20 ARMY � July 2013

Toward StrategicThis article is one of the most compellingstatements I have read recently on the con-ceptual framework for the structure, organi-zation, staffing and training of land forcesfor the near future. The authors clarify thedistinct nature of landpower and articulatethe roles of both the service chiefs and thecombatant commanders. What is writtenhere takes us into an important campaign toensure that Strategic Landpower makes ourarmed forces the world's best.

—GEN Gordon R. SullivanU.S. Army retired

The creation of the Strategic Land-power Task Force, chartered by theChief of Staff of the Army, the Com-mandant of the Marine Corps andthe Commander of U.S. Special Op-

erations Command, harkens back to the de-velopment of AirLand Battle doctrine in theearly 1980s. The Vietnam War broke theArmy, and there was growing concern thatthe American military would be quicklyoverwhelmed by the numerically superiorforces of the Soviet Union in the event of amajor conventional war. The authors of Air-Land Battle recognized that an attrition-based strategy could not succeed against theSoviet military. A new way of thinking wasrequired.This new way of thinking was based upon

the recognition of the interdependence of land and airforces working closely together to simultaneously attackand destroy enemy forces not just in the main battle areabut also throughout the depth of an extended battlefield.The conduct of synchronized and relentless offensive actionthroughout the close, deep and rear areas would, in theory,simultaneously disrupt the enemy’s maneuver formations,logistics, and command and control capabilities to the ex-tent that their superior numbers would be effectively neu-tralized piecemeal and rendered irrelevant. Operationaliz-

ing this concept required a doctrine, organization, training,materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities(DOTMLPF) overhaul. This resulted in the M1 Abramstank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache and Black Hawkhelicopters, Paladin howitzer, F-16 and F/A-18 fighter air-craft, the creation of the combat training centers, and thecreation and indoctrination of an Army doctrine and cul-ture that emphasized decentralized command and controland small-unit initiative enabled by mission orders and aclear understanding of the higher commander’s intent.

U.S. Army/SPC Phil Kernisan

The record of AirLand Battle as a military strategic con-cept for prosecuting traditional warfare and combinedarms maneuver speaks for itself. Its application contributedto the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, which couldnot sustain the costs of trying to keep up with the UnitedStates’ qualitative military advantage. It resulted in therapid removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 and thesubsequent rapid defeat of the Iraqi military and SaddamHussein’s regime in 2003. Consequently, no one should besurprised that 21st-century enemies recognize our asym-metric advantage in conducting combined arms maneuverand have therefore sought to turn our strength into weak-ness, nor should anyone be surprised that our enemiespursue their own asymmetric advantage through uncon-ventional, irregular and hybrid approaches to conflict andtesting of American resolve. As we have learned in Iraqand Afghanistan, while AirLand Battle remains a highlyvalid military strategic concept for prosecuting a waragainst traditional military threats, we still lack a coherentand comprehensive concept for dealing with the irregularand hybrid enemies we will continue to face in the foresee-

able future. New and creative ways of thinking are re-quired.Today, the Army must consider the possibility that mili-

tary success in modern “wars among the people” (as de-scribed in Gen. Rupert Smith’s seminal work, The Utility ofForce: The Art of War in the Modern World) will require ever in-creasing interdependence among the military services andinteragency partners. It will also require that the Army de-velop a new set of DOTMLPF solutions for operating in anemerging domain of warfare, referred to by U.S. Special Op-erations Command (USSOCOM) as the human domain. US-SOCOM defines the human domain as “the totality of thephysical, cultural, and social environments that influence hu-man behavior to the extent that success of any military strat-egy, operation, or tactical action depends on the applicationof unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win pop-ulation-centric conflicts.” This idea is sure to be controver-sial, but it is worthy of serious debate and discussion. Military professionals have long acknowledged that war

is fundamentally a human enterprise—and, yes, all warsare population-centric to varying degrees. Unlike the tradi-tional warfare paradigm, in which the military object is the

“We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking that created them.”—Albert Einstein

July 2013 � ARMY 21

U.S. Army/SSG Shane Hamann

Landpower By LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris

destruction of enemy battal-ions, divisions and corps, inthe paradigm of irregularwarfare, the security objec-tive is indeed the populationitself. This requires forces—military and nonmilitary—with not only the ability todestroy but also the decisiveability to first understand thepopulation within the contextof the operational environ-ment and then take meaning-ful action to effectively influ-ence human behavior towardachieving the desired out-come. In other words, for mil-itary force to be of utility inthe forms of conflict we aremost likely to face, we musthave military forces capableof succeeding, in conjunctionwith nonmilitary forces, inthe human domain.The logic for a more com-

plete study of the human do-main is compelling. The kinds of war most analysts fore-cast—sometimes called war among the people, other timeshybrid warfare or complex contingencies—place a pre-mium on pursuing comprehensive engagement and widerand more constructive partnerships. In addition, the strate-gic environment is characterized by an increasingly popu-lated, urbanized and interconnected world. Furthermore, ifwe acknowledge we went into Afghanistan and Iraq withinsufficient understanding of cultural dynamics, and if webelieve military success will most likely require a deep un-derstanding of foreign languages and cultures and the hu-man factors involved in a given conflict, then recognizingthe human domain becomes a critical organizing and re-sourcing concept for supporting national security missions.Seeing the facts of our strategic situation as they are

should compel the Army to organize, educate, train, equipand provide forces for operating in the human domain as

we already do in the land, air, maritime, space and cyber do-mains. New DOTMLPF solutions were required to enableAirLand Battle and American dominance in the air and landdomains. Similarly, the Army must develop new DOTMLPFsolutions for providing forces to ambassadors and geo-graphic combatant commanders capable of navigating, op-erating and prevailing within the most complex and unpre-dictable of all environments—the human domain. AirLandBattle recognized the fully integrated nature of the air andland domains in order to ensure success in conducting com-bined arms maneuver against traditional threats. Now is thetime to similarly recognize, develop and combine humandomain competencies with our traditional land domaincompetencies. Doing so will provide senior decision makerswith the range of options correctly aligned with the strategicrealities they face.

The recognition and ability to effectively operate inthe human domain become even more critical givencurrent fiscal constraints. We are entering an uncer-tain strategic security environment paradoxically

framed by diminishing defense resources and an increasingnumber and variety of potential threats. These threats arewell-documented and may emanate from state actors suchas Iran and North Korea; al Qaeda and its associated franchises; the continued export and spread of ideologicalextremism to Africa; the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and of advanced military and cyber-attack tech-nologies; and the resurgence of great powers competing forincreased regional and global influence. How does theUnited States prepare and posture itself to deal with such

22 ARMY � July 2013

LTG Charles T. Cleveland assumed command of U.S. Army Spe-cial Operations Command in July 2012. Previously, he served ascommanding general of Special Operations Command Central atMacDill Air Force Base, Fla., and Special Operations CommandSouth at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla. A graduate of theU.S. Military Academy, he holds a master’s degree from the U.S.Army War College. LTC Stuart L. Farris is a Special Forces of-ficer currently assigned to U.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand. He has served six tours in Afghanistan as a member of the3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). A graduate of the IndianaUniversity of Pennsylvania, he holds master’s degrees from theCommand and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Mili-tary Studies and Webster University.

U.S. Navy/HMC Josh Ives

myriad potential threats in an emerging era of domestic fis-cal austerity?Clearly, the United States must look beyond our own in-

herent capabilities in order to form long-term and durablesecurity relationships abroad. In essence, America’s landforces should look to develop a global landpower network.This network would consist of allies, expeditionary globaland regional partners, and host-nation forces. It could ulti-mately include nonmilitary “forces” and even friendly non-state actors that have a direct relationship to success in warsamong the people in places like Libya or Syria. The networkcan be bound together by the common interests of peace, re-gional stability and global prosperity—very useful in shap-ing, deterring and winning.To be clear, this network is not intended to simply do the

bidding on behalf of America’s defense and security inter-ests. This is not about outsourcing our global security re-sponsibilities to witting or unwitting actors. Rather, it is de-signed to generate strategic options for senior defenseofficials and policymakers, both domestically and abroad,who can work together to deter-mine who should lead regional se-curity and stability efforts and howand where military capabilities canbest be used to support the success-ful achievement of a desired out-come on land. These decisions canbe better informed by strategists,planners and commanders with re-gional expertise who are organized,trained and educated to operate inthe human domain. Potentially, themore established, capable and com-petent this network is perceived byreal or potential adversaries, the lesslikely they will be willing—or per-haps more importantly, able—totake actions resulting in an intolera-ble change to a regional or globalstatus quo. Conceivably, the globallandpower network would occupythe strategic “high ground” and re-tain a globally distributed position of advantage that effec-tively deters significant adversary misbehavior. If deter-rence fails, or if the situation warrants other effects, thenetwork might provide flexible options to senior defense of-ficials and policymakers for further coercing, containing,disrupting, defeating and/or imposing long-term costs onenemies across the threat spectrum, from traditional nation-state to irregular or hybrid.

* * *Today, AirLand Battle remains a valid and viable concept

and doctrine for conducting combined arms maneuver war-fare against traditional military threats. If there is one lessonthe Army has learned (or relearned) in the past 12 years ofwar, however, it is this: The application of military force inits current form has limited utility when fighting modern

wars among the people. Combat power in the form of supe-rior weapons systems, cutting-edge technology and dispro-portionate force ratios may enable tactical success on theground but does not guarantee strategic victory. Strategicvictory requires a wider understanding of “forces” that in-cludes military and nonmilitary. Strategic victory requires amore complete understanding of the human domain.

Looking to the future, the Army should have theforesight and courage to adapt its structures andprepare its soldiers for operating in the human do-main, supported by a coherent strategy that knits

together the proper joint, interagency and internationalpartners resident within a global landpower network. Thechanges required are largely cognitive and cultural in na-ture. The solutions lie mainly in investing in people andideas, not platforms. Recognizing a human domain of war-fare, analyzing and producing the associated DOTMLPFoutputs, and working to create a global landpower net-work that continually evolves is but a proposed first step.

This will require significant investment in critical thinkingand a willingness to change, and therein lies perhaps themost significant challenge.When a superpower decides it must achieve a desired

outcome on land, the Commander in Chief should havethe appropriate tools and options ready and able to get thejob done. Land forces designed to prevail in the human do-main and dominate in the land domain, combined with se-nior decision makers enabled by a global landpower net-work, will help ensure that the necessary suite of options isavailable when results matter and America must employland forces to prevent, shape and win across the spectrumof conflict. Having the options capable of achieving de-sired outcomes is ultimately what strategic landpower isall about. �

July 2013 � ARMY 23

U.S. Army/SPC Ken Scar