CINCO V CANONOY

FACTS:Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. ISSUE:W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal actionHELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for nature and character of his action was quasi delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

o SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

o Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

o Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

o Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done.

BAKSH V CA

FACTS:In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get

married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion. Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.

HELD:The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Art. 21 defines quasi-delict: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code). It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.

DULAY V CA

FACTS:On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on

negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.ISSUE:

Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;

Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: (1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

GARCIA V FLORIDO

FACTS: August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and

Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of attending a conference

August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala

Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization

Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car

RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal action.HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,

namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passengerbus No. 25 by

Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of

private respondents e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the

interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners

petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either byconviction or acquittal of said accused

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in thecriminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case

petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one wherereservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal

ANDAMO V IAC

FACTS:Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondent’s water paths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for

whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

FACTS: September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more

mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine

After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces

they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it

2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a

considerable explosive power the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result break the cap with a stone - failed opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and

started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck Manuel had his hand burned and wounded David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to

such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE: 1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable - NO2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage - NOHELD:

No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:(1) Damages to the plaintiff.(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.Taylor at the time of the accident was well—-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can

not demand reparation therefor from another Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

TAYAG V ALCANTARA

FACTS:On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan — docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 — alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying the other allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the ground that the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836, acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an order 9 dated April

13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114. The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his order 11 dated May 30, 1979. Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.ISSUE:W/N the civil case based on quasi-delict should be barred by the acquittal in a criminal caseHELD:NO. order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

PADILLA V CA

FACTS:On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of

oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.ISSUE:WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. NO. DR. CRUZ IS ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS STILL CIVILLY LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral damages, 50k exemplary damages).HELD:Elements of reckless imprudence1. Offender does / fails to do an act2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary3. Without malice4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender's employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time, place

Standard of careStandard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established by expert testimony.

Expert testimonyExpert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any expert testimony re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the prosecution only testified as to the possible cause of death. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen are incapable of intelligently evaluating.

Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiffPlaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused Lydia's death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing. The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz' allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz' fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT V PEOPLE

FACTS:Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.ISSUE:Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion ormotu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

PEOPLE V LINGON

FACTS:Accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat was convicted of the crime of Robbery withhomicide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Gabat allegedly robbed Jose“Rosales” Ortiz, a 17 year old working student, who was a cigarette vendor. According to Prudencio Castillo, a taxi driver, who allegedly saw the incident that transpired on the night Ortiz died. According to Castillo, he was at a distance of about 3 meters travelling on the same lane and was behind the Kombi driven byRogelio Ligon together with Gabat. Castillo, in his testimony, said that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales. That while waiting for the traffic light to change from red to green, Castillo idly watched the Volkswagon Kombi and saw Gabat signal to Ortiz. WhileOrtiz was handling the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light changed to green and as the Kombi moved forward, Gabat grabbed the box from Ortiz. Ortiz ran beside the Jombi

and was able to hold on to the windowsill with his right hand. However, m as the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Rector underpass, Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the said windowsill and as aresult fell face down on the ground.On the other hand, according to Gabat, after Ortiz handed the two sticks of cigarettes Gabat in turn paid him a 5 peso bill. In order to change the said bill, Ortiz placed his box between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. When the traffic light changed to green, Ligon moved the vehicle forward. That, in spite of Gabat’s order to stop the vehicle, Ligon said that it could not be done due the moving vehicular traffic. When Ortiz fell down, Gabat shouted at Ligon but the latter replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat and that later they would come back to the scene of the incident. At this point, the Kombi was blocked by Castillo’s taxi and the jeep driven by the policeman. The trial court gave full credence to Castillo’s testimony and dismissed Gabat’s testimony on the ground that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendorsdo not let go of their cigarette. Gabat was convicted by the trial court; Hence, this appeal.ISSUE: