Filamer Case

Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

Rakes Case

Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).

ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.

In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).

2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).

Elcano Case

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally

prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

Cangco Case

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.,It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

Ong Case

On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.

The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the lifeguard in attendant (Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of no avail.

The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other testified that Abaño was reading a magazine and was chatting with a security guard when the incident happened and that he was called a third time before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming that there was no negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for having the last opportunity to save the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.

HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all of them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were proper safety measures and precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper defense in this case. Further, the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the statements they have given to the investigators when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was called about the boy at the bottom of the pool.

The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application here. It was not established as to how Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

Picart Case

In December 1912, Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Smith’s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.

ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.

HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smith’s negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.

Bataclan Case

After one midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was speeding through and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.

Corliss Case

Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff

´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.

Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.Ruling:ComplaintDismissed Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.

Nakpil Case

The private respondent hired the services of the petitioner to make the plans and specifications for the construction of their office building. The building was completed by the contractor but subsequently, an earthquake struck causing its partial collapse and damage.

Issue: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and failed to observe requisite workmanship standards in the construction of the building while their architect drew plans that contain defects and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an earthquake. Other buildings in the area withstood the tremor. The lower court also found that the spirals in one of the columns in the ground floor has been cut. One who creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability even if an act of God may have intervened as in this case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein petitioner) and the architect for the collapse of the building is solidary.

Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.

In the afternoon of May 5, 1946while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions were loading grass,an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power andDevelopment Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and seriousmultiple burns from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain andwounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year afterthe incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show anyspecific act of negligence.

The appellate court, in overruling this defense, held: “While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff toestablish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without

fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does notoccur as if he having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care. This rule is known by the nameof res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case atbar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the highway, and the electricwire was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electricwires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strainand stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels do notordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which isadmittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock “if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.

Victorias Plantation v. Victorias Millers G.R. No. L-6648, 25 July 1955Facts:

The petitioners Victorias Planters Association, Inc. and NorthNegros Planters Association, Inc. are non-stock corporations and arecomposed of sugar cane planters having been established as therepresentative entities of the numerous sugar cane planters in thedistricts of Victorias, Manapla and Cadiz. The sugar cane productionswere milled by the respondent corporation. Petitioners are the ones incharge of taking up with the respondent corporation problems whichmay come up. At various dates, the sugarcane planters executedidentical milling contracts setting forth the terms and conditions whichthe sugar central “North Negros Sugar Co. Inc.” would mill the sugar produced by the sugar cane planters.Because of the Japanese occupation, the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. did not reconstruct its destroyed central and it had madearrangements with the respondent Victorias Milling Co., Inc. for saidrespondent corporation to mill the sugarcane produced by the plantersof Manapla and Cadiz holding milling contracts with it. When theplanters-members of the North Negros Planters Association, Inc.considered that the stipulated 30-year period of their milling contractshad already expired and terminated and the planters-members of theVictorias Planters Association, Inc. likewise considered the stipulated30-year period of their milling contracts as having likewise expired andterminated.Respondent has refused to accept the fact that the 30-year period has expired. They contend that the 30 years stipulated in thecontracts referred to 30 years of milling – not 30 years in time. Theycontend that as there was no milling during 4 years of the recent war and 2 years of reconstruction, 6 years of service still has to berendered by petitioners.

Issues: Whether or not respondent is correct.

Held: The trial court rendered judgment, which the Supreme Courtaffirmed.“Wherefore, the Court renders judgment in favor of thepetitioners and against the respondent and declares that the millingcontracts executed between the sugar cane planters of Victorias,Manapla and Cadiz, Negros Occidental, and the respondentcorporation or its predecessors-in-interest, the North

Negros Sugar Co., Inc., expired and terminated upon the lapse of the thereinstipulated 30-year period, and that respondent corporation is notentitled to claim any extension.”

Ratio: The reason the planters failed to deliver the sugar cane wasthe war or a fortuitious event. The appellant ceased to run its mill dueto the same cause.Fortuitious event relieves the obligor from fulfilling acontractual obligation. The fact that the contracts make reference to"first milling" does not make the period of thirty years one of thirtymilling years.The seventh paragraph of Annex "C", not found in the earlier contracts (Annexes "A", "B", and "B-1"), quoted by the appellant in itsbrief, where the parties stipulated that in the event of flood, typhoon,earthquake, or other force majeure , war, insurrection, civil commotion,organized strike, etc., the contract shall be deemed suspended duringsaid period, does not mean that the happening of any of those eventsstops the running of the period agreed upon. It only relieves theparties from the fulfillment of their respective obligations during thattime.To require the planters to deliver the sugar cane which theyfailed to deliver during the four years of the Japanese occupation andthe two years after liberation when the mill was being rebuilt is todemand from the obligors the fulfillment of an obligation which wasimpossible of performance at the time it became due.

Daywalt vs. La Corporation de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Art 1314)

Held: “The most that can be said with reference to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff was prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to dispose of the property advantageously. “The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be determined in the light of the situation in existence at the time the contract is made; and the damages ordinarily recoverable in all events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts then known to the contracting parties. Where the purchaser desires to protect himself, in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give possession, from the possibility of incurring other damages than such as are incident to the normal value of the use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to be paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession; and no case has been called to our attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the purchase in excess of the normal value of use and occupation.

The damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense, necessary damage; and (2) special damages. “Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where there are no special circumstances to distinguish the case especially from other contracts. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort of damage. In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a breach, “according to the usual course of things”. In cases involving only ordinary damage, it is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as

a necessary legal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties. “Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. It is only found in cases where some external condition, apart from the actual terms of the contract exists or intervenes, as it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promissor, without actual notice of the external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee.

Plaintiff’s right chiefly as against Teodorica Endencia; and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to be subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages from the defendant corporation for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica Endencia not to perform the contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract. “Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.”

Facts: Teodorica Endencia obligated herself to sell a parcel of land to the plaintiff. It was agreed that the final deed of sale will be executed when the land was registered in Endencia’s name. Subsequently, the Torrens Title for the land was issued in her favor but in the course of the proceedings for registration it was found that the land involved in the sale contained a greater area than what Endencia originally thought and she became reluctant to consummate the sale of the land to the plaintiff. This reluctance was due to the advice of the defendant which exercised a great moral influence over her. However, in advising Endencia that she was not bound by her contract with the plaintiff, the defendant was not actuated with improper motives but did so in good faith believing that, under the circumstances, Endencia was not really bound by her contract with the plaintiff. In view of Endencia’s refusal to make the conveyance, the plaintiff instituted a complaint for specific performance against her and, upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that she was bound by the contract and she was ordered to make the conveyance of the land in question to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then instituted an action against the defendant to recover the following damages: (a) The amount of Pesos 24,000.00 for the use and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle therein during the period that the land was not conveyed by Endencia to the plaintiff; (b) The amount of Pesos 500,000.00 for plaintiff’s failure to sell the land in question to a sugar growing and milling enterprise, the successful launching of which depended on the ability of Daywalt to get possession of the land and the Torrens Title.

JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded withankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could notbe seen because of dirty rainwater.A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of 1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he

developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/crutchesfor 15 days and could not operate his school buses.He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana hadbeen placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of Manila. ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with AsiatecHELD: YESRATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manilais invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189CC governs the liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other public works” in particular andis therefore decisive in this case.It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province,city or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that suchbelongs to such province, city or municipality.In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under the control of the City as evidenced by:1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of the City is stillneeded in the operations.

It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonablysafe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have beentaken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placedunder the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings werecovered.It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months after this incident itwas still uncovered. There were also findings that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills tohasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways andif any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it.Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable

CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) 253 SCRA 483

The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. As access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are 2 possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos St. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants. The second passageway is about 3m in width. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length, has to be traversed. - When said property was purchased by Mabasa, therewere tenants occupying the premises and who wereacknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenantsvacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa wentto see the premises, he saw that there had been builtan adobe fence in the first passageway making itnarrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along theirproperty which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entirepassageway was enclosed. And it was

then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.Defendant Cristina Santos testified that sheconstructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedaled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. –

ISSUES 1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper 2. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiffappellee Mabasa

HELD 1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court

Reasoning - Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

2. YES Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case, upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.

Reasoning [1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. [2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. [3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong. [4] In this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art.21 CC) [5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property (See Art.430 CC).

ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of OurLady Of La Salette, Inc) 191 SCRA 195

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. - Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed awaycostly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners andtheir laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, andexposed plants and other improvements to destruction.- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal actionagainst Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and RutilloMallillin, officers and directors of respondentcorporation, for destruction by means of inundationunder Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case fordamages with prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction against respondent corporation.Hearings were conducted including ocular inspectionson the land.- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an ordersuspending further hearings in the civil case until afterjudgment in the related Criminal Case. And later ondismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as thecriminal case which was instituted ahead of the civilcase was still unresolved.The decision was based onSection 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court whichprovides that "criminal and civil actions arising from thesame offense may be instituted separately, but afterthe criminal action has been commenced the civilaction cannot be instituted until final judgment hasbeen rendered in the criminal action."

ISSUE WON a corporation, which has built through its agents,waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances withinits land, thereby causing inundation and damage to anadjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damagesunder Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code onquasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case canproceed independently of the criminal case

HELD Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, inquasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independentof the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusionthan this, for to subordinate the civil actioncontemplated in the said articles to the result of thecriminal prosecution — whether it be conviction oracquittal — would render meaningless the independentcharacter of the civil action and the clear injunction inArticle 31, that his action may proceed independentlyof the criminal proceedings and regardless of the resultof the latter."

Reasoning - A careful examination of the complaint shows that thecivil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of theCivil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasidelictare present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by theplaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, orsome other person for whose acts he must respond;and (c) the connection of cause and effect between thefault or negligence of the defendant and the damagesincurred by the plaintiff.- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondentcorporation are alleged to have inundated the land ofpetitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causalconnection between the act of building thesewaterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligencewhich may be the basis for the recovery of damages.- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court appliedArticle 1902, now Article 2176 of

the Civil Code andheld that "any person who without due authorityconstructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow orcommunication between a creek or a lake and a river,thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who,like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use andenjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to thepayment of an indemnity for loss and damages to theinjured party.- While the property involved in the cited case belongedto the public domain and the property subject of theinstant case is privately owned, the fact remains thatpetitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges thatpetitioners have sustained and will continue to sustaindamage due to the waterpaths and contrivances builtby respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of thecomplaint, the alleged presence of damage to thepetitioners, the act or omission of respondentcorporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence,and the causal connection between the act and thedamage, with no pre-existing contractual obligationbetween the parties make a clear case of a quasi delictor culpa aquiliana.- It must be stressed that the use of one's property isnot without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Codeprovides that "the owner of a thing cannot make usethereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of athird person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NONLAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutualand reciprocal duties which require that each must usehis own land in a reasonable manner so as not toinfringe upon the rights and interests of others.Although we recognize the right of an owner to buildstructures on his land, such structures must be soconstructed and maintained using all reasonable careso that they cannot be dangerous to adjoininglandowners and can withstand the usual and expectedforces of nature. If the structures cause injury ordamage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,the latter can claim indemnification for the injury ordamage suffered.

- Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liabilityon a person for damage caused by his act or omissionconstituting fault or negligence.- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault ornegligence", covers not only acts "not punishable bylaw" but also acts criminal in character, whetherintentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, aseparate civil action lies against the offender in acriminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecutedand found guilty or acquitted, provided that theoffended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor isactually charged also criminally), to recover damageson both scores, and would be entitled in sucheventuality only to the bigger award of the two,assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article

21772 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of theCode Commission "the foregoing provision though atfirst sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinarywhen we consider the exact nature of criminal and civilnegligence. The former is a violation of the criminallaw, while the latter is a distinct and independentnegligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict,of ancient origin, having always had its own foundationand individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has beensustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Courtheld that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separatelegal institution under the Civil Code with asubstantivity all its own, and individuality that isentirely apart and independent from a delict or crime —a distinction exists between the civil liability arisingfrom a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts orculpa extra-

contractual. The same negligence causingdamages may produce civil liability arising from a crimeunder the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictsor culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminalcase is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, ofcourse, in the event of an acquittal where the court hasdeclared that the fact from which the civil action arosedid not exist, in which case the extinction of thecriminal liability would carry with it the extinction of thecivil liability.

AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)18 SCRA 155

FACTS: - Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/48 other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL,issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticketfrom Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,Carrascoso traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok, theManager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff tovacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupyingbecause, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,there was a 'white man', who, the Manageralleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. Whenasked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff,as was to be expected, refused, and tolddefendant's Manager that his seat would betaken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of theFilipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having ahot discussion with the white man [manager], theycame all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; andplaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in theplane."-

ISSUES: Procedural

1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such,WON the Court could review the questions of fact

Substantive 2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seathe claims, as proved by written documents (tickets…) 3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages,when his action is planted upon breach of contract andthus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faithwhich the CA allegedly failed to find 4. WON moral damages could be recovered from AirFrance, granted that their employee was accused of thetortuous act 5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract 6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascosoregarding the account made by the air-carrier’s purseris admissible in evidence as hearsay 7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages 8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees 9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso wasexcessive

HELD: 1. NO, NO Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with detailssuch that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So longas the decision of the Court of Appeals, contains thenecessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no errorfor said court to withhold therefrom "any specificfinding of facts with respect to the evidence for thedefense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision)the contentions of the appellant and the reasons forrefusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold thesame contrary to the requirements of the provisions oflaw and

the Constitution"; "only questions of law maybe raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment ofthe Court of Appeals.

Obiter. - Constitution mandates that a judgmentdetermining the merits of the case shall state"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law onwhich it is based" and that "Every decision of theCourt of Appeals shall contain complete findingsof fact on all issues properly raised before".xxxThe law, however, solely insists that a decision statethe "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court'sconclusion is drawn. - FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential tosupport the decision and judgment renderedthereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusionswith respect to the determinative facts in issue"- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for anexamination of the probative value of the evidencepresented by the parties

2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a firstclass ticket without any reservation whatever.Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language;that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. Ifonly to achieve stability in the relations betweenpassenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket soissued is desirable.

Reasoning - Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not representthe true and complete intent and agreement of theparties; that said respondent knew that he did not haveconfirmed reservations for first class on any specificflight, although he had tourist class protection; that,accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was noguarantee that he would have a first class ride, but thatsuch would depend upon the availability of first classseats. However, CA held that Air France should knowwhether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored ornot. The trial court also accepted as evidence thewritten documents submitted by Carrasco and even thetestimony of the air-carrier’s employees attested thatindeed, Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holderis not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding thefact that seat availability in specific flights is thereinconfirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollowof the hands of an airline.-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat inBangkok, he was granted the “first class” seat. If therehad been no seat, and if the “white man” had a betterright to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrascohis seat?

3. YES. Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as towhether or not there is sufficient averment in thecomplaint to justify an award for moral damages.Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by theevidence. An amendment thereof to conform to theevidence is not even required. Reasoning- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first classpassage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was breached whenpetitioner failed to furnish first class transportation atBangkok; and Third, there was bad faith whenpetitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leavehis first class accommodation berth "after he wasalready seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class,by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing himmental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings andsocial humiliation, resulting in moral damages.- Air France did not present evidence that the “whiteman” made a prior reservation, nor proved that

the“white man” had “better right” over the seat; also, ifthe manager’s actions could be justified, they shouldhave presented the manager to testify in court – butthey did not do so- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso fromenjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, heimposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him fromhis seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having togo to the tourist class compartment-just to give way toanother passenger whose right thereto has not beenestablished. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, ofcourse, bad faith has assumed a meaning differentfrom what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operatingwith furtive design or with some motive of self-interestor ill will or for ulterior purposes

4. YES - The responsibility of an employer for the tortious actof its employees need not. be essayed. For the willfulmalevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, hisemployer, must answer.

5. YES - Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attendedwith public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action aswe have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-aircarrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.(note: it was held that it was a case of quasi-delict eventhough it was a breach of contract) Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quitedifferent in kind and degree from any other contractualrelation.43 And is, because of the relation which an aircarriersustains with the public. Its business is mainlywith the travelling public. It invites people to avail ofthe comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract ofair carriage, therefore, generates a relation attendedwith a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of thecarrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for anaction for damages.

Reasoning - Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.They have a right to be treated by the carrier'semployees with kindness, respect, courtesy and dueconsideration. They are entitled to be protected againstpersonal misconduct, injurious language, indignitiesand abuses from such employees. So it is, that anyrude or discourteous conduct on the part of employeestowards a passenger gives the latter an action fordamages against the carrier.6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae

Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within theproscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimonyis admissible.- also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted,when the dialogue happened, the impact of thestartling occurrence was still fresh and continued to befelt. The excitement had not as yet died down.Statements then, in this environment, are admissible aspart of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of thenervous excitement and mental and physical conditionof the declarant".

Reasoning - Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carriermade an entry in his notebooks reading "First class. passenger was forced to go to the tourist class againsthis will, and that the captain refused to intervene". Thepetitioner contents that it should not be admitted asevidence, as it was only hearsay. However, the subjectof inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also,the said entry was made outside the Philippines and byan

employee of petitioner. It would have been easy forAir France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if theyhad presented the purser.

7. YES Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power togrant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasicontracts.The only condition is that defendant shouldhave "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,oppressive, or malevolent manner".

Reasoning- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascosofrom his first class seat fits into this legal precept

8. YES Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies asimilar Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that canbe said is that the courts below felt that it is but justand equitable that attorneys' fees be given.

9. NO Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. The dictates of good sense suggestthat we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the factsand circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.

PSBA V Ca February 4, 1992

A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which causedthe death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of thePhilippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in theManila RTC. It was established that his assailants werenot members of the school’s academic community butwere outsiders.- The suit impleaded PSBA, Itsought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s deathdue to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lackof security precautions.- Petitioners sought to have the suitdismissed alleging that since they are presumably suedunder Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint statesno cause of action against them since academicinstitutions, like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of thatrule.

ISSUE WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case

HELD: Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art.2180 on quasi-delicts, it may still be liable under thelaw on contracts. Reasoning - The case should be tried on its merits. But respondentcourt’s premise is incorrect. It is expressly mentioned inArt. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done bypupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBAis not liable. But when an academic institution acceptsstudents for enrollment, the school makes itselfresponsible in providing their students with anatmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, nostudent can absorb the intricacies of physics or explorethe realm of arts when bullets are flying or where therelooms around the school premises a constant threat tolife and limb.

SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) 217 SCRA 624

Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia,authorized and instructed the defendant to inter theremains of deceased.- After about a month, preparatory to transferring theremains to a newly purchased family plot also at thesame cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffinof the deceased was removed from its nicheunderground. As the concrete vault was being raised tothe surface, the Syquias discovered that the vault had ahole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and itappeared that water drained out of the hole.- Pursuant to an authority granted by the MunicipalCourt of Parañaque, they caused the opening of theconcrete vault and discovered that:(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and siltcausing the wooden parts to separate and to crack theviewing glass panel located directly above the headand torso of the deceased;(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, andthe exposed parts of the deceased's remains weredamaged and soiled.

SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against MlaMemorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation todeliver a defect-free concrete vault;(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concretevault (Art. 2176)- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLAMEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating thegrave of the dead.

ISSUES: 1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract withpetitioners,or alternatively 2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana

HELD: 1. NO. Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract,which is the law between them. A contracting partycannot incur a liability more than what is expresslyspecified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended byimplication, beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Saleand Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bounditself to provide the concrete box to be sent in theinterment.- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLAMEMORIAL provides that: “Every earth interment shallbe made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wallof stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment ofwhich shall be made by the employees of theAssociation.” Pursuant to this, a concrete vault wasinstalled and after the burial, the vault was covered bya cement lid.- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contractbecause it was stated in the brochures that “lot mayhold single or double internment underground in sealedconcrete vault."- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries defineseal as any of various closures or fastenings thatcannot be opened without rupture and that serve as acheck against tampering or unauthorized opening.- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Whenthe terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubtas to the intention of the contracting parties, then theliteral meaning of the stipulation shall control.

2. NO. Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission ofthat diligence which is required by the nature of theobligation and corresponds with the circumstances ofthe persons, of the time and of the place." In theabsence of stipulation or legal provision providing thecontrary, the diligence to be observed in theperformance of the obligation is that which is expectedof a good father of a family.

Reasoning: - Although a pre-existing contractual relation betweenthe parties does not preclude the existence of a culpaaquiliana, circumstances of the case do not shownegligence. The reason for the boring of the hole wasexplained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, whosaid that: “When the vault was placed on the grave ahole was placed on the vault so that water could comeinto the vault because it was raining heavily thenbecause the vault has no hole the vault will float andthe grave would be filled with water.”- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of agood father of a family in preventing the accumulationof water inside the vault which would have resulted inthe caving in of earth around the grave. Finding noevidence of negligence, there is no reason to awarddamages.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue: Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence

Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,189 SCRA 158

FACTS: - This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collisionbetween the Phil. Rabbit’s bus driven by Tomas delosReyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physicalinjuries.- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, thejeepney’s right rear wheel detached which

caused it torun in an unbalanced position.-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, thejeepney which was then running on the eastern lane(its right of way) made a U-turn, invading andeventually stopping on the western lane of the road insuch a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south(from where it came) and its rear faced the north(towards where it was going). -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked thegreater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among whichwas Bus No. 753 of Rabbit- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a suddenU-turn and encroached on the western lane of thehighway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, thebus bumped from behind the right rear portion of thejeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries.- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, therewere no vehicles following the jeepney, neither werethere oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weathercondition of that day was fair.- A criminal complaint against the two drivers forMultiple Homicide.- Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned.The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack ofsufficient evidence.***As regards the damages.- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon,(jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbit’sdriver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spousesMangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractualliability.- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs basedtheir suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (theinsurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded asadditional defendant in the civil case filed by thePascuas.- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were formedical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, forexemplary damages, moral damages and attorney'sfees and expenses of litigation.- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees andexpenses of litigation.- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreonfiled a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and forits non-use during the period of repairs.- TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENTand held that there was a breach of the contract ofcarriage with their passengers; ordered them to paythe damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable asit was the jeepney’s insurer. Rabbit was to be paid bythe jeepney party for actual damages.- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it founddelos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly andseverally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1)the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumptionthat drivers who bump the rear of another vehicleguilty and the cause of the accident unless contradictedby other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test toconclude that delos Reyes was negligent.

ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVERARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFEREDBY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY

HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERSARE LIABLE. REASONING:TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTSCONCERNING MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE.(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passengerCaridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "runningfast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo toslow down but did not heed the warning(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of PoliceInvestigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Policewho found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on theEastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road)until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle,crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) centerline and encroaching fully into the western lane wherethe collision took place

as evidenced by the point ofimpact;(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacaldaalso of the San Manuel Police that the path of thejeepney they found on the road \was shown by skidmarks which he described as "scratches on the roadcaused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel wasremoved;"(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicideand Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage toProperty thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac,as a result of the collision, and his commitment toprison and service of his sentence(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitarattesting to the circumstance that the collision occuredon the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.

-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune andCarreon. They all failed to exercise theprecautions that are needed precisely pro hacvice.- In culpa contractua l , the moment a passenger dies oris injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at faultor to have acted negligently, and this disputablepresumption may only be overcome by evidence thathe had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribedin Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2or that the death or injury of the passenger was due toa fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657) .- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreonoffered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, analleged mechanic, that he periodically checks andmaintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last onDec. 23, the day before the collision, which includedthe tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding theright rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while intransit. As to the cause thereof no evidence wasoffered. Said defendant did not even attempt toexplain, much less establish, it to be one caused by acaso fortuito. . . .-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against thecarrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to hisdestination, an accident caused either by defects in theautomobile or through the negligence of its driver, isnot a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriersliability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company,94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil.657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners(excluding Manalo)-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and thepassenger, and in the event of contractual liability, thecarrier is exclusively responsible therefore to thepassenger, even if such breach be due to thenegligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29,1966, 16 SCRA 742).- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liablewith the carrier, that would make the carrier's liabilitypersonal, contradictory to the explicit provision of A2181 of the NCC.

RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS: Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparksfr a locomotive engine. The fire was communicated tofour houses nearby. All of these houses were of lightconstruction, except that of Rodrigueza which was ofstrong materials. Plaintiffs say that the company failedto supervise their employees properly and wasnegligent in allowing locomotive to operate withoutsmokestack protection for arresting sparks. They alsosay that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuelused by the company – Bataan coal.Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly withinlimits of land owned by company. Rodrigueza didn’tmind the warnings from the

company. His house’smaterials included nipa and cogon, this indicatescontributory negligence on his part.

ISSUE WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributorynegligence

HELD Yes. - Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery bythe other plaintiffs.- There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfullyintruded upon company’s property. His house wasthere before the railroad company’s property. He maybe at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fireresulted from the company’s negligence.- The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage wasthe negligent act of the company. That Rodrigueza’shouse was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION butthat can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created byhimself and because his house remained by thetoleration and consent of company and because even ifthe house was improperly there, company had no rightto negligently destroy it. The company could haveremoved the house through its power of eminentdomain.

GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER ANDHARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO andkids)GR No.70493

FACTS - Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, andMaximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the BacnotanConsolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel,as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge goingtowards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in theafternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargotrack, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood,driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, comingfrom the opposite direction of Davao City and bound forGlan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. Atabout 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargotruck and the jeep collided as a consequence of whichEngineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patossustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As aresult of the impact, the left side of the truck wasslightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,including its fender and hood, was extensivelydamaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested onits right side on the asphalted road a few meters to therear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheelson the road.- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damageswas filed by the surviving spouse and children of thelate Engineer Calibo who are residents of TagbilaranCity against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.-

ISSUES WON respondent court is correct in reversing thedecision of trial court.

HELD NO. Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides asvalid and complete a defense to accident liability.(Picart v Smith)Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found,had had a full view of each other's vehicle from adistance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicleswere travelling at a speed of approximately thirtykilometers per hour. The private respondents haveadmitted that the truck was already at a full stop whenthe jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit todeny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they alsoadmitted the truck had been brought to a stop whilethe jeep was still thirty meters away. From these factsthe logical conclusion emerges that the driver ofthe jeep had what judicial doctrine hasappropriately called the last clear chance toavoid the accident, while still at that distance

ofthirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turnor swerving his jeep away from the truck, either ofwhich he had sufficient time to do while running at aspeed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In thosecircumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity ofavoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right toexpect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truckto swerve and leave him a clear path.-

Dingcong v. Kanaan 72 Phil. 14; G.R. No. L-47033

FACTS The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented thehouse of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of theCity of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. Amongthe hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 amonth, and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel.Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor ofthe hotel and established his "American Bazaar"dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles andmerchandise.-Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, whenretiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that withonly an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, thepipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run offthe pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articlesand merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing aloss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61.-The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representingthe establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filedthis complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong,Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.-CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted JoseDingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcongresponsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffsdamages.

ISSUE WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liablefor damages

HELD YES. -Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable forbeing the one who directly, by his negligence in leavingopen the faucet, caused the water to spill to theground and wet the articles and merchandise of theplaintiffs.-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of thehotel, with complete possession of the house, must alsobe responsible for the damages caused. He failed toexercise the diligence of a good father of the family toprevent these damages, despite his power andauthority to cause the repair of the pipes.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292

FACTS - Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business ofselling food and drinks to children in the KindergartenWonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained thatthey found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke andSprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store.Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and foundthat there were indeed fibrous materials in theunopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to theDepartment of Health office in their region and wasinformed that the soda samples she sent wereadulterated.- Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with herregular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a daywhich later on forced her to close down her business onDecember 12, 1989.- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiffCoca-Cola but the latter did not accede to herdemands.- Petitioners’ Claim: - Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on thegrounds of failure to exhaust

administrative remediesand prescription.- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (underA1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6months from the delivery of the goods.

ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict andpursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4years

HELD YES Reasoning- The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respectto the warranties against hidden defects orencumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited tothose prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also askfor the annulment of the contract upon proof of error orfraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligationsshall be applicable.- Under American law, the liabilities of themanufacturer or seller of injury-causing products maybe based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort orother grounds.

Rodriguez v. IAC 135 SCRA 242

FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luisand his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of theLunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earningsof Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legalinterest from date of the decision, and attorney’s feesof P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father andson solidarily liable for damages.)

ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legalinterest

HELD: 1. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearnedearnings had no basis, thus is void.Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the netunearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of thedeceased of another 30 years, and an annual netincome of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000personal expenses).In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC consideredthe age and health of the deceased. However, the CAmodified this by factoring in the “engagement of Lunain car racing,” thus lowering the life expectancy to only10 years.WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the variouspositions the deceased held at the time of his death,and the trend of his earnings over the span of his lastfew years, thus coming up with a potential grossincome of P75,000. However, the CA increased theannual personal expenses to P30,000, due to theescalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the netannual unearned income to P45,000.CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racingreduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on recordthat supports the claim that the car racing was adangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his lifeexpectancy. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racingis the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannotbe categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts areextremely low slung, low powered vehicles, onlyslightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeledconveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to havedisturbed the determination of the RTC which it hadpreviously affirmed.”Also, it was an error to increase the expenses withoutincreasing the gross income. “It stands to reason that ifhis annual personal expenses

should increase becauseof the ‘escalating price of gas which is a keyexpenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing’ [astatement which lacks complete basis], it would not beunreasonable to suppose that his income would alsoincrease considering the manifold sources thereof”

2. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the conceptof damages in a quasi-delict case and under thecircumstances, interest as part thereof may beadjudicated at the discretion of the court.(The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date offiling of the compliant.)

AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315

Facts: It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about tograduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredowent to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”.While they were in the auditorium of their school,hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.

ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable.

Held: Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic ornon-academic. Teachers are liable for acts of theirstudent except where the school is technical in nature(arts and trade establishment) in which case the headthereof shall be answerable.“There is really no substantial difference distinctionbetween the academic and non-academic schools in sofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.The same vigilance is expected from the teacher overthe student under their control and supervision,whatever the nature of the school where he isteaching”. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains atpresent. x x x “The student is in the custody of the school authoritiesas long as he is under the control and influence of theschool and within its premises, whether the semesterhas not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. Theterm “custody” signifies that the student is within thecontrol and influence of the school authorities. Theteacher in charge is the one designated by the dean,principal, or other administrative superior to exercisesupervision over the pupils or students in the specificclasses or sections to which they are assigned. It is notnecessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher isphysically present and in a position to prevent it.Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacherand not the parent shall be held responsible if the tortwas committed within the premises of the school at anytime when its authority could be validly exercised overhim.In any event, the school may be held to answer for theacts of its teacher or the head thereof under thegeneral principle of respondent superior, but it mayexculpate itself from liability by proof that it hadexercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Suchdefense they had taken necessary precautions toprevent the injury complained of and thus beexonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180.Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, theyacting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). Howeverteachers are not expected to have the same measureof responsibility as that imposed on parent for theirinfluence over the child is not equal in degree. x x xThe parent can instill more lasting discipline morelasting disciple on the child than the teacher and soshould be held to a greater accountability than theteacher or the head for the tort committed by the child.As the teacher was not shown to have been negligentnor the school remised in the discharged of their duties,they were exonerated of liability.(Note – the court view on increasing students activismlikely causing violence resulting

to injuries, in or out ofthe school premises – J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly saidmany student x x x view some teachers as part of thebourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice onbehavior deportment and other non-academic mattersis not only resented but actively rejected. It seemsmost unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumptionjuris tantum of negligence for acts of students evenunder circumstances where strictly speaking therecould be no in loco parentis relationship.The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case hasoutlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it canonly apply the law with its imperfections. However thecourt can suggest that such a law should be amendedor repealed.

Phil Rabbit v. Forwarders 63 SCRA 231

FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGANfiled a complaint for damages in an action based onquasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICANFORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and thedriver, PINEDA.- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freightTRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the nat’l highway atSto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUSdriven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit.Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus wasdamaged and could not be used for 79 days. Thisdeprived the company of earnings of about P8,600.- Among the defenses interposed by the defendantswas that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingitmoved that the complaint against him be dismissed onthe ground that the bus company and the bus driverhad no cause of action against him.- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on theground that he was not the manager of anestablishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because outof its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingitand his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that theveil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as oneand the same civil personality. But this was not allegedin their complaint.*

ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners andmanagers of an establishment or enterprise" used inArt. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager ofa corporation owning a truck(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)

HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers ofEstablishments: Art.2180 uses the termmanager" ("director" in the Spanish version) tomean "employer.”- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, notortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened onBalingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,in connection with the vehicular accident because hehimself may be regarded as an employee ordependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders ,Inc.* This issue was not raised in the lower court so itwould be unfair to allow them to do so now. The casehas to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed inthe trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has apersonality separate and distinct from that of theBalingit spouses.

DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD) 243 SCRA 220

FACTS - Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the"Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay hadan altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action fordamages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigationand Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or SuperguardSecurity Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers ofdefendant Torzuela.

ISSUE WON civil action can proceed independently of thecriminal action

HELD YES - Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the civil actionfor the recovery of civil liability is impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, unless theoffended party waives the civil action, reserves hisright to institute it separately, or institutes the civilaction prior to the criminal action.Such civil action includes recovery of indemnityunder the Revised Penal Code, and damages underArticles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines arising from the same act or omission ofthe accused."- It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civilaction before the prosecution in the criminal actionpresents evidence is even far better than a compliancewith the requirement of an express reservation. This isprecisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case.- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 hasalready been construed to include bodily injuriescausing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physicalinjuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includesnot only physical injuries but also consummated,frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v.Caro).- Although in the Marcia case, it was held that noindependent civil action may be filed under Article 33where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, itmust be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused inthe case at bar, is charged with homicide, not withreckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marciawas charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, inthis case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.

G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997 GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO

FACTS: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgicaloperation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended byDr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes wastheanaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of"unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital.Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled thatFlorencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia.Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the CityProsecutor.

.ISSUE:Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the respondent.

RULING:In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training andskill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use atleast the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat acondition under the same circumstances.

It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that experttestimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that thephysician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as thecauses of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientificknowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support theconclusion as to causation.

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of anyexpert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of goodstanding in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons ofDr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) onlytestified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matterof the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.The better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal theresolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justiceunder the Department of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules onAppeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended byDepartment Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides:Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed . — Only resolutions of the ChiefStateProsecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing acriminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justiceexcept as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution." On theother hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal onspecified grounds."In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within hispower and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will notinterfere with the same.

G.R. No. L-7255 October 3, 1912 THE UNITED STATES, v. TEODORO JUANILLO

Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia to Santa Barbara, Province of Iloilo, at about 4 o'clock on the afternoon of April 23, 1911, by being struck by an automobile, of which the appellant was the chauffeur.

There is no dispute that the deceased was struck on or near the left hip by the lamp or fender over the left front wheel of the automobile; that the blow knocked him to the side of the machine; that the machine did not pass over his body; and that as a direct result of the blow the deceased died very soon thereafter on the same day.

Now, do these facts constitute a violation of article 568 of the Penal Code? This article reads:

ART. 568. Any person who by reckless imprudence shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degree shall be imposed.

It (the automobile) has no right to run at a greater speed along the public highway in passing people afoot or in vehicles that it can stop when danger arises. A footman has the right of way in public highways and people in vehicles have no right to ride him down.

It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may use the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. (20 L. R. A., n. s., 32 [232], Note.) Owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways that pedestrians and drivers of horses have. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animals are not to use the means of locomotion without regard to the rights of others having occassion to travel on the highway. While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has equal rights upon the roads with pedestrians, horses, and carriages, its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied with that degree of prudence in management and consideration for the rights of others which is consistent with safety.

Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3d ed.), 1324, defines negligence to be:

The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (Ahern vs. Oregon Tel. Co., 24 Ore. 276.) The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to the use of such vehicle. He is obliged to take notice of the conditions before him, and if it is apparent that by any particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an injury, it is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if within reasonable care and prudence he can do so. In determining the degree of care an operator of an automobile should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take into consideration the place, presence or absence of other travelers, the speed of the automobile, its size, appearance, manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and anything that indicates unusual or peculiar danger.

Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a common right to the highway. A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. an automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances. The appellant was aware of and is chargeable with the knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple country people and were lacking in the capacity to appreciate and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high rate of speed, and he was bound to enlarge to a commensurate extent the degree of vigilance and care necessary to avoid injuries which the use of his machine made more imminent.

The negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from the collision. He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. Great care was due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling along the highway. When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more dangerous than a street car or even a railway car. These are propelled along the fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual, and for this reason is far more dangerous to the traveling public than either the street car or the railway train. We do not feel at liberty, under the evidence, to say that this defendant was free from reckless negligence. In failing to so check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence but reckless negligence in a marked degree.

HedyGany Yu vs CANo. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.

Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old

man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.

Tamargo vs CA

GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.  

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

People vs. Aragon 100 Phil 1033

FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea.  While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol.  Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo.  He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu.  When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse.  She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment.  While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang.  CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.  Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.  

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL:

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Id.) When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. (Id.) In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” (Calalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74613, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 514, 523-524.) In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987), the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation

and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. (FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. ET AL., G.R. NO. 174654, AUGUST 17, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 217 SCRA 16 (1993)

FACTS: Albenson Enterprises Corporation (AEC) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (GII) mild steel plates and as part payment thereof, AEC was given a check drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. The check bounced.‖ Upon inquiry with the SEC, AEC discovered that the President of GII was one ―Eugenio S. Baltao.‖ Upon further inquiry, AEC learned that E.L. Woodworks was registered in the name of one ―Eugenio Baltao.‖ In addition, upon verification with Pacific Banking Corp., AEC was advised that the signature appearing on the bounced check belonged to one ―Eugenio Baltao.‖ Thereafter, AEC made an extrajudicial demand upon Baltao for the payment/replacement of the dishonoured check. Baltao denied issuing the check and further claimed that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and could not have transacted business with AEC. Hence, AEC filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It turned out, however, that Baltao has a namesake, in the person of his son, Eugenio Baltao III, who manages E.L. Woodworks. In the meantime, the Assistant Fiscal of Rizal filed the information against Baltao. Baltao immediately filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who reversed the finding of the Assistant Fiscal. Because of the alleged unjust filing of the criminal case against him for a measly amount of P2,575, Baltao filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against AEC, its owner and one of its employees. AEC contended that the civil case against them was one for malicious prosecution. They asserted that the absence of malice on their part absolved them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Baltao, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for damages on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Can Baltao recover damages based on Articles 19, 20 and21 of the Civil Code?

RULING:

NO. AEC, et. al. could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights for the following reasons:1. What prompted AEC to file the case for violation of B.P. Blg.22 against Eugenio S. Baltao was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by Eugenio S. Baltao.2. When AEC made an

extrajudicial demand upon Eugenio S.Baltao, the latter did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, he waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless AEC at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.3. The criminal complaint filed against Eugenio S. Baltao was a sincere attempt on the part of AEC to find the best possible means to collect the sum due to it.4. Considering that GII, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned Baltao, AEC acted in good faith in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.5. A civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35 and 2219(8) thereof. In order that such can prosper, however, the following elements must be present, to wit: a. the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; b. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; c. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evidence that AEC, et. al ., were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass Eugenio S. Balao, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao. In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of AEC to vex or humiliate Eugenio S. Baltao by instituting the criminal case against him. While AEC may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of Eugenio S. Baltao for the dishonoured check, the same is not so gross as to amount to bad faith in warranting an award for damages. 6. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. Thus, an award of damages and attorney‘s fees is unwarranted wherethe action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person‘s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria. In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that AEC et. al acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against Eugenio S. Baltao. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by AEC et. al , they cannot be held liable for damages. No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution

Garciano vs. Court of Appeals212 SCRA 436 (1992)FACTS:

Garciano was hired by Immaculate Concepcion Institute to teach during the 1981-82 school year. On January 13, 1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria. The President of the school approved the application. On June 1, 1982, the school advised her, thru her husband, that her services were being terminated since there was no written contract of employment between

her and the school. Upon her return from Austria and upon her inquiries as to her status, the Board of Directors of the school reinstated her and the Board likewise declared the notice of termination as null and void. Instead of reporting back for work, Garciano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against some of the school officials and faculty members for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that she was not entitled to damages. The Court explained:

―Garciano‘s discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While some school officials and faculty members wanted her services terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post. That the school principal disagreed with the board of Director‘s decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board‘s decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not illegally dismiss‘ her for the Board‘s decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earning was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria .

With respect to Garciano‘s claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault. Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21. In the case at bar, Garciano is not without fault. Firstly, she went on indefinite leave of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the bOD’s order for her to report on July 5, 1982.

Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Phil.100 Phil. 186 (1956)FACTS:

The Commercial Air Lines, Inc. (CALI), on the verge of bankruptcy, met with all his creditors. It was agreed that CALI‘s assets, including a C-54plane that was still in California, would be sold and the proceeds distributed to the creditors. Right after the meeting, Shell Co. shrewdly made a telegraphic assignment of its credit to a sister corporation in the US, which immediately secured attachment and sale of CALI‘s plane in California, the proceeds of which were totally applied to the satisfaction of its claim. Can the Shell Co. in the Philippines be madeto pay for damages to the other creditors of CALI?

RULING: The case at bar falls squarely within the purview of the principle of abuse of rights embodied in Art. 19 of the Civil Code. True, this article contains essentially a mere declaration of principles, yet such declaration is implemented by Art. 21, a sequent of Art. 19, which declares that ―any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Shell Co. is liable for damages because it did not show good faith and honesty

Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. vs. CA176 SCRA 778 (1989)FACTS:

Restituto Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as purchasing agent and administrative assistant the engineering operations manager. Fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions were discovered and the same were attributed to Tobias, who ironically was the one who actually discovered and reported the anomalies. One day after Tobias made the report, Herbert Hendry, the EVP and GM of Globe, confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. When Tobias returned to work after his forced leave, Hendry again went to him and called him a ―crook‖ and a ―swindler.‖ He was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen signatures of his handwriting, signature and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing Tobias of participation in the anomalies. Not satisfied with the police report, Hendry hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him. Thereafter, the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents, reiterated his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector test conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias, Hendry filed several complaints of estafa against Tobias, all of which were dismissed. In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from Globe Mackay that his employment has been terminated. Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which case was settled amicably. Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, Hendry without being asked by Retelco, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for damages against Globe Mackay and Hendry (Petitioners for short). Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss Tobias. Tobias, on the other hand, contends that because of Petitioners‘ abusive manner in dismissing

him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages.

RULING: Petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to Tobias and for which the latter must be indemnified. Even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners. The following reasons convinced the court to awarddamages:1. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said ―Tobby, you are a crook and a swindler in the company.‖ Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was yet to be submitted, the statement made by Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.2. Several other tortuous acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter‘s termination from work. After the filing of the criminal complaints, Tobias talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias‘ protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added, ―You Filipinos cannot be trusted.‖ The threat unmasked petitioner‘s bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry‘s earlier statements about Tobias being a ―crook‖ and ―swindler‖ are clear violations of Tobias‘ personal dignity. (see Art. 26, Civil Code)

3. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias had been dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with Retelco and as result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176of the Civil Code. (4) Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. In the instant case, the petitioners acted in bad faith

in filing the criminal complaints. Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against Globe Mackay, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 115 (1993)

FACTS: Gashem is an Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a medical course at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Sometime in 1987, Gashem courted Marilou Gonzales and proposed to marry her. Marilou accepted his love on the condition that they would get married and they agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October 1987.Gashem then visited Marilou‘s parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime in August 1987, Gashem forced Marilou to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She was a virgin before she began living with him. Soon, Gashem‘s attitude towards Marilou started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. At the confrontation before the representative of the barangay captain of Guilig, Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod.

RULING: Gashem is liable for damages. The Supreme Court ruled that where a man‘s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, it was Gashem‘s ―fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry Marilou that made her surrender her virtue andwomanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on Gashem‘s part that made Marilou‘s parents agree to their daughter‘s living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.‖ In short, Marilou surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.

Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 (1964)

FACTS: Francisco Veles and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the bigday. On September 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be, which reads:

―Dear Bet,We will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.‖―Please do not ask too many people about the reason why. That would only create a scandal.

Pacquing.‖

Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued Velez for damages. Velez contended that ―there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing‖ an action for breach of Promise to marry. The records reveal, however, that on August 23, 1954 Wassmer and Velez applied for marriage license, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be‘s trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed ,with accessories was bought. And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply called off the wedding, went to Mindanao and never returned and was never heard from again.

RULING: This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publication, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code

St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals133 SCRA 179 (1984)FACTS:

St. Louis Realty Corporation (SLRC) published an advertisement in the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968, with a heading ―WHERE THE HEART IS,‖whereby the residence of a doctor was erroneously depicted as the residence of a family (different from that of the doctor‘s) that had recently moved into the Brookside Hills community. Noticing the mistake, the doctor called the attention of the advertiser whose officer subsequently offered his apologies but without however rectifying the published item. However, when the lawyer of the doctor demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages from the advertiser on account of the erroneous publication, the advertiser published a new advertisement, in the Manila Times of March 18, 1969, wherein the same family as in the original advertisement was depicted with its real house but no apology to the doctor or an explanation of the error in the original advertisement was made. Moreover, after the doctor had filed a complaint for damages, the advertiser published a

―Notice of Rectification‖ in a space 4 by 3 inches, claiming that its print ad ―Wherethe Heart Is‖ which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18,1969 was a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times (Sunday Times) issue of December 15, 1968 and January 5,1969, wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside homeowner was mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner. In the lower court, the judge ruled that the advertiser committed a mistake which violated the complainant‘s right to privacy and should have immediately published a rectification and apology, but because of its mistake and utter lack of sincerity, defendant had caused complainant to suffer mental anguish in addition to actual damages resulting from reduced income.

RULING: When the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court after the appellate court had affirmed the lower court‘s decision, the Supreme Court declared that the St. Louis Realty‘s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times and it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up but just contended itself with a cavalier ―rectification.‖ As a result of the mix-up, the private life of complainant was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed causing him to suffer diminution of income and mental anguish. According to the Court, the acts and omissions of St. Louis Realty fall under Article 26

Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals160 SCRA 449 (1988)FACTS:

Some students of a state college formed an organization named Student Leadership Club. Delmo was elected treasurer. In that capacity, she extended loans from the club funds to some students. The college president, claiming that extending loans was against school rules, wrote Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award from the school. Delmo appealed to the Bureau of Public Schools. The Bureau directed the college president ot to deprive Delmo of any award if she is entitled to it. On April 27,1966, the President received the Director‘s decision. On the same day he received a telegram ―airmail records Delmo missent that office.‖ The Bureau Director asked for the return only of the records but the President allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. So he returned by mail all the records plus the decision to the Director. The next day the President received from the Bureau Director a telegram telling him to give a copy of the decision to Delmo. The President in turn sent a telegram to the Bureau Director telling him that he had returned the decision and that he had not retained a copy. On May 3, the day of graduation, the President again received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo‘s name in the program as one of the honor students, the President let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the latin honor magna cum laude.

RULING: The President of the state college was held liable for damages unde rArticle 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors, on account of said official‘s neglect of duty and callousness. Undoubtedly, Delmo went through a painful ordeal brought about by the president‘s neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code are but proper.

Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan202 SCRA 309 (1991)

FACTS: As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned. Among them were Curio, Perez, Azucena and Javier. They were all required to apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits. Condition (a) of the clearance provided: ―The clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers concerned only when there is no item appearing under ―Pending Accountability‖ or after every item previously entered there under is fully settled. Settlement thereof shall be written in red.‖ Notwithstanding Condition (a) just quoted, the clearances of Perez and Azucena were favorably acted upon by the PCA officers concerned, including Atty. Llorente. The clearance of Javier was likewise favorably acted upon. But with respect to the clearance of Curio, Atty. Llorente refused to approve it because Curio had accountabilities. To justify his stand, Atty. Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the clearance which he said was ―very stringent‖ and could not be interpreted in any other way. Between December 1981and December 1986, Curio failed to get gainful employment because he had no clearance yet. Thus, Curio filed a complaint against Atty.Llorente for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted Atty. Llorente in the absence of any evidence that he acted in bad faith but held him civilly liable. Atty. Llorente questioned the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding him civilly liable in spite of an acquittal.

RULING: In justifying the award of civil liability, the Supreme Court declared ––Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal procedure, amending Rules 110 through 127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court shall include, in case of acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, ―a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.‖ The rule is based on the provisions of substantive law, that If acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action lies nonetheless. The challenged judgment found that the petition, in refusing to issue a certificate of clearance in favor of the private offended party, Herminigildo Curio, did not act with ―evident bad faith,‖ one of the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3819. We agree with the judgment, insofar as it found lack of evident bad faith by the petitioner, for the reasons cited therein, basically, because the petitioner was acting within the bounds of law in refusing to clear Curio although ―the practice was that the clearance was nevertheless approved, and then the amount of the unsettled obligation was deducted from the gratuity benefits of the employee.‖

We also agree with the Sandiganbayan that although the petitioner did not act with evident bad faith, he acted with bad faith nevertheless, for which he should respond for damages.‖

Yap vs. Paras,205 SCRA 625 (1992)

FACTS: On Oct. 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate of their parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On thes ame date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the RTC of General Santos City. The criminal case was eventually filed in court. Before arraignment, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question, citing the case of Ras vs. Rasul , 100 SCRA 125.Yap elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

RULING: In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil case ––forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale –– had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contracts, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed

ABERCA V VER G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"

Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that

military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants. Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Sol- Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.

ISSUES WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.

HELD NO Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case, as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32 governs. [b] By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So, under the above principles, it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. 32 of CC.

Banal vs. Tadeo

Facts: Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed against Rosario Claudio. Claudio is charged with 15 separate information for violation of BP22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. Petitioner moved to intervene through private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent judge on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, “it is not a crime against property but public order.” Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for violation of BP 22 which does not provide for civil liability.

Held: Yes. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, ‘every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.’ Thus a person committing a felony offends namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable actor omission. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission ,done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same feloniousact or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct andproximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, itis enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.

HERMOSISIMA v. CA

An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry

complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD: It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Tenchavez v. Escano

In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez:

His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.

On the part of Escaño’s parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962 ZAPANTA, v. Montesa

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

RULING: We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.

G.R. No. 182371 September 4, 2013 HEIRS OF YU & MATUALAGA v. CA

On May 24, 1972, the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga filed Civil Case No. 1291 against John Z. Sycip (who died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs, namely: Natividad D.Sycip, Jose Sycip, John Sycip, Jr., Alfonso Sycip II, and Rose Marie Natividad D. Sycip) for the declaration of nullity of documents and recovery of possession of real property with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) and damages. The subject matter of the case was Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd, the same lot being contested herein. The trial court initially dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, but the CA set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 1291, squatters entered the subject lot. Consequently, when a writ of execution and an order of demolition were issued by the trial court, a group of squatters known as Yard Urban Homeowners Association, Inc. (YUHAI) filed a complaint for injunction with damages and prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)or temporary restraining order (TRO). It was docketed as Civil Case No.4647 and raffled before the General

Santos City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22. In time, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA affirmed the decision on August 28, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003.8

Arguing in main that there was no complete demolition and no proper turn-over of the contested lot on December 13, 2007, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with very urgent prayer for immediate issuance of WPI and WPMI.27 On April 3, 2008, the CA resolved to grant the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.28 On the same day, the writ was issued by respondent Rosemarie D. Anacan-Dizon.29

The petition is granted.

In the case at bar, the different issues raised by petitioners and countered by private respondents ultimately boil down to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which, aside from the need to urgently resolve in view of the peculiar facts involved, is an issue that is purely a question of law.

We explain.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 38 To justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.39 An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise since, to be protected by injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.40 As this Court opined in Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Juan Valdez :41

A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo between the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper. While it is not required that the right claimed by applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.42

Thus, a preliminary mandatory injunction should only be granted "incases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."43

In this case, there is doubt on private respondents’ entitlement to a preliminary mandatory injunction since the evidence presented before the respondent CA in support thereof appears to be weak and inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected is vehemently disputed. The documentary evidence presented by private respondents does not suffice to prove their ownership and possession of the contested lot. Notably, both the Quitclaim Deed44

allegedly executed on April 16, 1957 by the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga in favor of Alfonso Aguinaldo Non and the Transfer of Free Patent Rights45 allegedly executed on May 28, 1957 by Melencio Yu in favor of Concepcion Non Andres were among those documents already declared null and void by the trial court in Civil Case No.1291 on the grounds that: (a) the spouses never received any consideration for said conveyances; (b) the documents were falsified; (c) the instruments were not approved by the Provincial Governor or his duly-authorized representative pursuant to Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu; (d) all transactions were restricted by the law governing free patent; and (e) Lot No. 2, Psu-135740-Amd is a paraphernal property of Talinanap Matualaga and was sold without her consent.46 The trial court’s decision was affirmed in Heirs of John Z.Sycip v. Court of Appeals,47 wherein this Court ratiocionated:

It is not disputed that the private respondents are Muslims who belong to the cultural minority or non-Christian Filipinos as members of the Maguindanao Tribe. Any transaction, involving real property with them is governed by the provisions of Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, Section 120 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), as amended, and Republic Act No. 3872, further amending the Public Land Act.

Finally, granting that there is strong evidence to prove private respondents’ ownership and possession of the disputed lot, still, they are not entitled to the grant of preliminary mandatory injunction. As the damages alleged by them can be quantified, it cannot be considered as "grave and irreparable injury" as understood in law:

It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely," immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the

billboard which is "a considerable amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v. Bayona:

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy . "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat , the writ of injunction – should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.56

Thus, in case of doubt, respondent CA should have denied private respondents' prayer as it appeared that although they may be entitled to the injunction, they could still be fully compensated for the damages they may suffer by simply requiring petitioners to file a bond to answer for all damages that may be suffered by such denial.57

Velasco v. Meralco

FACTS: Velasco was the owner of 3 adjoining lots. He then sold two of these to Meralco who later constructed a substation. It was only separated from the house of petitioner by a wire fence.

HELD: General rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance.

The test is whether the rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable

limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds.

ILOILO COLD STORAGE v. MUN. COUNCIL

FACTS: An ice factory was constructed in the premises. Not long after, there had been numerous complaints regarding the health hazards that the factory brings to the area’s residents. There was then an order for the factory to raise its smokestacks, otherwise, it will be ordered to close down.

HELD: If no compelling necessity requires the summary abatement of a nuisance, the municipal authorities under their power to declare and abate nuisances, don’t have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authority to decide whether the thing is a nuisance or not.

DE AYALA V BARRETTO

FACTS: De Ayala proposed the erection of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano, afashionable residence street with large expensive houses. 22 residents and property owners on the samestreet filed a suit or injunction against it on the ground that it’s a nuisance.ISSUE: WON such brewery and ice plant is a nuisanceHELD: No.RATIO: The locality in question is gradually being transformed from a fashionable residence area into anindustrial center.There is now a coal yard, warehouse , public school, club, lumberyards, sawmills and powerplant,electrical railroad and light co. In addition, Pasig River is in it immediate the vicinity.One who settles in a district which has a natural watercourse, especially beneficial for transportation purposes, or one who remains there in the light of the fact of its transformation into atrading or manufacturing center, must submit to the ordinary annoyances and discomforts which areincidental to the reasonable and general conduct of such business.In addition, the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently shown thatthe plant will be incongruous with it since another brewery is already in existence in the vicinity.The injunction will only be granted when there’s a pressing necessity and not just a triflingdiscomfort.

YU v. CA

FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines, cried foul when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased the merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England through FNF Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of origin and the

appellate court rejected petitioner's thesis that private respondent was engaged in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Article 28 of the New Civil Code (pp. 23 and 64, Rollo). Hence, the petition at bar.

There is no dispute that petitioner has had an exclusive sales agency agreement with the House of Mayfair since 1987 to promote and procure orders for Mayfair wallcovering products from customers in the Philippines. Even as petitioner was such exclusive distributor, private respondent, which was then petitioner's dealer, imported the some goods via the FNF Trading which eventually sold the merchandise in the domestic market. In the suit for injunction which petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Manila, petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and that private respondent acted in concert with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Private respondent professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of petitioner. Even then, private respondent responded by asserting that petitioner's understanding with Mayfair is binding only between the parties thereto.

ISSUE: Did respondent appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitioner?

That the exclusive sales contract which links petitioner and the House of Mayfair is solely the concern of the privies thereto and cannot thus extend its chain as to bind private respondent herein is, We believe, beside the point. Verily, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable (Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 [1915]; 4-A Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1988 Ed., p. 90). The liability of private respondent, if any, does not emanate from the four corners of the contract for undoubtedly, Unisia Merchandising Co., Inc. is not a party thereto but its accountability is "an independent act generative of civil liability" (Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587 [1919]; 4 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1981 10th Ed., p. 439; 4 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1986 Ed.,p. 439). These observations, however, do not in the least convey the message that We have placed the cart ahead of the horse, so to speak, by pronouncing private respondent's liability at this stage in view of the pendency of the main suit for injunction below. We are simply rectifying certain misperceptions entertained by the appellate court as regards the feasibility of requesting a preliminary injunction to enjoin a stranger to an agreement.

To Our mind, the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect (30 Am. Jur. Section 19, pp. 71-72: Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and

Contracts, 1983 8th Rev. Ed., p. 336) which may otherwise not be diminished, nay, rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods from the supplier to defeat the very purpose for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized distributor (43 C.J.S. 597).

Another circumstance which respondent court overlooked was petitioner's suggestion, which was not disputed by herein private respondent in its comment, that the House of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code). The breach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused by the latter's species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining order. This brings Us to the irreparable mischief which respondent court misappreciated when it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage. A contrario, the injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor by petitioner insofar as his goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are concerned. Withal, to expect petitioner to file a complaint for every sale effected by private respondent will certainly court multiplicity of suits (3 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, 1985 Edition, p. 261).

GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542

FACTS: -Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. - Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.

- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties

HELD: YES

- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. - Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered.

ONGSIAKO, ET. AL. vs. ONGSIAKO, ET. AL.GR# L-7510March 30, 1957FACTS:

There are 3 causes of action filed in this case. One of which is the obstruction of thedikes constructed by the defendants in 1937. Such dikes obstructed the natural flow of excesswater from the plaintiff’s higher tenement. It was alleged that from time immemorial before the partition of the Hacienda Esperanza, the water coming from the portion of the estate assigned to plaintiffs had been flowing regularly and without artificial obstruction towards the other areas of that same hacienda subsequently assigned to the defendants, as a result of the partition in 1929.The CFI granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:

May the dikes be demolished?

RULING:

The SC affirmed the Order appealed from.Considering that the action was filed in 1951, the legal easement sought to be enforcedhad been extinguished by non-user and the action is therefore barred by prescription.

Banal vs. Tadeo

Facts: Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed againstRosario Claudio. Claudio is charged with 15 separate information for violation of BP22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. Petitioner moved to intervenethrough private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent judge on the groundthat the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does notprovide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, “it is not a crime againstproperty but public order.” Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but wasdenied by the respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution forviolation of BP 22 which does not provide for civil liability.

Held: Yes. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, ‘every person criminally liable for a felony isalso civilly liable.’ Thus a person committing a felony offends namely (1) the societyin which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated;and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastityor property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable actor omission.While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it givesrise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damageto another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise tothe civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair ormake whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. Inother words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same feloniousact or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct andproximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, itis enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage toanother, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss orinjury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.

FRANCO v. IAC Facts: At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound

Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.

Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company.

Issues: 1. whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict;

2. whether respondent appellate court in an appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners, may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue, prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said court's decision.

Ruling: 1. We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,

apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties; while the second kind is governed by the of the Civil Code as stated in Articles 2176 -2177 and 2180.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry,

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.

On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.

The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to say that there can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted.

Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition, we agree with petitioners' contention that the Intermediate Appellate Court is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. 13 For failure of plaintiffs-appellees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. 14

Furthermore, the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited their claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average income for a period of one (1) year of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and P12,000.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. We feel that our award should not exceed the said amounts . 16

However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to P30,000.00 each remains, the same having been made in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated Philippine currency. 17

LAGAZON v. Reyes

Facts: On April 1, 1972, a passenger-type jeepney driven by Moises San Angel collided with a motorized tricycle driven by plaintiff-appellant, Orlando Lagazon, at San Gabriel, Macabebe, Pampanga. As a result thereof, the tricycle was damaged and Lagazon suffered injuries.

On April 25,1972, Lagazon filed a criminal complaint for damage to property and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence against San Angel.

On January 11, 1973, Lagazon filed a civil complaint against the defendant-appellee, Visia P. Reyes, for damages alleging that Reyes was the lawful and registered owner of that vehicle driven by Moises San Angel on April 1, 1972; that Reyes was the employer of San Angel; that on the aforesaid date, San Angel drove his vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner which resulted in damage to his Lagazon tricycle and injuries to his person; that as a consequence thereof, he filed a criminal; and that on June 30, 1972, San Angel pleaded guilty to the offense charged and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P604.00.

At the initial hearing of the aforesaid civil case, counsel for Lagazon announced to the trial court that the complaint was filed against Reyes for the latter's liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code based upon the conviction of San Angel in the criminal case filed with the Municipal Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, upon a plea of guilty.

Issue: whether or not it was still necessary to sue the employee, San Angel, with his employer, Reyes, ' for the latter's subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

A person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of the separate action therefor is reserved. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the employer is subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liability of his employee in the event of the latter's insolvency. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the defendant employer in a civil case filed to

enforce the latter's subsidiary liability under the said article not only with regard to the former's (employee) civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee (Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, 99 Phil. 670).

However, before the employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liability of his employee, certain facts must be proved, such as evidence establishing that (1) he is indeed the employer of the convict (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (4) execution against the employee is unsatisfied. The determination of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But a determination there must be, on the basis of evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present; and this may be done in the same criminal action at which the employee's liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced. It may be done at a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment.

In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant, Lagazon, reserved his right to institute a separate civil action while the criminal case filed against the employee, San Angel, was still pending before the Municipal Court of Macabebe, Pampanga. Accordingly, no civil liability was adjudged against San Angel after he pleaded guilty to the offense charged.

It is very clear, therefore, that when plaintiff-appellant, Lagazon, filed his complaint against the defendant-appellee, Reyes, on January 11, 1973, there was still no adjudicated civil liability of the latter's employee, San Angel. There is no ipso facto subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 where his employee has not been previously convicted of the offense charged and adjudged civilly liable. If the plaintiff-appellant desired to recover directly from the defendant-appellee in view of the apparent insolvency of the latter's employee, he should have included this employee in that complaint filed by him as a party defendant. By that process, the trial court could then render judgment holding the employee civilly liable in an amount previously determined by it and ordering the defendant-appellee, Reyes, to pay subsidiarily such amount in the event that the former is insolvent or is unable to satisfy the judgment (Yumul vs. Juliano, 72 Phil. 94).

Lagazon contends that instead of dismissing the complaint, the trial court should have ordered that San Angel be impleaded as a party defendant if it believed all along that the latter was an indispensable party in the civil action to enforce the subsidiary liability of Reyes under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This contention is impressed with merit. The court a quo should have ordered that San Angel be impleaded as a party defendant in accordance with Rule 3, Section 11, of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

The aim of the rule is that all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of the suit, should be made parties to it in order that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation, thus avoiding multiplicity of suits (67 C.J.S. 939-940).

Ordinarily, the instant case should be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. However, such action is no longer necessary considering that a decision in Civil Case No. 73-59-M entitled, "Orlando Lagazon, Plaintiff, versus Moises San Angel, Defendant," was already rendered on June 14, 1975, finding San Angel civilly liable to Lagazon and ordering the former to pay the latter an amount by way of damages. In this connection, if Lagazon, by virtue of the said decision, had already recovered from San Angel the entire amount adjudged as the latter's civil liability, there would be no subsidiary liability on the part of Reyes to speak of. However, if there was no such recovery or where the recovery was only for a partial amount due to the insolvency of San Angel, and Lagazon desires to enforce Reyes subsidiary liability for the entire amount or the remaining unpaid amount, as the case may be, he may take the proper steps towards that end by proving the requirements outlined in Ozoa vs. De Madula, et al., supra, with the decision in Civil Case No. 73-59-M as the basis therefor.

Yusay v. Adil

Facts: On 5 September 1979, a cargo truck or log loader driven by Rodolfo Guillen figured in a traffic mishap in Jaro, Iloilo City with another cargo truck owned by Igmedio Sumbanon. 1

Thereafter, Guillen was charged in a criminal case for less serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. Accused was found guilty and was eventually given a sentence. A writ of execution was issued against the accused. It was returned unsatisfied on the ground of accused's insolvency. Igmedio Sumbanon then filed a motion for execution of owner/ employer's subsidiary civil liability. On 24 October 1980, the respondent court issued an order granting the motion and forthwith ordered the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution against the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Eliseo Yusay 3 As stated in said order, Eliseo B. Yusay received a copy of the motion but did not file any objection thereto. His wife, Aida 0. Yusay, received a copy of the order and the aforesaid writ of subsidiary execution in the evening of 24 October 1980.

Issue: Whether or not the Yusay Spouses are subsidiarily liable.

Ruling: Since Martinez v. Barredo, the rule has been that a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant-employee to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Pajarito v. Seneriso 10 the case relied upon by the respondent court, but assailed by petitioners herein as not applicable in the case at bar, this Court stated:

Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary (sic) liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. In Martinez v. Barredo, this Court ruled that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability. 11

The Court, in Miranda v. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc. ruled that the decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court." 12

In the instant case, the spouses Yusay do not deny that, while the cargo truck in question was not registered in their names but in the name of the Calinog-Lambunao Sugarmill, Inc. by virtue of a contract to sell between the spouses, as vendees, and the latter, as vendor, with reservation of ownership on the part of the vendor until final payment has been made, yet the contract provides that responsibility for any and all damages arising from the operation of the vehicle is for the account of the petitioners, the spouses Yusay. The latter cannot, therefore, escape subsidiary liability under the law.

As stated in Martinez vs. Barredo:

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way

that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence (Almeida et al., vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S., 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco vs. Onrubia, 46 Phil., 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil., 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.) 13

The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to the criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. Thus:

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:

It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them benefit of counsel; and consequently doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied (Martinez vs. Barredo, supra.). 14

Carpio v. Doroja

Facts: Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.

An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.

At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.

The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling: In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.