Toward an Identity Metasystem

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Toward an Identity Metasystem Robert Richardson, Director Computer Security Institute (CSI) 4/28/2008| Session G2 Lots of Activity

description

Many Web users are resigned to the fact that their identities are perpetually at risk, because authentication mechanisms are either too weak or too difficult to manage. Yet, some efforts�OpenID and Windows CardSpace�aim to create an identity metasystem that is strong, flexible, trivial to use and can work across any site on the Internet. Learn how these systems work and discuss what else needs to happen before truly secure online identity and access management can become a reality.

Transcript of Toward an Identity Metasystem

Page 1: Toward an Identity Metasystem

Toward an Identity Metasystem

Robert Richardson, DirectorComputer Security Institute (CSI)

4/28/2008| Session G2

Lots of Activity

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Lots of Activity

Lots of Activity

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Answer the questions:

What’s all this mayhem that’s going on in the “Identity 2.0” space?

Which pieces matter?

Answer the questions:

How can we talk about the pieces in ways that encourage fruitful discussion about best practices for user-centric identity management?

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Lots of Activity• LID• Yadis

• X.509• Kerberos

• OASIS• SAML• SOAP• CardSpace

• Active Directory• WS-*• Liberty Alliance• CAp

• OpenID • STS

Forwards

Redesigned Apps

Known Users

Trusted Credentialing

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Back to Our Agenda:

• Blatantly ignore stuff like LDAP & Active Di tDirectory

• Take a look at specifics of OpenID and use it as a sort of reference framework

• Compare it to Microsoft’s CardSpaceExplain why some solutions may be better• Explain why some solutions may be better than others

An OpenID Approach

• I won’t authenticate you—someone else illwill

• My ticket to your authentication process is a URL

• You provide the URL and I talk to the Identity Provider who serves that URLIdentity Provider, who serves that URL

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• Identity Provider (IP)• Relying Party (RP)• User or Subject

Three Key Components

OpenID

IP 1. URLIP

UserRP

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OpenID

IP 1. URLNote that

context was IPsuch that URL was understood as an identifier

– no negotiation over what ID

was being used

UserRP

OpenID

IP1. Lemme In2 Get ProofThis is an HTTP IP 2. Get ProofThis is an HTTP

Post Packet, & one of 4 OpenIDmessage types

UserRP

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OpenID

IP1. Lemme In2. Get ProofThis is an HTTP IP 3. AuthenticateRedirect,

Leading User Browser to IP for

authentication

UserRP

OpenID

IP1. Lemme In2. Get Proof

3. AuthenticateIP 4. Deliver token

UserRP

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OpenID

IP

1. Lemme In2. Get Proof

3. Authenticate4 DeliverIP 4. Deliver

Token5. Verify Credential

UserRP

IP Trust Admin

ID Admin

Selector

AuthToken

ID 2.0 Components

SelectorRPAccess

Negotiation

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IP Trust Admin

ID Admin

SelectorRP

AuthToken

ID 2.0 Components

RPAccess

Negotiation

Enter Microsoft / Cardspace

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Bandit

IP Trust Admin

ID Admin

T k

SelectorRP AccessNegotiation

AuthToken

ID 2.0 Components

WS-MetadataExchange

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IP Trust Admin

ID Admin

SelectorRP

AuthToken

User

ID 2.0 Components

RPAccess

Negotiation

• Username• SAML• X.509• Kerberos• Rights Expression Language

WS-Security Token Profiles

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• Assertion – Authentication Statement– Attribute Statement

SAML Token

• OpenID is gaining traction because it’s i l d i l t d t d d tsimple and simple to understand and try,

but it has some potential flaws from a privacy and security point of view.

Some Issues

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• Privacy: OpenID lacks non-auditing mode.

Some Issues

• OpenID’s lack of card metaphor muddies th i f diff t l i S l tthe issue of different claims. Selector concept, though, provides a great metaphorical structure and inherent phishing protection.

Some Issues

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• The safe desktop is a powerful idea but, h t f TPM t f l fshort of a TPM, may create false sense of

security

Some Issues

• Maintaining data for IDs has some i h t bl th t b diffi lt iinherent problems that may be difficult in real-world, scaled out scenarios.

Some Issues

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• Picking IPs at will sounds great, but in lit i ti ill t t kreality, organizations will want to make

wholesale federation decisions.

Some Issues

• Systems that invoke an OS-provided “safe d kt ” d i ifi t itdesktop” mode are a significant security advantage. Browser-plugin selectors are a great shortcut in the current world, but don’t necessarily make real security gains.

Some Issues

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Thanks!

Robert RichardsonContact me at: [email protected]

• Digital Identity, Phillip J. Windley, O’Reilly, ISBN 0-596-00878-3

• Get Ready for OpenID Rafeeq Ur Rehman ISBN 978-0-• Get Ready for OpenID, Rafeeq Ur Rehman, ISBN 978-0-9724031-2-2

• Beginning Information Cards and CardSpace, Marc Mercuri, Apress, ISBN 1-59059-807-5

• Understanding Windows CardSpace: An Introduction to the Concepts and Challenges of Digital Identities (Independent Technology Guides) by Vittorio Bertocci

Book Resources

(Independent Technology Guides) by Vittorio Bertocci, Garrett Serack, and Caleb Baker, 0321496841