__**TPA – Aff

Thumper – Pot 2AC*Obama’s budget push thumps Topaz 2/2/15 (Jonathon, “Barack Obama budget would allow D.C. pot legalization to proceed,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/barack-obama-budget-dc-pot-laws-114851.html)

President Barack Obama’s proposed budget would allow for Washington, D.C., to move forward with its

marijuana legalization law by restricting the funds members of Congress hoped to use to undermine the ballot initiative passed in November. The president’s $4 trillion budget plan, released Monday, tweaks language included in Congress’ December spending bill that sought to nullify D.C.’s legalization initiative, which voters approved in the midterm elections, by barring the city from using public funds to enact the law. The language in Obama’s budget would still disallow federal funds but would

permit the nation’s capital to use its own funds to implement legalization. “[T]he president supports the principle of home rule and he believes that Congress should not interfere with local decisions by the citizens of the District of Columbia about how they should be governed,” a White House official wrote in an email to POLITICO. In November, D.C. voters approved Initiative 71, a ballot proposition that legalized the use and transfer of recreational marijuana. In December, a group of

Republican lawmakers — led by House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers of Kentucky and Rep. Andy Harris of

Maryland — succeeded in inserting language into the $1.01 trillion government spending bill specifying that “none of the funds contained in this act may be used to enact any law, rule, or regulation” that would legalize or lessen the criminal penalty for any Schedule I drug, including marijuana. D.C. officials have argued that voters enacted the legalization law when they passed it in November and are vowing to move forward to implement it. D.C. Council Chairman Phil Mendelson last month submitted the ballot initiative to Congress to begin the 30-day process to review the law. During a review, Congress, under the Home Rule Act, can block any D.C. law by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. Experts say that outcome is highly unlikely, and district officials plan to move forward with the law if Congress fails to block the law in the review’s remaining days, which end next week. Obama’s budget — as first noted by Tom Angell, chairman of the Marijuana Majority — adds the term “federal” before the “funds” referred to in the spending bill. That

one-word difference would allow D.C. to use its own monies to implement its law. Congressional Republicans have already slammed Obama’s budget , and it remains to be seen if the new language will make it into a larger budget agreement. It almost certainly will not be included in any legislation that passes before the 30-day review period ends and D.C. makes its decision on whether to

implement the law. Obama’s budget language is his most explicit foray into the debate between the District’s government and congressional Republicans, a standoff that could result in a legal battle . And it provides another example of the president favoring local control over marijuana issues — his Justice Department has largely allowed Washington state and Colorado, two states that have begun implementation of marijuana legalization laws, to enforce their own narcotics laws.

Thumper – Pot 1AR More ev – Obama pushing D.C. legalization – triggers huge fight over pot Santos 2-3-15 (Maria, “Obama’s budget proposal would allow D.C. to finally legalize marijuana, after attempts by Congress to block them,” http://redalertpolitics.com/2015/02/03/obamas-budget-proposal-allow-d-c-finally-legalize-marijuana-attempts-congress-block/)

DC ’s marijuana legalization h as somehow become a budget item for Congress and the president to squabble over . The bickering began after several Republicans quietly snuck a provision into the “Cromnibus” spending bill forbid ding the city from using any funds to enact marijuana legislation, which passed in the district in the last election. Now President Obama has jumped into the fray with his budget proposal. His budget plan amends language in the spending bill so that it forbids only the use of federal funds , leaving city funds free for use towards implementing the new law. “[T]he president supports the principle of home rule and he believes that Congress should not interfere with local decisions by the citizens of the District of Columbia about how they

should be governed,” the White House told Politico. Rep. Rob Woodall (R-Ga.) told Red Alert Politics that the problem ultimately lies with federal law. Marijuana is still a highly-controlled substance under federal law, rated as a Schedule 1 drug—the same level as heroin. “If you

don’t like federal law, let’s change federal law,” Woodall said . “The president has taken us down this road so many times…instead of

changing the law, he just ignores the law . That’s true on marijuana. It’s true on the delay of the Affordable Care Act.”

Thumper – Keystone/TPA 2AC Democrats already defecting over Iran and Cuba AP 1-21-15 (Associated Press, “Friendly fire: Dems challenge Obama agenda,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/21/friendly-fire-dems-challenge-obama-agenda/)

President Obama, for all the flak he took from Republicans over his combative State of the Union address, now is running into turbulence from members of his own party – who could prove an even bigger barrier to his agenda . Democrats from

across the political spectrum spent Wednesday taking aim at parts of the president’s platform. Though

in the minority, they hold sway because Democratic defectors – particularly in the Senate – could make the difference in helping Republicans pass key legislation, and even override a presidential veto .

Already, a top-ranking Senate Dem ocrat has renewed pressure on Obama to slow his diplomatic outreach to Cuba and to Iran. House and Senate Democrats also convened a press conference on Wednesday to blast his push for new free-trade deals. Meanwhile, Democrats are likely to play a big role in advancing a bill in the Senate

approving the Keystone XL pipeline. On Wednesday, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., leveled some of the toughest Democratic criticism to date regarding the president’s foreign policy. On the day the U.S. opened historic talks with the Cuban government in Havana, Menendez, who is Cuban-American and is the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry warning about the Castro regime’s intentions. “Mr. Secretary, after five decades of authoritarian, one-party rule, we must recognize that the Castros will never relax their iron-fisted control over Cuba unless compelled to do so,” he wrote. “As the Administration pursues further engagement with Cuba, I urge you to link the pace of changes in U.S. policy to reciprocal action from the Castro regime.” Menendez voiced concern that a few of the political prisoners released by Cuba as part of the deal were rearrested, and about U.S. fugitives hiding out in Cuba, among other issues. He said all these matters must be addressed before re-establishing diplomatic ties. Shortly afterward, the senator scorched administration officials at a Senate committee hearing over their pushback on lawmakers’ effort to set up new potential sanctions against Iran. The legislation would provide for sanctions if Iran does not strike a deal with the U.S. and other nations curbing its nuclear enrichment program. Obama, in his State of the Union address, said this legislation would "all but guarantee that diplomacy fails,” and threatened to veto. Antony Blinken, deputy secretary of state, also said at the Senate hearing that “new sanctions at this time are both unnecessary and, far from enhancing the prospects of negotiations, risk fatally undermining our diplomacy.” But Menendez scolded the administration witnesses. “Iran is clearly taking steps that can only be interpreted as provocative,” he said. “Yet the administration appears willing to excuse away any connection between these developments and signs of Iran's bad faith in negotiations.” He also said the more he hears from the administration, “the more it sounds like talking points that

come straight out of Tehran. And it feeds to the Iranian narrative of victimization.” Not only could Menendez and his fellow Democrats help pass the Iran sanctions legislation out of Congress, but they potentially could provide Republicans enough votes to override the threatened presidential veto. On another front, liberal House and Senate Democrats on Wednesday spoke out against Obama’s call for authority to fast-track pending trade deals with Europe and Asia. In the State of the Union speech, the president said he wants the authority to “protect American workers, with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that aren’t just free, but are also fair.” “It’s the right thing to do,” Obama said. “I’m the first one to admit that past trade deals haven’t always lived up to the hype, and that’s why we’ve gone after countries that break the rules at our expense. But 95 percent of the world’s customers live outside our

borders. We can’t close ourselves off from those opportunities.” But many Democrats , and union leaders, say these kinds of deals cost U.S. jobs,

and point to the Clinton-era NAFTA deal. Rep. Louise Slaughter, D-N.Y., on Wednesday vowed to fight the proposal “ tooth and nail .” She and other

Democrats argued the push would hurt American workers.

Thumper – Iran 2AC Democrats already defecting over TPA and Cuba AP 1-21-15 (Associated Press, “Friendly fire: Dems challenge Obama agenda,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/21/friendly-fire-dems-challenge-obama-agenda/)

President Obama, for all the flak he took from Republicans over his combative State of the Union address, now is running into turbulence from members of his own party – who could prove an even bigger barrier to his agenda . Democrats from

across the political spectrum spent Wednesday taking aim at parts of the president’s platform. Though

in the minority, they hold sway because Democratic defectors – particularly in the Senate – could make the difference in helping Republicans pass key legislation, and even override a presidential veto .

Already, a top-ranking Senate Democrat has renewed pressure on Obama to slow his diplomatic outreach to Cuba and to Iran. House and Senate Democrats also convened a press conference on Wednesday to blast his push for new free-trade deals. Meanwhile, Democrats are likely to play a big role in advancing a bill in the Senate

approving the Keystone XL pipeline. On Wednesday, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., leveled some of the toughest Democratic criticism to date regarding the president’s foreign policy. On the day the U.S. opened historic talks with the Cuban government in Havana, Menendez, who is Cuban-American and is the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry warning about the Castro regime’s intentions. “Mr. Secretary, after five decades of authoritarian, one-party rule, we must recognize that the Castros will never relax their iron-fisted control over Cuba unless compelled to do so,” he wrote. “As the Administration pursues further engagement with Cuba, I urge you to link the pace of changes in U.S. policy to reciprocal action from the Castro regime.” Menendez voiced concern that a few of the political prisoners released by Cuba as part of the deal were rearrested, and about U.S. fugitives hiding out in Cuba, among other issues. He said all these matters must be addressed before re-establishing diplomatic ties. Shortly afterward, the senator scorched administration officials at a Senate committee hearing over their pushback on lawmakers’ effort to set up new potential sanctions against Iran. The legislation would provide for sanctions if Iran does not strike a deal with the U.S. and other nations curbing its nuclear enrichment program. Obama, in his State of the Union address, said this legislation would "all but guarantee that diplomacy fails,” and threatened to veto. Antony Blinken, deputy secretary of state, also said at the Senate hearing that “new sanctions at this time are both unnecessary and, far from enhancing the prospects of negotiations, risk fatally undermining our diplomacy.” But Menendez scolded the administration witnesses. “Iran is clearly taking steps that can only be interpreted as provocative,” he said. “Yet the administration appears willing to excuse away any connection between these developments and signs of Iran's bad faith in negotiations.” He also said the more he hears from the administration, “the more it sounds like talking points that

come straight out of Tehran. And it feeds to the Iranian narrative of victimization.” Not only could Menendez and his fellow Democrats help pass the Iran sanctions legislation out of Congress, but they potentially could provide Republicans enough votes to override the threatened presidential veto. On another front, liberal House and Senate Democrats on Wednesday spoke out against Obama’s call for authority to fast-track pending trade deals with Europe and Asia. In the State of the Union speech, the president said he wants the authority to “protect American workers, with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that aren’t just free, but are also fair.” “It’s the right thing to do,” Obama said. “I’m the first one to admit that past trade deals haven’t always lived up to the hype, and that’s why we’ve gone after countries that break the rules at our expense. But 95 percent of the world’s customers live outside our

borders. We can’t close ourselves off from those opportunities.” But many Democrats , and union leaders, say these kinds of deals cost U.S. jobs,

and point to the Clinton-era NAFTA deal. Rep. Louise Slaughter, D-N.Y., on Wednesday vowed to fight the proposal “ tooth and nail .” She and other

Democrats argued the push would hurt American workers.

---XT: Iran x Dems

More ev – Dems defecting over Iran Koran 1-21-15 (Laura, “Dems go after Obama on Iran,” http://www.4029tv.com/politics/dems-go-after-obama-on-iran/30842754)

A key Senate Democrat slammed the administration Wednesday over the state of ongoing nuclear talks with Iran, raising doubts about whether the President even has the support of his own party in pursuing diplomatic outreach with the longtime geopolitical foe. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

expressed deep skepticism that negotiations between six world powers, known as the P5+1, and Iran are leading to a deal that is in the interest of the U.S. and its allies. "I have to be honest with you: The more I hear from the administration and its quotes, the more it sounds like talking points that come straight out of

Tehran," said the visibly frustrated Menendez, addressing two administration witnesses at a hearing on the status of talks. Menendez has backed a bipartisan proposal to institute new sanctions on Iran, which the president has threatened to veto. At Wednesday's hearing, he suggested the United States is losing ground to Iran in the ongoing negotiations. "Over the past 18 months, we have been moving closer to their positions on all key elements," said Menendez, adding that Iran's history of secretive behavior should make the administration particularly weary of any deal that does not fully dismantle its nuclear weapons program. "After 18 months of stalling, Iran needs to know there will be consequences for failure," Menendez went on to say. "Now some of us believe those consequences should be additional sanctions." Menendez was

one of several Democrats who expressed concerns about the state of the Iran talks at Wednesday's hearing.

---XT: TPA x Dems Obama’s TPA push already fracturing Dems Needham 1-22-15 (Vicki, “Trade war erupts between Obama, Dems,” http://thehill.com/policy/finance/230358-fast-track-splits-dem-lawmakers)

A trade war is erupting between Democrats and the Obama administration over efforts to pass “fast-track” legislation

that would smooth the way for two major trade deals. Dozens of House Democrats are expressing deep reservations about the White House’s trade agenda, putting themselves on a collision course with President Obama over concerns that the deals will benefit big business at the expense of U.S. workers. The president used Tuesday’s State of the Union address to lobby Congress to give him expanded trade powers that would allow an up-or-down vote on any deal that reaches Capitol Hill, while giving the U.S. more power to steer the global

agenda. But while Democrats say they backed most of the president’s vision on other issues, some called his trade policies “dangerous.” Reps. Rosa DeLauro (Conn.) and Louise Slaughter (N.Y.) have been two of the loudest voices in the Democratic chorus against trade promotion authority (TPA) and say they are optimistic they can block the trade agenda . “These trade deals make it

much easier for corporations to send American jobs overseas,” DeLauro said Wednesday in what has become a weekly occurrence of press conferences on the issue. DeLauro and other critics

say the fast-track authority doesn’t allow proper public or congressional scrutiny of the agreements and fails to give Congress the ability to debate or amend the trade text. “I believe we have the votes , and I think we’re going to win motion in denying fast-track,” DeLauro said. They also say

they have been left out of the trade-shaping process and are concerned that the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will cause the loss of jobs and wages, something they say has also occurred after the passage of other trade deals. Blocking fast-track authority could essentially kill any trade deals, since it would be much more difficult for the Obama administration to complete deals without that lever. Trading partners would be much less willing to negotiate if they believe Congress could then change the agreements and ask them to make further concessions. Democrats rallying against it believe the defeat would force the administration to re-evaluate its stance, a House Democratic aide said. “We can’t swallow another hopeful notion

about trade,” said Slaughter. “We’re going to fight this tooth and nail , and I believe we’re going to win.”

TPA thumps Democrats French 1-21-15 (Lauren, “Liberals: Great speech, Obama … except on trade,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/state-of-the-union-trade-policy-114432.html)

President Barack Obama gave progressives much to love in his State of the Union address — even if they didn’t much like what he said about trade. The president railed against income inequality and stagnated pay for the middle class, and heralded his push for affordable college education — policies lefty Democrats have been trumpeting for months. And he issued a series of veto threats against legislation favored by the Republican-controlled Congress, announcements that are sure to cheer the Democrats’ progressive base. “We can’t put the security of families at risk by taking away their health insurance, or unraveling the new rules on Wall Street, or re-fighting past battles on immigration when we’ve got a system to fix,” Obama said. “And

if a bill comes to my desk that tries to do any of these things, it will earn my veto.” But he irked even the most die-hard Obama Democrats by pushing yet again for fast-track

authority to reach trade deals. Oregon Democratic Rep. Peter DeFazio said trade is “No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 in terms of things” that House Democrats “will find objectionable to the speech, along with a long list of things we would like.” “To challenge Congress to pass policies that would bring us in line with the rest of the world, I think that is a great moment,” DeFazio told POLITICO. “The one bad note was another job-killing, job-exporting free trade agreement identical to the ones pushed by [former Presidents Bill] Clinton [and George W.] Bush.” House Democrats have long been wary of the trade proposals the White House had strongly suggested would be unveiled in the State of the Union address. They argue that middle-class jobs are at risk of being exported by businesses seeking the cheaper labor markets that would open up if the U.S. signed a trade deal with Asian-Pacific countries. And

progressive lawmakers are further skeptical of passing the so-called “ t rade p romotion a uthority” legislation Obama called for, a fast-track measure that would force Congress to

hold swift up-or-down votes on trade deals he negotiates. The measures would also prohibit lawmakers from attaching amendments to any trade deals. “I was looking for the president to explain to me why this is going to be different than the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994,” said Minnesota Rep. Keith Ellison, the chair of the House’s progressive caucus. “I don’t want to dwell on the negative — 95 percent of what the president said, I loved it. Loved it. But on the trade stuff I’m not convinced.”

No Pass – 2ACWon’t pass – PC fails and Obama not pushing Freeman 2/2/15 – International Principal at Forbes-Tate, LLC (Charles W, “Trade -- Can Obama get it done?,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trade-can-obama-get-it-done/article/2559487)

This is why other all America's trade partners are waiting anxiously for Obama to be granted trade promotion authority (TPA). Until he gets it, they will not give their final, best offers to the his negotiators. TPA would force an up-or-down vote on the deal the president sends to

Congress. But who in Congress , Republican or Democrat, is eager to give the president a blank legislative check on any issue these days? Republicans, particularly those on the Right, are loath to provide him with powers the the Constitution otherwise reserves to Congress. Democrats, smarting from their

election losses of 2014, which many ascribe to Obama’s unpopularity, aren’t keen on helping him burnish his legacy, particularly with an issue that splits his base . Talk of “steamrolling ” probably doesn’t do much to

advance the cause . Supporters of trade and the TPP are hoping that the president’s alternatively vaunted and lampooned skills as a community organizer will be brought to bear and knit together this fractious community. Similar efforts by the Clinton and Bush administrations involved all hands on deck and late-night phone calls by the president to individual lawmakers. The pro-trade community is cheered by recent talk that Obama will create a whip group of cabinet officers chaired in the White House to rally support for first TPA and then TPP (and then,

possibly, for a trans-Atlantic trade and investment partnership with Europe). But if the President is truly going to launch a campaign with the kind of retail politicking necessary to drive "yes" votes on trade , it would be a solitary outlier in the otherwise- aloof legislative strategy practiced by this White House . After all,

the president’s signature piece of legislation, the A ffordable Care Act, was notoriously passed with a White House legislative strategy that consisted primarily of cheering from the sidelines . If the

legislative activity on trade is as buzzing as some in the administration suggest, it’s a little alarming that few if any of the key members and staffers on the Hill seem to have heard from anyone at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave . purporting to be whip ping their votes . Froman has thus far been the frontman selling the trade agenda, but despite his strengths, he can’t deliver the votes to pass the agreements he is negotiating with other countries.

Trade votes ideological – PC irrelevant Guida 2-5-15 (Victoria, “President Barack Obama amps up personal trade pitch,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/obama-trade-democrats-congress-114933.html)

Bill Clinton perhaps set the standard for presidential efforts to round up trade votes during the tempestuous debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement, said Greg Mastel, a former Democratic aide on the Senate Finance Committee. “I honestly don’t think it could have passed without his concerted effort,” said Mastel, who’s now a senior adviser for international

trade and tax policy at the Kelley Drye & Warren law firm. “By that I mean he called members personally, talked to them one-

on-one and in groups. He must have spent a couple hundred hours personally rounding up votes, which is a whole lot of time for a president .” But Mastel said he was skeptical an all-out push by Obama would have the same impact because 20 years after the vote on NAFTA, trade is a “very mature” issue, and most lawmakers, even new ones, have already made up their minds on it.

No Pass—1AR* Opposition building momentum – insider optimism is wrong MacGillis 2/2/15 (Alec, Slate staff writer, “Why Obama’s Big Trade Deal Isn’t a Sure Thing,” http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/02/democrats_working_with_tea_party_against_obama_s_trade_deal_the_president.single.html)

But the opposition is far from giving up . With a majority of House Dem ocrats likely to oppose fast track, it would only take a sizable minority of House Republicans to derail it when it comes up for

a vote in the next month or two. And so the traditional opponents of free-trade agreements are plugging along,

stoking the fires of opposition on the right. The Teamsters have retained a Republican-leaning lobbying outfit, the Keelen

Group, to reach out to conservative members. And the Coalition for a Prosperous America, a group that lobbies against

free-trade agreements and has ties to both industry and organized labor, is provoking conservatives’ innate distrust of the GOP establishment by noting that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s promise to return the Senate to “regular order” conflicts with the rush and lack of transparency involved in passing trade deals via fast track. “McConnell said, ‘I’m bringing back regular order,’ but in this case it’s suspending regular order, passing something with no amendments before you even know what's coming from the smoky

back room in the other branch—it’s procedurally far worse,” says Michael Stumo, the organization’s CEO. He predicts that the trade deals are in more trouble on the right than GOP leaders and the Obama administration think. “This is a real street fight,” Stumo said. “They’ve granted [Obama] a massive amount of authority and don’t want to grant him more.”

No Pass—GOP No pass – GOP will cave to labor Freeman 2/2/15 – International Principal at Forbes-Tate, LLC (Charles W, “Trade -- Can Obama get it done?,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trade-can-obama-get-it-done/article/2559487)

<So even pro-trade members of Congress are wary of trade votes. No politician wants to hear the wrath of out-of-work constituents on local TV news or splashed across negative campaign advertising come election time. Obama and his team have plenty of hard work ahead to convince even Republicans that a vote in favor of his trade deals won’t be Exhibit Number 1 when a political opponent want to suggest that he or she has lost touch with voters. One otherwise pro-trade GOP lawmaker

privately said, “Give us an excuse not to vote on trade.” Steamrolling Democrats into a pro-trade vote may prove even harder. The common wisdom is that Republicans need a sizable corpus of Democrats to fall

on their swords and vote yes on trade deals . That number could be as few as 20 in the House, but the smaller the number , the greater the chance recalcitrant Republicans who feel electorally vulnerable will refuse to go along.>

GOP will block due to fear of executive overreach French 1/30/15 (Lauren, “Obama cranks up trade pitch to Dems,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/obama-trade-pitch-114781.html)

The anti-trade caucus is bolstered by conservative Republicans who have no intention of handing Obama even more executive authority. Twenty-two Republicans previously signed a letter circulated by Rep. Walter Jones (R-N.C.) that decried the fast-track option as unconstitutional, and while

some have since left Congress, the number of GOP lawmakers skeptical of White House overreach has grown . Many Republican lawmakers have said they first need to see the proposal from the Senate and House committees.

No Pass—Dems Democrats ‘peeling away’ votes – PC fails French 1/30/15 (Lauren, “Obama cranks up trade pitch to Dems,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/obama-trade-pitch-114781.html)

The Democratic caucus’ anti-trade leaders are searching for moderates to peel away from the White House. DeLauro approaches New Democrat Coalition members each day Congress is in session

to ask where they stand and lobby against the deals, multiple members said. DeLauro said the central argument against the deals is that giving U.S. employers easier access to cheap labor markets could drive down American wages. Speaking after her

briefing during the retreat, DeLauro said the party’s focus on “middle-class economics” for the 2016 elections will make it hard to sell lawmakers on accepting trade packages that could hurt U.S. workers. “Congress can no longer give this administration — or any future one — the benefit of the doubt, especially given the scope of this particular deal,” DeLauro said in a statement with Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) earlier this week. “America’s trade policy has not improved the lives of the middle class and leading economists overwhelmingly agree that trade has contributed to the rise in income inequality.”

Obama Push Fails—1AR Obama push fails French 1/30/15 (Lauren, “Obama cranks up trade pitch to Dems,” http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/obama-trade-pitch-114781.html)

Some lawmakers have complained that the administration’s outreach efforts have been superficial . Levin said administration officials have stopped congressional staff from taking notes on the trade proposals, and lawmakers have been barred from taking paperwork from briefings. Some members also criticized an administration email blast that went out after Obama’s State of the Union address, saying it was too low-key for such a controversial policy .

A2 Top Priority Not priority – passage is MONTHS away STR 1-30-15 (Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, “Legislation to Expedite Consideration of Trade Agreements Gaining Momentum,” http://www.strtrade.com/news-publications-trade-promotion-authority-TPA-legislation-013015.html)

The combination of a Republican-controlled Congress and the approaching conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership

negotiations has many observers expecting that lawmakers will introduce, consider and vote on t rade

p romotion authority legislation within the next few months. According to press sources, TPA bills could be introduced in the House and

Senate by the end of February. However , it is generally believed that the process of moving TPA through the two chambers and, assuming it passes both, to the president’s desk will take a number of months .

A2: TPP Alt causes kill TPP *Domestic politics – TPA can’t produce passable TPP

*Int politics – TPA = countries rush agreements and hurt negotiations

Freeman 2/2/15 – International Principal at Forbes-Tate, LLC (Charles W, “Trade -- Can Obama get it done?,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trade-can-obama-get-it-done/article/2559487)

What’s in the TPP will affect the politics involved in passing it. There is a delicate balance in the construction of trade agreements. The administration almost certainly will attempt to inject new provisions into it that will reduce the ability of other countries to use lax labor and environmental regulations as a competitive trade advantage. These provisions aim to respond to demands from the Democratic base that, to paraphrase opponents of the deal, “trade agreements shouldn’t only

be about trade.” However, strong labor and enviro nmental provisions are far from likely to win votes from lawmakers who fundamentally dislike trade . The primary beneficiaries of trade

liberalization are, after all, private sector companies whose agenda is held in deep suspicion by the Left. Despite the fact that only around 15 percent of the private sector workforce is organized, the labor movement is deeply antagonistic to market-opening trade agreements that are perceived to place U.S. workers under new pressures. The environmental movement views trade agreements as race-to-the-bottom exercises, and will lobby bitterly against a TPP regardless of new provisions to raise environmental standards. If the president wants progress on other parts of his policy agenda — the trade agenda only took up 15 sentences of an hour-long State of the Union address — he will need the support of his base. And traditional progressive constituencies have warned that spending too

much political capital on trade will imperil their support on other issues. If the Obama administration will find it difficult to appease the Left, a TPP that seems focused more on left-of-center concerns than on opening markets

will undermine the interest of the business community in rallying support for passage . As a trade

association executive lamented recently, “There’s a big difference between business saying its for trade legislation — and it will be almost as a knee-jerk reaction — and actually committing resources and CEO time to lobby on behalf of that legislation.” Thus far, not much time or money have been committed by the business community to get out the vote on either TPA or TPP. Business leaders, and not just Washington representatives of American businesses, will need to make the trek to Capitol Hill personally for members to be

comfortable voting for trade. Appeasing all these constituencies is complicated. Further complicating the task is the fact that the political process in Washington has a global audience, and the messaging behind a pro-TPP narrative is read

far beyond the Beltway. Other TPP members will attempt to read the process with a view to finalizing their offers, which in some cases will be complicated by domestic political events back home . Some will rush to complete TP P even before TPA is granted to avoid the appearance of being captive to U.S. politics. Although

some analysts believe that TPP could be passed through Congress even absent TPA, it would make an already fraught process that much riskier . “I hope,” said one Republican trade staffer, “they’re smarter than that.”

Impact Turns

IP Impact Turn

2ac IP/PharmaLow protectionism now means TPA won’t change tariffs enough to impact trade- passage guts the US economy and locks in big pharma, killing generic salesReich 1/6/15 (Robert-, former U.S. Secretary of Labor, is professor of public policy at the University of California at Berkeley) “Why the Trans-Pacific partnership agreement is a pending disaster” http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Tax-VOX/2015/0106/Why-the-Trans-Pacific-partnership-agreement-is-a-pending-disaster (xo1)

Republicans who now run Congress say they want to cooperate with President Obama, and point to the administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, as the

model. The only problem is the TPP would be a disaster . If you haven’t heard much about the TPP, that’s part of the problem right there. It would be the largest trade deal in history — involving countries stretching from Chile to Japan, representing 792 million people and

accounting for 40 percent of the world economy – yet it’s been devised in secret. Lobbyists from America’s biggest corporations and Wall Street’s biggest banks have been involved but not the American public. That’s a recipe for fatter profits and bigger paychecks at the top, but not a good deal for most of us, or even for most of the rest of the world. First some background. We used to think about trade policy as a choice between “free trade” and “protectionism.” Free trade meant opening our borders to products made elsewhere. Protectionism meant putting up tariffs and quotas to keep them out. In the decades after World War II, America chose free trade. The idea was that each country would specialize in goods it produced best and at least cost. That way, living standards would rise here and abroad. New jobs would be created to take the place of jobs that were lost. And communism would be contained. For three decades,

free trade worked. It was a win-win-win. But in more recent decades the choice has become far more complicated and the payoff from trade agreements more skewed to those at the top. Tariffs are already low .

Negotiations now involve such things as i ntellectual p roperty, financial reg ulations, labor laws , and rules for health, safety, and the environment . It’s no longer free trade versus protectionism .

Big corporations and Wall Street want some of both. They want more international protection when it comes to their intellectual p roperty and other assets. So they’ve been seeking trade rules that secure and extend their patents, trademarks, and copyrights abroad, and protect their global franchise agreements, securities, and loans. But they want less protection of consumers, workers, small investors, and the environment, because these interfere with their profits . So they’ve been seeking trade

rules that allow them to override these protections. Not surprisingly for a deal that’s been drafted mostly by corporate and Wall Street lobbyists, the TPP provides exactly this mix . What’s been leaked about it so far reveals, for example, that the pharma ceutical industry gets stronger patent protections , delaying cheap er generic versions of drugs . That will be a good deal for Big Pharma but not necessarily for the inhabitants of developing nations who won’t get certain life-saving

drugs at a cost they can afford. The TPP also gives global corporations an international tribunal of private attorneys, outside any nation’s legal system, who can order compensation for any “unjust expropriation” of foreign assets. Even better for global companies, the tribunal can order compensation for any lost profits found to result from a nation’s regulations. Philip Morris is using a similar provision against Uruguay (the provision appears in a bilateral trade treaty between Uruguay and Switzerland), claiming that Uruguay’s strong anti-smoking regulations unfairly diminish the company’s profits. Anyone believing the TPP is good for Americans take note: The foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations could just as easily challenge any U.S. government regulation they claim unfairly diminishes their profits – say, a regulation protecting American consumers from unsafe products or unhealthy foods, investors from fraudulent securities or predatory lending, workers from unsafe working

conditions, taxpayers from another bailout of Wall Street, or the environment from toxic emissions. The administration says the trade deal will boost U.S. exports in the fast-growing Pacific basin where the United States faces growing economic competition from China. The TPP is part of

Obama’s strategy to contain China’s economic and strategic prowess. Fine. But the deal will also allow American corporations to outsource even more jobs abroad. In other words, the TPP is a Trojan horse in a global race to the bottom , giving big corporations and Wall Street banks a way to eliminate any and all laws and regulations that get in the way of their profits. At a time when corporate profits are at record highs and the real median wage is lower than it’s been in four decades, most Americans need protection – not from international trade but from the political power of large corporations and Wall Street. The Trans Pacific Partnership is the wrong remedy to the wrong problem. Any way you look at it, it’s just plain wrong.

Collapsing patent revenue incentivizes new business models – encourages outreach to emerging markets, crucial to solve infectious diseaseBennett 14 (Shannon, member of the Thomson Reuters API Intelligence team, http://lsconnect.thomsonreuters.com/author/shannon-bennett/#sthash.9kuO5xdy.dpuf, “Current Trends in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Emerging Markets,” 10-28-14)

One of the largest pharmaceutical trade shows, CPhI Worldwide, recently concluded in Paris. The event brought together companies from an expanse of geographical regions and played host to countless meetings where industry professionals worked to identify potential suppliers, partners and opportunities for growth. Much of the discussion and presentations during the event focused on the increasingly globalized industry, and new markets presenting interesting opportunities. As the industry evolves in the wake of the patent cliff, and small

molecule opportunities in mature markets wane, more companies are scouting emerging markets for prospects. Business models for both innovators and generics are changing ; strategic partnering and outsourcing for specific capabilities are becoming integral decisions as firms strive to gain or maintain a competitive

edge . There has been an increase in the presence of companies exhibiting from Latin

America , Africa , Russia, Middle East and South East Asia . These regions with large , thriving populations and increasing personal wealth are at the forefront of strategic planning for many companies. The potential for novel research and development programs as well as large populations of treatment-naive candidates for clinical trials command the attention of innovators. Meanwhile, expanded sales and marketing opportunities appeal to the

industry as a whole. These regions, excluding Russia, are comprised of a number of countries with separate governments, laws and regulations; navigating the requirements of each country can be cumbersome. Many of these emerging regions are heavily dependent on the importation of medicines, and while various governments are enacting legislation encouraging and even requiring local manufacturing, the challenges in many areas continue to dissuade many companies from fully investing. Pharmaceutical companies assessing the potential and challenges of these markets may find partnering with local manufacturers a successful option. Partnering for marketing, manufacturing or product licensing is a strategy a number of foreign companies have used to enter emerging markets allowing entrance without a tremendous amount of financial gambling. Partnering with local companies can offer value through familiarity with regulatory requirements, and governmental policies; as well as aid in market access through distribution to an existing customer network and knowledge of cultural aspects of the customer base. These partnerships can also offer insight into the deeper challenges of

succeeding in that particular market. Companies entering emerging markets must evaluate not only their potential return on investment but also the populations they will be serving . Companies may find their pricing structure incompatible with these markets as middle class income, affordability of medicines and healthcare have different definitions in

developing economies than in more mature markets. While many emerging markets are looking to strengthen access to essential medicines and fight infectious disease , the mature markets are seeing business models changing. Western medical treatments are becoming increasingly specialized, personalized, and targeted to

specific therapies. The shift in drug portfolios has impacted not only the innovation landscape, but also the generic drug and the active ingredient landscape. Understanding how these shifts will impact business strategies, partnerships, and potential competition is critical for any company’s long term growth and success.

1ar Econ TurnTPA kills the economy- job outsourcing and

FTA kills US economy- trade deficit and income inequalityKohn 1/23/15 (Sally- chief executive officer of the Movement Vision Lab, a grassroots think tank) “Obama is wrong about 'fast track' trade policy” http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/opinion/kohn-obama-trade-policy/(xo1)

T rade p romotion a uthority is a new synonym for "fast-track authority" which would give the president authority to negotiate international trade agreements on his own. Congress could veto such deals, but could not amend or filibuster

them. Fast-track trade authority removes important checks and balances not only in our legislative process but in our economy as a whole. This is a bad idea for two reasons. In recent history, trade deals enacted by Washington have been bad for American workers and our economy. President Obama and Republicans promote trade deals as good for economic growth and job creation. "Ninety-five percent of the world's customers live outside our borders, and we can't close ourselves off from those opportunities," President Obama said.

However, government data analyzed by the nonprofit Public Citizen shows that under two decades of f ast-t rack trade a greements, U.S. trade deficits have gotten worse -- increasing by over 440%.

Nearly 5 million U.S. jobs -- 1 in 4 manufacturing jobs in America -- have been lost since fast-track deals

like NAFTA and related agreements. While President Obama has emphasized that he wants to reduce income inequality, numerous studies say such trade deals have contributed to the rise in income inequality. In fact, wages in the United States have

remained mostly stagnant, adjusted for inflation, since the mid-1970s — when fast-track trade authority was first enacted -- even though worker productivity has doubled in the same period. All of this suggests we need more scrutiny on these trade deals , not less . Given the evidence of the destruction of previous trade deals, we need giant caution signs, speed bumps and roadblocks -- not a fast track. The other problem

with fast-track trade authority is that it allows our trade negotiators to unilaterally undermine democratically passed legislation. For instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an 11-nation deal championed by both President Obama and top Republicans in Congress, is not really about trade. Of the partnership's 29 chapters, only five address trade issues. The other chapters do things like create new monopoly patent extensions for pharmaceutical companies that would raise medicine prices for average Americans, and create a right for foreign firms to import food to the U.S. exempt from our current food safety standards. The Trans-Pacific Partnership would even restrict certain "buy local" and "buy American" initiatives -- in other words, preventing American consumers from protesting the trade deal with their own votes and wallets. I should add that this is what watchdogs think is in the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal -- because of document leaks. We don't know for sure, because while 600 private corporations have been involved in negotiating the terms of the trade deal behind closed doors, even Congress won't get to see the terms of the deal until after it's signed. That's why many Democrats oppose the deal, and similarly disastrous trade deals like it. If more crummy job-killing trade bills are what comes from bipartisanship, I would rather take more bitter acrimony.

1ar IPTPP and TTIP hurts trade – IP outweighs barrier reductionFulton, 11/7 (Deirdre, “Will the GOP senate hand over fast track authority on the trans-Pacific Partnership?” http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/11/will-the-gop-senate-hand-over-fast-track-authority-on-the-trans-pacific-partnership/)

“[T]he TTIP and TPP (the two main deals currently being negotiated) will do almost nothing to increase trade and quite

possibly could reduce it,” writes Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Baker argues: Both deals

are primarily about imposing a business-friendly regulatory structure on the signatories to the agreements. One

aspect of this regulatory structure is creating a quasi-judiciary system, investor-state dispute settlement councils, which would operate outside the existing legal

structure of the countries in the agreements. The agreements, which are being negotiated in secrecy, also will have provisions on the environment, health and

safety regulation, and copyright and patent protection. All of these provisions will supersede existing domestic law and regulation. The increases in patent and copyright protection in these deals (yes, that is “protection” as in the opposite of free trade) will raise the price of prescription drugs and other items. These higher prices will reduce purchasing power and slow growth. They will likely lower, not raise, the amount of trade. This means that if Republicans are actually enthusiastic about increased trade, they probably would oppose both the TPP and TTIP.

TPA increases protectionism – leads to IP protections that are comparatively worse than the barriers it eliminatesCarson 14, 2014 (Kevin, senior fellow of the Center for a Stateless Society and holds the Center's Karl Hess Chair in Social Theory, “Protectionism is dead.

Long live protectionism!” Jamaica Observer, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Protectionism-is-dead--Long-live-protectionism-_16958654)

IF you follow the news, you will hear regularly various treaties — GATT's Uruguay Round, NAFTA, CAFTA, TPP — described as "Free TradeAgreements", whose purpose is to "reduce trade barriers". This is a lie . Without exception, such

agreements actually strengthen the one form of protectionismmost vital to safeguarding corporate interests against competition in our time: so-called intellectual property. In a recent Facebook discussion David K Levine, co-

author (along with Michele Boldrin) of Against Intellectual Monopoly, explained that what copyright actually confers is property right. If you record a song and give me a copy of the MP3, Levine asks, and I duplicate my copy and email it as an attachment to a third party (Bill), what "loss" have I inflicted on you? Not loss of the song itself, because you still have it. "What you have lost is (possibly) a sale you might have made to Bill. In other words, the right that you are granted by copyright is the exclusive right to sell to Bill. In other words, the property right granted by copyright is not over the 'idea' but rather a right over customers."

Exactly! Intellectual property is a protectionist monopoly, just like the tariff. In both cases, what's protected is a

monopoly on the right to sell a particular thing to a particular set of customers. The difference is that the monopoly conferred by the tariff operates along territorial

lines — the boundaries between nation states — whereas the monopoly conferred by patents and copyrights operates along corporate boundaries.

Today's f ree t radeagreements, falsely so-called, weaken or remove some outdated trade barriers like tariffs, while greatly strengthening other trade barriers, like "intellectual property" protections, increasingly to the point of nullifying free speech and due process rights against search and seizure in signatory countries, and giving the corporate "owners" of proprietary content what amounts to police state rights to enforce censorship on Internet publications and Internet service providers. So, why weaken one form of protectionist trade barrier then strengthen another — more than enough to make up for it — if this is really a free trade agreement? Maybe because it's not. These agreements are about — and only about — serving the interests of the industries whose representatives write them. "Free trade" is just a slick advertising slogan they're packaged with to sell them to the allegedly sovereign public "represented" by the governments that negotiate them. Of course, the only way the public ever gets to see the actual

provisions of these secretly written and negotiated treaties is if they're illegally leaked. The governments that negotiate these treaties, and the corporate

lawyers that actually write them, don't lower tariffs because of a principled opposition to trade barriers. They lower tariffs because they're no longer useful. A hundred years ago, most industries in the industrialised world were national. They were physically located within a country, and

owned by a corporation chartered in a particular country. So a monopoly on the right to sell manufactured goods to the domestic population was useful. Today, most corporations are global. The major forms of international "trade" in physical goods are trade in unfinished goods between local subsidiaries of the same global corporation, unfinished goods produced by nominally independent contractors in a global corporation's supply chain, or finished goods produced on contract

overseas and then marketed domestically in the United States. So a territorially based restrictionon the free flow of raw materials, finished

and unfinished goods no longer suitsthe needs of global corporations because they, themselves, are no longer territorial. On the other hand, it's extremely useful for a corporation to hold a monopoly on the right to sell a product to consumers. Thanks to patents and trademarks, Nike, an "American" corporation, can delegate actual production of sneakers to nominally "independent" sweatshops in Asia, while using its monopoly on the sale of the finished

product to pay the actual manufacturers a few bucks a pair and market them in American retailers with a "Swoosh" markup of several thousand per cent. This is

true, to a great extent, of every manufacturing supply chain in the world. And it's even more true of things like software and entertainment. What we see, in the negotiation of these "free trade agreements" is really an updated version of Adam Smith's observation: When representatives of a single industry meet in secret, they do so only to work against the public interest. What these corporations actually do in their secret meetings is terrorism of greater destructive impact than al-Qaeda could ever have dreamed of. And their main weapon of terror is the State.

 

India Turn

2ac India Trade deal cuts out India, which kills their econ through trade diversionSubramanya 2/9/15 (Rupa Subramanya is a Mumbai-based economist and co-author of Indianomix: Making Sense of Modern India) “The Looming U.S.-India Trade War” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/modi-obama-tpp-trade-intellectual-property/(xo1)

But the solar dispute is only one piece of a much larger philosophical divide. An equally important, unresolved source of friction

between India and the United S tates is their positions on intellectual property protection (IPP), and on the relationship of IPP and international trade agreements. Large, deep-pocketed American pharmaceutical companies with powerful lobbies in Washington want India to strengthen its regulatory regime. For instance: they want India to extend patent protections to new drugs and not allow compulsory licensing, whereby makers of generic drugs are allowed to manufacture patented pharmaceuticals. Here, India appears to have made a fairly major concession to the United States. Its long-standing position has been that IPP is a domestic matter, not one to be negotiated with trading partners. But during Modi’s visit to the United States last fall, India agreed to discuss its evolving IPP regime in a joint working group with U.S. experts. The report from those discussions

has yet to be released, perhaps suggesting some difficulty in reaching a consensus. On the other side of the fence, Indian generics manufacturers — the largest source of generics in the world — fear that they will lose much of their business if India adopts U.S.-style patent protection , which privileges the inventors of new drugs and limits availability of cheaper generic alternatives. What’s more, public health advocates and non-governmental organizations fear that moving to a tougher regime would raise the cost of life-saving drugs for those both in India and in developing countries that depend on its generics instead of the costly American originals. The IPP issue resides at the heart of the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement among 12 nations in the

Asia Pacific accounting for 40 percent of world gross domestic product and one-third of world trade. Pointedly, the TPP includes neither China nor India. If India remains outside the TPP — the likely outcome, as there is no indication that the original

12 wish to open up to potential new members until they have first struck a deal among themselves — India is likely to lose out on major market access . One study from the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, a think tank, released in May 2014 finds that the TPP’s big winners would be

countries like Japan, Korea and Malaysia. India, meanwhile, is likely to end up a loser, due to what economists call “trade diversion.” This occurs when a free trade area shifts production away from more efficient suppliers locked out of the agreement, to less efficient suppliers that are part of the agreement. This would hurt India . Its textile manufacturers, for example, worry that they will lose out on the lucrative U.S. market , in favor of suppliers in Vietnam, a TPP member. Intellectual property

regulations would be at the core of the TPP’s potential negative impacts on India. If India joined the TPP in the future , it would almost certainly have to replicate the patent regime built into the agreement.

This would extend and worsen the difficulties India faces on pharma ceuticals into a range of sectors where trademark and copyright laws are important, including publishing, music, and film production — the TPP’s IPP regulations, after all, are more stringent. Another study, also by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in May 2014,

concludes: “the costs of conforming to the TPP’s [intellectual property regime] Chapter are greater than any potential market access gains from joining the TPP .” The TPP also includes a host of stringent labor and environment standards that India — and, for that matter, most emerging economies — would fail to meet. There’s no indication that the Modi government has any plans to cave on these standards, the adoption of which would seriously erode India’s competitiveness , anymore than it has shown any inclination to cave on climate change — yet another area

where India and the United States remain at logger heads. It’s very hard to see how the new-found friendship between Obama

and Modi can resolve these tensions. Now that he’s unburdened by the need to win another election or help his party win, Obama is free to be as aggressive as he wishes in pursuing his policy agenda. In search of a legacy, bringing the TPP to fruition would be a feather in his cap, much as the India-US civil nuclear accord became a late foreign policy triumph for George W. Bush back in 2009. Obama’s State of the Union was quite striking for the strength of its rhetoric. Indeed, when it comes to the rules of global commerce, he said: “We should write those rules.” This may play well in Peoria. But leaders of other major economies like India are unlikely to sit back and accept dictation from Washington on how to run their own economies.

Decline triggers indo-pak conflict.Pardesi 5 (Manjeet S., Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005, Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives, April, [http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/4475], p. 51

There are good reasons to believe that India’s economy is on an upward trajectory. A rapidly growing India is likely to align all South Asian economies with its own, which is itself projected to emerge as one of the largest in the world. A rising India has two options vis-à-vis Pakistan—its neutralization as a challenger, or its accommodation. Irrespective of the policy it pursues, India will become the regional hegemon of South Asia. A rapidly growing India that decentralizes power within the Indian federation (from central

government to state governments) and integrates the economies of South Asia with it own is highly likely to co-opt Pakistan, as well as the other South Asian states strategically (not politically) in the medium-to-long term.

Goes nuclear- hot spots and historical tensionShifferd 1/3/14 (Kent - Ph.D. in history from Northern Illinois University) “After a nuclear war between India and Pakistan – a global nuclear winter” http://nuclear-news.net/2014/01/07/after-a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-a-global-nuclear-winter/(xo1)

What could be worse than a nuclear war ? A nuclear famine following a nuclear war. And where is the most likely nuclear war to break out? The India-Pakistan border .¶ Both countries are nuclear armed, and

although their arsenals are “small” compared to the U.S. and Russia, they are extremely deadly . Pakistan has about 100 nuclear weapons;

India about 130.¶ They have fought three wars since 1947 and are contending bitterly for control over the

Kashmir and for influence in Afghanistan……¶ Experts predict a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would kill about 22 million people from

blast, acute radiation, and firestorms. However, the global famine caused by such a “limited” nuclear war would result in two billion deaths over 10 years.¶ That’s right, a nuclear famine. A war using fewer than half their weapons would lift so much black soot and soil into the air that it would cause a nuclear winter. Such a scenario was known as far back as the 1980s, but no one had calculated the impact on agriculture.¶ The irradiated cloud would cover vast portions of the earth, bringing low temperatures, shorter growing seasons, sudden crop-killing extremes of

temperature, altered rainfall patterns and would not dissipate for about 10 years.¶ Now, a new report based on some very

sophisticated studies reveals the crop losses that would result and the number of people who would be put at risk for malnutrition and starvation .¶ The computer models show declines in wheat, rice, corn, and soybeans. Overall

production of crops would fall, hitting their low in year five and gradually recovering by year ten.¶ Corn and soybeans in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana and Missouri would suffer an average of 10 percent and, in year five, 20 percent.¶ In China, corn would fall by 16 percent over the decade, rice by 17 percent, and wheat by 31 percent. Europe would also have declines.¶ Making the impact even worse, there are already almost 800 million malnourished people in the world. A mere 10 percent decline in their calorie intake puts them at risk for starvation.¶ And we will add hundreds of millions of people to the

world population over the next couple of decades……¶ And what follows famine is epidemic disease .

1ar India EconDecline in trade triggers conflict- it enhances hostilities, undermines peace talks, and magnifies migration flow harm- that’s Paredisi

Goes nuclear- both stats are nuclear armed and vying for influence in Afghanistan, means any tension incentivizes action- that’s Shifferd

Defense doesn’t apply because it doesn’t assume trade decline, which removes channels for coop and incentivizes war

And, India turns the DA- it’s key to global growth and independently prevents interstate conflictBouton 10 (Marshall M., President – Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “America’s Interests in India”, CNAS Working Paper, October, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_USInterestsinIndia_Bouton.pdf(xo1)

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and development of both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing conflict between Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every one of India’s

neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, undermine economic and political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely

important counterweight to the prevalent instability and conflict all around India’s periphery.

Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability on a scale that would have global consequences, including damage to the global economy , huge dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism , and much greater potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict .

That war escalates quickly to extinction---no checksGreg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased

India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange . Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war . Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only

chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising

the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but

both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or

as the result of a decapitating strike), c ommand and c ontrol elements would be disabled, leaving individual

commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities . As a result any such conflict would likely

continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal . A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a

whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the

global repercussions of a regional nuclear war . Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in

1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union wouldresult in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter ,which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in

which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely

targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of

direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation

of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at

this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade , during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the

upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer . The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature

would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention.

Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan , it might not take much to set them off . Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s

security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to

nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that

could quickly escalate .

Deterrence can’t prevent escalation.Kapur ‘8 (S. Paul Kapur, Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School and a Faculty Affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. International Security. Volume 33, Number 2, Fall 2008. Project Muse.)

G iven the uncertainties that would be inherent in a large-scale Indo Pakistani conflict , however, such a benign outcome is not guaranteed. For example, an unexpectedly rapid and extensive Indian victory, or failure to achieve a quick diplomatic resolution to the conflict, could result in a far more extreme Pakistani response than the Indians currently anticipate. Thus India's planning for a carefully controlled limited war with Pakistan could prove to be overly optimistic. As a senior U.S. defense official familiar with Cold Start worries, the Indians "think that they can fight three or four days, and the international community will stop it. And they believe that they can fight through a nuclear exchange. But there are unintended consequences. Calibrate a conventional war and nuclear exchange with Pakistan? It doesn't work that way."70 Significantly, a large-scale Indo-Pakistani crisis could erupt even without a deliberate decision by the Pakistani government to provoke India. The Islamist forces that the Pakistanis have nurtured in recent decades have taken on a life of their own and do not always act at Islamabad's behest. Indeed, they often behave in ways inimical to Pakistani interests, such as launching attacks on Pakistani security forces, government officials, and political figures.71 If these [End Page 91] entities were to stage an operation similar to the 2001 parliament attack, India could hold the Pakistani government responsible, whether or not Islamabad was behind the operation.72 And with a doctrine that would enable rapid mobilization, India's military response could be far more extensive, and more dangerous, than it was during the 2001–02 crisis. By facilitating the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani crises in the past, then, nuclear weapons have inspired strategic developments that will make the outbreak and rapid escalation of regional crises more likely in the future. Thus nuclear weapons proliferation not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade since the 1998 tests; proliferation is also likely to increase dangers on the subcontinent in years to come. In the first decade after the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, South Asia managed to avoid a nuclear or full-scale conventional war. This does not mean, however, that nuclear proliferation has stabilized the region. In fact, nuclear weapons have played an important role in destabilizing the subcontinent. Nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the first Indo-Pakistani war in twenty-eight years as well as the eruption of South Asia's largest-ever militarized standoff, and played only a minor

role in these crises' resolution. It has little to do with the current thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. And it has triggered strategic developments that could threaten the region's stability well into the future. Although I have argued in this article against the claims of proliferation optimists, my findings suggest that both optimistic and pessimistic scholars largely ignore one of nuclear weapons proliferation's most pressing dangers. Proliferation optimists downplay proliferation risks by maintaining that the leaders of new nuclear states are neither irrational nor suicidal. Therefore, these scholars argue, new nuclear states will behave responsibly, avoiding overly provocative actions for fear of triggering a devastating response.73 Pessimists, by contrast, emphasize problems such as organizational pathologies, [End Page 92] arguing that these factors will result in suboptimal decisionmaking and dangerous behavior by new nuclear states.74 The decade since the South Asian nuclear tests, however, suggests that a principal risk of nuclear proliferation is not that the leaders of new nuclear states will be irrational or suicidal, or even that organizational and other pathologies will result in suboptimal policy formulation. The danger, rather, is that leaders may weigh their strategic options and reasonably conclude that risky behavior best serves their interests. Nuclear weapons do enable Pakistan, as a conventionally weak, dissatisfied power, to challenge the territorial status quo with less fear of an all-out Indian military response. Ensuing crises do attract international attention potentially useful to the Pakistanis' cause. And forceful retaliation does enable India to defeat specific Pakistani challenges, while offering it a possible means of deterring future Pakistani adventurism. Thus, given their military capabilities and territorial preferences, India's and Pakistan's recent behavior has not been unreasonable. But even if these policies make sense from the two countries' own strategic perspectives, they are nonetheless dangerous, creating a significant risk of catastrophic escalation. Thus nuclear proliferation could have dire consequences even if new nuclear states behave in a largely rational manner.

IL Ext.Yes trade key to stop Indo-Pak warDash & McCleery 14 (Kishore- a Corresponding author and Associate Professor, Department of Global Studies, Thunderbird School of Global Management; Robert- b Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,) “The Political Economy of Trade Relations between IndiaPakistan”file://psf/Home/Downloads/65-211-1-PB.pdf(xo1)

The level of trade flows between India and Pakistan is one of the most widely debated issues within the academic and policy arena in and outside South Asia. A

number of studies have found that an expansion of trade would reduce political tension and the threat of conflict, while also enhancing economic development in these two neighboring countries (Chowdhry, 2012; De, Raihan, and Ghani, 2013; Gopalan, Malik, and Reinert, 2013; Khan, 2010; Mamoon and Murshed, 2010; Taneja, 2013). Scholars, while divided on specifics, generally embrace the linkage between trade,

economic development and peace. Economically, expanding trade can raise incomes, reduce poverty, lower unemployment, expand foreign investment, improve production technologies and reduce cost of production, lower consumer prices and increase variety of products available to consumers . Over time, the channels from trade to higher growth seem to be increased savings and investment, enhanced technology transfer, and improved macroeconomic

policy and governance (Wacziarg, 2001). Politically, trade expansion has the potential to decrease rivalry, reduce severity of conflicts, and increase partnership, promoting regional peace and stability

(Anderton and Carter, 2001; Barbieri and Levy, 1999; Morrow, 1999). Such stability itself could foster further regional development by expanding trade, investment, and other beneficial interactions within a region.

The impact is east asia conflict- decline in trade increases hostilityMamoon & Murshed, 10 – Professor the Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham & Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), PRIO, Oslo, Norway [Dawood & Mansoob, “The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case” Econ Gov, 11:145, 2010, http://www.springerlink.com/content/4736rl34w118q532/fulltext.pdf]

However, if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average level.Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. The current low levels of bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing, so more trade with increased exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged. More access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able to also export more to India. A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities, as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict, and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind recent India- Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not

only India but Pakistan also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% per annum. The forecasts suggest that conflict will rise, even if there is a significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a

proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the economic version over the democratic version of the liberal peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though recently Pakistan has edged towards greater democracy with elections in February 2008

Mpx Ext.That war escalates quickly to extinction---no checksGreg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased

India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange . Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war . Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only

chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising

the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but

both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or

as the result of a decapitating strike), c ommand and c ontrol elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities . As a result any such conflict would likely

continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal . A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a

whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the

global repercussions of a regional nuclear war . Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in

1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union wouldresult in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter ,which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in

which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely

targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of

direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation

of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at

this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade , during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the

upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer . The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature

would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention.

Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan , it might not take much to set them off . Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s

security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to

nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that

could quickly escalate .

Deterrence can’t prevent escalation.Kapur ‘8 (S. Paul Kapur, Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School and a Faculty Affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. International Security. Volume 33, Number 2, Fall 2008. Project Muse.)

G iven the uncertainties that would be inherent in a large-scale Indo Pakistani conflict , however, such a benign outcome is not guaranteed. For example, an unexpectedly rapid and extensive Indian victory, or failure to achieve a quick diplomatic resolution to the conflict, could result in a far more extreme Pakistani response than the Indians currently anticipate. Thus India's planning for a carefully controlled limited war with Pakistan could prove to be overly optimistic. As a senior U.S. defense official familiar with Cold Start worries, the Indians "think that they can fight three or four days, and the international community will stop it. And they believe that they can fight through a nuclear exchange. But there are unintended consequences. Calibrate a conventional war and nuclear exchange with Pakistan? It doesn't work that way."70 Significantly, a large-scale Indo-Pakistani crisis could erupt even without a deliberate decision by the Pakistani government to provoke India. The Islamist forces that the Pakistanis have nurtured in recent decades have taken on a life of their own and do not always act at Islamabad's behest. Indeed, they often behave in ways inimical to Pakistani interests, such as launching attacks on Pakistani security forces, government officials, and political figures.71 If these [End Page 91] entities were to stage an operation similar to the 2001 parliament attack, India could hold the Pakistani government responsible, whether or not Islamabad was behind the operation.72 And with a doctrine that would enable rapid mobilization, India's military response could be far more extensive, and more dangerous, than it was during the 2001–02 crisis. By facilitating the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani crises in the past, then, nuclear weapons have inspired strategic developments that will make the outbreak and rapid escalation of regional crises more likely in the future. Thus nuclear weapons proliferation not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade since the 1998 tests; proliferation is also likely to increase dangers on the subcontinent in years to come. In the first decade after the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, South Asia managed to avoid a nuclear or full-scale conventional war. This does not mean, however, that nuclear proliferation has stabilized the region. In fact, nuclear weapons have played an important role in destabilizing the subcontinent. Nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the first Indo-Pakistani war in twenty-eight years as well as the eruption of South Asia's largest-ever militarized standoff, and played only a minor role in these crises' resolution. It has little to do with the current thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. And it has triggered strategic developments that could threaten the region's stability well into the future. Although I have argued in this article against the claims of proliferation optimists, my findings suggest that both optimistic and pessimistic scholars largely ignore one of nuclear weapons proliferation's most pressing dangers. Proliferation optimists downplay proliferation risks by maintaining that the leaders of new nuclear states are neither irrational nor suicidal. Therefore, these scholars argue, new nuclear states will behave responsibly, avoiding overly provocative actions for fear of triggering a devastating response.73 Pessimists, by contrast, emphasize problems such as organizational pathologies, [End Page 92] arguing that these factors will result in suboptimal decisionmaking and dangerous behavior by new nuclear states.74 The decade since the South Asian nuclear tests, however, suggests that a principal risk of nuclear proliferation is not that the leaders of new nuclear states will be irrational or suicidal, or even that organizational and other pathologies will result in suboptimal policy formulation. The danger, rather, is that leaders may weigh their strategic options and reasonably conclude that risky behavior best serves their interests. Nuclear weapons do enable Pakistan, as a conventionally weak, dissatisfied power, to challenge the territorial status quo with less fear of an all-out Indian military response. Ensuing crises do attract international attention potentially useful to the Pakistanis' cause. And forceful retaliation does enable India to defeat specific Pakistani challenges, while offering it a possible means of deterring future Pakistani adventurism. Thus, given their military capabilities and territorial preferences, India's and Pakistan's recent behavior has not been unreasonable. But even if these policies make sense from the two countries' own strategic perspectives, they are nonetheless dangerous, creating a significant risk of catastrophic escalation. Thus nuclear proliferation could have dire consequences even if new nuclear states behave in a largely rational manner.

ExtinctionGreg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia,” online: http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010

paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union

would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter , which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number

of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash,

soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere . Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron)

and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade , during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast . Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone

layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as

2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

AT Trade Impact

2ac TPA =/= TradeDoesn’t solve the econKrugman 2/3/15—he's pretty good at economics (Paul, "Beware of False Rationales for Supporting Trade Deals." Truth Out. truth-out.org/opinion/item/28905-beware-of-false-rationales-for-supporting-trade-deals,)

I am in general a free trader. There is, I would argue, a tendency on the part of some people with whom I agree on many issues to

demonize trade agreements, to make them responsible for evils that have other causes. And my take on both of the trade agreements currently under negotiation - the T rans- P acific P artnership and the T ransatlantic T rade and I nvestment P artnership - is that there's much less there than meets the eye. ¶ But my hackles and suspicions rise when I listen to the advocates.¶ In his recent "State of American Business" speech, Thomas Donohue, the head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, warned against economic populism, which he says is really about a push to create a "state-run economy." Yep - so much as mention rising income inequality, and you're Joseph Stalin (unless you're Mitt Romney). But what really gets me is the Chamber's supposed agenda for growth. Topping the list -

the No. 1 priority - is completing those trade agreements.¶ This is absurd, and disturbing.¶ Think about it. The immediate problem facing much of the world is inadequate demand and the threat of deflation . Would trade liberalization help on that front? No , not at all. True, to the extent that trade becomes easier, world exports would rise, which is a net plus for demand. But world imports would rise by exactly the same amount, which is a net minus. Or to put it a bit differently, trade liberalization would change the composition of world expenditure - with each country spending more on foreign goods and less on its own - but there's no reason to think that it would raise total spending . So this is not a short-term economic boost. ¶ Could these trade agreements be about the supply side, about raising efficiency and productivity? Well, standard economic models do say that liberalization should have that effect, in principle - but the effects are only large when you start from high levels of protectionism .

1ar TPA =/= TradeProtectionism is low now, means new trade deals won’t raise total spending enough to have a positive impact on the economy- even if they win protectionism is increasing it doesn’t matter because trade deals just change the composition of expenditure, not overall rates, which takes out the impact- that’s Krugman

Open trade is locked in—no protectionismKim 13 Soo Yeon Kim, of the National University of Singapore, associate professor of music at Nazareth College of Rochester, New York, Fellow of the Transatlantic Academy, based at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Monkey Cage, January 30, 2013, " Protectionism During Recessions: Is This Time Different?", http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2013/01/30/protectionism-during-recessions-is-this-time-different/

There is widespread agreement regarding the critical role of international institutions as “firewalls” against protectionism during this recession. Economic and non-

economic international institutions have served as conveyors of information and mechanisms of commitment and socialization. Their informational function enhances the transparency and accountability of states’ trade policies, and they mitigate uncertainty when it is running high . Specialized international institutions devoted to trade, such as the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs ), also lock in commitments to liberal trade through legal obligations that make defections costly , thus creating accountability in the actions of its members. Equally

important, international institutions are also arenas of socialization that help propagate important norms such as the commitment to the liberal tradi ng system and cooperative economic behavior. In this connection, the degree to which a particular country was embedded in the global network of economic and non-economic international institutions has been found to be strongly correlated with fewer instances of protectionist trade measures.¶ Information provided to date by

international institutions, with the exception of the GTA project, largely agree that states have not resorted to large- scale protectionism during this recession , in spite of the fact that the “great trade collapse” at the beginning of the current crisis was steeper and more sudden than that of its Great Depression predecessor. The WTO Secretariat, in addition to its regular individual reports on members’ trade policies under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), has issued more than a dozen reports on member states’ trade policies during the crisis. At the request of the G-20 countries, which pledged not to adopt protectionist trade measures at the onset of the crisis in 2008, the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD have produced joint reports on the trade and investment measures of the world’s largest trading states. They, too, find that G-20 countries had largely adhered to their commitment not to raise trade and investment barriers. In the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers (TTB) project, an important and unique data collection that includes information on pre-crisis and crisis trade policy behavior, Bown finds that temporary trade barriers such as safeguards, countervailing and antidumping duties saw only a slight increase of usage by developed countries, in the neighborhood of 4%. In contrast, emerging market economies were the heavy users of TTBs, whose usage rose by almost 40% between 2008 and 2009.¶ As scholarly insights accumulate on the current recession and its impact on protectionism (or lack thereof), two questions emerge for further research. First, to what extent have governments employed policy substitutes that have the same effect as trade protectionism? International institutions may appear to have been successful in preventing protectionism, but governments may well have looked elsewhere to defend national economies. This question can be seen in the broader context of the “open economy trilemma,” in which governments may achieve only two of three macroeconomic policy objectives: stable exchange rates, stable prices, and open trade. Irwin argues that governments that abandoned the gold standard during the Great Depression were less protectionist, and their economies also suffered less from the recession. Existing

scholarship also indicates that governments are likely to employ policy substitutes, opting for monetary autonomy when facing trade policy constraints, for example, due to membership in a preferential trade agreement . Moreover, at the time of writing, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced that it has dropped its objections to capital controls, albeit cautiously and only under certain conditions, thus potentially providing another policy alternative for governments to achieve economic stability during this crisis. Future research may further extend the application to policy substitutes that are deployed during economic downturns.¶ Finally, why did firms not push for more

protection? Protectionist policies are not adopted by governments in a political vacuum. In order to adopt trade defense measures such as anti-dumping duties, governments first conduct investigations to assess the extent of injury. Such investigations are initiated when firms apply for them through the domestic political process. If indeed governments did not appeal extensively or unusually to protectionist trade policies, the explanation to a significant degree lies in firm behavior. A distinguished body of research exists in this area that is due for a revisit in the age of extensive international supply chains, from Schattschneider’s classic examination of the domestic pressures that led to the Smoot-Hawley Act to Helen Milner’s study of export-dependent firms that resisted

protectionism during the crisis of the 1920s and the 1970s. Milner rightly pointed out that “firms are central,” and over the years the export-dependent, multinational firm has evolved in tandem with the increasing complexity of the international supply chain. Today’s firm is not only heavily export-dependent but equally import-dependent in its reliance on intermediate inputs, whether through intra-firm trade or from foreign firms. The extensive international supply chain thus often puts exporting and importing firms on the same side of the political debate, especially when they are members of large multinational firms. Moreover, the study of firm-level behavior must extend beyond the developed world to consider firms in emerging market economies, which have been the heavy users of trade defense measures during the current recession. How the internationalization of production, driven by investment and trade in intermediate goods, restrained multinational firms from pushing for more protection remains an important question for further research.

Institutional power and global norms mean no snowball effect for protectionism Drezner 14—professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

(Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Politics / Volume 66 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 123-164,)

It could be that the global economy has experienced a moderate bounceback in spite of,

rather than because of, the global policy response. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, cross-border flows grew dramatically despite efforts by states to raise barriers to exchange.46 In assessing policy outputs, Charles Kindleberger provided the classic definition of what should be done to stabilize the global economy during a severe financial crisis: “maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods” and providing liquidity to the global financial system through “countercyclical long-term lending” and “discounting.”47 Serious concerns were voiced in late 2008 and early 2009 about the inability of anyone to provide these kinds of public goods, threatening a repeat of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.48 By Kindleberger’s criteria,

however, public goods provision has been quite robust since 2008. On the surface, the open market for distressed goods seemed under threat. The stalemate of the Doha Round, the rise of G20 protectionism after the fall 2008 summit, and the explosion of antidumping cases that occurred at the onset of the financial crisis suggested that markets were drifting toward closure. According to WTO figures, antidumping initiations surged by 30 percent in 2008 alone. In a June 2013 assessment, the free trade group Global Trade Alert warned of a massive spike in protectionist

measures leading to “a quiet, wide-ranging assault on the commercial level playing field.”49 A closer look, however, reveals that warnings about an increase in protectionism have been vastly overstated . The surge in nontariff barriers following the 2008 financial crisis quickly receded ; indeed,

as Figure 3 shows, the surge never came close to peak levels of these cases. By 2011, antidumping initiations had declined to their lowest levels since the founding of the WTO in 1995. Both countervailing duty complaints and safeguards initiations have also fallen to precrisis levels. Some post-2008 measures are not captured in these traditional metrics of nontariff barriers, but similar results hold. Most temporary trade barriers were concentrated in countries such as Russia and Argentina that had already erected higher barriers to global economic integration.50 Even including these additional measures, the combined effect of protectionist actions for the first year after the peak of the financial crisis affected less than 0.8 percent of global trade.51 Furthermore, the use of these protectionist measures declined further in 2010 to cover only 0.2 percent of global trade. Five years after the start of the Great Recession, the effect of these measures remains modest, affecting less than 4 percent of global trade flows. The WTO’s June 2013 estimate is that the combined effect of all postcrisis protectionist measures by the G20 had reduced trade

flows by a total of 0.2 percent.52 The WTO estimate jibes with academic estimates of post-2008 trade protectionism playing a minimal role in affecting cross-border exchange. The overwhelming consensus is that “the Great Recession of 2009 does not coincide with any obvious increase in protectionism .”53 The quick turnaround [End Page 136] and growth in trade levels further show that these measures have not seriously impeded market access.54 The multilateral trade system played a significant role in

this outcome. The WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism helped to contain the spread of protectionist measures that the Great Recession triggered; there is no evidence that compliance with these rulings waned after 2008.55 This is consistent with research that shows membership in the WTO and related organizations acted as a significant brake on increases in tariffs and nontariff barriers .56 The major trading jurisdictions—the

United States, the European Union, and China—adhered most closely to their WTO obligations. As Alan Beattie acknowledged: “The ‘Doha Round’ of trade talks may be dead, but the WTO’s dispute settlement arm is still playing a valuable role.”57 The WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (gpa ) helped to blunt the most blatant parts of the

“Buy American” provisions of the 2009 fiscal stimulus, thereby preventing a cascade of “fiscal protectionism.” Policy advocates of trade liberalization embrace the “bicycle theory”—the belief that unless multilateral trade liberalization moves forward, the entire global trade regime will collapse because of a lack of forward momentum.58 The last four years suggest that there are limits to that rule of thumb. The Financial Times/Economist Intelligence Unit surveys of global business leaders reveal that concerns about protectionism have stayed at a low level . Figure 4 shows that compared with popular concerns about economic and political uncertainty, corporate executives were far less concerned about either protectionism or currency volatility. Reviewing the state of world trade, Uri Dadush and his colleagues conclude: “The limited resort to protectionism

was a remarkable aspect of the Great Recession.”59 Former US trade representative Susan Schwab concurs, noting, “Although countries took protectionist measures in the wake of the crisis, the international community avoided a quick deterioration into a spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor actions to block imports.”60 At a minimum, the bicycle of world trade is still coasting forward .

2ar KimInstitutions lock in trade via norms and huge penalties that deter defections, especially in times of decline. Even if international checks fail, domestic checks force firm approval- reliance on corporation imports and exports make this an impossible political battle, that’s Kim

AT Pivot Impact

2ac Pivot FailsPivot fails---too diluted and doesn’t solve US leadershipRod Lyon 15, fellow at Australian Strategic Policy Institute and executive editor of The Strategist, “The Real Problem With America's Rebalance to Asia: A Crisis of Expectations,” 1/16/15, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-problem-americas-rebalance-asia-crisis-expectations-12050

In Work’s view, the rebalance is occurring but its effects are somewhat diluted by an even larger global shift within the US defense force—after Afghanistan and Iraq, a smaller emphasis on forward -deployed forces and a larger one on reconstitution of US

surge-force capabilities.¶ The second source is the majority staff report prepared for the US Senate Foreign Relations

Committee back in April 2014. That report looked in greater detail at the non-military side of the rebalance —including diplomacy and aid—and in general found a set of policy instruments that were even less well-resourced than the military effort. The East Asia and Pacific Bureau in the State Department, for example, had 12% less funding

in 2014 than it had back in 2011.¶ So yes, the rebalance exists . But it struggles for oxygen , in part

because of the broader strategic baggage carried by the president. Moreover, substantial parts of the rebalance will take time to unfold—it’s not designed to address allies’ and partners’ demands for instant gratification and constant assurance. And, even

when it’s run its course, the rebalance isn’t going to restore the region al status quo ante China’s rise.¶ ¶ It’s that last point that highlights the extent to which the rebalance faces what we might call a crisis of expectations. Since different people believe it was meant to do different things, they judge it by different standards. Some of

those metrics strike me as unrealistic. For example, it’s perfectly true that even after the rebalance is completed, the US’ position in the region won’t be restored to what it was in the glory days of the 1990s. But the rebalance was never intended to do that. It wasn’t meant to reverse the rise of the Asian great powers, nor to roll back the tides of history.¶ Similarly, the rebalance was never intended to suggest that the US was happy to ignore what went on in Europe and the Middle East. Washington might have thought it was overweight in those areas, but it certainly didn’t think they were irrelevant. So have events in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq distracted the US from Asia? Of course. But the US is a global player, not just

a regional one.¶ The rebalance, even if successful, is merely one variable in a shifting strategic landscape . By itself, it won’t return the US to the position of the ‘indispensable player’ in Asia. Still, its principal value lies in the fact that the policy strengthens Washington’s ties to Asia. And that’s why Australia should want the rebalance to succeed: because its various components—including a comprehensive TPP agreement, a military reorientation into the region, and US membership of key regional institutions—will mean a US more closely engaged with both our and the region’s strategic future.

1ar Pivot FailsPivot does nothing- it can’t address US military grand strategy shifts, shrinking diplomacy budgets, or the need for constant assurances in the region, that’s Lyon

Even if they win that the deal overcomes that, it doesn’t matter because the shift gets us nowhere Francis 14, Fiscal Times national correspondent, 1-9-14, David, “Why Obama’s Big Pivot to Asia Is a Myth”, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/09/Why-Obama-s-Big-Pivot-Asia-Myth

“It’s really more rhetoric than reality and more rhetoric than resources ,” says Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow on Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. “On the one hand it’s a good strategy as it’s important to prioritize Asia for the United States because Asia

is so vital to U.S. interest, diplomatically, economically and militarily. That said, there’s not a lot of meat behind it.” Benjamin H. Friedman, a

research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the CATO Institute, concurs with this assessment. He said that the pivot is more of an effort to draw attention away from military pullbacks in Europe and the Middle East than it is a true effort to make Asia more strategically important . “All strategies tend to have … sort of a

combination of public relations and speeches and documents to steer the foreign policy enterprise of the U.S. in a new direction. It puts a gloss on things … but we don’t see a

lot of big changes being made that show a commitment to Asia,” he said. A closer look at actions on all three fronts shows why the pivot is a myth. Military - The United States already has 28,000 troops in South Korea, so adding 800 doesn’t substantially change the force. According to Friedman, the real proof of DOD spending priorities is in their budget. While it might appear that the Air Force and Navy -- the two forces who would benefit from the pivot - are making out better than the Army in the coming years, that’s not the case. The funding formula that DOD

uses to allocate its annual budget hasn't changed; any extra cash the Army got during the Afghan and Iraq wars came out of supplemental war spending. “We’re not seeing a fundamental shift in budget from the Army to the Air Force and Navy. If we were doing a serious pivot we would see that shift,” Friedman said. Friedman added that

many of the exercises that the Pentagon touts in the region have been ongoing for years. Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, no one was paying attention. Economically - The Obama administration likes to tout the Trans-Pacific Partnership meant to

increase trade with Asian nations of evidence of the economic pivot. But in reality, TPP talks precede the Obama presidency by years. “The economic aspect was left from the Bush administration. The reality is contrary to Obama’s assertion. We are not back in Asia. The reality is we never left Asia,” Klingner said.

Diplomatically - The White House often says evidence of its diplomatic shift to Asia is the number of meetings held between U.S. and Asian diplomats. K lingner said this is

a ploy. “But anyone who’s even been in a meeting can tell you: attending more meetings doesn’t mean success.

There’s a lack of tangible successes that the admin can point to rather than attendance,” he said. In a recent paper, Friedman said that State Department planning documents also reveal lack of action. “As the State Department’s Inspector

General Office recently noted, the pivot has had no obvious organizational or budgetary manifestation in the State Department, aside from the creation of an Ambassadorship and permanent mission for [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. Foreign assistance to the region is actually down almost 20 percent since 2010 ,”

Friedman wrote.

Protectionism

Trade/Growth/Offshoring—2ac Current agreements devastate trade and growth – ensures rapid offshoring – rejection of TPA key to a better product Hiltzik 2-7-15 (Michael, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, author of five books, “'Free trade' isn't what Trans-Pacific Partnership would deliver,” http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-20150206-column.html#page=1)

In principle, almost everyone's in favor of free trade. It promotes international harmony, raises wages, helps economies grow. It's an article of

historical faith that the enactment of harsh protective U.S. tariffs in 1930 contributed to the Great Depression. And who wants that? But "free trade" has little to do with the trade deal that President Obama hopes will be a high-water mark for his administration's foreign

policy: the T rans-Pacific Partnership talks, which now involve the U.S. and 11 Pacific Rim countries — Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The pact — which has been under negotiation virtually since the turn of

the century — is in trouble on Capitol Hill, where its enemies include conservatives and liberals. The overall problem may be that the TPP, as

it's known in shorthand, has become a symbol of everything that's wrong with free trade agreements today. The pact is being negotiated in secret , although U.S. trade negotiators have given big industries nice long looks behind the curtain. The White House is demanding "fast-track" approval from Congress,

which limits the say lawmakers will have and requires them to ratify in haste. And public interest advocates say it could undermine rules and regulations governing the environment, health, intellectual property and financial markets (to name

only a few topics). "Most of these provisions have nothing to do with trade or jobs ," says liberal economist Joseph Stiglitz , a leading critic of the deal and the secrecy of the talks . On the other side of

the argument is the trade pact's potential to foster economic growth and job creation — "650,000 jobs in the U.S. alone," as Secretary of

State John F. Kerry asserted last month. But that widely challenged figure is extrapolated from a 2012 report by the Peterson Institute of International Economics, which didn't offer a jobs estimate. In fact, the report said the TPP might dislocate workers and drive older people out of the workforce —

and that any benefits might be canceled out by the resulting costs to workers and society. Evidence from earlier trade pacts, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, suggests that the benefits for developing countries among the treaty signatories are similarly oversold. "Trade liberalization on

average has not brought economic growth for emerging economies," Stiglitz said. "The idea that it's

necessarily mutually beneficial is just wrong." Doubts about the TPP fall into three main categories. •Overreach.

Domestic policies and regulations shouldn't be treated as trade barriers subject to international negotiation, such as patent and copyright terms, wage and working conditions , even environmental regulations. But provisions in the TPP would protect brand-name pharmaceuticals from competition from generics in developing countries, forcing up the cost of healthcare, and would impose the overly strict copyright terms of the U.S., where copyright lasts 70

years after the death of a copyright holder, on signatory countries. Critics fear that bringing such issues into a trade pact will encourage a race to the bottom , favoring the most business-friendly regulations. "Some of these provisions roll back important public interest policies on issues like food safety, product safety and access to drugs," says Lori Wallach, the global trade watchdog at

the public interest organization Public Citizen. "This is diplomatic legislating on things that affect our day-to- day lives that have nothing to do with trade ." Especially worrisome is a procedure allowing corporations to file claims in arbitration courts against sovereign countries over changes in their laws and regulations. As is the case in some previous trade agreements, commercial interests will be able to seek compensation for "injuries" from anything from minimum-wage increases to environmental and health regulations. Mexican truckers filed a $30-billion case objecting to safety and environmental rules on U.S. roads; Eli Lilly & Co. is seeking $481 million from Canada for its invalidation of Lilly patents on several drugs; and Philip Morris has sued Australia because its rule requiring plain packaging for cigarettes deprives the company of its property rights in trademarks and logos. Even conservatives who otherwise favor the

TPP detest this provision. The Cato Institute has urged that it be "purged" from the pact. By giving special privileges to corporations operating abroad , Cato said, the provision allows them to undermine domestic

sovereignty and "effectively encourages outsourcing ." •Secrecy. U.S. Trade Representative Michael

Froman, who is conducting the talks, has been stingy with the text, critics say, out of fear of public nitpicking. Most of what the public knows of the TPP's drafts and the U.S. negotiating position has come via Wikileaks. Froman told the House Ways and Means Committee last month that he has taken "unprecedented steps to

increase transparency" by keeping Congress and the public in the loop, but most observers say disclosure has been nowhere near adequate. In 2012, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) was so frustrated at being stonewalled by the USTR that he introduced a bill requiring that all lawmakers with oversight on trade policy be given access to key documents. •"Fast-tracking." Fast-tracking allows the administration to present Congress with a completed trade pact, which lawmakers must vote up or down within 90 days, without amendments and with limited

debate and no filibustering in the Senate. The White House argues that fast-tracking allows negotiators to reassure trade partners that "the administration and Congress are on the same page," as Froman told the House Ways and Means Committee. The system

"puts Congress in the driver's seat," he said, because the lawmakers can "define U.S. negotiating objectives and priorities." But

the opposite is true: The congressional directives aren't binding , and the result can be jammed through the House and Senate. GOP leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.) favor fast-tracking, but opposition is growing from conservative Republicans and progressive

Democrats alike. Combined with secrecy, fast-tracking encourages the overreach that makes the TPP so much more

than a trade pact, and so dangerous. If fast-tracking is turned down , the TPP will have to be widely published and openly debated , says Public Citizen's Wallach. "That will bring out all the skunks that have been invited to the secret picnic ," she says. "Some of these things that should never have been in that agreement in the first place aren't going to fare very well when they're exposed to sunshine.

And that's good ."

That guts US military power and causes terrorism *offshoring’s the key internal link

Hira ‘8 – PhD [Ron, recognized expert on outsourcing, Anil Hira, specialist in international econ development and innovation issues, “Outsourcing America”, page number below]

The Potential Impacts Are Far-Reaching The stakes are enormous, not just for our economic future but also for ail other aspects of our quality of life. Without good, high-paying jobs there are no tax revenues to fund our education, health, infrastructure, and social security systems. Economists want to claim dogmatically that workers will simply retrain for other jobs, but where are those jobs going to come from? Retraining has never proven itself reliable. More important, can an outsourced IT worker or engineer, who has been forced to train her overseas replacement, find comparable work with comparable salary to support her family and pay for her kids' education? The answer is clearly not, as the growing multitude of devastated, overqualified workers has been crying out. Outsourcing is not just about jobs. Its potential impact is not only on our quality of life but also on our national competitiveness and national security. Our competitive edge—the reason, until now, America has been the beacon for immigrants to come and achieve the American Dream—has been our ability to create new high-wage jobs. And a good part of that job creation has been in technology, with government and private support for developing the most highly skilled workforce and the most innovative products. The IT, the aerospace, and the biotechnology industries, to name a few, depend on a careful partnership among publicly funded research , our leading-edge universities, the

private sector, and the most productive workers in the world. Outsourcing is taking away the workforce that has been a key part of our winning

formula . Once we lose the high-tech jobs , then why would our most capable minds study engineering, computer science, biotech nology, or any of the other

promising fields that will create national competitiveness in the future? Already we are seeing record unemployment rates in these

occupations and a major drop in enrollments in these fields, in good part owing to outsourcingMoreover, our national security is based in large part on this tech nological edge . Our soldiers depend upon a solid core of engineers, computer technicians, and research

and development scientists to provide the equipment and logistical support that protect our country . Now that terrorist forces are using tech nology , including the Internet and high-tech communications equipment, we need to maintain the national capability to stay ahead of their technological

knowledge. If we allow outsourcing to wipe out our base of technical workers, we will leave the nation vulnerable to foreign powers , much as unhappy consumers have found their personal, medical, and tax information in the hands of overseas computer technicians.<8-9>

Nuclear war Khalilzad 11 Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, “ The Economy and National Security”, 2-8-11, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024, CMR

The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership . By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable , with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers . Failures of multi- polar international systems produced both world wars . American retrenchment could have devastating consequences.

Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats . Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races ,

miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the

stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States.

Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

1ar—trade /growth defense*Tariffs already toast – solves their impact *TPA not key to trade or growth – tariffs already eliminated – TPA just deals with non-tariff barriers that benefit evil corporations

Stiglitz 14 (Joseph, American economist and a professor at Columbia University, “On the Wrong Side of Globalization,” March 15, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/joseph-e-stiglitz/, CMR)

Trade agreements are a subject that can cause the eyes to glaze over, but we should all be paying attention. Right now, there are trade proposals in the works that threaten to put most Americans on the wrong side of globalization. The conflicting views about the agreements are actually tearing at the fabric of the Democratic Party, though you wouldn’t know it from President Obama’s rhetoric. In his State of the Union address, for example, he blandly referred to “new trade partnerships” that would “create more jobs.” Most immediately at issue is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, which would bring together 12 countries along the Pacific Rim in what would be the largest free trade area in the world. Negotiations for the TPP began in 2010, for the purpose, according to the United States Trade Representative, of increasing trade and investment, through lowering tariffs and other trade barriers among participating countries. But the

TPP negotiations have been taking place in secret, forcing us to rely on leaked drafts to guess at the proposed provisions. At the same time, Congress introduced a bill this year that would grant the White House filibuster-

proof fast-track authority, under which Congress simply approves or rejects whatever trade agreement is put before it, without revisions or amendments . Controversy has erupted, and justifiably so. Based on the leaks — and the history of arrangements in past trade pacts — it is easy to infer the shape of the

whole TPP, and it doesn’t look good . There is a real risk that it will benefit the wealthiest sliver of the American and global elite at the expense of everyone else . The fact that such a plan is under consideration at all is testament to how deeply inequality reverberates through our economic policies. Worse, agreements like the TPP are only one aspect of a larger

problem: our gross mismanagement of globalization. Let’s tackle the history first. In general, trade deals today are markedly different from those made in the decades following World War II, when negotiations focused on lowering tariffs . As tariffs came down on all sides, trade expanded, and each country could develop the sectors in which it had strengths and as a result, standards of living would rise. Some jobs would be lost, but

new jobs would be created. Today, the purpose of trade agreements is different. Tariffs around the world are already low .

The focus has shifted to “nontariff barriers,” and the most important of these — for the corporate interests pushing agreements — are regulations. Huge multinational corporations complain that inconsistent regulations make business costly. But most of the regulations, even if they are imperfect, are there for a reason: to protect workers, consumers, the economy and the environment. What’s more, those regulations were often put in place by governments responding to the democratic demands of their citizens. Trade agreements’ new boosters euphemistically claim that they are simply after regulatory harmonization, a clean-sounding phrase that implies an innocent plan to promote efficiency. One could, of course, get regulatory harmonization by strengthening regulations to the highest standards everywhere. But when corporations call for harmonization , what

they really mean is a race to the bottom .

1ar—trade /growth—epistemology Err affirmative – their authors are captured by corporate interests Stiglitz 14 (Joseph, American economist and a professor at Columbia University, “On the Wrong Side of Globalization,” March 15, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/joseph-e-stiglitz/, CMR)

When agreements like the TPP govern international trade — when every country has agreed to similarly minimal regulations — multinational corporations can return to the practices that were common before the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts became law (in 1970 and 1972, respectively) and before the latest financial crisis hit. Corporations everywhere may well agree that getting rid of regulations would be good for corporate profits. Trade negotiators might be persuaded that these trade agreements would be good for trade and corporate profits. But there would be

some big losers — namely, the rest of us. These high stakes are why it is especially risky to let trade negotiations proceed in secret. All over the

world, trade ministries are captured by corporate and financial interests . And when negotiations are secret,

there is no way that the democratic process can exert the check s and balances required to put limits on the negative effects of these agreements.

---UQ: Re-ShoringUniqueness – re-shoring now – broad trend Rob Johnson, 1-17-15, “'Reshoring' brings jobs back to U.S., including Pensacola,” http://www.pnj.com/story/news/2015/01/17/reshoring-brings-jobs-back-us-including-pensacola/21929659/, CMR

Now, moving jobs back to the United States from global manufacturing meccas like China is a nascent trend called "reshoring." The strategy is becoming more popular , especially among companies such as U.S. Block Windows. Its acrylic product line, ranging from picture windows to interior systems that make up walls and doors, is sold mainly to residential home builders. Murphy's retail customers include Home Depot and Lowe's. Crated windows ready for shipping at Murphy's on a recent day were addressed to customers from North Carolina to California. The success of U.S. Block Windows' reshoring represents "a business model that may apply to other companies in our area. It's something we are monitoring as an emerging opportunity," said Scott Luth, head of economic development for Escambia County. He said there are databases from public and private sources that detail the number and kinds of jobs being outsourced

overseas by local companies. "We'll look at these on a case-by-case basis to see if those jobs are in our target industries," Luth said. More than 50,000 jobs have been returned by domestic employers during the last three years, according to Harry Moser, president of the Reshoring Initiative, a Chicago area nonprofit that consults with companies on the benefits of doing

business at home. "Companies that take a hard look at the numbers are often realizing they haven't considered all the costs of doing business offshore," Moser told the News Journal in a phone interview. Indeed, the

reshoring of Pensacola jobs at U.S. Block Windows is based on the bottom line, Murphy said. Like an increasing number of companies, U.S. Block Windows discovered that rising wages in China, along with gradually higher international shipping costs, are making American plant locations more financially viable.

---Kills Military

Outsourcing threatens US military superiority

Hira ‘8 – PhD

[Ron, recognized expert on outsourcing, Anil Hira, specialist in international econ development and innovation issues, “Outsourcing America”, page number below]

In this period of global terrorism, Americans are especially concerned about their security. Part of our national security policy for more than the past half-century has been to maintain a strong science and engineering workforce in the United States, thereby reducing economic vulnerability and producing leading-edge military technology at home. Indeed, we are secure in part because we have relied on our technological superiority. Our troops are the best trained, and many of our key industries are centered on defense. These industries include aerospace, information technology, materials sciences, and biochemistry. We have had the leading research universities in the world, and they have worked with our private and public sectors to lead the way in technological innovation. But once our technological efforts are lost to foreign competitors, it will be difficult to maintain our edge. As more work moves offshore, the Defense Department and Department of Homeland Security will have to increasingly rely on providers of technology based in foreign countries that have no interest in helping the United States. In the early 1990s, the U.S. military realized that it could no longer invent and develop all of the technology that it needed. It turned to the commercial sector for its new technologies—something called commercial off-the-shelf technologies (COTS). The private sector became a major bidder and provider of defense goods and services. But with increased offshore outsourcing, will the companies that the Defense Department relies on move their operations to other countries—perhaps to hostile nations? How will this affect our national interests? Our access to the technology? As a Federal Computer Weekly article put it: "Offshoring may make economic sense for the companies, but the security ramifications are starting to raise red flags for Congress, the Pentagon, and some vendors."" And according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) the Defense Department is not prepared to handle the problems: "DOD acquisition and software security policies do not fully address the risk of using foreign suppliers to develop weapon system software."28 <page 120-121>

---Link Wall The link’s one direction – status quo is free trade and growth – only a risk TPP upsets the balance Krugman 14 (Paul, American economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, Distinguished Scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study Center at the CUNY Graduate Center, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times, “No Big Deal,” 2-27, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/opinion/krugman-no-big-deal.html)

And you know what? That’s O.K. It’s far from clear that the T.P.P. is a good idea. It’s even less clear that it’s something on

which President Obama should be spending political capital. I am in general a free trader, but I’ll be undismayed and even a bit relieved if the T.P.P. just fades away. The first thing you need to know about trade deals in general is that they aren’t what they used to be. The glory days of trade negotiations — the days of deals like the Kennedy Round of the 1960s, which sharply

reduced tariffs around the world — are long behind us. Why? Basically, old-fashioned trade deals are a victim of their own

success: there just isn’t much more protectionism to eliminate . Average U.S. tariff rates have fallen by two-thirds since 1960. The most recent report on American import restraints by the International Trade

Commission puts their total cost at less than 0.01 percent of G.D.P . Implicit protection of services — rules and regulations that have the effect of, say, blocking foreign competition in insurance — surely impose additional costs. But the fact remains that,

these days, “trade agreements” are mainly about other things. What they’re really about, in particular, is property rights — things like the ability to enforce patents on drugs and copyrights on movies. And so it is with T.P.P. There’s a lot of hype

about T.P.P., from both supporters and opponents. Supporters like to talk about the fact that the countries at the negotiating

table comprise around 40 percent of the world economy, which they imply means that the agreement would be hugely significant. But trade among these players is already fairly free, so the T.P.P. wouldn’t make that much difference . Meanwhile, opponents portray the T.P.P. as a huge plot, suggesting that it would destroy national sovereignty and transfer all the power to corporations. This, too, is hugely overblown. Corporate interests would get somewhat more ability to seek legal recourse against government actions, but, no, the Obama administration isn’t secretly bargaining away democracy. What the T.P.P. would do, however, is increase the ability of certain corporations to assert control over intellectual property. Again, think drug patents and movie rights. Is this a good thing from a global point of view? Doubtful. The kind of property rights we’re talking about here can alternatively be

described as legal monopolies. True, temporary monopolies are, in fact, how we reward new ideas; but arguing that we need even more monopolization is very dubious — and has nothing at all to do with classical arguments for free trade. Now, the corporations benefiting from enhanced control over intellectual property would often be American. But this doesn’t mean that the T.P.P. is in our national interest. What’s good for Big Pharma is by no means always good for America. In short, there isn’t a compelling case for this deal, from either a global or a national point of view. Nor does there seem to be anything like a political consensus in favor, abroad or at home. Abroad, the news from the latest meeting of negotiators sounds like what you usually hear when trade talks are going nowhere: assertions of forward movement but nothing substantive. At home, both Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, and Nancy Pelosi, the top Democrat in the House, have come out against giving the president crucial “fast-track” authority, meaning that any agreement can receive a

clean, up-or-down vote. So what I wonder is why the president is pushing the T.P.P. at all. The economic case is weak, at best, and his own party doesn’t like it. Why waste time and political capital on this project? My guess is that we’re looking at a combination of Beltway conventional wisdom — Very Serious People always support entitlement cuts and trade deals — and officials caught in a 1990s time warp, still living in the days when New Democrats tried to prove that they weren’t old-style liberals by going all in for globalization. Whatever the motivations, however, the push for T.P.P. seems almost weirdly out of touch with both economic and political reality. So don’t cry for T.P.P. If the big trade deal comes to nothing, as seems likely, it will be, well, no big deal.

“Fast track” is merely a vehicle to force through corporatized agreements irrelevant to trade – their authors epistemology is suspect Shrouded in secrecy

TPA precludes revision and amendment

Nontariff barriers, irrelevant to trade

Flawed epistemology – NEG authors are implicated

Key to check corporate excess

Stiglitz 14 (Joseph, American economist and a professor at Columbia University, “On the Wrong Side of Globalization,” March 15, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/joseph-e-stiglitz/, CMR)

Trade agreements are a subject that can cause the eyes to glaze over, but we should all be paying attention. Right now, there are trade proposals in the works that threaten to put most Americans on the wrong side of globalization. The conflicting views about the agreements are actually tearing at the fabric of the Democratic Party, though you wouldn’t know it from President Obama’s rhetoric. In his State of the Union address, for example, he blandly referred to “new trade partnerships” that would “create more jobs.” Most immediately at issue is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, which would bring together 12 countries along the Pacific Rim in what would be the largest free trade area in the world. Negotiations for the TPP began in 2010, for the purpose, according to the United States Trade Representative, of increasing trade and investment, through lowering tariffs and other trade barriers among participating countries. But the

TPP negotiations have been taking place in secret, forcing us to rely on leaked drafts to guess at the proposed provisions. At the same time, Congress introduced a bill this year that would grant the White House filibuster-

proof fast-track authority, under which Congress simply approves or rejects whatever trade agreement is put before it, without revisions or amendments . Controversy has erupted, and justifiably so. Based on the leaks — and the history of arrangements in past trade pacts — it is easy to infer the shape of the whole

TPP, and it doesn’t look good. There is a real risk that it will benefit the wealthiest sliver of the American and global elite at the expense of everyone else . The fact that such a plan is under consideration at all is testament to how deeply inequality reverberates through our economic policies. Worse, agreements like the TPP are only one aspect of a larger problem: our gross mismanagement of globalization. Let’s tackle the history first. In general, trade deals today are markedly different from those made in the decades following World War II, when negotiations focused on lowering tariffs. As tariffs came down on all sides, trade expanded, and each country could develop the sectors in which it had strengths and as a result, standards of living would rise. Some jobs would be lost, but new jobs would be

created. Today, the purpose of trade agreements is different. Tariffs around the world are already low . The focus has shifted to

“nontariff barriers,” and the most important of these — for the corporate interests pushing agreements — are regulations. Huge multinational corporations complain that inconsistent regulations make business costly. But most of the regulations, even if they are imperfect, are there for a reason: to protect workers, consumers, the economy and the environment. What’s more, those regulations were often put in place by governments responding to the democratic demands of their citizens. Trade agreements’ new boosters euphemistically claim that they are simply after regulatory harmonization, a clean-sounding phrase that implies an innocent plan to promote efficiency. One could, of course, get regulatory harmonization by strengthening regulations to the highest standards everywhere. But when corporations call for harmonization, what they really mean

is a race to the bottom . When agreements like the TPP govern international trade — when every country has agreed to similarly minimal regulations — multinational corporations can return to the practices that were common before the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts became law (in 1970 and 1972, respectively) and before the latest financial crisis hit. Corporations everywhere may well agree that getting rid of regulations would be good for corporate profits. Trade negotiators might be persuaded that these trade agreements would be good for trade and

corporate profits. But there would be some big losers — namely, the rest of us. These high stakes are why it is especially risky to let trade

negotiations proceed in secret. All over the world, trade ministries are captured by corporate and financial interests . And when negotiations are secret, there is no way that the democratic process can exert the check s and balances required to put

limits on the negative effects of these agreements .

Intellectual Property Turn—2ac TPA increases protectionism – leads to IP protections that are comparatively worse than the barriers it eliminatesCarson, 2014 (Kevin, senior fellow of the Center for a Stateless Society and holds the Center's Karl Hess Chair in Social Theory, “Protectionism is dead. Long live protectionism!” Jamaica Observer, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Protectionism-is-dead--Long-live-protectionism-_16958654)

IF you follow the news, you will hear regularly various treaties — GATT's Uruguay Round, NAFTA, CAFTA, TPP — described as "F ree T rade A greement s ", whose purpose is to "reduce trade barriers". This is a lie . Without

exception, such agreements actually strengthen the one form of protectionism most vital to safeguarding corporate interests against competition in our time: so-called intellectual property . In a recent

Facebook discussion David K Levine, co-author (along with Michele Boldrin) of Against Intellectual Monopoly, explained that what copyright actually confers is property right. If you record a song and give me a copy of the MP3, Levine asks, and I duplicate my copy and email it as an attachment to a third party (Bill), what "loss" have I inflicted on you? Not loss of the song itself, because you still have it. "What you have lost is (possibly) a sale you might have made to Bill. In other words, the right that you are granted by copyright is the exclusive right to sell to Bill. In other words, the property right granted by

copyright is not over the 'idea' but rather a right over customers." Exactly! Intellectual property is a protectionist monopoly, just like the tariff . In both cases, what's protected is a monopoly on the right to sell a particular thing to a particular set of customers. The difference is that the monopoly conferred by the tariff operates along territorial lines — the boundaries between nation states — whereas the monopoly conferred by patents and copyrights operates along corporate boundaries. Today's f ree t rade a greements , falsely so-called, weaken or remove some outdated trade barriers like tariffs, while greatly strengthening other trade barriers, like "intellectual property" protections , increasingly to the point of nullifying free speech and due process rights against search and seizure in signatory countries, and giving the corporate "owners" of proprietary content what amounts to police state rights to enforce censorship on Internet publications and Internet service providers. So, why weaken one form of protectionist trade barrier then strengthen another — more than enough to make up for it — if this is really a free trade agreement? Maybe because it's not. These agreements are about —

and only about — serving the interests of the industries whose representatives write them. "Free trade" is just a slick advertising slogan they're packaged with to sell them to the allegedly sovereign public "represented" by the governments that negotiate them. Of course, the only way the public ever gets to see the actual provisions of these secretly written

and negotiated treaties is if they're illegally leaked. The governments that negotiate these treaties, and the corporate lawyers that actually write them,

don't lower tariffs because of a principled opposition to trade barriers. They lower tariffs because they're no longer useful. A hundred years ago, most industries in the industrialised world were national. They were physically located within a country, and owned by a corporation chartered in a particular country. So a monopoly on the right to sell manufactured goods to the domestic population was useful. Today, most corporations are global. The major forms of international "trade" in physical goods are trade in unfinished goods between local subsidiaries of the same global corporation, unfinished goods produced by nominally independent contractors in a global corporation's supply chain, or finished goods produced on contract

overseas and then marketed domestically in the United States. So a territorially based restriction on the free flow of raw materials, finished and unfinished goods no longer suits the needs of global corporations because they, themselves, are no longer territorial. On the other hand, it's extremely useful for a corporation to hold a monopoly on the right to sell a product to consumers. Thanks to patents and trademarks, Nike, an "American" corporation, can delegate actual production of sneakers to nominally "independent" sweatshops in Asia, while using its monopoly on the sale of the finished product to pay the actual manufacturers a few bucks a pair and market them in American retailers with a "Swoosh" markup of several thousand per cent. This is true, to a great extent, of every manufacturing supply chain in the world. And it's even more true of things like software and

entertainment. What we see, in the negotiation of these "free trade agreements" is really an updated version of Adam Smith's observation: When representatives of a single industry meet in secret , they do so only to work against the public interest . What these corporations actually do in their secret meetings is terrorism of greater destructive impact than al-Qaeda could ever have dreamed of. And their main weapon of terror is the State.

Intellectual Property Turn—1ar TPP and TTIP hurts trade – IP outweighs barrier reductionFulton, 11/7 (Deirdre, “Will the GOP senate hand over fast track authority on the trans-Pacific Partnership?” http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/11/will-the-gop-senate-hand-over-fast-track-authority-on-the-trans-pacific-partnership/)

“[T]he TTIP and TPP (the two main deals currently being negotiated) will do almost nothing to increase trade and quite

possibly could reduce it,” writes Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Baker argues: Both deals are primarily about imposing a business-friendly regulatory structure on the signatories to the agreements. One aspect of this

regulatory structure is creating a quasi-judiciary system, investor-state dispute settlement councils, which would operate outside the existing legal structure of the countries in the agreements. The agreements, which are being negotiated in secrecy, also will have provisions on the environment, health and safety regulation, and copyright and patent protection. All of these provisions will supersede existing domestic law and

regulation. The increases in patent and copyright protection in these deals (yes, that is “protection” as in the

opposite of free trade) will raise the price of prescription drugs and other items. These higher prices will reduce purchasing power and slow growth. They will likely lower, not raise, the amount of trade. This means that if Republicans are actually enthusiastic about increased trade, they probably would oppose both the TPP and TTIP.

Protectionism Turn—1ar Fast track ensures trade failureDelamaide ‘14 (Darrell Delamaide writes "Political Capital," a weekly column from Washington, D.C. on politics that affect financial markets. A former foreign correspondent and recipient of an Overseas Press Club award, he has written for Barron's, Dow Jones, Institutional Investor, Bloomberg and others. He is an Atlantik Bruecke Fellow and took part in a 2009 study trip to Germany. He is the author of nonfiction books on the debt crisis and post-Cold War Europe as well as a financial thriller, “Congress won’t give Obama blank check on trade deals”, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/congress-wont-give-obama-blank-check-on-trade-deals-2014-01-22?pagenumber=1, January 22, 2014)

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — The proposed new trade agreement between the U.S. and several Pacific Rim countries may be the

boon that advocates say it is, or it may be the corporate sellout described by its opponents. One thing it should not be, however, is a fait accompli. Leading Chinese academic, Boqiang Lin, explains why environmental problems are a key factor in slowing China's growth and its implications to the end of the commodity boom. Photo: Getty Images Supporters say the Trans-Pacific Partnership currently being negotiated among 12 countries will affirm or broaden existing agreements that will smooth the path of U.S. exports to this region while providing safeguards for intellectual property. Detractors say the agreement has little to do with expanding trade and more with weakening labor and environmental standards through a

back-door race to the bottom. Both may be right, but the issues are certainly controversial enough to merit debate. That is not what the administration is seeking, however, as it asks for fast-track authority to get the eventual agreement through Congress with a simple up-or-down vote — no debate, no amendments, no second thoughts. The conventional wisdom is that trade agreements are so complex and delicately balanced after sensitive negotiations over months and years that letting Congress muck around with it would make it impossible to ever get a trade pact finished. So instead Congress is invited, on behalf of

the American people, to buy a pig in a poke. The administration is saying , as have previous administrations that sought and won fast-track authority, “ Trust me .” The problem is that trust is not a very plentiful commodity in today’s Washington. President Barack Obama’s low approval ratings are evidence that, after his misfires on health care, budget, immigration and foreign policy, neither Democrats nor Republicans are eager to give him a blank check for trade or anything else. While a bill introduced earlier this month to grant Obama trade promotion authority is labeled “bipartisan,” that fig leaf comes only from including Sen.

Max Baucus as sponsor, though the Montana Democrat will be leaving the Senate soon to take up his appointment as ambassador to China. No other Democrats in the House or Senate are lending their names to the bill, complaining that it does too little to keep lawmakers informed about negotiations or let them provide input. The only other Senate sponsor so far is Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee. The bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Dave Camp, R-Mich., chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and he has so far found only two other Republican congressmen to get on board. Perhaps the oddest twist in the current White House campaign for fast-track authority is linking the trade pacts (the U.S. is also pushing a similar agreement with the European Union) to the issue du jour in Washington — income inequality. “I can tell you that trade promotion authority, TPA, is a key part of a comprehensive strategy of the president’s to increase exports and support more American jobs at higher wages,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said at a press briefing last week. This in spite of the fact that the North American Free Trade Pact (NAFTA), which turned 20 on Jan. 1, has resulted in a net depletion of American jobs. In a recent editorial supporting TPP and fast-track authority , the Washington Post tried to claim that the Pacific trade pact hardly included any low-wage countries, glossing over the fact that most

of the countries involved, including the populous Malaysia and Vietnam, have much lower wages than the U.S. It’s hard to square an agenda of boosting American wages, including the minimum wage, with introducing new competition with low-wage countries. A dozen senators in the Democratic caucus wrote a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada calling fast-track authority as described in the Camp-Baucus bill “outdated and inadequate,” and Reid indicated that no TPA bill would be coming to the Senate floor any time soon, given the controversy. Obama is expected to bring up the trade pacts once again

in his State of the Union address next week because he views both TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as potentially signature

accomplishments for his legacy. But it looks increasingly like he will be faced with a stark choice — he must abandon plans to get a classic fast-track approval and opt for a more consultative process, or forget about any wide-ranging trade agreements .

net-worse for trade – empirics prove Patrice Hill, “Congress Puts Obama on Bumpy Road for Fast-Track Trade Deals,” WASHINGTON TIMES, 12—22—13, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/22/congress-puts-obama-on-bumpy-road-for-fast-track-t/?page=all, accessed 12-30-13.

Trade analyst Clyde Prestowitz said the leaked document shows that U.S. negotiators appear to have been “captured” by the

lobbying of large multinational corporations that are trying to protect and expand their patented monopolies on drugs and other intellectual

property rather than promote open trade. The draft trade deal, for example, contains protections for patented drugs that the

pharmaceutical industry has been unable to get through Congress, he said. “This is something very unlikely to survive open debate in the U.S. Congress,” he said, contending that Congress should reject the fast-track bill unless the trans-Pacific draft agreement is changed substantially. “Clearly what is afoot is that the non-transparent TPP talks are being used to make an end run around the Congress and the parliaments and publics of many

countries to achieve far-reaching special rights [for big business] in the guise of free trade,” he said. Mr. Prestowitz and others say fast-track authority is not needed to make trade deals . They point out that it wasn’t needed to enact the trade deals with South Korea, Colombia and Panama

during Mr. Obama’s first term. But those deals were negotiated mostly by the George W. Bush administration and had overwhelming Republican support — something that any deals negotiated Mr. Obama may lack, other analysts say. While trade deals generally have resulted in large U.S. trade deficits in recent decades,

agreements passed without congressional amendment under fast-track procedures have resulted in 38 percent slower export growth than trade deals that weren’t fast-tracked through Congress, according to the U.S. Business and

Industry Council, which represents U.S. manufacturers hurt by past trade deals.

Turn Shield—1ar We control UQ and the direction of the link – SQUO solves barriers they assume but TPA is merely a vehicle to force Congress to submit to corporate interests Baker 12/22/14 (Dean, Co-director, CEPR; author, 'The End of Loser Liberalism: Making Markets Progressive', “The Trade Agreement Pinatas,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dean-baker/the-trade-agreement-pinat_b_6369924.html)

Under the fast-track rules there would be no opportunity for amendments or delays. The deal must be voted up or down in a narrow time-frame. The idea is that with the bulk of the business community promising large campaign contributions to supporters and threatening to punish opponents, most members of Congress would find it difficult to vote no. Furthermore, the elite media can be counted on to do its part. It will use both the news and opinion sections to denounce opponents of whatever deal is produced as Neanderthal protectionists. As Thomas Friedman once famously said in reference to his support of CAFTA, "I didn't even know what was in it. I just knew two words: free trade." Others in the media may be too sophisticated to express themselves so bluntly, but undoubtedly most share Friedman's view. Under such circumstances, there will be few politicians prepared to stand up for principle or their constituents and vote against the pacts regardless of what it is in them. Since many traditional Democratic constituencies strongly oppose these deals it is reasonable to ask why the Obama administration is so intent on pushing them. The answer is simple: money. There is a well-known argument for free trade familiar to anyone who sat through an intro econ class. Free trade allows countries to specialize in the goods and services in which they are best at producing. They can then trade for other items. This makes the world richer. While not everyone gains in the textbook story, the winners are supposed to gain enough that they compensate the losers and still be better off themselves.

This could then mean that everyone is better off. The real world trade story is considerably more complicated , in part

because the winners never actually compensate the losers, but that is really aside the point here. In TPP and TTIP we are not talking about the textbook trade story.

The actual trade barriers between the United States and the countries in these deals, with few exceptions, are already quite low . This means that

there is little to be gained by lowering them still further . TPP and TTIP are about getting special deals for businesses that

they would have difficulty getting through the normal political process. For example, oil and gas companies that think they should be able to drill everywhere may be able to get rules that prevent national or state governments from restricting their activities. This could mean, for example, that New York State would have to compensate potential frackers for the ban that Governor Cuomo imposed last week.

A/T Protectionism Impact—2ac No chance of rising protectionismGTN, 2014 (Global Tax News, “Global Trade: Protectionism on the rise?” April 8, http://www.tax-news.com/features/Global_Trade_Protectionism_On_The_Rise__571705.html)

It remains to be seen if the scale of the ambition to build regional free trade agreements like the

TPP, the TTIP and the RCEP is matched by political will in all of the participating nations . Certainly, these are extremely complex and delicate negotiations covering some sensitive economic areas and it is no surprise that numerous lobby groups have emerged to fight their corner, often backed by politicians. The TTIP negotiations have already entered choppy waters over non-tariff issues such as regulation, while the Democrats’ reluctance to give President Obama the authority to fast-track free trade agreements through Congress could make it virtually impossible for the US to ratify new deals as complicated as the TTIP and the TPP. What’s more, the inclusion of Japan, with its tightly protected agricultural and automotive sectors, could prove a step too far

for the expanded TPP negotiations. Overall however, fears that the world would descend into a downward spiral of ‘beggar

thy neighbour’ trade protectionism as the financial crisis began to bite have been largely unfounded . The use of trade barriers as an economic management tool by emerging economies remain s a problem, but when weighed against the total volume of global trade these infractions are relatively minor. Generally speaking

however, there seems to be an acceptance in most countries that international trade is better free than unfree , even if is often politically-problematic for leaders and government ministers to say so.

Trade wars are out of styleDePillis, 2014 (Lydia, “Has the developed world stopped waging trade wars?” June 26, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/26/has-the-developed-world-stopped-waging-trade-wars/)

This most recent downturn , however, seems to have come and (sort of) gone without countries entirely walling themselves in . At least, that's what it looks like to the World Bank, which has been tracking temporary trade barriers since 2004 and finds today that the percentage of goods covered by import restrictions decreased in 2013 after a small recessionary bump. Now, there is a line in there that increased more than others: developing economies, most notably India and Turkey. There's a reason for that increase. Not long ago, emerging nations more often had permanent high tariffs, so they didn't need to layer on additional restrictions, such as anti-dumping duties (which the World Trade Organization allows, as long as it can be proven the target of the measure has been selling goods at below the market price in its own country). Over the past few decades, though, international pressure toward liberalization has prompted them to open up dramatically, which means there's more room to clamp back down when they feel their native

industries are threatened. Developed nations , though, have pretty much kicked the protectionist habit.

Though the number of trade investigations did rise through the recession -- they're usually

initiated in response to complaints from businesses and labor groups -- they didn't get nearly as high as in previous recessions. Here's just the United States, over the past 30 years: So, why did the United States appear to be less

aggressive about protecting itself in the face of the latest economic meltdown? It's learned from experience. "We designed the current system in response to what happened in the 1930s," says Chad Bown, a World Bank economist who maintains the

database of temporary trade barriers. For one thing, the United States is able to target products more specifically rather than entire sectors. "That helps blow off some political steam and not have overall increases in protection," Bown says.

Protectionist measures are on insignificant shit – no risk of their impactGTN, 2014 (Global Tax News, “Global Trade: Protectionism on the rise?” April 8, http://www.tax-news.com/features/Global_Trade_Protectionism_On_The_Rise__571705.html)

The report also explains that, "for a list of more than 150 products including meat, garments, refrigerators, used vehicles, car bodies,

paper products and Information Technology Agreement products, Russia has incorrectly implemented its WTO bound tariffs. Whereas some lines have been corrected on September 1, 2013, some issues still remain on products such as paper, car

bodies, and agricultural products." The TIBR also points to the continued use of trade-restrictive measures in a number of other countries, including customs and tax

measures in China, and the discriminatory treatment of imported wood in Japan. On a positive note, the TIBR concludes that "a number of recent positive developments suggest that progress is under way and that the EU's Market Access Strategy is delivering on many fronts". For example, access to the Indian market for EU manufacturers of telecommunication products and electronic goods in particular improved in 2013. However, it warns that new barriers to trade are emerging “constantly” for European companies. Given that the number of new trade barriers seems to be rising at a much faster rate than new trade-facilitating measures, it would be easy to draw negative conclusions about the state of the world trading environment from the WTO’s and EU’s reports.

However, it must be remembered that these trade-restricting measures cover only a tiny percentage of overall world trade: the 407 trade barriers observed in the WTO report affect about 1.3 percent of world merchandise imports, or USD240bn; the trade remedy investigations cover around 0.2% of world imports; and the 190 other new trade measures affect 1.1% of global imports. Other reasons for optimism include the recent breakthrough in the long-stalled Doha Round of world trade negotiations, and the forming of new regional free trade areas involving the world’s major economic powers.

Protectionism peaked and is decliningMauldin, 2014 (William, “Creeping global protectionism? Not so fast, world bank says,” WSJ, June 26, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/06/26/creeping-global-protectionism-not-so-fast-world-bank-says/)

But the trend isn’t so simple, and there is at least some evidence the wave of protectionism could be subsiding, the World Bank

said in a reportThursday. Just 2.4% of products imported by G-20 countries in 2013 were subject to temporary trade barriers—including duties designed to blunt the effect of alleged subsidies or dumping by a trading partner. That is slightly less than the 2.5% of

products affected by trade barriers in 2012 but still well ahead of the 1.8% of products that were affected in 2007, before the start

of the financial crisis. “The data to date provides some evidence that the protectionism arising during this particular crisis may have peaked,” said Chad Bown, the World Bank economist who wrote the report.

A/T Protectionism—1ar No chance of war from protectionism – best and most recent data Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars , arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict , there were genuine concerns that the global

economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the

Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. The Institute

for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 20 07 .”38 Interstate violence in

particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most

sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The

key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 20 08 financial crisis , the proper comparison is with Great Depression . And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive . As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe

global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

Zero risk of trade warAlden ‘12 (Edward, Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness “What Exactly Is a “Trade War”? Time to Abolish a Silly Notion,” http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/10/23/what-exactly-is-a-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/, October 23, 2012)

I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: it is time to bury , once and for all, the concept of a “trade war.” The phrase is so ubiquitous that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty myself from time to time. Indeed, it is almost a

reflex that every time the U nited S tates or some other nation takes any action that restricts imports in any

fashion, reporters and editorial writers jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. But it is a canard that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate Monday night than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. The closest historical example is the reaction to the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has show persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the

consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But what are the chances of such a “ trade war” actually occurring ? Pretty close to zero , for two big reasons. First, in 1930, there was no World Trade Organization, no North

American Free Trade Agreement, no European Community/Union – in short, no rules to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or

imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. Today, such unilateral action is largely forbidden .

Indeed, the tit-for-tat measures we have seen in the U.S.-China trade relationship have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules. When the Obama

administration curbed purchases of Chinese steel in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, China responded with an “ anti-dumping” case which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But the United States challenged that action in the WTO, and just last week the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. No trade war – instead the phrase “see you in court” comes to mind. Secondly, almost every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global trade volumes plunging by more than 12 percent in 2009, the biggest drop since World War II – is how little of the protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred. Chad

Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than

tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire,

particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO

decision with which a Romney administration would quickly comply.

No trade wars---international institutions check Fordham 12—professor of political science at Binghamton University (Ben, International Economic Institutions and Great Power Peace, 8/12/12, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/15/international-economic-institutions-and-great-power-peace/)

I enjoyed Jack Levy’s comments on how the world would have looked to people writing in 1912. As part of my current research, I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the three decades before World War I. As Levy pointed out, this last period of great power peace has some interesting parallels with the present one. Like today, the international economy had become increasingly integrated. For good reason, some even refer to this period as the “first age of globalization.”

The period also saw the emergence of several new great powers, including Japan, Germany, and the United States. Like emerging powers today, each of these states sought to carve out its own world role and to find, as the German Foreign Secretary put it,

a “place in the sun.” Like Levy, I don’t think these parallels we are doomed to repeat the catastrophe of 1914 . I

want to highlight the different institutional rules governing the international economic system today. The dangers discussed in the NIC report are real, but there is reason for hope when it comes to avoiding great power war . The rules of the game governing the “first age of globalization” encouraged great powers to pursue foreign policies that made political and military conflict more likely . Declining transportation costs, not more liberal

trade policies, drove economic integration. There was no web of international agreements discouraging states from

pursuing protectionist trade policies . As Patrick McDonald‘s recent book, The Invisible Hand of Peace, explains nicely, protectionism went hand-in-hand with aggressive foreign policies. Many of the great powers, including the emerging United

States, sought to shut foreign competitors out of their home markets even as they sought to expand their own overseas trade and investment. Even though markets and investment opportunities in less developed areas of the world were small, great power policy makers found these areas attractive because they would not export manufactured products. As one American policy maker put it in 1899, they preferred “trade with people who can send you things you ant and cannot produce, and take from you in return things they want and cannot produce; in other

words, a trade largely between different zones, and largely with less advanced peoples….” Great

powers scrambled to obtain privileged access to these areas through formal or informal imperial control. This zero-sum competition added a political and military component to economic rivalry . Increasing globalization made this dangerous situation worse, not better, in spite of the fact that it also increased the likely cost of a great power war.

In large part because of the international economic institutions constructed after World War II, present day great powers do not face a world in which protectionism and political efforts to secure exclusive market access are the norm . Emerging as well as longstanding powers can now

obtain greater benefits from peaceful participation in the international economic system than they could through the predatory foreign policies that were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They do not need a large military force to secure their place in the sun.

Economic competition among the great powers continues, but it is not tied to imperialism and military rivalry in the way it was in 1914.

The public won’t tolerate protectionism/lashout

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

A nother salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike , as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a

wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.35 The results show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. 24 countries were surveyed in both 2007 and in at least one year after 20 08 , including a majority of the G-20 economies. Overall, 18 of those 24 countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, 20 of 24 countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5% to 83.6%. Contrary to

expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has strengthened , despite softening public support for freemarket economics more generally.36

Best institutional knowledge proves.

*no chance of protectionism – if the economy declines, it is in a government’s economic self-interest to lift trade tariffs to participate in bilateral trade

investments – lifting trade tariffs allows governments to expand corporate interests into foreign markets to gain revenue to finance the deficit – best body of institutional knowledge proves our argument

Ikenson, 09 associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html

A Little Perspective, Please Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research

Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years .8 That

would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period

mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls

"legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates . If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by

2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade . Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

A/T Econ Impact—2ac Doesn’t solve the econKrugman 2/3/15—he's pretty good at economics (Paul, "Beware of False Rationales for Supporting Trade Deals." Truth Out. truth-out.org/opinion/item/28905-beware-of-false-rationales-for-supporting-trade-deals, TD)

I am in general a free trader. There is, I would argue, a tendency on the part of some people with whom I agree on many issues to demonize trade agreements, to

make them responsible for evils that have other causes. And my take on both of the trade agreements currently under negotiation - the T rans- P acific P artnership and the T ransatlantic T rade and I nvestment P artnership - is that there's much less there than meets the eye. ¶ But my hackles and suspicions rise when I listen

to the advocates.¶ In his recent "State of American Business" speech, Thomas Donohue, the head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, warned against economic populism, which he says is really about a push to create a "state-run economy." Yep - so much as mention rising income inequality, and you're Joseph Stalin (unless you're Mitt Romney). But what really gets me is the Chamber's supposed agenda for growth. Topping the list - the No. 1 priority - is completing those trade

agreements.¶ This is absurd, and disturbing.¶ Think about it. The immediate problem facing much of the world is inadequate demand and the threat of deflation . Would trade liberalization help on that front? No , not at all. True, to the extent that trade becomes easier, world exports would rise, which is a net plus for demand. But world imports would rise by exactly the same amount, which is a net minus. Or to put it a bit differently, trade liberalization would change the composition of world expenditure - with each country spending more on foreign goods and less on its own - but there's no reason to think that it would raise total spending . So this is not a short-term economic boost. ¶ Could these trade agreements be about the supply side, about raising efficiency and productivity? Well, standard economic models do say that liberalization should have that effect, in principle - but the effects are only large when you start from high levels of protectionism .

Trade No Solve War—1ar

Trade doesn’t solve war

Katherine Barbieri 13, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict?” Chapter 10 in Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research, google books

How does interdependence affect war , the most intense form of conflict? Table 2 gives the empirical results . The rarity of wars makes any analysis

of their causes quite difficult, for variations in interdependence will seldom result in the occurrence of war. As in the case of MIDs, the log-likelihood ratio tests for each model suggest that the inclusion of the various measures of interdependence and the control variables improves our understanding of the factors affecting the occurrence of war over that obtained from the null model. However, the individual interdependence variables, alone, are not statistically significant. This is not the case with contiguity and relative capabilities, which are both statistically significant. Again, we see that contiguous dyads are more conflict-prone and that dyads composed of states with unequal power are more pacific than those with highly equal power.

Surprisingly, no evidence is provided to support the commonly held proposition that democratic states are less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states.¶ The evidence from the pre-WWII period provides support for those arguing that economic factors have little, if any, influence on affecting leaders’ decisions to engage in war , but many of the control variables are also statistically insignificant. These results should be interpreted with caution, since the sample does not contain a sufficient number wars to allow us to capture great variations across different types of relationships. Many observations of war are excluded from the sample by virtue of not having the corresponding explanatory measures. A variable would have to have an extremely strong influence on conflict—as does contiguity—to find significant

results. ¶ 7. Conclusions This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a

path to interstate peace . Even after controlling for the influence of contiguity , joint democracy, alliance ties, and

relative capabilities , the evidence suggests that in most instances trade fails to deter conflict . Instead, extensive

economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; however, it appears to have little influence on the

incidence of war . The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of

interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade.

Their authors have causality backward---war prevents tradeOmar M. G. Keshk 10, senior lecturer in the Political Science Department at, and PhD in Political Science from, Ohio State University; Rafael Reuveny, prof of international political economy and ecological economics at and PhD from Indiana University; and Brian M. Pollins, emeritus Associate Prof of Political Science at Ohio State; “Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 2010 27: 3, SAGE journals

In all, any signal that “ trade brings peace” remains weak and inconsistent , regardless of the way proximity

is modeled in the conflict equation. The signal that conflict reduces trade, in contrast, is strong and consistent . Thus,

international politics are clearly affecting dyadic trade, while it is far less obvious whether trade systematically affects dyadic politics, and if it does, whether that effect is conflict dampening or conflict amplifying. This is what we have termed in KPR (2004) “The Primacy of Politics.”

¶ 7. Conclusion¶ This study revisited the simultaneous equations model we presented in KPR (2004) and subjected it to four important challenges. Two of these challenges concerned The specification of the conflict equation in our model regarding the role of inter- capital distance and the sizes of both sides in a dyad; one questioned the bilateral trade data assumptions used in the treatment of zero and missing values, and one challenge suggested a focus on fatal MIDs as an alternative indicator to the widely used all-MID measure ¶ The theoretical and empirical analyses used to explore proposed alternatives to our original work were instructive and the empirical results were informative, but there are certainly other legitimate issues that the trade and conflict research community may continue to ponder. For example, researchers may continue to work on questions of missing bilateral trade data, attempt to move beyond the near- exclusive use of the MIDs data as we contemplate the meaning of “military conflict,” and use, and extend the scope of, the Harvey Starr GIS-based border data as one way to treat contiguity with more sophistication than the typical binary variable.¶ The single greatest lesson of this study is that future work studying the effect of international trade on international military conflict needs to employ a simultaneous

specification of the relationship between the two forces. The results we obtained under all the 36 SEM alternatives we estimated yielded an important , measurable effect of conflict on trade . Henceforth, we would say with high confidence that any study of the effect of trade on conflict that ignores this reverse fact is practically guaranteed to produce estimates that contain simultaneity bias. Such studies will claim that “trade brings peace,” when we now know that in a much broader range of circumstances, it is “peace that brings trade .” ¶ Our message to

those who would use conflict as one factor in a single-equation model of trade is only slightly less cautionary. They too face dangers in ignoring the other side of the coin. In one half of the 36 permutations we explored, the likelihood of dyadic military conflict was influenced by trade flows. In most tests where this effect surfaced, it was positive, that is, trade made conflict more likely. But the direction of this effect is of no consequence for the larger lesson: trade modelers ignore the simultaneity between international commerce and political enmity at their peril. They too run no small risk of finding themselves deceived by simultaneity bias.¶ Our empirical findings show clearly that international politics pushes commerce in a much broader range of circumstances than the reverse. In fact, we could find no combination of model choices, indicators, or data assumptions that failed to yield the result

that dyadic conflict reduces dyadic trade. Liberal claims regarding the effect of dyadic trade on dyadic conflict simply

were not robust in our findings . They survived in only 8 of the 36 tests we ran, and failed to hold up when certain data assumptions were altered, and were seriously vulnerable to

indicator choices regarding inter-capital distance, conflict, and national size.

Trade and interdependence don’t prevent war Zachary Keck 13, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, monthly columnist for The National Interest, 7/12/13, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War,” http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/

Xinhua was the latest to weigh in on this question ahead of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue this week, in an article titled, “China, U.S. Can Avoid ‘Thucydides

Trap.’” Like many others, Xinhua’s argument that a U.S.-China war can be avoided is based largely on their strong economic relationship.

This logic is deeply flawed both historically and logically . Strong economic partners have gone to war in the past, most notably in WWI, when Britain and Germany fought on opposite sides despite being each other’s largest trading partners.

More generally, the notion of a “capitalist peace” is problematic at best . Close trading ties can raise the cost of war for each side, but any great power conflict is so costly already that the addition of a temporarily loss of trade with one’s leading partner is a small consideration at best .

And while trade can create powerful stakeholders in each society who oppose war, just as often trading ties can be a n important source of friction. Indeed, the fact that Japan relied on the U.S. and British colonies for its oil supplies was actually the reason it opted for war against them . Even today, China’s allegedly unfair trade policies have created resentment among large political constituencies in the U nited States.

TPP Bad

Econ / Manufacturing—2ac*TPP is a corporate sell-out – collapse the economy and manufacturing Beachy 14 (Ben Beachy is Research Director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, former research fellow with Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, investment analyst for the Tellus Institute in Boston, agriculture researcher for ActionAid in India and labor rights investigator for the Worker Rights Consortium in Central America, B.A. from Goshen College and a Master in Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, “The Rising Use of the Trade Pact Sales Pitch of Last Resort: TPP Foreign Policy Arguments Mimic False Claims Made for Past Deals,” April, http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-foreign-policy.pdf, CMR)

Missing in this distorted “us” versus “them” narrative is the reality that many of the draft TPP rules would undermine U.S. national interests by increasing income inequality here ; raising medicine , natural gas and electricity prices ;

jeopardizing financial stability and further gutting the U.S. manufacturing base that is essential for our national security and domestic infrastructure. T he TPP is not some pre - ordained extension of the U.S. Constitution that inherently reflects “American values,” as Biden suggests . T he current terms of the TPP are just one version of possible rules

for Pacific Rim countries – one written largely at the behest of U.S. corporate interests, not broader national interests. The draft TPP text

was crafted in a closed - door process that granted privileged access to more than 600 official U.S. trade advisors, most of them explicitly representing corporations. 26 It is little surprise then that leaked TPP terms include new monopoly patent rig hts for pharmaceutical companies that would increase healthcare costs, limits on efforts to reregulate Wall

Street, a deregulation of U.S. gas expor ts that could increase domestic energy prices for industry and consumers , maximalist copyright terms that could thwart innovation and restrict Internet freedom , new investor protections that

incentivize offshoring and more. T he draft TPP rules not only jeopardize U.S. domestic priorities , but threaten to undermine U.S. interests abroad by weakening U.S. allies. The pact , for example, would bar TPP countries from enacting capital controls, endorsed by the International Monetary Fund as legitimate policy tools for preventing or mitigating financial crises . 27 It does not serve U.S. economic interest s to forbid TPP countries from using common - sense macroprudential measures . Financial crises in TPP countries with strong U.S. economic ties (e.g. Mexico) or financial linkages (e.g. Canada and

Japan ) could have a boomerang effect at home . And it does not serve U.S. political interests to insist on rules that

would expose our Pacific Rim allies to greater potential for financial instability. A wave of anti - American sentiment accompanied the 1997 Asian financial crisis even absent the United States directly imposing such limits on financial stability

measures. It is because the TPP would lock into place many harmful non - trade policies that many congressional Democrats and much of the Obama administration’s political base oppose the pact. 28 Th e opposition includes organizations that have never engaged in a “trade” debate before, but see their non - trade policy goals as being undermined by the TPP’s sweeping rules. Similarly ,

economists that have supported past agreements that actually focused on trade – l ike Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman –

have recently raised warnings about the significant threats that the TPP’s non - trade rules would pose to U.S. interests. In a February 2014 op - ed in The New York Times , Krugman writes : I am in general a free trader , but I’ll be undismayed and e ven a bit relieved if the TPP just fades away... What the TPP would do ... is increase the ability of certain corporations to assert control over intellectual property. Again, think drug patents and movie rights. Is this a good thing from a global point of view? Doubtful. The kind of property rights we’re talking about here can alternatively be described as legal monopolies...Now, the corporations benefiting from enhanced control over intellectual property would often be American. But t his doesn’t mean that the TPP is in our national interest. What’s good for Big Pharma is by no means always good for America. 29 Stiglitz offers an even more scathing critique of the pact in a March 2014 op - ed in the Times : When agreements like the TPP govern international trade – when every country has agreed to similarly minimal regulations – multinational corporations can return to the practices that were common before the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts became law (in 1970 and 1972, respectively) and before the latest financial crisis hit. Corporations everywhere may well agree that getting rid of regulations would be good for corporate profits. Trade negotiators might be persuaded that these trade agreements would be good for trade and corporate profits.

But there would be some big losers – namely, the rest of us. 30 As Krugman and Stiglitz make clear, the choice over the TPP is not a choice between the United States setting the rules or China setting the rules. It is a choice over

whether to allow m ultinational corporations to set rules that serve their own narrow interests at the expense of the interests of the U.S. majority. To borrow from Third Way, policymakers have a simple choice to make – do we want to define our national interests, or do we leave it to the corporations?

Manufacturing checks all global war --manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S. deterrence

O’Hanlon 12 (Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January 2012,” pg online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon)

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S. d efense i ndustrial b ase is in a much different place than it was in the past . D efense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the techn ologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance . Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military tech nology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them . That requires world-class scientific and

manufacturing capabilities — which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

Econ—1ar TPP increases derivatives risking global economic collapse – zero risk it helps the economy – just accelerates offshoring Stiglitz 14 (Joseph, American economist and a professor at Columbia University, “On the Wrong Side of Globalization,” March 15, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/joseph-e-stiglitz/, CMR)

The worries mount. One way of reading the leaked negotiation documents suggests that the TPP would make it easier for American banks to sell risky

derivatives around the world, perhaps setting us up for the same kind of crisis that led to the Great Recession . In spite of all this, there are those who passionately support the TPP and agreements like it, including many economists. What makes this support possible is bogus, debunked economic theory, which has remained in circulation mostly because it serves the interests of the wealthiest. Free trade was a central tenet of economics in the discipline’s early years. Yes, there are winners and losers, the theory went, but the winners can always compensate the losers, so that free trade (or even freer trade) is a win-win. This conclusion, unfortunately, is based on numerous assumptions, many of which are simply wrong. The older theories, for instance, simply ignored risk, and assumed that workers could move seamlessly between jobs. It was assumed that the economy was at full employment, so that workers displaced by globalization would quickly move from low-productivity sectors (which had thrived simply because foreign competition was kept at bay through tariffs and other trade restrictions) to high-productivity sectors. But when there is a high level of unemployment, and especially when a large percentage of the unemployed have been out of work long-term (as is the case now), there can’t be such complacency. Today, there are 20 million Americans who would like a full-time job but can’t get one. Millions have stopped looking. So there is a real risk that individuals moved from low productivity-employment in a protected sector will end up zero-productivity members of the vast ranks of the unemployed. This hurts even those who keep their jobs, as higher unemployment puts downward pressure on wages. We can argue over why our economy isn’t performing the way it’s supposed to — whether it’s because of a lack of aggregate demand, or because our banks, more interested in speculation and market manipulation than lending, are not providing adequate funds to small and medium-size enterprises. But whatever the reasons, the reality is that these trade agreements do risk increasing unemployment. One of the reasons that

we are in such bad shape is that we have mismanaged globalization. Our economic policies encourage the outsourcing of jobs : Goods produced abroad with cheap labor can be cheaply brought back into the United States. So American workers understand that they have to compete with those abroad, and their bargaining power is weakened. This is one of the reasons that the real median income of full-time male workers is lower than it was 40 years ago. American politics today compounds these problems. Even in the best of circumstances, the old free trade theory said only that the winners could compensate the losers, not that they would. And they haven’t — quite the opposite. Advocates of trade agreements often say that for America to be competitive, not only will wages have to be cut, but so will taxes and expenditures, especially on programs that are of benefit to ordinary citizens. We should accept the short-term pain, they say, because in the long run, all will benefit. But as John

Maynard Keynes famously said in another context, “in the long run we are all dead .” In this case, there is little evidence that the

trade agreements will lead to faster or more profound growth. Critics of the TPP are so numerous because both the process and the theory that undergird it are bankrupt. Opposition has blossomed not just in the United States, but also in Asia, where the talks have stalled. By leading a full-on rejection of fast-track authority for the TPP, the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, seems to have given us all a little respite. Those who see trade agreements as enriching corporations at the expense of the 99 percent seem to have won this skirmish. But there is a broader war to ensure that trade policy — and globalization more generally — is designed so as to increase the standards of living of most Americans. The outcome of that war remains uncertain. In this series, I have repeatedly made two points: The first is that the high level of inequality in the United States today, and its enormous increase during the past 30 years, is the cumulative result of an array of policies, programs and laws. Given that the president himself has emphasized that inequality should be the country’s top priority, every new policy, program or law should be examined from the perspective of its impact on inequality. Agreements like the TPP have contributed in important ways to this inequality.

Corporations may profit, and it is even possible, though far from assured, that g ross domestic p roduct as conventionally measured will increase. But the well-being of ordinary citizens is likely to take a hit. And this brings me to the second point that I have repeatedly emphasized: Trickle-down economics is a myth. Enriching corporations — as the TPP would — will not necessarily help those in the middle, let alone those at the bottom.

Enviro Turn—2ac TPP CRUSHES the environment and results in overfishing *uniquely worse than previous trade pacts

Howard 14 (Brian Clark, “4 Ways Green Groups Say Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Hurt Environment,” Jan 17, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/01/140117-trans-pacific-partnership-free-trade-environment-obama/)

A leaked draft of a major free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and nations on the Pacific Rim raises alarming questions about environmental protections, several leading green groups say. "If the environment chapter is finalized as written in this leaked document, President Obama's environmental trade record would be worse than George W. Bush's," Michael Brune, executive director of the Sierra Club, said in a statement after a

draft of the agreement was published Wednesday on WikiLeaks. "This draft chapter falls flat on every single one of our issue s—oceans,

fish, wildlife, and forest protections—and in fact, rolls back on the progress made in past free trade pacts," he said. The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership is a huge pact that would govern about 40 percent of the world's gross domestic product and one-third of world trade, said Jake Schmidt, international climate policy director for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The agreement involves a sprawling cast of countries: Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. The NRDC joined with the Sierra Club and WWF in criticizing the leaked draft of the environment chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which WikiLeaks publisher Julian Assange said proved the chapter was "a toothless public relations exercise with no enforcement mechanism." The White House has pushed back against such criticisms. In a blog post responding to the leak this week, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) wrote that "stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) or we will not come to agreement." Here are four grievances voiced by environmental groups over the leaked chapter: 1. They say the pact lacks basic environmental provisions. This is all about what's not in the proposed pact. The NRDC's Schmidt says that environmental groups are asking for "some pretty basic environmental provisions. "We're saying don't subsidize unsustainable fisheries and don't do illegal things," he said. Environmentalists say that the Obama White House has hinted that it will not support an agreement without enforceable environmental provisions, in recent remarks by some of the administration's key environmental players. But the "overarching"

problem with the leaked draft, Schmidt says, is that "there's no enforcement ." The leaked document mentions that trade partners should

take steps to protect the environment, but Schmidt says that "there are many caveats that effectively allow countries to not make these enforceable. "References to the word 'shall' are very rarely used," he says, "and are often paired with 'seek to' or 'attempt,' which are not legally enforceable." 2. Green groups say the draft agreement does not discourage overfishing.

The nations considering the T rans-Pacific Partnership have a "responsibility" to provide adequate protection against overfishing, but the draft agreement fails to provide that, said Carter Roberts, president and CEO of

WWF. The countries negotiating the agreement account for about a third of global fisheries production, Roberts notes, so the stakes are high. Those countries have a range of direct and indirect subsidies for their fishing fleets, including payments, discounted loans, reduced prices on fuel, and so on. "What we have been pushing for is for countries to phase out harmful subsidies ... that lead to greater harvest of fishing stocks than can be sustained," said Schmidt. "We're not saying end all fishing

programs and support, but you need to make sure that any support is targeted at programs that don't lead to overconsumption of fish stocks." For its part, the U.S. Trade Representative's office responded that the U.S. is "proposing that the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] include, for the first time in any trade or environment agreement, groundbreaking

prohibitions on fish subsidies that set a new and higher baseline for fisheries protections." 3. The pact does not take a strong enough stance against illegal wildlife products, activists say. Green groups would like to see stronger enforcement of international laws on products made from endangered species , such as elephant ivory or tiger pelts, as part of a new trade agreement. "The lack of fully-enforceable environmental safeguards means negotiators are allowing a unique opportunity to protect wildlife and support legal sustainable trade of renewable resources to slip through their fingers," WWF's Roberts said in a statement.

Biodiversity solves extinction – food crises and genetic irreplaceability Mittermeier 11(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book

Biodiversity Hotspots – F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at: http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis , since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevate d the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural

background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered

a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human . Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶

cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing

the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the

ecosystems ¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods,

biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the

importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders . More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally flexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for

biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of

biodiversity be implemented first ? The field of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a

framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the first application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to

guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots ” on the basis of extraordinary plant

endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a first systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the

world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientific publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the

better-defined criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redefined several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufficient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

Overfishing too

Jackson et al, Professor at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California San Diego, ’1 (Jeremy, July 27, “Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems” Science, Vol 293 No 5530, p 629-637)

Ecological extinction caused by overfishing precedes all other pervasive human disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water quality, and anthropogenic climate change . Historical abundances of large consumer species were fantastically large in comparison with recent observations. Paleoecological, archaeological, and historical data show that time lags of decades to centuries occurred between the onset of overfishing and consequent changes in ecological communities , because unfished species of similar trophic level assumed the ecological roles of overfished species until they too were overfished or died of epidemic diseases related to overcrowding . Retrospective data not only help to clarify underlying causes and rates of ecological change, but they also demonstrate achievable goals for restoration and management of coastal ecosystems that could not even be contemplated based on the limited perspective of recent observations alone.

---Enviro L TPP risks “environmental disaster” – it’s unique and Asia’s a key region Solomon 14 (Ilana, Director of the Sierra Club's Responsible Trade Program, “Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership an environmental disaster waiting to happen?,” May 12, http://www.treehugger.com/environmental-policy/trans-pacific-partnership-environmental-disaster-waiting-happen.html)

President Obama's environmental trade legacy is in deep trouble and in large part will hinge on a trade deal that his administration is discussing in Vietnam the week of May 12. This trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - essentially an expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - stands to erode our laws, further empower multinational corporations, and take away protections for our air, water, and climate. If agreed upon by the 12 negotiating

countries, including the U.S., Japan, and Vietnam, the TPP could spell out environmental disaster . We know all of this no thanks to the trade

negotiators themselves - they're keeping these discussions close to the vest - but because we’ve studied the costs of NAFTA and other similar trade pacts on the environment, and because of WikiLeaks, which has published three chapters of the pact. Most recently, WikiLeaks revealed a draft of the trade pact's chapter devoted to the environment. It was clear from my first reading of this draft text that we were in trouble. The leaked text revealed weak suggestions for environmental protection instead of binding obligations. Since a May 2007 bipartisan consensus on trade by the Bush administration and Congress, the environment

chapters of all U.S. free trade agreements have at least been legally enforceable. Not this one - at least not yet. This text fell flat, ignoring existing

environmental treaties and enforceability. The Pacific Rim is an area of rich biodiversity that must be preserved. But the natural resources in the region, such as the forests, wildlife, and fish, are threatened by illegal and unsustainable commercial exploitation. Already, the Asia-Pacific region accounts for about one-third of all the threatened species in the world. Populations of several species of oceanic sharks, including reef sharks, are declining rapidly. And illegal logging is a serious problem in many TPP countries, destroying not only natural forests but the communities who live in and rely on the forests. With so many conservation challenges in the Pacific Rim, a trade deal in this region must include strong and binding rules to avoid more environmental destruction. But the leaked chapter was completely unenforceable and did not include provisions that would, for example, ban shark finning or ban trade in illegally harvested timber, wildlife, and fish. The office of the U.S. Trade Representative seems to be pushing for a stronger chapter, but all of the other countries - including Vietnam - seem to oppose strong and binding provisions to protect our trees, fish, and wildlife. As U.S. trade representatives head to Vietnam, they must not make any compromises on the environment chapter

-- there's too much at risk . The TPP environment chapter must include strong, binding language including the elimination of harmful subsidies

that lead to overfishing; a ban on shark finning and commercial whaling; and ban on trade in illegally taken timber, fish and wildlife.

---Enviro ImpactCollapse of the environment causes extinction

Biodiversity loss is irrecoverable and means we can’t maintain agriculture and genetic diversity necessary to survive—that’s Mittermeir

No resiliency—collapses civilizationEhrlich and Ehrlich 2013—Associate director of the Center for Conservation Biology at Stanford University. Bing Professor of Population Studies in the department of Biological Sciences at Stanford University and president of Stanford's Center for Conservation Biology. (Paul and Anne, the dedevolping couple!, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?”, http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/280/1754/20122845.full#ref-1, chm)

Environmental problems have contributed to numerous collapses of civilizations in the past. Now, for the first time, a global collapse appears likely. Overpopulation, overconsumption by the rich and poor choices of technologies are major drivers; dramatic cultural change provides the main hope of averting calamity.¶ population consumption environment agriculture climate

culture¶ Previous Section¶ Next Section¶ 1. Introduction¶ Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse , a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or

the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most,

cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an ultimate cause [3].¶ But today, for the first

time, humanity's global civilization —the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with collapse by an array of environmental problems . Humankind finds itself engaged in what

Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4 ], facing what the UK's Chief Scientific Advisor John

Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption . But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating extinction of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological

environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system . The

negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicamen t’ [10], and

determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity. ¶ The human predicament is driven by overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio- economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far

the human population size now is above the planet's long-term carrying capacity is suggested

(conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today's population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level

would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization's life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in

which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth's carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation

[24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26]. ¶ Previous Section¶ Next Section¶ 2. Do current trends portend a collapse?¶ What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more

gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear .

Enviro + Econ Turn—2ac TPP crushes the economy and environment Scott Banbury, “U.S. Trade Policy Is on Course for Disaster,” THE TENNESSEAN, 12—26—13, www.tennessean.com/article/20131227/OPINION03/312270025/U-S-trade-policy-course-disaster, accessed 12-30-13.

The agreement is being developed behind closed doors with little public input. None of the texts are available, with the exception of those recently released by WikiLeaks. The only people with access, apart from trade officials, are the more

than 600 business representatives who serve as official U.S. trade advisers. Even members of Congress are left in the dark on the actual contents of the agreement. According to leaked texts, the Trans-Pacific Partnership poses a major threat to our environmental, consumer and public health laws. It would extend patent rights, keeping pharmaceutical prices high, and undermine efforts to re-regulate the unsound financial practices that led to the 2008 stock market crash . The agreement would outlaw “buy American” procurement policies, and encourage offshoring of millions of U.S. jobs through foreign investment

privileges and benefits. The chapter on investment would allow foreign corporations to sue governments directly — for unlimited cash compensation — over almost any domestic environmental or other law that the corporation believes is hurting its ability to profit. These so-called “investor-state cases” are heard in private and nontransparent tribunals without public participation.

Food Safety—2ac TPP mandates international tribunals – causes mass de-regulation of food safety and the environment Reich 15 (Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary of Labor, is professor of public policy at the University of California at Berkeley, “Why the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a pending disaster,” 1-6, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/bal-why-the-transpacific-partnership-is-a-pending-disaster-20150106-story.html)

The TPP also gives global corporations an international tribunal of private attorneys, outside any nation's legal system, who can order compensation for any " unjust expropriation " of foreign assets. Even better for global companies, the tribunal can order compensation for any lost profits found to result from a nation's regulations. Philip Morris is using a similar provision against Uruguay (the provision appears in a bilateral trade treaty between Uruguayand Switzerland), claiming that Uruguay's strong anti-smoking regulations unfairly diminish

the company's profits. Anyone believing the TPP is good for Americans, take note: The foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations could just as easily challenge any U.S. government regulation they claim unfairly diminishes their profits -- say , a regulation protecting American consumers from unsafe products or unhealthy foods , investors from fraudulent securities or predatory lending, workers from unsafe working conditions, taxpayers from another bailout of Wall Street, or the environment from toxic emissions .

Crushes global supply chains Agiwal 8 (Swati, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, “Risk mitigating strategies in the food supply chain,” April, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6248/2/469380.pdf, CMR)

Food safety is a credence 2 characterisitc and hence the credibility of the food product needs to be established by some forms of food safety po licies, if the market fails to provide su ffi cient information about this attribute (Cho and Hooker, 2002). While there are some mandated safety and security practices for the fi rms in the food supply chain the issue of economic incentives for the fi rms to actively address food safety throughout the supp ly chain is unclear. These practices often require signi fi cant investments in capital 3 and labor 4 too, but do not have

tangible returns. It is di ffi cult to estimate the value of preventing a safety inciden t. However, a risk that is realized can potentially

bankrupt the firm 5 . Some high-pro fi le cases of food safety outbreaks have had substantial economic consequences such as,

lost sales, recall and compe nsation costs, damaged goo dwill and hence impact on future business. Although such incidents can lead the fi

rms out of business, the impact is not contained just at the fi rm level but also felt throughout the food supply chain . Supply chains are often faced with various risks of supply disruptions and uncertain demand conditions, these food safety

events and security events arising from eithe r intentional or unintentional events pose risks that are above and beyond the common

operational and market risks, bringing the overall level of risk to unprecedented new levels . There is a greater emph asis in highlighting the role of product safety, especially in the food industry, given the recent spate of several high pro fi le food safety incidents (such as recalls for ground beef, pet food, green onions and spinach scare, etc.) and decreasing consumer con fi dence in food supply (Degene ff e et al., 2007).As a result, a supply chain manager’s "best practice" model today is to strive to achieve not only a fully integrated and e ffi cient supply chain, capable of creating and sustaining competitive advantage (Christopher and Towill, 2002), but also one with su ffi cient fl exibility and redundancy to enable the fi rm to respond to extreme events (She ffi 2005). Natural calamities, port lock-outs, labor disputes, terrorist

events, major recalls, outbreaks and epidemics are examples of such intentional and unintentional events that lie beyond market

uncertainties and could cripple not just firms but entire supply chains . There is a strong argument for building robust and fl exible systems that e ff ectively handle contamination incidents and increase the buoyance of the fi rm in the wake of an event (She ffi , 2005).

Nuclear war Future Directions International ’12 (“International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme”, May 25, http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf, CMR)

This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow .” He continues: “An

increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their

allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies , than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources .” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources , either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed

that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International

Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly

aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies

and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and

possibly even nuclear war .

TPP Bad—China/Asia Pivot

Asia War D—2ac No Asia War *best data proves

*state legitimacy, growth, deterrence check

*no major war, even if minor disputes

Alagappa 12-19-14 (Muthiah Alagappa, Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., “International Peace in Asia: Will it Endure?,” http://www.theasanforum.org/international-peace-in-asia-will-it-endure/, CMR)

In contrast to those dire warnings, this article makes two claims. First, Asia has witnessed a substantial reduction in the number of major and minor inter-state wars. After reaching a peak in the 1970s, major inter-state war has declined in number, frequency, and intensity measured in terms of battle deaths. From 1979 to 2014, there were only two major inter-state wars compared to 13 in 1945 to 1979. Connected to earlier wars, the nature,

purpose, scope, and outcome of these wars since 1979 reinforce rather than undermine my central claim that Asia has witnessed

substantial decline in major wars.6 It has even enjoyed a long period of peace, comparable in duration, nature, and complexity

to the “long peace” of the Cold War in Europe.7 Second, the long peace in Asia will continue in the foreseeable future. Entrenched conflicts will likely remain unresolved with a few becoming even more acute. The Asian strategic environment will become more complex with growing economic interdependence, cross-cutting links, and some new security challenges. And, armed clashes

cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, major war in Asia is unlikely in the coming decade or two. I made these claims about a decade ago.8 I am now even more convinced and set them out in this article to balance the growing chorus—now, also in Asia—of conflict and war in Asia. What explains the substantial decline in the frequency of major war in Asia and the claim that the inter-state peace that has endured in Asia since 1979 will continue in the foreseeable future? These are the central questions animating this article, which advances three

related arguments: 1. Decline in the number and intensity of inter-state wars in Asia since 1979 is due largely to the growing legitimacy of the Asian political map , rising nationalism, focus on and success in economic growth, and the development of effective deterrence in relevant dyads. Together, these developments

reduced the salience as well as altered the role of force, more specifically war, in the international politics of Asia. 2. Factors that underpinned the decreasing frequency of inter-state war will continue to be salient in the foreseeable future and sustain the long peace in Asia. A development that could substantially alter the strategic environment would be a shift in military technology and strategy from deterrence to offense. Such a shift would make war more costly, but also

restore it as a rational instrument of policy in pursuit of certain political objectives. 3. The international peace that has prevailed in Asia, as in Europe during the Cold War, is of the minimal type (absence of major war but not devoid of competition, conflict, minor war, and military incidents). That is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Stronger peace would require resolution of outstanding disputes, which appears unlikely.

Asia War D—1ar No scenario for conflict – economics, deterrence, and respect *A/T: China Rise, US-China, Japan-China, Korea, Taiwan, Indo-Pak

*No Escalation

Alagappa 12-19-14 (Muthiah Alagappa, Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., “International Peace in Asia: Will it Endure?,” http://www.theasanforum.org/international-peace-in-asia-will-it-endure/, CMR)

Will peace endure? Peace defined as the absence of major war will endure in the foreseeable future. Although changing distributions of power, growing military capabilities, continuing disputes and the emergence of

new challenges will likely create an unsettling environment for many countries and fuel talk of war, war in Asia is unlikely to materialize . Excessive attention to the rise of China and attendant change in the international distribution of power have privileged realist theories like power transition and hegemony, whose primary focus is on change through war. That

focus has diverted attention from the root cause of war, peace, cooperation, and order in the region. The rise

of China should be put in perspective. The primary driver of war in post 1945 Asia has been the contested legitimacy of nations and states, not the weakness or rise of China . Inter-state peace in Asia will endure due to the increasing international legitimacy of countries, a continued focus on economic growth and development, growing national

resilience and state capacity, and maintenance of effective deterrence. The political map of Asia has been relatively stable over the last thirty years. Increasing international legitimacy along with respect for the principles of territorial integrity and political independence implies that the Asia political map will

change only gradually. Changes will be a consequence of internal political developments, not inter-state war . Fundamental change (the appearance of new countries or disappearance of existing ones) will be driven by the outcome of domestic contestation over the type of political system and the identity of the national political community. Only minor territorial changes may occur as a consequence of inter-state

armed conflict. Invasion , conquest, and domination through war have become features of the past , but that does not mean obsolescence of the use of force. For various reasons (political legitimacy, poverty eradication, resolution of domestic conflict, desire to achieve developed country status, the need to end stagnation, aspirations for national power and influence), economic growth will continue to be the priority for several more decades. Participation in regional and global economic systems to mobilize factors of production and access markets will remain key features of the economic policies of Asian countries. Internationalist orientations argue for a peaceful and stable environment. State capacities can be expected to increase and, along with rising nationalism, to make countries less

vulnerable to international intervention. Resorting to war to resolve inter-state disputes with no certainty of success will be costly . Deterrence will continue to inform national security strategies of most countries in the region. It has prevented war even in acute conflicts on the Korea n Peninsula , across the Taiwan Strait , and between India and Pakistan . Deterrence (especially nuclear deterrence) will play a key role in preventing the outbreak of war between China and the U nited S tates , China and India ,

China and Japan , and Japan and Russia . Constant efforts must be made to review, renew, and upgrade it, including extended deterrence in the context of changing political and strategic circumstances, changing military technology, and development of new

capabilities. While strategic deterrence can prevent major inter-state wars , it cannot prevent minor wars, military incidents, or militant activities by non-state actors. Military capabilities and confidence building measures must be developed to deal with these situations. General and specific deterrence strategies, capabilities, and crisis management among key players must command greater attention.

Interdependence and institutionsNick Bisley 14, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University (Australia) and Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, 3/10/14, “It’s not 1914 all over again: Asia is preparing to avoid war,” http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-over-again-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875

Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle époque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however, the historical parallel is deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But there are very good reasons, notwithstanding these

issues, why Asia is not about to tumble into a great power war. China is America’s second most important trading partner . Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with which China trades. Trade and investment’s “golden straitjacket” is a basic reason to be optimistic . Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before

World War One? Because Beijing and Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely aware of how much they have at stake. Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The two powers have established a wide range of institutional links to manage their relations. These are designed to improve the level and quality of their communication, to lower the risks of misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from

all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has demonstrably improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine

conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes. Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914 , today’s two would-be

combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation . Just as the extensive array of common

interests has led Beijing and Washington to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and mechanisms intended to improve trust , generate a sense of common cause and promote regional

prosperity. Some organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders’ meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment

of heads of government dressing up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But there are more than 15 separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what might be described as an infrastructure for peace in the region . While these mechanisms are

not flawless, and many have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they have been crucial in managing specific crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.

China Containment—2ac TPP perceived as containment by China *A/T—China Incorporation

Backer 14 (Larry Cata Backer, Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Prof essor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, 2012–13 Chair, University Fa culty Senate, The Pennsylvania State University, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership,” http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1473&context=law_globalstudies, CMR)

Indeed, Wen Jin Yuan notes the sense among Chinese academic and policy circles that “the main reason behind the Obama Administr ation’s support for

the TPP agenda is the US’s desire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise .” 128 Wen notes, for example, reports

published in the People’s Daily , the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, that refer to TPP as “superficially an economic agreement but contain[ing] an obvious political purpose to constrain China’s rise.” 129 More importantly, a successfully negotiated TPP would result, according to other Chinese scholars, in trade diversion to the detriment of Chinese economic interests. 130 Yet, according to Wen’s research, United States officials insist that the ultimate goal of the United States was not containment, but incorporation. The “U.S.’s ultimate goal is to integrate China into this regional trade system, rather t han keeping China out, and the TPP initiative is actually similar to the strategy led by several U.S. agencies to incorporate China into the

WTO sys tem.” 131 Yet incorporation can be understood from the Chinese side as another form of containment . Rather

than have China lead a new effort at refining the rules and culture of trade in the Pacific, it would be forced to part icipate as a junior partner in a regulatory exercise

directed by the United St ates and its principal ally, Japan. For the Chinese, the substantial effe ct might well be understood as

containment , though that view/perception is lost on the United States. 132

Nuclear war Eland 5—MBA in economics, PhD in Public Policy, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute (Ivan, 11 April 2005, Coexisting with a Rising China?, http://www.independent.org/NEWSROOM/ARTICLE.ASP?ID=1494, RBatra)

Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany, the U nited S tates should take a page from another chapter in

British history . In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging U nited S tates to rise as a great power, knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the U nited S tates could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at

present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history . Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration.

UQ: No Asia Pivot/No WarWe control UQ – U.S. backing off in the SQUO produces peace and cooperation Gong 2-4-15 (James, associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, “Will South China Sea stay peaceful in 2015?,” http://forum.china.org.cn/viewthread.php?tid=163145&highlight, CMR)

Tensions in the South China Sea might be eased in 2015, not because of the low oil prices, but due to the strategic shifts laid out by major powers which have crucial interests in this region . Where the conflicts are heading is not decided by the claims of small disputing parties such as Vietnam and the Philippines, but by China and the US. After

years of efforts, the US "pivot to Asia" strategy has entered a phase of consolidation and calibration. The White House is unlikely to make big moves in the South China Sea as long as no emergencies take place.

With more progress made in bilateral relations, Washington has realized that too much pressure over Beijing on the South China Sea disputes will not benefit itself in the end . After all, both countries have seen wider space for cooperation and mutual benefits in many other regional and international issues. A face-off with China in the South China Sea will jeopardize the chance Washington seeks China's

cooperation in other issues. China will continue its policy over the region by aligning sovereignty protection with

peacekeeping. Beijing won't give up countering other claimants when they try to further encroach on resources and islands, but it will put more efforts in promoting its "One Belt and One Road" project, which refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road, seeking cooperation with other regional countries .

--UQ: Trade Ties Check WarCurrent trade ties checking Chinese aggression *proves L for the turn

Jenny 1-24-15 (Nicolas is a specialist in European and Asian political risk, currently works for a private urban development firm in Hanoi, Vietnam, “Trade unaffected despite competing claims in South China Sea,” CMR)

And although many are quick to remind us that trade cannot serve as a deterrent to conflict, today’s globalised world stands in stark contrast to the beginning of the 20th century. Even the Philippine president, Aquino, argued that

territorial disputes in the South China Sea were unlikely to lead to conflict because no one was willing to sacrifice the huge trade flows in the region . Therefore, despite the issues over sovereignty and the occasional flare ups between various claimants, peace , no matter how precarious, will prevail – no country is ready, particularly China, to sacrifice trade at the expense of stability.

---Containment L Obama’s SOU changed the game – TPP signals containment Tiezzi 15 (Shannon, received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary, “The State of the Union: Obama’s Challenge to China,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-state-of-the-union-obamas-challenge-to-china/, CMR)

Ah, the State of the Union address – that special time each year when analysts spend hours and hours pouring over a speech that will likely have little to no relationship to actual government policy. Fortunately, I can beg off from most of that tedium by virtue of working for an international affairs magazine. In fact, as of yesterday evening I had no plans to write about the speech at all – unless, of course, Obama said something particularly interesting or relevant to U.S.-China relations. And so he did, and here we are. The passage in question reads as follows: But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level the playing field. That’s why I’m asking both parties to give me trade promotion authority to protect American workers, with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that aren’t just free, but are also fair. It’s the right thing to do. There’s a lot going on here that, unfortunately, will reinforce some of the darker suspicions among Chinese officials. Let’s unpack this paragraph, shall we? First, Obama holds up a stark zero-sum vision of Asia-Pacific trade – something not likely to sit well in Beijing, where leaders constantly bemoan “Cold War thinking” in Washington. If China gets to “write the rules” for Asia-Pacific trade, Obama argues, U.S. companies and workers will be “at a disadvantage.” The underlying assumption is that a Chinese-led system will be inherently bad for the U.S., and (presumably) vice versa, with a U.S.-led system giving its companies an advantage over their Chinese competitors. The response from China’s foreign ministry was to double-down on Beijing’s model, which stresses cooperation rather than competition. In the words of spokesperson Hua Chunying, “We hope every party, through a common effort, will provide a fair, open, and transparent environment for economic cooperation and make a contribution to perfecting world trade regulations.” Hua also emphasized China’s position of prioritizing “mutual benefits and win-win” cooperation when it comes to trade. Analysts often argue over how sincere China is in its formulation of “win-win” cooperation, but there’s no denying this is Beijing’s preferred rhetoric. To see the possibility of “win-win” cooperation on economic issues tossed aside in favor of an I-win-you-lose formula is troubling for China. Second, another phrase that’s likely to grab Beijing’s attention (and not in a good way) is Obama’s rhetorical question, “Why would we let that happen?” This comes, of course, with the unspoken corollary that the U.S. can choose not to let China have its say in the rules that will govern future trade in the Asia-Pacific – China’s own backyard. This sentence speaks directly to a deep-seated fear in Beijing that the U.S. will never willingly cede any portion of its leadership to China, regardless of how powerful (or even well-behaved) China is. By asking “Why would we let that happen?” Obama is essentially saying: If I have my way, this will not happen. China will not be allowed to “write the rules” or set the agenda for Asia-Pacific trade. In other words, Obama just provided fresh fodder for every Chinese analyst who sincerely believes the U.S. will do its utmost to “contain” China for as long as possible. In saying “we [the U.S.] should write those rules,” Obama is of course speaking to a domestic audience, but he should also be well aware that observers around the globe are listening. That assumption that the U.S. “should” lead, simply by virtue of being the U.S., is problematic for many countries, not just China. But China, with its new initiatives to create Asian-only (and Chinese-led) economic and security blocs, is perhaps doing more than any other country to turn this

assumption on its head. Third, Obama ties this confrontational rhetoric to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP ). Specially, Obama argues that he needs trade promotion authority so that negotiations can proceed on “strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe.” When it comes to Asia, that can only mean the vaunted TPP, Washington’s vision for a “high-standard” trade agreement that includes rigorous intellectual property rights and free trade requirements (including restrictions on state-owned enterprises). China stands little chance of meeting those standards and is thus excluded from the negotiations (which currently include 12 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and Vietnam). China analysts have long looked askance at the TPP, reading it as another attempt at economic containment by the U.S. Recently, however, there were signs of a shift in position, with some Chinese officials even floating the notion of China eventually joining

the trade pact. However, Obama’s State of the Union address will reinforce the negative perceptions some Chinese analysts have of the TPP – that it’s an American-led trade bloc made to serve narrow American interests. By pushing through the TPP, Obama implies, the U.S. can keep China from creating rules of trade that complement its own strengths and weaknesses.

---Containment ImpactContainment causes a self-fulfilling prophecy that guarantees war throughout Asia

Klare 6—professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, 2006 [Michael, “Containing China: The US's real objective”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad01.html]

Accompanying all these diplomatic initiatives has been a vigorous, if largely unheralded, effort by the Department of Defense (DoD) to bolster US military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. The broad sweep of US strategy was first spelled out in the Pentagon's most recent policy assessment, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 5. In discussing long-term threats to US security, the QDR begins

with a reaffirmation of the overarching precept first articulated in the DPG of 1992: that the U nited States will not allow the rise of a competing superpower . This country "will attempt to dissuade any

military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States", the document states. It then identifies China as the most likely and dangerous competitor of this sort. "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U nited States and field disruptive military

technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages" - then adding the kicker - "absent US counter-strategies." According to the Pentagon, the task of countering future Chinese military capabilities largely entails the development, and then procurement, of major weapons systems that would ensure US success in any full-scale military confrontation. "The United States will develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning efforts," the QDR explains. These include the steady enhancement of such "enduring US advantages" as "long-range strike, stealth, operational maneuver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic distances, air dominance, and undersea warfare". Preparing for war with China, in other words, is to be the future cash cow for the giant US weapons-making corporations in the military-industrial complex. It will, for instance, be the primary justification for the acquisition of costly new weapons systems such as the F-22A Raptor fighter, the multi-service Joint Strike Fighter, the DDX destroyer, the Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine, and a new intercontinental penetrating bomber - weapons that would just have utility in an all-out encounter with another great-power adversary of a sort that only China might someday become. In addition to these weapons programs, the QDR also calls for a stiffening of present US combat forces in Asia and the Pacific, with a particular emphasis on the US Navy (the arm of the military least used in the ongoing occupation of and war in Iraq). "The fleet will have a greater presence in the Pacific Ocean," the document notes. To achieve this, "The navy plans to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable [aircraft] carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence." Since each of these carriers is,

in fact, but the core of a large array of support ships and protective aircraft, this move is sure to entail a truly vast buildup of US naval capabilities in the Western Pacific and will certainly necessitate a substantial expansion of the US basing complex in the region - a requirement that is already receiving close attention from Admiral Fallon and his staff at PACOM. To assess the operational demands of this buildup, moreover, this summer the US Navy will conduct its most extensive military maneuvers in the Western Pacific since the end of the Vietnam War, with four aircraft-carrier battle groups and many support ships expected to

participate. Add all of this together, and the resulting strategy cannot be viewed as anything but a systematic campaign of containment . No high administration official may say this in so many

words, but it is impossible to interpret the recent moves of Rice and Rumsfeld in any other manner. From Beijing's perspective, the reality must be unmistakable : a steady buildup of US military power along China 's eastern, southern and western boundaries. How will China respond to this threat? For now, it appears to be relying on charm and the conspicuous blandishment of economic benefits to loosen Australian, South Korean, and even Indian ties with the United States. To a certain extent, this strategy is meeting with success, as these countries seek to profit from the extraordinary economic boom now under way in China - fueled to a considerable extent by oil, gas, iron, timber, and other materials supplied by China's neighbors in Asia. A version of this strategy is also being employed by President Hu Jintao during his current visit to the United States. As China's money is sprinkled liberally among such influential firms as Boeing and Microsoft, Hu is reminding the corporate wing of the Republican Party that there are vast economic benefits still to be had

by pursuing a non-threatening stance toward China. China , however, has always responded to perceived threats of encirclement in a vigorous and muscular fashion as well , and so we should assume that Beijing will balance all that charm with a military buildup of its own. Such a drive will not bring China to the brink of military equality with the United States - that is not

a condition it can realistically aspire to over the next few decades. But it will provide further justification for those in the United States who seek to accelerate the containment of China , and so will produce a self-fulfilling loop of distrust, competition and crisis. This will make the amicable long-term settlement of the Taiwan problem and of North Korea's nuclear program that much more difficult , and increase the risk of unintended escalation to full-scale war in Asia . There can be no victors from such a conflagration.

Tough actions against China reinforce aggressive behavior

Shambaugh 11—Professor of Political Science & International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, as well as a nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution (David, © 2011 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 34:1 pp. 7-27, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Shambaugh.pdf, RBatra)

Collectively, these schools of thoughts also have policy implications. The international community must grasp that China’s international identity is not fixed. It is fluid and a work-in-progress that remains contentious and constantly debated. As such, the United States and others can influence the ongoing debates (as well as policy outcomes) through both actions and words, both negatively and positively. Harsh words and tough actions from the United States are likely to have a reinforcing effect on China, producing more truculent and troubling behavior from Beijing as domestic voices push the government to stand firm against Washington. However, more conciliatory statements and encouragement for China to act as a ‘‘responsible international stakeholder’’ and become more deeply involved in global governance will also exacerbate Chinese suspicions and not likely produce the intended outcome. Thus, Washington and the West are caught in a real conundrum: to get tough with China is likely to produce more Chinese toughness in response, but to be conciliatory will only strengthen the Realists’ self-interested ‘‘China first’’ orientation.

A/T China Influence Won’t solve Chinese influence – allies opposition & other pacts prove Beachy 14 (Ben Beachy is Research Director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, former research fellow with Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, investment analyst for the Tellus Institute in Boston, agriculture researcher for ActionAid in India and labor rights investigator for the Worker Rights Consortium in Central America, B.A. from Goshen College and a Master in Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, “The Rising Use of the Trade Pact Sales Pitch of Last Resort: TPP Foreign Policy Arguments Mimic False Claims Made for Past Deals,” April, http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-foreign-policy.pdf, CMR)

Even if one assumes that China will not one day enter the TPP (despite the open invitation), the evidence from past U.S. pacts does not support the notion that such agreements limit China’s economic influence. Although the United States has signed FTAs with 11 countries in Latin America (more than in any other region in the world) , the pacts have not stopped China from increasing its economic presence in the region. From 2000 to 2011 , a period in which U.S. FTAs with eight Latin American countries took effect , China’ s exports to Latin America soared more than 1280 percent , from $10.5 billion to more than $145 billion . U.S. exports to the region during the same period increased by just 30 percent, or $73 billion. As a result, the share of Latin America’s imported goods coming from the United States fell from 25 percent to 16 percent while the share coming from China increased from 1 percent to 7 percent. 14 This trend has held for major U.S. FTA partners. The share of Mexico’s imported goods coming from the United States dropped from 69 perce nt to 49 percent in NAFTA’s first 20 years, while China’s share rose from 1 percent to 1 6 percent. 15 China’s role as an importer for Latin America has also increased. The share of Latin America’s exports destined for China rose from 1 percent in 2000 to 4 percent in 2011, while the share exported to the United States shrank from 28 percent to 19 percent. 16 For some U.S. FTAs, the U.S. economic pres ence in FTA partner countries after the pact’s approval has fallen not just in relative terms, but

absolutely. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central America actually decreased after enactment of the U.S. - Central

America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The aggregate level of U. S. FDI in the six CAFTA partner countries dropped 30 percent, or nearly $1

billion, from the year before the FTA took effect in each country to 2012. 17 Mea nwhile , investment in the region from other countries grew , diminishing the U.S. share of Central America ’s FDI even further. This includes growth in FDI in CAFTA countries from Venezuela , undercutting the argument, used by CAFTA proponents to push for the pact’s

approval, that CAFTA would counter Venezuela ’s influence in the region. 18 The evidence from past pacts offers no indication that another FTA would prove effective in keeping China’s economic influence in check.

Moreover, many of the closest U.S. allies participating in the TPP reject the “counter China” portrayal of the pact as not only nonsensical, but as a threat to their national interests . For

example, t he governments of New Zealand and Australia, both of which maintain strong economic ties with China, have indicated that if the TPP were intended to impede China, they would abandon the pact. 19 In February 2012, New Zealand Trade Minister Tim Groser stated , “ The moment we smelt or sensed that this was an anti - China thing, we’d leave the TPP .” 20 When confronted by the fact that the TPP cannot be a tool to counter Chinese competition if it is comprised of China allies and open to China itself, proponents of the deal often shift to another variety of the argument: t he TPP is a tool for the United States to set international rules before China can do so .

More ev – won’t solve U.S. power or check China

Beachy 14 (Ben Beachy is Research Director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, former research fellow with Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, investment analyst for the Tellus Institute in Boston, agriculture researcher for ActionAid in India and labor rights investigator for the Worker Rights Consortium in Central America, B.A. from Goshen College and a Master in Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, “The Rising Use of the Trade Pact Sales Pitch of Last Resort: TPP Foreign Policy Arguments Mimic False Claims Made for Past Deals,” April, http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-foreign-policy.pdf, CMR)

These historical lesson s are relevant to the current TPP debate . As congressional and public opposition to the TPP is rising , the pact is now

being framed as a critical bulwark against China . Indeed, claims that the TPP is essential to contain

China , to maintain U.S. power in Asia or to better compete against China are increasingly dominating TPP proponents’ messaging. These claims falter on a few basic facts: China has been invi ted to join the TPP (which would enable China to take advantage of increased access to the markets of the United States and other TPP nations ) ;

U.S. allies in the TPP have threatened to quit the pact if it is intended as a China containment tool ; and past U.S. FTAs have proven utterly ineffective in preventing an increase in China’s economic influence .

A/T China Worse for Econ/TradeChina fill-in irrelevant – TPP is net-worse for U.S. interests Beachy 14 (Ben Beachy is Research Director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, former research fellow with Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, investment analyst for the Tellus Institute in Boston, agriculture researcher for ActionAid in India and labor rights investigator for the Worker Rights Consortium in Central America, B.A. from Goshen College and a Master in Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, “The Rising Use of the Trade Pact Sales Pitch of Last Resort: TPP Foreign Policy Arguments Mimic False Claims Made for Past Deals,” April, http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-foreign-policy.pdf, CMR)

Another newly prominent TPP foreign policy spin is that the pact presents a choice between the United States imposing “our rules” (assumed to be enshrined in the TPP) or China imposing theirs. The problem with this argument is that many of the rules now included in the TPP represent narrow special interests,

and indeed could undermine the broader U.S. national interest. This includes terms that c ould weaken the U nited S tates by increasing income inequality, threatening our financial stability , raising

energy and healthcare costs, and further gutting the U.S. manufacturing base that is essential for both our

national security and domestic infrastructure . TPP proponents seek to bury these inconvenient facts

about the actual terms of the pact by employing a crass “us or them” narrative . Activating Americans’ fears about a

rising China serves to distract from the relevant policy question: would the TPP benefit most Americans? The few chapters of TPP text that have leaked ( and revelations about the chapter s that remain secret ) offer a clear “no” to that question. W hile China’s rising economic power and foreign influence are legitimate matter s of U.S. interest, the notion that somehow the establishment – or not – of any specific U.S. FTA would control this process is a claim without support in the history of U.S. “ free trade ”

agreement outcomes. Indeed, implementing the numerous TPP provisions promoted by narrow and powerful commercial interests but

rejected by the U.S. majority would actually undermine U.S. national interests.

A/T US-Japan Alliance

No alliance collapse

Kai 2/19/14Jin Kai received his Ph.D. in International Relations from the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, South Korea, The Diplomat, February 19, 2014, "China Will Have to Face a Stronger US-Japan Alliance", http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/china-will-have-to-face-a-stronger-us-japan-alliance/

However China explains its claimed peaceful rise, it will still be viewed by a number of major actors in world politics as a revisionist power that intends to change the U.S.-led status quo, starting with the East Asian region.

As a newcomer to the dominant system, China has spent more than three decades learning and growing, especially utilizing resources from the Western world that range from capital investments to advanced management knowledge and skills. At the same time, China has been extremely vigilant when it comes to the issues that inherently determine China’s uniqueness: in general, China has emerged while keeping its own political and ideological characteristics. Interestingly, a swiftly-democratized Russia was invited to G7 while China, the world’s second largest economy, is still kept out of G8. Nick Butler of The Financial Times describes the absence of China in the G8 as “a self defeating exclusion.” As an important player in G20, though, China never stopped its rapid emergence, particularly in East Asia.

As China gains in global and particularly regional influence, a complex diplomatic issue has emerged. In the midst of enduring disputes in the East China Sea, a

Chinese version of an ADIZ has been viewed as an example of its assertiveness, particularly by the U.S. and its key ally Japan , both

of which have disparaged China’s action. For now, China needs to deal with its stand-off with Japan and its engagement with the U.S. at the same time.

There’s a good chance that China may face a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance even as it endeavors to build a new type of great power relations with the United States.

The suggested “new type of great power relations” will be an equal relationship between great powers – at least Beijing intends it to be. Although a rising China does not intend to truly challenge U.S. leadership in the near future, their differences and the subsequent distrust inevitably urge these two giants to consider the possibility of a peaceful co-existence. But there is a structural limit — the U.S. naturally would not allow such a new relationship to be constructed outside the current power structure in which the U.S. leadership prevails. Hence, the new U.S.-China relationship would be a compromise within the pyramid structure rather than an equal share of global dominance. It is notable that the U.S., in terms of national power, still wins out over China in almost every aspect.

The differences between the White House and the U.S. Congress could be another variable. The Taiwan Relations Act enacted in 1979 may best explain how the U.S. government and Congress occasionally react differently toward a communist China. The U.S. Congress simply rejected Jimmy Carter’s draft and replaced it with contents that have had great impacts on Sino-U.S. relations ever since. Congressional reactions could continue to throw a wrench into U.S.-China relations.

A new type of great power relations is surely welcomed by both the U.S. and China to avoid strategic misperceptions and the possibility of subsequent conflict. However, the concept should not be overestimated in the short term, however much China may wish it to play a role in its stand-off with Japan.

For the U.S. and Japan, strengthening mutual commitment and trust is much more natural and probable than doing the same between Washington and Beijing. Strengthening U.S-Japan ties would not only help deter a Chinese challenge to U.S.

dominance in the region, but also would hopefully ease worries of long-term Japanese challenges or threats to the United States’ own interests. Glen Snyder’s alliance dilemma indicates that “the greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment.” However, in the increasingly unbalanced East Asian region an orthodox anarchy still exists. Under these circumstances, it could be more urgent and practically more profitable for the U.S. to strengthen its alliance relations with Japan and to further ensure a mutual commitment, rather than to seek an instant strategic trust and a total reconciliation with China.

Pivot Bad—SCS 1nc** Pivot causes war over the South China Sea We control UQ – China behaving peacefully in SQUO

‘Pivot good’ = alarmist rhetoric, not supported by reality

Encourages allied aggression and disincentives negotiations, causing miscalc

Seen as encirclement by China

Harner 14 (Stephen, worked in Japan for more than 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch, The NYTimes' 'China Threat' Myth, The 'Pivot To Asia,' And Obama's Foreign Policy Legacy, 6-22, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/06/22/the-nytimes-china-threat-myth-the-pivot-to-asia-and-obamas-foreign-policy-legacy/print/, CMR)

That initiative is Obama’s strategic military “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia, the decision to redeploy 60% of American air and sea power to Asia

by 2020. Why? To counter to an aggressive, hegemonic, expansionist China. Never mind that the narrative of an expansionist China is a myth . We see The Times propounding–and building–the China-as-aggressor myth again in a June 18 editorial entitled “China’s Power Grab is Alarming.” The editorial speaks of “worries in Washington and elsewhere about Beijing’s continued bullying in energy-rich [South China Sea] waters….” The editorial cites “Beijing’s efforts to assert sovereignty over the many specks of rock dotting the South China Sea,” including now “the piling of sand on isolated reefs and shoals to create what amounts to new islands in the Spratly archipelago,” and “a strongly worded statement last month by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel condemning China’s ‘destabilizing, unilateral actions in the South China Sea.’” The Times continues: “China insists that the Spratlys, Paracels and other islands have always belonged to China. But Vietnam also

claims sovereignty, and parts of them are claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.” So, may we now conclude that The

Times’ case for China as aggressor–and by extension the ‘pivot’ as a necessary and proper strategic response–is made? To do so would be swallowing the myth. The reality is almost completely the opposite . China claims sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels islands in the South China Sea. By China, we should understand not just the People’s Republic in Beijing, but its post-1911 predecessor, the Republic of China (i.e., the government on Taiwan), and the great China’s imperial dynasties dating back at least 1000 years. The claim is based inter alia on discoveries by the Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He and by occupation of islands and exploitation of the surrounding waters for fishing by Chinese fishermen for hundreds of years. The famous “nine-dash line” is an expression of China’s historical claims. It was first transposed on Chinese maps in 1947 when France (then still the suzerain of Vietnam) and the Philippines began a diplomatic campaign to assert their claims in post-WWII forums dealing with Japan’s imperial conquests (which included the islands). Five times–in 1970, 1971, 1978, 1980, and 1999–Philippine armed forces took actions that have placed nine islands claimed by China under foreign occupation. Since occupying the islands, the Philippines has proceeded to build military installations and station some 1000 men on them. Beyond occupying the islands, Manila has for years taken actions highly provocative to China, including arresting and expelling Chinese fisherman fishing in the disputed area. Chinese protests have been dismissed. In June 2011 the office of PI president Aquino declared that the South China Sea would henceforth be called the West Philippine Sea. In July 2011 a delegation of Philippine legislators landed on a Chinese-

claimed island, declaring Philippine “sovereignty.” Against this background, what we–and The Times–should find remarkable is not China’s “maximalist stance in territorial disputes,” to quote the editorial, but Beijing’s restraint . On the recent altercation with Vietnam over Chinese drilling operations, on May 15, three days after Secretary of State John Kerry called the operations “provocative” and an “aggressive act,” People’s Liberation Army Chief of the General Staff General Fang Fenghui, on a reciprocal

visiting to the Pentagon, said the following. Quoting DoD’s transcript of the press conference: “China is conducting the

exploitation activity within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian Islands which is a part of the Paracel Islands. And this is an activity

conducted within our territorial water. “And secondly, the related countries in the South–in the South China Sea have drilled actually many oil wells in the South China Sea, but China has never drilled even one. From this single fact, we can see how much restraint China has exercised. And the purpose of this restraint is to keep–to maintain the stability of the South China Sea region. “We have an enduring position of putting aside disputes and achieve [sic] common exploitation. But while China is holding this position, other nations are drilling oil wells in this region. So that’s–this is the status quo. And I have to underscore it is only under this background that we are conducting the exploitation activity within the Zhongjian island.” What to make of the facts and context above, and the absence in The Times’ editorial of any mention of them? The Times remains a reliable organ of the American “internationalist” establishment–the Pentagon, defense industry, national security and intelligence bureaucracies and “think tanks.” For this establishment, American “leadership”–in reality hegemony backed by

unchallengeable military power, deployed the world over–is and must remain the sine qua non of a stable international order, particularly in

Asia. The Obama White House has been a servant of this establishment, and Obama’s militarized ‘pivot to Asia” policy is the

Establishment’s top priority initiative. The supreme irony is that the ‘pivot’ policy–in essence an American reprise of Cold War “containment”now directed at China, fueling an arms race and U.S. alliance structure that is a growing threat to China –has emboldened the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Japan, to oppose and challenge China, and to decline to negotiate in good faith to resolve disputes. Doing its duty for

the Establishment, and for Obama’s legacy, The New York Times is propagating a “China threat” myth and is biased,

unfair, untrue, and, in the end, dangerous for the U nited States.

South China Sea goes nuclearLowther ‘13 (William Lowther, Staff Rreporter in Washington, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report”, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211, March 16, 2013)

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US , a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US

and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues

and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in

2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on

Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation ,” Betts wrote in a separate study of

his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese

Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-

China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the

US, but they do “ provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by

flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms , such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the

Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion ,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side

understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a

very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.

Pivot Bad—Impact Wall The Pivot increase the risk of war with China, regional instability, kills US-Sino cooperation and ends possibilities of North Korean de-nuclearizaitonRoss 12 (Robert, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, “The Problem With the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive”, November/December 2012, Foreign Affairs journal, ZBurdette)

At the time, many analysts interpreted China’s new belligerence as a sign of the country’s growing confidence. Writing in The Washington Post, John Pomfret noted that Beijing was evincing “a new triumphalist attitude.” China was on the rise, the thinking went, and its newfound power had convinced its leaders that they could shape events in Asia as never before. And so in 2010, the Obama administration initiated what it called a “pivot” to Asia , a shift in strategy aimed at bolstering the United States’ defense ties with countries throughout the region and expanding the U.S. naval presence there. The diplomatic element of the strategy was on display in 2011, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reassured U.S. allies, many of which harbor concerns about China’s rise, that “the United States is going to remain a presence in the Pacific for a long time,” and the following year, when he promised that the U.S. military would bring “enhanced capabilities to this vital region.” Worried that a newly assertive China was becoming a destabilizing force, the White House moved to counter any perceptions of its own weakness by strengthening the U.S. presence in the region.

Unfortunately, however, this shift was based on a fundamental misreading of China ’s leadership. Beijing’s tough diplomacy stemmed not from confidence in its might -- China’s leaders have long understood that their country’s military remains significantly inferior to that of the United States -- but from a deep sense of insecurity born o f several nerve-racking years of financial crisis and social unrest . Faced with these challenges, and no longer able to count on easy support based on the country’s economic growth, China’s leaders moved to sustain their popular legitimacy by appeasing an increasingly nationalist public with symbolic gestures of force .

Consider China’s behavior in such a light, and the risks of the pivot become obvious. The new U.S. policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and will only

feed China’s aggressiveness, undermine regional stability, and decrease the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Instead of inflating estimates of Chinese power and abandoning its long-standing policy of

diplomatic engagement, the United States should recognize China’s underlying weaknesses and its own enduring strengths. The right China policy would assuage, not exploit, Beijing’s anxieties, while protecting U.S. interests in the region.

THE PAPER TIGER ROARS

The decision to pursue the pivot was based on the premise that a newly emboldened China was challenging U.S. interests and undermining regional stability simply because it could -- that is, because its growing military power made aggressive diplomacy easier and more attractive than in the past. In his March 2010 testimony to the U.S. Congress, Admiral Robert Willard, then head of the U.S. Pacific Command, asserted that China’s recent military advances had been “pretty dramatic.” The truth, however, is that the United States has greatly overestimated China’s military capabilities . Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made great strides since 1979, when it was embarrassed by its poor performance in a brief war with Vietnam, its power remains limited. Over the last ten years, the PLA has not deployed any new ships or aircraft that significantly enhanced its ability to challenge U.S. maritime superiority. China’s main tool to counter the U.S. Navy and deter an American intervention in Asian conflicts remains a fleet of diesel submarines that has been in service since the mid-1990s.

For all the talk of China’s naval modernization, the PLA has only just begun constructing a next-generation guided-missile destroyer, the quantity and quality of which will pale in comparison to those of the United States’ Aegis-class destroyer fleet. It was only in August 2011 that Beijing launched its first aircraft carrier -- the U.S. military has 11 -- and it was an old and relatively small ship purchased from the Russians . China is developing antiship ballistic missiles that could target U.S. aircraft carriers, but it has not yet mastered the technology to deploy these weapons. And according to the Pentagon’s own 2011 report on the Chinese military, less than 30 percent of the PLA’s naval surface forces, air forces, and air defense forces and only 55 percent of its submarine fleet could be considered modern. In short, the PLA is still unable to challenge U.S. dominance at sea or upend the balance of power in the region.

Over the last few years, Beijing has had more to worry about than its military shortcomings. In late 2008, when Chinese leaders recognized that their country was not immune to the financial tremors rocking the globe, Beijing panicked at the prospect of a spike in domestic unemployment and hastily funded a massive stimulus package of four trillion yuan (about $570 billion). But this only made things worse, breeding short-term instability and long-term structural imbalances in the economy. The result was that in 2009–10, China experienced the worst economic turmoil since the 1960s, following Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward.

Between 2009 and 2010, inflation increased more than tenfold, and in February 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that the worsening inflation resulting from the stimulus could “undermine social stability.” By 2009, housing prices in major cities had surpassed the average middle-class monthly income by 20–30 percent, far exceeding the World Bank’s suggested ratio. Meanwhile, throughout early 2010, in an attempt to constrain lending, China’s central bank repeatedly increased the amount of capital banks were required to hold in reserve. Nonetheless, inflation continued to increase. According to a June 2010 survey, nearly 60 percent of Chinese reported that prices were “too high to be acceptable.” Since the previous year, vegetable prices had gone up by approximately 25 percent, garlic prices had increased tenfold, and the price of tea was 20 percent higher.

As high inflation took its toll, unemployment and inequality rose: the urban unemployment rate in 2009 was the highest since 1980. The government especially feared that unemployed college graduates would destabilize Chinese cities. Over seven million graduates were without work in 2009, so the government invested 42 billion yuan (roughly $6 billion) to employ them in rural areas. And as the economy deteriorated, even the state-run People’s Daily ran an article acknowledging the situation; a May 2010 headline read: “Income Divide Reaches Dangerous Point.” The article cited World Bank statistics that ranked Chinese inequality “among the highest in the world.” Reflecting the leadership’s concern that mass discontent could boil over into antigovernment hostility, the newspaper warned that inequality could “brew strong negative feelings against the affluent” and that “the alarm bell is ringing.” It continued: “Beijing must not, and cannot afford to ignore it.”

This unemployment and inequality produced just the kind of unrest Beijing feared it would. According to Chinese government figures, the number of “mass incidents” -- defined as illegal protests of five or more people that disrupt public order -- increased from 120,000 in 2008 to over 180,000 in 2010. In a 2009 riot in Shishou, in Hubei Province, 70,000 people confronted police officers in what the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government-affiliated think tank, considered to be “the most serious street riot” since 1949. The social scientists at the academy argued that the increase in violent crime and civil disorder in 2009 reflected greater rural unemployment and the resulting growth of an idle, marginalized population. And in 2010, Guo Binsheng, a senior editor at the official Xinhua News Agency, warned that China had entered a period of “outstanding social conflict” and that “the task of stability . . . will be very arduous.” Faced with this growing unrest and needing to stave off a real crisis of legitimacy, Beijing had no choice but to appease a growing cadre of hard-line nationalists who wanted to project a tough image of China to the world.

RED DAWN

The Chinese Communist Party has long promoted nationalism to sustain its legitimacy, but during the recent decades of rapid growth, the Chinese public focused more on economic advancement than on politics. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, however, Beijing could no longer simply rely on economic success. Meanwhile, nationalism was on the rise. Even though the party’s top policymakers understood the country’s deficiencies, many Chinese nonetheless believed that the global financial crisis signaled the culmination of China’s rise to great-power status. In 2008 and 2009, as the United States fell into a recession, China’s economy grew by ten percent. And the Chinese leadership’s touting of the PLA’s successes, including its antipiracy missions, space program, and tests of advanced military aircraft, suggested to the public that China was catching up to the United States and should thus adopt a more assertive foreign policy.

Following the January 2010 announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Chinese opinion leaders and increasingly vocal Internet users argued for sanctions against the U.S. defense companies that had participated in the deal. Rear Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA’s National Defense University, called for China to “give a lesson to the U.S. government that harming others will harm yourself.” Similarly, Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary-general of the China Society of Military Science, insisted that it was time to “settle accounts” with the United States. Some Chinese Internet users on the Web sites of the People’s Daily and QQ, a popular instant-messaging program, quickly followed their lead, demanding that China break diplomatic ties with the United States and begin exporting weapons to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Then, in September 2010, the dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over the detained fishing-boat captain became the most searched item on the Internet in China -- a sign of just how enraged the public was over the issue. Online portals were overwhelmed with demands that Japan immediately and unconditionally release the captain. And in the official media, Feng Zhaokui, a senior Japan specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued that “it is no longer the era in which China can be bullied at will.” Despite the state’s attempts to quell them, calls for protests circulated on the Internet, sparking demonstrations in front of not only the Japanese embassy but also the Chinese Foreign Ministry building.

As nationalist sentiment rose and economic and political problems roiled the country, Chinese leaders, concerned for the party’s public standing and fearful of popular unrest, accommodated the nationalists with tough diplomacy and rhetoric. The result was Beijing’s uncompromising posture of 2009–10, which alienated not only China’s neighbors but also countries around the world. This new diplomacy stoked alarm throughout East Asia about China’s rise, which in turn led the United States to resolve to sustain the balance of power in the region.

THE END OF ENGAGEMENT

Some aspects of President Barack Obama’s Asia strategy have built on the policies of previous administrations. Washington has been devoting more resources to the region since at least 1997, when it first moved a submarine from Europe to Guam. The Clinton and George W. Bush administrations then deployed every type of major naval and air weapons system to Guam and Japan, cooperated with Singapore to build an aircraft carrier facility at the Changi Naval Base, and strengthened U.S. defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines. The Bush administration assigned an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific theater, and the Pentagon announced in 2005 that it would deploy 60 percent of U.S. submarines to Asia. Throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military funding for the Pacific theater remained at high levels.

These policies constituted an effective response to the rise of China. But following China’s uncompromising stances of 2009 and 2010, Washington faced a credibility problem: its East Asian allies questioned whether the United States, mired in its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, could contend with a seemingly more confident and capable China. Largely to assuage these fears, the United States set out to prove that it could maintain the balance of power in the region.

The Obama administration’s pivot has included a doubling down on the efforts of previous administrations. Washington expanded its joint naval exercises with Japan to prepare for the defense of disputed islands, reached new agreements to sell arms to the Phillipines, and, most recently, in April 2012, agreed to send U.S. marines to Australia. The administration also restored defense cooperation with Indonesia and New Zealand. These measured policies have reassured U.S. allies of Washington’s commitment to the region’s stability.

But the administration has also reversed Washington’s long-standing policy of engagement with Beijing , turning instead to costly initiatives whose force is disproportionate to the threat from China. Regarding territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea, past administrations were able to deter regional powers from resorting to aggression by making clear the United States’ interest in maintaining freedom of navigation. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, however, directly inserted the United States into these legally complex disputes. In July 2010 in Hanoi, after extensive discussions with all the claimants to the islands except China, Clinton declared U.S. support for the negotiating positions of the Philippines and Vietnam. What makes this decision puzzling is that these islands have little economic value (apart from fishing) and no mineral resources, and they are of minor strategic importance since they are too small to support military activities.

The United States has also unnecessarily challenged Beijing by boosting its military presence on the East Asian mainland. Recognizing that South Korean forces required less U.S. assistance to manage the threat from North Korea, the Bush administration withdrew 40 percent of U.S. troops from South Korea, ended the deployment of U.S. troops between Seoul and the demilitarized zone that divides North and South Korea, and reduced the scale and frequency of U.S.–South Korean military exercises. The Obama administration has reversed this trend. Over the last three years, the United States has carried out its largest joint military exercises with South Korea since the Korean War and increased the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. Washington and Seoul have also reached multiple new defense agreements, and earlier this year, the Pentagon announced plans to upgrade U.S. military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, despite the fact that South Korea’s military capabilities have vastly improved relative to the those of the increasingly dysfunctional North Korean regime.

At the same time, the United States has reinforced its presence in Indochina. Since the early 1990s, successive U.S. administrations had rebuffed Vietnam’s desire for more substantial defense ties. Washington understood that if it wanted cooperative relations with Beijing, it would need to acknowledge that China had a far greater strategic stake in the region than the United States. But in 2010, Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates both visited Hanoi (Clinton went twice). The secretary of state called for a U.S.-Vietnamese strategic partnership, and in late 2010, for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States carried out joint naval training with Vietnam. Since then, the U.S. Navy has held annual exercises with the Vietnamese navy, and in 2011, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. Meanwhile, the United States has also strengthened its cooperation with Cambodia, which in 2010 joined the U.S.-led Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, a series of annual bilateral naval exercises in the region. That year, Clinton explicitly warned Phnom Penh not to become “too dependent” on China.

Finally, the Obama administration has promoted a maritime coalition in the South China Sea. To complement U.S. ties with the Philippines and Vietnam, Japan signed strategic partnerships with the two countries, expanding their defense cooperation and military exchanges. This year, the Australian, Japanese, and South Korean militaries for the first time participated in the annual U.S.-Philippine military exercise called Balikatan (meaning “shoulder to shoulder”).

ASSUAGE AGAINST THE MACHINE

Even if the United S tates had limited its response to China’s nationalist diplomacy to improving defense ties with its maritime allies in the region, China’s leaders would not have been pleased. But those steps were necessary for U.S. security, occurred far from China’s borders, and built on the policies of previous administrations. When Washington got directly involved in China’s sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China’s land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening . As might be expected from a great power faced with a deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past.

One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported more of North Korea’s mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability.

The PLA has also put pressure on those of China’s neighbors that have boosted their defense cooperation with the United States. In the spring of 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi escalated as Chinese patrol ships harassed Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters, and several Chinese military officers advocated the use of force against the Vietnamese navy. Similarly, China’s maritime confrontation earlier this year with the Philippines over the contested Scarborough Shoal suggests that Beijing will push back against countries that rely on the United States to support them in sovereignty disputes. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal and, after the Philippines withdrew its ships, established a permanent presence there. Also this year, Chinese national oil companies announced unprecedented plans to drill for oil in disputed waters -- the other claimants have been active in these waters for years -- and the PLA formed a new military garrison charged with defending the country’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to actively strengthen its presence throughout the disputed waters and islands.

As all these events suggest, the Obama administration’s pivot has not contributed to stability in Asia. Quite the opposite: it has made the region more tense and conflict-prone . Military aircraft and naval ships now crowd the region’s skies and waters. And the United States risks getting involved in hostilities over strategically irrelevant and economically marginal islands .

The pivot will be further complicated by an environment of growing nationalism, not only in China but also in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Consider what happened in September, when anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan pressured Tokyo to purchase an island chain that both it and Beijing claim. (The territory is known in China as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japan as the Senkaku Islands.) After Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara, who is an outspoken anti-China activist, expressed interest in buying the islands -- a move that would certainly have provoked Beijing -- the Japanese government purchased them itself, instead of simply blocking the sale. Like the Spratly Islands, these islands are of little strategic or economic value. Nonetheless, Japan’s move challenged China’s claim to the islands and provoked anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China, sparking vandalism of Japanese businesses and government property there. This nationalist outcry led Beijing to escalate tensions with Japan. At least 14 Chinese government surveillance ships accompanied hundreds of Chinese fishing boats to the islands, where they entered Japanese-claimed territorial seas.

Meanwhile, China has challenged U.S. interests beyond East Asia, forsaking the cooperation that the two countries had managed to sustain in the years leading up to the pivot . Whereas between 2006 and 2010, China voted for five UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, in 2012 Beijing threatened to veto sanctions on Iranian oil exports. After the United States, European countries, and Japan independently agreed to sanction Iranian oil exports in January 2012, Beijing reached new agreements with Tehran to purchase Iranian oil. What is more, Beijing has blocked Washington’s attempts to halt the bloodshed in Syria, stymying its initiatives at the UN and backing Moscow’s support for the Syrian leadership.

Washington’s increased activity on China’s periphery has led Beijing to conclude that the United States has abandoned strategic engagement, the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward China since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to previous administrations, the Obama administration has dismissed China’s legitimate security interests in its border regions, including even those that are not vital to U.S. security. By threatening China and challenging its sovereignty claims over symbolic territories, Washington has encouraged Chinese leaders to believe that only by adopting belligerent policies will a rising China be able to guarantee its security. Herein lies the great irony of the pivot: a strategy that was meant to check a rising China has sparked its combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation.

The pivot has already damaged U.S. security interests, and the cost will only grow. If Washington continues down its current

path , Chinese resistance to U.S. policies will inevitably increase , preventing bilateral cooperation on crucial issues from trade to global economic stability. The

outbreak of hostilities in the region will become a real possibility, as China pushes back against the U nited States’ growing presence on its borders and nationalist tension rises between China and U.S. security partners over disputed but inconsequential islands.

This need not be the case . The United States could respond to China’s tough diplomacy with policies that would both sustain the regional order and minimize the chances of a U.S.-Chinese conflict. Over the next several years, Washington should reshape its Asia policy to restore the consensus of previous administrations: that increasing the United States’ military presence on the East Asian mainland is not vital for U.S. security and that the United States should avoid entanglement in complex sovereignty claims in the region. Because the U.S. Navy will continue to dominate Asia’s seas, the United States can reassure its allies of its resolve to counterbalance China while still quietly disengaging from maritime disputes and reducing its presence on China’s land borders. As China rises, a policy of restraint, rather than alarmism, will best serve U.S. national security.

North Korean prolif risks nuclear strikes and broad Asian prolif—turns the caseHayes and Hamel-Green 9—Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, degree in History, PhD from Berkeley—AND—Michael Hamel-Green, Professor, Executive Dean, Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development @ Victoria University, BA MA Melb, DipEd Hawthorn, PhD La Trobe (Peter, 14 December 2009, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia," The Asia-Pacific Journal, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267, RBatra)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack 1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.

But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:

That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4

These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts , and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity,

could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison . How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program - having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship-borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how air-transported materials could similarly be intercepted.

Given the high stakes involved, North Korea n proliferation , if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the

whole East Asian region and beyond . Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat

that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japan ese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with

the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and /or Japan acquire nuclear

weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing , especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States.

Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly . South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recent

confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency

reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads . Such responses , already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the

Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China , with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond . These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “ the end of American nuclear hegemony .”8

Independently, Chinese support key to solve Korean warKelly 10 —Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University (Robert E., 16 December 2010, Yeonpyeong Shelling Summation (2): More Causes in Hindsight, http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/yeonpyeong-shelling-summation-2-more-causes-in-hindsight/, RBatra)

China continues to calculate that an erratic, nuclearized NK is preferable to unification on Southern terms. A peninsula-wide version of SK is the only realistic unity scenario given NK’s extreme backwardness – decrepit, corrupt NK probably could not even manage the whole peninsula – and SK’s

demonstrated unwillingness to sacrifice democracy for unity. China’s continued subsidization for NK’s economy is well- known and has only become more crucial as events like the famines, failed currency reform, UN sanctions, expensive nuclear program, and continued resistance to Chinese-style reforms have effectively devastated the NK economy , all the more ironic for its autarkic claims of juche. (The CIA estimates NK’s GDP at just $42 billion

for 24 million people.) China’s refusal to endorse the Security Council reprimand of NK over the Cheonan signaled that when pushed, it will choose North over South .

This opens the door for continued NK intransigence and provocation. Given NK’s extreme asymmetric dependence on China, it is highly unlikely that NK would openly cross its benefactor . One can only speculate what if any Chinese red-line warnings on provocations were given to Kim Jong-Il on his recent trips to Beijing. Yeonpyeong probably did not cross that line, as the Chinese response has been widely regarded as tepid and insufficient.

Korean War leads to multiple scenarios for global conflictKarlin 10 —independent writer, author, analyst, educated at UC Berkeley (Anatoly, 28 March 2010, How a Second Korean War will be Fought, http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/03/28/korean-war-2/, RBatra)

If this were to happen, all bets are off. China will probably be able to roll back the invasion forces to the DMZ . After all, it managed to do this in the 1950 s′ , when it was much more militarily backwards relative to the US. Now, it will have a big preponderance over land, while its new “carrier-killing” ballistic missiles, submarines, cruise missiles, and Flanker fighters are now, at some level, able to deny the seas off China to the US

Navy, while its anti-satellite tests and cyberwar prowess means that the American dominance in space and information ought not

be taken for granted either. Now I am not saying that the Chinese Army (it ceased by the People’s Liberation Army recently) comes anywhere close to

matching the American military; however, it might well already have the ability to defeat it in a local war on China’s borders. If China is successful, it will re-establish North Korea as its own protectorate , although under someone more rational and reliable than Kim Jong-il (though needless to say this will also completely sever its economic relationship with the US and cause a severe, but temporary, economic contraction due to the collapse of its export sector).

There will be a cascade of consequences elsewhere. Taiwan may use the opportunity to declare independence, provoking a second war in the region. Though the US says that it will not come to Taiwan’s aid if it does this unilaterally, America will probably change its mind if it is simultaneously embroiled in an intense local war with China on the Korean peninsula ! Other actors opposed to American hegemony may view this as a chance to undermine the overstretched superpower. For instance, Russia could orchestrate a new war against Georgia and China may even persuade Iran to mine the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for security guarantees and technology transfer. All these dominoes going down may even precipitate the collapse of the increasingly fragile Pax Americana .

China relations are key to solve multiple scenarios for planetary destructionCohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” pg online @ http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf //ef)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement . In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism , among other pressing issues . Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation . The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own

national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational , and so too must be their solutions . As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in anothe r . These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation . What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping , nonprolif eration, and counterterror ism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation . Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korea n peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan . In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administration s foreign policy of smart power , as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both____It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world . There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

No offense—the pivot won’t solve for war structural reasons that the plan doesn’t changeAuslin 12 (Michael, American Enterprise Institute, WSJ, “America Doesn't Need a Pivot to Asia”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577614941100974630.html, ZBurdette)

It is time to bury the Obama administration's pivot to Asia. This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China's rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears. It won't solve Asia's problems and may even add to the region's uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.

Everything wrong with the pivot can be summed up by Four R's: rhetoric; reality; resourcing; and raising expectations and then doubts. So far, the first and perhaps biggest problem with the idea of the pivot—or, as the Defense Department calls it, the rebalancing—is that it remains largely rhetorical, vague and aspirational.

True, there are some laudable moves, such as basing U.S. Marines in northern Australia and agreeing to port new U.S. warships in Singapore. These, however, hardly add up to a breakthrough. The world still wonders what the purpose is: to contain China, to promote democracy, to make the United States the de facto hegemon of Asia, or simply to reassure nervous nations about China's rise?

The reality is that not much will change in America's actions. The pivot says nothing about taking on new commitments, for example toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or to countries with whom America does not currently have formal alliances. Just as importantly, Washington has made clear in recent months that it will not take sides in the territorial disputes that have roiled the East and South China Seas, even when allies like Tokyo and Manila are involved.

Further evidence for this reality comes from the resource constraints imposed on this grand project. The Obama administration is trying to do it on the cheap. Pivot funding is in danger from sequestration—forced budget cuts resulting from larger budget politicking in Washington—that, if allowed to proceed, will cut another $500 billion from a defense budget already reduced by $900 billion since 2009.

The administration claims that America's military presence in Asia will not be affected by these budget cuts. If that is so, then U.S. military posture in the rest of the world will be cut back. More likely, any buildup will be difficult to sustain. The shifting of more planes and ships to the Pacific will soon slow down, as the size of the Air Force and Navy shrink, and as other world problems such as Iran and Syria continue to dominate the attention of American policy makers.

This , in turn, is raising doubts about the pivot in Asia, so soon after the rhetoric from Washington had raised expectations. Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines led themselves to believe that the pivot would have concrete results, such as quickly increasing American presence in the region and perhaps even American support in their maritime territorial disputes with China. Both accordingly reached out to Washington, holding new military exercises or discussing greater security cooperation.

Yet this enthusiasm makes it all the worse when those hopes turn out to be dashed by Washington's failure to act. As one Philippines senator asked during his country's standoff this spring with China over the Scarborough Shoal, what good is the alliance with the U.S. if America refuses to back up its partners in times of need? By appearing to make unrealistic promises , the Obama administration has created new diplomatic headaches for itself in managing the fall-out from its failure to deliver.

What then is the point of the pivot? By not getting involved in maritime disputes, other than rhetorically, Washington is actually taking the most realistic approach possible. No administration , Republican or Democratic, is going to risk a crisis with China short of any overt attempt by Beijing to take over territory clearly controlled by other nations. Building up U.S. forces in Asia, were it even possible, would not change that political calculation.

The current American military posture can be diversified to a few more countries, but essentially, Washington has had the right balance for the past several decades . While it would be a mistake to shrink the U.S. air and naval presence in Asia, all Washington could do is slightly increase it, and that will change nothing in the region. Moreover, there are few realistic options for new partners in Asia, especially ones such as Japan and Australia that can provide some level of regional security cooperation. That means America's current grouping of allies and partners is right-sized for the political and security realities of the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.

As long as Washington persists, however, in proclaiming that it has a new policy for Asia, it will have to answer uncomfortable questions about what it all means. Once their political conventions are done this month, both Governor Romney and President Obama should decide to speak softly and carry the same-sized stick as a warning to any who would unilaterally upend the delicate balance among Asian nations.

Pivot Bad—China 2acPivot exacerbates Asian conflict and causes US-China nuclear warO'Reilly 13 (Brendan, China-based writer and educator from Seattle, author of Transcedent Harmony, 1/30/13, "'Pivot' could cost Obama, Asia dearly" Asia Times) www.atimes.com/atimes/China/OA30Ad01.html

Meanwhile, America's "pivot" towards Asia, and backing of Japan in the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, have provided the Chinese leadership with the perfect foreign threat for distracting their people from China's

domestic troubles.The Brooking Institution's open letters to Obama are by no means completely pessimistic regarding relations with China. One "Big Bet" dispatch calls for "Bringing Beijing Back In" by improving and deepening political, military and economic ties between China and the United States. However, this letter by Kenneth G Lieberthal from the very outset reveals the schizophrenic nature of America's China policy: Your rebalancing strategy toward Asia has produced desirable results, including convincing China that the United States is serious, capable and determined to be a leader in the region for the long term. But

this strategy is also generating dynamics that increasingly threaten to undermine its primary goals. [3] The Chinese government is indeed

convinced that the U nited S tates is committed to being a power in Asia - at the expense of Chinese influence. For the last

year, China's state-run media has consistently decried America's overly military "Cold War mentality" towards the People's Republic. Lieberthal further addresses his sensible admission that there are unstable dynamics to America's Asian aspirations: Unfortunately, at this point your current strategy is in danger of actually enhancing rather than reducing bad security outcomes. Most notably, territorial disputes have become sharper, and Beijing is largely operating under the false assumption that the flare-up of these disputes reflects an underlying US strategy to encourage Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines to push the envelope in the hope that Chinese responses will lead those countries - and ASEAN - to become more united and dependent on the United States. Liberthal is absolutely correct in noting that local territorial disputes have been sharpened in the year since outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for "America's Pacific Century". However, increased tension is an entirely predictable outcome of such a policy. Smaller powers naturally feel emboldened against China by the protection of the world's most

advanced military. All sides share a degree of responsibility for the ongoing tensions off of China's territorial waters, but the

American military "readjustment" to the region takes the lion's share of the blame. It may be no coincidence that

conflicts between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan began to intensify almost immediately in the wake of Clinton's open call for an American "pivot" to Asia. America's strategy exacerbates tensions in the region for two related reasons. First, it gives American allies who have territorial disputes with China added muscle for confronting the rising power. Secondly, it inspires a resolve in elements of the Chinese leadership to test the extent of America's willingness to back up regional allies. Chinese announcements of increased maritime and air patrols

around the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands could be related to a desire to see exactly how the United States will react in the event of a military clash. If the

increasing possibility of a shooting war between Japan and China is a "desirable result" of America's Asian policy,

then by all means America's pivot has been a resounding success. While it may be counterproductive for Japan and

China to damage their deep economic ties with mutual threats of military action over a few uninhabited islands,it is downright strategically reckless for the U nited S tates to commit itself to the possibility of universal economic ruin - and indeed, the outside chance of global Armageddon - over the distant and intractable conflict.

Pivot Bad—China 1ar Pivot causes US-China nuclear war and exacerbates all conflict in Asia—the Chinese are experiencing domestic unrest and are looking abroad for foreign challenges to sustain their nationalist credibility. Increasing US presence in the region provides the perfect target for this newfound Chinese nationalism. It also increases the boldness of our allies in confronting China because they think we’ve got their back—makes conflict far more likely—that’s O’Reilly.

Continued pursuit of China containment policy triggers US-Sino war Yang 13Yoa, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University and editor of China Economic Quarterly, “America’s pivot to Asia will provoke China,” Feb-12, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/02/12/americas-pivot-to-asia-will-provoke-china/#ixzz2XuEFkpjX /// cmf

One of the purposes of the pivot is presumably to hedge China’s military encroachment on its neighbours. It should be noted, though, that the growth of China’s military spending has been largely a result of its economic growth. Military spending is measured in nominal terms and the nominal size of China’s economy has been growing by double-digit rates.¶ To the average Chinese, the US is once again showing its nature as a hegemon that wields its power wherever it likes to,

reinforcing the long-held Chinese view that “being backward is to invite bullies”. If the pivot has any effect on China, it must be

that it has pushed Beijing to accelerate its military build-up. ¶ Americans like to say that the pivot is a response to China’s more aggressive claims on some of the islands and reefs in the South China and East China Seas. Informed Chinese

would not agree with this view. But regardless of the sequence of the events, the result presented to the world is that the American pivot has escalated tensions in the region. It has been taken as an encouragement by China’s neighbours; in the meantime, it has forced China to take more assertive actions. ¶ The more constructive part of the pivot should have been the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But even on this count, the US has caused more suspicion than goodwill in China. The TPP was designed for like-minded countries to form, in President Barack Obama’s words, “a platinum” free-trade agreement for the Asia-Pacific region. It was the result of both America’s agony with the ineffectiveness of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum and the White House’s political strategy to please those on both the right and the left – it expands free trade, so Republicans are happy; but it also requires member countries to meet labour, environmental and even human rights standards, so Democrats are happy.¶ To most Chinese, however, the TPP is one of America’s intentional moves to exclude China. For one thing, there is no way for China to meet its conditions in the medium term. For another, the TPP will not bring significant gains to the US, precisely because China, the US’s largest trading partner in the region, is not going to join.¶ More importantly, China was not part of the design process. To China, the TPP is a club set up solely on American will; China can knock on the door, but can be rejected. Ten years ago, when China applied to join the World Trade Organisation, this would not be a problem. Today, China feels differently: it has become reluctant to accept something if it does not feel ownership.¶ In a sense, all

Chinese history since the mid-1800s has involved China trying to become as equal as other world powers. Today, China’s leaders and the Chinese people are increasingly feeling that point is coming. Yet the existing powers, noticeably, the US and EU, may have different ideas about equality. To them, China will only be treated as “one of us” after China is fully transformed politically and socially. This discrepancy of beliefs will be a major source of tension between China and existing powers in the coming years.

Only the pivot risks conflict between the US and China – it stirs up nationalist fervor and breaks down economic interdependenceJohn Glaser, 6/24/13, The Washington Times, "The asia pivot: making an enemy of china," http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/john-glaser-intelligence-foreign-policy-world/2013/jun/24/asia-pivot-making-enemy-china/

But there is one aspect of Obama’s bellicose foreign policy so far removed from the al-Qaeda threat that he has been unable to conjure

it: the so-called Asia Pivot.¶ The “rebalancing” to East Asia is a confrontational policy that involves surging American military and naval presence throughout the region ― in the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Guam, South Korea, Singapore, etc. ― and boosting support to China’s neighboring rivals.¶ Washington has been refurbishing old WWII military bases in the region and building new ones in order to lay the groundwork for an “air-sea battle” with China. We’ve even deployed surveillance

drones near China’s borders. One wonders how might America react to such gestures in her backyard.¶ What villainous offense

has China committed against American security? Are they supporting terrorists? Have they threatened us

with military attack? Are they amassing weapons of mass destruction pointed at Washington?¶ No, nothing like that. Obama hasn’t been able to invoke a monster to destroy in China because there isn’t one. China’s mere existence as a rising economic and military power is its major transgression. China threatens not the security of Americans, but the hegemony of Washington.¶ The Asia Pivot harks back to a time when imperial powers didn’t have to justify military expansionism with tall tales of impending attacks on the homeland. It more resembles the famed “Great Game” in which the British Empire fought with the Russian Empire for strategic supremacy in Central Asia.¶ According to Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, writing in Foreign Affairs, “China is the only country widely seen as a possible threat to U.S. predominance. Indeed, China’s rise has led to fears that the

country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day supplant the United States as a global hegemon.”¶ They add that America “is the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s

neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing international legal regimes.”¶ The U.S. could cut its defense budget in half tomorrow and still outspend China on its military. But that hasn’t calmed the Obama administration into easing his approach.¶ This comes with serious risks. Already by 2011, the Center for Strategic International Studies identified in a report the unintended consequences that could come with Obama’s stern posture in Asia.¶ The report predicted “a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leadership’s

judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a great power.”¶ “The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming leadership to stand up to the United States,” the

report added. “Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines.”¶ Or, in the words of former Chinese diplomat Jia Xiudong: “Don’t treat China as an enemy. Otherwise you end up with an enemy in China.”¶ The economic interdependence between the U.S. and China has risen to unprecedented levels, and that’s a good thing. Left to their own devices, Americans and Chinese would continue to engage in peaceful, mutually

beneficial trade. Only Washington, going abroad in search of monsters to destroy, could turn that into a casus belli .

Continuing to contain China risks confrontation—domestic pressures escalate quickly Glaser 13Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia @ CSIS, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences,” April-13, http://csis.org/publication/pivot-asia-prepare-unintended-consequences ///cmf

The Obama administration’s initial policy in 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a G2 condominium that would make decisions over the heads of others. Those concerns were unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted the U.S. approach as weakness, which, along with China’s economic success and America’s struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that manifested itself in a series of intimidating actions in China’s neighborhood. Subsequent entreaties by regional states to counterbalance China increased U.S. attention

to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the U.S. Asia “pivot” has prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about intensified U.S.-China strategic competition. ¶ In the run-up to the leadership transition that will take place at China’s 18th Party Congress this fall, Beijing is

inwardly focused and unlikely to act on its fears. However, 2013 could see a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leadership’s judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that

seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a great power. ¶ Signs of a potential harsh reaction are already detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming

leadership to stand up to the United States. Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines. For example, an article published in China’s Global Times, a jingoistic newspaper owned by the Communist Party

mouthpiece People’s Daily, called for China to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities.¶ Deng Xiaoping’s guideline to keep a low profile in the international arena, designed more than two decades ago to cope with uncertainty

produced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is increasingly seen by China’s elite and public as irrelevant and even harmful to the task of defending Chinese ever-expanding “core interests.” Some voices are calling for closer alignment with Moscow and promoting the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a new “pole” in the

international arena to strengthen the emerging powers against the West.¶ Xi Jinping, who will assume the helm as China’s new

leader later this year, will be under pressure from many domestic constituencies to more forcefully defend Chinese interests in the international arena. Seeking to quickly consolidate his power and enhance the legitimacy of the Communist Party, Xi and his newly installed Politburo

Standing Committee colleagues may be more willing than their predecessors to test drive a policy that is more confrontational.

US-China war goes nuclearJohnson 1Chalmers, The Nation, May 14, Wilson OmniFile: Full Text Select

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads).

Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the

world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

Asia pivot increases conflict—Chinese belligerence stems from insecurity, not rising capabilitiesRoss 12 (Robert, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, December 2012, “Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive” Foreign Affairs)

At the time, many analysts interpreted China’s new belligerence as a sign of the country’s growing confidence . Writing in The Washington Post, John Pomfret noted that Beijing was evincing “a new triumphalist attitude.” China was on the rise, the thinking went, and its newfound power had convinced its leaders that they could shape events in Asia as never before. And so in 2010, the Obama administration initiated what it called a “pivot” to Asia, a shift in strategy aimed at bolstering the United States’ defense ties with countries throughout the region and expanding the U.S. naval presence there. The diplomatic element of the strategy was on display in 2011, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reassured U.S. allies, many of which harbor concerns about China’s rise, that “the United States is going to remain a presence in the Pacific for a long time,” and the following year, when he promised that the U.S. military would bring

“enhanced capabilities to this vital region.” Worried that a newly assertive China was becoming a destabilizing force, the White House moved to counter any

perceptions of its own weakness by strengthening the U.S. presence in the region. Unfortunately, however, thisshift wasbased on a fundamental misreading of China’s leadership. Beijing’s tough diplomacy stemmed not from confidence in its might -- China’s leaders

have long understood that their country’s military remains significantly inferior to that of the United States -- but from a deep sense of insecurity bornof several nerve-racking years of financial crisis and social unrest . Faced with these challenges, and no longer able to count on easy support based on the country’s economic growth, China’s leaders moved to sustain their popular legitimacy by appeasing an increasingly nationalist public with symbolic gestures of force. Consider China’s behavior in such a light, and the risks of the pivot become obvious . The new U.S. policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s

insecurities and will only feed China’s aggressiveness, undermine regional stability, and decrease the possibility of

cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Instead of inflating estimates of Chinese power and abandoning its long-standing policy of

diplomatic engagement, the United States should recognize China’s underlying weaknesses and its own enduring strengths. The right China policy would assuage, not exploit, Beijing’s anxieties, while protecting U.S. interests in the region.

China won’t be convinced that the pivot is benignLogan 13 (Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 1/25/13, “America’s Pivot: One Big Contradiction” The Diplomat) http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/25/contradictions-at-the-heart-of-the-pivot/

At the same time, Washington is ringing China with an array of bilateral alliances and partnerships, all of which are more or less anti-China. It is not paranoid for Chinese to view this as a policy of military containment. When pressed on the containment question, U.S. policy officials offer absurd responses like that from

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in June of last year. According to Panetta, the pivot “is not about containment of China .” Rather, Panetta stated, "it is about the challenge of humanitarian assistance and needs; the challenge of dealing with weapons of mass destruction that are proliferating throughout the world; and dealing with narco-trafficking, and dealing with piracy; and dealing with issues that relate to trade and how do we improve trade and how do we

improve lines of communication." Would any Americanaccept such a rationale for China deploying 60 percent of PLAN assets to the Western Hemisphere? Dealing with humanitarian assistance and needs, stifling nuclear proliferation, suppressing narco-traffickers, and dispatching pirates do not require more than half the U.S. Navy. Even Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, knows this is nonsense: “When the administration says it’s not about China, it’s all about China. China knows this .” If the success of America’s Asia policy relies on Chinese elites believing our official rationale, the policy is in trouble.

Pivot Bad—China Relations Asia pivot kills China cooperation over climate change, terrorism, and the economySwaine 11 (Michael, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12/7/11, “America's Asia Pivot Threatens Regional Stability” The National Interest) http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/washington-destabilizes-sino-american-relations-6211?page=1

Washington, we are told, is now "pivoting " its energy, resources and attention from the Middle East and Europe to Asia, reflecting a recognition of the

increasingly vital importance of that region for future American wealth, security and global influence. Unfortunately, the execution of this shift, and China's response, are combining to deepen mutual suspicions and potentially destabilize the entire area , ending the decade-long stability in Sino-American relations that resulted from a U.S. foreign-policy shift after 9/11. At that time, Washingtonmoved decisively away from viewing China ominously as a rising "strategic competitor " (to quote George

W. Bush) and toward significant levels of Sino-U.S. cooperation in combating terrorism and dealing with a growing array of common problems, from climate change to global economic instability . This shift brought Washington’s approach back into line with an earlier, long-standing U.S. policy of fostering greater Sino-American engagement while conducting low-key military hedging against the possibility of a future hostile China. With President Obama and Secretary Clinton's recent trips to the South and Western Pacific, expanding U.S. involvement in multilateral economic

and security-related fora, and a strengthening of Washington's traditional military alliances, the United States is now signaling an intention to move back toward the pre-9/11 strategic focus on a rising China. That focus places a premium on explicitly balancing against and constraining Chinese power and influence across the region. These moves are reportedly driven by a need to counter increasing regional anxieties over China's recently assertive behavior regarding several maritime territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries and Japan and a

growing perception of an America in decline and disarray. While a clear and reassuring reaffirmation of Washington's commitment to Asia is certainly needed, it is not producing the desired effect. Despite all the reassuring talk emanating from President

Obamaduring his recent trip to the region about welcoming China as a rising power, and despite repeated expressions of the U.S. intention to

remain neutral in Beijing's disputes with other powers, Secretary Clinton and other senior U.S. officials have been sending a very different message since at least the middle of 2010. Most notably, their words and deeds are creating the impression in some Asian capitals that Washington is now supporting Vietnam , the Philippines and Japan in their increasingly acrimonious disputes with Beijing over maritime territories. For its part, Beijing is acting—and reacting—in a confusing and at times belligerent manner. Tensions over its growing military presence in maritime Asia are deepening as China fails to exert adequate control over the behavior of its ships in nearby seas and acquiesces in (or perhaps even encourages) the nonsensical conspiracy theories being spewed out domestically by hypernationalist critics of the United States. Diplomatically, China's leaders gyrate between voicing completely unpersuasive statements about the nonthreatening nature of its military activities and demanding, through words and actions, that others accept its absolutist (and in some cases unclear) positions on a variety of highly contentious territorial issues. All the while, Beijing signals, with increasing energy and directness, that the region needs to move away from a U.S.-centered, bilateral-alliance-based security structure. America's leaders apparently think that the only way to manage this increasingly complex and challenging situation is to apply a more robust and strident version of that security structure, albeit with a nod toward what it has until very recently viewed as multilateral "talk-shops" and a continued stress on negotiation over confrontation in its bilateral interactions with Beijing. Moreover, U.S. officials seem confident that Washington can maintain indefinitely the two factors required for the ultimate success of this effort: a predominant level of military power and presence—right up to China's maritime borders—and its past level of political and economic leadership. Unfortunately, the Chinese do not support this approach, while others in and out of the region question whether America can sustain its leadership and predominance. Some even question the wisdom of attempting to maintain such a defense of the status quo in the face of a growing regional and global diffusion of power. Washington must rethink its basic assumptions about its role in the region. First, it should initiate serious discussions, internally and among friends in the region, about how best to reassure its allies and the Chinese that it is not pursuing a zero-sum approach in Asia. As a central part of this reassessment, it should reexamine how best to address and when to accommodate China's most critical security concerns, especially along its maritime borders. More broadly, the United States should develop a long-term strategy for gradually leading the region toward a more multipolar security environment and away from a heavy reliance on American naval superiority and a bilateral alliance system that is increasingly out of touch with regional and global realities. For its part, Beijing should exert greater control over its military in the Western Pacific, restrain its hypernationalists, and recognize, in words and deeds, that regional concerns over its growing power in Asia are not created or orchestrated by the United States. It should engage in direct and frank discussions with Washington and other Asian powers regarding its image of the future regional environment and its intentions and concerns over the long term. These changes could pave the way

for a much-needed regional-security dialogue, led by America and China, regarding the long-term future of the Asia-Pacific. Without such actions,the most important bilateral relationship in the world is in danger of lapsing into one of growing strategic rivalry and contention.

Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now keyDr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH

MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510, accessed 8-31-14.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical

science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival , health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “ virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system ” and that it is “ extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of

millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather

events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us

to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “ Business as usual ” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is

“incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “ tipping points ” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems . The

AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office

(WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]

Pivot Bad—Noko Asia pivot means China won’t help stop North Korea’s nuclear programRoss 12 (Robert, Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, December 2012, “Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive” Foreign Affairs)

Even if the United States had limited its response to China’s nationalist diplomacy to improving defense ties with its maritime allies in the region, China’s leaders would not have been pleased. But those steps were necessary for U.S. security, occurred far from China’s borders, and built on the policies of previous administrations. When Washington got directly involved in China’s sovereignty disputes and increased its presence on China’s land borders, however, Beijing predictably saw this departure from past U.S. policy as gratuitous, expansionist, and threatening. As might be expected from a great power faced with a

deteriorating strategic environment, China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies rather than the merely aggressive rhetoric it employed in the past. One result has been that China has all but given up its effort to use its leverage over North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has substantially increased its food aid to Pyongyang, imported

more of North Korea’s mineral resources, and made significant investments in North Korean mining, infrastructure, and manufacturing. China has also withdrawn its support for the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, forcing Washington to pursue bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons capability.

China is keyDorell 13 (Oren, staff writer, 3/8/13, “China key to enforcing U.N. sanctions on N. Korea” USA Today) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/07/un-north-korea-sanctions/1971345/

New sanctions on North Korea have as little chance of stopping Pyongyang from developing a deliverable nuclear weapon as previous efforts, unless China

gets more serious about enforcing them , nuclear experts and China watchers say. The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously Thursday to boost sanctions against North Korea for its third nuclear test Feb. 12. Pyongyang threatened a pre-emptive strike on the United States with a nuclear weapon. Friday, North Korea announced that it was canceling a hotline and a nonaggression pact with South Korea. After the vote Thursday, China's U.N. ambassador, Li Baodong, said his nation wants to see "full implementation" of the sanctions. "The top priority now is to defuse the tensions … bring the situation back on the track of diplomacy, on negotiations," Li said. But Bruce Klingner, former deputy chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence under President Clinton, said China is part of he problem. "In the past, China agreed to resolutions but didn't enforce them in China," said Klingner, now a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Klingner says China has recently been more vocal publicly about its displeasure with North Korea's recent missile and nuclear tests. Even so, Beijing has refused to help enforce previous sanctions it signed off on, he said. Klingner says he does not see the new sanctions as being enforced any differently. The U.N. resolution Thursday authorizes countries to: Inspect any North Korean vessel or airplane, and to deny landing or port rights if the North refuses to allow it. Ban exports of expensive jewelry, yachts, luxury automobiles and racing cars to the North. Freeze financial transactions or services that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear or missile programs. Bans financial support for trade deals, such as granting export credits, if the assistance could aid the North's nuclear or missile programs. "Taken together, these sanctions will bite — and bite hard," U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said. The new sanctions resolution is the fourth against North Korea since its first nuclear test in 2006. Many of the entities that provide North Korea with aid are in China, and that is why it is not likely to work, says John Bolton, who served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under then-president George W. Bush.

Goes nuclear—causes extinction Chol 11 Kim MyongChol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug 20 www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html

The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint, withany conflictsparked there likely to become a ful l-blown

thermonuclear war involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater.RodongSinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." Recent incidents illustrate the real danger of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. 1. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong Island mistook three noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that the slightest incident can lead to war. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. South Korean conservative newspaper the JoongAng Daily reported August 17: "A military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. "'We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the

source of the fire,' said the source." BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." 2. An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Inchon. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. It is nothing short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. "If North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and counter-firing. "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of the escalation. That's the

concern."Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". New Korean war differs from other wars Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars.The first essential difference is that the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first time since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own

land, not on faraway soil. The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless. However, this will no longer be the case. At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged. An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct retaliatory

transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA. The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear, thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare described in science fiction novels or films. North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The other is that North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's first and last nuclear exchange with the US. The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans . However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan centers on the US mainland. On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. At the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress, including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. An apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US, with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. The nuclear exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.

Pivot Bad—Prolif Asia pivot triggers global arms race and war Klare 13Michael, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, “The Cold War redux?,” Jun-3, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/World/WOR-01-030613.html /// cmf

In March, Russia agreed to sell 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multi-role combat jets and four Lada-class diesel submarines to China on the eve of newly installed President Xi Jinping's first official visit to Moscow. Although details of the sale have yet to be worked out, observers say that it will represent the most significant transfer of Russian weaponry to China in a decade.¶ The Su-35, a fourth-generation stealth fighter, is superior to any plane now in China's arsenal, while the Lada is a more advanced, quieter version of the Kilo-class sub it already possesses. Together, the two systems will provide the Chinese

with a substantial boost in combat quality.¶ For anyone who has followed Asian security affairs over the past few years, it is hard to view this deal as anything but a reaction to the Barack Obama administration's new Asian

strategy, its "pivot" to the Pacific. As announced by President Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament in

November 2011, it involves beefing-up the already strong US air and naval presence in the western Pacific - in,

that is, waters off China - along with increased US arms aid to American allies like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.¶ Not surprisingly, China has responded by bolstering its own naval capabilities, announcing plans for the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier (its first began

operational testing in late 2012) and the procurement of advanced arms from Russia to fill gaps in its

defense structure. This, in turn, is bound to increase the pressure on Washington from Japan, Taiwan, and other allies to provide yet more weaponry, triggering a classic Cold-War-style arms race in the region. ¶ On the eve of Secretary of State John Kerry's June 24 visit to India, that country's press was full of reports and rumors about upcoming US military sales. Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, was widely quoted as saying that, in addition to sales already in the pipeline, "we think there's going to be billions of dollars more in the next couple of years." In his comments, Shapiro referred to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who, he said, was heading up an arms sales initiative, "which we think is making some good progress and will, hopefully, lead to an even greater pace of additional defense trade with India".¶ To some degree, of course, this can be viewed as a continuation of weapons sales as a domestic economic motor, since US weapons companies have long sought access to India's vast arms market. But such sales now clearly play another role as well: to lubricate the US drive to incorporate India into the arc of powers encircling China as part of the Obama administration's new Asia-Pacific strategy.¶ Toward this end, as Deputy Secretary of State William Burns explained back in 2011, "Our two countries launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific to ensure that the world's two largest democracies pursue strategies that reinforce one another." Arms transfers are seen by the leaders of both countries as a vital tool in the "containment" of China (though all parties are careful to avoid that old Cold War term). So watch for Kerry to pursue new arms agreements while in New Delhi.¶ Repeating

History¶ These are just some examples of recent arms deals (or ones under discussion) that suggest a fresh willingness on the part of the major powers to use weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition. The reappearance of such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of Cold War-like rivalries. Even if senior leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing

are not talking about resurrecting some 21st-century version of the Cold War, anyone with a sense of history can see that they are headed down a grim, well-trodden path toward crisis and confrontation. ¶ What gives this an added touch of irony is that leading arms suppliers and recipients, including the United States, recently voted in the UN General Assembly to approve the Arms Trade Treaty, which was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although the treaty has many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation, it represents the first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales.¶ "This treaty won't solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias," said Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International and an ardent treaty supporter. "It will help to reduce armed violence. It will help to reduce conflict."¶ This may be the hope, but such expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers, led by the US and Russia, once again come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in

areas of strategic importance. Far from bringing peace and stability - as the proponents of such transactions

invariably claim - each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step

closer to a new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails. ¶ Are we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don't learn from history are destined to repeat it?

Pivot Bad—Space Weapons Asia pivot is counter-productive for deterrence—causes Chinese armament and space weaponizationCNN 12 (Editor’s Note: The following piece, exclusive to GPS, comes from Wikistrat, the world's first massively multiplayer online consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a crowd-sourcing methodology to provide unique insights, “ 10 strategic issues with Obama's East Asia "pivot " , http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/15/top-ten-military-strategic-issues-from-obamas-pivot-to-east-asia/, ZBurdette)

6. China tries to stiff-arm the U.S. navy

China will spend even more on anti-ship ballistic missiles and – quite possibly – an accelerating arms race in space to deter American aircraft carriers from loitering around Taiwan. None of this deals with China’s actual security challenge of becoming increasingly reliant on raw materials and energy emanating from distant, historically unstable regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. That means China will be forced to accept the U.S. global commons “policing role,” thus allowing Beijing to continue free-riding on U.S. military stabilization efforts outside of East Asia – something we’ve long complained about. That makes the Obama Doctrine approach seem even more tenuous as a long-term strategy.

7. America scares China

Think about it: a rising Asian power experiencing a fierce revival of nationalism and obsessed with its territorial sovereignty, armed with a rapidly growing economy that’s become dangerously dependent on foreign sources of energy and raw materials. As the Japanese before them, China perceives America as pursuing an encirclement strategy that conceivably chokes off access to those foreign sources. Toss in China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign colonial navies and you’ve got a dangerous recipe that’s guaranteed to elicit a hostile response from Beijing. Imperial Japan was a marginal economic player, whereas today’s China is the primary engine of global growth. That makes Obama’s strategic “pivot” one risky maneuver.

8. China resists American pressure

China is incentivized to back anti-Western rogue nations wherever they may be found – think Pakistan and Iran - in order to divert U.S. attention from East Asia . It also means Beijing should continue aggressively staking out advantageous investments in Central Asia, Africa and Latin America to further diminish Western – and specifically American – influence there. Bottom line? The more we squeeze China in East Asia, the more likely we’ll find ourselves on the strategic defensive closer to home. Monroe Doctrine, anyone?

That risks accidental global warfare

Mitchell, communications prof, et al. 1 – Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh (Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices . In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable , given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and /or chemical weapons . An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

AT Solves Credibility Asia pivot bad for credibility—forces us into conflict or be seen as a paper tiger Raine and Miere 13Sarah and Christian, Transatlantic Fellow @ the German Marshall Fund and Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security

@ IISS, “Chapter Four: The US in the South China Sea,” Adelphi Series, 53:436-437, 151-178, Taylor and Francis /// cmf

Another further constraint on US engagement is the limit on alliance-building in Southeast Asia demanded by US national interests beyond the South China Sea. As Germany and the UK manoeuvred before the First

World War to construct alliances designed to deter conflict, the dominoes of commitments engendered ended up actually helping to fan the flames of war.34 The danger for the US is that it ends up creating expectations it may not want to meet, taking on actual or perceived

commitments that force it towards a crossroads it might otherwise seek to avoid: the decision to stand by an ally or partner on principle and risk an escalation on a matter not of fundamental

national interest, or to be seen to have their bluff called, thereby bringing into question the core credibility of US commitments in the region. This is particularly the case with regard to the Philippines, with whom the US has a Mutual Defence Agreement, certainly applicable to the Western Pacific but questionably applicable to the South China Sea. As the Philippines sent its US-donated cutter to arrest Chinese fisher- men off Scarborough Reef in April 2012, the US had a delicate balance to strike in the support it proffered. A ‘2+2’ meeting in May between the foreign and defence ministers of the two coun- tries stressed Washington’s strategic ambiguity on the issue: while reaffirming the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, US diplomats also highlighted their country’s neutrality on the South China Sea sovereignty disputes. Whilst Secretary of State Clinton therefore explicitly stated that the US would protect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, she notably neglected to mention whether the defence treaty extended to disputed areas of the sea. The message sent was clear in its equivocality and is similar to the US position on Taiwan: while the US will help the Philippines develop its military and will protect undisputed Philippine territory, it cannot afford to provide a carte blanche for defending disputed areas claimed by the Philippines.

AT Hostile China RiseChina’s not expansionist or violent- other regional powers contain it if it is

Nye 2010 (Joseph S., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, The Future of American Power Subtitle: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, November/December, lexis)

Some have argued that China aims to challenge the United States' position in East Asia and, eventually, the world. Even if this were an accurate assessment of China's current intentions (and even the Chinese themselves cannot know the views of future generations), it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon. Moreover, Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries and the constraints created by China's need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among China's neighbors that would weaken both its hard and its soft power. The rise of Chinese power in Asia is contested by both India and Japan (as well as other states), and that provides a major power advantage to the United States. The U.S.-Japanese alliance and the improvement in U.S.-Indian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans from Asia. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China's power grows

First, China’s rise isn’t a threat to U.S. interests.Allin and Jones 12 [Dana H., Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Erik, Professor and Director of European Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS Director, Bologna Institute for Policy Research Head of Europe, Oxford Analytica Adelphi Series Conclusion: Realist Dilemmas Version of record first published: 22 Jun 2012 Adelphi Series, 52:430-431, 183-198]

Getting the balance right is obviously an overriding demand on US strategy and diplomacy. Along with the danger of provoking Beijing with a posture that might appear aggressive, the obverse risk is that the spectre of American disarray and decline could embolden nationalists in a still-growing China to demand more aggressive and assertive policies. In theory, such assertiveness would be enabled by the possibility that China’s GDP and military spending could exceed America’s

by the middle of the century. Yet, we should not let hypothetical future dangers scare us out of recognising

some stabilising realities of the present. ‘China’, Dobbins observes, ‘is seeking neither territorial aggrandise-ment nor ideological sway over its neighbours. It shows no interest in matching US military expenditures, achieving comparable global reach, or assuming defence commit-ments beyond its immediate periphery’.8 Indeed, insofar as Beijing is not eager to be a supplier of global public goods, its grand strategy at least implicitly confers upon the United States a continued leadership role. All of this might change, of course, but the United States would have ample time to observe these changes and adjust its own strategic planning and posture.

But pursuing primacy ensures escalating rivalry.White 12 [Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, America’s choices about China August 5th, 2012 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/05/america-s-choices-about-china/]

Washington’s message to Beijing is that everything will be fine, as long as China agrees to do things America’s way. If not, America will use ‘every element of America’s power’ to pull it into line. Don’t believe me? Go back and read

President Obama’s big speech in Canberra last November, and ask yourself how it sounds to Chinese ears — which are the ones that really matter. The problem is that China will not accept America’s pre-conditions for a good relationship, and the more its wealth and power grows relative to America’s, the more willing Beijing will be to make that plain. The rest of us might regret that, but we can hardly be surprised by

it, and we cannot wish it away. If America insists on maintaining the status quo of US primacy as China’s power and ambitions grow, escalating strategic rivalry with China is close to a certainty.

Hegemony doesn’t solve China war Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Resurrecting Retrenchment: The Grand Strategic Consequences of U.S. Decline," POLICY BRIEF, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

Harvard University, 5--11, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/macdonald-parent-may-2011-is-%20brief.pdf

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the

relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal . The

U nited S tates would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking

a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness . 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy , in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve

currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct

confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of

U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained

relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners inBeijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not i nadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S . conflict . 98 Moreover,Washington’s support for the development of

multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order . 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas . Indeed,

even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection

capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the U nited S t ates can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating

the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.101

China rise won’t be hostile Feffer ’12 (John Feffer, February 21, 2012, Our Man in Beijing? http://www.fpif.org/articles/our_man_in_in_beijing?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FPIF+%28Foreign+Policy+In+Focus+%28All+News%29%29

When Hu Jintao took over as the leader of China in 2002, U.S. companies welcomed his accession as a “good sign for American business.”

Political analysts described Hu as a fourth-generation member of the Communist party leadership who might very well turn

out to be a “closet liberal.” Playing it safe, the media tended to portray him as a pragmatic enigma. In the wake of 9/11 and high-level

cooperation on counter-terrorism, Hu proved to be a reliable U.S. partner , prompting Colin Powell to remark in 2003 that U.S.-China relations were the best since 1972. It didn’t take long, however, before the media and the punditry turned sour on Hu. By 2005, The Economist was labeling him a “conservative authoritarian” for tightening party discipline and cracking down on intellectuals. Hu also came

under fire for holding firm against the United States around disputes over trade, currency, intellectual property, and human rights. On counter-terrorism, U.S.-Chinese interests converged. But on this issue and most others, Hu turned out not to be a closet liberal at all. And when it came to prosecuting the “global war on terror,” the Bush administration didn’t want a liberal. Now, with China gearing up for another leadership transition, Hu’s putative successor Xi Jinping has embarked on his own grand tour of the United States. As with Hu, Western sources admit that they don’t know very much about Xi beyond his generally “pro-business” approach. He has a celebrity wife; he doesn’t like corruption; he’s a basketball fan. His father was a Party loyalist until he began to sympathize with the Tiananmen Square protestors. Aside from these tidbits, journalists have been forced to sift through Xi’s U.S. appearances – his meetings with the Obama administration, his return to the Iowa town he visited 25 years ago, his attendance at an LA Lakers game – for clues to the new Chinese leader’s

true political nature. Xi Jinping did what he could to frustrate the media. He was careful to tailor his remarks in Washington to satisfy both

his Western hosts and his colleagues back home. So, for instance, he spoke of U.S.-Chinese relations as an "unstoppable river that keeps surging ahead" and of Beijing’s willingness to engage with Washington on a broad agenda of issues from counter-terrorism to North Korea . At the same time he was careful to warn his hosts to “respect the interests and the concerns of China.” This latter point, that China has its own national interests, invariably eludes Western observers no matter how often Chinese leaders repeat it. Sure, a Chinese leader might like American basketball or admire American business. But the essential fact is that he leads a political, economic, and military apparatus dedicated to preserving itself and the country’s territorial integrity. The same can be said for the leaders of most countries, including the United States. Certainly no one in Beijing expects the 2012 U.S. elections to produce an American president who embraces state capitalism, a global trade order that disproportionately favors Chinese economic growth, or a ceding of U.S. military position in the Pacific to the up-and-coming superpower. And yet for some bizarre reason, U.S. observers expect the latest Chinese leader to suddenly tear off his clothes and reveal a Captain America suit underneath. China’s national interests are perhaps most visibly on display around security issues. During the early Hu years, the discussion in the West centered on China’s “peaceful rise.” More recently, the talk has gotten darker, as pessimists point to China’s recent purchase of an old Ukrainian aircraft carrier, its ambitions in the South China Sea, its confrontation with Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and of course its increased spending on the military. By 2015, according to IHS Jane’s, Chinese military spending will reach $238 billion, more than all the projected spending in the Asian

region as a whole. But there are no real indications that Beijing has abandoned its “peaceful rise ” approach .

The refurbished aircraft carrier is not t erribly i mpressive ( particularly compared to the U.S. Navy’s 10 modern vessels). South Korea and Japan have a similar row over a disputed island, which might lead to the conclusion that it’s Japan, not China, that’s abandoning its “peaceful rise.” China’s claims to islands in the South China Sea, however dubious, are longstanding and date back to the pre-communist era. And it’s been more than 30 years since China has conducted a significant military intervention overseas, an overall pattern of risk-averse behavior it shows no sign of abandoning. In any case, what might tip the region into conflict is not China’s territorial ambitions but climate change. “As sea temperatures in the South China Sea continue to rise, large quantities of fish will migrate north into even more heavily disputed waters,” writes Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) contributor Derek Bolton in Shifting Winds in the South China Sea. “As fishermen

are forced to follow suit, the probability of future confrontations will increase, raising the likelihood of a more serious conflict.”The U nited S tates , meanwhile, continues to outspend China militarily by at least five-fold and is in the midst of a “Pacific pivot” to reorient its security policy away from the Middle East and toward Asia. Increased U.S. military cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, and even Vietnam makes China nervous. China’s increased military spending is not a happy sign, but the leadership believes it has a long way to go before achieving even rough parity with its major rival. The overarching priorities of Chinese leaders remain nationalist: to keep a vast and fractious country together, maintain influence in Taiwan, and ensure a steady supply of energy through its neighboring regions to

sustain high levels of economic growth. Hu and now Xi consistently tell their U.S. interlocutors that closer U.S.-Chinese relations are possible and desirable as long as Washington recognizes these national imperatives.

AT Containment Superior We simply won't be able to sustain a coalition to contain China--no appetite for it among our alliesPatrick Porter, Reader, Strategic Studies, University of Reading, SHARING POWER: PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE STRATEGY, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 4--13, p. 40.

These two incidents point to a broader issue, that in these mercantile times, international relations are too fragile for an all-out contest for supremacy between a U.S.-led coalition and China. States are demonstrably willing to compete within limits, to build up military capabilities, court allies and partners, make claims on scarce resources, and generally jostle for advantage. However, thus far,

states have proven to be nervous when disputes escalate. Assembling a coalition to contain China too intensively could trigger crises, not least because China holds hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. debt that could be

dropped onto the market. America might find its allies distancing themselves when the hard costs of unmitigated competition focus their minds. Thus, any viable U.S. strategy that a coalition would buy into must straddle the delicate balance between a self-defeating containment strategy and an excessive withdrawal leading to power vacuums .

U.S. belligerence only risks a conflict with China--need to work with them, accommodate their rise-us has to adapt to increased china role

-us decisions influence china

Robert Manning, Atlantic Council, ENVISIONING 2030: US STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD, 12--10--12, p. 36-37.

To find a path to a US-China relationship that achieves a balance of interests tilted toward a cooperative future, US strategy will need to accommodate legitimate, essential Chinese interests. At the

same, China will need to make reciprocal adjustments in regard to US essential interests. However, the

myriad issues fueling mutual distrust suggests that achieving a modus vivendi promises to be a difficult and protracted process at best. Critical to how Washington and Beijing define their core interests is the broad acceptance of both to act as “responsible stakeholders” within the framework of global rules and norms. Accepting that in a rules-based world, China will have a larger role in shaping the rules is an aspect of power-sharing that the Un ited S tates will need to adjust to ; accepting more responsibility commensurate with its increased economic and political weight is China’s challenge. Whether China chooses to act primarily within the system to alter rules in its favor, as great powers are wont to do, or to simply assert power unilaterally to achieve narrow self interests will determine whether a cooperative future proves

elusive. However, what other actors, particularly the U nited S tates and its regional partners do, will likely influence China’s cost-benefit calculus over time.

Containing China risks a war-squo trends cause war; must accommodate rise

Amitai Etzioni, University Professor, International Relations, George Washington University, "The Devolution of American Power," FLETCHER FORUM OF

WORLD AFFAIRS v. 37 n. 1, Winter 2013, p. 22.

If one assumes that China’s rising power—thus far and in the near future—is largely regional, the question of whether this growth will be mainly adversarial or

compatible with the prevailing international order depends in part on the United States. If the U nited S tates ceases to sell arms to Taiwan, stops urging India to build up its military in order to contain China, welcomes China’s quest to secure pathways for its vital needs of raw materials and energy, limits rather than increases U.S. military forces in the region, and commits itself not to move its army to Chinese borders from the demilitarized zone should the North Korean regime collapse, it will accommodate China’s regional rise . However, if the U nited S tates takes the opposite course in these

matters and instead seeks to ring the country with military bases and form military alliances in the area to “contain” China, a confrontation is more likely .

TTIP

Won’t Pass—Europe European belligerence blocks it Inside US Trade 11-7[Inside US Trade. “STALLMAN: POLITICS ARE BIGGEST HURDLE TO PROGRESS ON TRADE WITH JAPAN, EU” 11/7/14 ln/]

**Bob Stallman is the President of the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Likewise, Stallman said he was skeptical that the Nov. 1 changeover in the leadership of the European Commission will really result in a "fresh start" for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) -- at least when it comes to longstanding differences with the U.S. on agriculture and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.¶ "I think there's an opportunity. Whether that opportunity is realized, I can't really predict at this point," Stallman said. "I'm skeptical in general, no matter who the players are. The political dynamics in the EU fundamentally haven't changed. Their attitudes [toward food and agriculture] fundamentally haven't changed just because they have a

new team on the field."¶ Stallman also reiterated his doubts that the U.S. and EU would be able to resolve fights over the use of growth-promoting drugs in meat production, or the approval of genetically

modified organisms (GMOs), through TTIP.¶ And he expressed his frustration that the European Commission to date has continued to take the line that it will not change its laws with regard to food and agriculture under TTIP, a position that he said will make it difficult to craft a deal that the U.S. farm lobby can support .¶ "I'm not optimistic that we're going to make much progress there. At least not in the short term. It depends on how badly they want

it, how badly do they believe their economy needs it over in the EU. And that's going to take a while to play out," Stallman said. "But there's no indication right now that we're going to be able to resolve many of the agricultural trade issues we have with the EU through the TTIP negotiations."

No deal – too many hurdles Moody 15 (Glyn, “Troubled TTIP isn't the only 'trade' takeover busting our sovereignty,” 1-20, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ournhs/glyn-moody/troubled-ttip-isn%27t-only-%27trade%27-takeover-busting-our-sovereignty, CMR)

Even as controversial 'trade' deal, TTIP, sputters, other deals to give corporations as much power as countries are being negotiated even more secretively. Billed

as the biggest trade agreement ever, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is in trouble. Started in July 2013, negotiators hoped to have it wrapped up by the end of 2014. The deadline has now slipped to the end of 2015, but that too looks unlikely. So far the talks have achieved little in terms of reaching agreement for specific market sectors. And they are facing increasing scepticism because of TTIP's plans to deregulate goods and services like health through "harmonisation" of EU and US standards - something that in practice usually means

levelling down. The most contentious area is undoubtedly that of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) which enables companies to sue for alleged losses caused by government actions. Originally, these were intended to cover physical expropriation, but companies now use ISDS to make claims for "indirect expropriation" of future profits. This might be something as simple as bringing in plain cigarette packs or health warnings, or refusing to grant a patent for medicines.

Not Key to Trade

TTIP not key to trade

Veseth 13Michael, Redefining 'Lame': Proposed EU-US Trade Deal. Robert G. Albertson Professor, International Political Economy Program BA, University of Puget Sound, 1972 MS, PhD, Purdue University, 1974, 1975

http://ipezone.blogspot.com/2013/03/a-bit-less-lame-than-us-eu-fta-japan-in.html

If you're wondering about scant coverage of the proposed EU-US FTA in what purports to be the IPE Zone,

nobody said that I had to cover rather pointless trade deals. While I am not entirely indisposed to doing so, the ones I do mention at least have some entertainment value alike the (rather unlikely) EU-MERCOSUR deal which has been decades in the pipeline. Unfortunately, an EU-US

FTA ranks right up there with a New Kids on the Block reunion on my radar screen. Who the £$%^ cares? The overall premise is overwhelmingly underwhelming . Let us count the ways: (1) Exporting stuff nobody buys at home because folks are hard up doesn't assure sales abroad when your trade partner is equally hard up. The underlying premise of this FTA, trade creation, is highly dubious. We owe a debt of gratitude to none other than Karl Marx in the stupefaction sweepstakes evident here:

We know that both the EU and the US are terminally stuck in reverse gear. Both economies are shrinking. Household incomes in both have bee n stagnant-to- declining for well over a decade. Hence, lowering trade barriers doesn't really matter when there's not enough money to go around despite unprecedented easy money policies on both sides of the

Atlantic. Why are we to believe that ridding EU-US trade of the negligible 3% average tariffs remaining will result in much of anything when trillions in stimulus-- far greater inducements to consume--have failed to get these economies out of their respective ruts? Peugeot cars selling well in America--dreaming is free, no?

AT Econ/Eurozone Won’t solve growth or Eurozone – only risks damage Bromund 14 (Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations, The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The Geopolitical Reality,” 9-17, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip-the-geopolitical-reality, CMR)

The TTIP’s Economic Benefits Have Been Oversold The first Backgrounder assessed the TTIP’s potential economic benefits. While recognizing that many imponderables remain and that the agreement cannot be fully assessed until it is concluded, most analysts have concluded that if a TTIP had been finalized in 2013, by 2027 it would have been worth between four and six months of growth in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and employment at the modest levels achieved in 2013. To put it another way, a TTIP would be like adding approximately $100 billion to U.S. GDP,

which is currently about $15.7 trillion, over the next 15 years. While this would be a good thing, it would not be revolutionary . On the

other hand, there is a serious risk that a TTIP will be based on regulatory harmonization between the U.S. and the EU, which could greatly reduce a TTIP’s

benefits and even damage the U.S. economy . Many TTIP advocates have oversold its potential benefits. On the economic side, many leaders have gone from defending the TTIP as a modest contribution to long-term economic growth to touting it as a near-term mechanism for ending the EU’s economic and financial crisis. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht has said, “We are convinced that this trade agreement will result in more jobs and more growth—and that will help to get us out of the economic crisis.”[2] During a 2013 trip to Paris, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “I believe, as does President Obama, that this [TTIP] may be one [of] the best ways of helping Europe to break out of this cycle, have growth.”[3] And former British Prime Minister Tony Blair supports a TTIP in part because, he argues, it will meet the “immediate challenge” of fighting the EU’s “economic malaise.”[4] Although an agreement that reduces trade barriers and increases economic freedom in the United States and the EU would boost economic growth in both regions, it would not be a miracle cure for the economically oppressive growth of government or for errors of economic, monetary, or fiscal policy in either region. In the United States, economic freedom has declined for seven straight years,[5] and most people living in the EU have even less economic freedom. A good TTIP would boost economic freedom, but it would not replace the need for other policy changes on both sides of the Atlantic. It is important to have a balanced perspective on the potential gains from a TTIP. All economic gains are valuable, as are all advances in economic freedom, but even a TTIP that did not result in increased regulation in the U.S. and so harm its economy would merely be a modest economic positive on both sides of the Atlantic. It would not be transformative; it would merely be one of many factors acting on the American and EU economies, and it would not be among the most important of those factors. Claims that a TTIP is of great significance cannot rest on its economic value to the U.S. or to the European Union. Moreover, the gains from a TTIP alone would not be enough to end the EU’s economic crisis. Even if a genuinely beneficial TTIP were concluded in the near future, the gains from it would

materialize over many years, not immediately . Economic freedom in general and free trade in particular are valuable, but they are not a rapid-fire cure for deeply rooted problems. Freedom works because it allows individuals to make decisions about their own interests, and those decisions take time to play out. Leaders or commentators who attempt to sell the TTIP as a short-term cure for the EU’s malaise are playing politics, not making a sensible economic argument.

AT EconWon’t solve growth – causes job displacement Ferdi De Ville is assistant professor in EU studies at Ghent University, Belgium, Gabriel Siles-Brügge is lecturer in politics at the University of Manchester, UK,

“ TTIP: Beware the treaty's empty economic promises,” 11-2-14, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429932.800-ttip-beware-the-treatys-empty-economic-promises.html, CMR

SUPPORTERS of TTIP claim the agreement will deliver much-needed growth and jobs. Karel De Gucht, the outgoing EU trade commissioner, described it as "the cheapest stimulus package you can imagine". To UK prime minister David Cameron it is a "once-in-a-generation prize". At the centre of this rhetoric lie various claims about the economic impact of TTIP. These are taken from economic models produced at the behest of the European Commission. They estimate that the deal will generate an extra €119 billion of GDP annually for the EU, or €545 for each family of four, by 2027 (€95bn in total and €655 per family in the US). Not only are these figures very modest, they are fundamentally misleading. They both exaggerate the potential benefit of TTIP and downplay its potential costs. Firstly, much criticism has been directed at the kind of modelling used. This is known as computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling, which is used to predict how economies

will react to changes in policy, such as a trade agreement. CGE is a form of mainstream economic modelling that assumes all markets are perfectly competitive, efficient and in equilibrium. Or, in lay terms, that there is a buyer for every product or service, including

labour. Not only is this a poor approximation of reality, but CGE models are notoriously open to bias.

They can easily be manipulated to obtain the sorts of results the researcher wants. These biases are evident in the TTIP models.

They rely on an assumption that the deal will eliminate half of the non-tariff barriers (or at least half of

those that could, in principle, be removed). The history of EU-US regulatory cooperation suggests that this is wildly optimistic. The most that negotiators have been able to agree on in the past are a series of modest "mutual recognition agreements" of each other's rules.

Moreover, the models assume such barriers will be eliminated across all sectors of the economy , generating synergies that will promote growth. This, again, is optimistic to say the least. The figures also hide much that is not easily measurable. This includes the

social impact of trade liberalisation, which often leads to workers being forced out of uncompetitive industries. The models do include estimates of "job displacement" – ranging from 400,000 to 1.1 million in the EU – but they also assume that these workers will be seamlessly reallocated to new jobs by the market. Experience suggests this is not always the case. Promising growth and jobs and justifying the promise with economic models has been a powerful tool in the past to stifle political debate on controversial issues. No politician wants to be seen as anti-growth and anti-jobs. It's time we challenged this tactic so that we can have an open and constructive discussion of the real costs and benefits of TTIP.

AT US-EU Relations EU partnership failsTechau 11 Jan, 10/6, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Dirty Secret of US European relations” http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secret-of-u-s-european-relations/8l1h

For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to

be whether all this new love translates into a more meaningful partnership on shared foreign -policy challenges. Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and terrorism was and is

constructive, one of the most crucial items on the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved

atmosphere: transatlantic burden sharing in the field of security and defense . Here, Europeans have

for the last sixty years been in a position of utter dependence on the Washington’s willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the 1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact.¶ It would be easy to blame President Obama for not using his popularity with allies intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they don’t feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned to look at the world without regard to strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the

world around them and for intervention on behalf of values and interests is small. Their political leaders —to the extent that they

are aware of today’s realities—shy away from the enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense posture would create. The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they

will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both America and Europe are broke . Their ability to shape the world around them is getting weaker . The global center of gravity is shifting towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in Washington’s fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world. Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up strategic culture will be more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than an American president they find easy to like.

Trade conflict is inevitable and will be managed without effecting relations.

Kahler ’05 [Miles, Professor of International Relations at UCSD, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, p. 99]

One axiom is required for claims that domestic politics drives cycles of transatlantic conflict and cooperation: politicians respond to political incentives on foreign policy issues just as they do on other issues. Two powerful forces have served to stabilize transatlantic relations over the decades by shaping the incentives faced by political leaders from both parties. The first is a broad internationalist majority among the American public – one that values Atlantic institutions such as NATO, even in the post-Cold War era, and that is committed to multilateral instruments whenever possible. Skeptics point to the shallow nature of this "apathetic" internationalism and to the growing importance of domestic political and economic issues on the public's agenda. Nevertheless, the consistency of this internationalism and Atlanticism is striking. The heightened threat perceived after 9/11 only increased these attachments, rather than pointing the public in a unilateralist direction. Although the attention of the electorate to foreign affairs and its unwillingness to mobilize around foreign policy issues may grant considerable latitude to political elites, these attitudes do set certain bounds to foreign policy choice, particularly if costly tradeoffs against valued domestic goals are involved. A second stabilizer has been the deepening and largely symmetric economic interdependence between Europe and the United States. The growth in foreign direct investment across the Atlantic, which implicates the largest corporations in each economy, has particular political

significance. Skeptics will point to the persistent stream of trade conflicts that divide the European Union and the United States, from beef hormones to steel tariffs. Such conflicts are a constant, however, and the institutions of the World Trade Organization have so far assisted in their management, if not their resolution. Before any of those conflicts are allowed to endanger the economic relationship, the political stabilizers of corporate power will be brought to bear in Washington and Brussels.

Trade disputes show the resilience, not the deterioration of relations.

Ilgen ’06 [Thomas, Professor of Political Studies at Pitzer College, Hard Power, Soft Power And the Future of Transatlantic Relations, p. 91]

The popular press on both sides of the Atlantic cites each new trade dispute as evidence that a "trade war is imminent and that "the relationship" is going badly, and we are invited to infer that if we could only get "the relationship" right we would have fewer trade disputes. When one examines the evidence, however, the notion of an imminent "trade war" is nonsense, and what emerges is not the deterioration but the resilience of the trade relationship.' Trade disputes are normal when two hinge economies bump up against one another. The current disputes are not worse than earlier ones ; indeed many of them are just the latest episodes of earlier ones. There has been some tetchiness on occasion, but that too is neither new nor unduly troubling. What is most willing about the economic relationship is that the US and the European Commission have resolved the recent trade disputes successfully, within the framework of the trade rules, in spite of rising domestic political opposition to some of the resolutions and in spite of disagreements between the US and much of Europe over some significant matters of security and foreign policy.

Trade disputes won’t effect relations – never has.

Van Scherpenberg ’08 [Jens, head of the America research section at the Stiftung Wissenschaft, The End of the West?, p. 142-3]

Do transatlantic economic conflicts provide a hint as to the "deepness" of the transatlantic rift? Not easily. Trade policy disputes are mostly dealt with by the comprehensive set of rules embodied in the various WTO agreements. Handling and settling them on the basis of existing trade law, therefore, is primarily a task for trade lawyers.4° Actually, nearly 20 percent of all cases dealt with through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism originate in disputes between the United States and the EU. Adding up the major U.S.-EU trade disputes by value, economists Gary Hufbauer and Frederic Neumann estimate that these conflicts refer to 5.4 percent of U.S. exports to the EU and 5.1 percent of EU exports to the United States." Keeping Philip Gordon's remark in mind that "margins can be pretty important," these percentages are not trivial 42 But despite their high political visibility, these conflicts are no in dicator of a fundamental crisis of economic relations, the more since neither side has questioned the legitimacy of WTO dispute settlement rulings.

AT NATO (Defense Spending) Won’t solve NATO or defense spending Bromund 14 (Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations, The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The Geopolitical Reality,” 9-17, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip-the-geopolitical-reality, CMR)

The TTIP’s Purported Geopolitical Impact on U.S.–European Relations Geopolitical arguments for a TTIP are more serious, though not necessarily more accurate. These arguments come on several levels. At the simplest level, some commentators have argued that a TTIP will produce spillover effects that will directly benefit NATO. For example, the Atlantic Council has suggested that the trade deal could boost defense spending in Europe, thus making NATO more capable. Based on the estimated economic gains for the EU of €119 billion ($158 billion) a year (on the generous end of the estimates), analyst Leo Michel writes: “This means that if the 28 EU members simply were to keep their current average rate of defense spending—roughly 1.5 percent of GDP—the projected TTIP boost could produce an extra $2–2.5 billion annually, or $20–25 billion over a decade, for military capabilities.”[6] This argument assumes that EU countries will keep their defense spending at current levels. Given the fact

that European defense spending has fallen by an average of 2.5 percent a year in real terms since 2010, this assumption is unrealistic . [7] This argument also assumes that any additional government revenue generated as a result of a TTIP will be allocated proportionally across all government departments, but events since 2010 have shown that most European governments want to cut, not increase, defense spending. In short, there is no realistic basis for claims that a TTIP will have a directly beneficial effect on NATO defense spending.

AT Russia (Energy)Not key to energy exports or Russia – too slow, and unilateral action solves Bromund 14 (Theodore R. Bromund, Ph.D, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations, The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The Geopolitical Reality,” 9-17, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip-the-geopolitical-reality, CMR)

Another version of this geopolitical argument is that the TTIP will require the U.S. to end its current legal restrictions on the export of energy resources, including oil and natural gas. In a recent survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council, the potential for U.S. energy exports to alleviate European dependence on Russian supplies was viewed by U.S. and EU experts as a potentially significant achievement of the TTIP.[8] In March 2014, President Obama claimed that “once we have a trade agreement in place, export licenses for projects for liquefied natural gas [LNG] destined to Europe would be much easier.”[9] This argument is correct on the one hand, since U.S. exports of energy would be a strategic and economic gain for the U.S. and Europe alike and, in particular, should be part of the U.S. response to Russian aggression against

Ukraine.[10] On the other hand, the United States already has the power to lift the restrictions on energy exports on its own . It does not need a TTIP to give it the authority to change its own regulations. President Obama’s assertion that a trade agreement would make it easier to export LNG is only a partial truth. Currently, U.S. law requires that companies apply for permits to export LNG to countries that do not have trade agreements with the U.S. Over the past four years, the U.S. Department of Energy has approved only seven of 31 permit applications. If bilateral trade liberalization, promoting American exports, and responding to Russia were at the top of his agenda, President Obama could speed up this permit process.[11] In short, the U.S. could give Americans the freedom to sell their energy abroad immediately without waiting for TTIP negotiations to conclude. Moreover, because of the time it takes to develop resources

and build export facilities, increasing energy exports will not be an effective response to Russia in the short term . In other words, advocating a TTIP as a way to counter Russian revanchism makes little sense: A TTIP will not be concluded fast enough, and though energy exports are an important part of a longer-term strategy, the U.S. can and should begin to promote them immediately. It does not need a TTIP to do this.

SQUO solves – Russian stranglehold is over Fidler 1-29-15 (Stephen, “Why Russia’s Grip on Europe’s Gas Markets Is Weakening,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-coffers-and-sway-fall-along-with-gas-prices-1422568622, CMR)

The collapse of oil prices—added to the weight of Western financial sanctions—has hammered Russia’s economy. But Moscow is also

suffering from the fall in prices of another important energy export: natural gas. Gas represented 14% of Russia’s export revenues in 2013, compared with 54% for crude oil and oil products. But its gas is more important to Europe and Ukraine. Gas is more than a commodity for Moscow: It has been a political tool that has helped it assert its influence in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.

Because of pipeline architecture, some European Union countries have had few alternatives to buying gas from Russia. But its grip over Europe’s gas markets is weakening . As natural-gas prices have fallen in the European market—less dramatically than oil but

still by at least a quarter—Moscow’s revenues have tumbled. In the longer term, further losses in Russia’s pricing power and market share in Europe appear inevitable . Russia has itself largely to blame. The Soviet Union treated gas as a commercial commodity and deliveries were unaffected by tensions between East and West. Under President Vladimir Putin , gas exports

became a political instrument, and Russian disputes with Ukraine caused stoppages in supplies in 2006 and 2009 to Ukraine and to EU

countries to its west. That set the European Union to work to “depoliticize” gas, including splitting gas transport from production, said Kristine Berzina of the German Marshall Fund think tank in Brussels. That meant companies like OAO Gazprom , the state-owned Russian gas monopoly, could no longer engage in both, at least in the EU. Other trends undermined Russia’s

gas dominance, curbing European demand. U.S. exploitation of shale and other unconventional gas reduced U.S. coal

imports and caused European coal prices to collapse. Coal, rather than gas, became the fuel of choice in Germany for base-electricity generation—needed when the country’s solar and wind farms weren’t producing. Many Gazprom export contracts are linked to the

price of oil, with a lag of several months. That means that the oil-price fall is now feeding through into gas prices. On

Thursday, as Gazprom reported a 62% drop in net profit for the third quarter of 2014, analyst Alexander Kornilov from Alfa Bank said Gazprom’s average gas prices this year will likely slip to between $200 and $250 per thousand cubic meters, from $352.70 in the

first three quarters of 2014. EU buyers of gas are demanding still-better deals. Just Wednesday, Gazprom announced a change in its agreement with Austria’s OMV to provide more favorable terms to the buyer. Even Ukraine has shifted. Andriy Kobolyev, chief executive of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company, said in an interview last week in Davos that Russia last year provided 70% of Ukraine’s gas imports, compared with 95% in 2013. “In 2015, we plan that at least 60% of natural gas will come from the EU’s direction,” he said, helped by EU projects that allow more gas to flow from west to east, particularly via Slovakia. European prices are currently 10% lower than the price Ukraine pays for Russian gas—even after a $100 discount to the official price that was negotiated through to the end of March. Russia is thus the source of last resort for Ukraine. If Moscow stops offering the discount after March, as it said it plans to, it will raise the price to a level that Mr. Kobolyev said is “totally uncompetitive.” Mr. Kobolyev said Gazprom is fighting the tide. “They should accept the fact that markets have changed and their attempts to keep a monopoly position in certain markets will only lead to negative consequences, further shrinkage of consumption volumes and a switch to other suppliers,” he said. Gazprom’s longer-term strategy has hit resistance too. Russia has canceled its planned South Stream project through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, as it struggled, Ms. Berzina said, to deal with rules policed from Brussels rather than by national governments. Now, Gazprom has announced plans to bypass Ukraine with a new pipeline through Turkey that would deliver up to 63 billion cubic meters a year of gas to the Turkish border with Greece. After a meeting in Ankara on Tuesday between Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller and Taner Yildiz, the Turkish minister of energy, Gazprom said that they approved a new route, and that Gazprom would pay for all of the offshore section of the pipeline. There’s skepticism about the plan because the pipeline’s capacity appears to be bigger than demand from potential customers. “A first assessment is that this would not work,” EU energy commissioner Maros Sefcovic said in Davos. If the pipeline is to be built, Gazprom will have to assume a greater financial burden than under South Stream, which was to be financed with

partners. Gazprom is also shifting its focus—some analysts believe belatedly—from Europe toward Asia, where it is planning to build new pipelines to China. It also needs to invest large sums upstream in developing new wells to keep the natural gas flowing, said Ms. Berzina. All that will require large sums of money, a commodity that Russia is running out of at a rapid rate.

AT Central Asia MPXNo central asia

Rogers 13 (Samuel, Advisor for the GPRA Group, The GPRA Group provides micro political and trade risk services to multinationals, insurance companies and financial institutions operating in emerging markets., 3/4/2013, "Central Asia: What's Next?", www.gpra-group.com/2/post/2013/03/central-asia-whats-next.html)

In recent years, Russia and to a lesser extent China, have been making inroads into consolidating their power within the region. The former set up the Customs Union to incorporate Kazakhstan into a free trade area;

mediated between Kyrgyz and Uzbek leaders during and following the 2010 ethnic clashes; and secured natural resource transit route rights from the region to Europe. For its part, China extended its Western borders by incorporating 1% of Tajikistan into Chinese territory; sees Central Asia as vital as a source of natural gas; views the area as a buffer zone to Russian and US expansionism; and has acted as an influential actor in offsetting Uyghur separatist intentions. Additionally, China has continued to increase investment in Afghanistan’s fledgling mineral sector and has agreed to train Afghan police, ahead of

the planned US troop withdrawal in 2014.¶ Political and economic stability are of paramount importance to Russia and China. Putin may look to expand the Customs Union in order to be in a position to rival the influence of the EU

(increased Kazakh-Kyrgyz economic cooperation has recently been discussed). China is concerned with extinguishing discontent in its Muslim-dominated Western regions and increasing economic cooperation. Premier Wen Jiabao

visited Bishkek in December 2012 in an official state visit, which aimed to consolidate Sino-Kyrgyz relations against the backdrop of signing four

official documents on economic cooperation, geology and financial investment for transport infrastructure, which reveal China’s desire for a more hands-on approach to diplomatic relations between the two states, which only began in 1992. The US, for the

immediate future, will be primarily concerned with maintaining its ability to station military personnel in Central Asia and diversify supply routes to avoid over-reliance on Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan as the 2014 deadline will

now likely be surpassed.¶ All three powers desire to preserve the political status quo and keep the current, long-standing

incumbents in office. It is therefore likely that in the event of internal political struggles, ranging from ethnic, religious or labour-related in nature, a swift return to the status quo will ensue. In 2010, for example, following widespread civil unrest in Kyrgyzstan, and the ousting of President Bakiyev, the 2011 elections saw the not dissimilar incumbent Atambayev elected amid strong international support.¶ With newly-elected Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping and the recent re-elections of Presidents Putin and Obama, 2013 will provide observers and investors a clearer picture of

official policy towards the region. Central Asian states are likely to remain politically stable and will present development opportunities as diverse as mining, dam construction and telecommunications, all of which are enjoying FDI from Russia and China. The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC), both official government-sponsored investment bodies, have jointly invested $2bn in Central Asian projects, a figure which is planned to rise to $4bn.¶ The Next Five

Years¶ Whilst it is unlikely there will be a ‘hot’ war between any of these major powers, there is potential for conflict by proxy within the

region. Areas of concern are the Afghan-Tajik border region, and internal deterioration in US-Pakistan relations, engineered by external forces. Civil unrest also has potential to re-emerge within states and also may have a ‘spill-over effect’, with the potential to permeate borders as seen in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Sudden price drops or price hikes in natural resources would also have the capacity to adversely affect trade and transit agreements between the countries.¶ With

the US set to channel funding more directly into East Asia in order to ‘face’ China’s increased regional dominance over the coming years, US military spending in Central Asia will decline, leaving a potential vacuum into which China and Russia will seek to enter through soft power; a policy, which Russia has recently openly stated it intends to pursue, and China has a long-standing policy of.¶ Observers of the region will note the rise in bilateral agreements between China and the Central Asian states - actions which make a break from traditional Chinese policy; the growing economic strength of the Customs Union; and the potential for conflict in Iran. These factors amongst others will determine the geopolitical situation of the former Soviet states over the next five years, and beyond.¶ Further afield, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey are all observing the situation in Central Asia. India, the dominant force in South Asia, will look to expand its horizons and consolidate a greater role in global affairs by becoming more proactive in Central Asia, though it is unlikely to surpass others’ presence due to its lack of strategy. Japan, from as early as the 1990s, has sought to engage the US in a joint policy towards the region in an effort to curb Chinese presence and diversify energy imports. South Korea, which is an increasing economic power, desires a stronger presence in Central Asia in order to forge closer ties with Russia, whilst consolidating its links with China, Japan and the US. Turkey, the first country to

recognise the independence of the Central Asian Republics, has donated 25% of all foreign aid to the region since 1992 ($1bn) and combined Turkish business projects’ value in Central Asia has now reached $50bn. Furthermore, the strength of cultural ties continues to increase through institutions such as the Turkic Council and student exchange programmes. ¶ Each of the aforementioned states are likely to actively seek to deepen and compound their presence in the region.

For China, Russia and the US however, the geopolitics of Central Asia is of greater importance .

There is too much to lose for any of the powers to afford conflict, economic neglect or widespread social unrest in the region, detrimental to their key

strategic aims.

AT Ukraine MPX

No war – 7 reasons

Peck 14 [Michael Peck (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/]

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the

U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia .

This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick:

Russia is a nuclear superpower . Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike.

For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought . Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that.

Russia has a powerful army . While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “Military Balance 2014″ from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast.

U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses .

Ukraine is closer to Russia . The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air.

The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war , America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan.

The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send . The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize.

The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war , especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation . Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.”

America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help . And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.