Tracking without GPS€¦ · Tracking without GPS Nuclear Security Transport IAEA - CN-254-99 IRSN...
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Tracking without GPS
Nuclear Security Transport
IAEA - CN-254-99 IRSNRéf. : PDS-DEND/SESN/2017-0244
du 26/10/2017
Nom : Kévin Hocdé
Date : 16/11/2017
© IRSN
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2/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Summary
▌ Monitoring nuclear material transports
▌ Strenghts and weaknesses of the GPS
▌ Jamming and spoofing
▌ Possible solutions : Absolute navigation
Relative navigation
Combination of both
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3/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Monitoring nuclear material transports
▌ Nuclear security functions :(AIEA NSS 13)
Detection ;
Delay ;
Response.
Detection Response Mitigation Back to
normal Prevention &
Deterrence Alert Delay
Start of the
attack Time of delay
Time of response
End of the
attack
Time of response should be as short as possible
Time of delay should be as long as possible
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4/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Monitoring nuclear material transports
▌ An efficient tracking system would Improve the detection (and possibly the alert) function ;
Improve the deployment time of the response force
Detection Response Mitigate Back to
normal Prevention &
Deterrence Alert Delay
Start of the
attack Time of delay
Time of response
End of the
attack
Time of response would be shortened
Time of delay is unchanged
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5/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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The risks
However, if not protected enough, a tracking system could be :
▌ Denied For example in a jamming attack :
The signals are lost. Monitors can observe the absence of signals, but don’t know
anymore where is the transport.
It might delay the detection and alert
It might delay the response force
▌ Corrupted For example in a spoofing attack :
Fake signals are sent to the tracking system. Monitors won’t detect anything and might
think everything is normal. The true position of the transport is unknown, another
position is believed to be true.
It might inhibit detection and alert
It might fool the response force
(…)?
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6/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Tracking system
An efficient tracking system should be :
▌ Accurate : As close as possible to areal-time monitoring, able to detect any change in
speed or direction ;
▌ Reliable : Won’t collapse unexpectedly. If the tracking is lost, monitors should be able
to suspect a deliberate attack, not a system failure ;
▌ Robust : Resists to hazards, natural (vibrations, extreme temperatures, radiations…) or
malicious ;
▌ Trustworthy/safeguarding : The data should not be intercepted nor distorted.
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7/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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GNSS technology
▌ Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Beidhou…)
▌ Nowadays, the only technology which is : Available 24/7 ;
Whatever the weather ;
Works everywhere ;
(as soon as you are on the surface of earth)
< 10 meters ;
Cheap.
This hegemony makes it use everywhere
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8/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Known weaknesses
▌ But GNSS also have weaknesses :No authentication
Signal strenght (GPS) on the surface of earth : 10-16 W
Any occurrence at the same frequencies might blindthe receptors
25 W ≈ 16 000 km
Jamming attacks : Spoofing attacks :
transmission
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9/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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▌ GPS jamming and spoofing : what used to be military is spreading to
civil application and organized crime
But jamming can also be unintentional !
(interferences, collateral damage of long range jammers)
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10/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Tracking without GPS
▌ Absolute navigation
▌ Relative navigation
▌ Combination of both
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11/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Absolute navigation
▌ Radio-navigation : Different tags, frequencies, protocols
▌ New development thanks to the Internet of Things
▌ Example : skyhookwireless system GPS, GSM, Wi-Fi
Congregates technologies in order to increase accuracy and reliability
Works even if one technology is willingly denied
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12/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Multiplicity of frequencies
▌ Avoid common paths of failure
▌ Efficient against jamming To jam them all, need to spread the energy on all frequencies
Need for the malevolant to get close to the target
If one resists to jammers
tracking continues
However, does not stop spoofing attacksDifficult to spoof them all
But if one is spoofed, how to know which one to trust ?
need for one trusted technology
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13/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Relative navigation
▌ Continuous and autonomous
▌ But drift
▌ Known in aeronautics, submarines Efficient, but expensive
▌ New development with UAV, MEMS Cheap, but less efficient
Tricks could be used to increase the accuracy :
Pressure
Magnetism
Gyrometer
accelerometer GIS analysis
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14/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Relative navigation
▌ Using those « tricks », a simple inertial system can track a 2D-transport for dozens of minutes
Not enough for a self sustaining system
But allows combination in case of GPS deny
Orders of magnitude :
Inertial drift ≈50m
With magnetometers ≈5m
With GIS analysis ≈1m
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15/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
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Combination
+
One absolute
system
One relative
system
Accurate
Can be jammed
or fooled
Trustworthy
Accurate for a
short time only
+
Tracking is
achieved using the
absolute system
Relative system is used as
a comparison
It detects any incoherence
between accelerations and
tracking
Normal situation :
Incoherence detected
between absolute and
relative system
=> Absolute is
corrupted
Tracking is achieved with
the relative system
Attack is caracterized
Spoofing attack :
+
Absolute system is denied
Question : is it done
willingly or is it normal ?
GIS analysis
(tunnel, obstacles…)
Tracking is achieved
with the relative system
Response force is
alarmed
(in case of too long
denying)
Jamming attack / interferences /
obstacles :
( ))( ≠
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16/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Reproduction, divulgation ou communication interdite sans autorisation. Copyright IRSN© IRSN
Conclusion and prospects
▌ What used to be considered as State restricted is now available to anyone (spoofing, inertial units…)
▌ GNSS are known to be vulnerable, attacks have already occured in organized crime
▌ A combination of both technologies would benefit the accuracy of absolute systems and the robustness of relative ones.
And still be affordable for civilian companies
▌ If one wants to anticipate evolutions in jamming/spoofing and tracking tools, he should keep an eye on UAV’s world.
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17/17IRSN – Tracking without GPS – International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Reproduction, divulgation ou communication interdite sans autorisation. Copyright IRSN© IRSN
Thanks for your attention