Tobacco Industry PAC Contributions & U.S.

Congressional Activity

Saint Louis UniversitySchool of Public Health

Prevention Research Center

Douglas Luke, Ph.D.Missy Krauss, MPH

Study Aims• Examine the effect of tobacco industry

(TI) PAC contributions from 1993-2000 on U.S. Congressional voting activity from 1997-2000.

• Determine if the effects of TI contributions differ by political party.

• Discuss policy implications of these findings.

Sample & Timeframe

• Senators & Representatives from 106th Congress who participated in > 25% of tobacco-related votes (N=527)

• Timeframe– All contributions from 1993-2000

– All bills from 1997-2000 (N=49)

Data Sources

• Tobacco Bills– Project Vote Smart, Public Citizen,

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids

– Congressional Quarterly, Thomas, CIS Congressional Universe

• TI PAC Contributions– Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids

– Federal Election Commission

Example Bill - 1 2000 House Bill 4635, Roll Call 293

Waxman (D-Calif.) amendment that would allow the Veteran’s Administration to transfer medical care funding to the Justice Department for use in government lawsuits against tobacco companies.

Pro-tobacco vote: No Amendment rejected 197-207 (R 34-

173; D 162-33)

Example Bill – 2 1998 Senate Bill 1415, RC 143

Kerry (D-Mass.) motion to table (kill) Ashcroft amendment. The Ashcroft amendment would strike all provisions from the bill concerning an increase of tobacco taxes.

Pro-tobacco vote: No Motion approved 72-26 (R 27-26; D 45-

0)

Tobacco PAC Contributions1993-2000

# (%) Receiving

Contributions Mean ($) Median ($) U.S. House of Representatives Democrats (n=211) 122 (58%) 8,677 500 Republicans (n=224) 175 (78%) 16,189 9,000 All Representatives (n=435) 297 (68%) 12,545 4,000 U.S. Senate Democrats (n=41) 18 (44%) 6,057 0 Republicans (n=51) 45 (88%) 22,004 17,812 All Senators (n=92) 63 (68%) 14,898 7,000 Combined All Members (n=527) 360 (68%) 12,956 4,500

Pro-Tobacco Industry Votes1997-2000

Mean (%) Median (%) SD (%) U.S. House of Representatives Democrats (n=211) 25.1 20.0 23.7 Republicans (n=224) 79.8 88.9 19.5 All Representatives (n=435) 53.3 60.0 34.9 U.S. Senate Democrats (n=41) 10.6 10.3 10.2 Republicans (n=51) 72.3 78.4 16.4 All Senators (n=92) 44.8 45.5 33.8 Combined All Members (n=527) 51.8 59.4 34.8

AL

AK

AZ AR

CA

CO

CT

DEDC

FL

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

MI

MN

MS

MO

MT

NE

NV

NH

NJ

NM

NY

NC

ND

OH

OK

OR

PARI

SC

SD

TN

TX

UT

VT

VA

WA

WV

WI

WY

Avg. Tobacco Contribution ($K)

30 to 60 (5)13 to 30 (13)

7 to 13 (16)2 to 7 (12)

-0.2 to 2 (5)

Average Tobacco PAC Contributions to Congress Members - 1993 to 2000

AL

AK

AZ AR

CA

CO

CT

DEDC

FL

GA

HI

ID

IL

IN

IA

KS

KY

LA

ME

MA

MI

MN

MS

MO

MT

NE

NV

NH

NJ

NM

NY

NC

ND

OH

OK

OR

PARI

SC

SD

TN

TX

UT

VT

VA

WA

WV

WI

WY

Avg. Pro-Tobacco Vote %

0.75 to 1 (9)0.6 to 0.75 (13)0.4 to 0.6 (10)0.25 to 0.4 (12)0 to 0.25 (7)

Average Pro-Tobacco Vote Percentage by Congress Members - 1997 to 2000

0 20 40 60 80 100

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Relationship of Contributions to Voting by Party

Total PAC Contributions ($K)

Pro

-Tob

acco

Vot

es (

%)

DemocratRepublican

Rationale for Multi-Level Model

• Congress members not independent, clustered by state

• ICC = 0.27, indicating that state differences account for mor than 25% of the variability in voting behavior

• Multi-level models allow inclusion of important state-level predictors

HLM Model of Voting Behavior

Parameters & Test Statistics Multilevel Model Coefficient SE t Ratio p

Mean Pro-Tobacco Vote (%) Intercept, 00 .1460 .0159 9.20 .000

Acres, 01 .0022 .0003 6.56 .000

Political Party (0=D,1=R) Intercept, 10 .5634 .0227 24.81 .000

Acres, 11 -.0011 .0004 -3.10 .004

Total Contributions ($K) Intercept, 20 .0091 .0017 5.28 .000

Acres, 21 -.0000 .0000 -1.52 .134

Party X Contributions Intercept, 30 -.0056 .0019 -2.92 .006

Acres, 31 .0000 .0000 .467 .642

Simple Model Summary

• Interpretation– Political party is largest factor

– Contributions, and CxP interaction are strongly significant after controlling for political party, state, and state tobacco acreage

• Predictions– E[Democratic Voting %] = .15 + .0091(Contributions)

– E[Republican Voting %] = .71 + .0035(Contributions)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

HLM Bayesian Estimated Regression Linesfor 50 States by Political Party

Tobacco Industry Contributions ($K)

Pre

dic

ted

Pro

-To

ba

cco

Vo

ting

(%

)

DemocratsRepublicans

Summary

• Confirms previous research on influence of TI contributions and importance of political party

• TI gets bigger ‘bang for their buck’ with the Democrats

• Policy implication – we need to work closely with our political allies to ensure that TI political contributions are kept to a minimum