TOA EOA SCOA MDW FOA DOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II Theory of Op...

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• Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II• Theory of Theory I & II• Theory of Op Art I & II

• Intellectual Context I, II & III• Theory and Culture• Chinese Military Theory• American Military Theory

• Systems Theory I & II• Theory of Irregular War• Civil War Violence• Political Geography• Theory & Planning

• Campaign in America, 1776• Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign• Mexico City, 1847• Moltke & Franco-Prussian

War

• Doctrine and Theory after Civil War

• Philippines, 1899-1902• Meuse-Argonne 1918

• Interwar Operational Art• NW Europe: OVERLORD• NW Europe: COBRA/

GOODWOOD• Eastern Front, 1944

• Philippines, 1945 I & II• Korea (Oct50-Mar51)• Vietnam Escalation• Cambodia, 1970

• 1973 Arab Israeli War• AirLand Battle• Nixon’s War

• From Desert 1 to Defense Reform• US Policy Process• US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:

The Founders

• Perspectives on IR Theory• Alliances and Institutions• IR: Special Topics

• Pol-Economy: Cold War• US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama• Pol-Economy: Base Force• Post-Gulf War Army

• StratComs vs. Smart Power• Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning• Contemporary Strat Guidance• Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c

• Justice of War and Justice in War

• Justice in War: Civilians on the Battlefield

• Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas

• Justice in War: Emerging Technologies

• Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees

• Intro to ADM I-III • Understand Op Env I-III • Understand Op Problem I-IV • Develop Op Approach I-III • Practice ADM I-IV

• Context for Future• Scenario Planning• Past Futures

• Deter and Defeat Aggression• WMDs and Deterrence• Theorizing TOA

• Stability and COIN Ops• Providing a Stabilizing

Presence• Design of Op Art

• Humanitarian Missions• Space and Cyberspace• Strat Context of and

Evolutions of Op Art

• Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare

• AirSea Battle and Power Projection

• DARPA and Beyond

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Ex • Intro (River Crossing) • Deploy/Employ (Haiti)• Staff Ride (Vicksburg)• Practicum (Arab -

Israel ‘73)• MSTP (Amphib Asslt)

• Campaign Planning Ex (SWB)

• Capstone

TOA• Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II• Theory of Theory I & II• Theory of Op Art I & II



Block 1:T101: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory I- Maclean, Norman. Young Men & Fire T102: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory II- Maclean, Norman. Young Men and Fire - Reynolds, Paul Davidson. A Primer on Theory Construction - Clausewitz, Carl von. On War T103: Theory of Theory I- Gaddis, John Lewis. The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past T104: Theory of Theory II- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions T105: Theory of Operational Art I- Schneider, James J. Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of the Operational Art - Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory - Swain, Richard M. "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army." - Kelly, Justin and Mike Brennan, “The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art,” T106: Theory of Operational Art II- Harrison, Richard W. Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson. - Isserson, G.S. “The Evolution of Operational Art,” - Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.

Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 1 (Lessons 101-106)Action: Analyze scientific method and theory development

Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on theory, method, military theory, and operational art

Standard:• Explain the characteristics and practical usefulness of theory• Describe the scientific method and principles of theory development• Assess the similarities and differences between methods used in the humanities and the social sciences• Analyze the processes of normal science and scientific revolutions• Describe the early development of the theory of operational art in the Soviet Union and the U.S. Army

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)

Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in planning for and conducting operational art

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T102) Paul Davidson Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction (TOA)Scientific knowledge must provide: 1. A method of organizing & categorizing things (typology), 2. “Predictions” of future events, 3. Explanations of past events, 4. Sense of understanding about causal relationships, 5. Potential for control (indep. Variables) Desirable characteristics of scientific knowledge: 1. Abstractness (independent of space and time) 2. Intersubjectivity (Agreement about meaning among relevant scientists) 3. Empirical relevance (can be compared to “known” evidence)

T103) John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History (TOA) History ≠ prediction, but helps to broaden experience/knwlge base Present as a singularity (funnel from past to future)History is scientific: reality, representation, persuasion Try not to be reductionist; work w/lmted generalizations, contingent causation, sim’s over modeling; trace processes to known outcomes. Fractals: patterns can be found, even in chaotic systems Immediate, intermediate, distant causes (diminishing relevance) Exceptional vs. general causes (PH attack example) Particularization of generalizationHistory studies phenomena w/which it can’t interact; embraces complexity and enables pattern recognition w/o singular causes.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (TOA) T104) Paradigm: Universally recognized scientific evidence/action (law, theory, application & instrumentation) that provides models that create new traditions of scientific research. 2 essential characteristics: Sufficiently unprecedented & open-ended. Paradigms change a group into a profession set rules, starting pt, etc. Paradigms start with an anomaly, which is explored, leading to an adjusted theory; can be factual (inductive) or theoretical (deductive). Remember: not all scientific (or military) knowledge is cumulative; when things are disproved, they can be thrown out and replaced with new knowledge.

T104) James Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil” (TOA) Am. CW marks departure from classical strategy & mvmt twd op art. Post-CW to WWI: Evolution of empty battlefield (more lethal wpns but lower casualty rates = strgth of the defense) IOT overcome defense, needed to develop MNVR tactics (3rd dimension) “OA characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed ops” OA greatly enabled by RR: logistics, mvmt w/in theater; fresher troops. Structure of OA: 1) Distrib. ops (various battles in time & space w/single aim), 2) Distrib campaigns (no single decisive battle), 3) Cont. logistics, 4) Instantaneous C2, 5) Op’ly durable formations, 6) Op’l vision, 7) Works best against similarly distrib. enemy, 8) Distrib continuous deployment.

T105) Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (TOA) Increase in scale of battles required new level of war in 1800s = Op’l Art Questions for Op’l planners: 1. In what way does this differ from strat.& tact. Levels? 2. How do we ID op’l problems? 3. How to differentiate bw practical aspects of OA and cognitive aspects of OL? 4. How do we justify an op’l level of war? Answer: Use a systems approach; look at components & whole systemCriteria for op’l acts: 1. Cognitive tension bw strat & tact, 2. Based on mnvr & dynamic interaction, 3. Synergy, 4. Aim should be disruption of ENY systems, 5. Contemplate choas, 6. Non-linear, 7. Acct for interaction bw mnvr & attrition, 8. Independent entities, 9. Relate to univ. theory.




Block 2:T107: Intellectual Context I- Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.T108: Intellectual Context II- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War.- Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War.- Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War.- Calhoun, Mark. “Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory.”T109: Intellectual Context III- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War.- Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War.- Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War.T110: Theory and Culture- Lynn, John A. Battle,- Porter, Patrick. Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western EyesT111: Chinese Military Theory- Ames, Roger T., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare.- Griffith, Samuel B., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of WarT112: American Military Theory- Linn, Brian McAllister. The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War. - Echevarria, Antulio J. II. “American Operational Art, 1917-2008.”

Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 2 (Lessons 107-112)Action: Assess military theory in terms of its cultural and intellectual context

Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on military theory and operational art in its cultural and intellectual context

Standard:• Describe the impact of intellectual context on theory development• Analyze the relationship of theory to culture and their influence on the practice of warfare• Describe ancient Chinese military theory in the context of its cultural influences• Assess the past and present state of American military theory• Evaluate the applicability of military theory in a context different from that within which it arose



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Clausewitz Book 2 “On the Theory of War”: Major characteristics of war: 1) Moral forces & effects, 2) Positive reaction (though unpredictable), 3) Uncertainty of information. Theory is a study, not a doctrine. War isn’t art or science; part of man’s social existence. Historical examples can: 1) explain an idea, 2) apply an idea, 3) support a statement, or 4) be deduced for doctrine (most difficult is #4 – details!) Better to study one campaign in depth than many shallowly – you learn more by digging into the details about successes and failures.

Clausewitz scholars (TOA) Antulio Echevarria: Cl’s aim was to bring the spirit of inquiry to the subject of war; connection b/w 8 books = dynamic relat. b/w purpose and means; Form matters as much as content; the essence of war is violence = center of Cl’s trinity. Mark Calhoun: Uses Reynolds’s criteria to assess J and Cl’s theories; Concl: J = didactic manual for conduct of war; Cl: unifying theory to increase CDR’s judgment, but must be understood in contextAlan Beyerchen:: Seeking exact analytical soln’s doesn’t fit nonlinear reality of war; sensitive to starting conditions; relat. to chaos theory

John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (TOA) Warfare practices aren’t evolutionary, but are driven primarily by culture, and secondarily by technology; military culture reflects civilian life. Discourse vs. Reality: D: Ideal war, nat’l interests, last resort, WIN, short wars, state-on-state, “exit strategy,” decisive battle R: Non-state actors, info warfare, ill-defined boundaries, messy & lengthy, non-decisive, economic impacts, risk aversion vs. “risk-all”

Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare William Griffith vs. Roger Ames (TOA) General principles: Know self, enemy, terrain CDR must have ch’I (character, moral courage) and ho (harmony)Hsing: Strategic positioning enabling victory before battle Shih: Strat. advantage of releasing all latent energy in concentrationYin-Yang: complimentary opposites; do what ENY won’t expect. Warfare is the art of deceit; high importance of intel Griffith trans: (1950s): focused on Sun Tzu’s possible history & intent in writing (systematic treatise to guide generals); influence on MaoAmes trans (1980s): More descriptive; possibility of 2 Sun Tzu’s; war tied to eastern philosophy

Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle (TOA) The way an Army fights is determined by they way it thinks about previous wars, interprets curr. threats, and anticipates future wars Three schools of thought: 1. Guardians: War plans = engr project; using art & science to predict consequences (Colin Powell). 2. Heroes: War = struggle for intangible martial virtues; flexible, innovative thinking; neg. view of scient. knowledge & civ. pop. (Patton). 3. Managers: War = running a corporation; when we fail, it’s time to reorganize; need best wpns, educated professionals IOT win wars. (Marshall). All three schools exist simultaneously, w/ strengths & weaknesses, to create Army’s way of war.




Block 3:T113: Systems Theory I- Bousquet, Antoine. The Scientific Way of Warfare.T114: Systems Theory II- Osinga, Frans. Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. T115: Theory of Irregular War- Daase, Christopher. “Clausewitz and Small Wars.”- Heuser, Beatrice. “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War.”- Schmitt, Carl. Theory of the Partisan- Biddle, Stephen. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.”T116: Civil War Violence- Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War.T117: Political Geography- Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa.T118: Theory and Planning- Mintzberg, Henry. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994).- Dolman, Everett Carl. Pure Strategy

Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 3 (Lessons 113-118)Action: Demonstrate the ability to evaluate critically various forms and uses of military theory

Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on theory, method, military theory, and planning

Standard:• Evaluate the applicability of traditional military theory within the current operational environment• Describe the relationship of American military theory to technology and systems theory• Describe the emergence of ideology as a component of military theory and modern warfare• Analyze theories of political geography and civil war violence and their relevance to planning for military action in complex contingencies• Assess the relationship of military and systems theory to planning and strategy development



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Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare (TOA) Warfare practices reflect the dominant body of scientific ideas within that timeframe (NOT a causal argument; analogy/metaphor)1. Mechanistic (Clock): Cause & effect; Enlightenment; Frederick the Great’s “war machine”; gunpowder2. Thermodynamic (Engine): Responsive to change; conservation of energy; entropy; Clause was clock/engine amalgam (Clock: COG, Mass; Engine: Fog, friction, complexity, rejection of linearity) 3. Cybernetic (Computer): Info = opposite of entropy; importance of feedback loops4. Chaoplectic (Internet): develop. of ORSA; overreliance & simplification led to failure in Vietnam (McNamara)

Boyd’s OODA Loop (TOA) Understand this diagram

Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (TOA) Why is violence prevalent in some cities during CW and absent in other seemingly similar ones? Violence is less about collective emotions, ideologies, and culture, and more a process taking place bc of human aversion to homicidal violence. Violence is rational if it has purpose; strat. & tact; can obtain compliance. Control = deciding factor in estab/maintaining collaboration; must be gained through discriminate violence. 3 zones of control: Incumbent, Insurgent, & contested control Prop 1: level of control = level of collaboration, rate of defection Prop 2: Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in CW. You don’t know who’s collaborating w/ENY unless you have some level of control; that’s why we fight in contested zones to gain control.

Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (TOA) Major issues for building states: 1. Cost of expanding dominant pwr infrast, 2. Nature of nat’l boundaries, 3. Design of state system. Africa’s current state is NOT based on colonialism; sovereignty issues pre-date colonialism Africa ≠ Europe: land is abundant, so wars are fought more for people or treasure NOT territory Actual “rule” only effective IVO cities and capitols, not in hinterland. Wars mostly internal = lack of nationalism and tax base Post-colonial theme = firm boundaries with weak internal control. Alternatives to current int’l state system: 1. Look at Africa regionally, 2. Decertify nonfunct’l states, 3. Recognize new nation states (ala Balkans)

Mintzberg’s Concept of Strategy (TOA) Understand this concept

Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy (DOA) Tacticians look for solutions; strategists look for continuous progress (diff. perspectives. Complexity is an attempt to understand the chaos; deal with systems of indep but interrelated parts where inputs ≠ outputs; must try to avoid overly disruptive inputs (over correction – Dorner). Chaos & Complexity = biggest influence on modern war/OA (net-centric) Quantum physics – prediction much easier at tactical level than strategic We work mostly in complex, adaptive systems – no final state & in state of perpetual flux (Does this negate the Element of OA for End State?)

E101: Course Introduction- Carl von Clausewitz, On War- ADP 3-0- ADRP 3-0, Chapter 4- Bruscino, “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations”- JP 3-0, Ch 1, 2, 5A, 5B.E102: The Campaign in America: 1776- Fischer, Washington’s CrossingE103: Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign- Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War - Chandler, The Campaigns of NapoleonE104: Mexico City, 1847- Johnson, A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign - Scott, “Vera Cruz and Its Castle”E105: Moltke & Franco-Prussian War- Wawro, Franco-Prussian War: German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.

Terminal Learning Objective (TLO) Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of operational art.

EOA


War







OBJECTIVES• Understand Op’l Art and Op’l Level today and since Clausewitz• Revisit Clausewitz’s: classical strategy, campaigns, theaters of

operations, marches, supply, terrain, lines of operation and communication, offense, defense, and culminating point.

• Use Clausewitz and contemporaries to set theoretical foundation for campaign analyses throughout EOA.

• Practice campaign evaluation methods: MC, Elements of Op Art

• British operations in 1776 are the standard for understanding campaign art at end of 18c, prior to Napoleonic warfare: included ground and naval components, a mix of regular and guerilla forces, and coalition warfare on both sides.

• For our classical theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz, Napoleon’s wars were never far from their minds. The 1806 war between France and Prussia, a classic example of large-unit operations in a conventional environment.

• Scott’s campaign demonstrated joint aspects, logistics and intelligence, and synchronized conventional and pacification operations.

• Battle of Königgrätz (1866): best example of military commander and politician terminated a conflict and restored the political dialogue. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1): German military victory did not immediately translate to political victory. A stubborn defense, an uprising in Paris, a hybrid war in the countryside nearly broke up Bismarck’s coalition.

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E106: Doctrine and Theory after Civil War- John Bigelow, Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American

Campaigns- Arthur L. Wagner, Strategy: Lecture by Col Arthur L. Wagner, Asst Adjt-

General, U.S.A., to Officers of Regular Army and National Guard at Maneuvers at West Point, Ky., and at Fort Riley, Kansas, 1903

- Matthew F. Steele, “The Conduct of War,”E107: Philippines, 1899-1902- Ramsey, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in

Philippines, 1900-02- Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Philippine War, 1899-1902 E108: Meuse-Argonne 1918- American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and

Battlefields in Europe, 1992 - Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918



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War







OBJECTIVES• Late 19c American theorists studied Civil War and other

American wars, Napoleonic Wars, and German Wars of Unification. Understand their perceptions of operational dilemmas.

• American intervention in Philippines, beginning with end of conventional fight with insurrectionists and continuing through declared end of insurrection in 1902. Explore Op art in a counterinsurgency or counter guerrilla war

• WWI, US suffered at Cantigny. After several months of supporting operations and smaller offensives, Pershing assaulted Metz and German frontier at end of Sep1918. Meuse-Argonne was largest campaign in American military history. This lesson investigates this operation's design.

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E109: Interwar Operational Art- Matheny, Carrying War to Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945E110: NW Europe: OVERLORD- Pogue, The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command- D’Este, Decision in Normandy E111: NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD- Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,- D’Este, Decision in Normandy E112: Eastern Front, 1944- Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped

Hitler- Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East



EOA


War







OBJECTIVES• The origins, building blocks, and thought processes behind

American doctrine, education, and planning in interwar period, and how that led to American concept and understanding of op’l art.

• 1. How allies understood problem, visualized end state, and described it to subordinates. 2. German plan to defeat Allied invasion: High Command’s vision of how to defend western coast and how subordinates implemented vision.

• Branches and sequels: when successful, not successful, or enemy surprise? E.g., Commonwealth unable to capture Caen b/c German defenders dominate terrain. American advance delayed b/c Wehrmacht infantry and armor master defense in bocage. German perspective, defense continued despite Allied aircraft dominating airspace b/c reinforcements continued to arrive. Unable to destroy Allies on beach, limit Allied advance to narrow enclave. As V1 and V2 rockets attack England, jet aircraft and better tanks enter battle, still hope that Allied invasion would progress no farther. Focus on what happened, and what should have happened.

• Soviet operations in spring/summer 1944. German Army effectively shattered and only capable of conducting op’l delay. How did that happen? What was Soviet operational art? Understand specific campaign, nature of Soviet op’l art, and its influence on development of U. S. Army doctrine in the 1980s.

E113: Philippines, 1945 I - Smith, Triumph in the Philippines – U.S. Army in World War II - Sixth U.S. Army, “Report of Luzon Campaign”- Reports of General MacArthur: Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific E114: Philippines, 1945 II- Smith, Triumph in the Philippines – U.S. Army in World War II - Sixth U.S. Army, “Report of Luzon Campaign”- Reports of General MacArthur: Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific E115: Korea (Oct50-Mar51)- Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North E116: Vietnam Escalation- Cosmas, MACV : Joint Command in Years of Escalation, 1962-1967E117: Cambodia, 1970- Shaw, Cambodian Campaign: 1970 Offensive & America’s Vietnam War


TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO) Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.

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War







OBJECTIVES• Discuss strategic setting, command structure at national and

theater level, resource allocation, and course of Philippines campaign to end of 1944. Prepare a single, integrated and synchronized, joint (SAL) op’l approach for lodgment on Luzon.

• Discuss follow-on op’ns to Luzon landings. Address a review of op’ns, any potential or real points of departure from plans, decision-making that went into (or should have gone into) those departures, ease or difficulty in deviating from plans in general, and role of strategy in op’l reframing.

• Understand relationship between policy, strategy, and operations: What guidance did Pres Truman and UN Security Council give to MacArthur? How did MacArthur, as an operational commander, coordinate forces under his direction? How did he anticipate and respond after Chinese intervention? How did 8th Army conduct this period of war?

• Explore escalation in Vietnam to see intersections of strategy and operations in a conflict with simultaneous conventional and COIN elements.

• Balance b/t COIN and conventional ops, changing strategic guidance, Vietnamization, and evolving (or devolving) American forces in Vietnam. How did commanders arrange tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic objective in 1970?

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E118: 1973 Arab Israeli War- Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory- Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991E119: AirLand Battle- FM 100-5 (1976)- FM 100-5 (1983)- Bronfeld, “Did TRADOC Outmanoeuvre the Manoeuvrists? A Comment,”E120: Nixon’s War- Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam

Lost Its War


TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO) Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.

EOA


War







OBJECTIVES• This conflict ended hostilities along Egyptian-Israeli Border,

and cemented gains along Israel-Jordan border, Israel has been involved in almost constant conflict with several Palestinian nationalist organizations. Victory did not bring lasting peace. Conduct and outcome of conflict largely depended on client state’s relationship with sponsoring superpower, US and USSR, and other interested parties, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Lesson examines op’l approach of three main participants in a war that influenced America military development and Op Art in last decades of 20c.

• US Army engaged in deep reflection on where it stood in world. Result was formal introduction of operational level of war and Op Art into Army thinking and doctrine. Lesson revisits major doctrinal publications of post-Vietnam era to discuss complex intersections of history, theory, institutional culture, strategic context, and doctrine.

• Discuss operational problems attendant to ending wars, and what lessons of past say about conflicts of present and future.

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S101: From Desert 1 to Defense Reform- Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Spec Ops as Instrument of US Foreign Policy- Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders,”- Roman and Tarr, “Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness”- MacKubin Owens, “Hollow Promise of JCS Reform,”S102: US Policy Process- McDougall, Const’l History of U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years of Tension in

Twilight Zone- Federalist Papers

- No.10: “Union as Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection”

- No.15: “Insufficiency of Present Confederation to Preserve the Union” - No.24: “Powers Necessary to Common Defense Further Considered” - No. 51: “Structure of Government Must Furnish Proper Checks and

Balances between Different Departments”- No.69: “Real Character of Executive”

- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (2011), Chapter II, Section A- Hammond, “Development of Nat’l Strategy in Executive Branch: Overcoming

Disincentives”- Lord, “Crisis Management: A Primer”S103: US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders- Herring, From Colony to Superpower- Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: Economic Foundations

of Military Power”

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES• Analyze impact on Op Art of:

• Past/present American statecraft• Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships• Analyze strategy and strategic culture

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO) Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art

OBJECTIVES• Explore dynamics of Op EAGLE CLAW and its reverberations in

years that followed. This period help us understand worldview of men and women who served since that time.

• McDougall surveys executive & legislative tension over foreign policy. Does JP 5-0 reflect an idealized process or not? Hammond & Lord discuss how executive develops policy and strategy.

• Understand US foreign policy tradition and American practice of political economy in early Republic. Provides background for subsequent discussion of IR theory and tendency to lump American statesmen into camp of realists versus idealists.

SCOA• From Desert 1 to Defense Reform• US Policy Process• US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:

The Founders




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S104: Perspectives on IR Theory- Thucydides, “Melian Dialogue,”- Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,”- Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,”- Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and rebuilding Order after

Major Wars- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic HistoryS105: Alliances and Institutions- Walt, “Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power,”- Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Order

after Major Wars- (Theory)

- Lake, “Beyond Anarchy: Importance of Security Institutions”- Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”

- (European Practice) - DeVore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and British and

French Responses to 1991 Gulf War”- Techau, “No Strategy, Please, We’re German—Eight Elements that Shaped

German Strategic Culture”- (Asian Practice):

- Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia”- Nam, “Relocating US Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging

Partnership in Changing Defense Posture”S106: IR: Special Topics- Brodie, “Anatomy of Deterrence”- Schelling, Arms and Influence- Freedman, Deterrence- Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism”




OBJECTIVES• Background on alliances, deterrence, and state power in int’l

arena. Understand realist, liberal int’list, and constructivist schools. Proto-realist Thucydides “coercive diplomacy.” Snyder: overview. Jervis, Gray, and Ikenberry provide extra depth.

• Alliance theory and perspectives of trad’l allies. After WWII, Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Asst, NATO, Aus-NZ-US, and bilateral alliances in Asia. NSS 2010: “Start point for collective action will be with other countries” based on relationship b/t US and close friends/allies in Europe, Asia, Americas, Middle East”

• Deterrence and compellence: Brodie and Schelling are classics. Freedman: Cold War strategy about nuclear weapons and deterrence, critiques contemporary concepts. Kroenig and Pavel discuss approach to deterrence of terrorism. Deterrence supplanted strategy in national security. NMS 2011 discusses deterring terrorism and nuclear weapons: “preventing war as important as winning, so deterring nuclear attack on US, allies/partners is role of US nuclear weapons.” “Adapt deterrence to countering extremists: difficult, but they make cost/benefit calculations and depend on states and others we can influence.”


The Founders




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S107: Pol-Economy: Cold War- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations- Truman:

- NSC 68- Gaddis and Nitze, “NSC 68 and Soviet Threat Reconsidered”- Fatua, ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, Korean War &Creation of Cold War Army

- Eisenhower- NSC 162/2- Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: Coherent Use of Military Power in War and

Peace- Bacevich, “Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and

Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-55”S108: US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama

- Herring, From Colony to Superpower- Leffler, “9/11 and Past and Future of American Foreign Policy- Obama: "Address Accepting Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway“- Lizza, “Consequentialist: How Arab Spring remade Obama’s Foreign Policy

S109: Pol-Economy: Base Force- Jaffe, Development of Base Force 1989-92- Rothmann, “Forging New National Military Strategy in Post-Cold War World:

Perspective from Joint Staff”- Brown, Kevlar Legions: Transformation of US Army, 1989-2005S110: Post-Gulf War Army- Brown, Kevlar Legions: Transformation of US Army, 1989-2005- JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations- Angstrom and Widen, “Adopting a Recipe for Success: Modern Armed Forces and

Institutionalization of Principles of War,”




OBJECTIVES• Understand intersection b/t political economy & nat’l strategic

guidance (SCOA 9 &13). Two appreciations of political economy (“grand strategy”) in Cold War. After WWII, Truman demobilized and converted US industry for domestic needs thru balanced budget & reduced defense budgets. After Korean War, Truman’s NSC 68 rapidly mobilized based on Keynsian economics. Ike’s NSC 162 focused US defense on “long haul” Cold War with USSR.

• Establish broad context for discussions of political economy, military affairs, smart power, and strategic culture.

• By late 80s, Carter/Reagan military buildup contributed to budget deficits. End of Cold War, Bush reduced military expenditure b/c 1989/91 and not sustainable. CJCS Powell’s Base Force for post-Cold War (political economy and strategy). Jaffe: Powell‘s attempt to shape future defense. Rothmann: J5 formulation of NMS 1992 to complement Powell’s Base Force. Kevlar Legions: how US Army coped with Cold War end.

• Understand how inst’l Army adapted to ‘90s financial and op’l demands. Includes first iteration of JP 3-0 and history of principles of war to better understand current doctrinal debates.


The Founders




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S111: StratComs vs. Smart Power- Armitage and Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power- Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of

Policy in 21st CenturyS112: Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning- Strachan, “Lost Meaning of Strategy”- Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and Strategic Way of Thinking”- Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam”- McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned”- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Decade of War, v.I: Enduring Lessons from

Past Decade of OperationsS113: Contemporary Strat Guidance- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning- Kugler, New Directions in US National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and

Diplomacy: Review of Official Strategic Document- Panetta, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense- Dempsey’s Address at Duke UniversityS114: Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic History- Freedman, “Escalators and Quagmires: Expectations and Use of Force”- Lake, “Limits of Coercive Airpower”- Strachan, “Strategy and Limitation of War”




OBJECTIVES• Juxtapose smart power and hard power. Use of ideas and

information as power. Lesson builds on “power” (SCOA 4/5). 21c nature of power & use of force (SCOA 14).

• Understand lesson learning, strategy and strategic theory. Mahan: Art of War rests on a few principles and application to history… when principles and precedents mastered, student is ready to begin. After WWII, FM 100-5 included Pearl Harbor lessons; after ‘54, lessons dropped. SCOA 1: lessons of Ops EAGLE CLAW and URGENT FURY on ‘80s Defense Reform. SCOA 11: principles of war—ultimate lessons learned. Currently, Afghan and Iraq lessons. Do we learn lessons? Who learns lessons, people or institutions? How are right lessons determined? Are we at beginning of our labors? Strachan & Owens provide perspective on current understanding of strategy; subsequent readings ask which lessons should be learned for future strategy.

• Builds on SCOA 2, US policy process and development of strategy within executive branch and SCOA 7, 9, and 12 on political economy and strategic thinking. Basis for FOA strategic guidance . Does everything work as JP 5-0 process charts suggest? How do we understand strategy in 21c?

• Brodie believed atomic-bomb/tech-revolution threatened to make war unlimited and absolute. Gen Smith believed West accepts limits on warfare. Consider utility of force as a member of profession of arms and Op’l Artist.


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M101: Justice of War and Justice in War- Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration- McCreedy, “Ending the War Right: Just Post Bellum and Just War Tradition”M102: Justice in War: Civilians on Battlefield- Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical IllustrationM103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas- Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing

Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan- Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New StoryM104: Justice in War: Emerging Technologies- Arkin, “Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems”- Tonkens, “Case Against Robotic Warfare: Response to Arkin”- Strawser, “Moral Predators: Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”- Galliott, “Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles and Asymmetry Objection: Response to

Strawser”- Dipert, “Ethics of Cyberwarfare”- Cook, “‘Cyberation’ and Just War Doctrine: Response to Dipert”M105: Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees- Gillman and Johnson, Operational Law Handbook- DiMeglio, Law of Armed Conflict Desk Book- Gillman and Johnson, Law of Armed Conflict Supplemental- Sadat, “Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under

International Law”

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES• Analyze moral dilemmas re

• “justice of war” and “justice after war”• posed by presence of COBs (justice in war)• faced by commanders in war (justice in war)• emerging technology presents in war (justice in war)• PoWs and detainees on battlefield (justice in war)

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO) Judge the moral implications of operational actions in war.

OBJECTIVES• Evaluate moral constraints and moral implications of op’l actions

in war using theory and history to evaluate moral dilemmas in war. Three theories: justice of war -in war; and -in peace.

• Analyze moral arguments for justice of war and justice after war; explain moral justification for war.

• Analyze moral dilemmas posed by presence of civilians in war• Analyze moral arguments of British and Americans for

firebombing German and Japanese cities in WWII; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.

• Analyze moral arguments for and against using autonomously manned systems in war; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.

• Analyze moral and legal arguments re PoW and detainee rights; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.

MDW • Justice of War and Justice in War

• Justice in War: Civilians on the Battlefield

• Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas

• Justice in War: Emerging Technologies

• Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees

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D401: Intro to ADM- ADRP 5-0. Ch 2. Pay particular attention to Value of Planning (p2-1) & ADM (p2-4)- TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 CDR’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, Ch 1 & 2- Gregor, William. “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations”- Evans, “Centre of Gravity Analysis in Joint Military Planning and Design:

Implications and Recommendations for the Australian Defense Force”- Adamson, An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. D402: Intro to ADM- Swain, “Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design.” Op

design is commanders business and all successful commanders practice it.- Schoen, Educating the Reflective Practitioner. Ch 2, 4, 5, 7. Modern world needs

reflective practice; difference in educating applied practitioners and theoretical scientists; pay attention to reflection in action and reflection on action.

- Lawson, How Designers Think. Ch 1, 6, 7. Design in architecture. Model of design problems in ch6.

D103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas- Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing

Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan.- Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New Story.D104: Intro to ADM-

OBJECTIVES• Explain: doctrinal explanation of ADM and relationship to military

planning; ADM development; and ADM key components. • Describe purpose, use and audience of ADM and MDMP; what is

narrative construction and its purpose; is a Frame the same as a theory; explain reframing and provide historical example

• Purpose of commander’s appreciation and campaign design; what are products; explain how complexity, complex adaptive systems, and ill-structured problems are important to Cdrs; explain how discourse, narrative, and systemic understanding support commander’s appreciation; understanding of problem frame; how does commander’s appreciation link to detail planning?

• What are benefits and limitations of various approaches discussed by Gregor? Importance of formal methods of analysis; importance of evidence; Difference and purposes of inductive and deductive approaches?

• Describe Swain’s definitions of design and planning, why do op’l design, describe his design methodology, why lead design, and what are links b/t Op Art and design?

• Schoen, explain: reflection in action; reflection on action; importance of reflective practitioner; why design before knowing what to do; importance of dialogue between coach and student?

• Lawson, explain: design is noun & verb; drawing is important to design; purpose for & military equivalent of presentation-, production- & design-drawings; how model of design problems helps mil-planners think about op’l environment; how mil-planners use design problems, solutions, and process?

DOA • Intro to ADM I-III • Understand Op Env I-III • Understand Op Problem I-IV • Develop Op Approach I-III • Practice ADM I-IV

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TOA EOA SCOA MDW FOA DOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II Theory of Op...

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Transcript of TOA EOA SCOA MDW FOA DOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II Theory of Op...