Took Us Long Enough

A History and Analysis of theAmerican Influence on the Panama Canal

December 4, 2012Kurt Fire

Dr. Schaefer

POLS 207

The creation of the Panama Canal was a dizzying feat of both engineering and

politics. King Philip II of Spain was reported to have concluded that, “it would be

impious to join the waters of the mighty oceans while Providence had seen fit to place

asunder.”1 For hundreds of years the proposition of a canal was prodigiously considered,

reconsidered, and shelved repeatedly. Interested parties, both states and non-state actors,

shifted continuously, including that of the Spanish, British, Americans, private groups,

and the local Panamanian, Colombian, and Nicaraguan governments. This case study will

examine the history of a prospective canal in the Central American isthmus, American

action and opinion concerning the situation, and the factors that led to America choosing

to build the Panama Canal, from the 15th century until Panama gained its independence in

November of 1903.

America was not the first nation to consider building a canal in Central America,

nor was it the first nation to gain influence in the area. In 1452, with the fall of the

Eastern Roman Empire, the Turks closed off land trade routes between India and Europe

and caused attention to shift westward, where it was thought a sea route could exist that

would mitigate the Turkish issue.2 The Spanish government was the first to fully devote

itself to the cause of this possible westward route.3 In the early 1500s, extensive surveys

were done, and it was widely thought that there was a possibility a sea route existed

through Central America that would connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and provide

access to the Indian coast.4 As explorers brought back report after report with no

indication of a sea route through Central America, the idea was proposed that a manmade

1 Miner, Dwight Carroll. The fight for the Panama route; the story of the Spooner act and the Hay-Herran Treaty. (New York: Octagon Books, 1940), 6.2 Haskin, Frederic J. The Panama Canal. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1913), 3. 3 Miner, 4.4 Ibid., 5.

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canal could be erected in lieu of a natural passageway. However, Spain was too

preoccupied with conquering the New World to devote time and energy to researching a

canal, and Spanish monarchs were never convinced of the feasibility of any canal plan

put before them.5 As time passed, other European states, namely the French, English, and

Dutch, gained significant footholds in the New World, and the Spanish realized that

building a canal would be an open invitation for war in the region.6 In the 1700s the

Spanish Colonial Government became diminished over time, to the point where rebellion

was actively taking place amongst the indigenous population. To appease the rebels, the

Spanish government ordered the creation of a canal in 1814, but it was too late, and the

Spanish government lost their grip on the area before work could begin.7

With the weakening of the Spanish, Great Britain made a hard and fast attempt to

garner a stronger foothold in Central America, offering gifts to the natives and pushing

for the area to be placed under British Protectorate status. Over time, the British too

dabbled with the prospect of the creation of a canal in the area. They encountered the

same difficulties as the Spanish, however, and no plans were yet laid out to construct a

canal.8

All the while, America’s interest in the region was far from extraordinary.

Following the War of 1812, American eyes looked to the west and showed little concern

with the area south of Mexico. The State Department, well aware of British interest in

Central America, was not eager to ignite another dispute with Great Britain.9 As Manifest

Destiny took hold of the American public, California’s location on the Pacific Ocean

5 Ibid., 6.6 Ibid., 7.7 Ibid., 9.8 Ibid., 10.9 Ibid., 11.

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ignited American interest in a canal. Secretary of State Henry Clay became highly

interested in the prospect of a canal following a report from the American Envoy to the

Central American Republic. A Senate resolution in 1835 officially endorsed the creation

of a treaty that would put a prospective Central American canal under American control,

however the Senate had no intention of actually building a canal, they would simply

protect it as it was built by a third party.10 In 1844, President Polk was elected, and the

idea of a canal continued to float around The White House. In 1847, President Polk urged

Congress to ratify a treaty with New Grenada, the nation in control of the Panamanian

isthmus at the time, which would “allow American citizens and merchandise to move

freely across the Isthmus of Panama.”11

Meanwhile, the British had redoubled their effort to maintain control in the

region, noting America’s acquisition of Texas and New Mexico as reason for suspicion of

future American imperialism to the south. Britain ordered Nicaragua to withdraw from

the mouth of the San Juan River, allowing Britain to move in and secure one of the most

promising prospective canal routes.12

The American response was not drastically reactionary. President Polk sent an

ambassador to Guatemala, hoping to encourage cooperation between Central American

states against the British. When the Ambassador, Elijah Hise, arrived, he found a

dizzying political situation unfolding. The governments of Nicaragua, Honduras, and

Salvador were eager to accept American assistance, but Costa Rica and Guatemala only

sought relations with the British. They were hardly in a position to pose a united front

against the British Empire. Realizing that Britain intended to garner total control of any

10 Ibid., 12.11 Ibid., 13.12 Ibid., 14.

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future canal, Hise quickly met with the Nicaraguan government and negotiated a deal

wherein the United States would have exclusive rights to build and protect a canal or

railroad across Nicaragua.13 By the time the news of this deal reached Washington,

President Taylor had been inaugurated, and the California Gold Rush had again turned

American eyes to its western frontier. If the British came to monopolize an isthmian

canal, the United States would lose the capability to reap greater rewards from the Gold

Rush, in addition to any previous economic and transit benefits. President Taylor

replaced Hise with E.G. Squier, and sent Squier to Nicaragua with news that any canal

constructed by the United States would have guaranteed neutrality towards all ships

utilizing it.14

Tensions heightened between the United States and Britain, but neither nation was

willing to fight another costly war just over the prospect of the canal. Negotiations were

slow going, but the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was signed by both nations and verified by the

American Senate in 1850. The treaty was great in scope; it established that neither

signatory would “take possession of, fortify, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part

of Central America”, and that any canal created would be supported and neutral to both

countries.15

Americans, both Congress and the general public, were completely dissatisfied

with the treaty, believing they should have exclusive rights over a canal. As the American

Civil War drew to a close, the idea of an “American canal under American control”

became the prevailing American sentiment. As President Grant came into power, he felt

very strongly that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should be replaced as soon as possible. 16

13 Ibid., 15.14 Ibid., 16.15 Ibid., 17.16 Ibid., 18.

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Meanwhile, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, public interest in a

Central American canal rose dramatically. After 10 years of drawbacks and stalemates

with both the Colombian and Nicaraguan government over a possible canal, the leader of

the Suez Canal’s creation, Ferdinand de Lesseps, was revealed to be heading up a

European operation to build a canal in Panama. He estimated that in 12 years and at a

price of 240 million dollars, a canal could be created, much to the surprise and

bewilderment of the United States.17

The American State Department immediately discouraged Colombia, who was

now in control of the area of Panama, from accepting any European offers. Congress was

nearly unanimous in its voice against this effort, painting this as a flagrant violation of the

Munroe Doctrine. The French Government revealed that they were not actively

supporting the efforts of de Lesseps in any way. After raising nearly 260 million dollars

worldwide, de Lesseps and company purchased land and began excavation in Panama.18

On February 1, 1881, a two-word telegram was sent to France that thrilled newspaper

readers throughout Europe: “Work begun”.19

As excavation began, the American State Department was searching desperately

for a means to remove the burdens of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Secretary of State

Frederick T. Frelinghuysen sought to throw out the Clayton-Bulwer treaty due to reasons

of national defense. However, President Cleveland was inaugurated and appointed

Thomas Bayard as the new Secretary of State, who felt that the United States should

17 Ibid., 19-20.18 Ibid., 22.19 McCullough, David G. The path between the seas: the creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 131.

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abide by the treaty. Throughout the Cleveland Presidency the American government

moved towards a consensus that the canal should not strictly be an American asset.20

While American interest waned, progress by the de Lesseps group was proving

itself a massive failure. Costs associated with the canal skyrocketed, and incompetence

was rampant at all levels of the operation. Scandal rocked the operation as it was

revealed, “expenses of all sorts had been systematically ‘padded’, that contractors

received millions of francs for services never rendered, and that a part of the French press

had been subsidized.” Work on the canal was suspended indefinitely, and the de Lesseps

operation disbanded in the wake of highly publicized French court proceedings.

Scandal and high costs were hardly the only things that derailed the work of de

Lesseps, however. No plans had even come near anticipating the true cost of creating the

canal, and the natural obstacles that would come to stymy construction. John Bigelow, an

American lawyer who visited the project to appraise the effort stated, “There probably

was never a more complicated problem- a problem embarrassed by a larger proportion of

uncertain factors… Every step is more or less experimental.” Where the de Lesseps team

had dealt with hot temperatures before with the Suez Canal, they were not prepared for

high temperatures paired with the near constant 98 percent humidity of Panama.21

Medicine had not yet established the connection between mosquitos and disease, which

caused yellow fever to ravage the ranks of both laborers and engineers. Hospitals were

provided for medical treatment, yet they came to exacerbate the problem, as they lacked

20 Miner, 24.21 McCullough, 130.

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mosquito nets.22 Hospital beds were set in pans of water that proved excellent spawning

pools for mosquitos.23

Figure 1: The Canal and Transit24

The American press, meanwhile,

reignited interest in the canal. In 1898, the

U.S.S. Oregon had to make a lengthy trip

around the horn of South America in order

to defend against the Spanish in the

Caribbean. This 8,000 mile trip was highly

publicized, and it became apparent that a

canal would have the added benefit of

being a valuable asset for national defense,

giving the Americans a much faster means to move their navy from the Pacific to the

Caribbean and vice-versa.25 The American public spotlight again shined on the prospect

of building a canal, and now that de Lesseps had made a dent in the excavation for the

canal, many analysts inside the U.S. government thought that now was the time to finish

what the Europeans had begun.

With the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt

suddenly became President of the United States. Roosevelt’s fervor and popular support

would make an American Panama Canal a reality.26 Even in his early years in the Senate,

22 Smith, N. 2011. "Classic projects: the Panama Canal." (Engineering & Technology 6, no. 8), 112.23 Haskin, 9.24 HowStuffWorks, The Panama Canal created a shortcut from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, 2009, jpeg image, 2012. http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/panama-canal.htm25 Haskin, 10.26 Collin, Richard H. Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: the Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American context. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 12.

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Roosevelt had been a staunch proponent of an isthmian canal. In his first message to

Congress, Roosevelt spoke of the canal that, “no single great material work which

remains to be undertaken on this continent is of such consequence to the American

people.” Roosevelt envisioned the canal as the keystone to becoming the greatest naval

power in both the Pacific and Atlantic. With the acquisition of the Philippines, Roosevelt

was convinced that America had to become a veritable naval power, and without a

isthmian canal under America’s control, that would be impossible.27

However, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still stood between Roosevelt and an

American Panama Canal. He immediately ordered Secretary of State John Hay, a carry-

over from the McKinley administration, to re-negotiate a more favorable treaty with the

British. Britain was as hesitant as ever to allow the United States total control over the

prospective canal, but after Hay removed a clause providing for American fortification of

the canal, the British ambassador signed the new treaty. Another clause in the treaty

provided that the United States would be given the power to protect against “lawlessness

and disorder” throughout the canal, which was interpreted by Roosevelt as still giving

America the ability to fortify the canal. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty now gave the United

States the ability to build and operate an isthmian canal without any British interference.28

With the financial failure of de Lesseps, the French government took control of all

assets pertaining to his canal project. However, both Congress and Roosevelt were not

interested in purchasing the French assets, instead preferring to build the canal in

Nicaragua. It was thought that the French government would only sell the equipment and

property of the de Lesseps project for a price too great to be practical to the Americans, at

27 McCullough, 254-256.28 Ibid., 258.

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109 million dollars. However, representatives of the French government later met with

the American canal commission in February of 1902, giving a price of only 40 million

dollars. Surprisingly, this was almost exactly the appraised value of the equipment and

property. Unfortunately, the findings of the American canal committee were not made

available to congress before the House had passed a vote to go ahead with a Nicaraguan

canal. The Senate amended the bill, moving the prospective canal location to Colombia.29

As preparations were made to go forth with building the Panama Canal,

negotiations with the Colombian government hit another snag. The Colombian Vice-

President kidnapped the President of Colombia and “locked him in an insanitary prison,

where he died.” This unforeseen regime change prompted the Colombian Congress,

which was regarded as a puppet for any Colombian sitting President, to reject outright

their treaty with the United States regarding the canal. The Colombian government made

a counter-offer in which they would allow the canal to go forward only if the United

States would assist Colombia in putting down the revolution brewing in Panama. These

Panamanian rebels “felt that they had the same sort of grievance against Colombia that

the people of the American colonies felt they had against England in 1776.” 30

Panama, which was once an independent state following the expulsion of the

Spanish, had decades ago received an invitation posed by the Colombians “to put itself

under the Government there with the understanding that it was to retain its sovereignty”.

The Panamanian people considered their state too small to function meaningfully alone,

and accepted in earnest. However, the Colombian government came to ignore the

Panamanians and didn’t allow any Panamanian representation in the Colombian

29 Ibid., 266-269.30 Ibid, 234-236.

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government. Eventually revolts occurred, and Panama claimed independent statehood

repeatedly, but each time they did so the Colombian government cracked down on the

revolution. As the Panamanians became aware that their land was ripe for canal-building,

they made every effort to entice nations to build a canal in Panama, as doing do would

give Panama a tremendous resource and power all nations in the region lacked. If the

United States chose Nicaragua to build a canal, Panama would surely fade back into

obscurity.31

Meanwhile, in late 1904, America picked up where the French lad left off, and

began their own construction efforts. Of the 300 over million dollars the French spent on

excavation, approximately 30 million of excavation work was available to the

Americans.32 A dedicated effort was made to not repeat the mistakes of the de Lesseps

group. The Americans realized, as de Lesseps did in hindsight, that the greatest challenge

to overcome was not excavation, or building the canal itself, but doing combat with the

mosquito population. It was now fully realized that Yellow Fever spread through

mosquito bites, and President Roosevelt appointed a chief sanitary officer for the project,

whose job it was to prevent the spread of Yellow Fever. Over 2 million dollars per year

was set aside to operate hospitals, 16 million square yards of mosquito-laden brush was

burned, and a million square yards of swamp was drained away. 150 million gallons of

mosquito oil, which stopped mosquitos from growing by preventing their larva from

breaking the surface of water, was dispersed per year throughout the canal operation.33

While the Americans worked, however, the question of Panamanian sovereignty festered.

31 Ibid., 238-242.32 Ibid., 243-246.33 Haskin, 115.

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An engineer from the de Lesseps group, Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, met with

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay, urging them to support the cause of

Panamanian independence. With the density of the Panamanian forest, it was apparent

that the only means Colombia had of doing real combat with Panama would be by sea.

The superiority of the American Navy could easily prevent a Colombian Navy force from

landing troops in Panama. Convinced that Colombia would not make war with Panama

while under the protection of the United States military, and that the new Panamanian

government would be very conducive to American diplomacy, Roosevelt endorsed

Panamanian independence. In November of 1903, American gunboats stood off the shore

of Colón and Panama City while Panama formally declared its independence. If the

American Navy were not standing by, “the Republic of Panama would not have lasted

more than a week.”34 The new Panamanian government quickly ratified a treaty giving

the United States unhindered access to its territory, and the United States was free to

continue work on the canal.

A multitude of factors led to the successful American construction of the Panama

Canal. Firstly, the inevitability of a canal being created in the Central American isthmus

made it only logical for the United States to attempt to become first to build the canal.

The reduction in time traveled from the American East to West coast, from 13,000 miles

to 5,200 miles in sea travel from San Francisco to New York City, made it a valuable

asset for both economic as well as military means. America could now not only see a

benefit in decreased cost of moving naval assets, both commercial and military, but it

could now charge a fee for vessels entering the canal, and bar access, if needed, to any

ships as it saw fit.

34 McCullough, 370-378.

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American progress towards construction of the canal was also greatly furthered by

the threat of a European power constructing a canal first. American interest, both of the

public and the government, increased greatly as the threat of another nation or group

constructing a canal before the United States became real. When Britain began taking

control of territory needed for the canal, the United States sprung into action and took

measures to stop Britain. Citing the Munroe Doctrine, the prevailing American attitude

was that Europeans should be barred completely from imperial affairs in the Western

hemisphere.

However, the American government made a number of follies that unnecessarily

added to the time before it built the Panama Canal. Firstly, the policy reversal in

Cleveland’s Presidency, to be content with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, halted progress

towards canal construction. Later, America was blindsided by the sudden prospect of the

de Lesseps group starting a canal, and its lack of foresight and intelligence regarding the

de Lesseps project left Congress and the President scrambling for answers. The single

factor that contributed to the amount of time it took for America to build the canal,

though, was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Not realizing the implications of giving Britain

an equal share of a prospective canal prevented the United States from going forward

with canal construction for nearly half a century.

Additionally, the leadership of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay

allowed for the canal to finally be constructed, after a half century of delays. Roosevelt’s

determination to construct an American Canal, paired with Hay’s shrewd diplomacy

skills, allowed the United States to overcome the restraints of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty

and circumvent British desire to have some sort of claim to the canal. Roosevelt and Hay,

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set on building the canal in Nicaragua, left themselves open to debate, and their open-

mindedness allowed America to build the canal in Panama, where the de Lesseps group

had already made progress. Noting the failures of the de Lesseps group, Roosevelt took

the necessary action to ensure that America did not make the same mistakes in building

the canal. During the disputes between Panama and Colombia, Roosevelt decisively

chose to support Panama, which allowed America to enter into a favorable treaty with

them and eventually be able to build and finish the canal.

Ultimately, America completed the canal in 1914.35 From the Spanish realization

that a manmade canal must exist, to its eventual completion, the Panama Canal was a

veritable point of international contention. As time passed, each American presidency

gave a different perspective to the issue, ending with Roosevelt’s decisive action that

made the canal to be built in America’s hands. Generally, Congress, the State

Department, and the President echoed each other’s sentiments on the issue, and no branch

of the American foreign policy machine presented a serious encumbrance regarding the

canal. The Panama Canal, through the multitudes of factors that eventually ended in its

creation, was a success in American foreign policy. One can only ponder the implications

if Britain or Spain had actually finished the canal before the United States could.

35 Haskin, 3.

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Bibliography

Collin, Richard H. Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: the Panama Canal, the Monroe

Doctrine, and the Latin American context. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

University Press, 1990. Print.

Figure 1: HowStuffWorks, The Panama Canal created a shortcut from the Atlantic

Ocean to the Pacific, 2009, jpeg image,

<http://history.howstuffworks.com/american-history/panama-canal.htm>

Haskin, Frederic J. The Panama Canal. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co.,

1913. Print.

McCullough, David G. The path between the seas: the creation of the Panama Canal,

1870-1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. Print.

Miner, Dwight Carroll. The Fight for the Panama route; the story of the Spooner act and

the Hay-Herran Treaty. New York: Octagon Books, 19661940. Print.

Smith, N. 2011. "Classic projects: the Panama Canal." Engineering & Technology

(17509637) 6, no. 8: 112-113. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed

December 1, 2012).

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