheimperativetoactonlyonamaximyoucanwilltobeauniversallawofnatureiscategorical(ifhumanitywereadiscretionaryend,theimperativewouldbehypothetical).Second,humanityistheoneendthat,relyingonpracticalreasonalone,wecanwilleveryonetohaveasuniversallaw.Thus,inTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantidentifies“thesupremeprincipleofthedoctrineofvirtue,”asfollows:“actinaccordancewithamaximofendsthatitcanbeauniversallawforeveryonetohave.—Inaccordancewiththisprincipleahumanbeingisanendforhimselfaswellasforothers,anditisnotenoughthatheisnotauthorizedtouseeitherhimselforothersmerelyasmeans(sincehecouldthenstillbeindifferenttothem);itisinitselfhisdutytomakethehumanbeingassuchhisend”(MM6:395).Together,theformulaofhumanityandthelawofnatureformationcanbringustotheformulationofthekingdomofends.Whereasthelawofnatureformulahighlightstheformofthecategoricalimperative,andtheformulationofhumanityhighlightsitscontent,theformulationofthekingdomofendshighlightstheircombination.
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legitimacyofanyotherendwilldependonitsadoptionbeingconsistentwiththis
commitment.
Toputitinasomewhatdifferentway,thefundamentalprincipleofmorality
commandsustovaluehumanityashavingdignity,thatis“anunconditionaland
incomparableworth,”“aworththathasnoprice,noequivalentforwhich[thatwhichbears
it]couldbeexchanged.”(MM6:462)Respectingitsdignitymeansneversubordinatingitto
somethingthevalueofwhichisconditionalonsubjective(empirical)valuation.
Insum,the“oneprinciple”ofreasoninthepracticalrealmistheprincipleof
autonomy,whichamountstothewillfollowingalawofitsownmaking.Thelawin
questioncommandsthewilltoactoutofanoverridingcommitmenttothecapacityto
followsuchalaw.Itissupposedtobetheprincipleof“apuremoralphilosophy,completely
cleansedofeverythingthatmightbeinsomewayempiricalandbelongstoanthropology.”
(GW4:389)Asanoperationofpurereason,themorallawisvalidforanyrationalbeing—
whetherhumanorholy—justinvirtueoftheirrationality.
1.2Ethicaldutiesingeneral
InTheMetaphysicsofMoralsKantbeginstoapplyhisaprioriprincipleofpracticalreason
tothekindsofobjectsthisreasondealswithinpeople’slivedexperience,resultingina
numberofdutiesthataremorespecificthantheoriginalcategoricalimperative,butthat
inherititsobjectivenecessity.
TheMetaphysicsofMoralshastwoparts,whichdevelopdistinctbutoverlapping
systemsofduties.TheDoctrineofRightdealswithdutiesofexternalfreedom,orduties
whichonecanbecompelledtoobeybyapublicauthority.Thesedutiesamounttojuridical
laws,andtheirpointistoensurethateachpersonhasasmuchfreedomtopursuetheir
endsasisconsistentwitheveryoneelse’sequalfreedom.Fulfilmentofsuchdutiesconsists
merelyinperformingoromittingtherequiredorproscribedbehaviors,nomatterwhat
motivatesonetodoso.Thoughtheexistenceoftheseduties(whichdependsonwhether
oneiswithinthejurisdictionofalegitimatepublicauthority)givesrisetoethicaldutiesto
fulfillthemnotjustfromanymotivationbutfromthemotivationofduty,dutiesofrightare
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fundamentallypolitical,notethical.Imentionthemmainlyinordertosetthemasidesoas
tofocusonfundamentallyethicalduties,ordutiesofvirtue.
EthicaldutiesaresystematizedintheDoctrineofVirtue(DV),thepartofThe
MetaphysicsofMoralsthatpicksupdirectlyfromwherethemoralpartofKant’scritical
projectleavesoff.DVspellsoutdutiesofinternalfreedom,ordutiesthatcannotbe
imposedonapersonbyanyonebutthemselves.Atbase,thesearedutiestotakeupcertain
ends.Theyoriginateinthesupremedutytomakehumanityone’send,which,asaprinciple
ofpurepracticalreasonunmixedwithempiricalconsiderations,offerslittleguidancefor
ourspecificchoicesabouthowtoliveandwhattodo.Itleavesopenwhatitmeansto
respectthedignityofrationalnatureinthecontextofanactualhumanlife.
Whatitmeansisspelledoutinanumberofmoresubstantiveethicaldutiesthatresult
whenthesupremeprincipleisappliedto“theparticularnatureofhumanbeings,whichcan
becognizedonlybyexperience.”(MM6:217)Kantthinksexperienceteachesusthatweare
animalswhoaremoral,andwhohaveimperfectwills.Itakeitthatatleastpartofwhatthis
meansisthatweareembodied,sensible,andfinite.Soforus,themotiveofduty,orrespect
forthemorallaw,isonlyoneoftwotypesofmotiveforchoice.Theotherisnatural
inclination,whichKantalsocalls“sensibleimpulse.”Thisisa“forcethatstrivesonly
toward[thesubject’sown]happiness.”(MM6:481)AsKantunderstandsit,happiness
encompassesallsortsofendsandpurposeswhichvaryfromsubjecttosubjectandwithin
asubjectovertime;apersonishappytotheextentthattheendstheynaturallydesireare
realized.Ourtwotypesofmotivescanpullusinoppositedirections,andevenwhenwe
haveresolvedtoactmorally,wesometimeschoosetoallowcompetingmotivationsto
guideouractionsinstead.Inotherwords,wecansubordinatetheobligatoryendof
humanitytoarbitraryends(incontrast,holyormorallyperfectbeingsareincapableof
beingtemptedtosubordinatethenecessaryendofrationalnaturetootherends;their
“maximnecessarilyharmonizeswiththelawofautonomy,”andsoforthemthemorallaw
nevercomesacrossasaconstraint).(GW4:440)Achievingandmaintainingthestrengthof
willtochoosemorallyeveninthefaceofopposingmotivations—astrengthKantidentifies
asvirtue—isalifelongtaskforhumanpracticalreasoners.
Soistheprotectionandcultivationofourphysical,cognitive,andemotionalcapacities.
Withoutthese,andwithouthelpfromotherpeople,wecanrealizeneitherourmorally
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obligatorynorourmorallypermissibleends.AsOnoraO’Neillexpressesit,“becausehuman
agentshavefragileandundevelopedabilitiesandarealways,andoftenintensely,
physicallyandmentallyvulnerabletooneanother,theymust,iftheyaretoensurethat
moralactionhasareliableplaceintheirworld,sustainhumanabilitiesbydevelopingtheir
owncapacitiesforaction(talents)andsupportingoneanother’spursuitof(permissible)
ends.”119
Inlightofhumanbeings’originalcombinationofcapacities,limitations,andneeds,the
dutytorespectthedignityofhumanityofoneselfandothersimpliestwomorespecific
unconditionalends:otherpeople’shappinessandone’sownperfection.Theyarepartofa
nestedsystemofduties;adoptingthemispartofwhatitmeanstoadopthumanityasan
end,andtheyinturnimplyfurtherevenmorespecificduties.Itcannotbeoverstressedthat
asinternalduties,ethicaldutiesarenotdutiestoperformortorefrainfromperforming
thisorthatexternalaction.Theyaredutiesregardingthesubjectiveprinciplesaccordingto
whichwechoosetoperformorrefrainfromactions:“EthicsDoesNotGiveLawsforActions
...butOnlyforMaximsofActions.”(MM6:389).
1.3Maxims
Kantsaysthatamaximisa“subjectiveprincipleofvolition.”Toclarifythis,letuslookat
therelationbetweenobjectiveprinciplesandmaxims.Anobjectiveprincipleisonethat
appliestoallrationalbeings,invirtueofbeingrational.Thecategoricalimperativeisan
objectiveprinciple.Itstipulatestheconditionofreason’sautonomyinthepracticalrealm.
Theconditionisthatpracticalreasonitselfhaslexicalpriorityoverothermotivesfor
action.Thisisanotherwayofsayingthathumanity,orrationalnature,mustalwaysbean
endandneverjustameans.
Theobjectiveprincipleprovidesthestandardforthesubjectiveprinciples,or
maxims,accordingtowhichaparticularhumanbeinginfactdoesact,atleastwhenthey
are(orcanbeconsideredtobe)actingfreely.Whereasthefundamentalobjectiveprinciple
istheproductofwhatKantcallsWille,orpurepracticalreason(andotherobjective
principlesareproductsofWilleappliedtohumannatureingeneral),amaximisthe
119O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”219.
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productofWillkür,orthepowerofchoice;aslongasanagentactsvoluntarily,itisupto
themwhattheultimateendoftheiractionis,andthuswhetheritmeetsthestandardsetby
purepracticalreason.Soaperson’smaximsreflecttheirultimateendsandthewaythey
orderthem,whetherornottheydosointhewaythecategoricalimperativecommands.As
Timmermanputsit,“inKant'sphilosophyofaction,maximsarethefreelychosen
subjectiveprinciplesordeeperintentionsofallofourconsciousactions.Theyarethus
expressiveofthestancewetaketowardsourincentives.”120
AmongKantians,thereissomedisputeaboutwhichkindsofpracticalchoices
expressmaxims.IfollowTimmermanandothersintakingmaximstoworkatmultiple
levels,whichcorrespondtothehierarchyofethicalduties.121Atthelowestlevelthereare
whatLoudencalls“specificintentionsfordiscreteacts,”andatintermediatelevelsthere
aresecondordermaximsthatexpresshowweprioritizeourends,incentives,or
motives.122Theseprinciplescanconveytheresolutions,suchaspersonalpoliciesorlife
rules,towhichapersonconsciouslycommitsasguidesfortheirlowerlevelmaxims.The
intermediatemaximscanalsoidentifythewayapersonactuallyhasprioritizedtheirends
ormotives,whichmightdivergefromhowtheyhaveresolvedtoprioritizethem.Atthe
highestlevelshouldbeamaximthatmirrorsthecategoricalimperative:fromrespectfor
thedignityofrationalnature,Iwillgiveitprecedenceoverdiscretionaryends.Lowestlevel
maximsareinfluencedbyintermediatemaxims,whichareinfluencedbythehighestone.
Becausemaximsuniteactiontypeswithmotives,twooutwardlyidenticalactscan
bedonefromdifferentmaxims,andsooneoftheactsmighttransgressethicaldutywhile
theotherdoesnot.ItisnotuncommontothinkthatKant’sethicsstrictlyforbidsthe
externalactofkillingoneself.However,thedutynottocommitsuicideismostaptly
understoodasaprohibitionagainst“disposingofoneselfasameremeanstosome
discretionaryend.”(MM6:423,emphasisadded)Thisrulesoutchoosingtotakeone’slife
fromanincentiveofself-interest,butitleavesopenthepermissibilityoftakingone’slife
120Timmerman,“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims,”39.121Timmerman“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims.”SeealsoLouden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics”andCuretonandHill,“KantonVirtue.”122Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”481;Timmerman,“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims.”
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outofrespectforrationalnature,eitherinoneselforinotherpeople.Kantsignalsthis
opennessinthe“casuisticalquestions”heappendstohisexplanationofourdifferent
ethicalduties.Forinstance,heasksbutnotablydoesnotanswerwhetheritisever
permissibletosacrificeone’slifeforallofhumanity,orwhenonefeelstheonsetof
incurablemadnessandfearsthatonewillcauseharmtoothersoncetheillnessinevitably
escalates.(MM6:423–424)
1.4Thesystemofethicalduties
Ihavesaidthat“lawsforthemaximsofactions”containedinKant’ssystemofethical
dutiesarerelatedhierarchically.Withinthisstructuretherearenegativedutiesand
positiveduties.
Negativeduties
Negativedutiesforbidmaximsthatopposeanobligatoryend.Aprominentsetofnegative
dutiestoothersareunitedunderthedutyofrespect,which“iscontainedinthemaximnot
todegradeanyotherasameremeanstomyends...”(MM6:450)Thelowerlevelmaxims
ruledoutbythisdutyareonesthatexpressafailuretorecognizethedignity,or
unconditionalandincomparableworth,ofotherpeopleasrationalbeings.Maximsof
publiclymockingsomeone,orexposingtheirfaultsandwrongdoingina“wanton”way,or
“withnoparticularaim”(MM6:466–467)areamongthoseproscribedbyrespectfor
others.Itisimportanttoemphasizethatsuchdutiesdonotforbidmakingfunofsomeone
orpublicizingtheirmisconduct.Theyforbiddoingthesekindsofthingswithoutagood
moralreason.Negativedutiestoothersalsoincludedutiesnottoactfrommaximsthat
opposepositivedutiesoflove,whichwillbeexplainedbelow.
Negativedutiestooneselfproscribetreatingoneselfasameremeanstoanother’s
ends,oreventoone’sownnon-moralends.Theystrictlylimitmaximsofdiminishingor
destroyingthephysical,intellectual,emotional,andmoralcapacitiesthatmakeitpossible
foronetosetandpursueends,andthustobehumaninKant’ssenseoftheterm.The
previouslydiscussedprohibitionon“disposingoneselfasameremeanstoadiscretionary
end”exemplifiesthekindofmaximproscribedbythesedutiesto“preserveoneselfinthe
perfectionofone’snature.”(MM6:423,6:419)Mutilatingoneself,anddiminishingone’s
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moralcharacter—e.g.byhabituatingoneselftoprivilegenaturaldesireoverreasonorby
stuntingone’smorallysignificantemotionsinordertoachieveanon-moralend—provide
otherexamples.
Negativedutiesdoprohibitabsolutely,butwhattheyprohibitabsolutelyisdoing
certainkindsofthingsfornon-moralreasons.However,itisnotalwayseasy,oreven
possible,forapersontoknowwhattheirultimatemotivationis,especiallywhenmoraland
non-moralmotivespointinthesamedirection.Forinstance,apersoncouldbelievethat
theyaremovedtoendtheirlifebyrespectforthehumanityofthosetheywillsavebydoing
so,wheninfactaself-interesteddesiretohavethelegacyofaherodrivestheirchoice.The
opacityofourownmotivesandourpenchantforself-deceptionareprobablythefeatures
ofhumannaturethatlieatthebasisof“thefirstcommandofalldutiestooneself”whichis:
“know(scrutinize,fathom)yourself...Thatis,knowyourheart.”(MM6:441)Thatpeople
aresusceptibletonotknowingtheirhearts,especiallywhenitisintheirinterestnotto,
shouldmeanthatalthoughnegativeethicaldutiesdonotabsolutelyprohibitthetypesof
externalactionthatcannotbedonefornon-moralreasons,thereisaverystrong
presumptionagainstchoosingtodoanactionofthesetypes.123
Anotherreasonforthepresumptionagainsttakingsuchactionsisthatitdoesnot
seemasthoughKantthinksthatjustanymoralmotivationsufficestomakepermissiblethe
maximofaproblematictypeofaction.Yethistheorygivesnorulesforascertainingwhen
moralreasonsleaveuptoourjudgementwhether,say,beinggenuinelymovedbythe
dutiesofgratitudeandbeneficencemakesitpermissibletodonatepartofone’slivertoa
parentwhoseliverisfailing,oreventosellanon-vitalorganinordertopaythefees
requiredtogettheparentoutofademeaningcircumstance.Therearestrong
presumptionsagainstperformingtheseactions,butthetheorycannotspecifyhowstronga
moralreasonmustbeinordertotrumpit.
Positiveduties
Aftertheratherabstractpositivedutytomakethehumanityofotherpeopleanend,the
nexthighestpositivedutytoothersistoadoptamaximofbenevolence,thatis,“tomake
123Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”andDenis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals.”
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other’sendsmyown(providedonlythattheyarenotimmoral).”(MM6:450)Amongthe
intermediatemaximsthisdutyimpliesisamaximofbeneficence,whichisthe
determination“topromoteaccordingtoone’smeansthehappinessofothersinneed”(MM
6:453)Italsoimpliesmaximsofgratitudeandsympathy,whicharecommitmentstohonor
andbenefitone’sbenefactors,andtocultivateone’scapacityforcompassionatefeeling.
Kantcallsthesepositivedutiestoothersdutiesoflove.Theendofother’shappinessalso
impliesnegativeduties,whichforbidmaximsopposedtolove.Actingonaprincipleof
malice,envy,oringratitude,forinstance,wouldviolatethisduty.
Positivedutiestooneselfarebasedinthedictum“makeyourselfmoreperfectthan
merenaturehasmadeyou.”(MM6:420)Thus,peoplearetomakeenduringcommitments
tocultivate(asopposedtosimplypreserve)thecapacitiesthatenablethemtoact
accordingtoprinciples,tobepracticallyrational,tobemoral,andsotobefree.
Positivedutiesarelessdeterminatethannegativeduties.Thoughtheydorequire
certainkindsofintermediatemaxims—e.g.resolutionstoputhelpingothersand
developingyourowncapacitiesabovethepursuitofnon-obligatoryends—theydonot
specifyexactlywhatyourlowerlevelmaximsshouldcontain;thereareallsortsofwaysin
whichyoucandevelopyourcapacities,orcontributetoothers’well-being,andthewaysin
whichyoudothesethingsareuptoyou:“...forifthelawcanprescribeonlymaximsof
actions,notactionsthemselves,thisisasignthatitleavesaplayroom(latitudo)forfree
choiceinfollowing(complyingwith)thelaw,thatis,thatthelawcannotspecifyprecisely
inwhatwayoneistoactandhowmuchoneistodobytheactionforanendthatisalsoa
duty”(MM6:390)
ThelinchpinofKant’ssystemofduties
InTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantwritesthat“thehighestunconditionalendofpure
practicalreasonisthatvirtuebeitsownend.”(MM6:397)ThatKantseemstobeofferinga
re-statementofthecategoricalimperativeheremightindicatethatheequates“virtue”with
“rationalnature.”Buthedoesnot.Kantconceivesofvirtueas“themoralstrengthofa
humanbeing’swillinfulfillinghisduty”(MM6:405).Sovirtueisnotsomuchthebare
capacitytoactfromthemotiveofduty,asitistherobustnessofaperson’sdispositionto
actuallydoso,eveninthefaceofcountervailingnaturalinclinations.Ithinkthatthe
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commandthatvirtuebeitsownendisthereforeanapplicationofthecategorical
imperativetothepeculiarlyhumancondition.Ournegativeandpositivedutiestoourselves
tohavemaximsofprotectinganddevelopingourmoralcharactershouldthereforebeseen
totakesomeprecedenceoverotherduties,becausewithoutstrengthofwill,wewouldnot
beablereliablytodoanyduties.AsRobertLoudenwrites,“withoutdutiestooneself,no
dutieswhatsoever,”andso“thedutytodevelopone’smoralcharacteristhelinchpinof
Kant’sentiresystemofduties.”124
Thesystemofdutiesisnotadecisionprocedure
Inrequiringandproscribingmaxims,Kant’ssystemofethicaldutiesprovidesguidelines
forformulatingtheintermediateprinciplesbywhichwewanttolive,(whichinturn
influence—orshouldinfluence—ourmaximsforparticularactions).Butitdoesnotfurnish
adecisionprocedurewecanusetodeterminewhat,ethically,weoughttodoinanyand
everycircumstance.125AsO’Neillargues,thesystemofdutiesfurnishesinsteadasetof
desiderataordemands,whichapersonmustinventawayoffulfilling.Sheillustratesthis
byanalogyto“theequallypracticaljudgementofthedesigner,craftsperson,orpoet,who
hastodiscoverorfindsomewayofmakingthatsatisfiesmultipledemands.Imaginethat
youhavetodesignawheelbarrow.Ithastorollsmoothly,tobelightenoughevenfor
feeblegardeners,tobedurableenoughforroughuse,andtobemadeofavailableand
affordablematerials...themultiplicityofdemands...constrainsandtherebyshapesthe
activitiesofthosewhomakewheelbarrows.”126Likewise,theconstellationoffundamental
andspecialdutiesthatapersonhasincorporatedintotheirintermediatemaxims
constrainsandshapes,butdoesnotdetermine,howtheyshouldliveandwhattheyshould
do.
124Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”483.125SeeGuyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”Louden“Kant’sVirtueEthics”,cf.Herman,“ObligationandPerformance.”126O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”343.
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2.MoralConflictswithinKant’sEthics
Ihavecharacterizedmoralconflictsinthreeways,whichIhavetakentobeequivalent:as
situationsinwhichallofaperson’savailablealternativesinvolvedoingsomethingthat
theyoughtnottodo(andnotdoingsomethingthatoneoughttodoisonewayofdoing
somethingthatoneoughtnottodo);assituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillwarrant
moralregretontheirpart;andassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbewrongin
someway.OnKant’stheoryasontheothersIamconsidering,atleastonewaytodowrong
istoviolateaduty.127
KantbrieflyaddressestheissueofconflictsofdutyintheintroductiontoThe
MetaphysicsofMorals.Itwillhelpourenquirytobreakthispassageintotwoparts.
FirstPart
Aconflictofduties(collisioofficiorum,s[ive]obligationum)wouldbethatrelationbetweenthembyvirtueofwhichoneofthemwouldinvalidatetheother(whollyorinpart).Butsincedutyandobligationareconceptsthatexpresstheobjectivepracticalnecessityofcertainactions,andtworulesopposedtoeachothercannotbothbenecessaryatthesametime—ratherifitisone’sdutytoactaccordingtooneofthem,toactaccordingtotheoppositeoneisnotonlynoduty,butevencontrarytoduty—acollisionofdutiesandobligationsisnotevenconceivable(obligationesnoncolliduntur).(MM6:224)
SecondPart
However,twogroundsofobligation(rationesobligandi),oneortheotherofwhichdoesnotsufficetoobligate(rationesobligandinonobligantes),canbecombinedinasubjectandtheruleheprescribestohimself,butinthatcaseoneofthemisnothisduty.Whentwosuchgroundsconflictwitheachother,practicalphilosophysays,notthatthestrongerobligationtakesprecedence(fortiorobligatiovincit),butthatthestrongergroundofobligationprevails(fortiorobligandiratiovincit).(MM6:224)
Asawhole,thepassageseemstobaronewayofaccountingforconflictwhilepossibly
leavinganotheropen.Inthefirstpartofthepassage,Kantclearlydeniesthatdutiescan
127InTheMetaphysicsofMorals,itisarguablethatKantdoesnotusewrongasasynonymofoughtnot,butasaspeciesofit.Whileoughtnotcoversallviolationsofduty,forthemostpartKantreserveswrongforviolationsofdutiesofright,orjuridicalduties.ItcouldbearguedthatforKanttherearenoethicalwrongs,onlylegal-politicalones.Ithinkthisisasemanticissue,notasubstantiveone.
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conflict.Hearguesfromtheconceptofadutytotheabsurdityofconflict:ifduties
conflicted,onewouldcanceltheotherout;butdutiesarenotthekindsofthingthatcanbe
cancelledout,becausetheyexpressobjectivenecessity;sodutiescannotconflict.
2.1Conflictsofduty
Inthefirstpartofthepassage,Kantseemsatleasttoruleoutinconsistenciesamonghigher
levelobjectiveprinciples.Thebestevidenceforthisisthatherejectsthepossibilityof
opposingrules.Aswehaveseen,Kant’sethicaltheorydoesnotfurnishprescriptionsfor
specificacts;objectiveprinciplescannotgodownthatfar,andiftheydiditwouldbe
strangetocallthemrules,becauserulesaregeneral,notparticular.Itthereforemakes
sensetointerpretthepassageasassertingthatgeneralethicalprinciplescannotcontradict
eachother.Forinstance,atheorycannotincludeaprincipleofmakingothers’happinessan
end,andaprincipleoftakingrevengeonone’senemies.Or,touseanexampleof
Timmerman’s,itcannotrequireusunconditionallytosupportthoseinneed,andalso
requireusnevertointerfereinother’slives.128
Unsurprisingly,theethicalsystemKantelaboratesinTheMetaphysicsofMoralsdoes
notincludeopposingduties.Noneoftheendsitrequiresustoadopt,orthekindsof
maximsitrulesoutasantitheticaltothoseends,contradictsanyoftheothers(e.g.a
commitmenttobeneficencedoesnotdirectlyopposeacommitmenttoself-perfection,and
neithercommitmentisintrinsicallyinconsistentwithprohibitionsonservility,contempt,
ordeceitfulness).Thisisnotaccidentaloradhoc.Ourethicaldutiesareallpartof,andare
organizedbyasingleself-consistentprincipleofrespectforrationalnature.
Ifnothingelse,thefirstpartofKant’sconflictpassageimposesaconsistency
constraintonduties,whichhissystemofethicaldutieseasilymeets.Aswesawinthe
introductorychapter,aconsistencyconstraintisuncontroversial,evenamongfriendsof
conflict.Forinstance,inarguingforthepossibilityofmoralconflict,Williamsdiscardsas
uninteresting“thepossibility(ifitexists)thatamanshouldholdmoralprinciplesor
generalmoralviewswhichareintrinsicallyinconsistentwithoneanother.”129Whatis
128Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”42.129Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”171.
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interestingiswhetherornotatheoryrulesoutaccidentalconflictsatthelevelofdiscrete
choices.Isiteverpossiblethat,say,onecannotfulfillthedutyofbeneficencewithout
transgressingthedutyofself-perfection,orwithoutviolatingtheprohibitionson
deceitfulnessorself-abasement?
WhileKant’spassageonconflictmightnotruletheseout,thenatureofhisethical
dutiesdoes.OnKant’sethicaltheory,thereisonewayinwhichanactcanviolateaduty—
itsmaximsubordinatesanobligatoryendtoanarbitraryone.So,incircumstancesinwhich
anobligatoryendisatstake,ifapersonchoosestoactfromanincentiveofself-interestas
opposedtomorality,theywillhavedonewrong.Anotherwaytoputthiswouldbetosay
thatactsarewronginvirtueofexpressingalackofrespectforrationalnature,andacts
expressrespectordisrespectinvirtueofthesubjectiveprinciplesthatunderliethem.
ForKant’stheorytoallowforconflictatthelevelofparticularchoices,itwouldhave
toallowforthepossibilitythatapersoncouldfindthemselvesinasituationinwhich,
althoughethicalendsareatstake,alloftheactionstheycouldproducewouldbedonefor
thesakeofanarbitraryend.Thetheorydoesnotallowforthispossibility.Aslongasa
humanbeing’srationalnatureisintact,theywillneverbeboundtoactfromaself-
interestedmotiveratherthanamoralone;wheneverrationalnatureisatstake,theycan
actforthesakeofit,andcandosojustbecauseitisobligatory.Indeed,itisapremiseofthe
theorythataperson,quaperson,canalwaysdothis.Theveryconditionofbeingsubjectto
ethicaldutiesisbeingcapableofactingfromamoralmotive,whetherornotone’snatural
desirescoincidewithmorality.Soifsomeonereallyhasnochoicebuttoactonnatural
inclination—iftheysimplycannotactfromaprinciplejustbecausereasonrequiresit—it
willbebecausetheirrationalnatureisnotintact.Inthatcase,theycannotpossibly
transgressaduty,becausedutiesdonotapplytothem.
Itiseasytomissthisifonefocusesmistakenlyontokenexternalactions,decoupled
fromtheirmaxims.Kant’stheorydoesnotruleoutthepossibilitythatapersonmightbe
facedwithachoiceamongoutwardactionsallofwhichtendtobethekindsofacts
expressiveofbadmaxims.Forinstance,theymightnotbeabletoavoidneglectingthe
urgentbutreadilysatisfiableneedsofonepersonandtoavoidneglectingthoseofanother
(e.g.afirstresponderoverwhelmedbymultiplecasualties).Evenmoreproblematically,
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theymightnotbeabletoavoidseriouslyharmingonepersonandtoavoidseriously
harminganother.
YetforKant,anactiondoesnotfulfillortransgressdutiesinvirtueofthekindsof
maximsonwhichactionslikeittendtobedone,butonthemaximsthatactuallyunderlie
thatparticularaction.Ineventhemostdifficultofsituations,apersonwillneverbebound
toactfromanon-moralincentive,orwithalackofrespecteitherforthemselvesorfor
others.Helpingonepersonindistressandnotanotherdoesnothavetomeanthatthe
choicewasmotivatedbyself-interest,orthattheagentdoesnotreallyseethehappinessof
bothpeopleasends.Evenactinginapredicamentinwhichridicule,harm,orlossoflifeare
unavoidableisnotincompatiblewithvaluingeveryhumanbeingasanendinthemselves.
Althoughrepeatedfailurestoactsoastopromoteanobligatoryendindicatethat
onedoesnotactuallyhavethatendorhasnotgivenitpriorityoverarbitraryends,passing
upachancetopromoteoneobligatoryendinordertopromoteanotherisentirely
consistentwithhavingandproperlyprioritizingbothofthem.Similarly,althoughthereisa
verystrongpresumptionagainstthepermissibilityofactionsthattendtobedonefrom
indifferencetoorhatredofobligatoryends,ifsuchanactionischosenoutofacommitment
tosuchends,itneednotviolateanethicalduty.
2.2Conflictsofgroundsofobligation
Whiletherecanbenosituationsinwhichwhateverapersondoeswillviolateanethical
duty,itcanbethecasethatwhatevertheydowillruncountertoagroundofobligation.
ThisisassertedinthesecondpartofKant’sconflictpassage:“twogroundsofobligation
(rationesobligandi),oneortheotherofwhichdoesnotsufficetoobligate(rationes
obligandinonobligantes),canbecombinedinasubjectandtheruleheprescribesto
himself,butinthatcaseoneofthemisnothisduty.”(MM6:224)Becausethepassagedoes
notmakeclearexactlywhatgroundsofobligationare,itraisesbutdoesnotanswerthe
questionofwhatkindofnormativeforceagroundofobligationhas,andwhetherthatforce
cancontinuetoexertitselfevenif,becauseofconflict,itdoesnotsufficetoobligate.
Whatdoesitmeanforasubjecttohavemultiplegroundsofobligationintherulehe
prescribeshimself?Interpretersofthispassageconcurthatthe“ruleheprescribeshimself”
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isthesubject’smaxim.130Theydonotagreeonwhatexactly“groundsofobligations”are.
Timmermanarguesthattheyare“obligatingreasonsthatresultfromcorrectif
inconclusivemoralarguments.”Thepremisesoftheseargumentsarei)ethicalprinciples
orduties,whichshouldbereflectedinaperson’sintermediatemaxims(e.g.helpothersin
needwhenyouhavethemeans)andii)thefactsofaperson’sconcretesituation(e.g.Hilda,
here,needshelpandIcanprovideit).131Thedutytohaveamaximofhelpingothersin
needwhenyoucan,andthefactsthatHildaneedshelpandthatyoucanhelpher,generate
areasontoprovidehelp,agroundofanobligationtohelp.
Therearetwoaspectsofgroundsofobligation,asTimmermanconceivesthem,that
shouldbenoted.First,groundsofobligationcommendmaximsofgeneraltypesofactions,
suchasprovidehelp.Likeobligationsproper,theydonotspecifyexactlywhatyouare
supposedtodoinordertofulfillthem.RecallthatKant’ssystemofdutiesistheresultof
purereasonappliedtohumannatureingeneral,soitcannotpossiblyfurnishempirically
detailedprescriptionsaboutwhattodo.Thus,themaximsofouractionsunitemotives
withactiontypes,notwithmeansforcarryingthemout.
Second,groundsofobligationsdonotnecessarilyobligate.Ifyoulackthemeansto
carryoutthetypeofactsuggestedbyagroundofobligation,youdonothaveanobligation
toperformit.Forinstance,ifprovidingassistanceisphysicallyimpossible(e.g.aswift
flowingriverseparatesyoufromthepersonwhoneedshelp)thenalthoughyoustillhavea
reasontohelpthepersoninneed,youwillnotbeobligedtodoso.
Moreimportantforourdiscussionistheimpossibilitythatresultswhentakingthe
stepsnecessaryforrealizingonegroundofobligationprecludestakingthosenecessaryfor
realizinganother.SayTariqneedsyourassistanceatthesametimeHildadoes.Thiswill
giveyouasecondgroundofobligationtohelp.Ifyouareabletohelpeitheroneofthem,
butlackthematerials,thetime,ortheskilltohelpboth,thenyourtwogroundswill
conflict—notintrinsically,butcontingently.AsTimmermansays“suchconflictsdonot
arisefromanytheoreticalorrationalinconsistencybutbecausetheagentisconsciousof
130O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”andHerman,“ObligationandPerformance.”131SeeHerman,“ObligationandPerformance”foracontrastingview.
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theempiricalcomplexitiesthatarisewhenheenvisagesconcrete,positivestepstoadvance
amorallyrequiredend.”132ToreturntoO’Neill’smakermetaphor,conflictsamonggrounds
ofobligationsoccurwhenthereisnocourseofactionapersoncantakethatwillcoverall
oftheactiontypestheyhavemoralreasonstoperformandavoidallofthosetheyhave
moralreasonsnottoperform.
Insuchcases,Kantsaysoftheincompatiblegroundsofobligationthat“oneofthemis
nothisduty.”Isittherebyeliminated?Thatis,doesfailingtobecomeanactualobligation
necessarilyextinguishitsnormativeforce?Timmermanarguesthatitdoesnot.Essentially,
thisisbecauseoftherelationbetweengroundsofobligationsandobligatoryends.Ifa
personhasagroundofobligation,shehasitinvirtueofbeingunconditionallycommitted
toamorallynecessaryend.Havinganecessaryendentailsnotbeingabletodropitjust
becauseyoucannotactonit.Andhavinganendofanysortentailsbeingmovedtoactonit,
andbeingfrustrated(atleast)whenyoucannot.IfHilda’sandTariq’sdistressgiveyou
groundsofobligationstohelp,thisisbecausebothHildaandTariq,andthehappinessof
eachofthem,andhelpingeachthemachievetheirhappiness,areunqualifiedendsofyours.
NotbeingabletohelpTariqbecauseofanobligationtohelpHildacannotextinguishthe
reasonyouhavetohelphim,becauseitcannotextinguishthesourceofthatreason.As
Timmermanexplains,“groundsofobligationdependontheprecariousavailabilityof
meanstogenerateduties,butunlikethosedutiestheydonotdisappearwhentheycannot
beactedupon.”133
Conflictsamonggroundsofobligationcanbetragic.Havingtheattitudeofrespect
forrationalnaturerequiredbythefundamentalprinciplesmeansvaluingeachandevery
humanbeing,quarationalbeing,ashavingavaluethatisunconditionalandincomparable;
nothingcancompensateforitsloss.ThomasHillobservesthattragicconflictoccurswhen
apersonfacesasituationinwhichthereisnosolutiontotheproblemofproducingan
action—orevenawayoflife—thatwillnothumiliate,diminish,ordestroyahuman
132Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”50.133Ibid.,60.
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being.134Thisdescribesmanypredicamentsinthecontextofwar,unjustinstitutions,and
evenjustbadmoralluck.Wearealreadyfamiliarwithsomeofthese;trolleyproblems,
Sophie’schoice,andAgamemnon’sdilemma.HelgaVardenbringsupanotherexampleof
peoplelivingunderanoppressiveregimehavingtochooseamongpathsofviolent
resistance,passiveresistance,andcompliance.Inallthesecases,eachoptionposesgrave
moralrisks(e.g.killinganotherhumanbeing,beingkilled,degradingoneself).135
Insuchsituations,apersonisnotboundtoviolateaduty,becauseevenintheworst
predicamentsonecannotbeboundtoabandontheattitudeofrespectforhumanity.For
thisreason,Kantianstendtoclaimthatnon-dutyviolatingresponsestoconflictsofgrounds
ofobligationscanwarrantagentregret,butnotremorse.AccordingtoTimmerman,
althoughapersonwhohasactedinresponsetoaconflictofgroundsofobligationmightbe
expectedtofeelregretthat“goesbeyondbeingunhappywiththeunfortunatesituationor
theresultsofmybehavior,”therecanbeno“unavoidableremorseorinevitableself-
reproachwhenanagenthasdonehisduty.”Similarly,BarbaraHermanarguesthat“if
remorseisthecorrectorgoodresponsetosituationsofconflict,wecannotacceptthe
Kantianaccount”(thatdutiesneednotbeviolatedinconflictsituations),whereasagent
regretisnotunwarrantedinherview.136
Hill’stakeontheappropriatenessofemotionalresponsestoconflictismore
interesting,becauseitskirtsthequestionofremorse.Heacknowledgesthefittingnessof
agentregret,writing“theattitudeofpersonalregret,althoughnotinitselfmorally
required,ismorallysignificantinsofarasitisanaturalexpressionofconscientiousagents’
deepandself-identifyingcommitmenttopreserveandrespecthumanityineachperson...
lackingitisasymptomthatonedoesnottakeone’smoralresponsibilityseriously.”137He
alsoclaimsthataslongasaperson’sresponsetoconflictdoesnotviolateduty,guiltis
inappropriate.Hedoesnotmentionthespeciesofagentregretthatisremorse,though.By
134Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”180,and“MakingExceptions.”135Varden,“KantandLying,”417-418.Varden’sexemplarofthisisthepredicamentfacedbypeoplewholivedunderNazioccupationinEurope.136Herman,“ObligationandPerformance,”325.137Hill,“MoralDilemmas.”
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notexplicitlydenyingtheappropriatenessofremorse,Hill’saccountmightleaveroomfor
it.
Thosewhodenythefittingnessofremorseincasesinwhichnodutyhasbeen
violateddonotdosobecauseremorseisinappropriatelyintense.Intragicconflicts
somethingofincalculablevaluehasbeenlost,anditslosscannotbecompensated.Mildor
passingregretwouldindicateafailuretograsptheimmensityandincompensabilityofthe
loss.Remorseisruledoutbecauseitisinappropriatelymoral.Thisispuzzling,becauseon
theKantianview,thelossinquestionismorallysignificant.Itisdifficulttoseehowagent
regretforhavingvoluntarily(albeitreluctantly)destroyedordamagedsomethingofmoral
valueisnotbestunderstoodasakindofmoralregret.
Oneexplanationmightbeanassumptionthatchoicesthatwarrantmoralregretare
coextensivewiththosethatwarrantblame.Onsuchaview,remorsewouldbeanextreme
formofself-blame.Itwouldnotbewarrantedbythosewhohaveactedwithgoodwillin
tragicconflicts,becauseonlyviolationsofdutyareblameworthy.Thiscouldaccountfor
whysomeonemightdiscussguiltbutnotremorseasresponsestotragicconflict,asHill
does.Theymightconflateguilt—whichisoftenassociatedwithrule-breakingandsowith
blameworthiness—withremorse.
2.3Twomoralstandards:thecategoricalimperativeandthehighestgood
Anotherexplanationisanexcessivelynarrowfocusononeoftwomoralstandardsatwork
inKant’sethics.Thefirstmoralstandardisthatgivenbythecategoricalimperativeandis
moralinthestrictestsense.Itappliesatthelevelofthemaximsofouractions.Thesecond
standard,whichisoftenoverlookedindiscussionsofconflictinKant,istheidealofthe
highestgood.Thehighestgoodappliesatthelessrarifiedleveloftheoutcomesofactions
originatinginmaximsthatmeetthefirststandard.Itisbroaderthanthecategorical
imperative,butisnonethelessmoral:itproceedsfromthemorallaw;itisthetouchstone
foramoralworld;anditanswersanessentialinterestofpurepracticalreason,whichfor
Kantismorality.Inwhatfollows,IhewcloselytotheaccountofKant’sconceptionofthe
highestgoodthatPaulineKleingeldpresentsin“Kanton‘Good,’theGood,andtheDutyto
PromotetheHighestGood.”
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Callingthehighestgoodamoralstandardmightraisehackles,becauseultimately
thereisjustonesupremeprincipleofpracticalreason,andthatprincipleisthecategorical
imperative.GivenKant’sinsistenceonthecompletesystematicityofmorality,asecond
standardmightseemawkwardatbest.Thedisorganizationimpliedbytwostandardsis
onlyapparent,though.Thecategoricalimperativeandthehighestgoodarestandardsfor
differentmorallysignificantthings,andthehighestgooddoesnotchallengethecategorical
imperative’sstatusasthesupremeprinciple.138
Asexplainedinsection1.3(Maxims),thecategoricalimperative—andthusthe
ethicaldutiesthatderivefromit—ispracticalreason’sstandardforjudgingmaxims.As
such,itfulfillsreason’sneedforsystematicunity:itdelimitsthetotalityofgoodmaxims
(or,allofthepossiblegoodmaxims)fromthetotalityofbadones,anditensuresthatgood
maximsharmonizewitheachotherandneverconflict.139
Maximsthatmeetthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperativecanbeenactedin
allsortsofways,however,andthemorallawdoesnotgiveguidanceonhowtochoose
amongthenumerouswaysofactinginaccordancewithit.SaythatIhaveamaximof
helpingmyundergraduatestudentslearnphilosophy,whichisbasedinamaximofmaking
others’happinessmyend,whichisbasedinamaximofrespectforhumanity.Therearean
almostinfinitenumberofwaysIcouldtrytohelpmystudentslearnthatwouldconformto
themorallaw.Somewillworkwell,otherswillonlydemoralizethestudents,orpanderto
them.IfIchoseademoralizingorpanderingmethod,orifIchooseamorepromising
methodbutdonotpullitoffeffectively,somethingwillhavegonewrong.Butthemorallaw
138“Theconceptofthehighestalreadycontainsanambiguity,that,ifnotattendedto,canoccasionneedlessdisputes.Thehighestcanmeaneitherthesupreme(supremum),orthecomplete(consummatum).Thefirstisthatconditionwhichisitselfunconditioned,thatis,notsubordinatetoanyother(originarum).Thesecondisthatwholewhichisnotpartofastillgreaterwholeofthesamekind(perfectissimum),”writesKantintheCritiqueofPracticalReason.(CPrR5:110)Thecategoricalimperativeisthesupremeprincipleofmorality,butthehighestgoodistheprincipleofmoralityasacompletewhole.139AsKleingeldobserves,“IntheDialecticofthefirstCritique,Kantprovidesanaccountoftheideasofspeculativereasonasbasedonreason’s“need”forsystematicunityandcompleteness(KrVAvii,A796/B824).IntheDialecticofthesecondCritique,thesamerationaltendencyleadstotheideaofthehighestgood.Theconceptionofthehighestgooddoesnotspringfromasensibleneed,but,rather,fromatendencythatKantregardsascharacteristicforreasonassuch,whetherinitsspeculativeoritspracticalemployment.”Kleingeld,“Kanton‘Good,’”48.
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cannotsaywhat.Practicalreasonneedsadifferentstandardforjudginghowtoenactour
goodmaximsandforevaluatingtheoutcomesofthoseactions.Inotherwords,inaddition
tosystematizingthemaximsofouractions,practicalreasonalsoneedstosystematizethe
objectsorendsofouractionsintheworld.140Kleingeldsuggeststhatwecanthinkofthis
standardastheoverallplanforwhatwecollectivelyaimtorealizeintheworldasweactin
accordancewiththesupremeprincipleofmorality.
Thisplanorstandardisthehighestgood.ItisthetouchstoneofwhatKantcalls“a
moralworld.”(CPRA808/B837)141AsKleingeldexplains,onewaythatKantcharacterizes
thisis“theworldthatmoralagentswouldbringintoexistenceiftheiragencyfacedno
obstacles,thatis,ifallmoralagentswerefullyvirtuousandtheiractionswouldachieve
theirmoralends.”142Itisaworldinwhicheachpersonisvirtuous,andinwhichtheir
actionsperpetuatetheirvirtueandbringotherpeoplehappiness.Makingsuchaworldis
onewayoflookingatwhatwearedoingexternallywhenwefollowthemorallaw
internally.143
Kantsometimescallsthehighestgoodthe“finalend”ofreason.[e.g.R6:5–6:7]
Kleingeldemphasizesthatcallingitafinalenddoesnotindicatethatitgroundsmorality;
achievingthehighestgoodisnotwhywefollowthemorallaw.Rather,itistheendthatwe
aimforbecauseweseeourselvesboundbythemorallaw,andbecauseweneedtobeable
tojudgetheresultsofouractionsfromamoralpointofview.Andsothefinalendisnot
140InReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason,Kantwritesofthefinalendofpracticalreason,whichisthehighestgood,“Theideaisnot(practicallyconsidered)andemptyone;foritmeetsournaturalneed,whichwouldotherwisebeahindrancetomoralresolve,tothinkforallourdoingsandnondoingstakenasawholesomesortoffinalendwhichreasoncanjustify.”(R6:5)And“thehumanbeingevincestheneed,effectedinhimbymorality,ofaddingtothemthethoughtofafinalendaswell,astheirconsequence.”(R6:6).141IntheCanonofPureReasonintheDoctrineofMethodoftheCritiqueofPureReason,Kantwrites“Icalltheworldasitwouldbeifitwereinconformitywithallmorallaws(asincanbeinaccordancewiththefreedomofrationalbeingsandasitshouldbeinaccordancewiththenecessarylawsofmorality)amoralworld.”(CPRA808/B837)SeealsoKant’sReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason(R6:5).142Kleingeld,41.143AnotherwaythatKantcharacterizesthehighestgoodisasastateinwhichhappinessisdistributedaccordingtovirtue,e.g.CritiqueofPracticalReason(CPrR5:110-111).Thisformulationcanmisleadoneintothinkingthataworldinwhichallthevirtuousarehappyandalltheviciousaremiserablecouldmeetthestandard.Butthestandardismetonlywheneveryoneisvirtuousandtheirvirtuousactionsbringaboutcompletehappinessaswellastheperpetuationofvirtue.
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additionaltotheobligatoryendsofothers’happinessandourownperfection.Rather,it
encompassesthoseends,organizesourpursuitofthem,andgivesusawaytoassessour
efficacyatrealizingthem.Sothehighestgoodisgroundedin,yetgoesbeyond,the
categoricalimperative.144
Anactthatmeetsthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperativecanfailtomeetthe
standardsetbythehighestgood.Well-intentionedbutdemoralizingphilosophyinstruction
isoneexample.Andwhileapersoncannotfaceasituationinwhichtheyhavenochoicebut
todosomethingthatfailstomeetthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperative,theycan
faceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowillfailtomeetthestandardsetbythehighest
good.Imaginethefirstpoliceofficerwhoarrivesatabuildinginwhichamassshootingis
inprogress.Theonlywaytostoptheshooteristotakemeasuresthatsheknowswillharm
orevenkillsomeoftheinnocentpeopletrappedinthebuilding.Ifshechoosestotakethe
measures,thentheworldwillfallfarshortofthehighestgoodinoneway(certainpeople
willsufferandperhapsdie);ifshechoosesnotto,itwillfallfarshortofitinanotherway
(otherpeoplewillsufferanddie).Whatevershedoeswilldetractsubstantiallyfroma
moralworld,eventhoughherchoiceneednotviolatethemorallaw.OrtakeVarden’s
exampleofmembersoftheWWIIresistancemovement,whoinasituationthatoffered“no
morallyunproblematicexits,”choseheroicyetviolentcoursesofaction;theychoseto
injureandkillotherpeopleinordertoremovethebarrierthosepeopleformedagainst
rightfulinteraction.145
144Seenote131,andKleingeld,“Kanton‘Good’,”42-8.145Varden,“KantandLying,”417-418.Vardeninterpretstheresistancefighters’predicamentthroughthelensoftheDoctrineofRight,arguingthattheirchoicewasbetweencommittingageneralwrong(injuringandkillingpeople)andfailingeffectivelytoputinplacethesocialconditionsforrightfulinteractionamongpeople.Withoutcontradictingthis,thepredicamentcanalsobeinterpretedthroughthelensofthestandardofthehighestgood;Evenifthesufferingoftheviciousdoesnotdetractfromthehighestgood,aswewillseeinsection3ofthischapter,causingharmtoanyonecanthreatenone’sownemotionalpreconditionstovirtue,thusthreateningone’sownmoralstrengthorvirtue.Sotheresistancefightersfacedasituationinwhichtheyhadtochoosebetweenthreateningtheirownvirtue(andsodetractingfromthehighestgood),andallowingastateofaffairsthatwasveryfarfromthehighestgoodtogetevenfartherfromit(tobeclear,Vardendoesnotquestionthevirtueoftheresistancefighters).Importantly,shearguesfortheintelligibilityof“themoralcostorstressthosewhouseviolenceagainstaggressorssooftenexperience.Forexample,itisaknownfactthatmembersofresistancemovementsduringWWIItypicallystruggledwithsadnessanddepression,nervousdisordersandvariousotherpsychologicalproblemslateroninlife.”
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Attheriskofrepetitiveness,Iwanttoemphasizeandrephrasethecoreideasofthis
subsection.TherearetwonotionsofmoralityatworkinKant’sethics.Thefirstconceives
moralityaspurepracticalreason.Itsstandardisthecategoricalimperative,which
abstractscompletelyfromthematerialconditionsofitsapplication.Ofcourse,theethical
dutiesoutlinedinthedoctrineofvirtuetakematerialityintoaccounttoanextent;they
applythecategoricalimperativetothenatureofhumanbeingsingeneral,forwhomvirtue
isanaturallyacquiredstrengthandforwhomhappiness,ortherealizationofdiscretionary
ends,isprecarious.Yetaswehaveseen,thereisnopossibilityofconflictamongsuch
duties,becausetheyaresystematizedbythecategoricalimperative.
Thesecondnotionconceivesmoralityasamoralworld,anditsstandardisthe
highestgood.Thehighestgoodisdeterminedbythecategoricalimperative,butitisalso
determinedbythematerialconditionsinwhichpeopleact.Inadditiontohumannaturein
general,thisincludesalltheempiricalvicissitudesthatmakeadifferencetothenatural
developmentandmaintenanceofeachperson’svirtueandtotheefficacyoftheirvirtuous
actionsinbringingaboutotherpeople’shappiness.Sowhiletheresultsofanactionare
morallyirrelevanttowhethertheactionmeetsthestandardofthecategoricalimperative,
suchresultsareextremelysignificanttowhetheritmeetsthestandardofthehighestgood.
Atthislevel,unlikethatofthemorallaw,conflictispossible.Apersoncanbesituatedsuch
thatwhatevertheydowilldetractfromthehighestgood—forinstance,bycompromising
thenaturaldevelopmentoftheirownmoralstrength(thatis,virtue)orbycompromising
thehappinessof(virtuous)otherpeople.Somesuchdetractionscanbetrivial,otherscan
betragic.
Thissectionstartedwithconflictsofgroundsofobligation.Groundsofobligation
arereasonstohelpothers,ortootherwiseexpressrespectforthem,andtoperfect
ourselves.Theyarebasedinourethicaldutiestoadopthumanity,other’shappinessand
ourownperfectionasends.Whenapersoncannotactoneachofthegroundsofobligation
atstakeintheircircumstance,therecanbenoconflictatthelevelofpurepracticalreason,
wherethecategoricalimperativeisthestandardformoralaction.Butactingagainsta
groundofobligation—especiallybutnotonlythosesuggestedbynegativeduties—can
detractfromamoralworld.Becausethestandardforthisworld(thehighestgood)isthe
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“finalend”ofreason,itencompassestheobligatoryendsthatgenerategroundsof
obligation.Actionsthatdiminishordestroyoneselforothers,thatunderminethe
happinessofothers,orthatthreatenordegradeone’sownperfection—especiallyone’s
moralperfectionorvirtue—goagainstgroundsofobligation,andalsofrustratethefinal
endofreason.Therecanbeconflictatthislevel,wherethehighestgoodprovidesthe
standardforaction.Ifonecanfaceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowillinvolve
seriousmoralwrongdoing,itwillbeatthislevel.Thequestionis,isthereroomwithin
Kant’sethicsforactionstobeseriouslywronginvirtueofdetractingfromamoralworld?
Becauseseriouswrongnessandwarrantedremorseimplyeachother(seechapterone),we
canre-phrasethequestionas“isthereroomwithinKant’sethicsforanactiontowarrant
remorseinvirtueofdetractingfromamoralworld?”
2.4Tragicmoralconflicts
Kant’sstudentCollinsreportsKantsayingthatremorseistheoutcomeofaverdictof
conscience.146Conscienceis“aninstincttojudgewithlegalauthorityaccordingtomoral
laws.”[LE27:353]SoonKant’stheory,remorseiswarrantedforviolationsofthemoral
law.Thisiscompletelyunsurprising,becauseaswehavealreadyseen,atleastonewayan
actcanbewronginKant’sviewisbyviolatingthemorallaw,orthecategoricalimperative.
Thequestionis,canremorsealsobewarrantedforatleastsomefailurestomeetthe
secondmoralstandard,thehighestgood?Ifitcan,thenthepossibilityremainsthatKant’s
moraltheoryhasroomformoralconflict,orforsituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswill
bewronginsomesense.
TheonlyemotionthatKantexplicitlyassociateswiththehighestgoodishope.Inthe
CanonofPureReasonintheCritiqueofPureReason,heliststhreequestionsthattogether
expresstheentiretyofreason’sinterests.Thefinalquestion,whichreflectsaninterestof
boththeoreticalandpracticalreason,is“whatcanIhope?”andtheanswertoitisthe
highestgood.[CPRA805/B833]
146Presumably,Kantmeantthatremorseisignitedbyanegativeverdict,butCollins’notesarenotentirelyclearonthis.
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Hopeisaforward-lookingemotion.Itsbackward-lookingcounterpartsare
satisfactionanddisappointment,orregret.Ifpeoplearewarrantedtohopeforamoral
world,onKant’stheory,thentheyarewarrantedtoregretstatesoftheworldthatfallshort
ofit.Forinstance,onecanappropriatelyregretthatanotherpersonalwaysputshisown
satisfactionabovemoralends,orthatmanyvirtuouspeoplegowithouttheirbasicneeds
beingmet,orthatthefirststateofaffairsisacauseofthesecond.Similarly,agentregret
canbewarrantedwhenone’sownactionsareimplicatedinastateofaffairsthatfalls
regretfullyshortofthehighestgood.ItisconsistentwithKant’stheorythatWilliams’truck
driver,forinstance,appropriatelyexperiencesprofoundagentregretforhisinvolvementin
achild’sdeath,andinthesufferingitbringstothosewholovedher.
Thequestioniswhethermoralregretcaneverbewarrantedinresponsetoone’s
owninvolvementinastateofaffairsthatfallsshortofwhatpracticalreason(morality)
hopesfor?Thatis,caniteverbeappropriatetomorallyregretone’sfailuretomeetthe
moralstandardofthehighestgood?Thatthefirstmoralstandard,thecategorical
imperative,doesnotwarrantmoralregretinsuchcasessaysnothingaboutwhetherthe
standardofthehighestgooddoes.
ThoughneitherKantnorthosewhoelaboratehisaccountofmoralconflictaddress
this,hisviewdoesnotprecludeit.Inotherwords,ithasroomtoaccommodatemoral
regretforfailurestomeetthemoralstandardofthehighestgood.Moreover,itmakesmore
sensethatmoralregretcouldbeanappropriateresponsetosomesuchfailuresthanitdoes
toruleitoutcompletely.Therolethatthehighestgoodplaysinpracticalreasoning
demandsthatweacknowledgethemoralsignificanceoftheoutcomesofouractions,
consideredseparatelyfromthemoralstatusofthemaximsofthoseactions.
Ifweacceptthatmoralregretcanbewarrantedinresponsetosomemorallaw-
abidingfailurestomeetthemoralstandardofthehighestgood,thenextquestionsare
“whichsuchfailureswarrantmoralregret?”“Andamongthose,whichoneswarrant
remorse?”AsneitherKantnorhisinterpretersaddressthesequestion,Iwillsuggest
adaptingaversionofTudor’sresponsibilityrequirementtomarkoffmoralregret-worthy
failurestomeetthestandardofthehighestgoodfromthosethataremerelyagentregret-
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worthy.147AccordingtoTudor,apersonisresponsibleforaharm(or,inthiscase,a
deviationfromthemoralworld)iftherearegroundsforrequiringthemtoanswerforwhat
theydid,groundsforboththemandustonotevadeitsmoralsignificance.Isaidthatwhat
thesegroundsarewilldependonthemoraltheoryinplay,butonecandidateTudor
mentionsisthattheregrettedactwasdonewith“freewillplusknowledgeofthenature
andlikelyresultsoftheaction,plusdesireorintentiontoachievesuchresults,orto
performtheactionregardlessofknownlikelyconsequencesetc.”148Kantdoesnotidentify
thegroundsforanagenttonotevadethemoralsignificanceofanactionoftheirsthat
bringsaboutalessmoralworld.SowecantakeupTudor’ssuggestion.
Ifwedo,thenthesufferingthatispartiallyattributabletothepoliceofficer’smoral-
law-abidingchoice(whicheveroneshetakes)canwarrantmoralregret,becausethechoice
wasmadefreely(whichaKantianhastoaccept),theofficerknewinadvancewhatthebad
sideeffectsofherchosenactionwouldbe,andshechosetoperformtheactionanyway.
ThisalsoholdsfortheWWIIresistancefighters.
Whatabouttheparticularlyintenseformofmoralregretthatisremorse?Isaidin
chapteronethatremorseisappropriatewhenone’sactionhaswrongfullybroughtabout
orhasconstitutedalosstoafundamentalmoralvalue,andthelossissignificant.That
moralregretiswarrantedforanactionimpliesthatitiswrongful,sothequestionis
whethertheactionconstitutesorbringsaboutasignificantlosstoafundamentalmoral
value.OnKant’stheory,thefundamentalmoralvalueishumanity.AsHillobserves,tragic
conflictcanoccurwhenapersonfacesasituationinwhichthereisnosolutiontothe
problemofproducinganactionthatwillnotthreaten,destroy,ordiminishthisvalue.
Althoughhedoesnotgosofarastosaythatinsuchcaseswhateverthepersondoeswill
warrantremorse(whichimpliesthatitwillbeseriouslywrong,insomesense),oncewe
recognizethatremorsecanbewarrantedbyactsthatfallfarshortofmeetingthestandard
147Tudor,CompassionandRemorse.148Ibid.,31.
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ofthehighestgoodeveniftheydonotviolatethemorallaw,wehavefoundroominKant’s
moraltheoryforthepossibilityoftragicmoralconflict.149
3.IstheRecoveryPredicamentaTragicMoralConflict?
Inthissection,Iwillarguethatrecoverypredicamentsposetragicmoralconflictsbecause
fromwithinthem,thereisnopracticalresponsethatdoesnotweaken,orthreatento
weaken,theagent’svirtue.Whileaperson’scapacitytoimpelthemselvestofollowthe
morallawisafeatureoftheirpurepracticalreason,andsocannotbeputatriskbyevents
inspaceandtime,theirvirtue(ormoralstrength)isacquired,maintained,andmanifested
inspaceandtime.Thisiswhywehaveethicaldutiestoprotectanddevelopourvirtue.As
wesawintheprevioussection,thesedutiescanyieldwhatKantcallsconflictinggroundsof
obligation.Fromthestandpointofthecategoricalimperative,suchconflictsarenotmoral
conflicts,becausetheydonotleaveapersonwithnochoicebuttoviolatethemorallaw.
Yetfromthestandpointofthehighestgood,conflictsamonggroundsofobligationcanbe
moral,becausefromwithinthemitcanbethecasethatwhateveronedoeswilldetract
fromamoralworld.150
3.1Dutiesregardingmorallysignificantfeelings
Therecoverypredicamentoccurswhenpreventingtheextinctionofaspecies,subspecies,
orpopulation,requiresharming,killing,orcontrollingthelivesofindividualanimals.Allof
Kant’sethicaldutiesarebasedinthedignityofrationalnature;wehavedutiestoother
peopleandtoourselvesbecauseourcapacitytomakechoicesdeterminedbyreason
149Itisinteresting,andperhapsrevealing,thatinthelectureinwhichKantlinksremorsetoviolationsofconscience(andsotoviolationsofthemorallaw),theGermanwordthathasbeentranslatedasremorseisGewissensbisse.Thisliterallymeans“biteofconscience,”andinanotherpartofthelectureistranslatedas“pangofconscience.”Gewissensbissecanalsomeanthefeelingofguilt.ItisnottheonlyGermansynonymforremorse,andwasnottheonlysynonymwhenKantwaslecturingattheendoftheeighteenthcentury.AmorecommonGermanwordforremorseisandwasReue,whichissimilartotheEnglishrue.WemightsaythatviolatingthemorallawwarrantsGewissensbisse-remorsewhilesignificantfailuretomeetthestandardofthehighestgoodwarrantsReue-remorse.Thatthelatterdoesnotinitselfwarrantguiltdoesnotimplythatitdoesnotinitselfwarrantruing.150Ofcourse,therearetwosensesofmoralhere.Conflictsofgroundsofobligationarenotmoralconflictswhenmoralisidentifiedcompletelywithpurepracticalreason.Theyaremoralconflictswhenmoralistaken,lessstrictly,toencompassthefinalendofthatreason.
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commandsrespect.Inanimatepartsofnature,suchasspecies,donothaverationalnatures,
andsotheydonotcommandrespect.Otheranimalsdonoteither.Althoughunlike
inanimatenaturetheyhavefeelingsandmakechoices,animals’choicesarenotfree,
becausetheyaredeterminedbynaturalinclinations.SoforKanttheworthofbothanimals
andinanimatenatureismerelyconditional.
Thisdoesnotentailthathisethicsleavesourtreatmentofanimalsandinanimate
naturetoourdiscretion,orthatitdoesnotprovidemoralreasonsagainstharmingor
destroyingthem.Itdoesprovidesuchreasons,butastheyarebasedinrespectforour
rationalnature,theyareultimatelydutiestoourselvesandtootherhumanbeings.More
specifically,theethicaldutiesthatgroundobligationsnottoharmordestroyanimalsand
otherpartsofnatureflowfromourdutiestoprotectandcultivatecertaindispositionsof
feeling.
Wehumanbeingshavedignityinvirtueofbeingabletoconformthemaximsofour
actionstothemorallaw,andtodosofromthemotiveofduty.ItseemsasthoughKant
thinksthatinordersubjectivelytobemovedbytheobjectivenecessityofthemorallaw,it
mustaffectusinsomeway.ThiscomesoutmostclearlyintheIntroductiontotheDV,
wherehediscusses“...naturalpredispositionsofthemind(praedispositio)forbeing
affectedbyconceptsofduty,antecedentpredispositionsonthesideoffeeling...”(MM
6:399)Thesedispositionstofeelcertainwaysinresponsetothewill’sself-generated
representationofthemorallawarenotpracticallysuperfluous.Tothecontrary,theyare
partofwhatmakesmoralchoice,ordutifulactionforitsownsake,possibleforhuman
beings.Kantsaysthatthey“lieatthebasisofmoralityassubjectivepreconditionsof
receptivenesstotheconceptofduty,”and“itisbyvirtueofthemthat[ahumanbeing]can
beputunderobligation.”(MM6:399)Furthermore,althoughmoralfeelingis“merely
subjective,”Kantclaimsthatisessentialforourpeculiarlyhuman(finite,embodied)sortof
morality:“were[ahumanbeing]completelylackinginreceptivitytoithewouldbemorally
dead.”(MM6:400)
Kantdiscussesfourofthesenaturalbutmorallyessential“predispositionsonthe
sideoffeeling”:moralfeeling,conscience,loveofhumanbeings,andrespect.His
descriptionsofthemleavemuchopentointerpretation,andhisaccountofhowtheyenable
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moralchoiceisvague.PaulGuyerproposesthattheyoperatetogetherinthefollowingway.
Moralfeeling,whichKantcalls“asusceptibilityonthepartoffreechoicetobemovedby
purereason(anditslaw)...”motivatesustoconformtothemorallawingeneral.(MM
6:400)Conformingtothislawrequiresstrengtheningourconscience,whichislessa
feelingthananawarenessofwhatthemorallawdemandsofusinparticularcases(recall
Kant’sclaiminhislecturesthatconscienceis“aninstincttojudgewithlegalauthority
accordingtomorallaws”).Italsorequiresstrengtheningourfeelingsofrespectandof
love—thelatterofwhichincludesfeelingsofsympathyandgratitude—becausetheyimpel
ustofollowthelawinparticularcases:theyarethe“finalimpulsespromptingustofulfill
ourspecificdutiestoourselvesandothers.”151
Becausetheyareessentialtoourcapacitytoactfromthemotiveofduty,wehave
ethicaldutiestocultivateourdispositionstomoralfeeling,love,andrespect.Recallthatthe
linchpinofaperson’sethicaldutiesisthedutytodeveloptheirownvirtue.152Virtueis
strengthofwillinfulfillingone’sduties.Thisisa“strengthtoovercomeallopposing
sensibleimpulses”ortoovercometheobstaclespresentedbynaturalinclination.(MM
6:397)“Strengthofanykindcanberecognizedonlybytheobstaclesitcanovercome,and
inthecaseofvirtuetheseobstaclesarenaturalinclinations,whichcancomeintoconflict
withahumanbeing’smoralresolution.”(MM6:394)Itmakessensethatthestrengthofour
moralfeelingsconstitutesatleastpartofthestrengthofvirtuebecausemoralfeelingsare
theproximatecausesofourdutifulchoices(theultimatecausemustbeautonomyof
practicalreason)andbecauseasinclinations,theyarejustthekindofthingsthatcould
counteracttheinclinationsthatvirtueisneededtooppose.153
151Guyer,“MoralFeelings,”151.152Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”483.153Thisisreflectedinthedutytomakeone’sownperfectionone’send.Byperfection,Kantsaysthathemeans“theharmonyofathing’spropertieswithanend.”(MM6:386)Theendinquestionherecanbenothingotherthanvirtue.Whatmustharmonizewithitareour“faculties(ornaturalpredispositions).”Forthesakeoftheupcomingdiscussionoftherecoverypredicament,itisimportanttoemphasizethatemotionsareamongthenaturalpredispositionsthattheethicaldutyofselfperfectionrequiresustoharmonizewithreason.AsGuyerexplains“...dutiestooneselfcanbedutiestohave—topreserveanddevelop—certainkindsoffeelings.Or,toputthepointanotherway,one’ssensiblebeingcanandevenmustbemadeharmoniouswithone’sduty...outoftheincentiveofdutyonecanmakeone’snaturegracefullyharmoniouswithduty.And,Kantnowargues,onefallsshortofthedemandsofvirtueifonedoesnottrytodojustthis”(“DutiesRegardingNature,”33).Loudenmakesasimilarpoint:“Thereareahostofphenomenalemotions
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3.2Dutiesregardinganimalsandinanimatenature
BetweenthesectionsofDVdedicatedtoperfectandimperfectdutiestooneself(positive
andnegativeduties),Kantinsertsanepisodicsection.Thissectionprovidessomeofthe
besttextualevidencefortheclaimthatKant’ssystemofdutiesincludesethicaldutiesto
ourselvestopreserveandtodevelopcapacitiesformorallysignificantfeelings.Italso
showsthatthesedutiesimplyfurtherdutiesregardingourtreatmentofotheranimalsand
inanimatenature.Kantwrites:
“Apropensitytowantondestructionofwhatisbeautifulininanimatenature(spiritusdestructionis)isopposedtoahumanbeing’sdutytohimself;foritweakensoruprootsthatfeelinginhimwhich,thoughnotitselfmoral,isstilladispositionofsensibilitythatgreatlypromotesmoralityoratleastpreparesthewayforit:thedisposition,namely,tolovesomething(e.g.beautifulcrystalformations,theindescribablybeautyofplants)evenapartfromanyintentiontouseit.”Withregardtotheanimatebutnonrationalpartofcreation,violentandcrueltreatmentofanimalsisfarmoreintimatelyopposedtoahumanbeing’sdutytohimself,andhehasadutytorefrainfromthis;foritdullshissharedfeelingoftheirsufferingandsoweakensandgraduallyuprootsanaturalpredispositionthatisveryserviceabletomoralityinone’srelationwithothermen.”(MM6:443)
Thatapropensitytowantondestructionofbeautifulnature,andviolentandcruel
treatmentofanimalsopposedutiestooneselfsuggestthatthesechoicesgobeyondfailing
toadoptanobligatoryend.Inreferringtoactsthatopposeduty,Kantuseslanguagehe
usuallyreservesforvices,orviolationsofwhatIhavecallednegativeduties.154Negative
dutiestooneselfprohibitmaximsthatdemeanorareincompatiblewithrespectforone’s
humanity.Inthispassage,Kantdeclaresthatmaximsofwantondestructionviolateaduty
(themostimportantofwhicharejoy,sympathy,andlove)which,whilenotthedirectBestimmungsgrundofthewill,...mustbepresentinavirtuousdisposition.”And“actingfromvirtue,onKant’sview,doesentaildiscipliningtheemotionsthroughreasonsothatonecomestowanttoperformthesameexternalactsthatreasoncommands”(“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”487-488).154TobySvobodamakesasimilarpointin“DutiesRegardingNature,”153.
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tooneselfbecausethey“weakenanduproot,”(ratherthanjustfailtostrengthenand
deepen)one’scapacitiesforloveandsympathy.Ourdutiesregardinganimalsandnature
arethusbasedinadutytomaintainourcapacitiesforthesefeelings,whichinturnisbased
inadutytopreserveourmoralperfection,orvirtue.
Thatthevalueoftheseemotionsliesintheirusefulnesstomoralactionissuggested
byKant’sdescriptionofthemas“serviceabletomorality,”andbythefactthathe
unquestionablydoestakethemtobeuseful.LaraDenisobservesthatonKant’sview,these
feelings“canmotivatepeopletoactrightlyevenwhentheylackthemoralstrengthtodo
so,orwhentheirmoralstrengthaloneisinsufficient,”andthatsympathyinparticular“can
directuswhenandhowtohelpothers.”155ButitcannotbeKant’sviewthatthevaluesof
loveandsympathyaremerelyinstrumental.
ThedutiesregardingloveandsympathythatKantdiscussesintheepisodicsection
arenegative,so,atbase,theyaredutiesnottodemeansomethingthathasdignity,or
unconditionalworth.Ifthevaluesofloveandsympathywereonlyinstrumental,their
worthwouldbeconditional.Wehavenegativedutiestoourselvesnottoweakenoruproot
thesefeelings,becausetheyarepartofourmoralstrength;theyarenotjustaidstohuman
virtue,theyareconstitutiveofit.AsPatrickKainexplains,“thesefeelingsofloveand
sympathyarenotsimplymorallyuseful,asmerelyonemeansamongothers,ormerely
becauseofsomehighlycontingentfactsabouthumanpsychology;theymaybe‘anessential
partofthefulfillmentofdutyitself,’atleastforbeingsanythingmuchlikeus.”156Thisline
ofthinkingissupportedbyKant’scontentionsthatthesefeelings“lieatthebasisof
morality”andthatwecannotbemovedbydutywithoutthem.(MM6:399)Italsomakes
moresensethandoesapurelyinstrumentalaccountofthevalueofmorallyimportant
emotionsofKant’sstatementthat“anyactionwherebywemaytormentanimals,orlet
themsufferdistress,orotherwisetreatthemwithoutlove,isdemeaningtoourselves”and
“inhuman,”“anindirectviolationofhumanityinourownperson”(asrecordedbyhis
studentVigilantus,LE27:710).Thisisbecausedisregardforpriceorinstrumentalvalueis
notdemeaning,butlackofrespectfordignityis.
155Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”406.156Kain,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”223;Guyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”390.
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Negativedutiesnottodestroynatureorharmotheranimals
Whatisthenatureoftheseduties?Thatis,whatpreciselydotheyprohibit?Negativeduties
absolutelyforbiddoingcertainkindsofactionfromnon-moralincentives.Thus,ourduty
regardingnatureisnevertodestroybeautifulpartsofitwantonly,orforarbitraryreasons.
AsDenisobserves,ournegativedutiesregardinganimalsshouldlikewisebeunderstoodas
dutiesnottoengagein“cruelorviolenttreatmentthatisnotpartofamaximthatshows
respectforrationalnature.”157Thus,whileKantsaysthatpainfulandunnecessaryphysical
experimentsonanimals,andexperiments“doneforsport”“aretobeabhorred,”(MM
6:443),somecasesofpainfulvivisectionare“acceptable.”
First,asIdiscussedinsection1.4(Thesystemofethicalduties),negativeduties
carryastrongpresumptionagainstthepermissibilityofanyactionofatypethatmustnot
bedonefornon-moralreasons.Justbecauseapersonthinksthattheyhaveamoralreason
forharmingananimalordestroyingabeautifulpartofnaturedoesnotmeanthatthey
actuallyaremotivatedbysaidreason.Andeveniftheyare,thereasonmightnotbestrong
enough.Thereshouldbeaparticularlyhighbarfordefeatingthepresumptionagainst
doingthingsthatthreatento“weakenoruproot”ourmorallysignificantcapacities.As
Guyersurmises,inKant’ssystem,dutiesregardingone’sownmoralperfection“mustbe
givenacertainpriority”overreasonsgroundedinotherobligatoryends,because
“fulfillmentofdutiestoourselvesisanecessaryconditionforactingoutoftheincentiveof
duty.”158
Thatwehavenegativedutiestoourselvesnottotreatotheranimalsandbeautiful
natureinwaysthatdiminishordemeanourmorallysignificantfeelingsimpliesthatwe
alsohavepositivedutiestotreattheminwaysthathonorandcultivatethesefeelings.
Negativeself-regardingdutiesaredutiestoconserveone’sperfection,whilepositiveself-
regardingdutiesaredutiestodevelopit.Refrainingfromtreatinganimalsandnaturein
certainwaysprotectsourmoralperfectionbyprotectingourmorallysignificantnatural
feelings.Sotreatingtheminotherways,e.g.withcompassion,orfromaloveofthemfor
157Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”417.158Guyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”329.
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theirownsakes,wouldbewaysoffulfillingourpositivedutiestocultivatemorally
essentialfeelings.159
Inadditiontoself-regardingduties,weshouldalsohavepositivedutiestoother
peopletotreatanimalsandnatureinwaysthatcultivatemorallyessentialfeelings.Oneof
Kant’sheadingsinthesectionofDVondutiesoflovetootherhumanbeingsis
“SympatheticFeelingisGenerallyaDuty.”Inthissubsection,heexplainsthatamongour
positivedutiestoothersis“theindirectdutytocultivatethecompassionatenatural
(aesthetic)feelingsinus,”becausedoingsois“ameanstosympathybasedonmoral
principlesandthefeelingappropriatetothem.”(MM6:457)Itakethepointheretobethat
the“willtoshareinothers’feelings,”—whichisadirectdutytootherpeople—isenhanced
byournaturalreceptivitytotheirfeelings,andthatstrengtheningthelatterisawayto
strengthentheformer(MM6:456).Exercisingthisnaturalreceptivitythrough
compassionaterelationstootheranimalswouldbeonewaytofulfillthisduty.
AlthoughKantdoesnotmentionitexplicitly,preservingandincreasingourcapacity
to“lovethingsoutsideus”inawaythatisnot“self-serving”mightalsobeamongourduties
toothers,becauselovingthem(inapracticalway)fortheirownsakesismuchthesameas
adoptingtheirendsasourends.Ifwedohaveadutytootherstocultivatethecapacityfor
non-instrumentallove,thenappreciatingandprotectingbeautifulnaturewouldbeone
waytofulfillit.
3.4Therecoverypredicament
Therecoverypredicamentwillbeatragicconflictifbothpossiblecoursesofaction—
recoveryandextinction—willdiminishordestroytheagentsorotherpeople,will
underminethehappinessofothers,orwillthreatenordegradetheagents’own
perfection—especiallytheirmoralperfectionorvirtue.Insuchacase,bothcoursesof
actionwillgoagainststronggroundsofobligation,andalsodetractfromamoralworld.
Apersoncanalwaysactfromthemotiveofduty.Inthissense,theirhumanity
cannotbediminishedordestroyed.Yettheirvirtue,orthestrengthoftheirdisposition
159Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”makesanargumentlikethis.AndGuyer“DutiesRegardingNature,”arguesthatdutiesregardingnaturearealwayspositive,notnegative.
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actuallytochooseaccordingtothismotive,canbecompromised.Kantsuggestsasmuch
wheninthemidstofadiscussionoftheeffectsofhowpeopletreatanimalsontheir
morallysignificantemotions,henotesapprovinglythat“InEngland,nobutcher,surgeon,
ordoctorservesonatwelve-manjurybecausetheyarealreadyinuredtodeath.”(LE
27:460)Kantcouldnotpossiblymeanthataperson’schoicetopracticemedicineis
necessarilymorallyimpermissible.Rather,heseemstomeanthateventhemorally
permissiblepracticeofmedicinediminishesaperson’snaturalfeelingsaboutdeathenough
thattheycannotbetrustedtomakegoodchoicesaboutmurderorcapitalpunishment.
Kantmightbewronginthiscase,butthatdoesnotmarthepointthatthecaseillustrates:a
person’svirtue,oritsoperationincertainfieldsofchoice,canbecompromisedbyactsthat
diminishtheirmorallyessentialfeelingsevenifthoseactsdonotviolatethemorallaw.The
quotealsoshowsthatonKant’sview,muchexposuretothedeadbodiesofotheranimals
canalsocompromiseaperson’svirtue.
Soourquestionbecomeswhetheracasebemadethat1)peoplecompromisetheir
virtuebysupportingoractivelycarryingouttherecoveryactivitiesthatharm,killand
controlotheranimals,and2)theycompromiseitbyopposingrecoveryoractivelyrefusing
toparticipateinitregardlessofwhethereithercourseofactionviolatesethicalduty.
Aswesawinpreviouschapters,bothcoursesofactionintherecoverypredicament
involveharmtoanddeathsofotheranimals.Thisiswhatmakesthembothwrongful
accordingtomyinterpretationofRoss’sdeontology.Letusexaminewhethertheharmsin
eachcasemightthreatenvirtue,asKantunderstandsit.Wewilltakerecoveryfirst.
Doesislandfoxrecoverycompromisevirtue?
Ifpeopleinjurecapacitiesformorallyessentialfeelingswhen,toquoteVigilantus’noteson
Kant’slectures,they“tormentanimals,orletthemsufferdistress,orotherwisetreatthem
withoutlove,”thentheyinjurethesecapacitiesbyparticipatinginrecovery.(LE27:710)
Whileitcertainlycouldbearguedthatanimalsarenottormentedinrecovery,anditmight
bepossibletoarguethattheyarenottreatedwithoutlove,itcannotreasonablybeclaimed
thattheyarenotmadetosufferdistress.
OnKant’sview,itseemsclearthatbybeingadirectagentofthisdistress,aperson
willcompromisetheirvirtue,eveniftheydonotviolateadutyindoingso.Thiswillbe
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particularlytrueiftheyroutinelycauseorareexposedtoanimals’distressoveralong
periodoftime,asbutchersandsurgeonsareregularlyexposedtodeathanddying.Those
whoareinvolveddailyincaptivebreedingprogramswillthuscarryatragicmoralcost.
Whataboutthoseofuswhoactivelysupportbutdonotparticipatedirectlyinrecovery
programsliketheonethatpreventedtheextinctionofislandfoxsubspecies?Orthoseofus
whopassivelysupportthem?Denis’sconstructionofaKantiantakeoneatingmeatand
usingproductsmadefromanimalsforcedtosufferonindustrialfarmsishelpfulhere.She
arguesthatwhenpeople“knowthattheanimalswhosebodypartstheyarebuyingwere
killedpainfullyorweretreatedharshlywhilealive,theirpurchasesexpresssupportforthe
morallyobjectionablecrueltyofthosewhooperateslaughterhousesandfactoryfarms,”
andthatthereisastrongpresumptionagainstexpressingsupportforthoseviolations(in
otherwords,thereisanegativedutynottosupportothers’violationsofdutywithoutgood
moralreason),atleastinpartbecauseitdullsorshowsdisregardforone’sownmoral
feelings.160However,Denisnotesthatthelessapparentitistoapersonthatanimalswere
harmedinproducingagood,“thelesslikelytheuseistoweakenoropposemoral
sentiments.”161Shereasonsthatinthesecases,peoplehaveapositivedutytothemselves
toconsiderhowtheirproductsaremade.
ToborrowfortherecoverypredicamentDenis’lineofthinking,thoseofuswhoare
awarethataparticularspeciescannotberecoveredwithoutmakinganimalssufferwill
impairourownmoralfeelingsifwesupportrecovery,evenifrecoveryand/oroursupport
foritdoesnotviolateaduty.Animplicationofthisisthatclear-eyedsupportofislandfox
recovery,inadditiontoactiveparticipationinit,impairsaperson’smorallyessential
feelings,andsoimpairstheirvirtue.Thereisatragicmoralcosttosupportingrecovery,
whetherornotsupportingitviolatesanethicalduty.
Doesnorthernspottedowlrecoverycompromisevirtue?
Spottedowlrecoveryentailskilling,butnotnecessarilycausingsufferingordistressto
animals.OnKant’sview,doespainlesskilling,andclear-eyedsupportofit,threatenour
160Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”416.161Ibid.
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moralfeelings,andthusourmoralstrength?IntheepisodicsectionofDV,hedoessaythat
“thehumanbeingisauthorizedtokillanimalsquickly(andwithoutpain).”(MM6:443)
Thatpainlesskillingisauthorizeddoesnotmeanthatitismorallyunproblematic.Ifwe
takeseriouslyKant’sclaimthatbutchersandphysiciansproblematicallyinurethemselves
todeath,weshouldassumethatkillinganimals,whichlikebutcheryandmedicineexposes
onetodeath—andunlikethemexposesonetotheexperienceofcausingdeath—would
haveasimilareffect,evenifthekillingispainless.SoIthinkaKantiancasecanbemade
thatthekillingrequiredtorecovernorthernspottedowlsdiminishesnaturalsympathetic
feelingsaboutlossoflifeandsocomeswithatragicmoralcostregardlessofwhetheror
notitviolatesethicalduties.Thesamewouldhold,probablyinanattenuatedway,for
clear-eyedsupportofspottedowlrecovery.
Doesextinctioncompromisevirtue?
Inrecoverypredicaments,Iwanttoinvestigatetwopossiblewaysinwhichtheextinction
courseofactionmightimpairaperson’svirtue.Itmightdosobydiminishingtheir
dispositiontolovesomethingforitsownsake,anditmightdosobydiminishingtheir
capacityforsympathy.Iwillconsidersympathyfirst.AswesawinthechapteronRoss’s
deontology,boththeextinctionofislandfoxpopulationsandtheextinctionofnorthern
spottedowlswouldlikelyhaveharmedsignificantnumbersofindividualanimals(e.g.in
theabsenceofinterventionbytherecoveryteam,mostofthe48capturedislandfoxes
wouldlikelyhavediedearlydeathsbyeagledepredation).Thequestionis,dotheseharms
makeadifferencetoanyone’scapacityforsympathy?Onereasontothinkthattheydonot
isthatnoonedirectlycausestheharms.ButasDenis’Kantiananalysisofimplicitsupport
forthemeatindustrysuggests,oneneednotimmediatelycauseaharminorderforone’s
voluntaryinvolvementwithittoimpactthestrengthofone’smorallyessentialemotions.
Thiswouldholdfornon-instrumentallove,aswell.Kantthinksthatdestroying
inanimatenaturecanimpairone’scapacityforthismorallysignificantnatural
predisposition,andhistheoryimpliesthatprotectingnaturecanstrengthenthis
disposition.Eitheractivelydecidingnottorecoveraspeciesthatisthreatenedbyhuman
activities,orsupportingsuchadecisioncouldaffectone’scapacityforlove.
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Whetherthechoicetoallowextinctionbyrefrainingfromrecovery(andsothe
choicetosupportthis)affectaperson’scapacitiesforloveandsympathyintragicways
dependsonwhetherthechoiceisbestunderstoodasachoicetodestroyaspecies(orother
taxonomicgroup),orasachoicenottoprotectit.Ifitistheformer,thenitwillbeaformof
moralself-harm,andsobetragic.Ifitisthelatter,thenthosewhomakeitdonotbydoing
soimpairtheirmorallyessentialemotions,theyjustmissanopportunitytocultivatethem.
Thismightbedeeplyfrustratingandsad,butitwillnotbetragic.
4.Conclusion
Itcannotbethecasethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthesenseofviolatingthe
morallaw.Butbecauseitispossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthesenseof
detractingfromamoralworld,Kant’sethicscanaccommodatemoralconflicts.Recovery
predicamentscanposeKantiantragicconflicts,becauseinthemitcanbethecasethat
whateverapersondoeswilldiminishtheirmoralperfection,andsodetractfromamoral
world,byinjuringtheirowncapacitiesforthemorallyessentialfeelingsofloveand
sympathy.
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ChapterFour:Utilitarianism
1.ThePrincipleofUtility
Someofthemostprominenttextsofutilitarianismexplicitlypresentitasasolutiontothe
problemofmoralconflict.InhisintroductiontotheclassictomeMethodsofEthics,Henry
Sidgwickframestheclashingprescriptionsgeneratedbycommonsensemoralityas
symptomsofanunacceptableirrationality.Thefatalflawhefindsinintuitionism,whichhe
takestobeutilitarianism’schiefrival,isthatithasnowaytoresolvesuchconflicts.Just
overacenturylater,R.M.Hare’sMoralThinkingclaimsthatitisirrationaltogroundmoral
thinkinginmoralintuitions,inlargepartbecauseitleadstoirresolvableconflict.Tellingly,
itisinachapterentitled“MoralConflict”thatheputsforwardthekernelofhisownversion
ofutilitarianism.LikeSidgwick’s,itisportrayedasbothexplainingandresolvingthe
problemofconflict.
Sidgwick’sutilitarianism
SidgwickandHareconvergeonutilitarianismfromwidelydivergentmetaethicalstarting
points.Sidgwickacceptstheintuitionistassumptionthatthecontentofanethicalprinciple,
ifitreallyisaprinciple,isself-evident.Thatis,peoplecanknowit“withreallyclearand
validfinalintuition,”muchaswearesupposedtoapprehendmathematicalaxiomsapriori.
Ifthemoralrulesreallyareknowableinthisway,thenpeoplecanhavetheutmost
confidenceinthem,andinthejudgementstowhichtheylead.ButSidgwick’sassiduous
investigationofcommonsensemoralityleadshimtoconcludethat,contraryto
appearances,noneofitsrulesarereallyself-evident.Thatis,noneofthemare
independentlyvalidaxiomsofpracticalreason.Heacceptsthattherearesuchaxioms,
albeitatamoreabstractlevelofmoralthinking.Specifically,therearethree,andonly
three,ofthem.Twoaremoralinthenarrowsense:1)theprincipleofjustice,accordingto
which“individualsinsimilarconditionsshouldbetreatedsimilarly;”162and2)the
162Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,380.
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principleofrationalbenevolence,accordingtowhichoneismorallyboundtoaimatthe
generalgood,towardswhichthegoodofeachindividualcountsequally.163
Alone,neitheroftheseprinciplesdeterminewhatoneoughttodoinanyparticular
situation.Theprincipleofjusticeleavesopenthecontentoftherulesitinsiststhatwe
applyimpartially.Andtheprincipleofrationalbenevolencecannotguideactioninthe
absenceofatheoryofthegood.Sidgwickprovidessuchatheory,arguingthatan
individual’sgoodconsistsinherhappiness,whichhedefineshedonisticallyaspleasureor
“desirableconsciousness.”164
Sidgwickthinksthatonceitissupplementedbythistheoryofthegood,theprinciple
ofrationalbenevolencebringsusstraighttotheutilitarianprinciple,whichhasquite
enoughsubstancetoguideaction:
“...theconductwhich,underanygivencircumstance,isobjectivelyright,isthatwhichwillproducethegreatestamountofhappinessonthewhole;thatis,takingintoaccountallwhosehappinessisaffectedbytheconduct.”165
Hare’sutilitarianism
Haredoubtsthatwecanhaveconfidencethatanysubstantiveethicalintuitionisan
immediatedeliveranceofreason,ratherthananexpressionofdeeplyrootedbutultimately
contingentculturalnorms.SoherejectsSidgwick’smethodofjustifyingutilitarianismby
groundingitinsuchanintuition.Instead,Harejustifiesitbyshowingthattheformofmoral
thinkingentailsit.Thisformisgivenbythelogicalpropertiesofought:itisanoverriding
universalizableprescription.
Tomakeaprescriptionistoexpressapreference,andtodirectactiontowardits
satisfaction.ThisiswhyHaresaysthattoberational,aprescriptionmustbeissuedwith
“cognizanceoffacts,”orwithanunderstandingof“whatitsexecutioninthisconcrete
163Theotherprincipleistheprincipleofprudence,accordingtowhich“oneoughttoaimatone’sowngood...onthewhole.”(ME,381).Sidgwickarguesthatutilitarianismcansolvetheproblemofconflictwithinmoralityunderstoodnarrowlyashavingprimarilytodowithhowouractionsorattitudesshouldrespondtothelives,claims,andinterestsofothers.Yetheconsidersmoralityalsotoincludeself-interest,andfindsnosolutiontotheproblemofconflictgeneratedbynarrowlymoralprinciplesandtheprincipleofprudence.164Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,391-407.165Ibid.,411.
99
situationwouldentail.”166Otherwise,theprescribermightguideactiontoward
establishingastateofaffairswhichtheydonotactuallywant.
Ofcourse,apersonneednotknowalloftheimplicationsofanactioninorder
rationallytoprescribeit.Theyonlyneedtoknowthosethatwouldmakeadifferenceto
whethertheycanwillthattheactionbeundertaken.Whenitcomestouniversal
prescriptions,theimplicationstowhichtheymustattendarethosehavingtodowiththe
preference-satisfactionsofallthesentientbeingswhomtheactionoritsalternativeswould
affect.
Thisisbecauseauniversalprescriptionappliesnotonlytothesituationinwhichit
ismade,buttoallsituationswiththesameuniversalproperties.Theseincludethelogically
possiblesituationsinwhichtheauthoroftheprescriptiontakestheplaceofanyoneofthe
otheraffectedbeings.Tobeassuredthatonecouldacceptthatone’sprescriptionforthis
situationbefollowedinalloftherest,onemustknowwhateachoftheotherswouldprefer.
Harethinksthatapersoncannotknowwhatanotherpreferswithoutknowingwhat
itwouldbelikefortheothertolivethroughallofthealternatives.Toensurethatone’s
oughtisrational,therefore,apersonmustimaginativelyinhabittheexperiencesofevery
beingforwhomthingswouldgodifferentlyiftheprescribedactionwerenotcarriedout.
Theymustundergowhatevereachofthem—intheirownbodies,andwiththeirown
memories,relationships,attitudes(includingmotivationalstates),etc.—wouldundergoif
theprescribedactionwereperformed,aswellwhatevertheywouldundergoifthe
alternativeswereperformedinstead.
Apersonwhosucceedsinempatheticallyidentifyingwithanotherwillknow
throughdirectexperiencewhattheotherprefers(orwhattheywouldprefer,iftheyknew
whatallthealternativeswouldbelike),andthusthepersonwillknowwhattheywould
prefer,iftheyweretobeintheother’ssituation:theywouldpreferexactlywhattheother
does(orwould).Knowingthis,Harethinks,entailsacurrentpreferenceaboutwhatshould
happenintheeventthattheytaketheother’splace.Thispost-reflectivepreferencewill
havethesamecontentandthesamestrengthastheother’soriginalpreference.
166Hare,MoralThinking,89,108.
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Thus,conflictsamongthepreferencesofdifferentbeingsmetamorphoseintoa
conflictamongthepreferencesofasingleperson—themakerofthemoraljudgement(or,
theywillsometamorphoseifthemakerofthejudgementistobesatisfiedthatthe
judgementisrational,i.e.genuinelyuniversallyprescribable).
Harethinksthattheonlyuniversalizablemethodofresolvingoriginally
interpersonalconflictsofpreferencesintoamoralprescriptionistomaximizeaggregated
preferencesatisfaction.Hepresumesthatthismethod,andonlythismethod,skirtsthe
trapsofprivilegingsomepreferencesoverothers,andofallowingunexaminedmoral
intuitionstospoilajudgementthatissupposedtofollowonlyfromfacts(whatwillhappen,
whowillbeaffected,andhowwilltheybeaffected)andlogic(giventhefacts,what
prescriptionwouldbeuniversalizable).
Harethusgeneratesautilitariannormativeethicfromhisquasi-Kantianmetaethics.
Strictlyspeaking,theuniversalprescriptivistcriterionforright,orrational,actionisnot
thattheactionmaximizeswelfare.Rather,itisthattheprescriptiontoperformtheactis
universalizable.Butaprescriptionisuniversalizableifandonlyiftakingitwouldmaximize
aggregatewelfare(understoodaspreferencesatisfaction).Sotheprincipleofutilitycan
functionastheuniversalprescriptivistcriterionforaction.
2.TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness
2.1Thefirstsenseofwrongness:violatingtheprincipleofutility
Accordingtothiscriterion,anactionisrightiffitbringsaboutmore(ornoless)welfare
thananyalternativepracticableaction.Corollarytothis,anactioniswrongiffitbrings
aboutlesswelfarethanatleastonepracticableaction.Whenrightandwrongaretakenin
thisway,thepossibilityofmoralconflictisnegated,becauseitisimpossiblethatwhatever
onedoeswillbringaboutlesswelfarethansomethingelsetheycouldhavedone.
Thisdoesnotsettlethequestionofwhethermoralconflictispossiblewithin
utilitarianism.Ifutilitarianismincorporates,oratleastleavesroomfor,anotherwayin
whichanactioncanbewrong,itmightstillbeabletoaccommodatemoralconflict.
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2.2Indirectutilitarianism
Aspaceformoralconflictemergesfromwithintheutilitarianresponsetooneofthe
strongestobjectionsagainstthetheory.Theobjectionisthatitistoodifficulttoconduct
ourmoraldeliberationsbytestingpossibleactsagainsttheprincipleofutility.Doingitwell
enoughtocomeclosetomeetingthestandardwouldrequireustoknowmanyfactswhich
weoftendonotknow:whatarethealternativecoursesofaction?Whatarepossible
outcomesofeachalternative?Whatarethelikelihoodsofeachoutcome?Whatdifference
willeachoutcomemaketothewelfareofeachpersonorotheranimalitaffects,including
thosewhohavenotyetbeenborn?Itwouldalsorequireustoresistthenaturalinclination
toallowthewelfareofthosewecareaboutmosttoinfluenceourdecisionsmorethanthe
welfareofunknown,distantothers.Andgiventhebriefamountoftimewehavetomake
moralchoicesbeforeourfailuretochooseimposesachoiceuponus,testingpossible
coursesofactionagainsttheutilitarianstandardcouldrequireustoperformenormously
complicatedfelicificcalculationsmorerapidlythanwepossiblycan.
Standardly,utilitariansrespondtothisobjectionbyadvocatinganindirectformof
utilitarianism.Therearevariousversionsofindirectutilitarianism,buttheiressenceisthe
same:thesurestroutetoutilitarianconductusuallyrunsthroughnon-utilitarianthinking.
Thispositionreliesonaconceptualdistinctionbetween1)thetestorcriterionof
rightaction,and2)eithertheprocedurebywhichoneidentifiestherightaction,orthe
motivefromwhichoneperformsit.AsSidgwicksays:
“ThedoctrinethatUniversalHappinessistheultimatestandardmustnotbeunderstoodtoimplythatUniversalBenevolenceistheonlyrightoralwaysbestmotiveofaction.For...itisnotnecessarythattheendwhichgivesthecriterionofrightnessshouldalwaysbetheendatwhichweconsciouslyaim:andifexperienceshowsthatthegeneralhappinesswillbemoresatisfactorilyattainedifmenfrequentlyactfromothermotivesthanpureuniversalphilanthropy,itisobviousthattheseothermotivesarereasonablytobepreferredonUtilitarianprinciples.”167
Indirectutilitariansholdthatexperienceshowsthatweareoftenmorelikelyto
meettheutilitarianstandardifweactfromothermotives,oruseothermethods;setting
167167Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,413.
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oursightsonsomethingotherthanmaximizingaggregatehappinessworksbetterthan
aimingstraightforit.Indirectutilitariansthereforeadvocatethegeneraldisuseof
impartialfelicificcalculationsinmoralthinking.
Instead,mostindirectutilitariansrecommendfollowingwhatMill,Sidgwick,and
Harerespectivelycallthe“receivedcodeofethics,”therulesof“commonsensemorality,”
or“intuitivelevelprinciples,”whichtheysayweabsorbthroughsocializationandwhich
havewhatVarnerdescribesasa“deontologicalflavor.”168Byfollowingtheserules,they
argue,oneismorelikelyinthelongruntoconformtotheutilitarianstandardthanby
attemptingtotesteachandeveryactionagainstthatstandard.
Sidgwick’sindirectutilitarianism
Sidgwick’sindirectutilitarianismrunsthroughtheverysameunconditionalrulesthathe
rejectsasindependentmoralaxioms.Hethinksthatthemethodofutilitarianismistostart
fromthemoralcodealreadyinplaceandtoenforceoramenditdependingonthe
consequencesofdoingso.Thus,utilitarianisminpracticeusuallycomesdownto“...a
comparisonbetweenthetotalamountsofpleasureandpainthatmaybeexpectedtoresult
respectivelyfrommaintaininganygivenruleasatpresentestablished,andfrom
endeavoringtointroducethatwhichisproposedinitsstead.”169
Sidgwickbelievesthatthiscomparisonwillfavorconservatism.Itwilllicensesmall,
incrementalchangestoasociety’sreceivedmoralcode,butnotradicalones.Theattempt
tomakeradicalchanges,especiallyiftheyarenegative,willlikelyweakenpeople’sresolve
totaketherestofthecodeseriously.
Sidgwickalsobelievesthattheprincipleofutilitymightlicenseitsowneffacement
fromthemoralthinkingofordinarypeople.Inparticularcases,knowledgeofautilitarian
exceptiontoacommonsensemoralrulemightbestbelimitedtoanelitewhocanbe
trustedneithertolettheknowledgeerodetheircommitmenttotherulewhenthe
exceptiondoesnotapply,nortobetemptedtocraftself-servingexceptionstootherrules.
168Mill,Utilitarianism,24;Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics(throughout);Hare,MoralThinking(throughout);Varner,Personhood,Ethics,AnimalCognition,83.169Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,477.
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Sidgwickevenentertainstheideathatmostpeoplearenotcapableofresponsiblyusingthe
utilitarianprincipleatall.Hesurmisesthatperhapsweshouldbeallowed—andmaybe
evenbeled—tobelievethatutilitydoesnotultimatelydeterminetherightnessofacts,and
doesnotjustifyouradherencetoostensiblydeontologicalmoralrules:
“...itmaybedesirablethatCommonSenseshouldrepudiatethedoctrineswhichitisexpedienttoconfinetoanenlightenedfew.AndthusaUtilitarianmayreasonablydesire,onUtilitarianprinciples,thatsomeofhisconclusionsshouldberejectedbymankindgenerally;oreventhatthevulgarshouldkeepalooffromhissystemasawhole,insofarastheinevitableindefinitenessandcomplexityofitscalculationsrenderitlikelytoleadtobadresultsintheirhands.”(ME,490)
TheunabashedelitismofSidgwick’searlyformofindirectutilitarianismisnow
rightlyconsideredunacceptable.Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianismprovidesabetter
alternative.
Hare’sindirectutilitarianism
Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianismoffersthemostfullydevelopedexplanationofindirect
utilitarianismthatIknowof.Itsdetailsmeritattention,becauseitpreparesthegroundfor
arichandnon-dismissiveaccountofmoralconflict,onewhichcanbeembracedby
utilitarianswhodonotaccepthisuniversalprescriptivistjustificationforutilitarianism.
ThetwolevelsofHare’sversionofindirectutilitarianismrefertohierarchically
relatedwaysofthinkingaboutmoralquestions.Atthecriticallevelofmoralthinking,one
usestheactutilitarianstandardofactiontodeterminewhetheranactionisuniversally
prescribable,orwhetheritwillmaximizeaggregateutility.Onlythismethodprovides
certaintyaboutwhetherawhetheraparticularactisrightorwronginthesense
elaboratedinsection2.1.SinceHarebelievesthatthejobofmoralphilosophyistohelp
peoplesolvetheirmoralproblemsanddisagreementsthroughthinkingrationally,his
theoryprivilegesthecriticallevel.
Asanexemplarofthisidealformofmoralthinking,Hareinvokesthearchangel.
Whenevertheinterestsofmorethanonepersonorotheranimalareatstake,thearchangel
immediatelyandunerringlyappropriatestheinterestsofeveryoneinvolved,determines
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whichofallpossibleactionswouldmaximizethesatisfactionofthoseinterestsand
performsthatactionwithouthesitation.
Wehumanbeingsrarelythinklikearchangels.Usually,wethinklikewhatHarecalls
proles.Withouttryingtogatheralltherelevantfacts,andwithouttryingtoextendour
empathybeyonditsnaturalterritory,wemakemoraljudgementsbasedsimplyonasense
ofrightandwrong.Thissenserevealsitselfthroughstabledispositionstoexperience
certainmoralsentimentsinrelationtoourownandother’sconduct.Forinstance,wetend
tofeelrepugnanceorqualmsattheprospectofcommittingcertainkindsofactions,andwe
tendtofeelmoralregretwhenwecommitthemanyway.Thoughwemaynotarticulate
themassuch,ourdispositionstoexperiencetheseemotionsamounttosimple,general
principlesofaction.Thelinkbetweenintuitivelevelprinciplesandmoralfeelingscouldnot
becloser.Harewrites:“Havingtheprinciples,intheusualsenseoftheword,ishavingthe
dispositiontoexperiencethefeelings.”170Ifwearewellbrought-up,welearnand
internalizetheseprinciplesinchildhood.Bythetimewereachadulthood,theyfeellike
intuitionsofmoralfacts.
Thinkingontheintuitivelevelhasalegitimaterolewithinutilitarianismprimarily
becauseconductingallofourmoraldeliberationatthecriticallevelisnotuniversalizably
prescribable,orconducivetothegreatestgood.Whilethecriticalmethodyieldsrational
moraljudgementswhenitisdonewell,wehumanbeingsdonotalwayshavewhatittakes
todoitwell.Indefendingthetwo-levelaccountofmoralthinking,RichardArnesonbluntly
explainsthatcriticalthinkingchallengesusbecause“humanshavecognitive,affectiveand
volitionaldisabilities.”171Itisnoaccidentthatonthisaccount,theidealmoralthinkerisnot
anexcellenthuman,butasupernaturalbeing.
ThoughweHomosapienscannotthinklikearchangelsmostofthetime,wearemore
orlesscapableoffollowinguncomplicated,broadlyapplicableprinciples—especiallywhen
thoseprinciplesimplicatemoralsentimentswithwhichweidentify.Ifoursimpleintuitive
principlesareonestheacceptanceofwhichwouldmaximizewelfareinthelongrun,then
theireverydayusewouldbesanctionedfromthecriticalstandpoint.Inotherwords,an
170Hare,MoralThinking,39.171Arneson,“WhatDoWeOwe?”289.
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archangelwhoknowsaboutourcognitive,emotional,andvolitional“disabilities”would
prescribethatwehumanbeingstendtoholdandtofollowsuchprinciplesratherthan
attemptcriticalthinkingeverytimewefindourselvesinsituationswhereouractionsmight
affectthewelfareofothers.172
Anarchangelwouldnotprescribethatwefollowourintuitiveprinciples
unwaveringly,however.Inextraordinarycases,wehumansmusthoistourselvesuptothe
criticalleveltoensurethatourintuitiveprinciplesreallydofunctiontomaximizewelfare,
eitheringeneralorinaparticularinstance(e.g.Isthewidespreaddisapprobationof
transsexualityuniversallyprescribable?ShouldIbreaktheruleagainstlyinginorderto
deceivethemurdereratmydoor?)Iftheydonot,wemustusecriticalthinkingtobanish
them,amendthem,orcarveoutexceptionstothem.Thiscanbeaprojectforeachofus,not
justforSidgwick’simaginedutilitarianelite.
Intuitiveprinciplesarenotfixed
Becausetheusefulnessofanintuitiveprincipledependsonhowsentientcreatureswillbe
affectedbyitsacceptance,andbecausethesefactsarenotimmutable,agood(thatis,
utility-maximizing)principleformembersofasocietyatonetimemightbebadatanother
time,orbadformembersofadifferentsociety.AsVarnersays“totheextentthatsocieties
facedifferentbackgroundecological,technologicalandeconomicconditions,thereshould
bevariationsacrosscultures”inintuitiveprinciples.173Two-levelutilitarianismthus
requiresanopennesstoabandoningorrevisingevenourdearestintuitiveprinciples,as
ourphysicalandsocialenvironmentschange.
172AutilitariancantakeupHare’stwo-levelswithoutcommittingtohistheoryofwelfareaspreferencesatisfaction.Inadditiontopreferenceordesiresatisfaction,someprominenttheoriesofwelfareincludehedonism,objectivelisttheories,hybridtheories,andeudaimonistictheories.Accordingtohedonism,welfareispleasureandtheabsenceofpain.Onobjectivelisttheories,onefareswelltotheextentthatone’slifecontainsorexemplifiesobjectivevalues(e.g.knowledge,achievement,alifethatisexemplaryofone’skind).Hybridtheoriesofwelfarecombineobjectivismaboutwhathaspotentialprudentialvaluewitharequirementthatasubjectmustfavorthosethingsinorderforthemtoenhancethesubject’swelfare.Eudaimonistsholdthatonefareswelltotheextentthatoneishappy,orasSumnerargues,authenticallysatisfiedorfulfilledbytheconditionsofone’slife.SeeSumner,Welfare,Happiness,andEthics,andHeathwood“Welfare”formoredetailedaccountsofvarioustheoriesofwelfare.173Varner,Personhood,Ethics,AnimalCognition,51.
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Evenwithinthesamesocietyatthesametime,differentpeoplewillhavedifferent
setsofgoodintuitiveprinciples.Inadditiontoprinciples“commontoall,”Harepointsout
thattherewillbespecialprinciples“commontoparticularroles,”aswellasonesthatare
“personaltoindividuals.”174Heobservesthatasapersonencountersnovelmoral
problems,theymightupdatetheirsetofintuitiveprinciplestodealwiththem.Since
differentpeopleencounterdifferentproblems,weshouldexpectthemtoreviseor
complexifytheirintuitiveprinciplesindifferentways.Also,regardlessofthekindsofmoral
questionstheyencounter,somepeoplewillsimplybebetteratcriticalmoralthinkingthan
others.Theintuitiveprinciplesofthosewhocantrustthemselvestothinklikearchangels
willtendtobedifferentfromandlikelymoresophisticatedthantheonesheldbypeople
whorarelydaretoquestionthesimplerulestheyhaveinherited.
Peoplewithincertainsectorsorcommunitieswillencountersimilarkindsof
problemsthatotherswillnot,andtheymighthavespecialresponsibilitiesforresponding
totheseoneveryoneelse’sbehalf.Forinstance,weshouldexpectpoliceofficerstohave
andtopropagateamongthemselvesprinciplesconcerningtheenforcementoflawwhich
arericherandmorecomplexthanthosewhoarenotpolice(inlightofwhathasbeen
revealedaboutsystematicallyunjustpolicingintheU.S.andCanada,Ishouldpointoutthat
theprinciplesspecialtomembersofaprofessionmightnotbeoptimific)or,healthcare
giverstohaveandtopropagatearicherandmorecomplexsetofprinciplesrelatedto
treatingpatients,etc.
Becausepeopledonotallhavethesameabilitytoperformcriticalmoralthinking,
andbecausewedonotallfacethesamekindsofmoralproblems,orfacethemwiththe
samefrequency,differentpeoplewillhavedifferentsetsofgoodintuitiveprinciples,
includingprinciplesregardingwhentothinkaboutmoralquestionsfromthecritical
standpointandwhentoremainattheintuitivelevel.Andnoone’ssetofgood,orutility
maximizing,principleswillalwayspointtowardthesameactionthattheprincipleofutility
does.
Tobringhomethesepoints,taketheexampleoftwodifferentagentswho
separatelyfindthemselvesinsimilarsituations:theybothwitnessanaggressorattackinga
174Hare,MoralThinking,203.
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thirdperson.Assumethatinbothcases,harmingtheaggressorindefenseofthevictim
wouldleadtomoreutilitythananyofthealternatives,suchasfleeing,callinglaw
enforcement,doingnothing,ortryingtotalktheaggressoroutoftheirviolentstate.
Imaginethatthefirstagenthasanintuitivelevel“donotharm”principlethatisqualifiedto
admitofanexceptionfordefendingothers,andthatitmaximizesutilityforthemtohold
exactlythisprinciple.Thismightbebecausetheagentislikelytofacesituationsinwhich
theonlywaytopreventonepersonfromattackinganotheristoharmthewould-be
attacker,theyarestrongandskillfulenoughtointervenewithoutsufferingseriousinjury,
areunlikelytobeconfusedaboutwhentheconditionsofthequalificationaremet,andwill
notbeencouragedbyajustifiedexceptionto“donotharm”tomakeunjustifiedexceptions
toit.Incontrast,theotheragentdoesnotqualifytheir“donotharm”principle,andit
maximizesutilityforthemnottodoso.Thiscouldbebecausetheyhaveneverandwill
neveragainfindthemselvesinasituationwhereinvokingthedefenseexceptioniscalled
for,becausetheytendtomakebadjudgementsaboutwhenaggressionisappropriate,
becausetheyarepronetouseexcessiveforce,orbecausetheyareusuallyunabletouse
forceeffectively.Whenfacedwiththesituationdescribedabove,thesecondagent’sutility-
maximizingprinciplewillruleoutthecourseofactionrequiredbytheprincipleofutility,
whilethefirstagent’swillnot.
2.3Thesecondsenseofwrongness:violatingagoodintuitiveprinciple
Aswehaveseen,onewayforanactiontobewrongfromtheutilitarianperspectiveisforit
toviolatetheprincipleofutility,ortobringaboutlesswelfarethananavailablealternative
would.Inthissense,itwouldbewrongforeitheroftheagentstorefrainfromharmingthe
attackerintheexampleabove.Yettwo-levelutilitarianismentailsanotherwayforan
actiontobewrong:itiswrongifitviolatesagoodintuitivelevelprinciple.Inthissense,it
wouldbewrongforthesecondagenttoharmtheattacker.
Toseehowthiscanbe,letusreturntotheconceptofmoralregret.Inchapterone,I
explainedthatmoralregretisagentregretforanactionthatisinsomewaywrong.Thatan
actiswrong,andthatmoralregretiswarrantedbythepersonwhodoesit,implyeach
other.Soifmoralregretiswarrantedbyanagentforanactionoftheirs,thenthataction
waswronginsomeway.Utilitariansacceptthatmoralregretsignalsajudgementthatone
108
hasdonesomethingwrong.AsHaresays,“remorse...impliesthethoughtthatIoughtnot
tohavedonewhatIdid.”175Ofcourse,Icanbemistakenaboutwhethermyactionwas
wrong,andsomymoralregretaboutitcouldbeinappropriateorunwarranted.According
totwolevelutilitarianism,actionsthatviolatetheprincipleofutilityarenottheonlyones
thatwarrantmoralregret.Moralregretcanalsobewarrantedbyactionsthatviolate
intuitiveprincipleseveniftheydonotviolatetheprincipleofutility.
Recallthatbeingdisposedtofeelcertainmoralsentiments,includingmoralregret,
aboutatypeofactionispartofwhatitistoholdanintuitive-levelprinciplethatforbids
thattypeofaction.Tobewarrantedinholdingtheprincipleistobewarrantedinfeeling
moralregretforviolatingit.Anagentiswarranted—evenrequired—tohold(or,todevelop
andmaintainthedispositionsthatconstituteholding)aprincipleifftheirholdingitwould
leadthemtomaximizewelfareoverthelongterm.Theyarethereforewarrantedinfeeling
moralregretaboutviolatingit.Violatingitwouldbewrong.
Sotwolevelutilitarianismaccommodatestwowaysinwhichanactioncanbe
wrong:itcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewrongin
virtueofviolatinganintuitiveprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagentto
hold.Thissecondsenseofwrongnessdoesnotcollapseintothefirst.Ifitdid,theclassof
actionsthatarewronginthesecondsensewouldinevitablyoverlapperfectlywiththe
classthatarewronginthefirstone.Butitdoesnot.Astheexampleaboveillustrates,
intuitiveprinciplesthatleadtowelfaremaximizationoverthelongtermdonotnecessarily
pickoutthewelfaremaximizingactineveryinstance.
Beforemovingaheadtoexaminewhetherthesecondkindofwrongnessgives
utilitarianismroomtoaccommodatemoralconflict,itisworthaddressingitssusceptibility
toarepeatedcriticismofindirectutilitarianism.Thecriticismproblematizesthegap
betweendispositionsattheintuitivelevel,andthejudgementsthatwouldbemadeatthe
criticallevel.AmongthosewholodgethiscriticismisBernardWilliams,whosaysthatby
construingintuitivelevelprinciplesessentiallyasstrategiesforfulfillingtheprincipleof
utility,two-levelutilitarianisminstrumentalizestheformer.Thus,afissureemerges
betweenthemeaningoftheintuitiveprinciplesatthecriticallevel,andthemeaningof
175Hare,MoralThinking,28.
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themaslivedbythosewhoholdthem,forwhom“theyaredispositionsnotsimplyofaction
butoffeelingandjudgementandtheyareexpressedpreciselyinascribingintrinsicvalueto
suchthingsastruthtelling,loyalty,andsoon.”176Accordingtoutilitarianism,onlywelfare
hasintrinsicvalue.Butitcanbeoptimificforpeopletoholdintuitiveprinciplesrequiring
themtoprotectothervalues.Sobyencouragingpeopletofeelandtobelievethatveracity,
loyalty,andothervaluesprotectedbygoodintuitiveprincipleshaveintrinsicvalue,two
levelutilitarianism“demeansmostmoralagents.”177
Notallintuitivelevelprinciplesdemeaninthisway,however.Holdingprinciples
thatprescribebenefittingothers,andthatprohibitharmingothers,encouragethosewho
holdthemtovalueforitsownsakeexactlywhatthetheorydoes:welfare.Soatleastsome
intuitivelevelprinciplesarenotsusceptibletoWilliams’otherwisetrenchantcritique.
3.ThePossibilityofMoralConflictwithinUtilitarianism
Utilitarianscanandshouldacknowledgetwowaysinwhichanagent’sactcanbewrong:it
canbewronginvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewronginvirtueof
violatinganotherprinciplewhichtheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.
Conflictoccurswhenalloftheactionsavailabletoapersonareinsomewaywrong.
Ipointedoutinsection2(TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness)thatitisimpossiblefora
persontofaceasituationinwhichalltheactionsavailabletothemarewronginthefirst
sense.Yetitispossibleforapersontofaceasituationinwhichtheymusteitherdo
somethingthatiswronginthefirstsense,orsomethingthatiswronginthesecondsense.
Oneoftheagentsinthedefense-of-anotherexamplefindsthemselvesinthiskindof
conflict;notharmingtheattackerwouldbewrongin(atleast)thefirstsense,butharming
themwouldbewronginthesecondsense.Itisalsopossibleforapersontofaceasituation
inwhichwhatevertheydowillbewronginthesecondsense.Forinstance,imaginea
palliativecarephysicianwhohasamoralcommitmenttohelpingherpatientsliveoutthe
176Williams,EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy,108.177ThisisaquotefromBarbaraHerman,in“ObligationandPerformance,”313.ItisworthnotingthatherversionoftheobjectiondiffersslightlyfromWilliams’s.Shefaults“indirectioninmorality”forencouragingpeopletobelieveandtofeelthatcertainactsarewrong,eventhoughtheactsnotwrong.ThisversionoftheobjectiondoesnotcutintoutilitarianismasIhaveinterpretedit.Onmyinterpretation,violationsofintuitiveprinciplesreallyarewrong,albeitnotinvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility.
110
endsoftheirlivesinwhateverwaysarebestforthem,andwhoalsobelievesandfeels
deeplythatitwouldbewrongforhertokillapatient.Ifoneofthephysician’spatientstells
herthattheywouldfarratherbeeuthanizedthanliveoutthelastfewweeksoftheirlifein
eithermiseryorsemi-consciousness,andifthephysicianhasnodoubtthatthepatient’s
desireisfirmandcohereswiththeirlifelongvalues,andifthepatientisphysicallyunable
toadministerlife-endingdrugstothemselves,thephysiciancouldfaceasituationinwhich
whatevershedoeswillbewronginthesecondsense(whichisnottodenythatoneofthe
coursesofactionthatiswronginthesecondsenseisalsowronginthefirstsense).
Istipulatedthatthestrictandsimple“donotharm”principleheldbytheagentin
thedefense-of-anotherexampleisagoodprinciple,thatis,itmaximizesutilityfortheagent
toholdit.Notalloftheintuitiveprinciplesheldbyeveryagentaregood,though.Thisis
whytwo-levelutilitarianismrequiresussometimestohoistourselvesuptothecritical
leveltoensurethatourintuitiveprinciplesreallydofunctiontomaximizewelfare.A
conflictinvolvingintuitiveprinciplescompelsatwo-levelutilitariantorevisitthose
principles.AsHaresays,“thoughingeneralitisbadpolicytoquestionone’sprimafacie
principles...conflicts...forceustodothis(hencetheanguish).”178Conflictsforceustodo
thispartlybecausetheycallintoquestiontheutilityofasetofprinciples;aconflictingsetis
notnecessarilynon-optimific,butallelsebeingequalconflictproduceslessutilitythan
harmonydoes.Also,whentwointuitiveprinciplesconflict,anagentcanfindthemselvesat
apracticalimpasse.Insuchcases,everydaymoralthinkingfailstoguideaction,andcritical
thinkingisrequired.
Harereferstotwodifferentoutcomesofsuchquestioning:thequalification,andthe
overridingofatleastoneoftheprinciples.Thoughhedoesnotdescribetheseoutcomesin
muchdetail,drawingouttheimplicationsofhisdistinctionhelpsmakesenseofhow
intuitivelevelconflictcanpersistevenafterresolutionatthecriticallevel.
178Hare,MoralThinking,50.
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3.1Qualifyingandoverridingintuitiveprinciples
Qualifyingaprincipleinvolvesrevisingitsuchthatitnolongertriggersaconflict.For
example,onemightamendtheprinciple“Neverphi,”to“Neverphi,exceptincircumstances
likeC.”AsHaresays,“Thisqualificationofprincipleswillhavebroughtwithitaresolution
oftheconflict,becausetheprinciples,asqualified,arenolongerinconsistentevenper
accidens.”179
Becauseintuitiveprinciplesinvolveemotionaldispositions,whenanintuitive
principleisqualified,thedispositionsofthosewhoholditwillchange.Forexample,
someonewhowasoncedisposedtobalkattheprospectofadulteryinanyformmight
graduallyceasetofeelmoralregretorindignationaboutextramaritalsexcarriedoutwith
thewholeheartedconsentofbothspouses,orjustpriortothesettlementofamutually
soughtdivorce.Althoughhesaysthat“peoplewhohavebeenthroughsuchcrises[conflicts
thatleadtoqualifyingprinciples]oftenthinkdifferentlythereafteraboutsome
fundamentalmoralquestions,”Haredoesnotemphasizethefactthatqualifyingaprinciple
willleadtoashiftinprincipleholders’judgementsaboutandemotionalresponsesto
behaviorsthattheprinciplenolongercovers,orthatithasonlyjustbeguntocover.180
However,theinevitabilityofthisshiftfollowsfromhischaracterizationofthesentimental
dimensionofintuitiveprinciples,andmarksanimportantcontrastwithwhatoccurswhen
aprincipleisoverriddenratherthanqualified.
Haresaysthatinsteadofusingcriticalmoralthinkingtoqualifytheprinciplesthat
generateconflict,onecoulduseittodeterminewhichcourseofactiontotakeina
particularcaseofconflict.Takingonecourseratherthantheotheramountstooverriding
one(ormore)oftheconflict-generatingprinciples.AccordingtoHare,tooverridea
principleisnottoalterit,buttodecidenottofollowitinaparticularsituation.Becausea
personretainstheprinciplestheyoverride,andbecauseholdingaprincipleinvolvesbeing
disposedtothinkthatiswrongtoactagainstit,andtoexperiencemoralregretforhaving
doneso,usingcriticalthinkingtochoosewhichprincipletooverridedoesnotremovethe
179Ibid.,51.180Ibid.
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phenomenaofconflicteventhoughitsolvesthepracticalpuzzleofwhattodofromwithin
thatconflict.“Thegoodutilitarianwillreachsuchdecisions,butreachthemwithgreat
reluctancebecauseofhisingrainedgoodprinciples;andhemayagonize,andwillcertainly
reflect,aboutthem.”181
Harewritesasthoughusingcriticalthinkingtodecidewhichconflict-generating
principletooverrideisonlyatemporarysolutiontoconflict.Eventually,theprinciples
themselvesmustbeexaminedcriticallyand,heimplies,qualified.Hare’sgoodutilitarian
will“agonize,andwillcertainlyreflect,aboutthemtillhehassortedoutbycriticalthinking,
notonlywhatheoughttohavedoneintheparticularcase,butwhathisprimafacieprinciples
oughttobe.”(emphasesadded)182Thattheutilitarianwillagonizeuntilhehascritically
scrutinizedhisprinciplesimpliesthattheresultofsuchscrutinywillbeaconflict-skirting
qualificationofthoseprinciples.Afterqualification,theoriginalconflictwillbeseenas
havingbeenonlyapparent.Theutilitarian’soriginalsensethattheactrequiredbythe
principleofutilitywassomehowwrongwasnotwarrantedbecausetheintuitiveprinciple
thattheactviolatedwasnotonethattheywerewarrantedinholding.Thatis,itwasnot
optimificforthemtoholdit,whichiswhyitdidnotwithstandcriticalscrutiny.
Yetitwouldbeamistaketoassumethateverytimeintuitiveprinciplesconflict,the
resultofcriticalmoralthinkingwillbetoqualifyatleastoneoftheminawaythat
eliminatestheconflict.Criticalthinkingwillcallforqualifyinganintuitiveprincipleif,and
onlyif,theacceptanceutilityofthequalifiedversionisatleastashighasthatoftheoriginal
one.Frequentconflictswouldbeamongthethingsthatlessenaprinciple’sacceptance
utility.YetasHarehimselfpointsout,sowouldbeconfusingcomplexity,andatendencyto
weakenagents’resolvetofollowtheprincipleevenwhenqualificationsdonotaffectits
bearing.Thus,itcouldbethecasethatalthoughcertainpairs(orsets)ofprinciples
engenderconflict,criticalthinkingwouldconcludethatitisbettertokeepthembothintact
thantoqualifyeitheroneofthem.
Whenapair(orset)ofoptimificprinciplesyieldsincompossibleprescriptionsfor
action,howdoesapersondecidewhattodo?BecauseHaredoesnotdirectlyaddressthe
181Ibid.182Ibid.,51-2.
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possibilityofthistypeofconflict,hedoesnotdirectlyanswerthisquestion.Nonetheless,
theanswerisclear:overrideoneoftheprinciples.Sincetheprincipleshavealreadybeen
deemedoptimific,qualification—theonlyalternativetooverriding—makesnosense.
AsIexplainedabove,thequalificationofaprincipleshouldleadtoaneventual
changeinthedispositionsofthosewhoholdit.Theywillresistandeventuallyovercome
experiencingoffenseormoralregretinresponsetoactionsthatanamendedprincipleno
longerprohibits.Overriddenprinciples,ontheotherhand,willcontinuetoprohibitthe
actionswhichcriticalthoughtjustifiesinparticularcasesofconflict,sothosewhohold
themwilltendtofeelmoralregretforhavingviolatedthem.Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianism
impliesthatoneshouldnotresistordiscouragethisaslongascriticalthinkinghasshown
thattheoverriddenprincipleisagoodonetokeep.Inthatcase,themoralregretwillbe
warranted,andsoactingagainsttheoverriddenprinciplewillbewrong,despitenot
violatingtheprincipleofutility.
3.2Ephemeralandpersistentconflicts
Critical-levelscrutinybreaksthepracticalimpassethatconflictscancreate.Ifthescrutiny
resultsinthequalificationofatleastoneofthe(setsof)conflictingprinciples,thenthe
conflictwillhavebeenephemeral,ormerelyapparent.Whatseemedtobeagoodprinciple
wasnotinfactutility-maximizing.ThisisthekindofresolutionofwhichWilliamssays“it
explainstheoriginofmyconflictasnothavingcometothesituationsufficientlyprepared,
becauseIhadtoosimpleasetofmoralprinciples;anditpicturesmeasemergingfromthe
situationbetterpreparedsinceIhavenowmodifiedthem—Icanfacearecurrenceofthe
samesituationwithoutqualms,sincenexttimeitwillnotpresentmewithaconflict.”183
Moralregretwillnotbewarrantedbyalloftheactionsavailabletome—theywillnotallbe
wronginsomeway,despitehavinginitiallyappearedtohavebeenso.Yet,contraWilliams,
notallutilitarianresolutionsofconflictextinguishthem.Ifcriticalthinkingvalidatesthe
conflictingprinciplesandsocallsforoverridingthemcase-by-caseratherthanqualifying
themonceandforall,thepracticalimpassewillbebreached,buttheconflictwillpersist.I
willhavebeenandIwillcontinuetobejustifiedinholdingtheoverriddenprinciple(s)in
183Williams,EthicalConsistency,176.
114
itsconflict-generatingform,Iwillrightlycontinuetoexperiencequalmsinsimilar
circumstances,andmoralregretwillbewarrantedonmypartnomatterwhatIdointhem.
Thatis,eachofmyavailableactionswillbewronginsomeway.
Iftherecoverypredicamentisatleastanephemeralconflict,bothrecoveryand
refrainingfromrecoverymustviolateoneormoreintuitivemoralprinciples.Ifitistobea
persistentconflict—arealmoralconflict—foreachcourseofactionitmustbeoptimificto
retainoneormoreoftheprinciplesitviolates,evenaftertheprinciplehasbeenimplicated
inthepredicament.
3.3Tragicconflictswithinutilitarianism
Aschapteroneexplains,aconflictistragicwhenthewrongsamongwhichapersonmust
choseareserious;whichmeansthatremorsewouldbeafittingresponsetohavingtaken
anyofthepossiblecoursesofactioninsuchsituations.Likemoralconflictsingeneral,
tragicconflictscanbeeitherephemeralorpersistentwithintheutilitarianframework.An
ephemeraltragicconflictoccurswhenthefollowingtwothingshold.First,eachofthe
actionsavailabletoapersonwouldseriouslyviolateatleastoneoftheirintuitivelevel
principles.Inotherwords,thepersonisdisposedtofeelremorseforhavingdoneanyof
theactions,andtojudgethatdoinganyofthemwouldwrongfullybringaboutorconstitute
asignificantlosstosomethingoffundamentalmoralvalue.Second,criticallevelscrutiny
willshowthatitisnotoptimificforthepersontohavesuchdispositionsregardingatleast
oneofthepossiblecoursesofaction;theremorsethattheyaredisposedtofeelisnot
warranted,thecourseofactionisnotseriouslywrong.Thepersonshouldthusqualifythe
intuitiveprinciplessuchthattheynolongergenerateatragicconflictinthissituationorin
oneslikeit.
Incontrast,atragicconflictispersistent,orreal,ifforeachpossiblecourseofaction,
atleastoneoftheperson’sintuitiveprinciplesforbiddingitmaximizesutilityinitstragic
conflict-generatingform.Itisoptimificforthepersontobedisposedtojudgeasthough
violatingitisnotjustwrongbutseriouslywrong,andtofeelremorseabouthavingviolated
it.
115
Insection4,below,Iarguethattherecoverypredicamentcanbeatleastan
apparentorephemeralconflictformostormanyofthepeopleincontemporarysocieties
thatcreateit,andthatforsomeofthem,itcanalsoappearasatragicconflict.Insection5,I
arguethatwecannotknowwhetheritisarealorpersistentconflict.Giventhecomplexity
ofthebenefit-harmanalysis(BHA)thatwewouldhavetoconductinordertohaveasense
ofwhetherpreservingtheprincipleswillproducemorewelfarethanmakingconflict-
evadingchangestothem,andgiventheradicaluncertaintyofmanyoftheassumptionswe
wouldhavetomakeinordertorunthisBHA,wecannothaveanyconfidenceinitsresults.
4.TheRecoveryPredicamentisatLeastanEphemeralConflict
Ihopetohaveshowninchapteronethatintherecoverypredicament,itcertainlyseemsas
thoughwhateverwedowillwarrantremorse.Eitherwewillfailtopreventthehuman-
causedextinctionofaspecies,orwewillundertakecaptivebreeding,translocation,and
removalofpopulationsthatthreatenrecovery.Ontheutilitarianaccountofconflict,this
mustbebecauseeachpossiblecourseofactionviolatesatleastoneintuitive-levelmoral
principle.Whataretheprinciplestheyviolate?
Whataretheprinciplestheyviolate,andforwhom?Insection2.2(Indirect
utilitarianism),Iexplainedhowaccordingtotwolevelutilitarianism,differentpeoplewill
havedifferentsetsofintuitiveprinciples.Therecoveryconflictmightnotregisterasa
conflictforeveryone,becauseevenwithinasinglesociety,theprinciplesitinvolvesneed
notbeuniversallyheld.Inadditiontoaskingwhataretheprinciplesatriskofbeing
violatedintherecoveryconflict,wethereforeneedtoaskwhoseprinciplestheyare.
Intuitiveprinciplesinvolvedintherecoverypredicament
Ithinkthattherecoveryconflictwillregisterasaconflictformanypeoplewholiveinthe
societiesthatencourageandbenefitfromtheactivitiesthatdrivespeciestoextinction,and
thatundertakethespeciesrecoveryprocess.Inthenextsection,Iwillofferevidencethat
theprinciplesthatautilitarianmightclaimtounderlietheconflictareonesthatare
commonlyheldinCanadaandtheUnitedStates.Inthissection,Iendeavortoidentifywhat
thoseprinciplesare.
116
Ifprinciplesareabstractionsfromimmediateemotionalreactionstoand
judgementsaboutparticularactions,thenagoodwaytoidentifyprincipleswouldbeto
workbackwardfromthosereactionsandjudgements.Onehasbetteraccesstotheirown
experiencesandjudgementsthantheydotoothers’.SoIwillbeginbytryingtoidentifythe
principlesthatmightunderlieorexplainmyownexperienceoftherecoveryconflictasa
situationinwhichbothpossiblecoursesofactionarelamentable,andevenwrong.
Preciselywhatisitaboutthecoursesofactionthatdisturbme,thatsetoffmy
moral-emotionalalarmbells,thatappeartowarrantremorse?184Ontheutilitarianaccount,
theanswerstothesequestionswillpointtowardprinciples.Iwillstartwiththerecovery
alternative,takingtheislandfoxcaseasanexampleandfocusingonwhatpeopledidtothe
foxknownas81659(pleaseseethefirstsectionofchapteronefordetails).
ThemainthingsatwhichIbalkinthiscasearethatpeoplesevered81659fromher
mostimportantsocialrelationships,thattheyremovedherfromtheplacesinwhichshe
knewhowtosustainherself,togetsafe,andtofindcomfort,thattheyconfinedher,that
theyforcedhertoassociatewithafoxshewouldhaveavoidedifshewerenottrapped,and
thattheyputherinasituationinwhichshewasunabletoprotectherownbodyandlife.I
believeIdonotunjustifiablyanthropomorphize81659inassumingthatbydoingthis,
peoplecausedhergreatsorrow,anxiety,confusion,frustration,pain,fear,andlikelyeven
terror.Becausecausingeachofthesethingsisawayofseriouslyharmingsomeone,ifthere
isagenericprincipleunderlyingmyrepugnanceformuchofwhatpeopledidto81659,it
mightbe:donotinflictseriousharmonothers.SinceIamdisposedtocondemnnotonly
thosewhodidthesethingto81659,butalsotherestofusinwhosenameitwasdone,I
mightaddtothistheprincipledonotbecomplicitintheinflictionofseriousharmon
others.
184Here,IfollowJoshuaGreeneinlikeningpeople’simmediateandforcefulmoralconvictionsto“alarmbells.”However,Iremainneutralon,orevenwaryof,Greene’sexplanationfortheanalogy.Inhisview,ourmoralalarmbellsare“designedtomakeacleardemandthatisextremelydifficulttoignore.”(emphasisadded).Adheringtoadualprocesstheoryofcognition,hethinksthattheyemergefromwhatDanielKahnemancallscognitivesystem1,whichisinstantaneous,automatic,andnon-conscious.Incontrast,cognitivesystem2ischaracterizedbytheslow,effortful,conscious,andrule-basedthinking,whichmanyiswhatpeopleengageinwhentheyconducttheirmoraldeliberationbytestingalternativesagainstthestandardofutility(seeGreene,“SecretJoke,”andKahneman,ThinkingFastandSlow).
117
Theseprinciplescouldalsoexplainmyinclinationtocondemnandtofeel
remorsefulaboutotherpartsoftherecoveryalternative.Forcinganimalstobreed,and
forcingthemtodosoatshorterintervalsthantheydointhewildimposesonthem
physiologicalandprobablypsychologicalstress.Italsomakessensetothinkthatdepriving
themoftheirownchoiceofmateorcompanions,andtakingthemfromafamiliarplacein
whichtheyarethrivingtoanunfamiliaronewheretheywillfacerisksforwhichtheyare
possiblyunprepared(translocation,re-introduction)cancauseanimalstosuffer,andso
wouldbeprimafacieviolationsoftheprincipledonotseriouslyharmorbecomplicitin
seriouslyharmingothers.
Myflinchingatrecoveryisnotlimitedtothesufferingitcauses.Recoveryalso
involveskillinghealthyanimals,andthisappearsasmorallyregrettablewhetherornotitis
accompaniedbysuffering.Killingbarredowlswhowerethrivingseemstobewhatcaused
Dillersuchanxiety,eventhoughasanexperiencedandcarefulhunterhedidhisutmostto
killtheminstantlyandpainlessly.Asecondsetofprinciplesmightbe:donotkillorbe
complicitinkilling.
Anotheraspectofrecoverythatdisturbsmeistheintensityofcontrolthatpeople
exertoverotheranimals.Incaptivity,andespeciallyincaptivebreedingprograms,what
wouldseemtobeamongthemostimportantaspectsofananimal’slifearealmost
completelymanagedbypeople.Suchthoroughcontrolappearswrong,evenasidefromthe
harmIimaginethatitmustinflict.Soathirdpairofprinciplesmightbe:donotcontrol
others,anddonotbecomplicitincontrollingothers.
Recoverycanalsoinvolveafailuretocareforthosewhomonehasmadedependent
ononeself.IdonothaveanimmediatesenseofwrongnesswhenIthinkaboutdeathor
sufferingthathasnothingtodowithhumanagency(thereisasenseofbadness,butnotthe
moralregretorcondemnationthatsignalswrongness).Yetwhenpeoplehaveputothersin
situationsinwhichthethingstheyneedtolive,andtolivewell,dependalmostentirely
uponourchoices,itimmediatelyseemswrongnottodowhatisnecessaryforthemnot
onlytosurvivebutalsotofarewell.Thus,afourthpairofprinciplesmightbe:whenyou
makeothersdependentonyourself,donotdeprivethemofthingstheyneedinorderto
livewell,anddonotbecomplicitinsuchdeprivation.
118
Finally,Iamdisturbedbythefactthatinrecovery,otheranimalsarecontrolled,die,
enduresuffering,andarenottreatedwiththecarecalledforbytheirdependence,allinthe
serviceofanendthattheanimalsneitherknownorcareanythingabout.Manyofthe
regrettablethingsthathappentotheminrecoveryarenotinstrumentaltotheirown
welfareoragency.Thebenefitaccruesalmostentirelytoothers,notleasttothehumans
whocareaboutspeciesandecosystemsassuch.185Afifthsetofprinciplesviolatedbythe
recoveryalternativemightbe:donotexploitothers,anddonotbecomplicitintheir
exploitation.
Intherecoverypredicament,whatintuitiveprinciplesareviolatedbythe
alternativeinwhichaspeciesisallowedtogoextinct?Myoriginalnegativeemotional
responsetothisisarousedbythedestructionofanalmostunthinkablycomplexand
wonderfulwayofbeingalive,theresultofeonsofunrepeatableevents(suchasbirths,
pairings,deaths,foraysintonewterritories,trialsofnovelbehaviors,mutations).The
principlethisrevealsmightsimplybe:donotcause,orcontributetocausing,another
speciestogoextinct,anddonotbecomplicitincausingextinction.
Inaddition,someofmyintuitiveprinciplesthatareviolatedbyrecoveryarealso
violatedbyextinction.Likerecovery,extinctioncancausesufferinganddeath(the
proximatecauseoftheislandfox’sextinctionwouldhavebeenearlydeathsvia
eviscerationbyeagles,andiftheygoextinct,thelastnorthernspottedowlswillgowithout
matesandyoung,andprobablywithoutterritories),soanthropogenicextinctioncan
violatetheprinciplesagainstcausingorbeingcomplicitincausingsufferinganddeath.
Assumingforthesakeofargumentthatintuitive-levelprinciplesunderlieorare
constitutedbymyimmediate,concretereactionstorecoveryandextinction,Ithinkthat
thesearetheprinciples.Itwouldbetooeasytodismisstheconflictbypointingoutthatthe
principlesarenotabsolute.Onreflection,Icanseethatkillingisnotalwayswrong,that
185J.M.Coetzee’sfictionalElizabethCostelloexpressesakindredideamoreeloquently,whenshesays“Anecologicalphilosophythattellsustolivesidebysidewithothercreaturesjustifiesitselfbyappealtoanidea,anideaofahigherorderthananylivingcreature.Anidea,finally—andthisisthecrushingtwisttotheirony—whichnocreatureexceptmaniscapableofcomprehending.Everylivingcreaturefightsforitsown,individuallife,refuses,byfighting,toaccedetotheideathatthesalmonorthegnatisofalowerorderofimportancethantheideaofthesalmonorthegnat.”Coetzee,ElizabethCostello,99.
119
inflictingseriousharmcansometimesbejustified,andthatinsomecasesitmightbebest
toallowaspeciestogoextinct.Itisjustthatevenjustifiedviolationsoftheprinciples
triggeramoral-emotionalrecoil.Thatispartofwhatitmeanstosaythattheyare
principles.
Theprinciplescomeintwosets.Theprinciplesagainstharming,killing,controlling,
neglecting,andexploitingothersmakeupthesetaccordingtowhichrecoveryiswrong.I
willcallthistheNoMistreatmentset.Thesetaccordingtowhichitiswrongnotto
undertakerecoverycomprisestheNoExtinctionset.Itisimportanttonotethatholding
justoneprinciplefromeachsetcangiverisetotherecoveryconflict.
Someevidencethatmoralprinciplesagainstmistreatingotheranimalsarecommonlyheld
Idonotthinkmuchargumentneedstobemadefortheclaimthatmostpeople--whetherin
NorthAmericaoranywhereelse—tendtothinkthatprotanto,itiswrongtoinflictserious
harmonothers.AsShaunNicholsnotes,“normalhumanshavestronglyaversiveemotional
responsestosufferinginothers,”suchresponsesareprobablyinnate,and(consequently,
hethinks)normsthatprohibitharmexistandpersistacrosscultures.186
OnequestioniswhethermostofusintheU.S.andCanadalimitthisprinciplesoas
toforbidonlyharmstohumanbeings(or,whetherwehaveextendedittoforbidharming
otheranimals).Ithinkthatmostofusdonotsolimitit,buttheevidenceisadmittedly
mixed.Anotherquestioniswhethermostofusextendtoanimalstheotherprinciplesinthe
NoMistreatmentset.Whileitshouldbepossibleinprincipletodisentanglepeople’s
adherencetothevariousprinciplesinthisset,inpracticeitisnot.Theevidencefor
people’smoralapprobationordisapprobationofthedifferentformsofmistreatmentisnot
fine-grainedenoughtodistinguishbetweencausingsuffering,killing,controlling,
exploiting,andneglecting.
Muchofourcollectivebehaviorbeliesacommonprincipleforbiddingthesekindsof
mistreatmentofotheranimals.Foroneofmanyexamples,99%ofthe9.1billionfarm
186Nichols,“SentimentalismNaturalized,”271.
120
animalskilledforfoodeachyearintheUS,and95%ofthe665millionkilledinCanada
livedtheirlivesinthedeplorableconditionsoffactoryfarms.
Ontheotherhand,pollssuggestthatintheU.S.,mostpeoplecareabouthowother
animalsaretreated,andbelievethattheyshouldbeprotected.Independentlyofeach
other,YouGovandGallupintervieweddifferentsamplesof1000randomlychosenadults
fromacrossthecountry.187ExactlythreequartersofthosepolledbyYouGovthoughtthat
animalsshouldbeaffordedsomelegalprotections,andabarelysmallerpercentage—
74%—saidtheybelievethatanimalshaverights.TheGalluppollproducedsimilarresults.
AmongthequestionsGallupaskedwasthefollowing.“Whichofthesestatementscomes
closesttoyourviewaboutthetreatmentofanimals:animalsdeservetheexactsamerights
aspeopletobefreefromharmandexploitation,animalsdeservesomeprotectionfrom
harmandexploitation,butitisstillappropriatetousethemforthebenefitofhumans,or
animalsdon'tneedmuchprotectionfromharmandexploitationsincetheyarejust
animals.”Only3%ofrespondentsthoughtthestatementdismissiveofprotectionbest
capturedtheirbelief,while94%believedthatanimalsdeserveatleastsomeprotection
againstharmandexploitation.Thisgroupincludedthe32%ofrespondentswhothought
thattheirviewwasbestrepresentedbytheclaimthatotheranimalsdeservethesame
rightsaspeople.
Inadditiontopublicopinionpolls,atrendinlegislationthatprotectsotheranimals
givessomesupporttotheclaimthatmostpeopleinCanadaandtheU.S.holdatleastoneof
theprinciplesintheNoMistreatmentset.Lawspassedbylegislaturesandbyreferenda
tendincreasinglytoprotectotheranimalsfromharminflictedbypeople,despiteacounter-
trendtowardpreventingprotectivemeasuresthatwouldlessenprofitsofanimal
agriculture.AccordingtotheAnimalLegalDefenseFund(ALDF),inboththeU.S.and
Canadatherearestrongtrendstowardincreasinglyprotectiveanimalwelfarelaws,passed
eitherbyreferendaorbylegislatures.188Between2012–2017,morethanhalfofthestates
andterritoriesintheU.S.made“significantimprovement[s]”totheiranimalwelfarelaws,
187SeeRiffkin,“MoreSayAnimalsShouldHaveRights”andMoore,“MajorityEndorseAnimalRights.”188AnimalLegalDefenseFund,2017U.S.AnimalProtectionLawsRankings;and2017CanadianAnimalProtectionLawsRankings.
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onALDF’sanalysis.CrueltytootheranimalsisnowafelonyineveryU.S.state,andthe
numberofstatesthatassignfelonypenaltiestoneglect,abandonmentandreckless
endangermentisrising.Similarly,inCanada“therehasbeenamarkedimprovementinthe
lawsofmanyprovincesandterritories”since2008,thoughinsomeprovincesandinthe
territories,legalprotectionremainsweakandpatchy.Someprovinceshavebegunpassing
lawsthatprotectotheranimalsnotonlyfromphysicalharm,butalsofrompsychological
harm.
Insummary,publicopinionpollsandatrendinpublicly-supportedlawsprotecting
otheranimalsgivessomesupporttotheclaimthatmostpeopleinCanadaandtheU.S.hold
atleastoneoftheprinciplesintheNoMistreatmentset.Sincethereismistreatmentof
otheranimalsonbothsidesoftherecoverypredicament,thepredicamentwillatleast
appearasaconflictformostpeople,eveniftheydonotalsoholdtheprincipleagainst
causingextinction.
Someevidencethatamoralprincipleagainstdrivingaspeciestoextinctioniscommonlyheld
LawsandpublicopinionstudiesalsoindicatethatthatpeopleinCanadaandtheUStendto
thinkthatitiswrongforpeopletodriveotherspeciestoextinction.Inonestudy,Leigh
RaymondandLauraSchneidersentmailsurveystoasampleoflandownersincentral
Indiana.189Thesurveyspresentedanumberofdifferentkindsofreasonspeoplehavegiven
forprotectingendangeredspecies,andaskedrespondentstoratehowimportanteach
reasonwastothem,onascaleof1(notatallimportant)to7(extremelyimportant).Of419
responses,theaverageimportancegivento“Speciesprotectionisimportantbecause
human-causedextinctionismorallywrong”was4.47.Thisindicatesthatthosesurveyed
tendtothinkthatthereisamoralreasontopreventanthropogenicextinction,although
admittedlynotanextremelystrongone.190Inasimilarstudy,AndreaOlivesurveyed
189RaymondandSchneider,“PersonalMoralNormsandAttitudes.”190TheenormouspopularityoftheEndangeredSpeciesAct(ESA)addssomesupporttotheclaimthatmanypeopleintheU.S.thinkthatcausingextinctioniswrong.InJuly2015,TulchinResearchreleasedtheresultsofapollof600registeredvotersintheU.S.NinetypercentofthemsaidthattheysupporttheESA.Supportwashighacrossregions,demographicgroups,andpoliticalaffiliations.ThoseleastlikelytosupporttheESAweremid-westerners,men,people50yearsoldormore,andconservatives.Eveninthesegroups,thepercentagesofpeoplewhoexpressedsupportfortheactwerequitehigh,at87%,88%,87%and82%respectively.SeeTulchin,“PollFindsBroad,OverwhelmingSupport.”
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registeredvotersinSaskatchewanbymail.191Shereportsthat82%ofasampleof369
peopleagreedthat“otherspecieshavearighttoexist,”andonly17%ofthemagreedthat
“itisokayforhumanbeingstoletotherspeciesgoextinctbecauseofhumanactivities.”
Therecoverypredicamentwillregisterasaconflictforanyonewhorespondswith
moralperturbationbothtoextinction(ortotheharmfuleffectsofit)andtowhatmust
sometimesbedonetopreventextinction.Onautilitarianinterpretation,thisconflictisthe
resultofintuitivelevelmoralprinciplesthatyieldclashingprescriptionsforaction.Ihave
suggestedwhattheseprinciplesmightbe,andhavegivensomeevidencethattheyare
widelyheldbyresidentsofCanadaandtheU.S.,twocountriesinwhichtherecovery
predicamentsoccur.Ihavenotproventhatalloftheprinciplesareuniversallyheld,orthat
uponbeingmadeawareoftherecoverypredicament,mostpeopleinthesesocietieswould
experienceitasaconflict.YetIhopethatIhavemadetenabletheideathatitwouldbeso
perceivedbyacommunitythatincludesmanymembersofthesocietiesthatcreatethe
conflict.
Insection2.2,underthesubheadingIntuitiveprinciplesarenotfixed,IsaidthatHare
distinguishesamongintuitiveprinciplesthatarecommontoall,onesthatarecommonto
particularroles,andonesthatarepersonaltoindividuals.Therewillthereforebeconflicts
thatarecommon,onesthatoccuronlyforpeopleinparticularroles,andonesthatare
uniquetoindividuals.Ifwetake“all”withagrainofsalt,Ithinkitisfairtosaythatthe
recoverypredicamentisaconflictthatiscommontoall,atleastephemerally.Isitalsoa
conflictforatleastsomeofthosewhoserolesplacethemattheheartofthepredicament?
Whilesomepeopleonthefrontlinesoftherecoverypredicamentmaynotregister
itasevenanephemeralconflict,otherswill.TakeLowellDiller,thelong-timewildlife
biologistwhokillsbarredowlsinthehopeofpreventingextinctionofspottedowls,and
whothinksasfeelsasthoughbothcoursesofactionavailabletohim—killingtheowlsand
doingnothing—are“ethicallywrong.”192AndrecallthatBobSallinger,anofficialatamajor
191Olive,Land,Stewardship,andLegitimacy,112-143.192Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57.
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birdconservationorganizationintheregionwheretheowlrecoverypredicamenttakes
place,expressesthesimilarnotionthatbothoptionsare“unacceptable.”193
Thesepeoplewhoworkonornearthefrontlinesofthespottedowlrecovery
predicamentcertainlyregisteritasamoralconflict.Morethanthat,theyseemtoregisterit
asatragicmoralconflict.Sallingerdoesnotcalltheoptionswithinitsimply“unacceptable,”
hecallsthem“completelyunacceptable.”AndDillerdoesnotsayonlythattheyare
“ethicallywrong,”hedescribeshavingtodecidebetweenthemas“asortof‘Sophie’s
Choice,’”whichisatragicconflictifthereeverwasone.
Thatpeopleholdintuitiveprinciplesinsuchawaythattheyregister(orare
disposedtoregister)recoverypredicamentsastragicmoralconflictsisallthatisneeded
forautilitariantoacceptthatforthosepeople,recoverypredicamentsareatleast
ephemeraltragicmoralconflicts.Butcanrecoverypredicamentspersistastragicmoral
conflictsevenaftercriticalutilitarianscrutiny?Theycan,aslongasforeachpossible
courseofaction,atleastoneoftheperson’sintuitiveprinciplesforbiddingitmaximizes
utilityinitstragedy-generatingform.Thetragicconflictwillnotpersist,thatis,unlessitis
optimificforthepersontobedisposedtojudgethatviolatingitisnotjustwrongbut
seriouslywrong,andtofeelremorseabouthavingviolatedit.
5.WhethertheRecoveryPredicamentisaPersistentConflictisIndeterminate
Inthissection,Iwillarguethatitisnotpossibleforautilitariantodeterminewithany
degreeofcertaintywhethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentmoralconflict
becausethereliabilityoftheirmethodfordeterminingthisdependsontheaccuracyof
empiricalfactstowhichtheydonothaveaccess.Thisentailsthatthepredicament’sstatus
asatragicmoralconflictisalsoindeterminate;iftheutilitarianmethodcannotshow
whetherthepredicamentisapersistentmoralconflict,thenitwillnotbeabletoshow
whetheritisapersistenttragicconflict,either.
193Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”
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AsHarewrites,conflict“force(s)ustoquestiontheprinciplesthatgiverisetoit.”194It
compelsautilitariantoscrutinizeprincipleswhich,previously,theymayhavehadno
reasontodoubt.Thequestionautilitarianmustaskaboutconflict-generatingprinciplesis
aretheprinciplesoptimificintheirconflict-generatingform,orwouldthosewhoholdthe
principlesbringaboutmorewelfare,onthewhole,iftheyweretoqualifytheminawaythat
eliminatesconflict?
Inresponsetotherecoverypredicamentthereareaminimumofthreealternative
treatmentsofprinciples,theutilityofwhichautilitarianmustcompare.
1. Keepbothsetsofprinciplesintheirconflict-generatingforms.Ifthisalternative
maximizesutility,therecoveryconflictwillpersist.Eachtimeitarises,oneofthe
setsofprinciplesmustbeoverridden,andsoactedagainst.Butthedispositionsto
thinkthatitiswrongtoactagainstitandtofeelmoralregretforhavingdoneso,
willendure.
2. QualifytheNoExtinctionsetbybuildingintoitanexceptionsuchthatitdoesnot
applyinthecircumstancesoftherecoverypredicament.Eventually,tothosewho
amendorinheritamendedprinciples,therecoverypredicamentwillnolongerpose
evenaprimafacieconflict.Soifthisistheutility-maximizingresolution,the
recoveryconflictwillnotpersist.
3. QualifytheNoMistreatmentsetbybuildingintoitanexceptionsuchthatitdoesnot
applyinthecircumstancesoftherecoverypredicament.Ifthisistheutility-
maximizingresolution,therecoveryconflictwillnotpersist.
Thesearetheminimumnumberofalternativesamongwhichautilitarianwillhaveto
choosewhentheycriticallyassesstheprinciplesimplicatedintherecoverypredicament.
Thethreebasictreatmentscanalsobecombinedtoyieldhybrids.Forinstance,autilitarian
couldconsideramendingtheNoExtinctionsetforasubsetofrecoverypredicaments(say,
194Hare,MoralThinking,50.
125
onlythoseinvolvingdecadesofcaptivebreedingandlarge-scaleculls),whileamendingthe
NoMistreatmentsetfortherest.Or,theymightconsideramendingtheNoMistreatment
principlesinonesubset,andotherwisemaintainbothsetsofprinciples.Thehybrid
possibilitiesarenumerous.Undersomeofthemconflictwillsometimespersist,under
othersitwillnot.
Two-levelutilitarianswillmovetothecriticalleveltochooseamongthesetreatments
ofrecoveryconflict-generatingprinciples.Becausenooneisactuallycapableof
imaginativelyinhabitingthepreferencesofeverysentientbeingwhowouldbeaffectedby
thechoiceamongalternatives,choosinginvolvesconductingabenefit-harmanalysis(BHA)
tocomparetheutilityofthevariouspossibleresolutions.IftheBHAshowsthatthewelfare
maximizingresolutionisonethatneitherqualifiesthecontentoftheconflict-generating
principlesnoreradicatestheprinciples,thenrecoverypredicamentswillbepersistent
conflicts.Yetifwelfarewouldbemaximizedbyamendingtheprinciplessuchthattheyno
longergenerateconflict,thentheconflictwillbeonlyephemeral.
However,itisnotpossibleforautilitariantodeterminewithanydegreeofcertainty
whethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentconflict.Toseewhythisisso,letustake
alookatthefivestepsofarecoverypredicamentBHA(RPBHA),thatis,aBHAcomparing
theaggregatewelfarethatwouldresultfromeachofthewaysthatwemightreformulateor
re-ordertheprinciplesthatgeneratetherecoveryconflict.Thefirststepistodetermine
whateffectthevariousresolutionswillhaveonthebehaviorofthosewhooriginallyheld
theconflictingsetofprinciples.Thesecondstepistodeterminewhichwelfaresubjectswill
beaffectedbythedecisiontoretainorchangetheprinciplesinvolvedintherecovery
conflict.Next,theutilitarianmustfigureouthowthingswillgodifferentlyundereach
alternativeforeachofthosewhowillbeaffected.Afterthat,theymusttranslatethese
differencesintoamountsofwelfare—howmuchmoreorlesswelfarewillaccruetothe
affectedundereachalternative?Finally,theymustaggregatetheseamounts,andcompare
thetotalsforeachalternative.
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Howwilldifferentresolutionsaffectpeople’sbehavior?
Letusallowtheutilitariantoassumethatpeople’sbehaviorwillreflecttheirprinciples.So
qualifyingoroverridingtheNoMistreatmentsetofprinciplesinrecoverypredicaments
willleadpeopletoundertakeortosupportrecoveryinthosesituations,andqualifyingor
overridingtheNoExtinctionsetwouldresultinrecoverynotbeingundertakenor
supportedinsuchsituations.Thismightbeasafeassumptionabouttheeffectofprinciple
changesonpeople’sbehavior,buttheutilitarianwillbefacedwithothersthataremore
opentoquestion.Forinstance,howwillmodifyingoroverridingaprincipleinone
situationaffectpeople’sbehaviorinothersituations?WouldoverridingtheNoExtinction
principlesincasesoftherecoverypredicamentstrengthenorweakenpeople’stendencies
toundertakeandtosupportrecoveriesthatdonotinvolveconflicts?Woulditleadthemto
bemoreorlesscarefulnottodothethingsthatcriticallyendangerspecies?Itisdifficultfor
metoseehowtheutilitariancanmakegoodguessesabouttheanswerstothesequestions.
Whowillbeaffected?
ThesecondquestiontheutilitarianmustanswerinordertoperformtheirBHAis:Whowill
beaffectedbythedecision?Thatis,whoseliveswouldgodifferentlyfortheminimportant
waysifpeopleregularlyresolverecoveryconflictsinonewayratherthananother?Ifthis
wereacost-benefitanalysis,thequestionwouldbephrased“whoarethestakeholders”?It
isimportantnottoignore,substantiallyoverestimate,orsubstantiallyunderestimateany
groupofstakeholders,asthiscouldskewtheanalysistowardanoutcomewhichwouldnot
infactmaximizewelfare.WhenitcomestoperformingBHAsforpoliciesthatwould
primarilyaffectcurrentlyexistinghumanbeings(e.g.shouldthepostalservicediscontinue
door-to-doormailcarrierserviceinurbanareas),therisksofthesemistakescanbe
minimizedbygivingpeopleampleopportunitiestoclaimandtoargueforstakeholder
status.Yetwhenmostofthosewhowillbeaffectedareotheranimals,whocannotadvocate
fortheirinclusion,therisksremainhigh.Thisisespeciallysowhenthedecisionhasthe
potentialtomakeadifferencetogreatnumbersofindividualsfrommanydifferent
populationsoverlongperiodsoftime,becauseslightlymistakenassumptionsaboutthe
initialnumbersaffected,orabouthowdifferentpopulationswillgroworshrinkovertime,
canleadtoenormouserrors.IntheRPBHA,ignoring,overestimating,andunderestimating
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the“stakeholders”ofthisdecisionisalmostinevitable,andsotheutilitarianshoulddoubt
thatthattheresolutionitrecommendswillactuallymaximizeutility.Tomakethismore
concrete,letustakealookatthebroadgroupsintowhichtheaffectedwillfall.
1.Sentientmembersofcriticallyendangeredpopulations,therecoveryofwhicha)requires
captivebreedingand/ortranslocationand/orremoval/eradicationofotherpopulations
thatimpederecovery,andb)wouldbeattempteddependingontheoutcomeoftheRPBHA.
2.Sentientmembersofnon-threatenedpopulationsthatwouldbetranslocatedor
eradicatedifpeopleattempttorecoverthepopulationsingroup1.
3.Sentientmembersofpopulationsthatdepredate,parasitize,competewith,are
depredatedby,orotherwiseimpactedbythepresence/absenceandsizeofthepopulations
in1and2(humanswillbeamongthosewhofallintothisgroup).
4.Potentialmembersofgroups1,2,and3whoseexistence/non-existenceand/orlife
conditionsinfuturegenerationswillvaryaccordingtowhetherpopulationsingroup1are
recovered.
Neitheridentifyingthespeciesmembershipofindividualsingroups1and2,nor
estimatingthenumberofindividualsperspeciesinthesegroupsshouldbethesourceof
greatuncertainty.Populationsingrouponewouldbeformallylistedasendangered,and
wouldhaverecoveryplanscallingforcaptivebreeding,translocation,oreradication.
Estimatesoftheirsizearelikelytobefairlyaccurate,becausewhenananimalpopulationis
knowntobeatthebrinkofextinction,thosewhoworktorecoverthemoftenkeeptabson
everysinglemember.Populationsingroup2wouldbeidentifiedintherecoveryplansfor
speciesingroupone.Thenumbersthatwouldbecapturedandtranslocated,orkilledare
usuallyspecifiedprecisely,inpartbecausedoinganyofthesethingstoawildanimal
normallyrequiresapermit.
Groups3and4willbemuchlargerthangroups1and2,butneithertheirspecies
compositionnorthenumberofindividualsperspeciescanbeknownwithanydegreeof
128
certainty.Letustakegroup3first.Evenexpertsoncriticallyendangeredspeciesdonot
alwaysknowallofthespeciestheypreyupon,letalonethesizeofthosepreypopulations
ortheextenttowhichtheywouldbeaffectedbytheextinctionorrecoveryofthe
endangeredpopulations.Neitherdotheyknowhowtheextinctionorrecoverywouldmake
adifferencetothepredatorsofgroups1and2,orwhosedietsorhabitatuseoverlapswith
thoseofgroups1and2.Thespeciesandnumbersofindividualswhowouldnotbe
impactedbyasingleextinctionorrecoverybutwhowouldexperiencecumulativeeffectsof
multipleextinctionsorrecoveriesareevenlesscertain.Amongthisgroupmightbesome
humanpopulations,althoughmostofthehumansaffectedbythisdecisionwillbeingroup
4,futuresentientbeings.
WhiletheutilitarianmightbefairlycertainthatamendingoroverridingtheNo
Extinctionprincipleswouldresultintherebeingzerofuturemembersofpopulationsin
group1,andthatamendingoroverridingtheNoMistreatmentprincipleswillresultinzero
futuremembersofpopulationsthatrecoverywoulderadicate,theycannotpredictwith
muchaccuracythefuturesizesofpopulationsinthesegroupsunderotheralternatives.
Neithercantheyaccuratelypredictfuturesizesofpopulationsingroup3.Todothis,they
wouldneedaccurateestimatesofthecurrentpopulationsizes,andtheywouldalsohaveto
knowtheirdensity,theirdensity-dependentratesofgrowth,andhowtheseparameters
wouldbeaffectedbychangesinthesizesofotherpopulationstowhichtheyrelate
ecologicallyinbothdirectandindirectways.
Howwilltheybeaffected?
Fortheirbenefit-harmanalysis,theutilitarianalsoneedstohaveasolidunderstandingof
howthelivesoftheaffectedwouldgodifferentlyundereachresolutiontorecovery
predicaments.Underwhatconditionswilltheyliveineachscenario?Forhowlongwill
theyliveunderthem?Eveniftheutilitarianmanagestohavegoodestimatesofwhowillbe
affected,theywillnothaveaccesstomuchdetailaboutwhatconditionswillbelikefor
manyofthem.Attheverybest,theutilitariancanroughlyestimatehowmanyofwhich
kindsofanimalsintheaffectedgroupswillreachtheirlifeexpectancyandhowmanywill
liveshorterorlongerlives,howmanywillspendtimeinthewild,howmanyincaptivity,
howmanyinunfamiliarplaces,andhowmanyinplacestheyknowwell,howmanywithin
129
theirownterritoriesandhowmanywithoutterritories,howmanywithcompanionsthey
havechosen,andhowmanywithoutthem.Yettheutilitarianisnotinapositiontomake
evenroughguessesoftheseunlesstheyhavegoodestimatesofthenumbersandspecies
membershipofindividualsineachoftheaffectedgroups.
Howmuchwelfarewilleachalternativecontain?
Iftheutilitarianisableroughlytodescribetheconditionsunderwhichthousandsof
sentientbeingswillliveifweundertakerecoveryinrecoverypredicaments,andthose
underwhichtheywillliveifwedonot,theymusttranslatethisinformationintoaranking
oftheoutcomesofthesechoicesaccordingtowhichcontainsthemostnetlifesatisfaction.
ThisisthewholepointoftheBHAandisarguablythemostdemandingstep.Itisdifficult
enoughforautilitariantoknowwhichamongalternatecoursesofactionwillmostenhance
welfarewithinjusttheirownlife,asSidgwickobserves.195Thisdifficultyismagnifiedwhen
theyaredealingwiththelivesofmanydifferentkindsofbeingswhosebodies,sociallives,
andformsofcognitiondiffervastlyfromours,andwhocannotcommunicatetheirattitudes
touswithmuchdetail.Yettocometoaconclusionaboutwhichchoicewillleadtothemost
welfare,theutilitarianmustmakesomebigassumptionsabouttherelativeamountsoflife
satisfactionexperiencedbybeingstowhoseinnerlivesshehaslittleornoaccess.
Theutilitarianmightassume,contraDavidBenatar,thatsomelifeisbetterthanno
life.196Theymightalsoassumethat,atleastuntilsenescence,morelifeisbetterthanless,
thattimespentincaptivityisworsethantimespentinthewild,andthatitisbettertolive
withinone’shomerangethantobetranslocatedelsewhere.IftheresultsoftheBHAare
close,though,theutilitarianmighthavetomakeadditionalassumptionsabouthowmuch
betteronekindoflifeisthananother.Thiscouldinvolvemakingevenfurtherassumptions
aboutwhether,say,captivelifehasnegativeorpositiveutility(whetheritisbetteror
worsethannothing).Suchassumptionswillbeshakierthantheassumptionthatcaptive
lives,etc.arenotasgoodaswildones.
195Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,140-150.196Benatar,BetterNevertoHaveBeen.
130
Becausethealternativeresolutionswouldleadtodifferentsuitesofspecies,and
differentnumbersofindividualsperspecies,theutilitarianfacesafurtherdifficultyin
tryingtocomparetheamountofwelfareassociatedwitheachone:thewildlivesof
membersofsomespeciesmighttypicallycontaineithermorelifesatisfaction,ormore
dissatisfaction,thanthelivesofmembersofothers.Icanthinkoftworeasonstoentertain
thispossibility.First,membersofsomespeciesleadmuchlongerlivesthanmembersof
others.Forinstance,wildelephantsliveforabout42years,whilehousemiceliveforabout
two.Imagineahappymouseandahappyelephant,eachofwhichlivestotheaveragelife
expectancyofherspecies.Forthesakeofargument,saythatlifesatisfactioncanbe
quantifiedonascaleof1to10,andthatthroughouttheirlives,bothanimalsmaintainalife
satisfactionof8.Dotheirlivescontainanequalamountofwelfare?Thattheelephantwill
spend40moreyearsenjoyingherlifethanthemousesuggeststhattheirlivesdonot
containequalamountsofwelfare.Ontheotherhand,theelephants’lifemightnotseem
longertotheelephantthanthemouse’sdoestothemouse;therecouldbeasmanymouse-
eventsinthemouse’slifeasthereareelephant-eventsintheelephants’.
Ifthelivesofmembersoflonger-livedspecieshavegreaterpotentialforwelfareand
suffering,thentheassumptionthat“themorewildlivesanalternativecontains,themore
welfareitcontains”biasesaBHAtowardmembersofshorter-livedspecies.Onesolutionto
thiswouldbetochangeourcoreassumptionto“themorewildyearsanalternative
contains,themorewelfareitcontains.”Butthisassumptionmightnotgiveenoughweight
tothewelfareofmembersoflong-livedspecies.Wedonot—andprobablycannot—know
whichassumptionisclosertothetruth.
Anotherreasontothinkthatthelivesofmembersofsomespeciesmightcontain
morewelfarethanthoseofothersisthatevenfortwospecieswithsimilarlifespans—such
asislandfoxesandferalpigs,bothofwhichtendtoliveforaboutsevenyears—membersof
onemightbedisposedtogreaterlifesatisfactionthanmembersoftheother.Justassome
individualswithinthesamespecieshavehigherbase-linelevelsofcontentmentthan
131
others,somespeciesmight,too.Species-specificemotionalandcognitivetendenciesmight
makeitsothatsomekindsofanimalsaregenerallyhappierthanothers.197
Insum,theutilitariancannottrustthattheirRPBHAwilldowhatitissupposedto
do:pickouttheutility-maximizingreformulationorre-orderingoftheintuitivelevel
principlesthatgeneraterecoverypredicaments.Thisisbecauseinordertoperformthe
RPBHA,theutilitarianwillhavetomakepoorlygroundedassumptionsabouthow
reformulatingprincipleswillchangepeoples’behavior,aboutwhoseliveswillbeaffected
bythosechanges,abouthowtheirliveswillbeaffected,andabouthowtheseeffects
translateintotheamountofwelfaretheirliveswillcontain.Asaresult,theutilitarian
cannotdeterminewhethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentconflict—tragicor
not—ormerelyanephemeralorapparentone.
Onemightconcludefromthisthatrecoverypredicamentsleaveutilitariansata
practicalimpasse.Thisisnotnecessarilyso.Whenitisnotfeasibleadequatelytoevaluate
conflict-generatingintuitiveprinciples,theutilitarianhasasolution:conductBHAsonthe
availablecoursesofactioninparticularsituationsofconflict,astheyarise.TheseBHAswill
beslimmerthanthemega-BHArequiredtodeterminewhethertheprinciplesimplicatedin
therecoverypredicamentareoptimific.
Whetherthismovesusawayfromthepracticalimpassedependsonwhetherthe
smallerBHAssufferthesameweaknessesasthelargeronedoes.Iamafraidthattheydo.
Likethelargerone,theyrequireinformationaboutthesizeandspeciescompositionof
currentandfuturegenerationsofotheranimals,oftheconditionsunderwhichthose
animalswilllive,andhowthoseconditionswillmakeadifferencetotheamountsof
welfaretheirliveswillcontain.
197Somestudieshaveshownthatdomesticatedmammalstendtohavemoreserotoninintheirbrains(silverfoxes),andlesscortisolintheirblood(silverfoxes,Norwayrats,Guineapigs),thantheirwildcounterparts.SeeHareetal.,“Self-DomesticationHypothesis,”2-3,6;KünzlandSachser,“BehavioralEndocrinologyofDomestication;”Popovaetal.,“SerotoninMetabolismandSerotonergicReceptorsinNorwayRats;”andTrutetal.“AnimalEvolutionDuringDomestication.”Inhumans,serotoninisassociatedwithfeelingsofwell-beingwhilecortisolisassociatedwithfeelingsofstress.Sowemighthypothesizethatmembersofdomesticatedspecies(includingH.sapiens)tendtobehappierthanmembersofwildones.
132
6.Conclusion
Utilitarianismaccommodatestwowaysinwhichanactioncanbewrong:itcanbewrongin
virtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingan
intuitiveprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.Admittedly,it
cannotbethecasethatwhateverapersondoeswillbewronginthesenseofviolatingthe
principleofutility.However,apersoncanfaceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowill
bewronginthesenseofviolatingagoodintuitiveprinciple.Andtheycanfaceasituationin
whichwhatevertheydowilleitherviolateagoodintuitiveprincipleorviolatetheprinciple
ofutility.Toknowwhetheramoralconflictispersistent,orreal,wemustassesswhetherit
maximizesutilitytoretaintheimplicatedintuitiveprinciplesintheirconflict-generating
form.Yetwedonotandperhapscannotknowenoughtodeterminewhetherwithany
degreeofcertaintywhetheritmaximizesutilitytoretaintheprinciplesimplicatedinthe
recoverypredicamentintheirconflict-generatingform.
133
Conclusion
TheprecedingchaptersexploredwhetherworkingfromwithinKant’sdeontology,Ross’s
deontology,orutilitarianismprovidesenvironmentalethicswithanexcuseforavoidingthe
problemoftragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizerecoverypredicamentsastragic
moralconflicts.Thechaptersaskedthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatit
takestoadmitthattherightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatittakes
toadmitthattherightactcanbetragicallywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretrecovery
predicamentsassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?
Foreachtheory,theanswertothefirsttwoquestionswasyes;noneofthetheories
excusesenvironmentalethicsforneglectingthequestionoftragicmoralconflict.198For
bothRoss’sandKant’sdeontologies,theanswertothethirdquestionwasalsoyes,butfor
utilitarianism,theanswerwasindeterminate.Thismeansthatfromwithinutilitarianism,
wecannotsaywhetherarecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflict,butfromwithin
theothertwotheorieswecansaythatitis.Thefollowingthreesectionssummarizethe
argumentsthatledtotheseconclusions,andhighlightsomeoftheimplicationsofeach
theory’saccountofconflict.Thefourthsectioncriticallyyetbrieflycomparesthetheories’
accountsofrecoveryconflicts.Thefinalsectionshowsthattherecoverypredicamentisnot
theonlykindoftragicmoralconflictcreatedwhenhumanactivitiesvastlyandrapidly
transformenvironments.Itsuggeststhatlikewagingwar,causingextremeecological
changesprolificallygeneratestragicmoralconflict.Thisgivesusyetanotherreasonnotto
causethem.
198Asmentionedinnote49,whenIsaythatenvironmentalethicsneglectstheproblemofconflict,IdonotmeanthatitneglectsthekindsofsituationsIhavecalledrecoverypredicaments.Environmentalethicsoftenaddressessuchsituations,andhasdonesoforalongtime(forexamples,seeRolston,DutiesandValues,141–143;Singer,“NotforHumansOnly;”Jamieson,EthicsandtheEnvironment,172-175).Itevensometimescallsthem“conflicts.”But“conflict”canbeusedtomeannomorethanadifficultproblem,orthatdifferentpartieshavepracticallyincompatibleideasaboutwhatshouldbedone.Evenwhenitcallsthemconflicts,environmentalethicsrarelyframesrecoverypredicamentsexplicitlyassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolvemoralwrongdoing.Andwhileitoccasionallyimpliesthatrecoverypredicamentsareconflictsinthissense(forexamples,seeBeckoff,“Preface,”andVucetichandNelson,“InfirmEthicalFoundations”),itdoesnotthematizethis.Thatis,itdoesnottreattherealityofmoralconflicts—inthewaythatIunderstandthem—asaproblemthatneedsoursteady,carefulattention.ThatiswhatImeanwhenIsaythatenvironmentalethicsneglectstheproblemofmoralconflict.
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1.Ross’sDeontology
Rossproclaimsthathisformofdeontologyprovidesauniquesolutiontothe“casesof
conscience”createdbymoralconflicts,andthatindoingsoitshowsconflicttobe“non-
existent.”Tobesure,thetheorydoesruleoutconflictsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbe
wronginthesenseofviolatinganallthingsconsideredduty.However,Ihavearguedthat
thisisnottheonlynotionofwrongnessatworkinthetheory.Fulfillingone’sallthings
considereddutycanbewronginthesensethatitwrongssomeone,eitherbyharmingthem
orbreachingtheirtrust.OnRoss’sview,suchwrongswarrantmoralregretandreparation,
evenwhentheyareinevitablepartsoffulfillingone’sallthingsconsideredduty.Whensuch
wrongsareserious,itisconsistentwithRoss’stheorythatremorseisanappropriateform
ofmoralregret.Becauseitdoesnotdenysituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswill
involvewrongdoingthatisbothseriousandremorse-worthy,Ross’sdeontologyhasroom
fortragicmoralconflict.
Ihavealsoarguedthatrecoverypredicamentsareamongthesituationsthatcanbe
interpretedastragicmoralconflictsfromwithinRoss’sframework.Thesepredicaments
occurwhenonefacestwoincompossiblecoursesofaction:recoveryandextinction.The
extinctioncourseofactioninvolvesfailingtopreventthehuman-causedextinctionofa
species,sub-species,orpopulation.Therecoverycourseofactioninvolvestaking
managementmeasuresthatharm,kill,orintimatelycontrolindividualanimals.Inconcrete
casesoftherecoverypredicament,itispossiblethateachofthesecoursesofaction
seriouslybreachesdutiesofnon-maleficenceorfidelity.Intheislandfoxandnorthern
spottedowlpredicaments,forinstance,eachcourseofactionwouldseriouslybreachduties
ofnon-maleficencetootheranimals.Andtheextinctioncourseofactionwouldbreach
dutiesoffidelitytohumans,althoughwhetherthesebreacheswouldbeseriousisunclear.
BernardWilliams,MichaelStocker,andothershavearguedthatatheorycannot
handlemoralconflictunlessitadmitsapluralityofmoralvalues.199AsStockerexplainsthe
argument,valuemonismprecludesconflictbecauseifthereisonlyonekindofvalue,thena
worsecourseofactioncannotcontainorbringaboutanygoodthatthebetteronedoesnot
199Stocker,PluralandConflictingValues,chapter8;Williams,“ConflictsofValues.”SeealsoTessman,MoralFailure.
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alsocontainorbringabout.Thebetterlacksnothingofvalueincomparisonwiththelesser.
Sowhileitcouldberationaltobeupsetthatonecannottakebothcoursesofaction,it
cannotnotberationaltofeelregret—includingmoralregret—abouthavingtakenthe
betterone.Ifthereismorethanonekindofvalue,however,alessercourseofactioncould
containagoodthatthebetterlacks.Whenitdoes,takingthebetteronecanwarrantmoral
regret.
OnecanconcludefromStocker’sargumentthatmoralconflictrequirespluralism
aboutthegoodand/orpluralismaboutfundamentalmoralprinciplesorduties.Ross’s
theoryispluralisticinbothoftheseways.Butneitherofthemexplainswhythetheory
allowsforthepossibilityofmoralconflict.WecouldstripawayfromRoss’stheoryevery
primafaciedutyexceptthedutyofnon-maleficence,andwecouldstripawayevery
intrinsicevilexceptpain,andmoralconflictwouldstillbepossible.Apersoncouldfacea
situationinwhichtheactthatleastviolatestheprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence
nonethelessseriouslyharmsatleastonesentientbeing.Performingtheactwouldbe
wronginthesecondsenseIdrewoutofRoss’stheory(itwouldwrongsomeone)while
abstainingfromitwouldbewronginboththesecondsenseandthefirstone(itwouldbe
allthingsconsideredwrong).
MyinterpretationofRoss’sdeontologydoesnotsupporttheclaimthatconflict
requirespluralvalues,becauseneithermultiplegoodsnormultipledeonticprinciplesare
necessaryforthekindofconflictthetheorymakespossible.Conflictisenabledbytwo
featuresofthestructureofthetheory.Thefirstfeatureisthedistinctionbetweenprima
facieduties,whicharticulatefundamentalmoralprinciples,andallthingsconsidered
duties,whicharetheparticularactsthatfulfillanagent’sprimafaciedutiesasmuchasor
morethananyotherpracticableact.Thesecondfeatureisthatwrongdoingisnotlimitedto
violationsofallthingsconsideredduties.Violatingsomeprimafaciedutiescanalsoamount
towrongdoing,evenwhenitisnotallthingsconsideredwrong.Thus,Ross’sdeontology
leavesroomforthepossibilityofmoralconflictbecauseithasapluralityofwaysinwhich
anactcanbewrong,notbecauseithasapluralityofgoodsorapluralityoffundamental
duties.Onmyinterpretationsofthem,thisisalsotrueofutilitarianismandKant’s
deontology,althoughthestructuralfeaturesthataccommodateconflictonthesetheories
differfromthosethataccommodateconflictinRoss’s.
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2.Kant’sDeontology
ThosewhodenythatKant’sethicsleavesroomforthepossibilityofmoralconflictinsist
thatitisimpossibleforapersonevertobeboundtoviolatethemorallaw.Thatis,itcan
neverbethecasethatwhateveronechosestodo,themaximoftheiractionwillviolatethe
categoricalimperative.Theyarecorrecttoinsistonthis.However,thecategorical
imperativeisnottheonlymoralstandardatworkwithinKant’sethics.Thehighestgoodis
alsoamoralstandard,notforthemaximsofactionsbutfortheiroutcomesintheworld;it
iswhatKantcallsa“moralworld,”inwhichallagentsarefullyvirtuousandtheirvirtuous
actionsareeffectiveinhelpingotherpeoplerealizetheirends.Iarguedthatmoralregret
canbewarrantedbysomefailurestomeetthisstandard,andthusthatsuchfailuresare
wrong.Becauseitispossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthisway,Kant’s
theorycanaccommodatemoralconflict.Itisalsopossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbe
seriouslywronginthisway—asThomasHillhasobserved,apersoncanfindthemselvesin
asituationinwhichwhatevertheydowilldestroy,diminishordegradeaperson.200Kant’s
theorythereforehasroomfortragicconflicts.Ithenarguedthatrecoverypredicaments
canposeKantiantragicconflicts,becauseinthemitcanbethecasethatwhateveraperson
doeswilldiminishtheirmoralperfection,andsodetractfromamoralworld,byinjuring
theirowncapacitiesforthemorallyessentialfeelingsofloveandsympathy.
Theaccountoftherecoverypredicamentasatragicconflictthatcanbeunearthed
fromKant’sethicsbringstotheforethemoralinjurythatissufferedbypeoplewho
encountersuchconflicts.Kant’sframeworkallowsustoseerecoveryconflictsassituations
inwhichwhateveronedoeswillweakenanaturalpreconditionofone’svirtue.Itthus
allowsusclearlytoseehowtragicconflicts,suchastherecoverypredicament,harmthe
peoplewhoareentangledinthem.Kant’saccountofconflictoffersanexplanationfor
compassionforLowellDiller,whichsomeonemightfeelwhetherornottheyagreewiththe
choicehemadeinhisconflict.
ThespotlightthatKant’saccountofconflictfocusesontheagentasbotha
perpetratorandavictimofmoralinjurytothemselvesalsoprovidesawaytounderstand
200Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”180,and“MakingExceptions.”
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RuthMarcus’sobservationofthe“dynamicforce”ofmoralconflict,which“motivatesusto
arrangeourlivesandinstitutionswithaviewtoavoidingsuchconflicts.”Becausehavingto
actfromwithinatragicconflictinvolveshavingtochoosetomorallyinjureoneselfinone
wayoranother,itcouldbearguedthatwehavenegativeethicaldutiesnottocreatesuch
situations,eitherforourselvesorforotherpeople.Andaccordingtomyinterpretationof
theaccountofconflictinKant’sethics,thatanactcreatesasituationofconflictmight
sufficetomaketheactwrong,inthesensethatitdetractsfromthehighestgood.
ItisimportanttocontrastthispossibilitywithAlanDonagan’scontentionthatprior
wrongdoingisanecessaryconditionformoralconflict.201LikemostinterpretersofKant,
Donaganholdsthatthereisjustonewayinwhichapersoncandowrong,andthatisby
violatingthemorallaw.202Unlikemostinterpreters,though,Donaganthinksthatitis
possibleforapersontofindthemselvesinasituationfromwhichwhatevertheydowill
violatethemorallaw—butonlyiftheyhavealreadydonesomethingwrong.203
Donagan’sclaimthatapersoncanbeboundtoviolateanethicaldutycontradicts
Kant’snotionofsuchdutiesasapplyingtomaxims,notexternalactions.Ethicalduties
obligateustoprioritizeobligatoryendsoverdiscretionaryones,theydonotrequireor
forbidparticularkindsofoutwardbehavior.Aslongasone’srationalnatureisintact,one
willneverbeboundtoactfromaself-interestedmotiveratherthanamoralone;whenever
rationalnatureisatstake,onecanactforthesakeofit,andcandosojustbecauseitis
obligatory.Indeed,itisapremiseofthetheorythataperson,quaperson,canalwaysdo
this.Thisiswhytheonlykindofwrongdoingapersoncanbeboundtocommit,onmy
interpretationofKant’stheory,isthekindinvolvedindetractingfromthehighestgood.
201DonaganTheoryofMorality,chapter5;and“MoralDilemmas.”202E.g.Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”;Herman,“ObligationandPerformance.”203Forexamples,DonaganturnstoSt.GregorytheGreat.Allinvolve“injudiciousvows”whichlaterobligatethevowmakertodosomethingcontrarytoduty.Inatypicalexample,amanpromisesareprobatefriendtokeepallofhissecrets.(TheoryofMorality,144)Thefriendlaterdivulgesthatheisgoingtokillsomeone.Ostensibly,theman’sinitialwrongdoingistomakeapromisedespitenothaving“acceptablereasontobelievethathecanandmaydoashepromises.”(“MoralDilemmas,”283)Subsequently,hefacesaconflictbetweennotpreventinganeasilypreventablemurder,andbreakingapromise.Donaganthinksthatpracticalreasonprovidesarulefordecidingwhattodoinresponsetosuchconflicts:takethelessevilcourseofaction.Yetthisruledoesnotcanceloutthewrongnessofthelessevilact,whichremainsinviolationofthemorallaw.
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3.Utilitarianism
Utilitariansoftenchampiontheirmoraltheoryasresistanttoconflict,andfriendsof
conflictcriticizethetheoryonthesamegrounds.Againstthechampionsandthecritics,I
havearguedthatwithinutilitarianism,itispossibleforanagenttofaceasituationinwhich
whatevertheydowillbewronginsomeway.Admittedly,itcannotbethatwhatevera
persondoeswillbewronginthemostconspicuoussenseofviolatingtheprincipleof
utility.Thatis,itcanneverbethecasethateverycourseofactionpersoncouldtakewould
bringaboutlesswelfarethananotheravailableaction.However,utilitarianismimplies
anothersenseinwhichanactioncanbewrong:itcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingan
intuitivemoralprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.AsHare
explains,violatingautility-maximizingintuitiveprinciplewarrantsmoralregret,whichis
anotherwayofsayingthatitiswrong.Utility-maximizingintuitiveprinciplesdonotalways
prescribeutility-maximizingactions.Soanagentcanfindthemselvesinasituationin
whichwhatevertheydowilleitherbewronginthesenseofviolatingtheprincipleof
utility,orwronginthesenseofviolatinganotherprinciplethattheprincipleofutility
vindicatestheminholding.
Ihavealsoarguedthattherecoverypredicamentwillbeautilitarianmoralconflict
if1)bothrecoveryandrefrainingfromrecoveryviolateatleastoneintuitivemoral
principle,and2)themoralprinciplestheyviolateareoptimific,eventhoughthey
sometimesclashwitheachother.Iarguethat1)istrue,butthat2)isindeterminate
becausethereliabilityoftheutilitarianmethodforfiguringoutwhethertheimplicated
principlesareoptimificdependsonempiricalfactstowhichwedonothaveaccess.
NoneofthetheoriesIhavecanvassedmakeiteasytofigureoutwhattodointhe
faceoftherecoverypredicament.Utilitarianismhasthefurtherproblemthatwecannot
applyitsmethodtothequestionofwhetherthepredicamentisaconflictandexpectan
answerinwhichwecanhaveanyconfidence.Utilitarianismcanexplaintheappearanceof
moralconflictastheresultofclashingintuitiveprinciples,butitcannotsaywhetherthe
principlesaregoodones,andsoitcannotsaywhethertheconflictisrealornot.
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4.CriticalComparisonofThreeAccountsofRecoveryConflicts
Onesummeryearsago,IworkedfortheUSFishandWildlifeService,censusing
seabirdsandmonitoringtheirproductivityonasmallislandinDownEastMaine.Among
mycrew’sresponsibilitieswaspayingattentiontothefeedingbehavioroflargegulls,and
“eliminating”anygullwhospecializedindepredatingterns.Thiswaspartlybecausethe
islandharboredasmallcolonyofendangeredroseateternsandasinglesavvygullcould
wrecktheirentirebreedingseason.Duringtheterns’chick-rearingperiod,werecognized
thatagreatblack-backedgullwecalledGoldmundwasanexpertandvoracioustern
hunter.Asthecrewsupervisor,Idecidedwithmuchreluctancethatwewouldfollowour
office-boundbosses’commandtoshootGoldmund.WhenIexaminedGoldmund’sbody
afterward,Ifoundabroodpatchbeneaththeouterlayeroffeathersonhisbelly.
Ifelt(andstillfeel)thatIhaddonesomethingevil.Kant’saccountofconflict
elegantlyaccommodatesoneofthethoughtsrelatedtothisfeeling:“whathaveIdoneto
myself?”Butthiswasnotthemainthought.Themainthoughtwas“Ihavewronged
Goldmundandhischicksinoneoftheworstpossibleways.”Kant’sethicaltheorycannot
accommodatethisthought,becauseitcannotregisterrespectforanimalslikeGoldmundas
intelligible.RecallthatforKant,practicalreasonmustbeunderstoodasfreefromoutside
forces.Theonlywayitcansecurethisfreedomistoabsolutelyprioritizefollowingthelaw
itgeneratesfromitself.Thislawrequirespracticalreasontomakethecapacitytofollow
suchalawanendaboveallothers,inotherwords,torespectthecapacitytofollowsucha
law.Respectforanythingelsewouldamounttoreasonsubmittingitselftosomething
outsideitself,whichwouldunderminereason’sautonomy.Absentanargumentthatother
animalsaremoralinthesensethattheirpracticalreasondisciplinesitselfbysubmittingtoits
ownlaw,anyKantianattempttoexpandthemoralcircleofrespecttoincludebeingsother
thanhumanswillfail.204,205
204Therearemanygoodargumentsfortheclaimthatotheranimalsaremoral,ifmoralityisunderstoodintermsofemotionsandbehaviorratherthanintermsofthecapacityofthewilltosubmititselftoitsownlaw.Forexamples,seeBekoff,WildJustice;Rowlands,CanAnimalsBeMoral?;andProctoretal.“ChimpanzeesPlaytheUltimateGame.”205SomeKantians,mostnotablyAllenWoodandChristineKorsgaard,havetriedtoshowthatdespitethefactthatKanthimselfstatesthathumanbeingscannotbeardutiestootheranimals(6:442),onthebestinterpretationofhistheory,theydeserverespectandhavetheconcomitantcapacitytoobligateus.Woodarguesthatotheranimalsdeserverespectbecausetheysharemanyofhumanbeings’preconditionsfor
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Byidentifyingwelfareasthethingthatmattersforitsownsake,utilitarianismdoes
notlimitmoralconsiderationtohumanbeings.Anactionthatharmsotheranimalscanbe
wrongjustbecauseitharmsthem,andarecoverypredicamentcanbetragicjustbecause
everycourseofactionitpresentswouldseriouslyharmotheranimals.Aslongasitviolates
agoodutility-maximizing“donotharm”principle,anactthatcausesseriousharmcanbe
seriouslywrong,regardlessofwhetheritviolatestheprincipleofutility.However,the
wrongnessofsuchaharmmightbelessrobustthanonemighthopefor.
Thatconflictispossiblewithinutilitarianismisafunctionofthefeatureofthe
theorythathasbeenadded,mostconvincinglybyHare,inordertoaccommodatewhat
RichardArnesonreferstoasthe“cognitive,emotional,andvolitionaldisabilities”that
preventhumanbeingsfromthinking,feeling,andbehavingastheyideallywould.206These
“disabilities”oftenhamperusfromapprehending,andfromimmediatelybeingmovedto
performactsthatmaximizeaggregateutility.Theroleofintuitivemoralprinciplesisto
guideustowardmaximizingnetutilitywithoutrequiringustodothechallengingworkof
aimingtodoso.Theidealmoralthinker—Hare’sarchangel,orabeingwhotakes
Sidgwick’s“pointofviewoftheuniverse”—doesnotneedandpresumablydoesnothave
thedispositionsthatconstituteintuitiveprinciples.“Suchanarchangelwouldnotneed
intuitivethinking,”saysHare,“everythingwouldbedonebyreasoninamomentoftime.
Nor,therefore,wouldheneedthesoundgeneralprinciples,thegooddispositions,the
intuitionswhichguidetherestofus.”207Anarchangelwouldneverfindthemselvesina
conflict,becausetheycandirectlyapplytheprincipleofutilitytoeverychoiceamong
morality.OnWood’sview,wecan(ethically)wrongthemdirectlybynotcaringaboutthemfortheirownsakes.SeeWood,“KantonDuties,”189–210.AccordingtoKorsgaard,Kantwasmistakentodenythatotheranimalsareendsinthemselves,andsohisargumentthattheycannotobligateus(whichentailsthatwecannot(ethically)wrongthem)isunsound.Shethinksthatotheranimalsareendsinthemselves,because“ananimalisanorganicsystemtowhomitsowngoodmatters,anorganicsystemthatwelcomes,desires,enjoys,andpursuesitsgood.Wecouldevensaythatananimalisanorganicsystemthatmatterstoitself,foritpursuesitsowngoodforitsownsake.”Animalsarethusthe“sourceoflegitimatenormativeclaims”andsocanobligateusdirectlyeventhoughthey“cannotgivetheforceoflawto[their]claims.”SeeKorsgaard“FellowCreatures.”Inordercogentlytoholdsuchaview,aKantianmustgiveupKant’scorecommitmenttoprioritizingreason’sfreedomfromexternaldemands.ForargumentsagainsttheattempttoexpandKantianrespecttootheranimals,seeKain“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”andVarden“KantandMoralResponsibility.”206Arneson,“WhatDoWeOwe?”289.207Hare,MoralThinking,44-45.
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actions,andcanfollowthroughontheresultingprescriptionwithouthindranceor
misgivings.Thewrongnessofviolationsofintuitiveprinciplesdependsonhumanbeings’
imperfection,andwillcorrelatenegativelywithindividualhuman’scapacitiesforthinking
likeanarchangel.
Themorecloselyahumanbeingapproximatesthearchangel’saptitudeforwielding
theprincipleofutilityuncomplicatedbyintuitiveprinciples,thefewermoralconflictsthey
willface.Theintuitiveprinciplesofsuchapersoncanbehighlyqualified—permittingharm
inmanyinstancesinwhichmore“disabled”peoplewouldconsiderharmingtobewrong—
andsuchapersoncanmoreoftenappealdirectlytotheprincipleofutility,withoutthe
resultchafingagainstintuitiveprinciples.InDiller’sposition,someonewhosemorallife
approachesthatoftheidealutilitarianwouldnotthinkandfeelasthoughwhatevertheydo
willinvolvewrongdoing.Rather,theywoulddeterminewhichcourseofaction—shooting
barredowlsorallowingnorthernspottedowlstobedriventoextinction—wouldbring
aboutthemostnetwelfare,andtheywouldtakethatcourse,unburdenedbymoralanxiety
orregret.
If,likeme,youregardDilleraswiserandmorefinelyattunedtothewrongsatstake
inhispredicamentthananarchangelwouldbe,youmaybecalledtoquestiontheelement
ofutilitarianismthatblindstheidealutilitarianthinkertothewrongnessofutility-
maximizingharm:aggregationism.Bytakingthepositionthatthepracticallyrational
responsetotheintrinsicvalueofwelfareistomaximizeitinaggregate,utilitarianism
allowsthewrongnessofindividualharmstofluctuateininverseproportiontoagents’
abilitiestocalculatewhichcourseofactionmaximizesnetwelfare,andnottobe
emotionallydeterredfromactingontheresultofthatcalculation.
OnmyinterpretationofRoss’stheory,thewrongnessofharmingindividual
others—whethertheybehumansorotheranimals—ismorerobustthanitisaccordingto
utilitarianism.Itdoesnotfunctionprimarilyasahelpfuldeviceforsteeringpeopletoward
theperformanceoftheactionwhich,inthefinalanalysis,isrequired.Whenweharm
someone,accordingtoRoss,wewrongthemwhetherornotisitoptimificforustobe
disposedtojudgethatwehavewrongedthem.IfRoss’stheoryhadanidealmoralagent,
thatagentwouldthinkthatharminganotheriswrong,andmoralregret-worthy,even
whenitisaninescapablepartoffulfillinganallthingsconsideredduty.
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ThewayRoss’stheoryhandlesrecoveryconflictsisopentoanothercriticism,
however.FromwithinRoss’stheory,takingorsupportingtheextinctioncourseofaction
wouldbewrongbecauseitwouldharmsentientbeings,andinsomecasesbecauseit
wouldbreakpromises.Itwouldnot,andcouldnot,bewrongjustbecauseitallowsor
bringsaboutthedestructionofaspecies(orothertaxonomicgroup).Inmanypeople’s
view,apparentlyincludingDiller’s,thedestructionofaspeciesisthemainwrong-making
featureoftheextinctioncourseofaction.Itwaspartlyinresponsetoaperceptionthat
mainstreamethicaltheoriesdenythiskindofwrongthatthefieldofenvironmentalethics
emerged.208ThatRoss’stheoryneglectsitcouldbeseenasadefectofthetheory.209
AlthoughRoss’sargumentagainsttheideathathousescanbeharmedstrongly
impliesthatthedutyofnon-maleficencedoesnotcoverspecies,histheorydoesnotrule
outthepossibilityofaprimafaciedutynottodestroyspecies.210Rosssaysthathislistof
primafaciedutiesisexpandable.Itis“correctasfarasitgoes,thoughnotnecessarily
complete.”211Asanintuitionist,Rossbelievesthatfundamentalmoralprinciples—prima
facieduties—areknownapriori.Inorderforanotherdutytobeaddedtothelist,itmust
bea“self-evident”moralprinciple.Thisepistemologicalintuitionismisperhapsthemost
questionableaspectofRoss’sethics.Ifoneacceptsit,however,onecanattemptthetaskof
showingthatitisintuitivelytruethatitisprimafaciewrongtoallowortoundertakeeither
speciesdestruction,orsomemoregeneraltypeofdestructionofwhichspeciesdestruction
isatoken.Ifoneissuccessful,thenonecouldarguethattherecanbecasesinwhichthe
relativestrengthofaparticulardutynottodestroyaspeciesrenderstheextinctioncourse
ofactionallthingsconsideredwrong.
208E.g.Routley,“IsThereaNeedforaNew,anEnvironmentalEthic?”209TobefairtoRoss,ifthisisdefect,itisnotonethattheothertwotheorieslack.210Ross,RightandGood,49.Forafullerexplanation,seechapter3,“Ross’sDeontology,”section3.1(Dutiesofnon-maleficence).211Ibid.,23.
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5.MoralConflictintheAnthropocene
Insection2(Kant’sDeontology)IdismissedDonagan’sclaimthatapersoncanonly
becomeentangledinamoralconflictasaresultofpriorwrongdoingontheirpart.Yeta
looserversionofDonagan’spointiswelltaken:peopleoftenfindthemselvesinmoral
conflictsbecauseofpriorwrongdoing,whetherithasbeencommittedbythemselvesorby
others.ManyoftheexamplesofconflictthatIhaveusedariseinpartbecauseofcoursesof
actionthatarguablywerewrongindependentlyofthefactthattheygeneratedconflict.
Sophie’sconflictwasadirectresultofanevildonetoherbyanSSofficer,andanindirect
resultofpoliciesandindividualactsthatputherinasituationtobesoabused.
Warsarecauldronsofmoralconflict.LikeSophie’schoice,anumberofmyexamples
ofconflictoccurinthecontextofwar:Agamemnon’sconflict,Agarjuna’sconflict,the
conflictofWWIIresistancefighters,andtheconflictofthosewhofacechildsoldiersin
combat.Warscannotgetstartedwithoutwrongdoingbyatleastoneoftheinvolved
parties.Eitheroneparty’smilitaryengagementwithanotherisunjust,oritisjust.Ifitis
unjust,thepartyhasdonewrong.Ifitisjust,anotherpartymusthavedonesomething
unjustenough—andthereforewrongenough—tosanctiontheintervention.
Likewartimeconflicts,recoveryconflictsoftenresultfrompriorwrongdoing.For
instance,theislandfoxandthespottedowlrecoveryconflictsbothresultedfromcourses
ofactionthatarguablywouldberemorse-worthyeveniftheyhadn’tengenderedconflicts.
Intheislandfoxcase,thearguablywrongfulprioractwaslargescaledumpingofpesticides
intoMontroseBay.Inthespottedowlcase,itwasclearcuttingvasttractsofmature
forest.212
Itisuncontroversialthathumanactivitiesarecausingvastandrapidchangesto
climate,tohabitats,aswellastothenumbersanddistributionsofdifferentkindsof
organismsontheplanet.Peopleworkinginenvironmentalethicshaveelaborateda
numberofreasonstoavoidcausingtheseextremeecologicaltransformations.Theseare
212Otherrecoverypredicamentsmightsimilarlybelinkedtopriorwrongdoing:partofthereasonthatCaliforniacondorswereatthebrinkofextinctionwasthatpeoplewereshootingthemforsport.Whoopingcraneswereindirestraitsbecausesomanywerekilledfortrophies,museumcollections,andhats,andbecauseofvastandrapiddestructionofwetlands.Androseateternswereendangeredbecausesomanyofthemwerekilledinorderforsomepeopletoprofitfromsellinghatsdecoratedwiththebirds’palest-of-pinkfeathers.
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someofthemostcompelling:suchtransformationsharmpeopleandotheranimals;they
exacerbateanalreadyunjustdistributionoftheburdensandbenefitsoftheactivitiesthat
causethem;andtheydestroyobjectsandrelationshipsthathavesignificantand
irreplaceablevalue.Ihopetohavedrawnattentiontoanadditionalreason:causing
extremeecologicaltransformationscanforcepeopleintosituationsoftragicmoralconflict.
ThetragediesonwhichIhavefocusedarerecoverypredicaments.Theyarenotrare,and
theyarenottheonlykindofmoralconflictcreatedbyextremeecologicaltransformations.
Foranotherexample,takeapotentialfutureconflictthatwearenowinapositionto
prevent.
Thelikelihoodiseverincreasingthatfortyorfiftyyearsfromnow,somepeoplewill
facethefollowingchoice:allowglobalsurfacetemperaturestoincreaseby2–6degrees
abovethoseofthelate19thcentury,orengageinsolargeoengineering—sprayingsulfate
aerosolsintothestratosphereinordertodeflectsolarradiationawayfromtheinner
atmosphere,counteractingtheeffectofrisinglevelsofanthropogenicgreenhousegases
(muchliketheashfromavolcaniceruptiondoesonsmallerspatialandtemporalscales).213
AsStephenGardinerpointsout,eventheadvocatesoframpingupresearchintosolar
geoengineeringcallthechoicetheyfavor“thelesseroftwoevils,”andsoholdthatboth
coursesofactionwouldinvolveseriouswrongdoing.214
Toallowglobaltemperaturestorisemorethan2degreeswouldbetoallow
catastropheformanyhumansandotheranimals.AccordingtotheIntergovernmental
PanelonClimateChange(IPCC),ifglobalsurfacetemperaturesinthelate21stcenturyhave
risen2–4degreesthefollowingareverylikelytohappen:extinctionrateswillincrease
sharplyforspecieswithlowdispersalrates(e.g.plants,smallmammals,freshwater
mollusks),especiallyinflatorisolatedhabitats;foodinsecuritywillincreasebecauseof
lowerfisheriesyieldsinlowlatitudes,andbecauseoflowerandmorevariablecropyields;
morbidityandmortalitywillincreaseamongchildren,olderpeople,peoplewhowork
outdoors,homelesspeople,andanimalswhocannotmovetoclimatestheyare
213WhenMountPinatuboeruptedin1991,itinjectedmillionsoftonnesofsulfatesintotheupperatmosphere,andglobalsurfacetemperaturesdroppedbyalmosthalfadegreeinoneyear.214Gardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,341-3.
145
physiologicallyabletohandle;waterwillbemorescarce,especiallyforpeoplewhoare
poorandforanimals;sectorsofhumansocietieswillcompetewitheachotherforwater
resources;therewillbelargescaledisplacementofpeoplefromplacesinwhichtheycan
nolongerlivebecausecoastalandlow-lyingareashavebeeninundated,andbecauseof
urbanflooding,foodscarcity,andwaterscarcity;theriskofpoliticalandmilitaryconflicts
willincreaseaspoverty,competitionforresources,anddisplacementdoes.215
Undertakingsolargeoengineeringcouldmitigatemanyoftheseevils,butwould
leadtoothers:Itwouldincreaseairpollution;itwouldmaketheplanetdrier—monsoons
mightbeweakened,andtherecouldbetropicaldroughts,substantiallydiminishing
agriculturalproductivityinsomeoftheworld’spoorestandmostpopulousregions;216
solargeoengineeringwouldextendandentrenchthehumandominationoftherestof
nature;217itwouldturntheblueskyadullwhite;218oncesolargeoengineeringis
underway,haltingitsuddenlywouldcauseglobaltemperaturestoshootup.Itispredicted
thatthiswouldcauseevenhigherratesofextinctionthanclimatechangealone.219
AsGardinersays,eitherdecisionwillmorallymarthosewhomakeit.220Thecurrent
generation,atleastthoseofuswhoarerelativelyaffluentandaremembersofthesocieties
thatdrivetheproductionofgreenhousegases,willimposethismarringchoiceonothersif
wedonotdotwothings.Thefirstistotakeeffectivemeasurestosignificantlydecreaseour
owngreenhousegasemissions.Thesecondistoinvestmoreintheprogramsand
institutionsthatcanreducepeople’svulnerabilityandexposuretoclimatechange,and
215IPCC,ClimateChange2014,seeesp.64-73.216Jones,“SolarGeoengineering.”217SeeJamieson,“IntentionalClimateChange,”andGardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,349.218Morello,“GeoengineeringCouldTurnSkiesWhite,”andHecht,“GeoengineeringWouldTurnBlueSkiesWhiter.”219Trisosetal.“PotentiallyDangerousConsequences.”220Gardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,385-9.GardinerisapplyingtothegeoengineeringconflictRosalindHursthouse’sideathatevenwhentheyareresolvedforthepurposeofaction,tragicmoralconflicts(whatshecallsdilemmas)maragents’lives.SeeOnVirtueEthics,chapters2and3.
146
increasetheirabilitytoadapttoit.Wealreadyhavemanygoodreasonstodobothofthese
things.Theprospectofforcingothersintoatragicconflictgivesusanother.
Thegeoengineeringconflictandtherecoveryconflictsuggestthattoevadethe
problemoftragicmoralconflictistoignoreanethicalsignalofthecurrentepoch,inwhich
humanactivitiesareadominantinfluenceonclimatesandecologies.221BecauseRoss’s
deontology,Kant’sdeontology,andutilitarianismallhavetheresourcestoacknowledge
thepossibilityoftragicmoralconflict,wecannotuseallegiancetoanyofthemasanexcuse
forignoringthissignal.
221TheInternationalUnionofGeologicalSciences,whichistheprofessionalorganizationthatdefinesEarth’sepochs,continuestomaintainthatweareintheHoloceneepoch.However,thereisagrowingpushtodefinethecurrentepochastheAnthropocene,becauseofthescaleoftheecological,geomorphological,andclimatologicalimpactshumansnowmake,andbecauseofthemarkstheseimpactswillleaveinthegeologicalrecord.
147
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