177. ABELARDO LIM VS CA

Facts:

A 10 wheeler truck lost its breaks. It swerved to the left in order to avoid collision with another vehicle until it reached the center island. However, the center island was not sufficient to stop the truck, it went further to the left and smashed into a Ferroza and a passenger Jeepney. The impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza and the passenger Jeepney which left one passenger dead and many other wounded.

The truck was driven by Gunnaban and owned by Lim. The Jeepney was owned by Gonzales under the Kabit System. Gonzales purchased the jeep in 1982 for P30,000. However, the registration and certificate of public convenience remained in the previous owners name.

Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident. Lim shouldered the cost for the hospitalization of the victims, compensated the heirs of the deceased passenger, and had restored the Ferroza to a good condition.

Lim made several offers with the Jeepney owner. Gonazales refused to have his jeepney repaired in Lims shop. He also refused payment P20,000, which was the assessment for the damage. Gonzales demanded a brand new jeep or the amount of P236,000. Lim increased his bid to P40,000 which was again rejected by Gonzales.

Gonzales filed for an action for damages against the Gunnaban and Lim. The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzales and awarded him P236,000. The CA upheld the trial courts decision.

Issues:

1) Whether or not Gonzales is barred from filing the action since he is not the operator of the record under the kabit system

2) Whether or not Gunnaban and Lim were negligent

3) Whether or not an award of P236,000 is inconceivably larger and would amount to unjust enrichment considering Gonzales only purchased it for P30,000

4) Whether or not the Gonzales unconcern towards the damage vehicle may mitigate the damage

Held:

1) The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings.

In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio the Court explained that one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for the business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising from accidents may be duly compensated.

It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved. In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist. First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right.

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business. Any effort then to frustrate his claim of damages by the ingenuity with which petitioners framed the issue should be discouraged, if not repelled.

2) Gunnaban was found by the trial court to have caused the accident since he panicked in the face of an emergency which was rather palpable from his act of directing his vehicle to a perilous streak down the fast lane of the superhighway then across the island and ultimately to the opposite lane where it collided with the jeepney.

On the other hand, petitioner Lim's liability for Gunnaban's negligence was premised on his want of diligence in supervising his employees. It was admitted during trial that Gunnaban doubled as mechanic of the ill-fated truck despite the fact that he was neither tutored nor trained to handle such task.

3) In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney was purchased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably greater than this amount would be improper and unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded that indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words, indemnification for damages is not limited todamnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the amount of profit lost.

Had private respondent's jeepney not met an accident it could reasonably be expected that it would have continued earning from the business in which it was engaged. Private respondent avers that he derives an average income of P300.00 per day from his passenger jeepney and this earning was included in the award of damages made by the trial court and upheld by the appeals court. The award therefore of P236,000.00 as compensatory damages is not beyond reason nor speculative as it is based on a reasonable estimate of the total damage suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage wrought upon his jeepney and the income lost from his transportation business. Petitioners for their part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the estimate made by the courts a quo.

4) One last word. We have observed that private respondent left his passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. One who is injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise reasonable care and diligence to minimize the resulting damage. Anyway, he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent damage to it. However we sadly note that in the present case petitioners failed to offer in evidence the estimated amount of the damage caused by private respondent's unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the burden of petitioners to show satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his damages but also the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be proportionately reduced

178. CARPIO VS DOROJA

Facts:

A passenger Fuso Jitney bumped Carpio who was a pedestrian crossing the street. The vehicle, driven by Ramirez, was owned and operated by Torribio. An information for Reckless Impridence Resulting to Serious Physical Injury was filed against the driver with the MTC. Ramirez pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries.

A writ of execution was served to the driver but it was unsatisfied by reason of insolvency. The complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle.

The MTC denied Carpios motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle. It was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." Carpio filed a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the MTC.

Issues:

Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.

Held:

The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.

179. FRANCO VS IAC

Facts:

The Franco Bus swerved to the left side and had taken the other lane in order to avoid hitting a trucked parked along the pavement of the highway. It collided with an incoming mini bus. The incident resulted to the death of both drivers and 2 passengers of the mini bus. The owner, wife of the victim-passenger, and wife of the driver of the mini bus filed action for damages against the owners and operators of Franco Transportation Company. The action was captioned as an action for damages through reckless imprudence. Spouses Franco raised the defense that they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their employees, including the deceased driver.

The CFI rejected Francos defense and stated that "This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises, and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to avoid civil liability."

The CA agreed with the CFIs decision was guilty of reckless or criminal imprudence punishable by law in driving appellants' bus; that the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants under the said provisions, that the case subject of appeal is one involving culpable negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil negligence.

Issue:

whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict;

Held:

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103.

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.

The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to say that there can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted.

Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of the lower court's findings, to wit:

Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of their bus driver. The evidence presented by the appellants in this regard is purely self-serving. No independent evidence was presented as to the alleged supervision of appellants' bus drivers, especially with regard to driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. The appellants in fact admitted that the only kind of supervision given the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal points of the line (t.s.n., September 16, 1976, p. 21). Moreover, the appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag line, have only two inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection. There is no evidence that they are really safety inspectors.

Basically, the Court finds that these determinations are factual in nature. As a painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and conclusions, the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative defense of due diligence.

180. YONAHA VS CA

Facts:

A Toyota Tamaraw bumped and hit Canete. As a result of his death, Elmer, the driver was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide after pleading guilty on the said information. The vehicle was registered under the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK Sea Products.

The Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied for the reason that Elmer was unable to pay the monetary obligation. A Motion for Subsidiary Execution was filed and was granted by the trial with neither notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers liability had yet to be established.

The trial court denied petitioners motion.

The appellate court initially restrained the implementation of the assailed orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision, dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not the writ of subsidiary execution may be issued without giving the employer his full day in court

Held:

The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.

The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable.

The employer must be given his full day in court. To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer] and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.

181. GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN

Facts:

Guilatco fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. The manhole was located at Perez Blvd, which is in a National Road and under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan. Guilatco filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan.

The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.

The court ordered the City of Dagupan to pay Guilatco for damages. The CA reversed the trial courts decision on the ground that no evidence was presented by Guilatco that the City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Boulevard.

Issue:

Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil Code is clear.

182. PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL VS IAC

Facts:

Theness Uy was playing with another child in a house when she was bitten by the dog. The child eventually died. The house and the dog were owned by the late Vicente Miranda. Vestil, the daughter of Miranda, was sued by Uys for damages. They alleged that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.

Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.

Court of First Instance sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The IAC arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.

Issue:

Whether or not Vestil is liable for the damages caused by the dog owned by her deceased father.

Held:

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Mirandas heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretakers duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

183. THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN RIZAL VS LOOD

Facts:

Homeowners Association of El Deposito was composed of residents who have houses and structures erected in a public land. The Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance, ordered for the demolition and removal of the said houses and improvements.

The Homeowners Assocition filed motions for of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of their houses and structures which was denied by the respondent court.

Petitioners filed with the SC an action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside respondent court's questioned orders dated February 9, 1970 and March 30, 1970 denying petitioners' motions for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of their houses pending final outcome of Civil Case No. 11078 filed by them before respondent court.

Issue:

Whether or not the houses and structures may be abated without judicial proceedings

Held:

Public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under the Civil Code.

The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings of public nuisances per se.

184. FARRALES VS CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO

Facts:

Farrales, holding a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods, had a stall in a temporary building. The city demolished temporary building where her store is located in order that it might construct a permanent building. She was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place which she did not like the location. Instead, taking the law into her own hands, she built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish this shack Farrales went to the CFI seeking an injunction which was denied. The Police demolished the temporary shack.

Plaintiff, in an action for damages, cited the police for contempt but CFI denied Plaintiffs petition. That order, denying the injunction, was final in characternot interlocutoryand no appeal having been made would operate as res judicata to his present suit which is based on the same act of demolition. To evade the effects of res judicata, Plaintiff amended her complaint so as to include as Defendants the policemen whom she claims did the demolishing.

The case was taken to the Court of Appeals and subsequently certified to the Supreme Court for the reason that only questions of law are involved.

Issue:

Whether the demolition of the shack was in order or not

Held:

Here no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. The abatement thereof was not summary but through a judicial proceeding. The appellant, after having been warned by the city police of Baguio that the lean-to she had put up without a permit would be demolished, went to court and asked for an injunction. A hearing was then held and the court refused to issue the writ unless she showed the proper permit. The denial of her petition for injunction upon her failure to produce such a permit was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined. And it was an authority which was later confirmed by the same court in its decision.