Torts-+session+14-19+case+doctrines

Torts and Damages – Session 15-19

Session 15 – Art 2216-2220, Cases 269-290

Ventura v Bernabe (1971) – V presented to B a letter supposedly wrote by Commander Calinawan Jr, Presidential Fact Finding Committee, asking for a loan of P350. The letter stated that Calinawan is waiting in his home and to hand V the money. B issued a check and was encashed. V found out that C did not make such letter. B sued V for falsification of private document. V claims no justifiable cause but merely for vengeance and to smear honor and reputation.

It is of no moment that there is no such crime of malicious prosecution in the Revised Penal Code. The present civil action need not be based on the existence of such a crime Article 2219 (8) of the Civil Code for “Malicious prosecution" It serves as a basis for relief in court against a party who has maliciously caused another to baselessly and unjustifiably undergo a criminal prosecution for an offense he knows the latter has not committed. Article 21 is related to such providing, "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage" and Article 2176 on torts or quasi-delict may also serve the purpose.

Elements in Malicious prosecution: these 3 must concur whether actions for criminal prosecution or civil suits. No distinction between criminal and civil.

1. requires MALICE and 2. WANT of PROBABLE CAUASE3. Defendant himself be the prosecutor of the instigator of the prosecution,

ended in acquittal

In malicious prosecution, the following must be present to be granted damages:

1.he has been denounced or charged falsely of an offense by the defendant,2. defendant knows that the charge was false3. acted with malice; 4. he has suffered damagesThe determination of the issue of malice must always be made to rest on all the

attendant circumstances, including the possibility of the fiscal or judge being some-how misled by the accuser's evidence. No doubt, the very purpose of preliminary investigations is to avoid baseless and malicious prosecutions, still, whether or not in a particular case such an objective has been duly pursued is a matter of proof.

American Home Assurance Co v Chua (1999) – Chua procured a fire insurance for their company’s stocks-in-trade for 200k. He issued a check for renewal of policy to petitioner’s agent. The next day, the whole business was gutted by fire amounting

to a loss of 4M-5M. Chua asked for insurance claim with petitioner and other insurers. Petitioner denied claim because of fraudulent income tax return, failure to establish actual loss and failure to notify them to cover the insured goods.

His loss of profit cannot be shouldered by petitioner whose obligation is limited to the object of insurance, which was the stock-in-trade, and not the expected loss in income or profit.

Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, MORAL DAMAGES may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. No such fraud or bad faith in case at bar. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. Such damages are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge. Moral of 200k deleted

Fores v Miranda (1959)– M was one of the passengers of the jeep that hit the bridge wall because of its excessive speed the driver lost control of such. M was injured and fractured part of body. Paz Fores was the registered owner of the jeep, but she claims that she sold it to Sacherman the day before the accident.

Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 (1 and 2) and 2220.

GR: By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract cannot be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties."

EXCEPTION: mishap resulting in DEATH of PASSENGER, Art 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.” Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of

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malice or bad faith. Mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier

Lopez v Pan America (1966) – Sen Lopez, wife, son-in-law and daughter made reservations for 1st-class accommodations in Tokyo-San Francisco flight. But due to mistake in travel agency’s agents, it was cancelled. It was included in the cancellation of Rufinos. PAM-AM’s supervisor withhold the information expecting cancellations of bookings before flight time. While they were Toko, they weretold that they could not be accommodated in first-class. Mr. Lopez had an engagement in US, his wife has a medical check-up so they took the tourist class but under protest. They sued PAN-AM for moral damages.

Moral damages – 100k for Sen Lopez, since Senate President and former VP of Phils. His wife, 50K – shared his prestige and subjected to humiliation and discomfort for 13hours considering she was sick. 25K for daughter – shared his prestige and experienced social humiliation.

The amount of damages is determined by considering the official, political, social and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. Also the present rate of exchange.

Moral damages for breach of contract of carriage is not recoverable unless it results to (1) death or (2) bad faith. PAN-AM is in bad faith. (1) failure to inform of cancellation intentionally. It was done to promote self-interest and closing the chances of having the Lopez family seek reservations from other airlines.

Zulueta v Pan America (1972) – Zulueta spouse and daughter were aboard PANAM from Honolulu to Manila. On its first lag, it landed on Wake Island, the stopover was 30 mins. Mr Z went to the CR at terminal but was full of soldiers, he was forced to look a CR down the beach. Upon boarding, Mr Z could not be found. The take-off was delayed and he blamed the EEs. Z claims that he was stopped at the gate and asked that Z open his luggage but he refused. He was disallowed to board and plane and was left in the island. He stayed there for 2 nights.

In relation between carrier and passenger involves special and peculiar obligations and duties, differing in kind and degree, from those of almost every other legal or contractual relation. On account of the peculiar situation of the parties the law implies a promise and imposes upon the carrier the corresponding duty of protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the carrier is under the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or injury by himself or his servants.

Where a conductor uses language to a passenger which is calculated to insult, humiliate, or wound the feelings of a person of ordinary feelings and

sensibilities, the carrier is liable, because the contract of carriage impliedly stipulated for decent, courteous, and respectful treatment, at hands of the carrier’s EEs. Among the factors court take into account is assessing moral damages are the professional, social, political and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other.

Moral damages of 1M excessive, only 500K. Contributory negligence that aggravated the gravity of situation, mainly because of his arrogant and overbearing attitude and behavior.

Ortigas v Lufthansa (1975) – Ortigas bought a 1st class ticket to Lufthansa because he was advised by the doctor to take only 1st class ticket because of his weak heart. But he was not given the seat. L promised 4 times that he will be transferred. It was aggravated by the fact that his seat was given to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him during the occasion of such discriminatory violation of its contract of carriage.

Moral damages 150k. Nobody, much less a common carrier who is under constant special obligation to give utmost consideration to the convenience of its customers, may be permitted to relieve itself from any difficulty situation created by its own lack of diligence in the conduct of its affairs in a manner prejudicial to such customers. When it comes to contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. Article 2220. But in the instant case, the breach appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may not be discriminated against with impunity.

An air carrier is liable only in the event of death or injury suffered by a passenger, because, according to the Court, to so hold would be tantamount to declaring the carrier "exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd."

Yutuk v Meralco (1961) – Yutuk was a lawyer by profession. She was recovering from broncho- pneumonia ailment. She just moved in new house in Paranaque. Electirc meter was installed at outside wall of the house. Meralco’s inspector, Jaime inspected it, then disconnected the meter alleging that Y uses a jumper and only pays half of her electric bill. Because of the incident, Y suffered a relapse.

Moral damages include mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation. While these moral



damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are made recoverable, in the amount determined by the court, provided they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. As most of these damages affect the aggrieved party’s moral feeling and personal pride, “these should be wighed in the determination of the indemnity.” Meralco not in bad faith but did with reckless negligence. The meter was disconnected without the presences of the homeowner which shows trickery. The Meralco seal was not tampered nor opened but Jaime was the one who broke the seal.

Northwest Airlines v CA (1990) – 3 siblings were given their first trip abroad as graudation gifts by their parents. While they were in Tokyo with their grandma, they were to pick up their tickets to US which were paid by their parents in Manila thru Northwest’s agent. However, NOA refused to give their tickets claiming that their agent made a wrong computation of the price – wrong conversion rate and 10% mileage surcharge was not included. They have a deficit of $261.60 each. They were forced to pay $1,046.40, which depleted their pocket money and was forced to check-in in a cheap hotel in Tokyo. Because they are worried that their money will not be enough, their grandpa was forced to go to Japan.

Even if there is a breach of contract, as admitted in this case, moral damages are nevertheless not justified where only simple negligence can be imputed to the defendant. With respect to moral damages, the rule is that the same are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where (1) the mishap results in the death of a passenger and (2) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result.

Moral damgages – 10k each plus 10k for 2 for their humiliation at NOA office. There was clear malice here, manifested in the contemptuous disregard of the passenger's protest and the abrupt rejection of their request that the Manila office be contacted for verification of the correct billing. Rudeness is never excusable. It is especially condemnable if it is committed in one's own country against a foreign guest, as in the case at bar.

PANAM v IAC (1990) – Ongsiako boarded PANAM with one check-in luggage. It was not carried on board and found after a week in its office in Manila. EE instead of helping him, arrogantly threatened to bump him off if persist. PANAM offered to forward it to LA or San Francisco but O refused, because he was about to leave.

Art 2220 – moral damages based on breach of contract with fraud or bad faith. Article 2220 of the Civil Code says that moral damages may be awarded in "breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." So, proof of infringement of an agreement by a party, standing alone, will not justify an award of moral damages. There must, in addition, as the law points out, be

competent evidence of fraud of bad faith by that party. If the plaintiff, for instance, fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., moral damages cannot be recovered. The rule applies to common carriers. In this case, the breach was substantial cause in bringing injury to plaintiff.

Heirs of Amparo de los Santos v CA (1990) – A vessel sank when it met a typhoon causing the death of A de los Santos and other poor litigants. Heirs sought damages. Board of Marine Inquiry found that crew were negligent in operating the vessel and suspended its license. Compania Maritima claims the sinking was due to force majeure. The case is pending for almost 23 years.

Moral damages – 10k each heir for mental anguish suffered due to death of their relatives. But does not apply to Reyes (survived the tragedy). Relate to Northwest Airlines v CA regarding the exceptions. No proof of bad faith in this case. Mere carelessness of carrier does not constitute per se or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on its part.

Guita v CA (1985) – Haguisan was a security guard of MMIC. All guards are required to take a psychiatric exam regularly because a general manager was previously shot by one of their guards. G was the administrative officer of MMIC. H was found to be unfit to work and was subsequently dismissed. He asked for a certification of employment, it states “after he was found mentally unfit to work.” H sued G for damages, alleging that the statement was false and derogatory which ruined his chances of employment elsewhere.

Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.

Capco v Macasaet (1990) – The parties are stockholders of Monte Oro Mineral Resources. C indorsed his 2 certificate of stocks (COS) value at 0.01/share to M for safekeeping only. When he demanded its return, M failed to produce it because it was given to an officer of said corporation. M instead placed it with his COS. M then was able to return 1 COS of C. C accepted it noted “all cleared”. The 2 COS was more than C’s previous shares. However, C still sued for damages claiming he had a ready buyer at 0.014/share, but did not materialize because of M’s failure to return his COS.



M was in good faith – replaces C’s COS and tried to recover it. No moral damages. Considering that in the absence of malice and bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the grant of moral and exemplary damages has no basis if not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code, properly set aside damages.

Maglutac v NLRC (1990) – M was an EE of Commart as a Manager of Energy Equipment Service. He was dismissed because of his family’s establishment of MM Int’l. Which is a direct competition with the company. M sued for illegal dismissal alleging that he was dismissed because his parents threatened to expose the massive diversion of funds to company president’s private accounts.

Moral damages 40k. Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral damages would be recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the employee was not only effected without authorized cause and /or due process for which relief is granted by the Labor Code but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals good customs or public policy for which the obtainable relief is determined by the Civil Code (not the Labor Code). The Labor Arbiter's judgment shall be for the employer to reinstate the employee and pay him his backwages or, exceptionally, for the employee simply to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by the Labor Code. But any award of moral damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the Labor Code but should be grounded on the Civil Code.

American Express Intl v CA (1988) – Alejandrino was granted a credit card by the petitioner. He did not always pay the fee on time. Account was cancelled one day then reinstated the next. Alejandrino presumed that his card has been restored. The card was cancelled so he was forced to surrender it at Bon Department at Seattle since there was no pre-set spending to use the card. Petitioner was only protected by stopping anyone who wrongfully uses it. Alejandrino suffered humiliation, but petitioner apologized.

While petitioner was not in bad faith, negligence caused the private respondent to suffer mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation, for which he is entitled to recover reasonable moral damages (Article 2217, Civil Code).

Strebel v Figueras (1954) – S was a lessee of a lot which he subleased to Standard Vacuum who constructed a gas station operated by S and Eustaquio. F tried to built

a drainage on the property out of spite and expectation to acquire such. F allegedly used political influence as Under Sec of Labor to cause City Fiscal the right to construct drainage and to transfer temporarily the husband of S step daughter from BOI to Bureau of Prison. S claims F is guilty of malicious prosecution, they issued a press statement that S and E violated 8-Hour Law since their EEs were required to work beyond 8 hours a day.

Mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another’s suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to such, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his sympathy for the other’s suffering.

Art 2219. Moral damages may not be recovered in cases of CRIME or TORT, unless either results or causes “physical injuries,” which are lacking in this case.

Cachero v Manila Yellow Taxicab (1957) – Cachero boarded a taxi of def. That bumped against a Meralco post. C fell into the ground and suffered slight physical injuries. He sought payment for his medical expenses, transportation, actual monetary loss, moral and exemplary damages.

Only Article 2219 (1 and 2) have any bearing on the case at bar. The defendant herein has not committed in connection with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries (Art 2219-1)". The case is but as a result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

While under the law, ERs are made responsible for the damages caused by their EEs acting within the scope of their assigned task, plaintiff, in case at bar, does not maintain his action against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused but on an alleged breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant ER alone. However, the defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal offense resulting in physical injuries against the plaintiff. The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the driver of the defendant’s taxicab but he was not made party defendant to the case. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for moral damages as his case does not come within the exception of Art 2219 (1).

Felisilda v Villanueva (1985) – F spouse’s lot was levied and sold to Dr. Galeon at public aution. No redemption was made so the sale was registered and new titles



were given. F was ordered by MTC to vacate the lot and pay Dr Galeon for the use of his land.

Award of moral and exemplary damages in an EJECTMENT SUIT, manifestly erroneous. Trial judges have a reprehensible propensity to adjudge moral and exemplary damages without any justification. Mere vexation or mental anguish is not sufficient to warrant moral damages. The case must come within the terms of Art 2217-2220 of the Civil Code.

The ONLY damages recoverable in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.

Mercado v Lira (1961) – M and others were owners and operators of Laguna Transpo. Comp. One of its bus, while on the trip from Batangas to Manila, its left front tire blew out and swerved gradually on the left side of the road, into a ravine some 270 meters away. Several passengers died and others were injured. Ramon Lira, Jr. died while Nita Lira was injured. The parents of Ramon and Nita herself sued for damages.

Moral damages 4k for death of Ramon. Damages in excess of P3k may be awarded for the death of a passenger, and in addition, the heirs may demand moral damages commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by them. Art 1764. “Art 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.” Art 2206(3). Once the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to award moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by them. Of course, the amount of moral damages to be awarded, should be such as may be reasonable and just under the circumstances in a given case.

See Fores v Miranda. A passenger who suffered physical injuries because of the carrier’s negligence (culpa contractual) cannot be considered in the descriptive expression “analogous cases used in Art. 2119” for which the new Civil Code authorizes indemnification for moral damages in favour of the injured party. Moral damages are only recoverable in this case when there is evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. There is none in this case. The cause of the accident was merely the bursting of tire.

Tamayo v Univ of Negros Occ (CA:1962) –

A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be

experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life.

PAL v CA (1981) – Samson was a co-pilot in PAL while Capt Bustamante was the commanding pilot on their Manila to Legaspi flight. Because of B’s very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield. The plane crash landed beyond the runway and the head of Samson hit and break through the thick front windshield of the plane which caused him severe concussion and wounds. He request for medical treatment but PAL merely refer him to the company doctor who is a only a general practitioner. He experiences periodic dizzy spells, general debility and nervousness. He was subsequently dismissed for physical disability. S sued PAL for damages.

Moral damages 50k . The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict, Art 2219(2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages. Even form the standpoint of the petitioner PAL that there is an EE-ER relationship between it and Samson as respondent arising from the contract of employment, Samson is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith and malice by CA, applying Art 2220 relate to Art 19 (act with justice, give everyone his due) . Buenaventura v CA (2005) – The marriage of Noel Buenaventura, petitioner and Lucia Singh, respondent was declared null and void for the psychological incapacity under Art 36 FC of B. He was ordered to pay 2.5M moral damages to Lucia,

Art 2217, Art 21 referred to Art 2219. The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must WILLFULLY cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, the lower courts could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.

Psychological incapacity was defined as “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage… utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage…”

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party



because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. The definition of psychological incapacity removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

Mercado v CA (1960) – Mercado, petitioners’ child and Quisumbing, respondents’ child are classmates. M has a pitogo (piggy bank) which he lent it to Lim, then Lim lent it to Legaspi then to Q. Legaspi and Q did not know that the pitogo is owned b y M. When M was trying to get it to Q, Q refused. A fight ensued, and when Q became weak, M cut the cheeks of Q with a razor.

While moral damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)

Session 16 – Art 2015, 2208, 2229-2235, 4 Annotations on Attorney’s Fees, Cases 133, 200, 238, 251, 261, 265, 291-310, and 322

Araneta v Areglado (1958) – Araneta, Atenean teased Arreglado, former Atenean because of transferring to La Salle. Arreglado fell from the ground.

Moral damages in case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who suffered them and not by his next of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary.

The father’s failure to submit the son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for or that its cost, if actually necessary, should not enter in the assessment of the damages to which the injured party is entitled.

Herbosa v CA (2002) – H sued for damages for breach of contract. They hired PVE, division of Solid Corp, to record their wedding ceremony. Through their utter disappoint, PVE failed to record of problems in the equipment. A writ of execution was issued, levied personal properties of Solid Corp. On the day of auction sale, an injunction was issued but was delivered late. It was sold & Solidbank sued for damages – moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees.

The claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees must each be independently identified and justified.

MORAL damages -75k - cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because such an action is not among those expressly mentioned in Art 2219 of NCC. However, it is recoverable if breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.

Exemplary damages – 40k – a warning to all entitled to observe good faith and due diligence in fulfilling contractual obligations

Attorney’s fees of 10k – Art 2208

Central Azucarera de Bais v CA (1990) – Def are sugar cane planters milling their sugarcane with petitioner without any written milling contracts. They had a share of 60% in sugar produced. RA 809 was enacted compelling increased participation of majority planters. Central gives 62% share for those who signed but 60% share if without milling contract.

ATTORNEY’s FEES is an award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. Article 2208 demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must



explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney's fees. Deleted award of such

Mindanao Academy, Inc v Yap (1965) – Nuqui and son sold land with 2 schools (Mindanao Academy and Misamis Academy) to Yap. Yap took possession and renamed it to Harvardian Colleges. But found out that there are many co-owners in such school that has not consented the sale. They sued for annulment of such.

Indeed the interests of the said stockholders, if any, were already represented by the corporation itself, which was the proper party plaintiff; and no cause of action accruing to them separately from the corporation is alleged in the complaint, other than that for moral damages due to "extreme mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings."

Attorney's fees P2k should be upheld, although the same should be for the account, not of the plaintiff stockholders of the Mindanao Academy, Inc., but of the corporation itself, and payable to their common counsel as prayed for in the complaint.

Lazatin v Twano (1961) - Lazatin sued Twano for price of 225 autotrucks purchased from the US government. They are partners in buying and selling such. Def claims that plaintiffs action was clearly unfounded. SC: the case was dismissed on purely technical ground – prescription and res adjudicata.

Atty Fess – 3k. Art 2208 (4). While it may appear also that the move was a scheme to prevent the defendants-appellees from reaping the benefits of the final judgment rendered in their favor in said case CA- G.R. No. 5433-R, still one cannot nullify, without cause, the good and honest motive, which should be presumed, when a litigant goes to court for the determination of his alleged right.

Considering the fact that defendants-appellant lees were drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant and were compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them, and taking into account the work done by said attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings.

Mambulao Lumber Co v PNB (1968) – Mambulao Lumber granted industrial loan of 100k by PNB. Only 27,500 and 15,500 was released. M failed to pay and the sheriff filed a notice of foreclosure mortgaged land and the chattel mortgage. M requested the suspension of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, and was granted. However, the sale of the land was done. The proceeds is 56,908. M deposited 738.59 which represents payment of the its whole debt. PNB claims that there is still a balance.

Exemplary 10k. Attorney’s fees 3k. But for the wrongful acts of herein appellee bank and the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte in proceeding with the sale in utter disregard of the agreement to have the chattels sold in Manila as

provided for in the mortgage contract, to which their attentions were timely called by herein appellant, and in disposing of the chattels in gross for the miserable amount of P4,200.

People v Bautista (1981) – Abalayan went to B, faith healer several times to seek help since she suspects that his husband is cheating on her. One day, B asked A to lie down and unzip her pants in the woods, claiming that he will do a ritual to ward off the infidelity of his husband. B started caressing the breasts and vagina, A protested. B instead gave her a potion but A after drinking it felt weak. She was hypnotized and B abused her.

Moral damages 20k. As a victim of rape, complainant undeniably felt mental anguish and distress. And having to face public trial that would expose the lurid details of her unhappy experience, that too had the effect of besmirching her reputation to warrant the award of moral damages, an inseparable liability to the punitive portion of the sentence imposed on all convicted rapists.

Prudenciado v Allied Transport System (1987) – Dra Prudencio was about to hold a class at Philippine Normal College. When she was about to cross the intersection to Taft Ave, she stopped and looked at both sides for any on-coming vehicle. She proceeded when she saw that there no cars. Suddenly, a taxi of defendant bumped her car. She sustained phyiscal injuries like brain concussion.

Exemplary damages-5K. Article 2231: In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good. However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other people cannot be said to be acting in anything less than gross negligence. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures.

Attorney’s fees 3k.

Corona v CA (1983) – Popioco was driving jeep owned by Ong, collided with pick-up driven by Pineda owned by Corona. Popioco suffered injuries.

Atty’s fees 1k each to be paid to Ong and Popioco. P50,000.00 moral damages quite excessive, considering that on record the

injuries suffered by private respondent Popioco were as follows: “Fracture, simple, complete, femur left, Fracture, simple, complete, distal third, patella, left” for which he underwent "an intramedullary nailing of the left femur on March 15, 1969 and removal of patellar fructure fragments and patellar tendon repair on April 2, 1969. "



There is no evidence showing that as a consequence thereof, he now limps, became lame or that even one of his legs became short.

People v Ruiz (1981) – Ruiz found that Atty Jose Ong Oh, deceased, refused to load his copra through Ruiz union. Looked for the Ong Oh and shot him.

3 mitigating circumstances: passion and obfuscation, drunkenness and voluntary surrender.

Moral damages from 50k to 20k. Amount awarded for damages in a criminal case shall be reduced where there are mitigating circumstances.

No exemplary damages shall be awarded if there are no aggravating circumstances.

Attorney’s fees – from 10k to 5k. The private prosecutors that helped in the prosecution of the case being deemed to have rendered service for a fellow member of the bar more in the spirit of professional fraternity.

Ribaya & Carbonell v Bautista (1980) – Ribaya was engaged in buying and selling jewelry. She was informed by her agent that Bautista was interest in buying jewelries with big diamonds. B bought jewelries amounting to P222k and 94K. B paid through checks but all was dishonoured since B’s account was closed. R cannot find B. B started to visit various pawnshops in Manila and found that the jewelries were pawned. R found B but was given a run around at maturity dates of checks.

Moral damages & Exemplary damages – 25% of principal sumMoral damages – Petitioner Niceta suffered "extremely" and that for three

months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral damages.

Exemplary - The wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil contract.

There was more than wanton refusal to pay a plainly valid and just contractual debt, but a malicious defraudation and gross abuse of petitioners' good faith, whereby petitioners were wantonly "paid" with bouncing postdated checks and besides not being paid what was due them, had to undergo trauma and travail to redeem with their own and borrowed funds from the pawnshops some of the jewelries in order to return them to their owners.

Domingding v Aranas v Ng (1958) – From the record we also understand that the offended party is an exporter of mangoes who, evidently, does not seem to have much capital because she only pays for the mangoes when the same is sold. Neither does the offender seem or appear to be of much financial consequence because he was only the overseer or manager of a mango store.With all the above circumstances in mind, the Tribunal believes that the sum of P50,000, assessed by the court a quo, is excessive. P1,000 should be sufficient as moral damages, but the offender should be required to pay punitive damages in the amount of P2,000 because of his act in abusing the confidence of a customer belonging to the weaker sex, which bespeaks of a perverse nature dangerous to the community.

Attorney's fees 1k reasonable.

Peo v Medroso Jr (1975) – Medroso driven by M while in a barrio, hit Andes. Andes died. 2 mitigating: voluntary surrender, plea of guilt. 1 aggravating: drove truck without a license.

Actual: 12k. Moral damages 4k. May be recovered where physical injuries ended in

death. Determination of nature of human life discretionary upon trial court. The assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest showing that the same is arbitrary or excessive.

Exemplary damages 4k. Exemplary damages are corrective in nature and are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229, Civil Code), and the situation before Us calls for the imposition of this kind of damages to deter others from taking into their hands a motor vehicle without being qualified to operate it on the highways thereby converting the vehicle into an instrument of death.

Tan Kapoe v Masa (1985) – Masa, Tan’s tenant for 10 years, asked the latter for the conversion of their share tenancy relationship to one of leasehold, petitioners rejected. Masa filed in CAR for such but Tan opposed and filed for ejectment. The conversion was granted. Tan filed 6 cases against Masa. He was arrested. Masa filed for moral and exemplary damages for malicious prosecution.

Exemplary 200 each. The award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages. However, there can be no question that the entitlement to moral damages having been established, exemplary damages may be awarded. And exemplary damages may be awarded even though not so expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved.



Attorney’s fees 3k. Attorney's fees are also recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, and in criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff.

Munsayac v de Lara (1968) – Plaintiff was a passenger in a jeep owned and operated by defendant. Defendant drove at excessive speed and did not take due care even though the road is under repair and that his passengers requested him to go slowly.

The law does not contemplate a vicarious liability on his part: the breach is his as party to the contract, and so if he is to be held liable at all for exemplary damages by reason of the wrongful act of his agent, it must be shown that he had previously authorized or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in effect making him a co-participant.

It is not enough to say that an example should be made, or corrective measures employed, for the public good, especially in accident cases where public carriers are involved. For the causative negligence in such cases is personal to the employees actually in charge of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this kind of damages by way of example or correction, unless by the demonstrated tolerance or approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and their fault is of the character described in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Otherwise there would be practically no difference between their liability for exemplary damages and their liability for compensatory damages, which needs no proof of their negligence since the suit is predicated on breach of contract and due diligence on their part does not constitute a defense.

Martinez v Gonzales (1962) – Gonzales, owner and Fornal, driver was sued by Martinez for damages because of physical injuries sustained while riding the taxicab of Gonzales. G’s taxi bumped with another taxi. Martinez lost consciousness because of such accident and was required to be hospitalized. Ca deleted moral and exemplary damages and reduced attorney’s fees.

Moral damages are not recoverable in damages actions, predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code.

The exceptions according to the Fores case:(1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even

if death does not result. NO moral -Plaintiff-appellant designated the incident as accident and

predicated her cause of action on the failure of the defendant to perform her

obligation, as a carrier, to bring plaintiff-appellant safely to her destination. This being the case, no moral damages are awardable.

NO exemplary. Plaintiff-appellant not being entitled to moral damages, she is not also entitled to exemplary damages. For one to recover exemplary damages, he must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate liquidated or compensatory damages.

Attorney’s fees. 200.

Octot v Ybanez (1982) – Octot was a security guard in GSIS. The government ordered all department heads to dismiss EEs that are undesirable especially those who are facing charges. Octot was convicted of libel in RTC. He was dismissed, Octot believing it was illegal, still continued to work but his salary was withheld by Ybanez. He was subsequently acquitted by CA. Imbong requested for his reinstatement, which was approved. However, Octot delayed in acting on such.

Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in a special civil action for mandamus unless the defendant patently acted with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest judgment. The claim for exemplary damages must presuppose the existence of the circumstances enumerated in Articles 2231 and 2232 of the Civil Code.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Such damages are required by public policy, for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic.

Conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded:1. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,

among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.

2. The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

3. The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner

Matura v Laya (1979) – Matura was a public school teacher, went to school where Sarmago also works as a teacher. M accused her as the paramour of her husband and started insulting her about the immorality & physically assaulted in front of Sarmago’s co-teachers and students. Matura was convicted of oral defamation and slight physical injuries.



Art 2230: criminal offenses exemplary damages as a part of a civil liability may be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. In case at bar, no aggravating circumstance.

Rotea v Halili (1960) – Bacson was driving a bus owned by Halili, which collided with a bus. Rotea, passenger of Halili was injured. Sought 10k exemplary damages but trial court did not awarded the same.

Exemplary damages are imposed primarily upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts in the future. Such punitive damages cannot be applied to his master or employer except only to the extent of his participation or ratification of the act because they are penal in character . Moreover, in this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Article 2230, new 3m 3 Civil Code), and here the crime being only qualified by negligence is not accompanied by an aggravating circumstance and no evidence of participation of wrongful act of EE.

Since they are awarded not by way of compensation, but as a punishment to the offender and as a warning to others, they can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense

Geluz v CA (1961) – Lazo, husband of Villanueva, sued Geluz for the 3rd abortion done by his wife alleging that he did not consent on such. But it was presumed that the 1st abortion which happened before they got married and the 2nd abortion (time that she was employed in Comelec) were done to his wife with his knowledge.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217).Exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). No damages in case at bar, appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,

clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

Mirasol v de la Cruz (1978) – Mirasol sued Mendoza for forcible entry. But Mendoza claims there is a prior existence of a tenancy contract and the case was purely for harassment.

Art. 2208: it is clearly intended to retain the award of attorney's fees as the exception in our law, as the general rule remains that attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy to self a premium on the right to litigate. Art. 2208 (4) allows attorney's fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, but it must be understood to mean those where the cause or causes of action are so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Proof must be presented to the court as to the facts and circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith.

“attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. ..." Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Art. 2208 (11) of the New Civil Code demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." Pirovano v de la Rama S/S (1954) – Estefania was one of the daugthers of Esteban de la Rama, major stockholder of respondent. He gave equal shares to his daughters. The husband of Estefania, Pirovano became the president of the company. He was responsible for the massive expansion of the company. When he died, the board made a resolution donating to his minor heirs P’s life insurance proceeds in terms of stocks. One daughter of Esteban protested since it will make the voting rights twice as to her sisters. The board nullified the donation and instead claims that the proceeds will be considered as their debt and will pay 5% interest per annum. Estefania filed for the recovery of proceeds.

Atty’s fee reduced from 20% to 10% of the amount as damages. Art 2208(2).

United General Industries v Paler (1982) – Paler bought a tv in instalment basis, and executed as promissory note and chattel mortgage. Paler violated the contract of mortgage, plaintiff sued for estafa.

Atty’s fees increased by 250 to 1k. Art 19 relate to Art 2208 (5). Paler wilfully refused to pay debt which he clearly ought to have paid. He even imposed a burden on this Court by filing an unnecessary and frivolous appeal.



Rizal Surety & Ins v CA (1967) – Imperial, consignee of 6 bales of cotton remnants, procured insurance. The cotton is shipped by US Lines. Upon arrival, Manila Port Service (MPS), arrastre operator gained custody of such. However, Imperial found that 4 were short landed or short delivered. Rizal forced to pay P1,422.42. Rizal subrogated the rights of Imperial. It asked reimbursement from US Lines and MPS as alternative defendants. US Lines claims for attorney’s fees claiming the suit was unfounded.

Art 2208(2) not applicable. Attorney’s fees:1. The litigation expenses recoverable therein are those incurred in suing

third persons, upon the premise that such expenses were unnecessary. The expenses mentioned in the second situation in said par. 2 are therefore non-litigation; otherwise, there would have been no justification for the distinction.

2. The article in question starts out with the general rule; "In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered . . ." Now a party sued in court is compelled under pain of default to become a party defendant either necessarily or unnecessarily. If necessarily, he cannot recover the attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred even if he should win, since it is not the fact of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather the attendance of special circumstances the enumerated exceptions in Article 2208 in addition. Otherwise, everytime a defendant wins, automatically plaintiff must pay attorney's fees, thereby putting a premium on the right to litigate, which should not be so. For those expenses then, the law deems the award of costs as sufficient reimbursement. On the other hand, if a party is unnecessarily made a defendant it will not be par. 2 of the article but par. 4 of the article that will apply, because the term "unnecessarily" connotes the idea that the cause of action against such party was clearly unfounded in the first place. Atty’s fees of 300 to US Lines was reversed. “Clearly unfounded” - cause of

action must be so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. There might have been such bad faith on petitioner's part if, it knew before filing the complaint against U.S. Lines that MPS would admit liability.

Trader’s Royal v CA (1997) – TRB EEs Union secured the services of Atty Cruz, and agreed a monthly retainer of 3k. The union claims for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against TRB. But only the holiday was granted to the union amounting to P175,794.32. TRB paid the amount to its employees. Atty Cruz sought 10% of award as attorney’s lien, which was granted by NLRC. Union protested alleging that

attorney’s fees should have been incorporated in main case not after final judgment of SC. The decision can no longer be altered.

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ORDINARY CONCEPT, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its EXTRAORDINARY CONCEPT, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation . The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

When the labor arbiter ordered the payment of attorney’s fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.

Even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co v Chavez (1966) – Firestone sued Ines Chavez for the price of automobile tires sold and delivered amounting to P6,241.75 plus interest and attorney’s fees. C issued a check but was dishonoured. invoice stipulates that in case of suit, C agrees to pay 25% as attorney’s fees and liquidated damages.

Attorney’s fees warranted. Art 2208. One such case is where the defendant is guilty of "gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff's



plainly valid, just and demandable claims. Article 19 related to Art 1170. Bad faith is evident on the part of Chaves because of issuing a check with no funds.

Abrogar v IAC (1988) - Respondents was ordered to pay Abrogar P2,553 in a civil case. Because of its failure to pay, its 2 land worth 75k was levied and was sold at public auction but without consent of Soccoro Desear, one of the respondent. It was sold for only P2,553. RTC ruled that sale was null and void for lack of notice and awarded attorney’s fees of 2k.

No Attorney’s fees. There is neither an allegation nor evidence to support the award of P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees in favor of private respondents. The exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (ii) of the New Civil Code demands a factual, legal, and equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.

Attorney's fees are recoverable not as a matter of right. It is the import of Article 2208 that the award of attorney's fees is an exception and that the decision must contain an express finding of fact to bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of attorney's fees. "Just and equitable" under paragraph 11, Article 2208, New Civil Code is not a matter of feelings, but demonstration. The reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.

Antonio v Santos – Antonio applied for the registration of the 2 land previously owned by his father. It was granted and declared owner but he found out that the lot is already registered to the respondents. A sued for recovery of land alleging that the title of respondents is void being procured thru fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations. Respondent claims in peaceful possession of the property and Antonio never possessed it.

An award of moral damages is not warranted since the record is bereft of any proof that Antonio acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the action. Neither should attorney’s fees be awarded. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the trial court’s decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed.

Bantoto v Bobis (1966) – Vallejo owner of jeep, driven by Bobis struck 3 year old girl, daughter of Bantoto. The young girl died because of serious injuries. Bobis pleaded guilty to homicide thru reckless imprudence. Bantoto filed a motion to

declared also the owner solidary responsible for damages – civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages.

Exemplary damages improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as person subsidiarily liable, cannot incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be held responsible more than the principal debtor. (Art 2064)

Attorney’s fees of 3k disallowed only 1k. Driver cannot pay because if he could, or if he had money or leviable property worth that much, he must be operating his own jeep. Art 2208(9).

Session 17 – Art 559, 1505, 2177 CC; Art 100-113 RPC; Cases 311-327, 426 scra 167, 427 scra 456

Martinez v Barredo (1948) – A taxi, driven by Digman, owned by Barredo collided with the Chevrolet car of Martinez. They sued each other for damages to property thru reckless imprudent. However, Digman plead guilty. He was ordered to pay Martines for P605.97 as indemnity. He was unable to pay so M sued B for subsidiary liability under Art 102-103 RPC. Whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code?

The judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiary liable . A finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in a criminal case.

The employer can not be said to have been deprive of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence.

MD Transit v CA (1968) – Epstein, plaintiff, was hit by a bus of MD transit driven by Sembrano. E suffered fractures bones. S was found guilty of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence but no pronouncement of his civil liability since E reserved right to file a separate civil action for damages. E sued S and MD Transit for



damages. Whether the liability sought to be enforced therein arises from a crime, as contended by the plaintiff, or from a quasi-delict, as urged by appellant?Delict – Art 102-103 RPC Quasi-delictEE primarily liable while ER secondarily liable. The secondary nature of the latter's obligation necessarily connotes that his properties may not be levied upon, in pursuance of a writ of execution of the judgment declaring the existence of both liabilities, as long and so long as the ER can point out properties of the EE which may be levied upon in satisfaction of said judgment. Thus, the EE's solvency is merely a matter of defense which may be availed of by the ER.

Prayer in the pleading ER “solidarily” liable with EE.

In the criminal action, he had reserved the right to seek indemnity in a separate civil action

Reservation unnecessary if based on quasi delict

The law authorizing the commencement of a civil action based upon a liability arising from a crime, even before the institution of the criminal action, necessarily implies that the rendition of a judgment of conviction in the latter need not be alleged in the civil complaint.Not a defense – diligence of ER. Judgment of conviction in the criminal case against an EE is, not only admissible in evidence in the civil case against the ER, but, also, conclusive upon his subsidiary liability arising from the EE's criminal liability.

Defense: due diligence of selection and supervision of ER.

That "actual" damages and "consequential damages" are dealt with in the Civil Code of the Philippines under the same Chapter; thereof that the two (2) terms are thus used therein as equivalent to one another. Art 2220 CC - "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered" otherwise known as "damnum emergens," and alluded to in said decision as "actual damages" "but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain" or "lucrum cessans" or "compensatory damages," pursuant to the same decision the distinction therein made appears to be inconsequential, insofar as the law and this case is concerned.

Cerezo v Tuazon (2004) – The tricycle was in its proper lane (Tuazon). While Country Bus Lines bus collided with a tricycle. Many died. Cerezo spouse was sued for damages as owner of Country Bus Lines with the driver. T was paralayzed. Is the

EE an indispensable party in recover of damages against ER against a quasi-delict committed by EE?

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

QUASI-DELICT: ER liability: primary and direct. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage . Not necessary to reserve the filing of separate civil action since liability is primary and direct for her own civil negligence.

DELICT. The aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the EE’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then trial court’s jurisdiction over EE is necessary.

Arambulo v Manila Electric (1930) – A motorman with his student was operating a streetcar with a speed of 35-40 kph. They saw an old woman but the student did not slacken speed and struck the old woman. Motorman seized the hand gear and applied the brakes but it was too late. The old woman died after 8 days. The car even after applying the brakes travelled for about 20m. They were held guilty of homicide by simple negligence.

Art 1092 CC relate to Art 20 RPC.1. exemption from civil liability in Art 1903 CC for all who have acted with the

diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in Art 20 RPC; and

2. amount of the subsidiary civil liability can in no case exceed that of the principal civil liability.

Pajarito v Senerix (1978) – Felipe Aizon owns a bus driven by Joselito Aizon. The bus turned turtle and passengers (one is Pajarito) died. P’s mother sued for double homicide thru reckless imprudence. Joselito was convicted and ordered to indemnify the mother for 12k. A writ of execution was unsatisfied, so a subsidiary motion for execution was filed against Felipe. F opposed the claims alleging that he



is not the ER of Joselito and if he is insolvent, he must suffer subsidiary imprisonment.

Art 100 RPC. The institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant. Civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law."

Art 103 in relation to Art 102 of RPC for an ER to be subsidiarily liable for EE’s civil liability in criminal action:

1) ER is engaged in any kind of industry; 2) EE committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and 3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after

conviction of the employee in the criminal case.The enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may be

conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice." In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of their rival claims.

Baza Marketing Corp v Bolinao Security (1982) – Baza Marketing leased a part of the building of Chamber of Commerce. CC signed a contract of security with the respondent. Fajarillo was designated as guard in the premises of CC. One day, F conspired with Secreto, 16-year-old outsider to steal office equipments from Basa worth P5,440. F was convicted with robbery. The writ of execution was unsatisfied, so a subsidiary writ was filed. Whether Bolinao w/c furnished guards for CC Building, wherein Basa is one of the tenants, is subsidiarily liable for the civil liability imposed on one of its security guards, as proven that he is insolvent.

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may only arise if the employee commits the crime of which he was found guilty in line or in pursuance of the discharge of his assigned duties. An employer will be held responsible for any misdeed that his employee could have done while performing his assigned tasks. The statutory limitation that the crime of the employee must have been committed "in the discharge of his duties" is clearly intended to exclude crimes not related to the performance of the duties assigned to him by his employer. It is not correct to say that the employer's subsidiary liability will be imposed even when the act is not done in pursuance of the duties of the employee, the act of stealing not being included in an employee's assigned tasks: nor would an employer ever include among the duties of his employee the commission of a crime.

Clemente v Foreign Mission Sisters (CA)–

Connel Bros v Aduna (1952) – Aduna was a driver of Ex-Meralco EEs Transportation Company. He bumped the car of Connel Bros Company and fell into the canal, where Boomer and Nichol were passengers and sustained injuries. A separate civil action for damages was filed against Aduna. Aduna was convicted with damage to property & serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Ex-Meralco presented evidence of their exercise of due diligence of good family in selecting and supervising its EEs.

Art 1902-1903 CC. Liability of Ex-Meralco only subsidiary. Every civil obligation arising from a crime or misdemeanor is to be governed by the provisions of the penal code, then, inasmuch as all acts or omissions causing damage to another as a result of one's fault or negligence are punishable by law.

The remedy provided by the penal code for the recovery of damages by the party damaged is more burdensome and difficult, particularly in the amount or extent of proof to establish his rights to damages, because to establish the guilt of the offender guilty of negligence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, whereas in a purely civil action to recover the same damages under Arts. 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, only preponderance of the evidence is required. So, the court in that case held that the offended party seeking damages has the right to choose between a criminal action and a civil suit.

Jamelo v Serfino (1972) – Regoles was driving a truck of Serfino with his co-EE Jamelo collided with a parked track. Jamelo died. Jamelo sued for damages. The writ of execution was unsatisfied. A motion of subsidiary liability to the owner was filed. S was adjuded liable for 8k. S claims that there being no judgment in a criminal case filed against the driver Regoles, S is not subsidiarily liable.

“A subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action." There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant-ER under Article 103 RPC where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. Criminal conviction of EE is a condition sine qua non under RPC. The plaintiff in case at bar filed an independent civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio Regoles based on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's son and secured the P8,000.00 damage judgment against him alone, which she could not collect, however, due to his insolvency. Such civil judgment is enforceable solely and exclusively against the only defendant, ER Regoles.



Phil Rabbit Bus Lines v People (2004) – Roman was convicted of reckless imprudence.

Art 102, 103 RPC. Civil actions in Art 32-34 and Art 2176 CC. shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil

liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. ERs are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

Conviction of EE binds ER subsidiarily. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. In a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

Joaquin v Ancieto (1964) – Pilar Joaquin, on the sidewalk, was hit by Aniceto while driving the taxi of Rodelas. A was found guilty of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. J reserved the right to file a separate civil action for damages. J sued for damages against the driver and owner pending criminal case. May an EE’s primary civil liability for crime and his ER’s subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against EE is still pending?

See Pajarito v Senerix for the 3 requisites for an ER to be held subsidiarily liable. Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. Any action brought against him before such is premature. Art 33 RPC only applies to an action against EE on his primary civil liability. Conviction is a condition sine qua non for the ER’s subsidiary liability. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice, between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.

De los Santos v Tan Khey (CA) –

Steinmetz v Valdez – p 249

US v Baggay (1911) – Many people was gathered in Baggay’s house for a song service “buni,” Tingguian custom. Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked a woman, Bil-liingan with a bolo and wounded her head and also inflicted wounds to 5 other women including her mother. He was declared exempt from criminal liability because of insanity but was obligated to indemnify heirs of murdered woman, 1k.

Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition.

Even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him (guardians) or the liability of the demented person himself with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation or indemnification.

Teleria v Garcia (CA) – p 250

Generoso v Univesal Textile Mills (1980) – Marcelo Generoso, working in the weaving department in Universal Textile, was stabbed to death by co-EE, Lebantino



while L was performing his duties. L was convicted for homicide and sentenced to pay 6k. L was unable to pay. Heirs of G received from the company P5,269.36 as workmen’s compensation (WC). Is the ER who already paid WC to heirs of an EE, who was killed by his co-EE, is still liable to pay to the same heirs the subsidiary civil liability under Art 103 of RPC.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law and articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code are statutes in pari materia. They should be construed together.

In view of the textile corporation's payment of workmen's compensation, its obligation to pay, in a subsidiary capacity (or in default of the killer), the civil indemnity adjudged against him in the criminal case, was extinguished. The instant case is an exception to the rule in article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Their remedies were alternative and could not be claimed simultaneously. Having opted for workmen's compensation, they are bound by that election of remedy and are estopped to claim other remedies. The injured employee who sustains a compensable personal injury has the option:

1. to claim workmen's compensation or 2. to sue for damages the person responsible for the personal injury.

Having paid workmen's compensation, the employer is subrogated ipso jure to the right of the heirs to claim civil liability from the author of the homicide. Instead of being liable for the indemnity, the employer, as subrogee, is entitled to recover it from the convicted killer of the employee. Any excess in the recovery would be paid by the ER to the “injured EE or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the ER and the costs of the proceedings.

Miranda v Malate Garage (1956) – A collision occurred between Miranda, owner of Studebaker car and Ramos, driver of Malate Garage. R plead guilty and was sentenced to pay P2,318.40. Malate was ordered to pay the indemnity. M admitted to be R’s ER but denied other allegations. In allowing the case to be submitted for decision. In allowing the case to be submitted for decision w/o giving said defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff regarding his claim for damages because such claim was never admitted as in fact denied when its answer it stated that it did not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

The decision in criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the defendant not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an ER cannot be separated but follows that of his EE. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary. To allow to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.

While strictly speaking, an ER is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his EE, it is his concern, as well as of his EE, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his EE. If because of his indifference or inaction the EE is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court.

Bantoto v Bobis (1966) – Vallejo owner of jeep, driven by Bobis struck 3 year old girl, daughter of Bantoto. The young girl died because of serious injuries. Bobis pleaded guilty to homicide thru reckless imprudence. Bantoto filed a motion to declared also the owner solidary responsible for damages – civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. Bobis was insolvent.

Exemplary damages improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as person subsidiarily liable, cannot incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be held responsible more than the principal debtor. (Art 2064)

In Art 103, insolvency of servant not mentioned. Such insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's (principal obligor's) properties if he can not "point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee.

Ramirez v Yatco (1963) – The Oldsmobile car by Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co disappeared and was seized from Ramirez which he allegedly bought from Barach Motor. Reyes was sued for qualified theft. ISSUE:

Art 105 RPC. Said article provides that the restitution of the thing itself shall be made by the court whenever possible, even though it b e found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving only to the latter the action he may have against the proper person who may be held liable to him. The only exception is when the thing has been acquired by a third person in a manner which bars its recovery. In case at bar, there is no claim that petitioner falls within the exception.



Session 18 – Art 29-35, 2177; RR of Crim Pro, Rule 111, Sec 1-5, Cases 328-348

Barredo v Garcia and Almario (1942) – Garcia, 16 year old died while riding a carretela when it collided with a taxi driven by Fontanilla. F convicted in criminal case, parents of victim filed a right to reserved a separate civil action. Parents sued owner of taxi, Barredo as ER for damages. F is negligent for the mishap because he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed. B claims that his liability is only subsidiary under RPC, he cannot be liable because F was not included as defendant.

A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or

misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. 2 jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects.

Art 365 RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.

To hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. RATIONALE: to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay.

Art 2180: to protect society. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. Before third persons the employer and employee become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.

Chan v Yatco (1958) – Phil Rabbit’s bus collided with parked truck. 2 helpers & driver of truck was injured. In the bus, 8 died, 20 passenger injured. The cargo of truck was also damaged (sacks of clean rice and tiqui-tiqui) Petitioner, owner of truck filed a suit for damages in truck, cargo and consequential losses, salaries of EEs during incapacity. The civil case was suspended pending judgment of criminal case previously filed.

The civil action for damages could be based on quasi-delict, which is different and independent from civil liability arising out of criminal negligence under RPC. It is an independent judicial institution separate from civil liability arising



from crime. Such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.Padua v Robles (1975) – Taxi driven by Punzalan, owned by Robles hit a 10-year old son of petitioners. The child was dragged by 40m. Paduas sued for damages and fiscal also charged Punzalan with homicide thru reckless imprudence. Civil Case, Punzalan was ordered to pay, in crim case, he was also convicted but civil liability already assessed in civil case. Paduas was unable to collect from Punzalan so Padua filed a motion to enforce subsidiary liability against Robles, ER. Does the crim case include civil liability?

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.

Allowance of the application of subsidiary liability involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission.

Ace Haulers Corp v CA (2000) – Truck, driver De la Cruz, owner Ace Hauler; Jeep driver Parma, owner Rivera. A motorcycle, Abiva driving was dragged by jeep towards the truck. The truck ran over the motorcycle and Abiva died. A criminal case was filed against De la Cruz and Parma while pending civil case. Ace and De la Cruz filed a motion to dismiss while criminal case is pending invoking that filing of independent civil action arising from quasi-delict is no longer allowed and civil aspect is already included with criminal case.

A separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In case at bar, it has not been shown that Abiva’s wife has recovered on the award in the criminal case, consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in the civil case.

Safeguard Sec Inc v Tangco (2006) – Tangco went to a Ecology Bank to renew her time deposit. She was also a licensed to carry firearms. She deposited it to the security guard, Pajarillo. P suddenly shot T in her abdomen with his service shotgun. T instantly died. Her husband filed a criminal case of homicide and reserved right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. He was convicted. A civil case was filed for damages against Pajarillo and its ER Safeguard for failing to observe due diligence. Safeguard claims due diligence in selection and supervision and the act of P was only on self-defense. RTC ordered to pay damages since P did not report the incident to head office or police the T was roaming around the area prior to the shooting. RTC: ER solidarily liable. CA: subsidiary only.

Sec 1, Rule 111 of CrimPro

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,

1. civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;2. independent civil liabilities, such as those

a. not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or

b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.

"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually



charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

Parker v Panlilio and PAL (1952) – Parker was a passenger in a PAL plane which exploded in mid-air. P sued for damages of P100k against PAL for not bringing him safely to Manila. The case was suspended upon pendency of crim case.

The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by respondent Philippine Air Lines, Inc. because of its failure to carry safely the late Richard Parker to his place of destination, whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accused, who bear no relation whatsoever with said entity, and are complete strangers to it. Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the accused in the criminal case or in a separate action. But this situation does not here obtain.

The failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action in the criminal case would not necessarily constitute a bar to the institution of the civil action against respondent, for the cause of action in one is different from that in the other. These are two independent actions based on distinct causes of action. Bit in this case, the civil case is directly interowner with the criminal case in the sense that the main issue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of

deceased passenger to reach safely to his destination or the determination of the cause of his death, RTC correct in suspending civil case.

Lanuza v Ping (1980) – Freight truck owned by Ping, driven by Mendoza rammed in a residential house and store of Lanuzo. It was completey razed to ground. L sued for damages against Ping and Mendoza due to reckless negligence of driver. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss since a criminal case for damage to property thru reckless imprudence pending between same parties for same cause.

The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the defendant.

The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.

Virata v Ochoa (1978) – Virata collided with jeep owned by Ochoa, driven by Borilla. A criminal case was filed against B. The heirs of V reserved a right to institute separate civil action. They filed a civil case for damages based on quasi-delict against O and B. RTC acquitted B in crim case on the ground of mere accident. The civil case was also dismissed because of the acquittal.

In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

The extinction of civil liability referred to in Sec 3(e), Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Art 100 of RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happended or has not been committed by the accused.

Marcia v CA (1983) – Victory Liner bus was driven by Paje when is collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia (with 2 passengers Edgar Marcia and Yap). A crim action of homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed.



While Yap and Marcia filed for damages against Victory and Paje because of negligence and reckless imprudence. CA acquitted because it was only a PURE ACCIDENT, NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Civil case was also dismissed.

Sec 2 Rule 111. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime.

Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.

“The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.” CA’s declaration that the mishap was “pure accident” are relevant and material evidence.

Manio v Gaddi (1972) – Balanza, 16 years old, in charge of a rig which he drove recklessly, sideswept Guevarra. G died. He pleaded guilty with homicide thru reckless imprudence. He was ordered P6k as damages. Manio, widow sued B and ER for damages. CFI dismissed since P6k as damages is crim case barred civil action sought by Manio.

Right to file a separate civil suit in culpa acquiliana in spite of lack of express reservation. The failure to make, in the criminal case, the reservation reuired in Rule 111, Sec 1, will not bar a separate civil action for quasi-delict provided that the injured party has not intervened actually or actively in the prosecution of said criminal action. Res judicata is not applicable where there is no identity of parties and civil liability for tort is different from liability for negligence under RPC. Andamo v IAC (1990) – Andamo owns an adjacent land to the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. A filed against the corporation’s officer and directors a criminal case under Art 324 RPC and civil case for damages. Issue: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case. RTC dismissed civil case pending criminal case.

All the elements of a quasi-delict under Art 2176-2177 are present, to wit: a. damages suffered by the plaintiff,

b. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and

c. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. (assertion of such between act of building waterpaths and damage sustained)

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

Yakult Phils v CA (1990) – Camaso, 5-year old boy was sideswiped by a motorcycle of Yakult while driven by Salvao. A criminal case against driver was filed while father of victim filed a civil case against Yakult and driver. In the civil case, defendants are solidarily liable. Yakult claimst that the civil case has no jurisdiction since under Sec 1, Rule 111 of Crim Pro that a separate civil action may not be filed unless a reservation is expressly made.

Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case.

In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.



The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Mendoza v Arrieta (1979) – 3 way accident. Jeep tried to overtake truck but was stopped at intersection but while still in a stop position, truck bumped it at the back. Jeep was then swerved to the Benz and Salazar in the jeep was thrown. Benz owned and driven by Mendoza sued Salazar, owner and driver of jeep. Salazar in turn sued driver Montoya of gravel truck. Montoya was convicted of damage to property thru reckless imprudence + fire and actual damages. While between Mendoza and Salazar, S was acquitted.

The owner of a car which was bumped by a jeep after the latter was bumped from behind by a truck may still file an civil action for damages against the truck driver and the jeepney driver, in the case filed by the car owner was acquitted in the criminal case for negligence filed by the car owner against the jeepney owner. There is no identity of cause of action between the civil case in question and the criminal case against the truck driver for damage to jeep.

Failure to make a reservation in the criminal action for negligence of the right to file an independent civil action does not amend the substantive provision of Art 31 CC on quasi-delict.

Art 2176-2177 CC creates a civil liability distinct from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under RPC. No reservation need be made in criminal case.

Escutea v Fandialan (1974) – July 2, 1952, Fandialan inflicted physical injuries against Escueta. F was convicted of slight physical injuries, E reserved right to file a separate civil action. The civil case filed based on Art 100 of RPC was dismissed for lack of interest. The civil case was refilled after 16 years, July 5, 1968. F claims action is not barred by prescription since only 4 years can a quasi-delict be filed under Art 1146(1).

Plaintiff's (offended party) civil action for recovery of civil liability and damages from defendant (accused) would have been implicitly instituted with the

criminal action, but plaintiff expressly reserved his right to institute the civil action separately. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, even without such reservation, he could prosecute his civil action for damages from the physical injuries separately and independently of the criminal action and would require only a preponderance of evidence to support his action. Such separate and independent civil action under the cited codal article proceeds to trial and final judgment irrespective of the result of the criminal action.

Prescriptive period of 4 years under Art 1146(1) applies not Art 1144(3) which provides 10 years for actions based “upon a judgment.” No civil liability was adjudged in the criminal case since plaintiff expressly reserved the right of filing a separate civil action. Hence, he had no standing in the criminal action as an offended party and the verdict of conviction excluded any civil liability. As in other-civil actions where judgment has obtained, the action to enforce the judgment would prescribe only after ten years, with the judgment being enforceable by mere motion within the first five years.

Tactaquin v Palileo (Sept 1967) – Tactaqun filed to recover damages for the death of her daughter when she was hit by Palileo while it was driving recklessly. P filed a motion to dismiss being barred by final judgment in criminal case convicting him of homicide and serious physical injuries for the same accident. He was also sentence to pay in crim case that pay offended party 4k.

"the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, it is crystal clear that any civil liability contracted by appellee whether based on quasi-delict or otherwise arose from exactly the same act or omission, namely, his reckless manner of driving which resulted in serious physical injuries to appellant, and in the death of her daughter. For this same act or omission appellant cannot recover twice.

The reservation was made after appelee had already pleaded guilty. Such must be deemed legally ineffective.

Jocson v Glorioso (1968) – 2 actions was filed for death of 3-year old boy who was run over by a jeep. (1) civil case – against owner and driver for culpa acquilina, (2) criminal action for homicide thru reckless imprudence. Civil case was dismissed, cannot hold driver guilty of negligence, but crim case, driver was convicted and ordered to pay 6k as indemnity. The writ of execution was unsatisfied. An action to enforce against owner was filed. Owner claims barred by prior judgment in civil case. Whether the previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana precludes the application of the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code?



The enforcement does not concern “the identity of reliefs prayed for.” The negligent act committed by defendant's employee is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punished by law.

To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent." On the same principle then, the previous dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana could not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability required by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

What clearly emerges then is the controlling force of the principle that once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer, according to the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable, if it be shown that the commission thereof was in the discharge of the duties of such employee.

PNB v Catipon (1956) – Catipon was charged by estafa for having misappropriated, misapplied and converted the merchandise covered by trust receipt which prejudiced PNB. C was acquitted. PNB sued to recover value of goods. C ordered to pay. Does the acquittal in crim case bar the institution of present civil action, because bank did not reserve in crim case the right to separately enforce the civil liability against him?

The acquittal is predicated on the conclusion “that the guilt of the defendant has not been satisfactorily established. The acquittal being equivalent to reasonable doubt, does not preclude a suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission, under Art 29 CC; it does not finally determine nor expressly declare that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.

The declaration in the decision of acquittal to the effect that “if any responsibility was incurred by the accused – that is civil in nature and not criminal” amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favour of offended party.

The appellant executed the trust receipt, he is liable ex contractu for its breach.

Albornoz v Albornoz (1956) – Racela filed 2 claims against estate of Soriano. R claims that S was supposed to sell properties to R evidenced by 2 deeds of sale. However, S sold the same to Ballesteros and registered the deed of sale. R filed crim case for estafa. S was acquitted. Civil case filed but was dismissed stating that the claim on both case is founded on same deed of sale and acquittal in crim case produced the effect of exemption of her estate from any civil liability.

RTC found that S did not sell any land to R and the deeds of sale were executed in order to enable R to convince the residents of the barrio that decedent could freely dispose of his properties. They were therefor simulated sales.

The judgment of acquittal amount to a judicial declaration that the basis of claimant’s action, or sales of said parcels of land to the claimant did not exists. His action is barred under Sec 2(d), Rule 107. “(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.” It is unnecessary to consider the claim of the claimant-appellant that he had submitted sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's liability.

Tan v Standard Oil Co (1952) – Standard delivered to Rural Transit gallons of gasoline contained in a gasoline tank-truck trailer. While the gasoline was being discharged to underground tank, it caught fire, the driver, Sto Domingo, helper Rico, took the truck in the middle of the road, and abandoned it. The cause of its moving in the opposite side of street caused buildings on that to be burned ad destroyed. Tan’s house was also destroyed. Sto Domingo and Rico was charged with arson thru reckless imprudence, but acquitted because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident. Tan then sued Standard and rural including SD and R a civil case for damages.

Rule 107, section 1(d) means that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states that the evidence throws no light on the causes of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible, this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused from civil liability.

The principle of res judicata cannot apply to them for the simple reason that they were not included as co-accused in the criminal case. Not having been included in the criminal case they cannot enjoy the benefit resulting from the acquittal of the accused. This benefit can only be claimed by the accused if a subsequent action is later taken against them under the Revised Penal Code. And this action can only be maintained if proper reservation is made and there is no express declaration that the basis of the civil action has not existed.

The act of driver is to avoid greater evil or harm. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to a civil action against this company



because its civil liability is completely divorced from the criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a separate civil action does not apply to it.

Salta v de Veyra (1982) – Salta, manager of PNB Malolos, recommended the granting of loans in violation of the bank rules – fraud and negligence w/c resulted in losses by bank. PNB filed 2 civil cases and also a crim case for violation of anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Crim case was dismissed. 1 civil case also dismissed because of such but 1 was not.

The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that acquittal in criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Courts makes a finding that even civilly the accused would not be held liable – there is no such finding. In civil cases – evidence only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal case.

Purpose of law in allowing a civil case related to criminal case to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during pendency of the latter case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action.

The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of the offended party.

Manliclic and Phil Rabbit v Calaunan (2007) – Jeep owned by Calaunan, driven by Mendoza collided with PRBLI bus driven by Manliclic. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. Calaunan sustained injuries. Criminal case was filed against Manlilic. Calanuan filed for damages against PRBLI and Manliclic. PRBLI claims due diligence. CA acquitted Manliclic. Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the CA that there was an absence of negligence on his part?

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Abellana v Marave (1974) – Felix Abellana (FA) was convicted by TC of physical injrueis thru reckless imprudence. Because FA while driving atruck hit a pedicab with its 3 passengers sustaining injuries. He was ordered to pay victims, 6k. He appealed in CA. Then respondents filed a separate civil action against FA and Clemente Abellana as ER of FA. They filed a motion to dismiss since respondents did not reserved their right to file a separate case. And the civil case was only filed when crim case was already on appeal.

The offended party in a criminal case has the remedy of pursuing an independnent civil action, although he has not made any reservation therefor in the city court where the action was begun, if the case us appealed to the CFI where the trial de novo is required by the Rules. The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal



by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it has been originally instituted in that court. So it is in civil cases under Sec 4 of Rule 40.

The right to initiate a civil action apart from the criminal case is substantive. The grant of power to this Court, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.

Santos v Pizarro (2005) – Viron Transit driven by Sibayan collided woth Lite Ace Van. In the van, 3 died including 2-month old baby and 5 were injured. S was convicted with Reckless Imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries but reserved to file a separate civil action. Filed for damages against S, Viron Transit and its President, Rondaris. Viron filed a motion to dismiss alleging that action based on quasi-delict prescribed after 4 years from accrual of cause of action. It also alleges that cannot be held subsidiary liable since S was not ordered to pay damages in criminal case.

Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions:

1. when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused;

2. when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and

3. when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.Sec 1, Rule 111. See Safeguard Security case.At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the

cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

Dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This

is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing substantial justice.

Session 19 – Art 19-35, 2187, Reading on Product Liability, Cases 53, 69 (380 scra 467), 349-368

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v Reyes (2005) – party gatecrasher in the birthday party of the President of Nikko Hotel in its penthouse. WON Lim, general manager, acted abusively in asking Reyes, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant and thereby become liable under Art 19 and 21 CC.

A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person in leave a party to which he was not invited cannot bemade to pay for damages under Art 19 and 21 CC.

Art 19 – Principle of Abuse of Rights. when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The rationale of this article is to set certain standards which must be observed:

1. not only in the exercise of one’s rights 2. but also in the performance of one’s duties.

a. act with justice, b. give everyone his due and c. observe honesty and good faith.Its elements are:1) There is a legal right or duty; 2) exercised in bad faith; 3) sole intent: prejudicing or injuring another.



4) must be INTENTIONALWhen Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles

20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does

not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.

Art 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: 1) an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public

policy; and 3) it is done with intent to injure4) must be INTENTIONALA complaint based on Art 19 and 21 CC must necessarily fail if it has

nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. The cause of action was “predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.”

Ramos v CA (2002) – A surgeon’s irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for a scheduled operation is violative, not only his duty as a physician but also of Art 19 CC which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due.

Velayo v Shell Co (1956) – Shell was one of the principal creditors of CALI. Taking advantage of its knowledge that voluntary insolvency proceedings will be instituted by CALI if the creditors would not agree on the manner of its distributing its assets among the creditors. So, it transferred its credit to a sister corporation in US. Its sister corporation immediately filed an action in California and the court attached the plane in California. Velayo became the assignee of CALI and filed an action against CALI of the transferring of credit.

A creditor’s transfer of credit to another without knowledge of other creditors of insolvent enable the transferor to collect almost if not the entire amount of credit, but it cannot be countenance such attitude, and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of the Government and local business.

A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages.

PNB v CA (1978) – Tapnio was granted a crop loan of 2k from PNB. He secured it with a mortgage on standing crop including her sugar quota allocation. T was not able to harvest enough to cover her sugar quota allocation, so she leased to Tuazon

at P2.50 per picul subject to the approval of PNB as a requirement in their mortgage contract. PNB’s Board of Directors required to raise it to P3. T however said that he was no longer interested. Tapnio lost P2,800 because of PNB’s unreasonable price requirement. She failed to pay the loan and PNB sued her.

PNB’s approval may be required, but the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. Art 19. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. Petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Art 21. The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts. A principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person. A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."

Manila Gas Corp v CA (1980) – Ongsip applied for installation of gas service connection for his residence. Additional gas was installed for his 46-door apartment in the same compound. However, there was no significant increase in his meter reading. Petitioner then filed a complaint for qualified theft and disconnected its gas service without prior notice.

Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. A clear violation of Article 21 CC. Article 2219 (10) of the Code. Article 2220: Moral damages. Moral: 15k. Exemplary 5 + attorney’s fees. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Non-payment of gas bill for 3 months cannot be used to justify disconnection without prior notice. Apparently, such misconduct or omission of petitioner formed part of a malevolent scheme to harass and humiliate respondent, exposing him to further ignominy and greater mental torture.



Grand Union Supermarket v Espino (1979) – Espino with his family were shopping in a supermarket in Makati and he forgot to pay a merchandise that he placed in his pocket shirt with its good part showing. It was worth 3.85. His wife paid P77 for the merchandise bought. The guard called his attention and took the product and publicly announced that he was a shoplifter. He was mechanical engr. and P&G executive and occupied positions in the government and business community.

The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Art 26. Moral 5k, attorney’s fees 3k.

Petrophil Corp v CA (2001) – Petrophil contracted with Dr. Cruz for Cruz to haul and transport any packages and bulk products of Petrophil. P can terminate the contract anytime and if there is breach or inadequate performance. P terminated the contract. A complaint was filed by Dr. Cruz alleging that it was unjustified and P only acted such as a retaliation for sympathizing with its striking Petrophil EEs. It was intended to silence her. All tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil officers.

Article 20 of the Civil Code: every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and, consequently suffered loss of income. Under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person , but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.

Cebu Country Club Inc v Elizagaque (2008) – Cebu Country Club Inc (CCCI) is a domestic corp operates as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club. SMC was a special proprietary member of CCCI. E filed an application for proprietary membership. It was indorsed by 2 members. CCCI president offered to sell a share for 3.5M (5M as regular price). But E purchased share of Dr. Butalid for 3M. CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate to E. E’s application was denied. CCCI did not reply thrice for his motion for reconsideration. E filed a complaint for damages against CCCI. CCCI claims that to approve proprietary seat all members of the Board must agree. However, in this case, 1 disagreed. SC: such rule was not printed on the application form.

CCCI, Board of directors has a right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership, but such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Art 19 correlated with Art 21: The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. CCCI’s disapproval is characterized by bad faith.

Damnun absque injuria does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right.

Pe v Pe (1962) – Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man and frequently visited Lolita to teach her to pray the rosary. They fell in love and had sexual relations. Lolita’s parents prohibited him to go to their house. But they still had contact and Lolita disappeared. Defendant was sued. He was a collateral relative and considered a member of a family.

Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

Tanjanco v CA (1966) – Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both of adult age. T professed his undying glove and affection for S which S reciprocated. T’s promised to marry S, so S consented and acceded to T’s pleas for carnal knowledge. They regularly had sex for a year. They conceived a child and to avoid embarrassment, S resigned her job as secretary in IBM Phils but T was unable to support herself and her baby. T refused to marry S. Is T liable for moral damages under Art 21.

Voluntariness and mutual passion is incompatible with idea of deceit. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual



intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse from mutual desire, there is no seduction.

Domingo v Maliwat –

Quisaba v Sta Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Inc (1974) – Q served respondent for 18 years. Hyde, VP of resp, was instructed to buy logs for company plant, Q refused alleging it was inconsistent with his work as internal auditor. Hyde warned Q that failure to do the instruction will be a ground for dismissal. Q sued damages for constructive dismissal.

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively , as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

Hermosisima v CA (1960) – Soledad Cagigas was a teacher while Hermosisima was 10 years younger. They were lovers and introduced themselves as engaged even though no promise of marriage was tackled between them. SC was pregnant, H promised to marry her. Their son was born but after 7 days, H married Romanita Perez.

The action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise.

Not morally liable for seduction. Complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

Wassmer v Velez (1964) – Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to get married and set their wedding on Sept 4, 1954. On Sept 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that they should postpone their marriage because her mother

opposed to it. But the next day, he sent a telegram but their marriage will push through. Velez was not heard of again. W sued for damages.

Art 21. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Castro v Meralco () –

Toledo v Saulog Transit Corp –

Equitable Banking Corp v Rural Insurance Surety Co –

Heirs of Pedro v Tayag, jr v Alcantara (1980) – Tayag Sr was riding a bicycle when he was bumped and hit by Phil Rabbit Bus driven by Villa. Tayag’s heirs sued PLRB for his death. PLRB moved to suspend the civil action while criminal action on the driver is still pending. The crim case was dismissed based on reasonable grounds. Civil action was instituted but PLRC opposed claiming heirs has no cause of action since driver was acquitted in criminal action.

Art 31. This refers to civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi-delict.

All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present, namely:1. act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of respondent2. damage caused by said act or omission3. direct causal relation between damage and the act or omission4. no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

Lim & taha v Ponce de Leon & Maddela (1975) – Taha sold a boat to Alberto. After a year, A sued T for forcibly taking his boat. The fiscal (Ponce) filed a case for robbery with force and intimidation against Taha. The bost was impounded. Upon its seizure it was exposed to elements that made it worthless and beyond repair. Are respondents civilly liable for damages to petitioners suffered by them from the seizure?

No law grants fiscal power to issue search warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it was the corpus delicti of the crime.



A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual (3k) and moral (1k- illegality of seizure) damages from the public officers or EE responsible therefor + exemplary damages. Attorney’s fees (750 for violation of consti rights).

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

Carandang v Santiago and Valenton (1955) – V was found guilty for frustrated homicide against C. While crim case was pending, C filed for damages. The civil case was suspended upon motion of V. C claims that Art 33 stated that in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, separate civil action is allowed.

The term “physical injuries” in Art 33 is not in the PI in RPC. It should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

As notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the person."

Reyes v Sempio Dy (1986) – Cristina Malicsi was charged with intriguing against honor by Reyes. M pleaded guilty and was fined with P50. Because of the plea of guilt, R was not able to present evidence to prove damages, nor did she make reservation to file a separate civil action for damages. R filed a new civil case for damages.

mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the

aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.

Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding.

Bernaldes v Bohol Land Transportation (1963) – Plaintiff’s son was a passenger of a bus of defendant that fell off a precipe. He filed for damages for the death of his son. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that its driver was acquitted in the criminal case on reasonable doubt and that B intervened in prosecution in criminal case.

Article 31 CC. This provision evidently refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that a civil action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or its employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of the latter.

Appellant's action concerned the civil liability (culpa contractual) of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case. The failure, on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the latter based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, such reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action to be independent and separate from the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to make such reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable.


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